p "Don’t idolise private business capital,” exclaims Mr. Tikhomirov on his return from one of his philosophical-historical excursions; "the more so as there still remains the great question whether such capital will be able to do for Russia even that" (!) "which it did for Europe. Our present condition differs considerably from that of the European countries at the moment when they began to organise national production on the basis of private capital. There the private businessman was provided with extensive markets and encountered no particularly terrible competition. But we have absolutely no markets and in everything he undertook the private businessman encountered insuperable competition from European and American production.” ^^155^^

p All these arguments of our author are again not his, they are borrowed from Mr. V. V. But, without going into their genealogy, let us examine how serious they are. Here again we are faced with a difficult and thankless task—that of unravelling the "lost unbelievable muddle of facts and concepts.

p First of all, we ask Mr. Tikhomirov why he attacks “private” business capital and does not mention other forms of the same business capital. Why does he, to use Rodbertus’ expression, prefer blondes to brunettes? Does he think "that state business capital in the hands of the Iron Chancellor is better than private capital in the hands of Borsig or Krupp?

p Or is he opposing private business capital to the same capital belonging to workers’ associations? Why, in that case, did he not make the reservation that his sympathy for business capital not belonging to private individuals extends only to one variety of that capital? And indeed, can one have sympathy for this variety without new and very substantial reservations?

p German^^156^^ Social-Democracy demands state credit for workers’ associations, but it knows by experience that these can be successful, i.e., not degenerate into exploiters of other people’s labour, only on condition that they are strictly controlled on the basis of socialist principles. Workers’ socialist parties can and must be representative of such a control. Thus, whoever speaks of state credit for workers’ associations either speaks of strengthening the influence of the workers’ party or suggests a measure capable of resulting in splitting the proletariat and strengthening the influence of the bourgeoisie or the government. Mr. V. V. is not afraid of the latter outcome, and that is why he fearlessly addresses his projects of reform to "the existing authority”. Mr. Tikhomirov is one of the irreconcilable enemies of absolutism and at the same time is very sceptical of the possibilities of a bourgeois regime and a workers’ socialist party coming to exist in our country. Hence his plans for the institution of workers’ industrial associations—plans, however, about which we can only make surmises, thanks to his confused terminology—belong to the more or less distant future when the "seizure of power by the revolutionaries" will be "the startingpoint of the revolution”. As we shall have a lot to say about this seizure and its possible consequences, we will not stop here to consider the conditions under which Russian workers’ industrial associations can promote the cause of socialism. Now, however, having pointed out to Mr. Tikhomirov his lack of clarity and definition in the economic terminology, let us go on to his historical contrasts.

p There would be no doubt, if the formulation were at least tolerable, that "our present condition differs considerably from that of the European countries at the moment when they began to organise national production on the basis of private capital”. Any schoolboy knows that no two facts in the whole of history have been accomplished under exactly identical conditions; it is therefore not surprising that every historical period in each 199 country "differs considerably" from the corresponding period in any other country. But as a consequence of this, we may say a priori that the stereotyped contrasting of Russia with the “West” loses all human meaning if it is not accompanied by a number of reservations, amendments and additions, since by Western Europe we mean not one single country but many greatly differing ones. Mr. Tikhomirov sees no necessity for these additions. He contrasts the "present condition of Russia" with the “moment” in the history of "the European countries when they began to organise national pruduction on the basis of private capital”. But not to mention that one cannot "organise national production on the basis of private capital" and that complete anarchy, i.e., the absence of any organisation, is a characteristic feature of "national production" in capitalist countries; forgiving Mr. Tikhomirov these blunders in logic and terminology, we will ask him whether the foundation of capitalist production was laid at a single “moment” "in the European countries”. Were there not, on the contrary, just as many “moments” as there were "European countries" engaging on the road of capitalism? And if so, did not those historical " moments" differ “considerably” one from another? Was the beginning of English capitalism like the beginning of capitalism in Germany? As far as we know, it was by no means alike, so unlike that at one time in Germany, too, the opinion was held that the country completely lacked the conditions for developing large-scale manufacturing industry and would have to remain for ever an agrarian country. Those who held that opinion based it on the very fact that the “present” condition of Germany "differed considerably”, etc. What has Mr. Tikhomirov to say about this question in general and about these false prophets in particular?

