p Indeed, and what exactly are these animal “utterances”? Let us leave the mammals, for instance, the donkey, who sometimes makes very loud “utterances” although not entirely pleasing to "our ears”; let us get down again to the level of the amoeba. I invite you, Mr. Bogdanov, to make a resolute “utterance” on this: can the amoeba "give utterance"? In my view, scarcely. But if it cannot "give utterance”, then, taking into consideration that the physical world is the result of utterances, we again reach this absurdity: when organisms were at the stage of development corresponding to that of the amoeba, the physical world did not exist. Further. Since matter enters into the composition of the physical world, which had not yet come into being in the period concerned, it must be acknowledged that the lower animals were immaterial, on which I congratulate with all my heart both these interesting animals and you, dear Sir!

p But why lower animals? Human organisms, too, belong to the physical world. And since the physical world is the result of development (“utterances” and so forth) we shall never and in no way avoid the conclusion that prior to the manifestation of this result human beings also had no organisms, that is to say, that the process of coordinating experience must, at the very least, have been started by creatures who were incorporeal. This, of course, is not had in the sense that human beings lose any reason to envy the 264 amoebas, but this can hardly be convenient for the “Marxism” professed by you, dear Sir, and those who think like you. In fact, while rejecting the materialism of Marx and Engels, you try to persuade us that you support their materialist explanation of history. But tell us, for the sake of Mach and Avenarius, can there be a materialist explanation of such history which is preceded by the "pre-historical life"... of incorporeal creatures?  [264•* 

p Later, when I come to analyse your theory of “substitution”, I shall have again to touch upon the question of what the human body is, and how this body originates. Then it will become as clear as crystal that you are “supplementing” Mach in the spirit of a distorted idealism. Just now, consider this. You think fit to deduce the physical, obective world out of people’s “utterances”. But where did you find these people? I assert that in recognising the existence of other people, you, dear Sir, are being frightfully inconsistent, and have knocked the feet from under your " utterances" in the domain of philosophy. In other words, that you have not the slightest logical right to repudiate solipsism. This is not the first time I have had to reproach you with this, Mr. Bogdanov. In the preface to your Book III of Empiriomonism, you tried toreject this reproach, but failed. Here is what you wrote in this regard:

p “Here I have to focus attention on yet another circumstance that is characteristic of the school: in the ’criticism’ of experience it regards intercourse between people as a previously given moment, - as a sort of ’a priori’, and in striving to create the most simple and most exact picture of the world, this school also has in mind the general applicability of this picture, its practical suitability for the greatest possible number of ’fellow-men’ for the longest possible length of time. It is already clear from this how mistaken Comrade Plekhanov is in accusing this school of a tendency to solipsism, to acknowledging only individual experience as the Universum, as the ’all’ that exists for the cogniser. The recognition of the equivalence of ’my’ experience and the experience of my ’fellow-men’, in so far as their experience is accessible to me by way of their ’utterances’, is characteristic of empiric-criticism. 265 Here we have something in the nature of an ’epistemological democratism’."  [265•* 

p It is obvious from this that you, Mr. "Epistemological Democrat”, simply did not understand the charge "Comrade Plekhanov" made against you. You regard the intercourse between people as a previously given moment, as a sort of "a priori”. But the question is: have you the logical right to do this? I denied it, but instead of advancing reasons for your claim, you put forward as proof that which has yet to be proved. An error such as this is called in logic petitio principii. You must agree, dear Sir, that petitio principii cannot serve as a support for any kind of philosophical doctrine.

p You continue: "It appears that out of all this school, the one whom our native philosophers suspect most of ’idealism’ and ’ solipsism’ is the true father of the school, Ernst Mach (who, by the way, does not call himself an empirio-criticist). Let’s see how he pictures the world. To him, the Universum is an infinite network of complexes consisting of elements that are identical with the elements of sensation. These complexes change, unite, disintegrate; they enter into various combinations, according to various types of connection. In this network there are what might be called ’key points’ (my expression), places where the elements are connected with each other more compactly and densely (Mach’s formulation). These places are called human ’egos’; there are less complicated combinations similar to them—the psyche of other living beings. Various complexes enter into the connection of these complicated combinations—and then they turn out to be ’experiences’ of various beings: then this connection is broken— the complex disappears from the system of experiences of the given being; it may then enter into the system anew, may be in a changed form, and so on. But, in any case, as Mach emphasises, this or that complex does not cease to exist if it disappears from the ’consciousness’ of one individual or another; it appears in other combinations, perhaps in connection with other ’key points’, with other ’egos’...."  [265•** 

p In this “utterance”, dear Sir, you again reveal with irrepressible energy a longing to lean upon petitio principii. Once more you accept as proven a basic proposition that has still to be proved. Mach “emphasises” that this or that complex does not cease to exist if it disappears from the consciousness of this or that individual. That is so. But what logical right has he to acknowledge that "these or those" individuals exist? That is the whole question. Yet in spite of all your verbosity, you give no answer^at all to this 266 basic question, and, as I said previously, you cannot furnish an answer to it so long as you cling to the views on experience that you have borrowed from Mach.

