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M.SILIN

A Critique
of Masarykism



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by ANATOLY BRATOV

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КРИТИКА ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИХ КОНЦЕПЦИЙ МАСАРИКИЗМА

На английском языке

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PREFACE

The 24th Congress of the CPSU made a profound and creative analysis of today's ideological problems; it revealed the increasing role of Marxist-Leninist science in the world today and stressed the importance of the struggle against bourgeois ideology and imperialist ideological subversion.

The Report of the Central Committee to the 24th Congress noted: "We are living under conditions of unabating ideological struggle, which imperialist propaganda is waging against our country, against the world of socialism, using the most subtle methods and powerful technical means."¹

The 24th Congress substantiated the necessity for giving timely, resolute and effective rebuff to bourgeois ideology and to all revisionist counterfeits of Marxism-Leninism. It pointed out the specific problems around which the most intense ideological struggle is raging. One such problem is that of democracy, about which the Report of the CC CPSU to the 24th Party Congress had the following to say: "...Questions of democracy are now the crux of the ideological and political struggle between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism. Bourgeois ideologists and revisionists raise a hypocritical hue and cry, alleging that we have no democracy. They offer us all sorts of 'advice' on how to 'improve' and 'democratise' socialism.

¹ *24th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1971, p. 109.

But their concern is not for socialism, of course. They would like to return us to bourgeois practices and, therefore, try to force bourgeois democracy on us, a democracy for exploiters, alien to the interests of the people."¹

The characteristic feature of the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969 was that anti-socialist forces and imperialist propaganda, hoping to undermine socialism, conducted ideological and political subversive activities under the banner of "democracy" and "improvement" of socialism, under the banner of reviving the ideology of Masarykism.

For this reason it becomes an important task in the struggle against bourgeois ideology to subject the ideological aspect of the events in Czechoslovakia to scientific analysis.

Contemporary bourgeois ideology is in serious crisis. It is incapable of offering ideas that can inspire the working people to historic achievements. That is why, during the events of 1968-1969, for example, imperialist reaction and the anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia which it goaded tried to galvanise the old ideological weapon of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, namely, the philosophy of Masarykism. The anti-socialist forces advanced the slogans of "Back to Masaryk", or "We will always proceed from the ideas of Masaryk", all of which was accompanied by propaganda about a "new model of democratic socialism" and "new variants of Marxism".

Masarykism never was, as its adherents claimed, a socialist ideology. Developed in the late 19th century by Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, a professor at Prague University, it was, rather, the ideology of the Czech bourgeoisie, and it became the official state philosophy when Masaryk was elected President of the first Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. Much later, in the 1960s, Masaryk's name cropped up once again on the political scene in Czechoslovakia.

For many years in the interim, however, the bourgeois press in the West continued to pay homage to him, keeping

alive the haloed image of Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, the first President of the Czechoslovak Republic, scientist, philosopher, humanist, democrat, politician, diplomat and religious man—a man whom everyone could call his or her brother. The Czechoslovak Republic was hailed as a model state with all the bourgeois freedoms, and Masaryk himself was referred to as "the Great Czech".

In bourgeois Czechoslovakia, the idealisation of "Masarykist democracy" as a model for all to copy reached the proportions of a cult of the individual, the individual being Masaryk, who personally told the workers that his republic was a model "socialist country".

During the events of 1968-1969 in Czechoslovakia, it came out that some Czechoslovak intellectuals who sincerely considered themselves to be Marxists were acquainted with Marx only through a Masarykist interpretation, having previously been exposed only to Masaryk's lecture course on "the foundations of Marxism". Some people spoke of Masaryk as the ideologist of socialism, of "humane socialism" or of "socialism with a human face". Revisionists camouflaged their campaign against Marxism with verbal recognition of Marxist teaching, but in action, in reviving Masaryk's ideas, they were trying to substitute Masarykism for Marxism.

The newspaper *Mladá fronta*, for instance, wrote in March 1968 that Tomas Masaryk and his works were "a compass for the future of our developed socialist society".¹

Who was Masaryk and what were his real views on Marxism and socialism?

Tomas Garrigue Masaryk was born on March 7, 1850 in Hodonfn, Moravia. In 1872-1873, he studied philosophy and philology at the University of Vienna. In 1876, he defended his doctoral thesis in philosophy. In 1882, he became a professor of philosophy at the Czech University in

¹ *Marxism-Leninism—the Single International Teaching*, 3rd edition, Moscow, 1968, p. 219 (in Russian).

¹ *24th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 99.

Prague, where he worked until 1914. It was there that Masaryk organised and delivered his lectures on the "foundations of Marxism". In 1898, using these lectures as a basis, he published a book called *The Philosophical and Sociological Foundations of Marxism. Studies on the Social Question by Masaryk, Professor of the Czech University in Prague*.¹ The book was actually setting forth Masaryk's anti-Marxist ideas.

Masaryk's book and two works by Eduard Bernstein—an article entitled "Problems of Socialism" and a book *The Prerequisites of Socialism and the Tasks of Social-Democracy*—revealed the fundamental coincidence of Masaryk's and Bernstein's views, for they both were attempting to supplant the revolutionary theory of Marxism with reformist and revisionist concepts. It was no accident that the two men published articles in which they praised each other.

In 1899, V. I. Lenin subjected Bernstein's revisionism to severe criticism, but gave Masaryk's work no special attention. We may conclude, however, that he was familiar with Masaryk's book because in his article "Karl Marx", published in 1915, he classified it as revisionist criticism of Marxism, the essence of which was substitution of "bourgeois views" for Marxism.

Masaryk's book did, however, receive extensive criticism from Plekhanov, who felt obliged to respond to Masaryk's appraisal of his, Plekhanov's, orthodox position in Marxism. In 1901, Plekhanov published an article entitled "About Masaryk's Book", in which he sharply criticised Masaryk's anti-Marxist concepts and showed that these concepts, purportedly serving the "need to move forward", actually meant "going back".²

¹ The title of the book was T. G. Masaryk, *Otázka sociální, základy marxismu filosofické a sociální*, Praha, 1898. Further references to *Otázka sociální (The Social Question)*, 1946 edition, Vols. I and II.

² G. V. Plekhanov, *Selected Philosophical Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1956, p. 669 (in Russian).

The subsequent history of the development of Masarykism confirms the correctness of Plekhanov's assessment, for revisionism ultimately led Masaryk to out-and-out anti-communism.

Specifically, it should be noted that Masaryk persistently propagated a negative attitude towards Soviet Russia. For example, in 1920, in his *Soviet Russia and Us*, he wrote: "...We have no choice but to reject Bolshevism as unacceptable in our conditions. . . . We have shown that Lenin's system is no good for Russia either; of course, it is up to Russia herself and the Russians to draw conclusions from this."¹

Was this not why the world bourgeoisie lavished such excessive praise on Masaryk, why it created a cult of Masaryk even during his lifetime, and why statues were erected in his honour at all crossroads and squares?

The revival of Masarykism by the anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia during the 1968-1969 events showed that those forces really needed Masarykism not as a banner of "democracy" and "humanism", but as a banner of nationalism and anti-communism.

The political direction taken by the events showed how dangerous the slogan "Back to Masaryk" was not only for socialist Czechoslovakia but for the international communist movement as a whole. The anti-socialist plot in Czechoslovakia was as much a real threat to world peace as was, in its day, the Munich agreement, which had set the stage for the Second World War. The 1968 plot could have led to a new world war because it, too, involved an attempt to strike at the positions of socialism in Europe, with a subsequent onslaught against the entire socialist world by the more aggressive forces of imperialism.

It was no accident that in the summer of 1968, the Military-Political Academy, which had become during the events a political and ideological centre for the Right-wing forces, issued an official memorandum calling for a re-

¹Masaryk, *Sovětské Rusko a my*, Praha, 1920, p. 88.

examination of the country's relationship to the Warsaw Treaty.

However, the attempt to destroy socialism, to introduce the Trojan horse of counter-revolution into socialist Czechoslovakia under the flag of Masarykism and the theory of "humane socialism" was frustrated, a fact attributable to "the staunchness of the Marxist-Leninist core of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and determined action by Czechs and Slovaks devoted to the cause of socialism and by allied countries loyal to the principles of socialist internationalism. . .".¹

In its document, *Lessons of the Crisis Development in the Communist Party and the Society After the 13th Congress of the CPCz*, a Plenary Meeting of the CC CPCz in December 1970 gave an exhaustive Marxist analysis of the causes of the events.

The document reads, in part, as follows:

"As a result of relaxation in political and ideological work, the struggle against bourgeois ideology, against petty-bourgeois tendencies and ideological subversion lost its vigour. This unavoidably led to weaker ties between the Party and the working people.

"The consequences of our errors and shortcomings were all the more serious because large petty-bourgeois segments of our society, both in the countryside and in the cities, still carried considerable weight. These strata represented a distinct political trend, with old traditions, strong organisation and a clear-cut petty-bourgeois *ideology* of nationalism, *Masarykism* and social-democratism, which had taken root and penetrated into the consciousness of a certain part of the working class. . . . All this created fertile soil for the penetration and activation of opportunist tendencies [emphasis added—*M. S.*]"²

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1972, p. 290.

² *Poučení z krizového vývoje ve straně a společnosti po XIII. sjezdu KSČ*, Praha, 1971, p. 7 (hereafter referred to as *Poučení z krizového vývoje*).

The present book examines Masarykism as a revisionist, anti-Marxist trend which emerged during the growth of the working-class movement in Czechoslovakia and which reflected the crisis of the traditional forms of bourgeois ideology as well as the trends in its adaptation to the era of triumphant Marxism and socialist revolutions. This adaptation was aimed at undermining Marxism and socialism from within and replacing Marxism with bourgeois theories by falsifying it and speculating on the problems, difficulties and contradictions of the working-class movement and socialism.

A definition of Masarykism should take into account not only what Masaryk himself preached but also the ways in which Masarykism was used and interpreted, that is, it must be drawn not simply from the letter of Masarykism but from its ultimate social orientation and its actual historical role. This role was fully disclosed by life itself: the events of 1968-1969 fully exposed its unscientific, anti-socialist and reactionary essence.

At the same time those events also showed that to define Masarykism simply as a bourgeois ideology of the imperialist period and Masaryk as a bourgeois ideologist is not enough.