p In the pamphlet Socialism and the Political Struggle I spoke of those Russian writers who are supporters of the geographical school founded by the Jewish boy in Weinberg’s story. "Russian writers, propagandists of exceptionalism,” I wrote, "introduced only one new thing into that clever geographical classification of the poor schoolboy: they divided ’abroad’ into East and West, and, not stopping long to think, began to compare the latter with Russia, which was ascribed the role of a kind of Middle Empire.” When I wrote those lines it did not even occur to me that such absurdities could be repeated in a publication edited, incidentally, by P. L. Lavrov. Now I see that Lavrov’s co-editor is among the followers of the Jewish boy and heaps together, in a “moment” of some kind “imagined” by himself, quite a number of highly complicated and “considerably” different historical plenomena. Vestnik Narodnoi Voli was 200 apparently fated to disappoint the expectations of its readers in many, many respects!

p In this case, however, there is an attenuating circumstance for Mr. Tikhomirov. He was led into his mistake by the conviction that in "the European countries" at a historical “moment” with which we are already familiar "the private businessman was provided with extensive markets and encountered no particularly terrible competition" whereas "we have practically no markets”. Were this correct, his contrast between Russia and the West would be sufficiently well founded. No matter how greatly the conditions under which capitalism arose differed in each of "the European countries”, they would have had in common one feature of the highest importance not repeated in contemporary Russia: the presence of "extensive markets" for the disposal of wares. This circumstance, which was favourable to "the European countries”, would have given a completely different colouring to the economic history of the West. The trouble is that Mr. Tikhomirov, or rather the author of the articles from which he derived his conviction, was cruelly mistaken. In the countries referred to, the private businessman was not provided with any "extensive markets" at all. The bourgeoisie created the markets, they did not find them ready-made.  In the feudal and handicrafts period which had preceded, not only were there no "extensive markets”, there were no markets at all in the modern sense of the word; at that time only surpluses were exchanged— what remained after the producers’ own consumption- and the handicraftsmen worked to order for a specified person in a specified locality, and not for the market. Nobody who has even the slightest understanding of the economic relations in the Middle Ages will dispute that. In the same way everybody, "even if he has not been trained in a seminary”, will understand that demand, and with it markets, could only appear side by side with production, as they were called for by the latter and in their turn called for it. "Most often, needs arise directly from production or from a state of affairs based on production. World trade turns almost entirely round the needs, not of individual consumption, but of production."  [200•*  But the modern, indeed “extensive”, world market is characterised precisely by the fact that not consumption calls forth production, but the other way round. "Large-scale industry, forced by the very instruments at its disposal to produce on an ever-increasing scale, can no longer wait lor demand. Production precedes consumption, supply compels demand."  [200•** 

p For brevity’s sake we may admit as indisputable that Western Europe encountered no "particularly terrible competition" during the period when capitalism arose, although the not unfrequent prohibitions of imports to "European countries" of Eastern industry’s products during that period show that indeed the manufactories in the West feared competition from Asia. But the "particularly terrible" rivals of West European producers were the West European producers themselves. This will cease to seem paradoxical if we remember that capitalism by no means began to develop at one and the same “moment” in the different "European countries”, as Mr. Tikhomirov thinks. When industrial development reached a certain level in one of those countries, when the representatives of capital attained such power and influence that they could make legislation an instrument to further their purposes, it turned out that "in everything he undertook the private businessman encountered insuperable competition" from neighbouring countries. Then agitation for state intervention began. The history of the seventeenth century with its tariffs, which were the object of diplomatic negotiations, and its trade wars, which necessitated colossal expenditures for those times, is a tangible proof of the enormous efforts that the "European countries" had to make to acquire the markets which are said to have been ready-made for them. It was a question not only of winning foreign markets, but of defending the home market too. Is there any need to illustrate by examples a history which seems to be generally known? Perhaps it will not be superfluous in view of the ignorance of our homegrown and exceptionalist economists. Let us begin with France.

