p The final crescendo in Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man, first published in 1964, was the manifesto-like announcement of the Great Refusal: "The economic and technical capabilities of the established societies are sufficiently vast to allow for adjustment and concessions to the underdog, and their armed forces sufficiently trained and equipped to take care of emergency situations. However, the spectre is there again, inside and outside the frontiers of the advanced societies. The facile historical parallel with the barbarians threatening the empire of civilization prejudges the issue.... The critical theory of society possesses no concepts which could bridge the gap between the present and its future; holding no promise and showing no success, it remains negative. Thus it wants to remain loyal to those who, without hope, have given and give their life to the Great Refusal"  [74•* .

p The Great Refusal, which Marcuse presented as a principle underlying his "theoretical criticism" and "critical action", implies total rejection of existing society that is not complemented by any search for concrete "points of support" which might make it possible to bridge the gap between present and future. In his later works, in particular the Essay on Liberation Marcuse admittedly attempts to lend the Great Refusal some positive content. "Now, however, this threatening homogeneity has been loosening up, and an alternative is beginning to break into the repressive continuum. This alternative is not so much a different road to socialism as an emergence of different goals and values, different 75 aspirations in the men and women who resist and deny the massive exploitative power of corporate capitalism even in its most comfortable and liberal realizations.”  [75•* 

p After discovering signs of this loosening homogeneity in existing society and the emergence of an alternative, Marcuse considered it was then possible to make a transition from the passive form of the Great Refusal—a manifestation of despair-in-fear—to its active form, to rebellion as a manifestation of hope-in-despair.

p Yet this rebellion, these "different goals and values, different aspirations" are concocted from the illusions entertained in the existing world and are not linked in its growth—- neither in form nor in content—with the institutions and values intrinsic to capitalist society. While announcing "permanent challenge", "permanent uprising" and revolt, Marcuse finds "social repression" "... even in the most sublime manifestations of traditional culture, even in the most spectacular manifestations of technical progress.”  [75•** 

p This interpretation of negation of the "world of repression" stemmed not from concrete sociological analysis of the system of relations predominant in modern capitalist society, but from a purely speculative conception of the way to solve social contradictions, from "negative dialectics”.

p Ideologists of the radical Left insisting on absolute rejection of the existing world endeavour thereby to express their attitude to positivism as the ideological basis of political conformism, as the "absolutisation of what is directly given”.  [75•***  Positivism as a modus vivendi and an embodiment of “one-dimensional” thought should, according to the ideologists of the radical Left, be abandoned and countered with dialectics, for the latter is critical and revolutionary in its very 76 essence. The function of dialectical thought is "to break down the self-assurance and self-contentment of common sense, to undermine the sinister confidence in the power and language of facts___"  [76•*  and direct man’s search for real material prerequisites for the emergence of a new society and the rejection of the old: however dialectical thought is dismissed by the ideologists of the radical Left as insufficiently “critical” and “revolutionary”. Yet according to Marcuse, Adorno and their supporters dialectics is only “critical” and “ revolutionary” in so far as it is “negative”. The advanced capitalist world of the present day sullied by positivist empiricism, political reformism and social apologia, in the eyes of the ideologists of the radical Left kills "negative thought", the embodiment of a dangerous alternative.

p This explains why the elaboration of so-called "negative dialectics" occupies a central place in the work of philosophers and sociologists whom fate has made the ideologists of today’s radical Left.

p When formulating their principles of "negative dialectics" Marcuse and Adorno refer to Hegel assuming that both Hegel’s dialectic and that of Marx, despite the differences between them, were permeated with a negative spirit. Marcuse draws a direct link between his reference to Hegel and the essential requirements of this rebirth of "negative thought". In the 1960 preface to his Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory Marcuse writes: "This book was written in the hope that it would make a small contribution to the revival, not of Hegel, but of a mental faculty which is in danger of being obliterated: the power of negative thinking.”  [76•** 

