7

p Volume III of G. V. Plekhanov’s Selected Philosophical Works contains material written by him mainly between 1904 and 1913. Most of the articles published in this volume are directed against idealism and especially Machism and god-building, against what Plekhanov called "the theoretical bourgeois reaction”. Plekhanov criticises and exposes the untenability and reactionary essence of idealist theories with great polemical skill. This volume contains: Fundamental Problems of Marxism (1908), in which Plekhanov expounds the philosophical principles of Marxism—dialectical and historical materialism; Materialismus Militans (1908-10), a criticism of Machian philosophy and a defence of Marxist materialism; On the So-Called Religious Seekings in Russia (1909), directed against the religious world-outlook of god-builders and god-seekers; the articles "Cowardly Idealism”, "Henri Bergson”, "On H. Rickert’s Book”, which criticise fashionable bourgeoisidealist trends in philosophy and sociology; a number of works on the history of West European philosophy, socialist teachings, the history of Marxist philosophy, and several other works.

p These were published by Plekhanov during the Monshevik period of his activities, which began at the end of 1903. At the beginning of the twentieth century, when the centre of the world revolutionary movement shifted to Russia and the first revolution under the conditions of imperialism took place there in 1905, Plekhanov proved unequal to the role of ideologist of the revolution. Ho disagreed with Lenin on fundamental issues of revolutionary theory and tactics. Plekhanov consigned the Marxist idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution to oblivion; he did not understand the significance of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, incorrectly assessed the role of the Russian bourgeoisie and failed to reveal its counter-revolutionary essence; he came out against the preparation and execution of the 1905 armed uprising, and declared after the December 1905 armed uprising in Moscow that the people should not have taken to arms. True, during the years of reaction Plekhanov fought the enemies 8 of the revolution, the liquidators of (he workers’ party. It was during this period I hat Lenin and the Bolsheviks considered it possible to form and, in facl, did form, a bloc on principle with the group of "pro-Parly Mensheviks" headed by Plekhanov. However, Plekhanov changed his position and, in 1914, went over entirely to opportunism and social-chain inism, opposing the socialist revolution in Russia. Plekhanov’s political dissidence and his transformation from a revolutionary and ideologist of the socialist revolution into a Menshevik and opponent of revolutionary Marxism may be explained primarily by his misunderstanding of the nature and peculiarities of the new historical epoch— the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. In* assessing new developments in the revolutionary struggle under the conditions of imperialism when the socialist revolution was on the order of the day, Plekhanov often drew analogies with the old bourgeois revolutions. He was unable to analyse creatively theoretical and tactical questions of the proletarian revolution in keeping with the new conditions of the imperialist stage of capitalism, when the proletariat and its Party, confronted by monopoly capitalism, required new forms and methods of struggle, great revolutionary organisation and creative initiative on the part of the masses, and a strengthening of the organising and leading role of the Party.

However, while sharing many of the defects and narrow political views held by the leaders of the Second International, Plekhanov at the same time differed from them in his critical attitude to the philosophical principles of bourgeois ideology. He waged a relentless war against all kind of bourgeois-idealist trends. Following the Russian revolution of 1905, when the counter-revolution was attacking on all fronts, including ideology, Plekhanov fought resolutely against the various manifestations of bourgeois ideology in philosophy, sociology, art, literature, and in other spheres of the cultural life of society. As Lenin said, Plekhanov combined in himself radicalism in theory and opportunism in practice. As sometimes happens, a change of his political views did not bring about an immediate, automatic, fundamental change of his philosophical world-outlook. Plekhanov, in going over to opportunism in the tactical field and having become a Menshevik, renounced revolutionary theory on such issues of scientiiic socialism as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the nature of the driving forces of the socialist revolution, the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, etc. But the political opportunism of Plekhanov the Menshevik could not but have an effect on his philosophical standpoint and led him to make a number of deviations from Marxist philosophy. Even then, however, Plekhanov remained a distinguished propagandist of Marxist philosophy, a fighter for the

9 materialist world-outlook, and even during this period he continued, although not always consistently, to defend the principles of Marxist philosophy and made a profound analysis of the basic issues of historical materialism.

p During the period 1904-13, he came out against the numerous enemies of dialectical and historical materialism, against the various trends of idealism, in order to protect the workers’ SocialDemocratic movement from the reactionary influence of the Machians, the god-builders, t lie god-seekers, and other representatives of idealism.

p Lenin valued Plekhanov’s struggle against revisionism and bourgeois-idealist philosophy highly, and attached great importance to his philosophical works in defence of dialectical and historical materialism.

p In the article "Marxism and Revisionism" (1908), Lenin wrote: "...the only Marxist in the international Social-Democratic movement to criticise the incredible platitudes of the revisionists from the standpoint of consistent dialectical materialism was PJekhanov. This must be stressed all the more emphatically since profoundly mistaken attempts are being made at the present lime to smuggle in old and reactionary philosophical rubbish disguised as a criticism of Plekhanov’s tactical opportunism.”   [9•*  It was not by chance that Lenin on a number of occasions recommended the study of Plekhanov’s philosophical works.