p Colbert "saw that France was importing from abroad far more goods than she was exporting, that in spite of the existence of the Tours and Lyons manufactories, Italy was continuing to supply silk wares, gold and silver fabrics, and gold yarn; that Venice was getting millions from her annually for mirrors and lace; that England, Holland and Spain were supplying her with woollen goods, spices, dyes, hides and soap.... lie saw ... that the large companies and colonies which Richelieu had tried to set up were ruined and that all France’s sea trade was still in the hands of the English and the Dutch. In order to hinder this overrunning of French ports Fouquet had already placed a tax of fifty sous on every ton of goods brought in foreign ships and constant complaints from the Dutch proved to Colbert that his predecessor had dealt them a heavy blow. Such was the situation. Colbert set himself the aim of changing it in France’s favour, of freeing the country from all trade subjection 202 and raising it by industrial development to the level of the more prosperous nations”, etc.  [202•*  He set about the matter with such diligence that his direct intention was to “annihilate” Dutch trade by the 1667 tariff. "The English and Dutch countered in like manner, the tariff dispute was the occasion for the 1672 war, and finally, the Peace of Nymwegen^^159^^ compelled France to restore the 1664 tariff."  [202•** 

p We see that France was by no means "provided with" extensive markets, she had to win them by the appropriate economic policy, diplomatic negotiations and even arms. Colbert relied only on "time and great diligence”, thanks to which Francewould be able, he thought, to become "the teacher of the nations which had taught her lessons”. We know that France’s protection and prohibition policy did not end with the influence of Colbert any more than it had owed him its beginning. Not until after the Peace of Versailles^^160^^ did the French Government take the first step towards free trade in 1786. But this attempt did not favour French industry. By an agreement with England in 1786 each of the contracting countries imposed a duty of only 12 per cent of the cost price on woollen and cotton fabrics, porcelain, pottery and glass wares, of 10 per cent on metal goods—iron, steel, copper, etc.; flax and hemp fabrics were taxed according to the tariff fixed for the most favoured countries; but England, being able to produce these goods 30, 40, or 50 per cent cheaper than the French manufacturers, soon became the mistress on the French market. That was why in 1789 the electors almost unanimously demanded a more energetic protection of French industry. The governments of the Restoration and the July monarchy also adhered to a strictly protectionist tariff. To guarantee the sale of French wares the colonies were forbidden to trade with any country but the metropolitan country. Not until 1860 was there a turn in favour of free trade, but even this aroused great opposition in the country and was censured, incidentally, by Proudhon. Finally, as recently as 1877, fear of English competition moved the protectionists to form the "Association for the Protection of National Labour”. The 1882 tariff was a compromise between demands for protection and the desire for free trade displayed mainly by the representatives of commercial capital.  [202•*** 

p Such is the history of the "extensive markets" that were at 203 the disposal of the French capitalists. Has Mr. Tikhomirov heard of it?

p And what about Germany, to which our author is “referred” by "a certain section of the socialists"?

p Here matters stood no better. Here too, "in everything he undertook the private businessman" encountered "insuperable competition" from the more progressive countries. We know that the appearance of German capitalism was relatively recent. Not only in the last century, but even at the beginning of this, competition with France or England was out of the question for Germany. Let us take Prussia as an example. In 1800, Prussia absolutely prohibited the import of silk, semi-silk and cotton fabrics. In the preceding eighty years the government had spent more than ten million taler only on silk factories in Berlin, Potsdam, Frankfort on the Oder and Kopenick (from which Mr. Tikhomirov can clearly see that not the Russian Government alone displayed efforts to “organise” national production " according to bourgeois principles”). But French and English wares were so much better than the Prussian that the prohibition of imports was evaded by smuggling, which no severe legislative measures could stop. Napoleon’s victory deprived Prussia of the possibility of saving her manufactories by a “wall” of prohibitive tariffs. With the invasion by the French army, French goods began to glut the markets in the conquered territories. At the beginning of December 1806, the invaders demanded the admission of French goods at low customs tariffs to all parts of the territory occupied by French troops. In vain did the Prussian Government draw their attention to the local industry’s inability to hold out against competition from French manufacturers. It tried in vain to prove that the Berlin manufacturers had held their own only thanks to protection tariffs, with the abolition of which the population would be irremediably impoverished and the factory workers would be completely ruined. Bourgeois France’s victorious generals answered that the- import of French goods was the "natural result" of the conquest. Thus, side by side with the governments’ political struggle there proceeded the economic struggle of the nations, or more exactly of those sections of the nations in whose hands the means of production are still concentrated. Side by side with the struggle of the armies was the struggle of the manufacturers; alongside the warfare of the generals was the competition of commodities. The French bourgeoisie needed to gain control of a new market, and the Prussian bourgeoisie did all in their power to safeguard the market they owed to protection tariffs. Where, then, were the ready-made "extensive markets"? When, after the declaration of war in 1813, the Prussian industrialists were at last freed 204 from their French rivals, they found themselves faced by new and still more dangerous opponents. The fall of the continental system gave English goods access to the European markets. Prussia was glutted with them. Their cheapness made it impossible for the local producers to compete with them in view of the low customs dues imposed on goods from friendly and neutral countries. Complaints from the Prussian industrialists again forced the government to limit imports of at least cotton goods.  [204•*  From then on until this very day the Government of Prussia, and indeed of Germany as a whole, has not ventured to waive protective tariffs for fear of "insuperable competition" from more advanced countries. And if the Russian Blanquists seize power while Bismarck is still alive, the Iron Chancellor will probably not refuse to reveal to them the secret of his trade policy and will convince our journalists that "extensive markets" do not and never did grow on trees.