p Marcuse in general does not accept Hegel’s dialectic because of its inner contradictions, but he (as indeed Adorno as well) attempts to adjust Hegel’s ideas to suit his own "negative dialectics". This explains his definition of Hegel’s philosophy as the "philosophy of negation" and in particular his interpretation of negation as such. Indeed the nucleus of Hegel’s dialectic, its “soul” is to be found not in negation but in contradiction, and in this respect it would be more apt 77 to refer to Hegel’s philosophy as the "philosophy of contradiction" rather than the "philosophy of negation". Negation is both a process and an interim result of development at a specific time-bound stage or moment of development. Negation is not a means of development as is contradiction, in its capacity as the dialectical unity of affirmation and negation, but a means for solving contradiction and only in that narrow sense is it a means of development. Negation is the resolved contradiction, the manifestation of its maturity. The transformation of negation into a means of development (highly characteristic of philosophical scepticism and political nihilism) is tantamount to a rejection of dialectics and a transition to a standpoint of insipid sophistry, a transition from reason to ratiocination. Admittedly, at certain stages of the march of history, when the development of contradiction is artificially held back, negation itself (or to use political terminology—violence) as reaction to unresolved contradiction (and in this sense as an attempt to evolve an alternative) can emerge as a stimulus for the resolution of contradiction; however in this case, (in so far as the resolution of the contradiction was not objectively prepared for) negation is not yet capable of bringing about sublation as the positive result of negation, or, to take its socio-political aspect, the realisation of the alternative.

p Characteristic features of Marcuse’s social theory are his absolutisation of the stimulating role of negation, and his presentation of negation as the absolute means of development, both of which elements are bound up with his interpretation of the essence of negation.

p Each phenomenon negates itself and passes into another, precisely because it contradicts itself from within, that is to say, it contradicts its own one-sidedness, abstractness, but in no way contradicts its own integrity, otherwise the contradiction could not develop within the object (the system). Development takes place because it is not confined to and does not stop at negation. In dialectics the negative is at the same time the positive, in so far as it contains within itself the negatable as a moment, precisely that, to use Hegel’s words, "from which it originates and without which it does not exist". The positive aspect of negation is therefore not only functional (negation as a stimulus for historical 78 develppment), but also substantial (structural). A new structure is a moment of development only in so far as it includes within itself transformed (sublated) elements of the old structure.

p Absolute negativeness, characteristic of Marcuse’s writing, which leads him into the realm of abstraction and scepticism, can to a large extent be explained by the fact that his method of criticism is dictated by its very object—- ratiocinative thinking and positivist sophistry. The radical critic thinks in terms of antinomies: positive-negative, affirmation-negation. Given this approach, the negation of fleeting subjective interests of “integrated” individuals can be conceived of only as affirmation of opposite—yet once again only fleeting—interests of the radical critics themselves. Then again radical negation of finite, abstract, ratiocinative thinking can only be effected on its own basis—on a basis of finite, abstract, ratiocinative thinking.

p This stand also goes a long way towards explaining the reason for Marcuse’s criticism of Hegel’s concept of “ reason”: "Dialectical thought has not hindered Hegel from developing his philosophy into a neat and comprehensive system which, in the end, accentuates the positive emphatically. I believe it is the idea of Reason itself which is the undialectical element in Hegel’s philosophy. This idea of Reason comprehends everything and ultimately absolves everything because it has its place and function in the whole and the whole is beyond good and evil, truth and falsehood.”  [78•* 

p However the question is more complex than it appears in Marcuse’s presentation, for the accentuation of positiveness, or to be more precise, Hegel’s conservatism, embodied in his acknowledgement of the completeness of the process of development, is linked in Hegel’s work not simply with the idea of Reason, or with Hegel’s betrayal of his own dialectic: it is predetermined by Hegel’s own dialectic as idealist dialectic. "The conservatism—for want of a stronger term—of Hegel’s dialectic is inherent in its very foundation; nowhere did he betray his dialectic, but the latter’s conservatism is less 79 conspicuous in the exposition of abstract categories and more clearly visible in material of a social nature.”  [79•* 

p Hegel’s idea of Reason shared the fate of all the other categories used in his dialectic and to the extent it is possible to talk of the "dialectical nature" of all the other elements in Hegel’s dialectic, it is also possible to term his idea of Reason “dialectical”. In affirming that all that is real is reasonable, Hegel the dialectician was not implying that it did not deserve criticism, negation, sublation, that it was completely justified in respect of the given moment of history. The “reasonable” nature of reality consists in the fact that it is the embodiment of the contradictoriness of reason, a moment of development: reality is subject to negation and sublation, but at the same time it “retains” itself (in sublated form) in new reality. The “reasonable” nature of reality consists therefore in the fact that it is not subject to absolute negation.