p Despite his opportunism in tactics, Plekhanov contributed much to the criticism of Machism, a variation of the idealist worldoutlook, and made particularly fierce attacks on the Russian leaders _ of Machism—Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, and others. In his’third letter to Bogdanov in Materialismus Militant,. Plekhanov wrote: "Those abroad who hold the same views as ourselves are very much mistaken in thinking, like my friend Kautsky, that there is no need to cross swords over that ’philosophy’ which is disseminated in Russia by you and similar theoretical revisionists. Kautsky does not know the relationships existing in Russia. He disregards the fact that the theoretical bourgeois reaction which is now causing real havoc in the ranks of our advanced intellectuals is being accomplished in our country under the banner of philosophical idealism, and that, consequently, we are threatened with exceptional harm from such philosophical doctrines, which, while being idealist to the core, pose as the last word in natural science, a science foreign to every met aphysical premise. The struggle against such doctrines is not only not superfluous, it is obligatory, just as obligatory as it is to protest against 10 the reactionary ‘revaluation of values’ which the prolonged efforts of Russian advanced thought have produced."  [10•*  However, Plekhanov’s fight against Machism was somewhat influenced by Menshevik factional interests. As a Menshevik, Plekhanov tried to link the Bolsheviks with Machism. Lenin was fully justified in writing: "Plekhanov in his criticism of Machism was less concerned with refuting Mach than with dealing a factional blow at Bolshevism.”   [10•**  But it would be a mistake to think—as Lenin often repeated—that Plekhanov, while being a Menshevik, did nol wage war on Machism and god-building, in defence of Marxist philosophy.

p It is interesting to note that Plekhanov, in a letter to F. I. Dan, on November 26, 1908, criticising the Machism of the Mensheviks Valentinov, Yushkevich, and others, wrote: "I did not at any time presume that ... we could go arm in arm in the legal press with Valentinov, Yushkevich, and other semi-Marxist scoundrels (don’t blame me for not expressing myself so sharply about them earlier—this has always been my opinion of them)—Write where you like, but make sure in advance that you give a wide berth to those who are bringing elements of heresy into Marxism. It is now time to cut adrift from the semi-Marxists Valentinov, Potresov, etc.... I do not think we should be more severe with Bogdanov than with Yushkevich on the grounds that the first is a Bolshevik and the second a Menshevik.... To me, heterodoxy from the Bolshevik camp is no whit worse than heterodoxy from the Menshevik camp.... I shun both."

p Plekhanov’s struggle against Machism, god-building, and other varieties of idealism was significant in the history of Marxist philosophy, and the allegation that, in combating Machism, Plekhanov simply wrote a few insignificant articles, is wrong. Plekhanov did not shun this struggle, but wrote a number of valuable works against Machian philosophy, in which he made a thorough criticism of the idealist views of the Russian Machians and their foreign mentors—Mach and Avenarius.

p Subsequently, in May 1914, Lenin wrote an article entitled: "Plekhanov, Who Knows Not What He Wants”,in which he said: "Among intellectualist anti-Marxist circles, among the flotsam of bourgeois democracy—this is where poor Plekhanov has accidentally landed. This is where you will find chaos, disintegration and tiny factions, which are opposing the unity achieved in the course of two years by thousands of workers’ groups of the Pravdist trend.

11

p “We are sorry for Plekhanov. Considering the struggle he waged against the opportunists, Narodiiiks, Machists and liquidators, he deserves a better fate."  [11•* 

p Plekhanov came somewhat late to the light against Machism, bul his action was nevertheless of the greatest importance. At that time, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, Yushkevich, Bazarov, and other Russian Machians were trying to conceal the open idealism of their views with all kinds of terminological devices and “new” words, such as "elements of the world”, etc. At the same time, they were hypocritically declaring themselves Marxists, who were “deepening” and “supplementing” the philosophy of Marxism with new principles. Actually, Machian idealist philosophy was the direct antithesis of Marxist philosophy. Plekhanov wittily ridiculed Bogdanov and his Machian philosophy which he was presenting as Marxist philosophy. "While not a Marxist yourself,” he wrote in his first letter to Bogdanov in Materialismus Militans, "you would like nothing better than that we Marxists should accepl you as our comrade.  You remind me of the mother in one of Gleb Uspensky’s stories. She wrote to her son, saying that since he lived a long way off and was in no hurry to see her, she would complain to the police and demand that the authorities send her son ’under escort’ for her to ’embrace’ him. Uspensky’s philistine, to whom this maternal threat was addressed, burst into tears whenever he remembered it. We Russian Marxists will not weep for such reasons. But this will not stop us from telling you quite bluntly that we wish to take full advantage of our right to dissociate ourselves and that neither you nor any one else {no matter who it may be) will succeed in ’embracing’ us ’under escort’."  [11•**  In the same letter to Bogdanov, Plekhanov wrote: "...You and / represent two directly opposed world-outlooks. And as the question for me is the defence of my outlook, you are, in relation to me, not a comrade, but the most resolute and irreconcilable opponent."  [11•*** 

p The Russian idealists—the Machians, following in the footsteps of their mentors Mach and Avenarius, considered that material bodies do not exist in the real world, objectively, independently of human consciousness, but only in human sensations and consciousness. Bogdanov, as Plekhanov pointed out, reiterated Mach’s proposition that it is not bodies that cause sensations, but complexes of sensations that form bodies. This old, hackneyed thesis had been formulated long since by Bishop Berkeley. Truly scientific, materialist philosophy, said Plekhanov, holds to other principles. "We call material objects (bodies) those objects that 12 exist independently of our consciousness and, acting on our senses, arouse in us certain sensations which, in turn, underlie our notions of the external world, that is, of those same material objects as well as of their relationships."  [12•* 