Masaryk's social objective as a bourgeois ideologist and politician was not merely to repulse Marxism, the working-class movement and socialism, but, by criticising and falsifying Marxism and by pretending to be fighting for the "true" interests of the working class and socialism, to gain control of the working-class movement, to tear it away from scientific socialism and divert it from the road of revolution on to the road of bourgeois reformism.

Lenin saw this general transformation of bourgeois ideology as an attempt by decayed bourgeois liberalism to reanimate itself in the form of socialist opportunism; the successes of Marxism made its enemies pretend to be Marxists and enter the field of Marxist research and socialist studies with a revision of the basic propositions of scientific

socialism, a revision intended to provide theoretical grounds for substituting bourgeois reformism and socialist opportunism for Marxism.

From this broad historical perspective Masarykism is unquestionably a revisionist ideology.

Lenin viewed revisionism, in the broad sense of the word, as a method used by bourgeois ideology in its struggle against Marxism, as a trend of bourgeois ideology which admits a verbal or organisational link with Marxism, but whose aim it is to undermine Marxism from within by criticising, revising and distorting it.

The revisionist character of Masarykism was thoroughly exposed by the Czechoslovak anti-socialist forces themselves which had made Masaryk their ideological authority.

It was precisely the revisionist essence of Masaryk's concepts that made it possible for contemporary revisionists to adapt themselves to the new historical conditions as they sought to prove that Marxism should either be supplemented or fully replaced by Masarykism. It was no accident that the situation developed to a point where the Right-wing opportunists demanded that the CPCz adopt Masarykism as its official ideology with the ultimate aim of restoring "Masaryk's socialism".

Indeed, Masaryk called himself a socialist, but he never was one.

Why was the ideology of Masaryk, the ideology of that "political captain of Czechoslovak financial capital",¹ to use Klement Gottwald's expression, revived during the critical events? Precisely because Masarykism was a revisionist ideology! And not an ordinary, rank-and-file revisionism, but a generalised revisionism which had integrated all the revisionist schools and trends of any note, a revisionism which was not only in complete agreement with Bernsteinism but vied with it for first place. It is no accident that bourgeois ideologists attempt to pass Masaryk off as one of the founders of "Western unorthodox Marxism".

¹ Kl. Gottwald, *Spisy*, Vol. VIII, Praha, 1961, p. 88.

Not the least among the factors playing a role in the attempt to substitute Masarykism for Marxism and to replace real socialism with Masaryk's socialism with its cult of abstract humanism and abstract democracy was Masaryk's skill in manipulating socialist terminology, his deftness in combining international revisionism with "Czech philosophy" and "Czech socialism".¹

Being a synthesis of the bourgeois ideology and revisionism of its time, Masarykism was naturally used by the Right-wing opportunists in Czechoslovakia as a basic "encyclopedia" of revisionism and anti-communism, a "handbook" for the distortion of the theory and practice of socialism.

Lenin wrote that the revisionist trend in Social-Democracy did not have to develop and take shape; it sprang up fully formed, like Minerva from the head of Jove, for as regards its substance it was transferred directly from the bourgeois to socialist literature.²

In a sense, Masarykism as a bourgeois ideology was brought into the socialist literature by Masaryk himself. Without putting anyone to any trouble he "brought" himself, a bourgeois ideologist and reformist, into the socialist literature; parasitising on the problems of the working-class movement and scientific socialism, he preferred to battle not on his own but on his enemy's ground, the field of Marxist research, in order to revise Marxism, implant bourgeois socialism in the working-class movement, and free the socialist movement of Marxism.

The fact that formally Masaryk was neither a Social-Democrat nor Communist did not dismiss him as a revisionist but rather made his revisionism "supra-party", that is, even more subtle and dangerous.

When he was President Masaryk raised his revisionism to the government level, making Masarykism the state doc-

¹ *Dějiny KSC*, Praha, 1961, p. 126.

² See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 353-54.

trine. This, too, lent Masarykism a "supra-party" aura.¹

The fact is, however, that although Masaryk had no formal party affiliation he was not only the ideological inspirer of Right-wing Social-Democracy in Czechoslovakia which adopted a revisionist stand, but had a decisive organisational influence on it—the Rightist leadership of the Social-Democratic Party did nothing without his instructions!

Typical of Masarykism was its unity of revisionism and anti-communism, a feature that anticipated the relationship between contemporary anti-communism and revisionism. Today, anti-communists openly speak of modern revisionism as their "best ally", having vital importance for the "free world", and call it a clear manifestation of anti-communism in the "Red Empire". Specifically, the anti-communists believed that international revisionism's "Prague experiment", if it succeeded, could change communism and indeed change Europe and show the "helpless" world a new way.

From the theoretical standpoint Masarykism is not a definite, cohesive and well-worked-out system. Lenin's appraisal of the philosophical foundations of revisionism which, he said, consisted in substituting eclecticism and sophistry for dialectics² and idealism for materialism, is fully applicable to Masarykism.

In structure, Masarykism is a highly inconsistent and eclectic trend in philosophy, a mechanical and unsystematic agglomeration of various idealistic schools and movements, an endless chain of manifold borrowings from the philosophical arsenal of bourgeois, social-reformist and revisionist ideologists.

Masaryk's principal objective was to fight Marxism by any means, including out-and-out falsification of Marxism; this predominant negative orientation of Masarykism is

¹ According to the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, the President could not hold membership in any party.—*Ed.*

² See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 234.

what accounted for the fact that its own theoretical position was weak, incomplete, fragmentary and eclectic.

The philosophical concepts of revisionism are extremely mobile and inconstant; like a chameleon, revisionism changes its concepts to blend with the "colour" of the times.

So it was with Masarykism. Proceeding from the needs of the struggle against Marxism at one or another point in history, it manipulated the appropriate set of idealist philosophical concepts, without bothering, however, to connect them logically—not even within the bounds of idealism. It is no accident, therefore, that Masarykism is self-contradictory at every step.

Elements of objective and subjective idealism, theism and mysticism, Kantianism and Machism, pragmatism and positivism, anthropologism and materialism are combined by Masaryk in a most eclectic and unprincipled manner.

All this made scientific criticism of Masarykism difficult, while at the same time simplifying the task of the modern revisionists: revisionists of any stripe could draw from Masaryk whatever concepts and arguments they felt were most suitable.

Indeed, Masarykism implicitly incorporated all the basic slogans used by revisionism at its various stages of development, such as "Back to Kant", "Back to Hume", "Back to Comte", "Back to Mach", and even "Back to Marx", a slogan especially typical of contemporary revisionism.

An historical fact that must be considered, however, one reflecting the specificity of the ideological situation in Czechoslovakia, was the tremendous influence of Masarykism on the subsequent development of intellectual life in that country, which hampered the spread and understanding of Marxism. On the one hand, Masarykism was made the "Czech national philosophy", while on the other, Masaryk was considered by many to be the first propagandist of Marxism in Czechoslovakia.

In connection with the definition of Masarykism as revisionism, of great importance are the description and clas-

sification of literature on Marx which Lenin gave in the concluding section of his article "Karl Marx". His analysis helps us understand the essence of revisionism and why Masarykism falls into this category.

Lenin divided all those writing on Marx into "...three main groups: Marxists who, in important matters, adhere to Marx's point of view; bourgeois writers, in essence hostile to Marxism; and revisionists, who, while claiming to accept certain fundamentals of Marxism, in fact replace it with bourgeois conceptions. The Narodnik attitude towards Marx should be considered a peculiarly Russian variety of revisionism".¹

The Narodniks, it may be recalled, had nothing in common, from an organisational standpoint, with Marxism or Social-Democracy and, in fact, waged an uncompromising struggle against them; nevertheless, Lenin called the Narodnik criticism of Marxism revisionism.

This is a very important point in Lenin's approach to revisionism as a whole, as well as in his appraisal of Masaryk, because the group into which he placed Masaryk comes right after the Narodniks.

Lenin's classification of literature on Marx contains the following basic groups:

1. First of all he gives a bibliography of Marxist literature on Marx.

2. Then, from "works by opponents of Marxism" he points out writings by Tugan-Baranovsky, S. Prokopovich, W. Sombart, M. Adler, and others.²

3. Next, he gives a general description of literature "on the question of the two main currents in the interpretation and development of Marxism—the 'revisionist' and the ... 'orthodox'", and mentions Bernstein, Kautsky, Lafargue, Pannekoek, and others.³

4. The next group concretises the general description

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 85.

² *Ibid.*, p. 88.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

given above: "The Russian Narodniks on Marxism: N. K. Mikhailovsky...";⁴ etc.

5. And, finally, immediately after listing this group, Lenin writes: "Besides the Narodniks, the following may also be mentioned: N. Kareyev ... Masaryk ... Croce", obviously considering this group to be very close to the Narodniks.

As we can see, Masaryk did not end up among "bourgeois writers", but clearly in the company of revisionists.

Kareyev stood on liberal Narodnik positions in his historical works, one of which (on the history of the French peasantry) Marx gave a positive appraisal to, and in his philosophical views he was very close to N. K. Mikhailovsky's school of subjective sociology.

As for Croce, in his younger years he was a student of Antonio Labriola, took a keen interest in Marxism and considered himself a Marxist; later, however, he withdrew to revisionist positions.

Was the composition of this group accidental? No, it was not. What Kareyev, Masaryk and Croce had in common was revisionism. And theirs was very close in content to Mikhailovsky's revisionist trend, in direct proximity to which Lenin placed the group in question.

It should be noted that Lenin had taken full account of the critique of revisionism given by Plekhanov. In putting these three revisionists in the same group, for example, Lenin unquestionably bore in mind that in several works criticising international and Russian revisionism Plekhanov had shown that the essence of the views expounded by Bernstein, Mikhailovsky, Kareyev, Masaryk and Croce was identical and that on many issues their views fully coincided.

Helpful to our understanding of Lenin's classification are Plekhanov's works "About Masaryk's Book" and "About Croce's Book", in which he criticised the two men's views.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

In "About Croce's Book", he pointed out, for instance, that Croce considered himself a Marxist whereas he actually sought to "modify" Marxism in favour of Kantianism.¹

As for Kareyev, Plekhanov criticised his views along with those of other revisionists in many of his works.

In "About Croce's Book", Plekhanov pointed out the connection between Croce's and Kareyev's views. In his article "Cant Against Kant or Mr. Bernstein's Spiritual Testament", he spoke of the closeness of "Mr. Bernstein and Mr. Kareyev",² and on another occasion Plekhanov underlined the identity of Kareyev's and Mikhailovsky's views and characterised the two men as leaders of the "army" of opponents of historical materialism.

