"NEGATIVE DIALECTICS"
p For the radical Left "negative dialectics" fulfils a twofold function: it is a method of criticising existing society and a method of critical action directed against the establishment. Radicals claim they adopt a consistently irreconcilable stand in relation to existing society, rejecting all half- measures and compromises. The principle underlying their action is “either—or”. Moreover as "negative dialecticians they are not entitled (if they wish to be consistent) to put forward any concrete alternative. They substitute for the latter, either “hope” or inner “predisposition” to the future, its vague expectation (as in Adorno’s case). The rebel is therefore a tragic figure, in so far as he condemns himself to a blind struggle, which, however, he endeavours to wage to the end even when he senses within himself that the struggle is hopeless. Yet in such struggle the rebel often suffers defeat, since he is not aware of true historical neces-
p In so far as "negative dialectics" claims to reach beyond purely intellectual activity and to invade the sphere of practical politics, its critical analysis presupposes something that extends beyond the confines of purely logical assessment, the definition of its socio-political essence, particularly since it reflects the destiny of its creators and adherents as typical representatives of that section of the bourgeois intelligentsia 95 characteristic of periods constituting a turning-point in the development of capitalist society.
p “Negative dialectics" embodied the tragic destiny of its creators and the generation of the West European—in particular German—intelligentsia they represented. With reference to Adorno there is no denying that "in the precise sense of the word he was a son of the impulsive, yearning twenties filled to overflowing with disillusionment and hopes which determined the intellectual and psychological make-up of the post-war and />osf-revolutionary generation in the West—-In Western Europe the spirit of revolutionary negation could not come into its own in practice . .. the revolutions in Hungary and Germany, suppressed when still in embryo had no opportunity to develop their potential, and the Mephistophelean dialectical ’spirit of negation’ was again obliged to return to the realm of consciousness, to the ’ elevated’ heights of culture and art, back to where it had originally sprung from and where now, after partaking of the tree of life and tasting live flesh, man found life far more crowded and intolerably oppressive than before.” [95•* Such was the overall intellectual climate which moulded the world outlook of Adorno, Marcuse, Fromm and many other philosophers, who despite all their preoccupation with “criticism” were insufficiently critical to extend their activities beyond the sphere of purely intellectual pursuits.
p “Negative dialectics" is neither a new interpretation of Hegel’s dialectic, nor is it on the other hand a simple imitation of any contemporary school of philosophy. It is above all a means of self-expression for the radical as a “ situation-individual” extrapolating that situation to all social reality and elevating the emotional mood bound up with that situation to the rank not only of a categorical moral imperative but also to an almost universal law of social being. It is in this connection perhaps that the existentialist roots of the overall methodological premises of "negative dialectics" come to the fore most clearly of all. However when this theoretical position proves to be no more than a means of self-expression for its creator, then the historical destiny of such a philosophical position is bound to share, as so often 96 happens, his unfortunate fate. "Negative dialectics" when viewed as a theoretical principle can, in the sphere of political thought, only lead to escapism and nihilism, or, to anarchist revolt, when under the impact of some impulse moods of this type take the form of practical action. Yet revolt proves powerless when confronted by the dictatorship of the ruling class that relies on armed force and traditions of conservative thought (above all as personified by the bourgeois state). If activist moods are not “sublated” in conscious, organised and purposeful struggle, revolt will very quickly lose its driving power and exhausted and disappointed rebels will give in to the very same establishment which they had been attempting so recently to destroy.
p Without analysing in detail the question as to what was the real socio-political impact of the New Left movement in the sixties, it can still confidently be maintained that the tactics of revolt as a political weapon, the tactics of action based on principles of pure negation were not vindicated; they showed the movement’s incapacity to overthrow not only political but also cultural institutions of advanced capitalist society and replace relations of domination and subordination with qualitatively new ones. And even if the protest movement did yield some results, this occurred above all wherever it ran counter to the “negative-dialectical” principle.
p Yet in the world of art, "negative dialectics" is much more at home than in the political sphere.
p This is acknowledged even by the adherents of "critical theory". Marcuse and in particular Adorno always set their sights on the elevated world of art and literature as the pure sphere of the true embodiment of "negative dialectics" achieved first and foremost by the artistic avantgarde, in which they included such widely disparate artists as Mallarme, Baudelaire, Breton, Brecht. It was precisely in their works that Marcuse and Adorno assumed that "the language of dialectics and poetry meet on common ground. The element they have in common is the quest for an ’authentic language’—a language of negation, of the Great Refusal to accept the rules of the game played with marked cards. Poetry is... the capacity to negate things, the power which Hegel demanded, paradoxical though it may sound, every 97 authentic thought should have.” [97•* However as a theoretical principle "negative dialectics" does not hold water even when it comes to aesthetics and art in so far as it advocates art out of touch with reality. Art of this kind can admittedly be interpreted as a symbol of protest, as a means of confronting the reader, beholder or listener with the question as to whether he is leading a meaningful life and whether that which he assimilates as a mass consumer of artistic works possesses artistic or social value. However art based on the principle of total negation provides the consumer with no answers to the questions confronting him and leaves the consumer alone with himself, with his rootless consciousness and without any confidence that the shock stemming from this consciousness will force him to reassess his earlier values. To tear the mask from the "unreal world" and show how repellent it actually is, is still not enough to make the world better than it is.
Yet since it came into being not as a theoretical principle but as a kind of metaphor, [97•** "negative dialectics" returns to its original state, without reaping any harvest from the field of social creation, without gleaning productive force as a theoretical principle. However the "negative dialectician" after experiencing the full measure of disillusionment in the surrounding world without finding contact with that world remains in the isolated sphere of celestial “poetry”, from which, to use Goethe’s expression, he was unable to construct a bridge that would take him into the world of truth.
Notes
[95•*] Y. Davydov, Sovietskaya musyka, No. 8, Moscow, 1969, pp. 103-04.
[97•*] Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, Boston, 1968, pp. X-XI.
[97•**] It was not without cause that Jiirgen Habermas suggested that the approach to the Great Refusal as a theoretical principle was the result of delusion on the part of Marcuse’s supporters and critics and, incidentally, the lack of clarity characteristic of the "negative dialectician‘s” exposition of his views. The Great Refusal is no more than the expression of a specific orientation but by no means a theoretical standpoint. (See J. Habermas, Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse (Answers to Herbert Marcuse), Frankfurt am Main, 1968.)
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