p The Machian interpretation of this question, i.e., of the comprehension of material phenomena as a complex of sensations, is the idealist standpoint and contradicts the basic conclusions of natural science. Bogdanov only “supplemented” Mach a little, and said of objective phenomena that these exist not in the individual human consciousness, but in the collective consciousness of people, whose opinions and ideas are socially-coordinated, and this is what underlies their experience. In Bogdanov’s opinion, the objectivity of the physical world is its universal significance, expressed by people’s identical opinions and ideas, by coordination among people. Proceeding from this, Bogdanov saw truth as the socially-organised and socially-coordinated ideological experience of men. None of this changes the essence of Bogdanov’s idealist views, because such a standpoint leaves untouched the main tenet of idealism, that material bodies and phenomena are sensations and not objective reality existing independently of the consciousness of people, of their experience. Plekhanov used the data and conclusions of natural science in subjecting this proposition of Bogdanov’s to annihilating criticism. "...We are aware,” he wrote, "that at one time there were no people on our planet. And if there were no people, neither was there their experience.  Yet the earth was there. And this means that it (also a thing- in-itself!) existed outside human experience.... The object does not cease to exist even when there is as yet no subject, or when its existence has already ceased. And anybody to whom the conclusions of modern natural science are not an empty phrase must necessarily agree with this."  [12•** 

p Plekhanov also sharply criticised the inconsistency of a number of idealists of the positivist trend, such as J. Petzoldt, who, assuming the existence of a world of things-in-themselves, independent of people, at the same time said that the world existed only for us. Nevertheless, J. Petzoldt finally came to the conclusion that the existence of an object independently of our minds is only its existence in the minds of other people. "Therefore,” Plekhanov wrote, "Petzoldt himself must be placed among the idealists. But his idealism does not acknowledge its own existence and is afraid of its own essence. This is unconscious and cowardly idealism."  [12•***  We have many such idealists among the positivisls of today.

13

p Plekhanov also severely castigated idealism and its variant, Machism, for its anti-scientific interpretation of space and time. "If space and time,” he wrote, "are only forms of contemplation (Anschauung) that I myself possess, it is clear that when I did not exist these forms did not exist either, that is to say, there was no time and no space, so that, when I assert, for instance, that Pericles lived long before me, 1 am talking arrant nonsense."  [13•*  Plekhanov argues that contemporary science has nothing in common with such views.

p In his struggle against Machism, Plekhanov dismissed the idealist theory of cognition advocated by Mach and his Russian disciples as untenable, and countered it with the scientific view on questions of epistemology. Moreover, Plekhanov proceeded from the materialist recognition of the objectively existing world. Man’s sensations and consciousness allow him to know real phenomena and objects, as a result of which “things-in-themselves” become “things-for-us”. Plekhanov wrote: "There is not and cannot be any other knowledge of the object than that obtained by means of the impressions it makes on us. Therefore, if I recognise that matter is known to us only through the sensations which it arouses in us, this in no way implies that I regard matter as something ’unknown’ and unknowable. On the contrary, it means, first, that matter is knowable and, secondly, that it has become known to man in the measure that he has succeeded in getting to know its properties through impressions...."  [13•** 

p But on this important issue Plekhanov deviated somewhat from the Marxist theory of cognition, towards agnosticism. In the theory of cognition Plekhanov committed an error along the lines of Helmholtz’s "theory of hieroglyphs”, when he maintained that impressions and sensations were conventional signs and not reflections or copies of things. This error was criticised by Lenin in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Yet, on the whole, Plekhanov held to the Marxist position on the theory of cognition, and made repeated sharp attacks on agnosticism. He later renounced the "theory of hieroglyphs”. In 1908, in M’ aterialismus Militans, Plekhanov wrote: "In the new edition of my translation of Ludwig Feuerbach published abroad in 1905 and in Russia in 1906, I declared that while I continued to share Sechenov’s view on this question, his terminology" (impressions—conventional signs of things—A. M.) "seemed somehow ambiguous to me.” "In 1905, I said I was against the Sechenov terminology.’"  [13•***  Plekhanov was wrong in this reference to Sechenov, who had never been an agnostic. At the same time Plekhanov very competently exposed the 14 hollowness of the Machians’ agnosticism, shared by Bogdanov, who camouflaged his agnosticism with talk of experience and social coordination of men’s views as the criteria for the verisimilitude of human knowledge. Socially-coordinated experience cannot be regarded as truth, since not all people’s opinions and ideas which are both universally significant and identical, that is to say, socially-coordinated, are true and correct. Everybody knows, for example, that religious feelings and views are common to an enormous number of people even to the present day, but this does not make them correct and authentic. Plekhanov justifiably demonstrated that, from the point of view of the Machian Bogdanov, even hobgoblins and sprites exist and perceptions of them are authentic. "No, Mr. Bogdanov,” he wrote, "no matter how you twist and turn you will never shake off the hobgoblins and sprites, as they say, neither by the cross nor by the pestle. Only a correct doctrine of experience can ’relieve’ you of them, but your ’philosophy’ is as far removed from such a doctrine as we are from the stars of heaven."  [14•* 

p While defending and expounding the principles of the Marxist theory of cognition, Plekhanov frequently made inaccurate statements. In a number of cases, he linked up Marxist materialism with pre-Marxist materialism, not realising that the Marxist epistemology differed from that of the pre-Marxist materialists in being based on the dialectical method, which includes practice as the basis and criterion for cognition. So one cannot, for instance, agree with Plekhanov’s assertion that "Marx’s epistemology stems directly from that of Feuerbach, or, if you will, it is, properly speaking, the epistemology of Feuerbach, only rendered more profound by the masterly correction brought into it by Marx".  [14•** 

p Plekhanov was also mistaken in his contention that "Marx was wrong when he reproached Feuerbach for not comprehending ’practical-critical activity’. Feuerbach did understand it."  [14•***  Here, Plekhanov di*d not take account of the contemplative and incomplete nature of Feuerbach’s materialism, for Feuerbach could not provide a materialist explanation of history and without this, there can be no really scientific understanding of the practical, material activity of people as the criterion for the authenticity of knowledge.