p Naturally the conservatism of Hegel’s dialectic determined by its idealist character, by the “closed” circle in which the Weltgeist (world spirit) moves as it develops, made it impossible for him to define fully the dialectical nature of reason. Yet precisely this task was undertaken by Marx, who thus rescued the "rational core" of Hegel’s dialectic. It is not a secret that Hegel’s philosophy is open to a wide variety of interpretations: this is borne out by the history of philosophy over the last two decades. It can also be interpreted in such a way as to coincide with certain aspects of "negative dialectics". Yet this would be only one of the possible—and moreover inadequate—interpretations of this philosophy.

p There is still less justification for deducing "negative dialectics" from Marxism, although both Marcuse and Adorno claim that the dialectical concepts elaborated in their writings should be assessed as Marxist or at least as concepts in keeping with the spirit of Marxism, cleansed of Hegelian conformism.

p Marcuse starts out from the premise that the features which Hegel’s dialectic and Marx’s dialectic have in common are supposedly determined by their negative character, for 80 “... Marx’s dialectical conception of reality was originally motivated by the same datum as Hegel’s, namely, by the negative character of reality.. .. Every single fact and condition was drawn into this process so that its significance could be grasped only when seen in this totality to which it belonged. For Marx, as for Hegel, ’the truth’ lies only in the whole, the ’negative totality’.”  [80•*  Admittedly though, in this work, Marcuse, contradicting the fundamental tenets of his "negative dialectics", acknowledges the possibility of negation of the whole, as a result of the processes at work within it. However in the Epilogue he wrote to Reason and Revolution in 1954, Marcuse, who by this time had come round to the conclusion that the individual was integrated in the whole, in faceless society, and that the latter was becoming if not free of contradictions at least homogenous, and that its contradictions were being kept under, deemed it necessary to underline the impossibility that anything new be born as negation of negation, for there no longer existed, in his opinion, any basis for such negation. These tenets were further elaborated in One-Dimensional Man and in Marcuse’s subsequent works, in particular his paper entitled: "Towards an Understanding of Negation in the Dialectic" which he read at the Hegel Congress in 1966.

p Marcuse accuses Marxist dialectics of not taking into account all the real changes which have taken place, and above all of underestimating forces of integration and restraint at work during the late stage of capitalism, of starting out from an appraisal of progress as the result of the internal development of the system holding that the "future is always rooted within what exists"  [80•** . In Marcus.e’s opinion concrete totality, i.e., the specific social system, should be sublated from without, not within.

p Anxious to avoid being accused of a mechanistic approach to questions of dialectics Marcuse at the same time makes the reservation that "any specific social whole must itself 81 be part of a larger totality, within which it can be assailed from without”.  [81•*  Indeed if this was a question of approaching the functioning and development of a specific system not isolated from other qualitatively similar systems, but in interaction with these systems, which together constitute a new, wider totality, then it would be legitimate to bring up the question of change in the role and scope of “inner” and “outer” factors in social development. But even in that case change in the correlation between inner and outer factors takes place through broadening of the scope of “inner” factors: that which formerly took place, for example, within one capitalist country now is meaningful in relation to the world capitalist system as a whole.

p Thus Marcuse’s thesis emerges as the result of superimposing the old logical schema onto new social reality. Yet here we find a new reservation. It appears that outward factors should be understood as the "qualitative difference", namely that which extends beyond the confines of the antagonistic opposites which constitute the totality (opposites such as capital and labour) and which cannot be reduced to such opposites. To be outside means to be qualitatively outside the existing system, to have no possibility of developing within it.

