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p Brecht’s play Leben des Galilei(Galileo) is an important event both in art and science. The West German journal of theoretical physics Physikalische Blatter at one time submitted the play to a detailed analysis, an unprecedented fact in the history of the press covering the natural sciences. The writer Ernst Schumacher published a book entitled Drama und Geschichte (Drama and History), in which Brecht’s techniques and the history of the play are studied against the background of the development of contemporary physics—an unusual event in theatrical criticism.

p Brecht saw in Galileo’s situation a number of conflicts typical for the development of science under capitalism. Hence the writer’s endeavour to draw the substance of the play out of the boundaries of the seventeenth century and bring it closer to the modern times. Brecht underscored the fact that his play should not be interpreted purely as invective against the Catholic Church. "In this play,” he writes, "the Church, even when it opposes scientific freedom, functions simply as the supreme power.... The play demonstrates the temporary victory won by this power, not by the clergy. It would be risky in our day to stamp on Galileo’s struggle for freedom of scientific inquiry the impress of the struggle against religion. This would have the most undesirable consequence of distracting attention from forces of reaction in the world today, which are by no means restricted to the church.”   [240•1  By this Brecht had in mind fascism.

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p Thus, at the core of Leben des Galilei lies the conflict between the progressive scholar and the reactionary power. The scientist strives for the truth, the power—for its further consolidation. Since the path to truth passes through doubt, science encourages scepticism and works to destroy illusions in its acquisition of knowledge. The bulwark of reactionary power is the force of habit, the faith in the reasonableness of the established order. Therefore a conflict between science and the forces of reaction is inevitable.

p This conflict is initiated within the framework of science itself. For ages its representatives have been divided into two categories: creative scientists, the destroyers of old systems, and “erudite” scientists who, having assimilated scholastic wisdom, remain in fact blockheads who vigilantly stand on guard of society’s mainstays and authorities. In the play there is an inimitable scene involving a dispute in the course of which Galileo suggests that his opponents look in the telescope to convince themselves in the existence of Jupiter’s satellites, but they resolutely refuse to do so, since the astronomer’s observation contradicts- the Aristotelian doctrine—the scientific Bible. If the facts don’t coincide with dogma, so much the worse for the facts. "Such a thing cannot be because it can never happen, for Aristotle teaches us that, etc.” Such a structure of proof exists to this day in certain sciences.

p The conflict is made more complex by the fact that base material interests poke out from under the vociferous phrases concerning elevated matters. Galileo is seen not merely as a free thinker, but as a renegade who could have availed himself of all of the privileges of the ruling caste, but instead infringes upon its well-being. “You’re biting the hand that feeds you,” the old cardinal rages in a state of frenzy.

p The substance of the matter, however, is to be found elsewhere. The fact is that power cannot rest on ignorance alone. Knowledge is strengtn and the powers that be try to secure exclusive domain over this strength. "We need you more than you need us,” says Cardinal Barberini (the future Pope Urban VIII) who will force Galileo to renounce his positions, but will preserve his star charts which are so essential for navigation. The reactionary ruling elite is forced to manoeuvre between the Scylla of free-thinking and the Charybdis of conservatism. It is no secret that those who fall behind are left to the wolves. The retrogrades would have been only too glad to forbid sciences as such if not for the danger of military damage consequent upon such an action. This is why 242 even the most reactionary, obscurantist power trembles before science and seeks to nurture its development. This is the conflict that disturbs Brecht.

p The writer is concerned above all with the fact that in the bourgeois countries the destructive capacities of modern science frequently fall into the hands of ruling adventurists. He began work on Leben des Galilei soon after the nazis came to power and finished it by the time when German physicists had succeeded in splitting the uranium atom. Brecht revised the play after Hiroshima and carried out a second revision after the creation of the hydrogen bomb. The concluding monologue of Galileo is addressed to the contemporary natural scientists: "The only aim of science is to alleviate the hard human existence and if the scientists, threatened by self-seeking rulers, will confine themselves to accumulating knowledge for the sake of knowledge science may be crippled and your new machines will only bring new hardships. Eventually you will probably succeed in discovering all that can be discovered, but your progress in science will mean your departure from mankind. And the gulf separating you from mankind may be so great that one day your exclamation of triumph concerning a new discovery will be met with a general cry of horror.”