p We should also stress that Plekhanov, while combating the idealism of Machian philosophy, was unable to expose its connection with the crisis in natural science. True, he did criticise individual naturalists for their idealism and their vain attempts to 15 “overcome” materialism. "The German chemist Ostwald, a wellknown exponent of energetics,” Plekhanov wrote, "has for long been applying himself to ’the overcoming of scientific materialism’.... But this is a mere misunderstanding. The good chemist Ostwald hopes to ’overcome’ materialism by means of energetics only because he is too poorly versed in philosophy."  [15•*  But Plekhanov’s criticism of the idealism of individual naturalists was no profound analysis of the crisis in natural science and the relation of Machism to this crisis. Lenin wrote in Materialism and EmpirioCriticism: "To analyse Machism and at the same time to ignore this connection—as Plekhanov does—is to scoff at the spirit of dialectical materialism, i.e., to sacrifice the method of Engels to the letter of Engels."  [15•** 

In spite of a number of shortcomings, Plekhanov’s works criticising Machian philosophy occupy an important place in Marxist philosophy. They helped to combat idealism in philosophy, and armed the revolutionary movement in the struggle against bourgeois ideology and its philosophical foundations. However, Plekhanov remained at the nineteenth century level, and was incapable of creatively developing Marxist philosophy in conformity with the new historical conditions, of raising it to a new stage, of exposing the crisis in natural science and indicating how it might be solved by the study and application of dialectical materialism to analysis of problems in natural science. This task was fulfilled by Lenin in his masterly work Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, which, together with his other philosophical works, represents a new and higher stage in the development of Marxist philosophy.

p G. V. Plekhanov, while criticising bourgeois idealist trends in philosophy, simultaneously did significant positive work in scientifically analysing many important philosophical questions. In his Fundamental Problems of Marxism, Materialismus Militans, "Translator’s Preface to the Second Edition of F. Engels’ Ludwig Feuerbach...”’, and other works published in this volume of the present edition, Plekhanov devotes much attention to ascertaining the essence of Marxist philosophy, the dialectical method, the theory of cognition and fundamental questions of historical materialism.

p The philosophy of Marxism, as Plekhanov demonstrates, is an entire world-outlook, contemporary materialism, which is, at 16 present, the highest stage of development of materialist philosophy. The philosophy of Marx and Engels rests upon the achievements of pre-Marxist thought, in particular, upon those of classical German philosophy—the dialectics of Hegel and the materialism of Feuerbach.

p At the same time, Plekhanov emphasised the qualitatively new nature of Marxist philosophy, calling the emergence of Marx’s materialist philosophy a genuine revolution, the greatest revolution ever in the history of human thought.

p While correctly remarking that Marx had critically fathomed and refashioned Feuerbach’s materialism, Plekhanov made certain wrong formulations, making it appear as though Marx and Engels at one stage in their philosophical development were Feuerbachians and only later became dialectical materialists. Plekhanov’s portrayal of the evolution of Marx and Engels does not correspond to reality, since Marx and Engels, while to some extent influenced by Feuerbach, did not proceed, as he did, from the principles of abstract man, but from recognition of the decisive role played in history by the masses. From the very beginning of their activities, Marx and Engels were revolutionaries and thinkers. While they were influenced by Feuerbach and shared his views on a number of important issues, they were not and did not become “pure” (“orthodox”) {followers of Feuerbach. Moreover: they were always dialecticians. Even in the early period of their activities Marx and Engels understood Feuerbach’s philosophy as dialecticians, as revolutionary democrats who were beginning to comprehend the role played by the revolutionary activity of the masses, their role as the remakers of history, which was never a feature of Feuerbach’s philosophy.

p Plekhanov’s elaboration of materialist dialectics, its interrelation with formal logic, is of considerable importance. He distinguishes the peculiarities of dialectical materialism from the metaphysical, and considers materialist dialectics as the teaching on the development and motion of all reality. The philosophy of Marxism is not simply materialism, but dialectical materialism. Its basic principle is that it recognises development and motion. If metaphysics, formal logic, says Plekhanov, adheres to the principle: "yea—yea and nay—nay”, then dialectics says: " yeanay and nay—yea."

p “Every definite question,” he wrote, "as to whether a particular property is part of a particular object must be answered either yea or nay. That is indisputable. But how should one reply where the object is changing, when it is already shedding the particular property or is still only acquiring if? Needless to say, a definite answer is demanded here too; but the point is that it will be definite only if it is based on the formula: "(yea—nay and 17 nay—yea."  [17•*  Thus, formal logic fixes the existence of (he object and its proper!ies abstracted from their changes, while dialectics indicates processes, the development of objects, phenomena. At the same time, it is extremely important to emphasise, as Plekhanov did, that dialectical logic is the reflection in the minds of people, in their conceptions, of the contradictions and development inherent in reality itself and in its phenomena. Plekhanov wrole: "Materialism pnls dialectics ’the right way up’ and thereby removes the mystical veil in which Hegel had it wrapped. By the very fact of (his, it brings to light the revolutionary character of dialectics."  [17•**  Dialectical logic is Ihe logic of objective reality and is its reflection in human thought. "The rights of dialectical thinking." said Plekhanov, "are confirmed by the dialectical properties <>\ being" as being itself determines thinking. However, Pleklianov was inexact in the formulations on the interrelationship of dialectical and formal logic. He said that "just as rest is a particular case of motion, so thought, according to the rules of formal logic (conforming lo the ’i/asic lairs’ of tkoug’.il) is a particular case oj dialectical thuug/it". This is inaccurate and incorrect, since formal logic does not and cannot enter into dialectical logic, lor dialectical logic, having as its own object motion and development, cannot embrace the laws of formal logic which do not deal with change and development but, consider objects outside of change. When dealing with dialectics, .Plekhanov emphasised its revolutionary character and, citing llerzen, referred to it as Ihe algebra of Ihe revolution, quoting Marx’s famous words that dialectics regards every historically developing social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient, nature no less than its momentary existence, because it lets nothing impose on it, and it is in its essence critical and revolutionary.