The purpose of Lenin's classification of literature on Marx was to reveal the relationships among revisionists of every stripe and the unity of the whole Bernstein-Mikhailovsky-Kareyev-Masaryk trend, something that Plekhanov had already come close to doing in his article "About Masaryk's Book":

"When we read the section that Mr. Masaryk devoted to historical materialism we frequently recall our kind, old Mr. Kareyev. Mr. Masaryk, who knows Russian and often cites Russian writers, is obliged to Mr. Kareyev for quite a bit. He borrowed many of his wonderful 'formulations'. . . . He likewise took a thing or two from the 'formulations' of Mr. Nikolai Mikhailovsky and other Russian 'critics' of historical materialism. . . . With all these borrowings and his verbosity and pedantism, Mr. Masaryk has turned out, in his 'criticism' of the historical views of Marx, to look very much like Mr. Eduard Bernstein."³

In conclusion, Plekhanov left not a shadow of a doubt about the revisionist character of Masaryk's book *The Social Question*, recommending it to anyone interested in a "critique" of Marxism because it revealed "the psycholog-

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 702.

² Ibid., p. 391.

³ Ibid., pp. 680-81.

ical basis underlying this currently fashionable so-called criticism".¹

It follows that Plekhanov considered that book more than just merely revisionist, but a kind of classical model embodying many characteristic features of revisionism.

Plekhanov's assessments on this score were fully developed in Lenin's description of the literature on Marx.

Subsequently, not only did Masaryk do nothing to contradict his being classified as a revisionist, but, on the contrary, especially after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, he modernised his revisionist concepts and made full use of the revisionist device of fighting Leninism from the positions of defending "true Marxism".

Let us take a few of Masaryk's utterances from the early twenties. Here, for example, are some from a speech he made on September 24, 1920 to miners working in Bfezove Hory near Pfiiram. He began by saying: "I want to say to you, workers, and mainly to you, Socialists, a few plain, almost working man's words. I was a worker myself. . . ."²

However, under the guise of "plain, working man's words", Masaryk revised and falsified Marx's views and sought to discredit Leninism, the socialist revolution and the building of socialism in the Soviet country: "I say here, with a clear conscience and to the best of my knowledge, that for us, Czechs, the Russian model is no good. . . . My only wish for you is that, as Marx wanted, you stick to really scientific socialism. . . . Your European socialism, according to Marx's teaching, is scientific socialism. And this is what distinguishes your socialism from the socialism in Russia."³

In an article entitled "Revolution and the Bolsheviks", Masaryk tried to present himself as a defender of Marxism

¹ Ibid., p. 680.

² Masaryk, *O bolševismu*, Praha, 1926, p. 11.

³ Ibid., p. 13.

as he hurled accusations at the Bolsheviks, saying that they "quite unworthily deviate from the truth in presenting the views of Marx and Engels and conceal their real essence".¹

But what, in Masaryk's view, was the "real essence" of Marxism? It was Marxism with its revolutionary substance expunged! Falsifying the views of Marx and Engels, Masaryk held that "the Bolsheviks, in seeking grounds for their own revolutionism, make completely erroneous references to Marx and Engels. Both of the latter rejected revolutionism in the socialist and scientific period of their development", "adopted the scientific and evolutionary point of view",² "and while the Bolsheviks dream of the revolutions of the old days, the uncultured, absolutist days when violence reigned, Marx and Engels, after long mental labour, arrived at the ideal of the revolution of the new times, a 'cultured' revolution ensuring a new administration";³ "Lenin, however, considers armed revolutions the main creative means",⁴ and, therefore, the Bolshevik "revolution was and is a political revolution, not a social and economic one".⁵

In an effort to discredit the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia, Masaryk gave as the main reason for this victory "Lenin's ultra-pacifism", his demand that the war be stopped no matter what, which supposedly assured for Lenin the support of the war-weary soldiery: "This is why Lenin won, and not because he made a correct Marxist analysis of the status of world capitalism and socialism."⁶

In *World Revolution*, Masaryk again opposed Lenin to Marx: "Lenin declares his communist programme to be true Marxism. But Lenin is wrong. Marx went through several stages in his socialist development. It is necessary

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., p. 27.

² Ibid., p. 28.

³ Ibid., pp. 28-29.

⁴ Ibid., p. 28.

⁵ Ibid., p. 32.

⁶ Ibid.

to distinguish two Marxisms. . . . In his second stage Marx had already abandoned the revolutionism of his youth. . . . Lenin and his followers cite the Marxism which Marx and Engels had themselves repudiated. . . . Generally speaking, Lenin cites Marxism incorrectly."¹

As we can see, Masaryk was trying to show Lenin to be a "revisionist" and himself to be a defender of "true" Marxism and "true" socialism.

Even as President, Masaryk remained a revisionist and continued to play the role of defender of "true" Marxism, while in fact he distorted the views of Marx, Engels and Lenin in order to replace Marxism with his own bourgeois concepts. And it was precisely an underestimation of the revisionist essence of Masarykism that accounted for its tenacity; during the events of 1968-1969 Masaryk was revived not as a President, but as a theorist of the "new", "Czechoslovak socialism", that is, as a revisionist.

As L. Hrzal writes, "the ideas of Masaryk and of similar 'authoritative' socialists were in the past years regarded uncritically in Czechoslovakia and even appeared in the mass media".² The revisionists of 1968 "began, in line with old revisionist theories following T. G. Masaryk's model, to look for differences between Marx's and Lenin's theories".³ Essentially, Masaryk was an ideologist of "democratic socialism", of whose revisionist character its contemporary theorists speak quite openly. "The revisionist movement in Social-Democracy," writes Friedrich Brandt, "can be equated with the movement of democratic socialism."⁴

In the matter of defining Masarykism as revisionism, some people hesitate because Masaryk was the President of the Czechoslovak bourgeois republic.

¹ Masaryk, *Světová revoluce*, Praha, 1925, p. 211.

² L. Hrzal a kolektiv, *Antikomunismus a ideologický boj*, Praha, 1972, p. 148.

³ Ibid., p. 235.

* *Die Neue Gesellschaft*, Nr. 11, 1972, S. 866.

However, Millerand was President of the French bourgeois republic (1920-1924), yet Lenin called Millerandism (ministerialism, ministerial "socialism") "practical Bernsteinism".¹ He saw in French Millerandism "the biggest experiment in applying revisionist political tactics on a wide, a really national scale".²

Through figures like Millerand and Masaryk revisionism was raised by the bourgeoisie of a number of capitalist countries to the level of state or government policy. Since the First World War, Millerandism has been essentially the basic tactic of the Right-wing socialist leaders.

It is still not fully appreciated, however, that Masaryk provided the main ideological inspiration not only for bourgeois reformism in Czechoslovakia but for Right-wing revisionism as well, that all the basic anti-communist and anti-Soviet "concepts" used by the proponents of Right-wing revisionism in Czechoslovakia have Masarykism as their historical source.

The fact that Masarykism had many faces, that it went through many socio-political and ideological metamorphoses was due to the conditions of the class struggle in Czechoslovakia. However, coming out politically now as bourgeois liberalism, now as bourgeois conservatism, now as "humane" socialism, Masarykism always remained revisionism in theory, parasitising on the socialist ideal of the modern era. That is what paved the way for Masaryk in 1968, when Masarykism in its revisionist essence was once again revived.

Vasil Bil'ak, Member of the Presidium of the CC CPCz and Secretary of the CC CPCz, in analysing how such an experienced party as the CPCz and such a cultured people as the Czechoslovak people could so quickly fall prey to false, non-class slogans,³ connected this fact to inadequate

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 352-55.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 15, p. 37.

³ Vasil Bil'ak, *Pravda zostala pravdou. Prejavy a články. Október 1967-december 1970*, Bratislava, 1971, p. 282.

exposure of the historical roots of revisionism in Czechoslovakia: "The tasks of our ideological work must consist in giving a fuller explanation of the very concept of revisionism and opportunism with which Vladimir Ilyich Lenin struggled all his life. We must show that this is not only a contemporary development but that it has its deep roots in the past." In criticising foreign revisionism we must not "forget the seats and creators of revisionism here at home, we must not forget what has grown up on our own soil in recent years".¹

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 392.

CHAPTER I

**THE HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT
AND IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE IN THE LATE 19th
AND EARLY 20th CENTURY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

**I. THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT
OF AN ORGANISED WORKERS' MOVEMENT**

At the early stage of its development the workers' movement was spontaneous and unorganised; it did not pursue its own, independent class goals and interests, but consisted merely of actions taken by the proletariat in support of the demands and interests of the bourgeoisie. In his article, "The Bourgeoisie and the Counter-Revolution", Karl Marx, characterising the actions of the proletariat in the English bourgeois revolution of 1648 and the French revolution of 1789, wrote: "In both revolutions the bourgeoisie was the class that *really* formed the van of the movement. The *proletariat* and *the strata of the burghers* which did not belong to the bourgeoisie either had as yet no interests separate from those of the bourgeoisie or they did not yet constitute independently developed classes or subdivisions of classes. Hence where they came out in opposition to the bourgeoisie, as for instance in France in 1793 till 1794, they fought only for the realisation of the interests of the bourgeoisie, even if not *in the fashion* of the bourgeoisie. The *whole French terrorism* was nothing but a *plebeian manner* of settling accounts with the *enemies of the bourgeoisie*, with absolutism, feudalism and *philistinism*."¹

For this reason, a real workers' movement, with its proletarian demands separate from the interests of the bour-

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, p. 139.

geoisie, took shape and developed considerably later, basically with the appearance of independent *class organisations* of the proletariat, i.e., trade unions and especially workers' parties. In the main, then, the history of the workers' movement, in the true sense of the word, began with the emergence of these working-class organisations; it began with the independent class demands and goals as manifested in the economic, political and ideological forms of the proletariat's class struggle against bourgeoisie. It is from this point on, from the time when this *organised* workers' movement first came into being, that this chapter examines the workers' movement in Czechoslovakia. Our discussion will be limited to a brief description of the two organisational forms of the workers' movement—the trade union and the party forms.

The trade unions arose in Czechoslovakia as an organisational form of the workers' movement, as an organisation of the Czechoslovak proletariat, primarily in the sphere of the proletariat's *economic* struggle against capital. Such struggle, however, does not yet impart full class consciousness to the proletariat. *Political and ideological* forms of the class struggle are also needed before the proletariat can rise to an understanding of its historic mission of transforming the world on a socialist basis. The crucial condition necessary for success in the proletariat's political struggle is the establishment of the highest form of working-class political organisation—a party which is governed in its activity by proletarian, socialist ideology.