p The historical Galileo could not have said anything of the kind: in the seventeenth century such a problem did not and could not have arisen. It has come to the surface only in our time.  [242•1 

p Norbert Wiener in his autobiography describes the doubts which beset him in the last years of his life when he began to ponder the conceivable social effects of his research, which could become the theoretical foundation for the creation of automated factories: "All these emotional experiences were nothing to those through which I went at tne time of the bombing of Hiroshima. At first I was of course startled, but not surprised.... Frankly, however, I had been clinging to the hope that at the last minute something in the atomic bomb would fail to work, for I had already reflected considerably on the significance in the bomb and on the meaning to society of 243 being compelled to live from that time on under the shadow of the threat of limitless destruction.”   [243•1 

p Albert Einstein wrote in 1945: "Physicists find themselves in a position not unlike that of Alfred Nobel. Alfred Nobel invented the most powerful explosive ever known up to his time, a means of destruction par excellence. In order to atone for this, in order to relieve his human conscience he instituted his award for the promotion of peace and for achievements of peace. Today, the physicists who participated in forging the most formidable and dangerous weapon of all times are harassed by an equal feeling of responsibility, not to say guilt.”   [243•2 

p Otto Hahn who had split the uranium atom in 1939 was on the verge of suicide after Hiroshima.

p “Physics, fear metaphysics,” so it was said in the .time of Galileo. Now physics itself has become the source of fear. Science has suddenly shown its other face to mankind and emerged not only as a productive but also as a powerful destructive force. "The disdain,” wrote Brecht in the rough draft of a foreword to his play, "which the people always felt towards the closeted scientist was transformed into unconcealed horror from the time that this scientist became a grave menace for mankind. And when he confined himself entirely to his science and steered clear from the people, the scholar to his horror discovered his connection with the people, for the threat hung over him as well; his own life was endangered and he knows better than anyone else the seriousness of this threat. He voices protests not only against pressure being exerted upon his science—pressure which slows down, sterilizes and misleads it—but also against the threat posited by science to humanity and the scientist himself.”  [243•3 

p It is only today that the problem of the moral justification of scientific activity has acquired the character or responsibility for the fate of the human species. Doubt has been cast upon a conviction which to the scientist of an earlier time seemed to be an unquestionable fact, namely, that the expansion of knowledge bears an a priori justification. The question was posited for the first time as to the human criterion the researcher should be guided by.

p “Science knows only one yardstick—a contribution to 244 science,” says the young student Andrea to Galileo in Brecht’s play. Galileo, the wiser from experience, corrects him: "The only aim of science is to alleviate the hard human existence.” Galileo had come to this conclusion through suffering. At first he himself had held Andrea’s views, i.e., he had not reflected upon the consequences. But then he understood: the joy of discovery, the pleasure of creative activity, the pursuit of "knowledge for knowledge’s sake" are dangerous impulses which can turn the scientist into a tool of reactionary forces. Galileo begins to doubt the irreproachable position of the scientist possessed only with the thirst for knowledge during his conversation with the little monk-physicist, (der kleine monch) who proposes that his teacher think about the people. Galileo has no ready response, instead he tosses at his student a bundle of manuscripts in which "the causes of the tides which move the oceans are considered”. The monk falls silent, engrossed in his reading. But what does Galileo say in this context? "The apple from the tree of knowledge. He is already biting into it. He is condemned for eternity but still he must finish eating, the unfortunate glutton! Sometimes I think that I would agree to be locked into an underground dungeon deep under the surface of the earth where light didn’t penetrate if only I could learn in exchange what in fact light is. The most terrifying thing is that all that I know, I must communicate to others. As a lover, or drunkard or betrayer. This is of course a vice, and threatens calamity.” Why such self-flagellation? Galileo refers to his own "unconquerable need to carry on research as the sadist or pervert caught on the scene of the crime refers to his hormones”, as Brecht comments upon this scene. As the play draws to a close Galileo demands of the natural scientist something resembling the Hippocratic Oath, "Use your knowledge only for the benefit of mankind”.