p Throughout his work in philosophy, Plekhanov paid constant attention to questions of historical materialism. lie showed that dialectical materialism extended to society is historical materialism, Ihe theory of the materialist, conception of the historical process. I n the works which make up the present volume, Plekhanov examines many problems of I.lie theory of historical materialism: social being and social consciousness, forms of social consciousness and their role in history, the laws of development of productive forces and relations of production, the part played by the geographical environment in the life of society, the role of the basis and superstructure in the development of society, the place of the masses and the individual in history, and 18 other issues. In propagating Hie fundamentals of historical materialism, Plekhanov underlined its methodological importance for the different social sciences, for the study of various aspects and areas of social life. "I am referring,” he wrote in his Fundamental Problems of Marxism, "not to the arithmetic of social development, hut to its algebra; not to the causes of individual phenomena, but to how the discovery of those causes should be approached. And that means that the materialist explanation of history was primarily of a methodological significance."  [18•* 

p Historical materialism establishes that the mode of production, which includes the productive forces and relations of production, is at the root of social life, of historical development. But what gives rise to and determines (he development of productive forces and relations of production? In Fundamental Problems of Marxism, Plekhanov replies to this question as follows: "The properties of the geograpllical environmenl determine the development of the productive forces, which, in its turn, determines the development of the economic relations, and therefore of all other social relations."  [18•**  This reply is not quite accurate. Here Plekhanov overestimates the role of the geographical environmenl. Plekhanov’s formulation transforms the geographical environment from one of the conditions accelerating or retarding social development into a factor determining the development of the productive forces of society, the basis on which the life of society is built. In many of his other works, however, Plekhanov gave a correct reply to this question.

p In examining the relationship of the economic basis to the superstruclure, Plekhanov set out a live-point formula: 1) the state of the productive forces; 2) the economic relations determined by them; 3) the socio-political structure erected on the given economic base; 4) mentality.of social man, determined partly by Hiedirect influence of the economy and partly by Hie socio-political system which has grown upon it; 5) ideology, reflecting the properties of the mentality. As a scheme, the “five-point” formula has serious shortcomings. Productive forces and relations of production, which are known to be two aspects of the mode oi production, are isolated from each other in this formula. The mentality of social man is made the fourth stage of Plekhauov’s scheme; this, he mistakenly believes, finds reflection later (at the fifth stage) in various forms of ideology. But ideology as a system of views, conceptions, ideas of one or other class, is the reflection of social being, the expression of the interests of a particular class; 19 it is rooted in the economic relationships of people, in the struggle of classes, and not in the psyche.

p It would he wrong to consider, for example, (hat political ideology or belles-lettres reflect the psyche, for the simple reason that both these forms of ideology, of social consciousness, reflect social beings, the conditions of the material life of society, the class struggle, expressing (lie interests of different classes in society either in the form of ideas and conceptions or in the form of artistic images. Plekhanov was well aware of this and, in many of his writings, he adduced splendid reasons to prove the principles of the materialist conception of history in its application to the history of ideology, explaining the objective sources of social ideology.

p Bui in the present instance—in his Fundamental J>rol>lems of Marxism—he is inaccurate in saying that ideology is the reflection of the mentality, as it were, the condensed mentality. It follows from this that the content of ideological forms is the mentality, but this does not correspond to the truth. Lenin pointed out, for example, that politics is the concentrated expression of economics. and not the mentality, as Plekhanov would have it.

p While sometimes inaccurate or erroneous in his views, Plekhanov, on the whole—in his analysis of the basic questions of the theory of historical materialism—held a correct Marxist position. For instance, he convincingly elaborated one of (he fundamental theses of historical materialism—on the progressive development of society, on the change of socio-economic structures in the history of society, lie repeated Marx’s statement thai no socio-economic structure will disappear before all the productive forces for which it has room have developed, and thai the new, advanced relations of production will never replace (he old before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the old society. This is why mankind always undertakes (hose tasks which are feasible, that is to say, those tasks which are ripe for solution, springing from the prevailing conditions of the material life of society. In this, we have one of the manifestations of the objective natural-historical character of the development of the human society. Such a conception differs intrinsically from the dogmatic view of the Second International about the level of development of the productive forces that I he socialist revolution would begin only in dial capitalist country in which the productive forces had developed most. However, while giving a correct reply to (his question from a general theoretical standpoint. Plekhanov in his analysis of the revolution in Mnssia relapsed into an opportunist position, leaning to the views of I lie Second International. For example, in his .Notes to (he ".HO (let-man edition of F”ito’ai>it’ii/(il Prolile/as < f Mar.i’isin he staled thai in the autumn of i’.)()"> " 20 certain Marxists ... considered a socialist revolution possible in Russia, since, they claimed, the country’s productive i’orces were sufficiently developed for suck a revolution”. Plekhanov did not comprehend Ike now historical epoch—Hie epocli of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, its peculiarities, and so lie sometimes approacked questions of Ike theory of (lie revolution dogmatically, not realising the necessity for the bourgeois- democratic revolution to develop into the socialist revolution.