The Emergence and Formation of the Trade Union Movement

The emergence and formation of the working class on Czech territory is directly linked with the rise and development of industry, primarily machine industry. The first machines appeared in the Czech lands in 1776, at the textile factories of Lejtenberger. The first steam-operated cloth-

processing machine was installed in 1804 in a textile factory in Liberec. Gradually, the industrial revolution spread throughout Bohemia. As industry expanded, the proletariat grew.

Exploitation of the workers at the factories prompted them to fight for their vital, at first only economic, interests. Economic workers' organisations began to take shape. In 1817, Bohemia's first workers' society—the Old Prague Fraternity—was organised. The work of the Fraternity attracted workers, and the society grew rapidly. In the event of death, disability and even unemployment, members of the society received a certain amount of material assistance.

The activity of the Fraternity showed workers that they needed collective associations to protect their interests.

In their fight against increased exploitation the workers initially destroyed machines, seeing in them the source of labour intensification. Gradually, however, the workers came to realise that they could not halt the development of machine industry or improve their own situation by wrecking and destroying the machines in the factories. They began to realise that their fight had to be directed not against the machines, but against the capitalists.

In 1841, there were 1,889 enterprises in Bohemia with machine equipment. By this time, the Czech proletariat was beginning to acquire class awareness, at first in the sphere of its economic interests. In the 1840s, the workers at some industrial enterprises organised mutual aid societies.

The workers' situation was very difficult. The working day was up to 14-15 hours long, child labour was widely used, and the living standard of the workers in Bohemia was extremely low. Mutual aid societies were a must for the workers. Czech historians of the workers' movement justifiably consider that the organisation of these societies was the beginning of factory worker organisation.

In 1844, workers at several factories staged the first, albeit unsuccessful, strike in Prague. The strike was broken after 525 strikers were arrested. But the workers' movement

gained maturity and experience in the course of the class struggle. The first actions of the workers frightened the Czech bourgeoisie, and after the 1848 revolutions in France and Germany it went into the service of the Hapsburg dynasty. This period in the development of the Czech workers' movement was characterised not only by their economic struggle. The Czech people were at that time under foreign domination and were faced with the problem of national liberation. The Czech proletariat took an active part in this struggle. Drawing on its experience in organised, basically economic, strike activity, the Czech working class participated in the political struggle of 1848: it took up arms and went into the streets of Prague against the Hapsburg oppressors. In its initial stage, the revolutionary struggle against these oppressors was waged by the Czech working class. This struggle was highly appraised by Marx and Engels.

After the Prague uprising of 1848, however, the liberal bourgeoisie succeeded in diverting the Czech people from revolutionary political struggle and in pursuing a policy supporting the Hapsburg monarchy and tsarist Russia. The reactionary nature of the Czechoslovak national movement during the 1848-1849 period that followed was pointed out by Marx. The Czech bourgeoisie was drawing the workers along the harmful, ruinous path of supporting the counter-revolutionary interests of the Hapsburg monarchy. This was the unhappy result of the slow development and weakness of the Czech workers' movement of that time.

The Czech bourgeoisie used every means possible, and often with success, to impede the emergence of workers' organisations. In this, the monarchy aided the bourgeoisie in every way. A law passed in 1852 prohibited the formation of workers' organisations. However, this did not stop the formation and development of an organised workers' movement.

In the 1860s, there was a noticeable increase in the number of workers' organisations in Czechoslovakia. Their

emergence was connected with the rapid growth of industry and a widespread strike movement, as a result of which the workers won legislation limiting the working day to ten hours for carpenters, eleven for roofers and twelve hours for shoemakers. That was the first success of the working-class movement. Working time had never before been regulated by any kind of law in Bohemia. The workers were fully aware of their first success. They now brought up with increasing frequency the question of freedom of assembly, which meant that the trade unions were now also making political demands. In late March 1870, a strike broke out in the Libig factory in Svárov. When the workers attempted to unite with workers from other factories, the police, who were called to suppress the strikers, used firearms, with consequent casualties, both killed and wounded.

The actions taken by the workers aroused apprehension in government circles, to the extent that on April 7, 1870 a law was passed permitting workers' organisations and recognising the workers' right to strike. This lent added impetus to the growth of trade unions; in two years' time there were 11, and in three years—36, with a total of 12,000 members. The existence of small and separate trade union organisations, however, hampered the workers' movement as a whole. Progressive workers understood that the efforts of all workers' organisations must be united. As a result, in 1872, in Prague, for the first time in the history of the Czech workers' movement, a trade union uniting all the organisations of a single trade was organised. This was the Central Association of the Machine Builders of Bohemia, headed by a Central Committee which was elected at a convention attended by 1,500 delegates.

By the 1890s, the trade union movement in Austria-Hungary was united on a nation-wide scale. In 1892, the first general Austrian Trade Union of Metal Workers, including Czech workers, was organised.

In addition, the early 1890s saw attempts to organise

an independent Czech trade union centre, which culminated in the formation of the Czech Trade Union in 1897, when 108 delegates representing 90 organisations argued in favour of organising a national trade union centre. Nonetheless, the Czech trade unions did not agree to complete separation from the Austrian trade union movement.

During this period, despite the fact that unity in the workers' movement was imperative, a split in the trade union movement was beginning to show; there was lack of unity even in the central organs of the trade union movement in Vienna. As a consequence of disarray in the trade unions, a strike staged in 1900 failed to achieve all its goals, despite the fact that about 80,000 miners went out. They did succeed, however, in establishing a nine-hour working day. A significant role in the split of the trade union movement was played by the separatist nationalist policy pursued by the leaders of the Czech trade union movement.

This policy was condemned by the Fourth International Conference of Central Trade Unions held in Amsterdam in 1905, and again in 1910, at a trade union congress in Copenhagen. In that same year, the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen passed a resolution condemning the actions of the Czech trade union centre and the Czech party. In his article "Separatists in Russia and Separatists in Austria", Lenin wrote: "In the international working-class movement, the question of separatism came to the front most urgently in 1910, at the Copenhagen Congress. The *Czechs* came forward as separatists in Austria, and destroyed the unity that had existed previously between the Czech and German workers. The International Congress at Copenhagen *unanimously* condemned separatism, but the Czechs have unfortunately remained separatists right up to the present."¹ The Czechs did not agree with the decision of the Copenhagen Congress and split off com-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 88.

pletely, breaking ties with the international trade union movement.

One might think that after the establishment of an independent Czechoslovak state in 1918 conditions for trade union activity should have become more favourable. As subsequent events showed, however, the trade union movement became even more fractionated. The policy of splitting the trade union movement, of keeping the trade unions fractionated, was supported by the bourgeoisie and its parties, for it was in the bourgeoisie's interest to weaken the proletariat.

**The Penetration of Marxism
into the Working-Class Movement
and the Emergence of Social-Democratic Organisations**

The penetration of Marxism into Bohemia and Slovakia began in the second half of the 19th century. A certain role in this was played by the Social-Democratic Party and its leaders. In contrast to the trade union form of the workers' movement, which had to do basically with the economic struggle, the Social-Democratic movement was primarily a political working-class movement.

The Social-Democratic movement of the workers emerged considerably later than the trade union movement; it constituted the next step in the development of the Czech proletariat's class awareness. Social-Democratic organisations began to appear only in 1874. Czech workers made their first acquaintance with Marxist theory through the tireless propaganda efforts of the first outstanding members of the socialist movement in Czechoslovakia—Josef Boleslav Pecka, Ladislav Zápotocký and Josef Hibeš. They were the first men in Czechoslovakia to study the works of Marx and Engels and to acquaint the Czech working class with the great historical truth of Marxism. Their written works, published in the working-class press, indicate that as early as the beginning of the 1870s they were familiar with such

works of the founders of scientific communism as the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, *Capital* (translated chapters of which they had already begun to publish), and Marx's remarks on the Paris Commune. These men fought for the interests of the workers and tried to put Marxist ideas into practice—not only through the printed word, but also in their day-to-day political activity.

As Marxist ideas spread, large strikes took place in Brno, Northern Bohemia and elsewhere.

Under the influence of Marxist ideas and in connection with the growth of the workers' strike movement, a Czech Social-Democratic Party was formed in 1878 in Prague. At the time, however, the activity of the Social-Democrats was not yet widespread.

A struggle was taking place within the party over the political line to be followed and over the question of becoming or not becoming part of Austrian Social-Democracy. A general Social-Democratic Party of Austria-Hungary was formed on January 1, 1889, at a congress held in Geinfeld, and this party began to unite a greater part of the working class in Austria. The working class could now begin to wage a struggle with the bourgeoisie for the leading role in the nation, especially since the class interests of the bourgeoisie came into greater and greater conflict with national interests. Soon, however, a split occurred in the Austro-Hungarian Social-Democratic movement. In 1891, the Czech Social-Democrats quit the Austrian central party organisations and in 1893, in České Budějovice, an independent Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Party was formed. At its Second Congress, held in 1894 in the city of Brno, this party adopted its own programme.

Alarmed by the upsurge in the workers' movement and perceiving in Marxism a threat to their own existence the ruling circles instigated police persecution of Marxist propagandists. But this did not halt the growing influence of

Marxism in Bohemia, and the bourgeoisie was forced to alter its tactics and methods of struggle.

The bourgeoisie now sought to find some kind of "carrot" to supplement its use of the "stick", some method by which the workers would be given a false understanding of capitalism and be convinced that it could be improved through the "development" of bourgeois democracy. Bourgeois liberal ideology came to play this role; operating with demagogic phrases about unlimited "freedom" for all, it served the bourgeoisie as a more refined ideological method of influencing the masses than were the conservatism and clericalism that were predominant in the past. The only thing that could succeed at least to some degree in influencing the workers was a liberal ideology, an ideology which masked the anti-popular nature of capitalism with words about "humanism" and "democracy". For this reason, such an ideology posed a serious threat to the class interests of the proletariat. Masarykism assumed this role from the very beginning.

It should be noted also that the history of the Czech workers' movement had by that time entered into a period when the unity of the working class was seriously undermined by the labour aristocracy and the revolutionary leaders of the working class were hounded by the police.