p The two differing approaches to the problems of scientific research, as exemplified in the controversy between Andrea and Galileo, are taken from contemporary life. Witness the argument put forth by a contemporary Andrea, Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb: "The scientist is not responsible for the laws of nature. It is his job to find out how these laws operate. It is the scientist’s job to find ways in which these laws can serve the human will. However, it is not the scientist’s job to determine whether a hydrogen bomb should be constructed, whether it should be used, or how it should be used.”   [244•1  In contrast here is "A Hippocratic Oath for Scientists" 245 published in a specialized journal: "Realizing that my scientific knowledge provides me with increased power over the forces of nature I pledge myself to use this knowledge and power solely to what, according to my ability and judgement, I consider to be for the benefit of mankind and to abstain from any scientific activity known to me to be intended for harmful purposes.”   [245•1  There are several variants of similar oaths for the contemporary scientist. These variants appeared in the press as a direct response to Brecht’s appeal to actively counteract the dehumanization of science.

p One must not silently wait in the wings, says" Brecht, believing in a better future and hoping that reason in and of itself will triumph over ignorance. “Don’t you believe that the truth, if this is the truth, will come to the surface without our help?" Galileo is asked, and he cries out in answer: "No! A thousand times no! The amount of truth that will come to light will be no more or no less than that which we ourselves bring forth. Reason can only triumph through the efforts of the man of reason.”

p But what of the scientist under a reign of fascist terror when he is daily and even hourly forced to renounce his convictions and direct his gifts in dangerous channels? Brecht rewrote the finale to his play three times. The significance of these revisions rests in the intensification of his condemnation of Galileo, who, in the words of the author, led science into battle, and then betrayed it in the heat of this battle by renouncing his ideals. He handed over his knowledge to the powers that be for them to dispose of, to use or abuse in their own interests.

p But in passing a verdict against Galileo, Brecht also understood that matters must not stop at this. "In Galileo,” he wrote, "we are not at all concerned with the fact that one must firmly hold one’s ground as long as one is convinced of the righteousness of his position—and thereby win the reputation of a stalwart individual.”  [245•2 

p The absolutely unyielding body even in the world of physical relations is an abstraction, achieved through idealization, that is to say, a projection of that which cannot be implemented in reality. It is all the less feasible in the world of’human relations. If an individual is not given the opportunity of a timely death, his spirit can in the end be broken by "qualified specialists" Campanella who withstood long hours of torture and 246 exhausted his torturers, had simply run into people poorly trained in their craft. The craft of torture evinces its own “progress”, the long-range perspectives of which were vividly outlined in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. This " antiutopian novel" depicts the triumph of "English socialism”, a modification of nazi national-socialism. The Ministry of Love, carrying out the functions of the Gestapo, practises a novel approach to its victims. The hero of the book is subjected to a variety of tortures but does not yield. This continues until his tormentors succeed in discovering his weakness: a pathological fear of rats. His resistance crumbles at this point. For Galileo matters were simpler, he was just shown the instruments of torture—this in itself sufficed.

p Galileo is broken. But what ensues of this? This question is of the utmost importance for Brecht. How ought a scientist to act if he is compelled to compromise with his conscience, or is drawn into a criminal conspiracy by force, cunning or personal carelessness? Orwell’s hero leaving the Ministry of Love in freedom, has become enraptured with his Fiihrer—Big Brother. He is destroyed as a personality, turned into a passive’ being leading a supine animalistic life.