p The credit for creatively developing .Marxism in the ne\v historical epoch belongs to Lenin. He proved brilliantly that under the conditions of imperialism the proletarian revolution would first be accomplished in that country where I lie contradictious of imperialist capitalism were mos! acute. Of course, a definite level in the development of the productive forces of capitalism was essential in order to bring about the social revolution. There could be no question of a proletarian revolution without the necessary material prerequisites and conditions. But this was quite different from the contention of the leaders of the Second International, including Plekkanov, that tlie socialist revolution was possible only in tlie country with the kighest level of development of the productive forces of capitalism, and in which Ike proletariat comprised the majority of the population.

p Plekhanov justifiably and profoundly criticised the conception of “automatism” in historical development. The ueo-Kantian Stammler, misunderstanding the Marxist proposition on causal necessity in social development, contended that if social development were accomplished exclusively by virtue of "causal necessity, it would be patently senseless to consciously try to further it— Who would attempt to assist the necessary, i.e., inevitable, rising of the sun?" he asked.  [20•*  The revisionist Bernstein considered the historical teachings of Marx and Eugels to consist in a recognition of the automatic operation of the economic situation in history. Plekhanov exposed this wrong conception of Marxism as a fatalist doctrine, and argued that the history of people has nothing in common with Nature and its phenomena, that tke history of society has its own peculiarities and is made by man. 15ut man makes history in a definite direction, not arbitrarily. At different stages of historical development, men’s actions have different tasks and aims which are determined by historical necessity and by the conditions of the given epoch. Consequently, "once this necessity is given,” wrote Plekhanov, "then given too, as its effect, are those human aspirations which are an inevitable factor of social derelopmenl. Men’s aspirations do not exclude 21 necessity, but are themselres determined by it."  [21•*  Pro-Marxist materialism, while stating correctly that people are the product of circumstances and education, failed to note that circumstances are changed by people and that, the tutor himself must be taught. Hence it follows that Marxist philosophy places enormous importance on the activities of people, of the masses, in the historical development of society, and views history as the deeds and struggle of the masses. "With the thoroughness of the historical action” Plekhanov recalls the words of Marx, "the size of the mass whose action it is trill therefore increase."  [21•** 

p Thus, the logical course of development of society includes tke activities of the people. Tke proposition that society develops according to definite laws and by necessity in no way precludes recognition of the tremendous role played by people, tke popular masses, in history. On this basis, Plekhanov rejected the revisionist Bernstein’s conception denying the activity and struggle of the masses.

p Defending and explaining the Marxist view that society develops in accordance witli laws, Plekhanov waged a struggle against the Rickertian variety of neo-Kantianism which negates the objective nature of historical laws. Rickert maintained that laws were only effective in nature and its phenomena which are studied by natural science. In the history of society, all phenomena are so individual and unique that there can be no question of history conforming to laws. Rickert counterposed the “sciences” of culture to those of Nature. This conception met with a sharp rebuff from Plekhanov. Upholding the Marxist thesis on the laws of historical development, he wrote: "History becomes a science only in so far as it succeeds in explaining from the point of view of sociology the processes it portrays.... Rickert’s attempt to oppose the sciences of culture to the sciences of nature has no serious basis."  [21•*** 

p PJekhanov devoted considerable attention in his writings of that, time to the inverse influence of tke superstructure, social consciousness, on tke development of existence, of economics. When the superstructure lias developed on a specific economic basis to which it corresponds, the former, as Plekhanov rightly indicated, in turn exerts a powerful influence on the course of economic development. "Political relations,” he remarked, " indubitably influence the economic movement, but it is also indisputable that before they influence that movement they arc created by it.... The Manifesto gives convincing proof that its authors were well aware of the importance of the ideological ’factor’."  [21•**** 

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p Plekhanov was hasiciil I y correct in his observal ions concerning (ho inverse influence of Ilie su persl rucl ure, social consciousness, on I he development of society, hut lie failed to elucidate the role of socialist consciousness in application to the labour movement. Moreover, he somewhat underestimated the role oi the Party in introducing socialist consciousness into the working-class movement and Ihe subjective factor and its place in the revolution.

p Despite individual errors and serious shortcomings in Plckhanov’s philosophical works, those contained in this volume reveal an enormous interest in the philosophy of Marxism and Ihe writer’s efforts to preserve the Marxist philosophy in all purify and make il the properly of the working class.

p Plekhaiiov wauled Marxist philosophy to be studied by advanced workers.

Once, after receiving a letter about the sludy of philosophy by workers, Plekhanov wrote a special article on the subject in Dnevnik solsial-demokrata I Diary of a Social-Democrat! (Mo. 12, June 1910). lie believed the study of philosophy essential, but maintained it was important for the studies to be well organised and, even more so, for the philosophy to be sound, that is to say, for it lo be Marxist philosophy. "We make it extremely difficult for ourselves lo acquire sound philosophical conceptions,” he wrote. "How do our comrades study philosophy? They read, or I will say for politeness’ sake, they ’study’ the now fashionable philosophical writers. Hut these philosophical writers who are now in fashion are thoroughly saturated with idealism."  [22•*  Plekhanov explained that sludy of fashionable idealist trends could bring nothing but harm. Only the study of Marxist philosophy would give a correct world-outlook, but study-of the predecessors of Marxist philosophy was also essential. "XeilherMach nor Avenarius,” he wrote, " neither \Vindelband nor Wundt, nor even Kant must lead us to the sanctuary of philosophical truth, but only Engels, Marx, Feuerbach, and Hegel. Only from these teachers can we learn what we need to know."  [22•**  However, these views did not cause IMekhanov to conclude that reading Die works of bourgeois philosophers was not worthwhile. On the contrary, he advised thai they be read, studied, and criticised from the standpoint of Marxist philosophy.