Under these conditions, Masaryk and his followers succeeded in overriding the Social-Democratic leadership and directing the Czech workers' movement away from the path of revolutionary struggle against capitalism and onto the path of reformism.

The Czech bourgeoisie was attempting to "intercept", as it were, the penetration of Marxism into the Czechoslovak workers' movement. It made wide use of Masaryk's idealist, reactionary philosophy in its struggle against the working class and its proletarian revolutionary ideology. Masaryk and his adherents began to spread among Czechoslovak intellectuals many Marxist propositions, but in their own distorted interpretation. The bourgeoisie was thereby striv-

ing to penetrate the workers' movement ideologically, to sow scepticism about the strength of Marxist teaching and to disarm the proletariat in its struggle against capitalism. With the same aim the bourgeoisie pursued a policy of spurious humanism and phone democracy.

Police repression coupled with the bourgeois ideological offensive against Marxism had their deleterious effect on the ideological steadfastness of Czech Social-Democracy. The latter was already abandoning its Marxist positions, and at its Fifth Congress, in 1896, it made substantial concessions to revisionism as it went over, in many respects, to opportunist positions. From that point on, Masarykism came to have an increasing influence on the Czech workers' movement in general, and on Czech Social-Democracy in particular.

**2. THE STRUGGLE WAGED
BY FEUDAL REACTIONARIES
AND THE CZECH BOURGEOISIE
AGAINST THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT.
THE EMERGENCE OF MASARYKISM**

**Masarykism as a Policy and Ideology
of the Czech Bourgeoisie in the Imperialist Period**

The period of bourgeois revolution in Austria ended with the establishment in 1867 of a dual Austro-Hungarian state and the adoption of the December constitution. The bourgeoisie had strengthened its position by compromising with feudal reaction; in subsequent years, many vestiges of feudalism remained untouched in Austria-Hungary. One of the most burning problems of the day was the unsolved national question. The bourgeoisie was unable to bring about the fulfilment of the basic national demands of the Czech people.

Meanwhile, the hope that in the course of the reforms of the 1860s a Czech national state would finally be established aroused great enthusiasm in the Czech people. This

enthusiasm was most fully manifested in the best works of the Czech national culture of that time, above all in the music of Smetana and the literary works connected with the National Theatre.

Immediately after 1867, the bourgeoisie began attempts to enter the ruling circles of the Hapsburg empire. With this in mind, the politicians of the Czech bourgeoisie who were connected with reactionary feudal strata made a fundamental deal with the government in 1871 which signified the bourgeoisie's capitulation to the Austro-Hungarian reactionary forces. Eight years later (1879), when the German Liberal Party was removed from power, Czech bourgeois deputies became members of the Imperial Council and supported one of the most reactionary of Austrian governments—the Taaffe government.

The Czech bourgeoisie was now playing up to the Emperor and Taaffe while, at the same time, trying to distract public attention from its disgraceful capitulation and even portraying itself as victor. To achieve the first goal, Czech authorities, headed by Minister of Justice Baron Pražák, participated zealously in the persecution of Socialists which the Taaffe government had launched. The Czech deputies gave loyal support to the government circles as they put through highly reactionary and unpopular measures, such as raising taxes to provide increased funds for the army, subordinating the schools to clerical reaction, shortening the length of school education, etc.

To achieve its second goal, the Czech bourgeoisie made demagogic use of a decree then issued concerning education in the Czech language. Although, in fact, this decree did not bring about substantial changes, the bourgeoisie pointed to it as its great accomplishment, focusing attention on the language question to distract public attention from the overall policy it was pursuing. Certain other measures were undertaken with the same aim, one of which was to divide Prague University into a German university and a Czech university. Under these conditions,

final decisions were made not by highly qualified people in the academic field, but primarily by politicians.

It was into this little world, full of complicated personal and factional interests, that Masaryk entered in the year 1882. Before coming to Prague, he had associated with people in reactionary Austrian society, ranging from the family of Le Monnier, the police chief of Brno, to circles of Viennese bankers, lawyers and high-ranking Austrian bureaucrats. In this environment, Masaryk grew as a sophisticated intellectual, a cosmopolitan, far removed from the life of the working people and the democratic culture of the Czech nation. Young Masaryk's socio-political views were greatly influenced by ideas of some members of the clergy, especially one father Proházka, who, in the late 1860s, tried to penetrate the workers' movement of Prague.

Masaryk's first step in his political career was to take part in a campaign to expose forgeries of *The Manuscripts*.¹ Shortly after the hullabaloo over this matter quieted down, Masaryk began negotiations with the most reactionary political group within the Czech bourgeoisie at that time—the Staroczech (Old Czech) Party. When these negotiations fell through, however, Masaryk established contact with another Czech bourgeois group—the Mladoczechs (Young Czechs). In contrast to the conservative Staroczechs, whose connections were with the large landowners and the

¹ Reference here is to Masaryk's participation in a polemic on the authenticity of the *Královédvorský* and *Zelenohorský* "manuscripts", which were published in 1817 and 1818 by Czech writer and poet V. Hanka, who claimed they were works of 9th-13th century national poetry. Careful study of the "manuscripts", however, made it increasingly clear that they were counterfeits. In the end, it was determined that Hanka himself had manufactured them in order to provide "confirmation" for his own theory about the existence of a developed Czech culture in that period.

Masaryk took an active part in this controversy in its final stages in 1886, proving the spuriousness of the "manuscripts" on the basis of a sociological and aesthetic analysis.

Masaryk's participation in sensational matters of this kind was used to spread the illusion that all of his views were progressive.

nobility, the Mladoczechs were a young industrial and kulak bourgeoisie, much more predatory and resourceful in implementing their demands. In 1891, Masaryk stepped into the political arena as a Mladoczech deputy.

The 1890s marked a new turning point in the development of society: capitalism entered the phase of imperialism, and with imperialism came an acute aggravation of all the contradictions that had characterised the situation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a consequence of the uncompleted bourgeois revolution. New contradictions also arose. From that time on, the basic factor in the historical development of Czechoslovakia was the workers' socialist movement. Beginning in 1890, it assumed unprecedented proportions as it involved an ever greater part of the proletariat.

In 1891, the Mladoczechs took over from the Staroczechs the function of representing the entire Czech bourgeoisie—but not for long. Contradictions in the bourgeois society waxed under imperialism. In the political sphere, one manifestation of these contradictions was the emergence of new political parties and new, more or less radical, trends and currents. Despite all their demagogy, in the late 1890s the Mladoczechs lost their support from the petty-bourgeois segments of the population and ended up representing only the *Živnostenská* Bank bourgeois group. The now much stronger kulak elements, who had actually brought Czech agrarian capital into being, organised themselves into an agrarian party. In the meantime, small, scattered groups sprang up within the bourgeois intelligentsia. The National Socialist Party, which had grown out of an ultra-reactionary group of "national workers" organised by Klofač, editor of the newspaper *Národní listy*, was now drawing its members from among the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie which was being ruined by imperialism.

Also connected with the cutting short of the bourgeois revolution was the fact that the anti-Austrian liberation movement of the oppressed working masses in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had gained momentum, for imperial-

ism brought with it new and even harsher national oppression that penetrated deeper and deeper into all spheres of social life.

During the period of transition from capitalism to imperialism in Austria-Hungary, the balance of economic power between the Czech and German bourgeoisie was changing. The Czech bourgeoisie, already relatively strong economically at the end of the 19th century, had to struggle against its German competitor not only for the small Czech market, but for the leading positions in all of Austria-Hungary. It was interested, consequently, not in destroying the Hapsburg monarchy, but in strengthening it. Since the domestic Czech market was already in the hands of the German bourgeoisie, the Czech bourgeoisie found the new imperialist trends in Austria-Hungary very much to its liking, and it began to take a substantial part in the export of capital to more backward countries, primarily the Balkans. That is why the Czech bourgeoisie supported the Austro-Hungarian expansionist foreign policy which was directed against the Slavic peoples of the Balkans. It was interested in government orders, and, therefore, also supported the armament and preparation of Austria-Hungary for an imperialist war.

Apprehensive of the powerful workers' movement, the Czech bourgeoisie supported internal Austrian reaction and the state apparatus. Never wavering, it sought to use the popular mass movement to promote its own competitive struggle for the Czech market, especially when it could use nationalistic demagogy as a means of "rendering harmless" the revolutionary strength of the popular masses. The Czech bourgeoisie—whose political orientation was alien to the traditions of national renaissance and the people's national movement which had always been directed against Austria-Hungary—was represented in one way or another in every Austrian government since 1899. Only by taking all this into account can we understand how and why Kramaf, Švehla, Masaryk, Klofač and other Czech bourgeois politi-

cians of the early 20th century carried on and developed the Staroczech-Mladoczech political traditions of the last third of the 19th century. Only by taking all this into account can we understand the real meaning of taking a "genuine interest in the fate of Austria", which Masaryk propagandised in the 1890s as the basic prerequisite to a successful Czech policy.

The disintegration of bourgeois society resulting from the growing contradictions of imperialism also manifested itself in the revival of old and the appearance of new and more refined forms of reactionary ideology aimed at giving the bourgeoisie greater influence over the working people. Working class discontent and the growing strength of workers' organisations were becoming increasingly dangerous to the bourgeoisie. It was at this time that Masaryk's ideology came to the fore, side by side with nationalistic, anti-Semitic and other reactionary movements, such as, for example, the "national workers" organisation and the clerical movement that played on the religious feelings of the people. Masaryk represented the more modern, more refined, more cosmopolitan bourgeoisie. In 1893, he broke with the Mladoczechs and began to criticise them, for their opportunism in respect to the Hapsburg monarchy repelled not only workers, but also broad segments of the nationally oppressed non-proletarian masses of the Czech people. By breaking with the Mladoczechs, Masaryk hoped to prepare the way for his playing essentially the same role in relation to the workers' revolutionary movement in his country as Bernstein and other revisionists played in Germany.

The objective precondition for the expansion of petty-bourgeois elements in the workers' movement in the late 19th century was the transition of capitalism to its imperialist stage and the consequent appearance in the ranks of the working class of a labour aristocracy, which acquired considerable influence over the trade unions and party branches. As a consequence, reformist opportunism began to spread through the workers' movement, and many forms

of bourgeois ideology that had already been exposed by Marx and Engels were revived. Advantage of this situation was taken by revisionists headed by Bernstein and, in the conditions extant in Bohemia, above all by bourgeois professor Masaryk, who exerted influence on the workers' movement along revisionist lines.