p Brecht’s Galileo is broken, but not crushed. After his abnegation he lives under the eye of the Inquisition and, like a secret vice, devotes himself to science and secretly sends out the results of his research for publication. "Brecht,” we read in the commentary to the most recent Soviet edition of the play, "had in mind that complex and often crafty policy to which the underground resistance (in particular in the Third Reich) was forced to resort in order to bring its truth to the people: it is necessary to conceal, mask one’s activities and through demonstrations of loyalty and obedience, to deceive those in power.” But what is this in fact? Is this not praise rather than condemnation of Galileo? In life there are few questions that can be answered directly, and Brecht does not simplify the situation. "It is highly unlikely,” he writes, "that one can either wholeheartedly condemn or praise Galileo.”   [246•1 

p In the first production of the play (Zurich, 1943) the accent was on praise of Galileo, the underground fighter who had not bowed his head. In 1957 the Berliner Ensemble shifted the accent to condemnation for his betrayal. In the production of the Moscow Theatre of Drama and Comedy (The Taganka Theatre) the thought of the playwright is dissected into 247 component elements, it is as if the spectacle has two endings. At first the viewer sees humbled Galileo who has fallen into a state resembling childhood, an evil idiot who abuses those about him and drives away his former student, come to pay a visit before his departure overseas. The light fades on the stage: a choir of imbecile monks celebrates, and a boy’s choir, personifying the bright future, mourns the events of the day. AH is finished. But suddenly the stage is bright again, and everything seems different: Galileo’s imbecility is but a camouflage: the scientist after his abnegation not only retained coherence in his thoughts but even continued to work at an intense pace. More than this, Galileo appears before the viewer as a thinker who has elevated his understanding of the place of science and role of the scientist in the life of society to a much higher position and who is from this position faulting the notions neld by his student (as well as his own former conceptions) of science as a kind of self-contained and self-justifying moment in the life of mankind. The import of the concluding monologue by Galileo can be expressed in the words of Julius Fucik, the prominent fighter against fascism: "People, be vigilant!" Both the pioneers who race onto the scene with spinning globes in their hands, and the music of Shostakovich—everything underscores the fact that all the same it does rotate—our planet Earth—regardless of the fictive constructs given to the world by those who would see it otherwise.

p Two endings to the play—two variants of fate: satiated supine vegetation, or resistance to the end. The moral problem of the scientist is formulated here with unusual acuity. Each is free to make a choice, in any situation there are two solutions. But is the play only concerned with this? If so this indicates that it culminates in Andrea’s cue after Galileo’s abnegation: "Miserable country, bereft of heroes!" But indeed following upon this cue come the vehement words of Galileo: "Miserable country, standing in need of heroes!" Most important for Brecht is the social aspect of the problem.

p Kathe Rulicke-Weiler relates in her memoirs that when Brecht was once requested to summarize the content of Leben des Galilei he recited the nursery rhyme:

p Humpty-Dumpty sat on a wall,
Humpty-Dumpty had a great fall,
All the King’s horses ana all the King’s men
Cannot put Humpty-Dumpty together again.

p Then Brecht quoted from Karl Valentin, whom he had always admired:

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p Two little boys climbed up a ladder, The one was dumb, the other clever. But when the ladder tumbled down Both little boys fell to the ground.

p The unredeemable nature and universality of the threatening catastrophe which will engulf all—both the “wise” at the top and the “stupid” under them, if the social status of contemporary science is not altered—this is the centralidea of the play. In this light the words of Brecht cited above take on a more profound hue: "In Galileo we are not at all concerned with the fact that one must firmly hold one’s ground as long as one is convinced of the righteousness of his position—and thereby win the reputation of a stalwart individual.”

p Of course one can and must make appeals to the courage as well as to the reason and moral sentiment of the individual—scientist, politician, etc., but mankind will be in peace only when a system of social relations excluding the possibility of a catastrophic unfolding of events has been created. The individual ought to conduct himself morally, but woe upon the country in which moral behaviour demands heroism! The moral problem is devoid of solution in isolation from the social problem.