p The present volume contains a number of I’lekhanov’s works criticising religion and Ihe religions seekings in Russia: "On the So-called Religious Seekings in Russia”; "On Houtroux’s Hook”; 23 “On Fr. Liilgenaifs Hook”; "On A. Pannekoek’s Pamphlet" and ot hers. In I hose works he ex plains Hie origin and essence of religion and examines the reactionary role of the religious seekings and their links with idealist philosophy. In accordance with the principles of historical materialism, and utilising vast historical and ethnographical data, Plekhanov made a materialist analysis of Ihe problems of religion and atheism.

p Ploklianov considered religion to be a system of notions and sentiments fantastically distorting reality, lie was basically correct in tracing the origin of religion to the socio-economic conditions of primitive society, when the productive forces were at a very low level of development, when man’s power over nature was negligible and he was helpless before natural phenomena, and did not understand them; il was precisely under these conditions thai man began lo endow phenomena wilh a personality and lo worship them. Animism was one of the first religious notions of primitive man. IMekhanov wrote: "Primitive man believes in the existence of numerous spirits, but worships only some of them. Religion arises from the combination of the animistic ideas with certain religious acts."  [23•*  Under Ihe conditions of primitive society, there also arose totomisrn, signifying belief in Ihe kinship of one or another clan of people and one or oilier animal, and subsequently the deification of animals, plants, elc. "The (ireek philosopher Xenophanes,” JMekhanov noted wittily, "was mistaken when ho said I hat man always creates his god in his own image and likeness. No, at Ihe beginning lie creates his god in the image and likeness of an animal. Man-like gods appeared only Jaler, as a consequence of man’s new successes in developing his productive forces. Rut even for a long time afterwards, deep traces of zoomorphism are preserved in man’s religions ideas. It is enough to recall Ihe worship of animals in ancienl Egypt and the fact thai statues portraying Fjgyplian gods very often had the heads of beasts."  [23•** 

p IMekhanov used many examples lo trace back and prove convincingly thai religions ideas and conceptions depend on socioeconomic conditions, on social being. He noted I hat (he social relations on Monnl Olympus were reminiscent of the structure of Greek society during the Heroic period. In the now period, when the transition of socielv from feudalism to capitalism was being accomplished, deism became widespread. This was connected with the desire of the bourgeoisie in that period to restrict the royal power. "Alongside Ihe efforts lo limit the powers of kings,” wrote Plekhanov, "came the trend towards ’natural religion’ and to ’deism, that is, to a system of ideas wherein the power of God is 24 restricted on all sides by f lie lairs of Nature. Deism is celestial parliamentarism."  [24•*  Hut under all conditions, religion retains the mythological element, a fantastic conception of the world, the worship of divine power. Changes in religions ideas and the religions cult are really the adaptation of religion to new historical conditions and the needs of the exploiting classes, as their ideology, as their means of keeping the working masses in subjection.

p Plckhanov made a great contribution to I lie si niggle against the god-builders, against those who "seek a road to heareri”, as lie put it, "for the simple reason that they hare last their iray on earth". The "religion of socialism”, created by Lunacharsky and his associates, fully corresponded to the idealism of Machian philosophy, and the declaration of the god-builders to the effect that they were materialists was, to say the least, absurd. Plekhanov wrote: "Only as a consequence of his complete ignorance of materialism could our prophet of the ’fifth religion’" (A. Lunacharsky.—A. M.) "call himself a materialist."  [24•** 

p Plekhanov exposed the anti-scientific and harmful nature of the Russian Machian god-builders’ attempt to create their religion without god, a religion purporting to be a "belief in socialism”, the idoiisation of the "potential of mankind”. He demonstrated that their talk of a proletarian religion had nothing in common with Marxism, with the working class and its socialist ideology.

p God-building is the "padded-jacket of modern despondency”, said Plekhanov, and not an ide«logy of struggle. In combating godbuilding Plekhanov also criticised the errors made by Gorky at that time, saying that Gorky’s Confession preached the new religion. But simultaneously with his criticism of Gorky’s ideological mistakes, Plekhanov fought for Gorky the artist; although lie did not always correctly assess Gorky’s works (Mother), he was well aware that G-orky was a great realist writer who paid only temporary homage to the propagation of the new religion.

Plekhanov’s writings against the religious world-outlook retain their vital force even today. Basically they give a correct scientific idea of religion, its social essense and purpose, and help to resolve the question of the attitude of the proletariat and its Party to religion, and to wage the struggle against religious prejudices.

p In this volume there are a number of Plekhanov’s works containing many profound statements and comments on the history of philosophy.

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p Plekhanov was one of I he fewMarxisls in the Second International to make an important contribution to Ihe Marxist history of philosophy and to create valuable works on the history of philosophical thought. He was not only an eminent propagandist of Marxist philosophy, but also a notable historian in this field. He contended both with the idealist historians of philosophy, who explained the development of philosophical thought by the development of the absolute idea, and with the vulgarisers of Marxism, such as Shulyatikov, who did not understand the relative independence of ideology, including philosophy.

p In several of his works, Plekhanov gives a clear elucidation of the basic principle of historical materialism—that social existence determines social consciousness, including philosophical thought. He wrote: "Marx’s materialism shows in what way the history of thinking is determined by the history of being"  [25•*  just as the content of philosophy is determined by economics. But at the same time, Plekhanov considered that one or other of these philosophical ideas and theories spring from economics, not directly, but indirectly, while being influenced by a number of other factors and phenomena. In his opinion, the content of ideological phenomena may be explained and determined by the economic development of society only in the very last analysis.