In the preceding period of his life—a time rich in events—Masaryk happened to live in the main centres of the workers' movement. In 1869, there was a bloody clash between workers and police in the city of Brno, where Masaryk was living at the time. In December of that same year he was in Vienna when thousands of workers staged a demonstration in that city in connection with the fight for suffrage. After this large demonstration came a period in which Viennese Socialists were persecuted. Nothing, however, could stop the growth of the workers' movement in the Austro-Hungarian capital.

The year 1873 saw the beginning of a severe and prolonged economic crisis in which hundreds of working people were thrown out of work to face poverty and hunger. At this time, the Social-Democratic movement began to develop rapidly in the Czech lands. But in the late 1870s, Bohemia also became the scene of intensified persecution of Socialists, which culminated, in 1882—just at the time Masaryk moved to Prague—in the arrest and illegal conviction of a large number of workers. These actions of the Austro-Hungarian monarchist authorities evoked strong protests from the Czech democratic community (for example, in 1886, I. Arbes ridiculed the policy of persecuting Socialists in a piece entitled "The Law on Exterminating Anarchists").

However, these developments evoked no protest from Masaryk, who had already perceived the danger that an organised Workers' Socialist Party posed to the bourgeoisie. During his stay in Leipzig, he had witnessed an election campaign in which German Social-Democracy had won out despite the Bismarckian persecution.

In the 1890s the workers' movement in Austria-Hungary became increasingly threatening to the bourgeoisie. Masaryk realised that open struggle was not always the best tactic in the fight against the Social-Democratic danger. This explains why, though he had never before shown an interest in the workers' movement, he did so now that he had become a deputy. He did not avoid contacts with Social-Democratic figures, did not refuse to organise lectures for workers, and was particularly active in the question of suffrage. Leipzig convinced Masaryk that suffrage posed no danger and that, on the contrary, it was dangerous to deny this right to the working class and thereby force it on to the road of uncontrolled struggle outside parliament. Also, the granting of suffrage to workers was an urgent democratic demand, and the fight for its satisfaction became the major political task of the Social-Democrats in Austria-Hungary in the 1890s. Being for or against suffrage was at that time like a criterion of membership or non-membership in the Social-Democratic Party. Masaryk's positive views on suffrage enabled him to win the sympathy of a part of the Socialists of that time. Nor did he break his connection with the working class in 1893, when he divested himself of his deputy powers and broke with the Mladoczechs, who had openly begun (in place of the Staroczechs) to play the role of lackeys to the Austro-Hungarian government circles.

Having split with the Mladoczechs, Masaryk entered the period of his greatest prewar political activity. His well-known works—*Our Present Crisis*, *The Czech Question*, *Jan Hus*, *Karel Havlíček*, *Palacký's Idea of the Czech Nation* and others—came out one after another. They were all political works that were not based on scientific research, but written with the idea of gaining for him, Masaryk, the reputation as a national thinker and to assure him a leading place in public life. In these works, as in other books, Masaryk distorted Czech history by ignoring its class content and stressing the "unity" of the people.

Masarykism as the Falsification and Revision of Marxism

For a long time it was asserted that Masaryk was the first to acquaint the Czech public with Marxism. Now, however, on the basis of a thorough study of the events of the last third of the 19th century and especially of the workers' movement of that period, we see that this was one of the many legends built around Masaryk.

In all of his works Masaryk set out to distort and falsify Marxist philosophy, political economy and socialism rather than to present them objectively. One has only to glance at the titles of his works to see that Masaryk's basic aim was to revise and criticise Marxism.

Masaryk's press organs—*Čas (Time)*, and, particularly, *Nase doba (Our Epoch)*—became the chief purveyors of information to the Czech public on the *revisionist* criticism of Marxism engaged in since the end of the 19th century mainly by German Social-Democrats, but also by some Socialists in other countries. The primary motive behind all the comment and information printed in Masaryk's press organs about the current development of socialism was to use *revisionism* as evidence that "young" Marxists allegedly rejected materialism and took issue with Marx and Engels. In an article entitled "Old Socialism and Fabianism", appearing in *Cas* in 1896, Masaryk vilified basic Marxist propositions, including "Workers of All Countries, Unite!", and criticised the revolutionary side of Marxism, saying that it was applicable to the mid-19th century, but now obsolete.

In 1898, Masaryk summed up all of his previous statements preaching international *revisionism* in a book entitled *The Social Question*. He used that book as a vehicle for denigrating socialism and passing off *revisionism*—which was, in fact, the fruit of the crisis in bourgeois society and bourgeois ideology in the era of imperialism—as the "crisis of Marxism". In the following year Bernstein published his book, *The Prerequisites of Socialism and the Tasks of Social-Democracy*, in which he summed up all of his previously

expounded revisionist views. Masaryk greeted this book enthusiastically. In an article, "On the Crisis of Marxism", appearing in the magazine *Nase doba* he wrote: "Bernstein's book fully confirms my opinion of Marxism. I could not ask for fuller confirmation. Bernstein comes out against revolution; he wants Marxists to become a social-reformist party (of course, more radical than other parties), and he does not reject compromise with other kindred parties. . . . In a word, in his basic scientific propositions, Bernstein departs from Marxism." The only fault Masaryk could find with Bernstein was that he formulated his arguments against Marxism too carefully and not decisively enough, thereby giving Kautsky a chance to initiate a polemic with him.¹

In another book, *Česká otdzka (The Czech Question)*, just as in *The Social Question*, Masaryk spread his slanderous and reactionary nationalistic statements about Marx's alleged hostility towards the Czechs and especially about his "anti-Czech" position in 1848. Knowing that large segments of the working people at that time were not fully acquainted with the works of the Marxist classics, he counterposed Engels to Marx and used Engels' prestige among Czech workers in an attempt to strengthen reactionary Czech bourgeois nationalism. This, then, was how in the last decade of the 19th century, Masaryk, taking advantage of the ideological slump in which Social-Democracy found itself and of spreading reformism, began to exert his influence on the workers' movement and to guide it along the lines of his pseudo-humanism in the interests of the bourgeoisie.

Another myth about Masaryk was that he was the father of objective Czech research on Russia and her problems. Nothing could be further from the truth. His press organs, *Cas* and *Nase doba*, always printed detailed information about every obscure revisionist in Western Europe, but never a

¹ Zdeněk Šolle, "The Influence of Masarykism on the Czech Labour Movement in the Late 19th Century", *Nova mysl*, No. 3, 1954.

word about the brilliant Marxist works which young Lenin had begun publishing since 1894. Especially after the first Russian revolution, Masaryk became one of the chief slanderers of Russian revolutionaries and of Russians in general, whom he portrayed as a backward people.¹

Masarykism—a specifically Czech variety of international revisionism—penetrated the workers' movement in other ways, too, in addition to the writings of Masaryk and his followers. In the second half of the 1890s, the Social-Democratic leadership was seized by new people who had come from the disintegrating radical petty-bourgeois movement of the "Progressists" and who represented the increasingly strong labour aristocracy. Many direct disciples of Masaryk also assumed leadership roles in the Social-Democratic Party.

At the Fifth Congress of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party, held in Prague in 1896, the influence of these members of the new strata of the workers' movement that were infected with petty-bourgeois ideology manifested itself primarily in the many concessions which Social-Democracy made to bourgeois nationalism. Masaryk's *Čas* greeted that congress with enthusiasm, flattered the Social-Democrats and emphasised: "Our Social-Democracy deserves special mention! While an excessively numerous Jewish element is immediately noticeable among the Germans, public opinion—which we hold dear—has no idea how national our organisation is. Only with repugnance could one read the false statement in the newspaper *Národní listy* on April 9 that 'the Social-Democrats are clearly trying to destroy all vestiges of national feeling among their adherents'. Whoever wrote that has never been among Social-Democrats."²

Similarly, Masaryk lauded the bourgeois-nationalistic statements made by Social-Democrats in 1897. Certain cosmopolitan tendencies cropped up in the Austrian Social-

Democrats' policies at that time, and this gave the Czech bourgeoisie—represented mainly by the Mladoczechs—and their ultra-reactionary agents (the so-called national workers) the chance to attack the workers' organisation. Then Masaryk's *Čas* came out "in defence" of the Social-Democrats and against the attacks of the Mladoczechs and the "national workers". But not out of sympathy for the working class, of course, but because Masaryk immediately realised that crude nationalistic attacks only united the proletariat into a single militant international front, while the cosmopolitanism of the Social-Democratic leadership automatically strengthened bourgeois-nationalistic reaction, especially within the ranks of the nationally oppressed Czech workers.

The decline of Social-Democracy and the influence of Masaryk's reformist adherents in the workers' movement manifested themselves fully when the national liberation movement reached a particularly high peak right after the first Russian revolution in 1905. It was then that Masaryk's supporters, who had taken over the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party, bent every effort to distract the workers "so that their minds were not occupied only with hunger and need", as Masaryk himself, in the 1890s, defined the meaning of his speeches to striking workers in Prague and Kladno.

On Masaryk's initiative, a Workers' Academy was established in 1896, its purpose being to implant in workers, instead of militant revolutionary enthusiasm, a "hopeless awareness of their cultural inadequacy" and thereby divert them from the path of revolutionary struggle onto the path of "self-education and enlightenment". This was also the idea behind the pseudo-theoretical articles published by Masaryk's followers in the Social-Democratic magazine *Akademie*.

Thus, in respect to the working class and its ideology—Marxism—Masaryk played a reactionary role from the very beginning of his political career. Moving about within bourgeois society since his early years, he lived, breathed and

¹ Zdeněk Šolle, op. cit., p. 11.

² Ibid.

championed the interests of the bourgeoisie, while his attitude towards the workers' movement was hostile. Realising much sooner than did other Czech bourgeois politicians the best way to deal with the danger of an increasingly potent proletariat, Masaryk meddled in the Czech workers' movement and found a response among the labour aristocracy which had boosted its influence in the workers' movement in the late 19th century, as capitalism moved into its imperialist phase. All this, in conjunction with a number of other circumstances, hampered the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie to overthrow the capitalist system. Masaryk's influence among workers made it easier for him than for anyone else from the bourgeoisie to deflect the labour movement from a revolutionary path. He took advantage of the ideological decline of the Social-Democratic Party and not only criticised Marxism in his writings, but tried to influence Social-Democracy directly. Masaryk wanted to restrict the activity of the Social-Democratic Party to "purely labour" issues, that is, to the struggle for reforms that would in no way jeopardise the capitalist system. This was the "progress" that distinguished Masaryk, the "humanist and friend of the workers", from the primitively reactionary Mladoczech politicians. Being a representative of the ruling classes, however, Masaryk could, under the circumstances then prevailing in the social development of Czechoslovakia, play a leading role in the struggle against the working class much more subtly than the less resourceful politicians of Kramaf's ilk.