p Let us return however to those thoughts which captivated the scientific minds of the world after 1945. We already know that Norbert Wiener tried to establish the nature of his moral debt. Should he take advantage of his right to maintain personal secrets and conceal both his work and his ideas? "After toying with the notion for some time, I came to the conclusion that this was impossible, for the ideas which I possessed belonged to the times rather than to myself. If I had been able to suppress every word of what I had done, they were bound to reappear in the work of other people, very possibly in a form in which the philosophic significance and the social dangers would be stressed less.”   [248•1  The idea of concealing a discovery is just as Utopian as that of keeping the discovery the property of a narrow elite of scientists. In his book on American science Robert Jungk depicts in idyllic tones the atmosphere reigning at the Princeton Center for Advanced Studies. Hundreds of scientists from a number of countries congregate here without any pre-established plan, control or limitations, to study “pure” science. Without thinking of 249 practical applications they respond only to their own consciences and dispose of the research results achieved as they see fit. It would be nice to believe in the existence of such a scientific "Promised Land”. However press communiques put us on our guard. Not long ago, for example, the whole world was stunned by a sensational exposure: leading scientists in neutral Sweden have for more than ten years been conducting research tailored and funded by the Pentagon.

p The problems which after World War II held the attention of Wiener, Einstein and Brecht today have caught the eye of the progressive world public. Recently scientific circles in the West have been engaged in a debate over the problem of academic freedom. If the scientist in isolation is not capable of halting the momentum of knowledge along a dangerous path, perhaps society is capable of doing so? Should science be restricted to predetermined areas in its development? How could this be effected? There are scientists who reject out of principle any attempt to interfere in the sphere of research activity. Academic freedom, they say, is absolute and untouchable. Science won its freedom through suffering; it did not fight for this freedom in order to be shackled with chains as soon as it had achieved this goal. Times have changed, their opponents reply, science has arrived at a dangerous frontier, its subsequent unguided development will be fraught with danger.

p Each new scientific discovery is for the good of mankind, Kurt Vonnegut, the American writer, comments ironically in his Utopia 14. With precise humour he draws a picture of American life after the culmination of the scientific and technological revolution: the ruling class oppresses the people through the use of cunningly designed machines. "...Anything a scientist worked on was sure to wind up as a weapon, one way or another.” This aphorism is borrowed from another of Vonnegut’s novels, Cat’s Cradle. In this story we are confronted with a certain genius of a physicist, a Nobel Laureate, the "father of the American bomb”, but alas, devoid of any sense of morality, humanity, etc. "People weren’t his speciality,” says his son. The novel ends with the snuffing out of civilization from the after-effects of a great discovery, "Ice Nine”, which freezes all living things. It all began with the American marines, who "after almost two-hundred years of wallowing in the mud, were sick of it”. The physicist agreed to lend a hand. The author’s idea is not difficult to follow: the unlimited development of science and technology under antagonistic social relations is harmful for society—what is needed is control.

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p The same thought has been expressed in academic prose. "It cannot ... be seriously argued,” writes the American chemist R. J. Rutman, in the journal Scientific World, "that the regulation of the academic community on the basis of agreed upon and generally accepted customs is at all unreasonable, and that therefore there is no way of declaring the subject matter of research as beyond the bounds of such regulations.... Furthermore, the right to do research when and how the scholar chooses is by no means absolute to begin with, for it is subject to numerous direct and indirect restrictions imposed by society, most of which act to control the application and development of new knowledge rather than its discovery.... On this basis there can be no such thing as the individual academic freedom to undertake activities which undermine and contradict the very goals and purposes for which academic freedom exists.”   [250•1 

p This scientist’s logic of argumentation coincides with the train of thought of the author of Leben des Galilei. Brecht, as we know, rejects the principle of "knowledge for the sake of the Inquisition" (and consequently rejects the Inquisition’s control over science). To an equal degree he rejects the principle of "knowledge for knowledge’s sake" (for in this case the uncontrolled progress of science gives the Inquisition the opportunity of obtaining all that it needs for carrying out its anti-humanist goals). The principle affirmed in the play proclaims "knowledge for the sake of mankind".  [250•2  Mankind is interested in establishing intelligent control over science. How will this control be organized? Brecht gives no answer, he merely leads us to the formulation of such a question. R. J. Rutman is totally engaged in precisely this side of the matter.