p Let us pass on to America.

p “In respect of industry the North American colonies were held in such complete dependence by the metropolitan country that they were to have no kind of industry except domestic production and the usual crafts. In 1750 a hat factory founded in Massachusetts so attracted the attention of Parliament and was the object of such jealousy on its part that factories of all kinds (in the colonies, of course) were declared common nuisances. As late as 1770 the great Chatham, perturbed by the first attempts at factory production in New England, said that not a single nail was to be made in the colonies."^^161^^ During the War of Independence, thanks to the rupture with England, "factories of all kinds received a strong impulse" and this, in turn, influenced agriculture and led to an increase in the price of land. "But as, after the Peace of Paris, the constitution of the states prevented elaboration of a general trade system and thus gave free access to English manufactures with which the newly built North American factories could not compete, the country’s industrial prosperity disappeared even more rapidly than it appeared. ’On the advice of the new theoreticians,’ a speaker in Congress said later, referring to this crisis, ’we purchased where it was cheaper for us and our markets were glutted with foreign goods.... Our manufacturers were ruined, our merchants went bankrupt and all this had such a harmful effect on agriculture that a general devaluation of land followed and as a result bankruptcy became common among landowners too.’"^^162^^

p Hence we see that a threat once hung also over American production, whose "insuperable competition" now threatens the Russian "private businessman”. What lightning-rods did the Americans invent? Were they convinced by this that their situation "differed considerably from that of the European countries at the moment when they began to organise national production on the basis of private capital"? Did they renounce large-scale industry? Not in the least. Taught by bitter experience, they merely repeated the old story of protecting the home market against foreign competition. "Congress was stormed by all states with petitions for protective measures favouring local industry”, and as early as 1789 a tariff was proclaimed making considerable concessions in this direction to local manufacturers. The 1804 tariff went still further along this path, and in the end, after a few vacillations in the opposite direction, the rigorous protection tariff of 1828 finally guaranteed American producers against English competition.  [205•* 