At first, Masaryk's liberal activity and propaganda were not always understood by members of the ruling classes, who preferred the standard conservative methods. It was not that Masaryk was encroaching upon their interests, but simply that they did not understand that complicated manoeuvring and effective phraseology were now needed to defend the existing system. Later, however, they were grateful to Masaryk, and at the time of the bourgeois republic many of his former "enemies" declared themselves to be

Masaryk's followers. Indeed, from the mid-19th century on, conservatism and liberalism were merely varieties of ruling class, primarily bourgeois, ideology. Conservatives and liberals, Pekář and Masaryk, despite their purely superficial differences, in essence championed the interests of the same class and differed only in their choice of the way in which these interests should be protected.

The bourgeoisie needed liberal ideologists who could, by talking about individual faults in the existing system and calling for insignificant reforms, attract the workers' attention and divert them from revolutionary struggle. Masaryk filled this need better than any other representative of the bourgeoisie. He preached his views on "humanism" and "democracy"—views which directly protected the interests of the bourgeoisie—from the very beginning of his career, and especially after 1882, when he began to lecture at the University of Prague.

The Communists of Czechoslovakia have always looked upon Masaryk as a bourgeois ideologist and politician; they have always considered him an enemy of Marxism-Leninism, an enemy of scientific socialism, an enemy of the communist world outlook. Masaryk took a hostile stand towards the revolutionary teaching of the working class in 1898, in *The Social Question*, an ideological treatise directed against the teaching of Marx and Engels and designed to do the same for Social-Democratic opportunism and revisionism in Czechoslovakia as Eduard Bernstein's writings did for it on an international scale. Masaryk was hostile to Lenin's teaching and to the Russian Bolshevik Party in his work, *Russia and Europe*, published in 1913.

Czech Social-Democracy co-operated with Masaryk long before the First World War, and this only confirms the fact of opportunism in the Czech Social-Democratic leadership. Prior to the First World War, Masaryk and the Czech Social-Democratic opportunists were in agreement in acknowledging the necessity of preserving the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; both rejected the idea of establishing an independent

Czechoslovak state and ignored the national aspirations of the Czechoslovak people.

In the imperialist period, the Czech bourgeoisie succeeded in drawing Right-wing Social-Democracy over to the defence of capitalist interests. In view of the prevailing opportunism in the parties of the Second International, Masarykism was able to split the Social-Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia prior to the advent of the revolutionary storms that broke out due to the impact of the Great October Socialist Revolution. With the help of Masarykism, the Czech bourgeoisie implanted the idea of nationalism in the broad segments of the Czech and Slovak public during the period of bourgeois Czechoslovakia. During Masaryk's presidency, his long-standing connection with Right-wing Social-Democrats became especially evident.

Throughout the years of bourgeois Czechoslovakia, its ruling circles strove to "educate" the Czechoslovak people in the spirit of the bourgeois legend about Masaryk and his "democratism and humanism".

The repressive measures, which included executions, undertaken in December 1920 on Masaryk's initiative against the revolutionary proletariat, established once and for all that relations between Masaryk and the communist movement were, from a class point of view, irreconcilable.

From the outset, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia stood opposed to Masaryk's policy and ideology, always seeing in him a political and ideological representative of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie and, above all, a close ally of finance capital. Masaryk was also an enemy of the Soviet Union and took an active part in anti-Soviet plots by giving material support to Russian counter-revolutionary emigrants and terrorists, such as, for example, Savinkov.

Throughout the Czechoslovak bourgeois republic's existence, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia never took a positive position in relation to Masarykism.

The Class Bias of Masarykism in Philosophy and Sociology

Masarykism emerged and developed as an ideology of the Czech bourgeoisie in the period of imperialism, when the bourgeoisie had already become a reactionary force and the proletariat had become an independent class, with its own organisations—trade unions and political parties—and its own ideology. The bourgeoisie and its ideologists no longer directed all their efforts against the forces of feudalism, as had been the case during the French Revolution of 1789-1794; on the contrary, they fought in alliance with those forces *against the working class and its ideology*, above all against *Marxism*. This is how the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie and its ideology manifested itself in the period of imperialism. *Masarykism was revisionism and reformism*, an attempt to distort Marxist teaching, particularly the theory of scientific socialism, while feigning an "objective" attitude towards Marxism.

The Czech bourgeoisie attempted to portray Masaryk's views as constituting a national Czech ideology having no class character of any kind and being impartial and objective. Masaryk himself bent no little effort in his writings to portray his views as forming a supra-party and supra-class ideology. In his first major work, *The Social Question*, he strove to contrast himself to party writers and to separate himself from them.¹

¹ Masaryk wrote: "In this work, I set myself the task of explaining the meaning of Marxism as a philosophical and sociological system. So far, only the economic aspect of Marxism has been subjected to analysis and, in particular, certain of its slogans and teachings have been studied. For example, there is discussion on the question of whether communism is possible or not. But even here an account of Marx's entire teaching on communism is not given. For *party* writers this is quite understandable; *but for me*, it is important to give an account of the teachings of Marx and Engels in their entirety and in their interconnection [emphasis added—M.S.]." See *Otázka sociální*, Praha, 1946, p. IX.

He also asserted that philosophy, sociology and other social sciences should not be an expression of partisan views or the instruments of party struggle; they should be impartial. He tried to make it look as though his own views stood above any class or party struggle, above any class ideology. In particular, in an attempt to cast doubt as to the scientific validity of Marxism, Masaryk argued that "Marx was first of all a party man and only a party man. The feeling of universal solidarity is unknown to him."¹

Behind Masaryk's own assertions, however, one may clearly discern the struggle of parties in philosophy—a struggle which in the final count expresses the trends and ideologies of antagonistic classes. Lenin pointed out: "Recent philosophy is as partisan as was philosophy two thousand years ago. The contending parties are essentially—although this is concealed by a pseudo-erudite quackery of new terms or by a weak-minded non-partisanship—materialism and idealism. The latter is merely a subtle, refined form of fideism, which stands fully armed, commands vast organisations and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses, turning the slightest vacillation in philosophical thought to its own advantage."²

This assessment fully applies to Masarykism.

The thing that immediately exposes the *class nature* of Masaryk's views is that he chose *Marxism*, the proletarian ideology, as the subject of his revisionist criticism.

That his aim was specifically *revision* and criticism of Marxism was stated by Masaryk himself in his works. In *The Social Question*, for example, he wrote: "Concretely and from a practical point of view, the social question at present is the question of socialism, and socialism in our country is predominantly Marxism. That is why we must take up the question of Marxism. In this, my first study, I restrict myself to the exposition and *analysis* of the sociological and philo-

sophical foundations of Marxism [emphasis added—*M.S.*]."¹

As can be seen from Masaryk's own words, of all socialist teachings he limited himself to a criticism of Marxism. And this was not accidental, because Marxism is precisely a *proletarian* and *scientific* ideology. Other socialist trends pose no real class danger to the bourgeoisie and its dominance, since they are either (a) merely Utopian in nature and, therefore, unrealisable, or (b) of a basically petty-bourgeois nature and, therefore, from a class standpoint, not dangerous to the bourgeoisie, or (c) a combination of the two. Only Marxism is a genuinely scientific ideology of the *working class* and, therefore, poses a mortal danger to the bourgeoisie from a class standpoint, for it alone places socialism on the practical plane of the class struggle of the working class, socialist revolution and elimination of capitalism, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of a socialist and communist society. Any other kind of socialism amounts to a utopia, ultimately used in the struggle to preserve capitalism. This, then, explains why Masaryk, as an ideologist of the bourgeoisie, chose Marxism and not some other socialist trend for his revisionist criticism.

Wishing, however, to portray his revisionist criticism of Marxism as objective and scientific, Masaryk claimed that he strove to examine Marx and Engels as impartially and factually as possible.² In fact, he was far from being impartial; his hostility towards Marxism and his continuous struggle against it permeated all of his works. To show that this was the case requires an examination of Masaryk's views on fundamental philosophical and sociological questions, and this is what the author will attempt to do in the present book.

The class viewpoint of Masarykism manifests itself in the struggle against materialism in general and against Marxist materialism in particular—against the Marxist

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., p. 261.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 358.

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 261.

theory of knowledge; against materialist dialectics; against the principal propositions of historical materialism on the role of the material conditions of the life of society as the basis of social being; against Marx's teaching on economics, especially on the question of surplus value; against the Marxist theory of the class struggle and socialist revolution; etc. Let us here deal briefly with Masaryk's view of the class struggle and his theory of class collaboration.

Marx, who defended the proletariat and only scientific viewpoint regarding the motive forces of historical development in an exploitative society, stated that class struggle and social revolution are natural phenomena in the transition to a new and higher system. They lead, in particular, to the elimination of the capitalist system and the establishment of working-class power and a socialist social system. But Masaryk stressed something else entirely. Unable to deny the existence of the class struggle—for if he did, he would have to *openly* oppose the interests of the working class, including its interests in economic struggle—Masaryk advocated class collaboration, and, moreover, he came out in defence of the monarchy and the feudalists in Austria-Hungary. Here are a few of his statements on this score which are related to his revision of Marx's theory of the class struggle. "I state with confidence," he wrote, "that people belonging to different classes also have a feeling of mutuality, that generally speaking there is a feeling of honest humaneness among people and among classes.... I say that even *the worker*, for example, realises that his interests are to a large extent *identical* to the interests of *the employer*. ... I say that the struggle is not at all what Marx describes it as being, that its meaning is different from that ascribed to it by Marx. Even when economic development is carefully analysed, it appears in a different light, that is, not at all how Marx presented it."¹ Masaryk asserted further that the emancipation of the peasants in Austria and in

Bohemia did not take place only as a consequence of the peasants' struggle against the landowners; that *it did not take place against the will of the landowners; that on the contrary, some of them, and particularly the Crown, looked upon emancipation with favour; and that absolutist state power demanded emancipation of the peasants even against the will of many landowners. Thus, he maintained, this emancipation was not solely the result of struggle.*¹

This clearly shows what kind of a "non-partisan", "supra-party" and "scientific" approach Masaryk took in attacking Marx's theory of the class struggle. We see that Masaryk undertook to revise the theory of the class struggle and advanced the theory of class collaboration in order to portray the absolutist feudal monarchy in Austria-Hungary as the *instigator* of social progress. As for the theory of class collaboration, it was just as obviously a theory for preserving the prevailing system, since it proposed co-operation within the framework of the existing system with the retention of the ruling and the exploited classes.