p Rutman’s article is interesting above all because he transplants the question of the dangerous effects of scientific development from the fragile soil of morality to the more solid ground of law. He is concerned not with the ethics of the scholar but with the legal position of science. Law, however, is 251 supported by compelling sanctions. Who after all is the guarantor of this law? Can we entrust contemporary imperialist state with control over science when we are concerned, in Galileo’s words, precisely with how to protect scientific knowledge from "abuse or misuse" on the part of the powers that be. As matters stand the very structure of bourgeois state power gives birth to conditions nullifying attempts at intelligent control over the forces of destruction. In 1945 when atom bombs exploded over two Japanese cities, this was carried out not because of scientific or even military considerations, but rather for political, or more precisely, opportunist reasons. Control over science on the part of the ruling imperialist elite, identifying their selfish interests with national interests, is worse than any imaginable anarchy.

p Rutman places his hopes on the scientific community as the proper instance of control over scientific research. But if this community is an internal state organization it is hardly likely that it will be able to carry out any measures running at cross purposes with the government point of view. Extremely indicative in this respect is the example of the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica, California. This "independent and non-profit" scientific organization originally was formed as a research centre for Douglas Aircraft. Today it is an unofficial "brain trust" of the Pentagon. From time to time, it is true, the ethics of scientific research comes under discussion. One can even hear radical speeches concerning the duty of the scientist to immediately destroy his invention as soon as the danger arises that it may be put to ill-use against mankind. But these discussions occupy the leisure hours. During working hours the focus is different. Day after day, in conditions of absolute secrecy (security measures at RAND are tighter than at the Pentagon itself), rehearsals for thermonuclear war are carried out in situations "approximating reality”, the effactivity of espionage is verified, as are the connections linking various weapons systems, possible losses are calculated, etc. RAND has garnered together specialists from all areas of science (from astrophysics to micro-sociology) who at the beck of the War Department provide the necessary data, recommendations and prognoses.

p But the contemporary scientific world is familiar with other types of organizations as well. A good example is the Pugwash movement which arose in response to scientific concern over the effects of radioactive fallout on the Bikini atoll in March 1954. (It was at that time that Brecht uttered his celebrated remark: "Now we have no need for war in order to destroy the 252 world thanks to the development of nuclear physics military preparations are quite adequate to the task!”) At the cradle of this movement stood Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell.

p Pugwash conferences invite the most outstanding scientists who exert an influence on political events in their respective countries, rather than scientific institutions and organizations. Parity in representation for the different countries and ideologies is strictly observed. The material under discussion is not published. The latter fact assures complete sincerity in the exchange of opinions and wards off the utilization of the conference as a tribune for propagandistic ends. As the necessity arises Pugwashers make declarations and addresses to the world public opinion, but the primary goal of their meetings remains maintaining unofficial contacts among specialists capable of giving intelligent advice to their governments or, minimally, of keeping them informed of the scientific and technological aspects of contemporary international politics.

p The late Academician M. D. Millionshchikov summarized in the following manner the twentieth Pugwash meeting: "While the first conferences basically devoted their energies to warding off the nuclear threat, Pugwash meetings in recent years, though not ignoring this threat, have also discussed such questions as the banning of the chemical and biological (bacteriological) weaponry, preventing the militarization of the sea bottom.... Participants in the Pugwash movement always lend an ear to the pulse of international events, and untiringly endeavour to be in the front ranks of the struggle for eliminating the most dangerous obstacles in the path of the peaceful progress of mankind. The widening scope of the problems discussed by the conferences is indicative of the maturation of the movement and of the fact that this maturation is accompanied by a higher effectiveness of these discussions. Pugwash scientists made a contribution to the preparations for a Treaty banning the nuclear weapons tests in three spheres, to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the treaty forbidding the deployment of weapons on the ocean bottom.” These treaties are evidence of the feasibility of intelligent control over experiments posing dangers to mankind. The adoption of all these decisions was to no small degree facilitated by the vigorous activity of So>viet scientists who are members of the Pugwash movement.