p Once more, where were the “extensive” markets that Mr. Tikhomirov speaks of? I completely agree that the course of development of West European capitalism which he indicates must be acknowledged as more “straight” and less “hazardous”; what risk does the "private businessman" run when he is "provided with extensive markets"? But Mr. Tikhomirov, on his side, must agree that he, or rather his teacher, “imagined” this course of development for the sake of a doctrine and that it has nothing in common with the true history of the West. The matter proceeds so differently there that Friedrich List even establishes a particular law according to which each country can come out in the struggle on the world market only when it has allowed its industry to strengthen by mastering the home market. In his opinion, "the transition of every nation from the wild state to that of herdsmen and from the state of herdsmen to that of tillers of land and the early beginnings in agriculture are best effected by free trade”. Then the "transition of agrarian peoples to the class of simultaneously agricultural, manufacturing and trading nations could take place under free trade only if, in all nations called upon to develop manufacturing power, one and the same vital process took place at one and the same time, if nations raised no obstacles whatsoever to each other’s economic development and if they did not impede each other’s success by ,war and customs systems. But as the nations which had attained superiority in manufactures, trade and navigation 206 saw that success as the most effective means of acquiring and consolidating political influence over other nations, they" (i.e., the advanced nations) "strove to set up institutions which were and still are calculated to guarantee their own monopoly in manufactures and trade and to prevent backward nations from succeeding. The aggregate of these institutions (import prohibition and customs dues upon imports, restrictions on snipping, premiums for exports, and so on) is called the customs system. Under the influence of the earlier successes of other nations, the customs system of foreign countries and wars, the backward nations find themselves forced to seek at home means for the transition from the agrarian to the manufacturing condition; they are obliged to restrict trade with the advanced countries— since it hinders that transition—by their own customs system. The latter is therefore by no means an invention of speculative brains, as some maintain, but the natural consequence of the nations’ desire to guarantee themselves lasting existence and progress or even dominating influence. But this wish can be recognised as legitimate and reasonable only inasmuch as it does not hinder the economic development of the nation displaying it, but, on the contrary, promotes it and does not contradict the higher aim of humanity—the future world confederation".  [206•* 

p These words are from Friedrich List, who understood well the interests of German capitalism in his time and whose only fault was a certain pompousness in the definition of the future "higher aims of humanity" which for the bourgeoisie boil down not to a "world federation" but to a fierce struggle on the world market. List was embarrassed neither by the accusation that his views were obsolete nor by the reference to the impossibility of Germany’s securing any favourable opportunities in the future struggle on the world market. To the first objection he replied that he was not at all an unconditional enemy of free trade, for he demanded only temporary restrictions of it, and at the same time stood for free trade within the limits of the German customs union. To the second he replied by criticising the very theory of markets, or rather the conditions of their acquisition. He pointed out that the backward countries may and must form alliances with one another to fight jointly their stronger enemies and that those backward countries must strive to acquire colonies of their own. "Every industrial nation must strive to have direct exchange with the countries in the torrid zone; if all second-rate manufacturing nations understand their own interests they must act in such a way that no nation can acquire overwhelming influence in respect of colonial 207 possessions."  [207•*  He supported the possibility of acquiring new colonies by pointing out that up to then a great number of convenient places in the torrid zone had not been utilised in this way by Europeans.

p At the time when List was agitating, many people doubted the possibility of a large-scale manufacturing industry being developed in Germany. Now nobody doubts this, but the programme of economic policy which he suggested has not yet been finally carried out. The question of acquiring colonies is only now being raised in Germany. Reality has surpassed his expectations. One part of his programme has sufficed to consolidate German large-scale industry.

p Not only does no sceptic now ask whether a large-scale manufacturing industry is possible in List’s country, but Mr. Tikhomirov "is referred" among other things "to Germany, where capitalism united the workers" and "private businessmen" are alleged to have been provided with "extensive markets”. How much that country’s first difficult steps on the road of capitalism have been forgotten! But is it a long time since List wrote? No more than half a century, no more than five times as long as the Russian Blanquists have been making fruitless efforts to "seize power”. What if Marx and Engels and their followers, convinced that the people must be taken "as they are" and that the German Communists of the forties still needed, to use Mr. Tikhomirov’s picturesque expression, "only to set about the creation of the class in whose name they wished to act”; what if Marx and Engels, I say, had given the “West” up as lost and decided that "the starting-point" of the social revolution in Germany had to be "the seizure of power" by the forces of the then existing Communist League? ^^163^^ What if they had directed all their work towards that aim? Would German SocialDemocracy have got far by now? And yet the question of such a "seizure of power" is by no means an exclusive feature of the Russian movement. It was raised even in the Communist League and caused its splitting into two groups: Marx and Engels on one side, Willich and Schapper on the other.