p In class society, ideology, including philosophy, has a class character and reflects the interests and aspirations of one or other of the classes. Plckhanov gives some remarkable examples of materialist, analysis of different philosophical systems and ideas: of French materialism, classical German philosophy, the philosophy of Russian revolutionary thinkers, and others. He was able to do all this because, having mastered the Marxist method, the principles of historical materialism, he utilised them in his historico-philosophical studies.

p Criticising the efforts of Shnlyatikov and other vulgarisers to derive the content of philosophical concepts directly from production, Plekhanov, in an article written specially against Shulyatikov, exposed the untenability and vulgar simplification of his historico-philosophical “researches” which appeared in his book Justification of Capitalism in West European /’hllosophi/ (from Descartes to Mach). Using Shulyatikov’s examination ofjKantian philosophy as an example, Plekhanov made devastating criticism of his vulgar views on the history of philosophy. Shulyatikov claimed that the philosophical views of any bourgeois thinker represented a picture of capitalist production drawn with the aid of conventional signs. All philosophical terms and formulas, concepts, ideas, opinions, impressions, “things-in-themselves”, " 26 phenomena”, “siihstances”, “modi”, etc., etc., served, in Slnil yalikov’s view, to designate classes and their interests.

p “After all,” wrote I’lekhanov, "to assort that ’all philosophical terms without exception’ serve^^1^^ to designate social classes, groups, nuclei, and llieir relationships, is lo reduce an extremely important question to a simplicity thai can only he characterised by the epithet: ’Su/dalian’. This word denotes neither a ’social class’ nor a ’group’, nor a ’nucleus’, but simply a vast woodenheadedness."  [26•*  That is why Sliulyalikov and his ilk, using such " methodology”, gave a distorted, crude, and vulgarly simplified analysis of philosophical theories, particularly the philosophy of Kant. I’lekhanov scoffed bitterly at Sliulyalikov: "According to him, when Kant wrote about nonmena and phenomena, he not only had in mind various social classes, but also, to use the expression of the old wife of one of Uspensky’s bureaucrats, he ’aimed at the pocket’ of one of these classes, namely, the bourgeoisie.”   [26•** 

p These words of Plekhauov’s, castigating those who vulgarly simplified philosophical history, have not lost their significance even today. Those historians of literature, art, philosophy, and other forms of ideology, who analyse hislorico-philosophical phenomena, if not completely, then approximately in the spirit of such vulgarism and “woodenheadedness”, are not yet extinct. I’lekhanov devoted a great deal of attention to elucidating the historico-philosophical and ideological roots of contemporary trends in idealism. Thus, for instance, he illustrated how the ideological and philosophical sources of Macliism are rooted in the views of Berkeley. Whereas Berkeley pronounced matter to be a "collection of ideas”, a combination of sensations, that is to say, resolved the question, of matter in the spirit of subjective idealism, Mach and his supporters maintained that physical phenomena, material bodies, are essentially complexes of sensations. So Plekhanov was fully justified in writing: "Mach ... adheres firmly on this t/ueslion to the point of rlew of the eighteenth-century idealist Berkeley."  [26•*** 

p In the writings contained in the present volume, Plekhanov also touches on many hislorico-philosophical and sociological questions connected with the preparation, formation, and development of Marxist philosophy and scientific socialism. I n such works as Fundamental I’rob/ems of Marxism: "From Idealism to Materialism”; "Utopian Socialism of the Nineteenth Century”, and others, he gives a detailed, though not always accurate, analysis of the philosophies of Hegel, Feuerbach, the French materialists, and Ihe views of the Western Utopian socialists.

27

p His analysis shows the importance of the philosophical ideas of Hegel, l-’euerbach. and Ihe leachings of the Utopian socialists in the origination of Marxism.

p I’lekhanov’s merit lies particularly in Ihe fact that he became one of the first and most prominent historians of socialist ideas, who made a profound Marxist analysis of I heir role and importance in Ihe preparation of scientific socialism, fn the articles "French Utopian Socialism of the .Nineteenth Century" and "I’ topian Socialism of the .Nineteenth Century”, he gives a convincing portrayal of the progressive nature of the Utopian socialists’ ideas, their critique of capitalism, and simultaneously sheds light, on the inherent narrowness of their views, Iheir inability to indicate the way out of capitalist slavery, since they could not discover the laws of social development or understand the class struggle of the proletariat againsl Ihe bourgeoisie. Plekhanov was right in saying that "like Fourier, Saint-Simon was horrified at the very thought of the class struggle and sometimes liked to intimidate his readers with ’the propertyless class’, the ’people’".  [27•* 

p Noting the negative altitude of the ulopian socialists lo the class revolutionary struggle, Plekhanov quoted the words of Cabel, which are pertinent in tin’s respect: "77 / had the revolution in my A’AYK/), / would not open rny hand even if I had to die in exile for //."  [27•** 

p Following in the Marx’s footsteps, Plekhanov indicated the connection between socialist teachings and the materialist worldoutlook. "If man,” Plekhanov wrote, "draws all his knowledge, sensations, elc., from the world of the senses and the experience .gained from it, as was laughl by the eighteenth-century materialists, then the empirical world must be arranged so that in it man experiences and gels used to what is really human and that he becomes aware of himself as man."  [27•*** 

p Despite the errors and deviations from Marxist philosophy, the works of (1. V. Plekhanov contained in this volume, today, too, serve the cause of defending Marxist philosophy, and the struggle againsl bourgeois ideology, idealisl philosophy, and all kind of revisionism.

p A. MASLIN

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p SELECTED
PHILOSOPHICAL
WORKS

VOLUME III

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