p In 1946 The World Federation of Scientific Workers was created. Today it has more than 300,000 members. It is noteworthy that the tenth anniversary of the World Federation 253 was celebrated in the building housing the Berliner Ensemble, where in honour of the anniversary Leben des Galileo was performed. The most important goals of this organization, inscribed in its charter, are as follows: 

p to work for the most effective utilization of science to assure the peace and well-being of mankind, focusing attention on the application of science for solving the most pressing problems of our time; 

p to work for international cooperation in science and technology through active participation in United Nations institutions on education, science and culture; 

p to support the international exchange of scientific information and personnel, etc.

p Scientists from the Soviet Union are active participants in the operations of the World Federation of Scientific Workers and are initiating discussion on the most urgent problems. It is worth recalling, for example, the Vienna Conference of 1968, dedicated to the problem of scientific cooperation in Europe. The representative of the USSR, G. G. Kotovsky, gave a speech entitled "Concerning the Question of Certain Tasks Standing before European Cooperation”. The final goal of international cooperation, this report states, is to stimulate scientific and technological progress for the benefit of mankind. However the utmost development of material production in and of itself is clearly insufficient for the creation of the harmonious society of the future. In this context the highest task of European scientific cooperation consists in the development of methods and forms for "the humanist amelioration of contemporary machine civilization”. The Soviet scholar proposed joint work in two areas. First, fending off a catastrophic destruction of the homeostasis of the biosphere, which has evolved to its present state over aeons of time. Second, the preservation of the cultural and historical heritage of mankind. “It’is amazing to observe the lag of the consciousness of the scientific community,” the speaker concluded, "from the actual role in contemporary society which it has taken on in recent decides. The awareness by the intelligentsia, and above all by scientists, of their place in contemporary socio-political development, and the uniting of this community on an international level in the epoch of the great social and scientific and technological revolution, will become a factor of the utmost importance in stepping up the pace of human progress.”   [253•1 

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p At the present time we may observe very widespread discussion of the good which will rain down upon mankind as a result of scientific and technological progress. Futurologists predict that by 1985 we will have achieved the recovery of mineral resources from the ocean, control over heredity and the transformation of agriculture into a sector of industry, to name but a few examples. The future promises the complete emancipation of man from the production process, automatic thought reading, space flights to Jupiter, a symbiosis between man and electronic machinery. These promises are all accompanied however by the reservation, "if the human species does not wipe itself out through a thermonuclear catastrophe".  [254•1 

p Progressive scholars are with growing trepidation turning their attention to social and ethical problems connected with the development of science. This is not limited to physics alone. The American psychologist David Krech provided a sufficiently gloomy assessment of the long-range prospects stemming trom the intrusion of science into the region of the human brain. If this happens, he considers, humanity will be confronted with problems more frightening than those which arose after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when atomic physicists demonstrated their achievements to the world.

p The late Soviet physiologist, Academician P. Anokhin, shares the fears of his American colleague. In Anokhin’s opinion, international control, viz., through the United Nations, must be put into effect not only over the application of this or that achievement of science, but also over the research process itself, which can lead to dangerous results.

p The appeal to establish control over selected spheres of research in the natural sciences is dictated by a higher concern for the fate of society and man. This is not a "Back to the Ape!" slogan. It expresses not a distrust in rational forms of cognition, but rather a sober evaluation of the irrational situation posed by class society in which there can be no "pure science”. Science is a social phenomenon and it is impossible to consider it "in itself”.