p Here we find the complete rift between outer and inner factors based on the tenet that to break with the old essence is only possible by transferring negation beyond the confines of the given essence and, therefore, by seeking the support of social forces alien to the given system. It is here that Marcuse reveals the political significance of his theoretical constructs: all the dialectics of outer and inner factors proves to be a means of negating the revolutionary role of the working class as an “inner” force, a means of substantiating the “revolutionary” role of the outsiders as an “outer” force in relation to the capitalist mode of production. Indeed Marcuse himself makes no attempt to conceal the social implications of his "negative dialectics", maintaining that the "force of negation... is today no longer concentrated in any one class”.  [81•** 

p There is no need to argue with Marcuse as to whether a force that is not really aiming at a break with the given system, at progressing beyond the limits of that system, can be the bearer of a new essence. A negative answer to that question is self-evident for the Marxist, for the transition to a new quality is bound up with progressing beyond the limits of the old quality. Very different are the questions as to whether the working class is an inner force as far as the capitalist system is concerned, and whether in fact outer forces, not linked with inner ones, can provide the material vehicle of dialectical negation.

p Indeed the proletariat as the exploited class creating surplus value is of necessity linked with the capitalist system and in relation to ’that system constitutes an inner force. Yet at the same time the proletariat, as "a class for itself" aware of the need for fundamental change and for a new social status for itself, also constitutes an outer force in relation to that society, in so far as qualitative negation of its status as an exploited class becomes possible only beyond the confines of the capitalist system. Therefore, the proletariat embodying in its development the contradiction inherent in the capitalist system constitutes both an inner and an outer force in relation to that system. Yet precisely this enables that class to come forward as the material vehicle of negation—a step, the implementation of which naturally requires the existence of the necessary concrete historical prerequisites. To come forward in the role of an outer force, negating the existing system, is something the proletariat is able to do precisely because it is also an inner force, which is directly bound up— through the system of labour relations—with capital and thus, through its own activity, determines the very existence of the latter. An outer force that is not at the same time an inner one is not able, even if it is “critical”, to submit the existing social structure to radical negation, in so far as its self-negation does not bring any decisive influence to bear on the existence of capitalism, and its “moving” outside the “system” does not create a fatal threat for capital, because it does not disrupt the mechanism for extracting surplus value. However Marcuse, as an advocate of negative dialectics, deliberately ignores the contradictions inherent in these “inner” and “outer” factors, focussing his attention on "non- 83 integrated", “external” forces which are not directly linked with the existence of the capitalist mode of production.

p For complete negation of capitalism as a structure, a firm starting-point is required: negativeness must contain within itself a positive factor as an alternative to the existing society. Marcuse, Adorno and other ideologists of the radical Left do not deny in principle that negativeness should become the starting-point for positive growth and that an alternative to the existing society is desirable, yet they specify there and then that no clearly defined formula is possible for at least two reasons: first, being born within the old society subject to negation it is therefore bound to become the embodiment of that very society  [83•* , while, second, being more or less clearly formulated the alternative will immediately prove to be integrated into that society and will lose its actual critical force. All that remains then is to define just the general contours of this alternative, which in fact Marcuse does, painting a highly abstract picture of the “liberation” of “ desirable” possibilities for the future held back by the present, and the "holding back" of “undesirable” possibilities. It is clear that concrete details of the society of the future are taking shape in the process of the very movement directed against the existing society. Yet this is only one side of the situation which in its time was lent absolute importance by the anarchists and above all Bakunin. The revolutionary movement looking towards the future at the same time is always rooted in the present, constituting a bridge between the present and the future. Thus singling out an alternative involves not sketching out as yet blurred details of a future, but specifying the contours of a projection into future of tendencies found in contemporary social development, a projection subject to constant modification.

There is yet another important factor rejected by "negative dialectics": namely the singling out of actually existing social forces capable of bringing nearer the realisation of social trends already discerned. Marcuse maintains that "... the search for specific historical agents of revolutionary change 84 in the advanced capitalist countries is indeed meaningless. Revolutionary forces emerge in the process of change itself; the translation of the potential into the actual is the work of political practice.”  [84•*  Of course the clear concrete structure of revolutionary forces can only crystallise in the course of actual social development, however, the nucleus of those forces takes shape in the present, and without the definition of these revolutionary forces at each particular stage any "real alternative" remains a childish dream. Without analysing the contradictory nature of capitalist society, without defining revolutionary forces and factors within that society, and without taking into consideration the experience of the socialist countries any truly radical negation of existing society and affirmation of the socialist alternative remain illusory.