p What does this or that person, "this or that individual" represent for me? A certain "complex of sensations”. That is how your theory (i.e., of course, your teacher’s theory) explains it. But if, according to this theory, this or that individual is for me but a "complex of sensations”, the question arises: what logical right have I to assert that this individual exists not only in my perception, which is based on my “sensations”, but also outside my conception, that is to say, that he has independent existence quite apart from my sensations and perceptions? Mach’s doctrine on “experience” denies me this right. This doctrine lays it down that if I assert that other people exist outside myself, I pass beyond the boundaries of experience, I “utter” a proposition that is above experience. And you, my dear Sir, call a proposition that is above experience, or, to use your own exact term: met-empirical, a metaphysical proposition. So it turns out that you and Mach are metaphysicians of the purest water.  [266•*  That is very bad. But what is even worse is that, though you are a metaphysician of the purest water, you are quite unaware of the fact. You swear by all the gods of Olympus that you and your tutors, Mach and Avenarius, always stay within the orbit of experience, and from there you look down on “metaphysicians” with the greatest contempt. When reading your works, and also of course, the works of your teachers, one involuntarily recalls the Krylov fable:

p A Monkey in a mirror viewing form and face
Nudged with her leg a Bear who chanced near the place.^^169^^

p Not only do you violate the most elementary requirements of logic, but you make yourself extremely ridiculous by simulating the "critical attitude" of the monkey. If the Dauges, Valentinovs, Yushkeviches, Bermans, Bazarovs, and other long-winded wiseacres whose names are known to the Lord, if all this philosophical rabble (to use Schelling’s energetic expression) accept you as a more or less serious thinker (although not always agreeing with you), everyone who knows the subject, everyone who has studied philosophy not just in currently popular books, must smile ironically when reading your onslaughts on the “metaphysicians”, and repeat to himself the lines from the same fable:

p To count thy friends though thou dost yearn,
T’were better, gossip, on thyself thy gaze to turn!

p At any rate, you renounce solipsism. You admit the existence of ’“fellow-men”. I take note of this and say: if "these or those individuals" both exist in my perception and at the same time have separate being independent of my perception, then surely this means that they exist not only "for me”, but also "in themselves”. ""This or that individual" thus turns out to be but a particular case of the notorious “thing-in-itself”, which has created such a furore in philosophy. And what have you to say, honoured Sir, about the “thing-in-itself"?

p Among other things, this: "Each particular part of the complex may be lacking in our experience at the given moment, but we nevertheless recognise the ’thing’ for the very same as a whole complex would be for us. Does this not mean that all ’elements’, all ’features’ of a thing may be discarded, and it will still remain, not as a phenomenon, but as ’substance’? Of course, this is only an old error in logic. Pluck each hair off a man’s head separately, the man will not be bald; pluck all the hairs together, the man will be bald. Such is also the process by which ’substance’ is created, the ’substance’ which Hegel called, not without reason, the ’caput mortuum’ of abstraction. If all the elements of the complex are discarded, there will be no complex; nothing will remain but the word denoting it. The word—that is the ’thing-in-itself’."  [267•* 

p Thus the “thing-in-itself” is but an empty word, devoid of all content, a caput mortuum of abstraction, as you repeat after Hegel, whose name, however, you decidedly take in vain here. Well, I shall agree with you: after all, I am an easy-going " individual”. The "thing-in-itself is an empty word. But if this is the case, the individual "in himself" is also an empty word. And if an individual "in himself" is an empty word, these or those “individuals” exist only in my perception, and if so, “I” am quite alone in the world and ... inevitably arrive at solipsism in philosophy. Solus ipse! Yet you, Mr. Bogdanov, reject solipsism. How is it possible? Doesn’t it again follow that in the mouthing of empty, meaningless words it is precisely you, "above all”, who are guilty, and not other “individuals”? You crammed these empty words, devoid of all meaning, into a lengthy article which you entitled, as if in mockery of yourself: "The Ideal of Cognition”. An extremely lofty ideal!

p Speaking between ourselves, Mr. Bogdanov, you are entirely at sea in regard to philosophical matters. Therefore I shall try to explain my thoughts to you by means of a graphic example.

p You have probably read Hauptmann’s play: Und Pippa tanzt! 268 In Act II, Pippa, on regaining consciousness after a fainting spell, asks: "Wo bin ich denn?"  [268•*  To which Hellriegel replies: "In Meinero Kopfe!"  [268•** 

p Hellriegel was right. Pippa really did exist in his head. But the question now arises: was it only in his head that she existed? Hellriegel, who on seeing her thought he himself was delirious, at first assumed that Pippa did indeed exist only in his head. Of course, Pippa cannot agree with this and protests:

p "Aber sieh doch, ich bin doch von Fleisch und Blut!"  [268•*** 

p Hellriegel gradually yields to her argument; he places his ear against her chest (like a doctor, says Hauptmann) and exclaims:

p "Du bist ja lebendig! du hast ja ein Herz, Pippa!"  [268•**** 

p Now, what happened here? To begin with, Hellriegel had a "complex of sensations" which led him to think that Pippa existed only in his perception, and then a number of new “sensations” (heart-beats, etc.) were added to this “complex” and at once turned Hellriegel into a metaphysician in the sense in which you, Mr. Bogdanov, mistakenly use this word. He admitted Pippa’s existence outside the bounds of his “experience” (again in your meaning of the word, Mr. Bogdanov), that is to say, that she had separate existence quite regardless of his sensations. It is as simple as ABC.

p Let us .proceed.

p As soon as Hellriegel had recognised that Pippa had not been created by his sensations, combined in a certain way, but that his sensations had been sparked off by Pippa, he fell at once into what you, Mr. Bogdanov, not understanding what it is all about, call dualism. He began to think that Pippa existed not only in his perception but also in herself. Now, Mr. Bogdanov, perhaps you too have guessed that there is no dualism here at all, and that if Hellriegel had continued to deny Pippa’s existence in herself he would have arrived at that same solipsism which you so strongly and so vainly strive to disavow.

p That’s what speaking popularly means! Having used this example from Hauptmann’s play, I am beginning to think that I shall at last be understood even by many of those readers thanks to whom several editions of your “philosophical” works are dispersed over the broad face of the Russian land. What I say is extremely simple. All that is needed to understand me is a little effort.

0, children, learn your ABC,
ABC, and learn it right,
We shall all be happy,
When we can read and write!