p The story of this division is so instructive that it is worth relating to the readers.^^164^^

p “Since the defeat of the 1848-49 Revolution, the party of the proletariat on the continent was deprived of all that it had during that, short period-freedom of the press, of expression and of association, i.e., the legal means of organising a party. After 1849, as before 1848, there was only one road open to 208 the proletariat—the road of secret societies.... The immediate aim of one section of those societies was to overthrow the existing state power. That was timely in France, where the proletariat had been defeated by the bourgeoisie and where attacks on the existing government were equivalent to attacks on the bourgeoisie.” Another section of these secret societies was working in countries such as Germany "where the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were both subjected by their semi-feudal governments, and where, therefore, a successful attack on the existing governments, instead of breaking the power of the bourgeoisie or of the so-called middle classes, had first to help them to power"—in such countries the progressive representatives of the proletariat, while not refusing to take part in the impending revolution, saw as their immediate aim not to seize power, but to prepare the working-class party of the future. Such, by the way, was the aim of the Communist League, in which Marx and Engels played the leading role. "The Communist League was not therefore a society of conspirators but a society which aimed at the secret organisation of the proletariat, because the German proletariat was under an interdict, was deprived of the fire and water, of press, expression and association.” It goes without saying that activity "which had in view the establishment not of a governmental but of an oppositional party of the future”, had exerted little attraction on people intellectually backward and impatient, and accordingly "a group broke off from the Communist League, demanding, if not actual conspiracies, at least a conspiratorial appearance and a direct alliance with the democratic heroes of the day”. The motives of this split, which many people ascribed to personal quarrels between the leaders of the two groups, were explained as follows by the very actors in these events.

p According to Marx, "the minority" (the Willich and Schapper group) "replace the critical outlook by a dogmatic one, the materialist by the idealist. They take their own will instead of the existing relations for the principal revolutionary motive force. Whereas we say to the workers: you must still pass through 15, 20, or 50 years of civil war and popular movements, and this not only to change existing relations but to re-educate yourselves and become capable of being the dominant party, the minority, on the contrary, say: we must win supremacy at this very moment or we shall be unable to do anything other than sit back and relax. Whereas we point out to the German workers the undeveloped condition of the German proletariat, you flatter the national feeling and estate prejudices of the German 209 craftsman  [209•*  in the vilest way, this, of course, being a far more popular method.... Like the democrats, you replace revolutionary development by revolutionary phrases”, etc., etc.

p Schapper, for his part, formulated his outlook as follows:

p “I did in fact express the outlook attacked here, because generally I support it with enthusiasm. The question is: will we start to chop off heads, or will ours be chopped off? First the workers in France will rise, then we in Germany. Otherwise I would, in fact, sit back and relax. But if our plans are fulfilled, we shall be able to take steps to guarantee the supremacy of the proletariat" (as Mr. Tikhomirov promises steps to guarantee "government by the people" for Russia, we will remark). "I am a fanatical supporter of this view, but the Central Committee" (Marx’s group) "wishes the opposite”, etc.

p This dispute took place on September 15, 1850, when the final break between the two groups occurred. Each of them set about its work. Willich and Schapper began to prepare to seize power, Marx and Engels continued to prepare the "oppositional party of the future”. Fifteen years went by and that "party of the future" became a threat to the bourgeoisie in all nations and countries; the views of the authors of the Manifesto of the Communist Party were assimilated by tens of thousands of workers. And what did Willich and Schapper do? Did they succeed in immediately "seizing power"? We all know they did not, but not all know that the same “fanatic” Schapper was soon convinced of the impossibility of carrying out his plans and even "many years later, a day before his death, when he was already on his death-bed" he could not speak of his unsuccessful ventures without "bitter irony".  [209•** 

Groups of the Willich-Schapper type are the natural result of undeveloped social relationships. They appear and may have a certain success as long as the proletariat is undeveloped and during its first attempts to achieve its emancipation. "The revolutionary literature that accompanied these first movements of the proletariat had necessarily a reactionary character,” as the Manifesto of the Communist Party says. When, under the influence of more highly developed relationships, a serious socialist literature is at last evolved in the more advanced countries, it is in part the object of more or less peculiar 210 counterfeits in countries which consider their backwardness as a sign of “exceptionalism”; and in part provides the occasion for incorrect interpretations and reactionary practical programmes. Not only in Russia, but in Poland too, and in the East of Europe generally, we now meet or may meet "social- revolutionaries" of the Willich and Schapper fashion.  [210•*  It goes without saying that the further development of the European East is discrediting their "expectations from the revolution" just as it discredited the expectations of Willich and Schapper in Germany.