p Richter’s inclination to extreme idealism in his teaching on the criterion of truth arises out of his inability to shed his idealist prejudices in the theory of cognition. According to him, it wouldfappear that truth for man is truth of some kind of secondary, lower category. Hence his recommendation that we should show “resignation”, that is to say, be reconciled with the impossibility of knowing higher truth, truth of the first category. 475 We have seen that his teaching on the criterion of truth must be rejected as utterly unsound. Truth is related not only to the subject but also to the object. That opinion of the object, which corresponds to its real state, is a true opinion. That which is true for man is also true in itself, precisely because a correct opinion truly depicts the actual state of things.  [475•*  Therefore there is no point in our talking of resignation.

p If we throw a man into the fire, he will be burnt; that is truth for him. And if we throw a cat into the fire? It too will be burnt. That is truth for the cat. Does truth for the man in this case resemble truth for the cat? They are as like as two peas! What does that mean? It means that truth for man has an objective significance that is not confined to the human race. Naturally, there are truths which are applicable only to the human race. These truths are the judgments that correspond to the actual state of all particular human feelings, thoughts, or relationships. But this does not affect the main point. The important thing is that true judgments regarding the natural laws are true not only for man, although man alone is capable of forming such judgments. Systematic cognition of the natural laws became possible only when "social man" emerged, having reached a certain level of mental development. A natural law which man has got to know is truth for man. But natural laws were operating on the earth before the appearance of man, that is to say, when there was no one capable of studying these laws. And only because these laws were operating at that time did man himself appear, bringing with him the systematic cognition of nature.

No one who understands this will accept, as Richter does, the legitimacy of that dose of scepticism which, he says, from the very first has been circulating in the blood of modern man. Modern man in a "certain social position" has indeed a good dose of scepticism. But this is adequately explained by the state of modern society.