p However, let us see with what criterion of truth we have to judge, for example, who is right: the “conservative” or the " liberal”. Let us suppose that it is a question of electoral rights. The “liberals” demand their extension. The “conservatives” are against it. Who is right? Richter says that both are right. Indeed, this is partly true. The “conservative”, from his point of view, is quite right; the extension of electoral rights would, generally speaking, be harmful to his interests, since it would weaken the political power of those of his own circle. The “liberal” is no less right from his point of view. If implemented, the reform of the 478 electoral system which he demands would strengthen the power of the social group he represents and thus enable him to promoteits interests better. But if everyone is right from his own point of view, is there really no sense in asking who should be judged more correct? Richter believes that this question is, in many cases, insoluble. That is not to be wondered at. Actually, he should have said that this question is insoluble in general, and not just fairly often. In his view, truth is relative only to the subject. Consequently the question of truth must be decided by him sceptically whenever the contesting subjects are each right from their point of view. But his decision is not binding on us. We consider that Richter’s criterion of truth is basically wrong. Therefore we argue differently.

p The “conservative”, from his point of view, is fully justified in opposing the extension of electoral rights.  [478•*  But what arguments does he advance against it? He asserts that it would be harmful^^1^^ to the whole of society. Here is the logical error made by the conservative who is right from his point of view: he identifies his own interests with the interests of society. And the “liberal”? Oh, h^ does exactly the same. He, too, identifies his interests with thoseof society. But if they are both wrong in one direction, it does not follow that they are both wrong to the same extent. In order to judge which of them is committing the smaller mistake, it suffices to determine whose interests are less at variance with theinterests of society. Is there really no objective criterion by which such a question could be solved? Will the historian never be ablfr to decide who was right in Russia on the eve of the peasant reform: the conservatives who did not wish to abolish serfdom (there were, of course, such people) or the liberals who sought for this change? In my opinion, the historian will have to record that the liberals were right, although they, too, did not forget their own interests at the time. The interests of their party wereless at variance with the interests of society than were the conservative interests. To prove this, it is sufficient to recall the harmful influence of serfdom on all aspects of social life at that time. History is the process of social development. In its development society finds advantageous all that promotes this development and rejects as harmful all that retards it. Stagnation was never useful to society. This incontestable fact provides the objective 479 criterion by which to judge which of the two disputing partiesis less mistaken, or not mistaken at all.  [479•* 

p It seems as though our author suspects nothing of this, becoming a sceptic where there is no sufficient reason at all for scepticism. He writes:

p “A motivation in favour of a cause with which we sympathise ’convinces’ us more than one differently oriented but no less conclusive. The instinct of life compels the urge for knowledge to serve it and obscures its view to such a degree that it cannot take cognisance of the logical isostheneia of arguments and counter-arguments. Otherwise, how would it be possible that, for example, in adopting a political position which theoretically presupposes a decision in respect of most delicate questions of sociology, political economy, ethics and the understanding of history, the parties by and large coincide with the social classes? Does the same solution of the questions raised occur, so to speak, by chance to people who by chance belong to the same circle?’ Their motives here are certainly not their motives. Just count the Social-Democrats among the aristocracy and the convinced conservatives among the factory workers, the supporters of the sharing out of fortunes among the capitalists and of the centralisation of fortunes among the poor! They all represent not the interest of truth, but of their own person (p. 179).

p Richter is vexed because people who belong to different classes defend their own interests, and not the interests of truth. But did he not say that truth always relates to the subject? Now he wants a truth which is independent of the subject. He is inconsistent. Further. The fact that the limits of acceptance’of varying political convictions, by and large, coincide with class limits is by no means an argument in favour of the sceptics’ principle of isostheneia. It proves only that being determines consciousness. It is only by grasping this truth that one is able to understand the course of development of the various ideologies. Richter is hopelessly bewildered by it. The reason for this is that it is difficult for anyone who does not take his stand solidly on the proletarian point of view to understand and fully assimilate this truth at the present time. Richter himself rightly says that the instinct of life often compels the need for knowledge to serve it and considerably obscures its view. He who is convinced that it is not consciousness that determines being, but being that determines consciousness, thereby recognises that the ideas formed and feelings experienced by a particular class in the period of its domination have at best the significance only of 480 temporary, transient truths and values. And it is not easy for one belonging to that class to realise this. That is why the best people of the modern bourgeoisie are more easily reconciled to the idea that the domain of disputed social problems is dominated by the sceptical principle of isostheneia than they are to the .assertion that the viewpoint of the class of "factory workers" is becoming the truth just when the viewpoint of the capitalists is ceasing to be truth.  [480•*  Richter, too, cannot reconcile himself to this idea. Hence his scepticism in social questions. The position of people of this way of thinking is a very unenviable one. Just as Buridan’s ass could not make up its mind which of the two bundles of hay to eat, neither can such people attach themselves to one of the two great classes of our time struggling with each other. This creates a special psychological mood, in which it is necessary to seek the explanation of all the trends now prevailing .among the ideologists of the upper classes: both the latest aesthetical theories to which Richter alludes and the subjective idealism with which he is infected. It is not consciousness that determines being, but being that determines consciousness.

This is what I thought it essential to tell the reader in recommending Richter’s interesting book to him. I am very sorry that the translators of this interesting book did not see the need for such a warning. However, the explanation for this is that they themselves are strongly influenced by those very ideologies which -spring from the psychological mood I have just mentioned.