p As in morals, so also in politics, as well as in the social field, Feuerbach quite consciously linked his radicalism with his materialism. He wrote: "I do not understand how the idealist or the spiritualist, at least one who is consistent, can make external political freedom the aim of his practical activity. Spiritual freedom is enough for the spiritualist.... From the spiritualist point of view, political freedom is materialism in the field of politics.... For the spiritualist, freedom in thought is sufficient" (Dem Spiritualisten geniigt die gedachte Freiheit).  [638•*** 

p In his Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, Schelling accepted as proved the proposition that the concept of freedom is incompatible with Spinozism, that is to say, in effect, with materialism. The further course of development of philosophical thought in Germany demonstrated the utter groundlessness of this proposition, which, incidentally, Schelling assimilated quite “dogmatically”.

If the idealist Fichte in his sympathy with the Great French Revolution even went as far as to justify extreme revolutionary actions, German idealism in its development moved gradually but very far away from such views: while in the person of Schelling (in his latest style) it completely hid the concept of freedom under its night-cap. It was only in Feuerbach’s materialist philosophy that the freedom-loving aspirations of the noble Fichte were revived and further developed, on an incomparably more reliable theoretical basis.

p ^

p Feuerbach did not want to be a philosopher in the sense in 639 which this word had always been understood in Germany. Hence his remark: "Meine Philosophie—keine Philosophic."^^296^^ Philosophy must not move away from life. On the contrary, it must approach closer to life. This is essential even for theory.

p Marx wrote: "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice."^^297^^ We find the same idea in the writings of Feuerbach, who said that the cardinal defect of idealism was that "it examined the problem of objectivity or subjectivity, the reality or the unreality of the world, exclusively from the point of view of theory, whereas the world became a subject of debate only because first of all it became a subject of desire."  [639•*  True, Feuerbach wrote this some twenty years after Marx had penned the above lines. But chronology hardly counts for anything in this case, since the idea of the destructive influence on philosophical theory of its rupture with practical activity corresponds fully with the spirit of Feuerbachian philosophy.  [639•**  Not without reason did he write that philosophy in comparison with practice is but a "necessary evil" (em notwendiges Uebel).

p Marx was wrong when he reproached Feuerbach for not comprehending "’practical-critical’ activity".^^298^^ Feuerbach did understand it. But Marx was right in saying that Feuerbach’s concept of the "essence of man”, which he used in his explanation of the "essence of religion”, suffered from abstractness. This was inevitable. Feuerbach could have eliminated this defect in his teaching only by attaining the materialist explanation of history. But that he did not manage to reach, although he did feel a vague but fairly strong theoretical need for it.

p In his Nachgelassene Aphorismen there is a passage which has been a source of error to many historians. Here it is: "To me materialism is the foundation of the edifice of the human essence and knowledge; but for me it is not what it is for the physiologists, the natural scientists in the narrower sense, for example, Moleschott. For them it is not the foundation of the edifice, but the edifice itself. Going backwards from this point, I fully agree with the materialists, but going forwards, I disagree with them."  [639•*** 

p In referring to this passage, it is frequently said: "There you are, you can see for yourself that Feuerbach admits to being only half a materialist.” However, those who say this forget to ask themselves precisely what materialism is meant here? It will do no harm to clear this up.

p In his Theogony, Feuerbach denounces those who want "to draw from one and the same source both natural laws and human laws”. Of course, indirectly—inasmuch as man himself is a part of nature—human laws are also rooted in nature. But it does not follow from this that (to use a picturesque phrase of Feuerbach’s) the Ten Commandments are written by the same hand that sends the peals of thunder. In the final analysis, paper is a product of the vegetable world. However, it would be highly ridiculous for anyone to claim that nature was a paper manufacturer.  [640•* 

p It was precisely with those materialists who did not see anything ridiculous in this that Feuerbach found it impossible to go forward. It was quite clear to Feuerbach that to regard nature as a manufacturer of paper was the surest way to commit numerous gross errors both in economic theory and in economic practice ( politics). To accept this proposition would be equal to reducing sociology to natural science. Later, Marx described short-sighted materialism of this type as natural-scientific materialism. Feuerbach was not satisfied with a materialism that was incapable of distinguishing between man as the object of biology and the man of social science. It is obvious from this, however, not that he was only partly a materialist; on the contrary, it is perfectly plain that he felt the need for a consistent materialist world- outlook. For in fact, natural-scientific materialism is inconsistent. When those who uphold this view discuss the phenomena of social life, they show themselves to be idealists. It would be hard to find more persistent adherents of the idealist interpretation of history than these materialists.  [640•**  None the less, Feuerbach did not succeed in correcting the defect of the "physiologists’" materialism by working out a materialist conception of history. He, who felt so strongly the limitations of Moleschott’s materialist view, nevertheless made great and quite impermissible concessions to 641 Moleschott from the standpoint of correct theory.  [641•*  It is quite obvious that in making these concessions, he himself voiced idealist views on social life. The materialist explanation of history must be acknowledged as one of the most important theoretical services rendered by Marx and Engels. But we already know that for some time Marx and Engels themselves were followers of Feuerbach. Moreover, until the end of their days they remained such followers as regards the general philosophical view of the relation of subject to object.  [641•** 

p The dialectical view of phenomena presupposes the conviction that they conform to law, i.e., are necessary. Historical idealism does not concur with this conviction, since it sees the conscious (free) activity of man as the mainspring of historical progress. Feuerbach, who had not reached a complete understanding of historical materialism, could not work out either a dialectical view of social life. Dialectics again came into its own only with Marx and Engels, who first placed it on a materialist foundation.

p We are entitled to say that Feuerbach’s starting point in his theory of cognition—not ego, but ego and tu—was also the starting point of some (in their own way interesting) trends of German social thought. On the basis of the Utopian application of this doctrine to questions of the social system there arose, in the person of Karl Griin and others, “German” or “true” socialism.^^296^^ The individualist rejection of the doctrine in the domain of morals— i.e., once again ego, not tu and ego—led to the appearance of an original German anarchism, as represented by Max Stirner ( pseudonym of Kaspar Schmidt) who in 1845 published a work, fairly well known at one time, entitled-.DerEinzigeundsein Eigenthum.  [641•*** 

p However, it should not be thought that Feuerbach’s influence was confined to the extreme trends of social thinking. It extended partly even to natural science. Moleschott, sincerely though onesidedly attracted by Feuerbach, was a prominent naturalist. Feuerbach’s influence was at its strongest, as could be expected, in philosophy. But here his influence was more negative than positive. True, that was not his fault.

If Marx and Engels always remained, generally speaking, of the same mind as Feuerbach on question of philosophy, strictly so called, the majority of those Germans who were interested in philosophy did not find it possible to accept his philosophical views. They were frightened both of Feuerbach’s materialism and his socialism which was closely associated with his philosophical views.  [642•*  The reaction which followed the failure of the revolutionary movement of 1848-49 gradually brought German philosophy back into the fold of idealism. And it is self-evident that the imperialist Germany of modern times could not recognise Feuerbach as its ideologist. It required philosophers of quite another brand....