p Lenin in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism wrote of the crisis in physics. To the superficial observer this seemed to be a paradox: science was making giant strides forward, and the 255 philosopher was talking about a crisis. But Lenin explained that matters concerned a methodological crisis, the inability of the natural scientist to apprehend and interpret his own discoveries. Marvellous precision was given to the question of the existence of a shadowy side of science: "the reactionary attempts are engendered by the very progress of science.”   [255•1 

p The results of a lifetime of reflection on the fate of science and mankind were summarized by Einstein in an article eloquently entitled "Warum Sozialismus?" (“Why Socialism?”). The great physicist described his encounter with a certain respectable-looking "intelligent man" concerning the threat of a new war, which, in Einstein’s opinion, would seriously endanger the existence of mankind. "...I remarked that only a supra-national organization would offer protection from that danger. Thereupon my visitor very calmly and coolly said tome: ’Why are you so deeply opposed to the disappearance of the human race?’" Einstein was amazed at this turn of the conversation. "...As little as a century ago no one would have so .lightly made a statement of this kind. It is the statement of a man who has striven in vain to attain an equilibrium within himself and has more or less lost hope of succeeding.” Einstein found the explanation for such a disintegration of the personality in the "economic anarchy of capitalist society...”, and the resolution of the problem in "the establishment of a socialist economy".  [255•2 

As we can see, in the interval since the publication of Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism the scientific crisis in the capitalist countries has spilled over into the social sphere, has been transformed into the scientist’s impotence in the face of the accomplishments of science, which have freed themselves from his control. Situation has become more complicated but the solution to it remains the same. This solution was pointed to by Lenin—the mastering of the scientific dialecticalmaterialist world outlook and, most important, its practical implementation. The author of Leben des Galilei shared in full this point of view.

p In 1968 the journal Teatr published N. Pogodin’s play "Albert Einstein”,  [255•3  dedicated to the same problems as those in 256 Leben des Galilei. The Soviet playwright took an approach differing from Brecht’s. "...Refutation of the idea that Einstein was responsible for the development of atomic weaponry was the central idea,” writes Professor B. Kuznetsov in an article accompanying the publication of the play. "...Einstein’s feeling of responsibility was not personal.”   [256•1  Pogodin’s Einstein was, as it turns out, only unwillingly drawn into the atom bomb project, he didn’t draft, but only reluctantly added his signature to the letter to Roosevelt, marking the beginning of atomic production. In his words: "Atomic energy ... what does this mean? Where does it come from, this atomic energy? What is its source? For fire the source can be located in the sun. But for the atom? It is of a different origin ... hidden from man by nature itself, a sealed book, inaccessible.... We have not only infringed upon this secret ... we want to use it to commit murder.... Think upon this phrase, ’the fission of an atom of uranium to create weapons’.... Dear Lord, explain to me what are we doing ... it seems that I have lost my ability to think straight.” Without thinking through all the ramifications of his action, Einstein yielded to persuasion and placed his signature on the fatal document. In the play then a tragic collision is avoided, the substance of which lies in the fact that the protagonist consciously chooses a fatal path, for there is none other open to him. In point of fact Einstein did consciously embark upon the development of the atom bomb and after the war he just as consciously and with a great deal of vigour struggled to ban the bomb and for the adoption of other measures of international security. "Einstein died,” asserts his close friend Albert Schweitzer, "...from the awareness of his responsibility for the atom bomb danger suspended over the head of mankind.”  [256•2  Brecht, who intended in the last years of his life to write a play on the life of Einstein perceived the tragedy which beset the great physicist in just mis manner.

By correlating the designs of Pogodin and Brecht we arrive at the initial point of our article—the Question of personal responsibility. The fact that the moral problem turns out to be merely a part of a larger, social problem “subtracts” the first only in a philosophical sense, namely, it elevates it to a higher level and by no means removes it as such. Responsibility for 257 collusion in a crime remains for each individual personally and to write it off as a vice of the capitalist system is quite beyond our reach. This fact is brought to mind by the War Criminals Trials where not only fascism as a whole but also its actual carriers were accused, including those with academic degrees and awards. Science is a social phenomenon, society determines its fate. The scientist is however a man, and as such, he is the master of his own fate.

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