Masarykism is in no way a supra-class ideology. It is, rather, an ideology of class exploitation, an ideology of subordinating the working class to the interests of capitalist exploitation. Hence, on the subject of the class struggle Masarykism is more reactionary and more anti-scientific than, for example, the views of such 19th century bourgeois historians as Thierry, Guizot and Mignet, who lived considerably earlier than Masaryk, but recognised the class struggle as a motive factor in social development.

In the 1930s, Zdeněk Nejedlý, who knew Masaryk before the First World War when Masaryk was still a university professor, revealed, on the basis of exceedingly rich factual material, the social roots, philosophical essence and class orientation of Masaryk's activity. It was no accident that Nejedlý chose Masaryk as the subject of a monograph in

¹ Masaryk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 237-38.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

which he wanted to present a picture of the decline in the bourgeois period in Czechoslovak history. In this monograph it was not Masaryk, the scholar, but Masaryk, the politician. It was not Masaryk, friend of the working class, but Masaryk, enemy of socialism, not only during his presidency, but from the outset of his academic activity in Prague in the 1880s. Such was the image of Masaryk which Nejedlý presented during the pre-Munich years of the republic to counter-balance the Social-Democratic demagoguery that described Masaryk as the son of a worker, the vanquisher of the Hapsburgs and a friend of the socialistically minded working class.

Nejedlý also exposed the scientific worthlessness of Masaryk's literary efforts. Even before the First World War Nejedlý had pointed out—in a critical study, entitled *The Dispute About the Meaning of Czech History*—that Masaryk's description of the Czech society and its development was invalid and pseudohistorical. He came to the same conclusion again after the First World War in his review of Masaryk's book *Světová revoluce (World Revolution)* and in a large monograph on Masaryk relating to his earlier works, *Sebevražda (Suicide)* and *Základové konkrétní logiky (Essay on Concrete Logic)*. Nejedlý showed that as a *researcher* Masaryk was not original and always remained an *unprincipled eclectic*.

In his revisionist struggle against Marxism, Masaryk used somewhat modernised versions of every kind of reactionary ideology of the past: various kinds of philosophical idealism and agnosticism, religion and various brands of feudal-monarchist ideology. He armed himself with the idealism of Plato and Hegel and the agnosticism of Kant and Hume for the struggle against Marxism in the sphere of philosophy, while in the sphere of sociology he brought in the Christian religion and other religious teachings. Finally, he declared that Marxism itself was a kind of religion and proposed to replace Marxism with Masarykism—also as a religion, but more modern.

All these aspects of Masarykism were extremely reactionary and out of line even with the bourgeois philosophy of enlightenment which had prevailed when the bourgeoisie was just rising to dominance, particularly during the years immediately prior to the French Revolution of 1789-1794. At that time, bourgeois ideologists were *atheists* in faith and *revolutionaries* in the struggle against feudal ideology and the feudal system in general. The following is the classic characterisation, given by Engels, of the French Enlighteners as bourgeois ideologists: "The great men, who in France prepared men's minds for the coming *revolution*, were *themselves extreme revolutionists*. They recognised no external authority of any kind whatever. *Religion, natural science, society, political institutions—everything* was subjected to the most *unsparing criticism*... [emphasis added—M. S.]"¹

Such were the ideologists of bourgeois nations in the period when the capitalist mode of production was being established. But Masarykism, in its struggle against the proletarian revolution, went so far as to support unlimited monarchist state power, alliance with the landowners and alliance with religion.

¹ F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, p. 25.

CRITIQUE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MASARYKISM

According to Marxist-Leninist theory, the history of philosophy is the history of the struggle between materialism and idealism. In examining Masarykism, we find this assertion clearly corroborated, although Masaryk himself, for demagogic reasons, claimed he stood outside of this struggle.

In its philosophical content Masarykism is above all *struggle* against *materialism* in general and the *revisionist criticism of Marxist* philosophy in particular. In the sphere of philosophy, therefore, Masarykism is primarily criticism of materialism and materialist dialectics. Plekhanov was quite justified in pointing out in his article "About Masaryk's Book" that *The Social Question* revealed "the *psychology* of the '*critics*' who hide behind trite phrases about the harmfulness of orthodoxy, about the need to go forward ... pardon —to *turn back*, and so on and so forth".¹

It should be added that both the criticism of materialist philosophy and the "independent" philosophical views contained in Masarykism basically consist of unsubstantiated idealist assertions, at times quite absurd, which are not intended for understanding, but for faith.

Masaryk's struggle against materialism begins with the

concepts of philosophy and philosophical materialism. We shall, therefore, use this as the starting point for our examination of the philosophical views of Masarykism.

1. DISTORTION OF THE CONCEPTS OF PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHICAL MATERIALISM BY MASARYKISM

In his book *The Social Question*, Masaryk argued against an understanding of philosophy as a scientific view of the world which manifests itself and finds confirmation in the various sciences. In discussing Engels' views on philosophy, for example, he wrote that sometimes Engels said that philosophy had ceased to exist and that, generally speaking, there was no longer philosophy, but simply a world outlook which must seek confirmation and manifest itself not in a *science of sciences* standing apart, but within the positive sciences.¹ But in actual fact, in his work against Dühring Engels states that of the *former* philosophy there still survives one independent part, the theory of thought and its laws—formal logic and dialectics, and that everything else is subsumed in the positive science of nature and history. In his work on Feuerbach, he says even more definitely that for philosophy, which has been expelled from nature and history, there remains the realm of pure thought, the theory of the laws of the thought process itself, logic and dialectics.

As we can see, Engels spoke against the *former* philosophy, the philosophy that claimed to be the *science of sciences*, and not against philosophy altogether. Philosophy, as Engels understood it, is a scientific view of the world which cannot take the place of all the rest of the sciences. When Masaryk quoted Engels' propositions, however, he failed to note the new and genuinely revolutionary change in the understanding of philosophy that had been introduced by Marx and

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 669.

¹ See Masaryk, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 98.

Engels. He approached the conception of philosophy from positions of the *former* philosophy—the *science of sciences*. And this is what made Masaryk's views on philosophy itself reactionary; he pulled back and looked at the new and genuinely scientific views on philosophy through the eye-glass of the preceding stage of the development of philosophy.

Masaryk also repeated his accusations against dialectical and historical materialism in other parts of his book, always with the aim of distorting Marxist philosophical materialism and materialist dialectics. He even went so far as to perceive positivism in the Marxist understanding of philosophy as a scientific view of the world.

"Marx and Engels," he wrote, "speak of 'metaphysics' and 'ideology' in the same way as do the positivists: they contrast materialist dialectics with metaphysics in a positivist way. Engels ultra-positivistically rejects philosophy and puts the positive sciences in its place."¹

In general, to contrast philosophy as a scientific view of the world with social and natural sciences, as Masaryk did, is completely untenable. Can philosophy be scientific if its expression and confirmation is not found in the concrete sciences? No, it cannot. It is also totally incorrect to say that Engels rejected philosophy. Engels rejected philosophy only in the sense of its being a *science of sciences*, but accepted philosophy in the sense of its being a *scientific* world outlook. In this sense, Marx and Engels did not reject philosophy, but, on the contrary, created a new, truly scientific philosophy, namely, dialectical and historical materialism. Indeed, Masaryk himself knew and understood this perfectly well, for did he not call his book *The Philosophical and Sociological Foundations of Marxism. Studies on the Social Question*. . .? What, one might ask, did Masaryk criticise and "present" if, in his opinion, Engels had rejected philosophy altogether? Clearly, we have here an obvious distortion of Marxist views on philosophy.

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

Consequently, instead of trying to analyse and comprehend the Marxist understanding of philosophy, Masaryk chose to distort the views of Marx and Engels, arguing from positions of a stage in the history of philosophy that had long passed. Masaryk accused Marx and Engels of rejecting philosophy and of having elements of positivism in their own views primarily because of their *materialism* and *materialist dialectics*. In this connection, he wrote: "For justification of his *materialism*, Engels refers to positivism and believes that no philosophy of any kind is necessary, that positive knowledge and positive sciences are enough [emphasis added—*M.S.*]."¹

Now there is a good example of a really "objective" and "impartial" presentation of Marxism and a "scientific" analysis of it! Engels, of course, never referred to positivism to justify philosophical materialism; in the quotation given above we have another example of Masaryk's distortion of the views of Marx and Engels. Repetition of unsubstantiated accusations was one of the devices used in Masaryk's revisionist criticism of materialism. But unsubstantiated criticism is, of course, not criticism at all. This aspect of Masaryk's "criticism" was aptly exposed by Plekhanov in his article "About Masaryk's Book". He wrote that from Masaryk's point of view "Marx (just like Engels) was not only a *materialist*, but also a *positivist*, without suspecting it himself".²

"What exactly is positivism?" Plekhanov asked further. "Mr. Masaryk does not define this philosophical concept, so all that is left for us to do on this account is to *guess*. For example, Engels appears to him to be a *positivist* when he says: '. . .to comprehend the real world—nature and history—just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets . . . mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist crotchet which

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

² G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 678.

could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this.' Evidently, the professor thinks that a materialist could not speak in this manner. He thinks this because he is not acquainted with materialism. One can find plenty of this kind of 'positivism' in the works of the French materialists of the 18th century (see, for example, the end of the sixth chapter of the second part of *Système de la nature*). But this is of no concern to the professor. He doesn't want to know anything about materialism. And, as a matter of fact, he doesn't."¹

Indeed, Masaryk not only did not give a definition of positivism, but was far from understanding Marx's and Engels' connection, not with positivism, but with the concrete scientific disciplines. Positivism is an anti-scientific philosophy, for it denies the necessity of a scientific world outlook concerning the general laws of the development of nature, society and human thought. Positivism seeks the elimination of a *world outlook per se*, and tries to replace it with concrete sciences. Nothing like this is found in Marxism; Marx and Engels not only upheld the need for philosophy as a scientific world outlook, but actually developed such a philosophy—dialectical and historical materialism. Generally speaking, any attempt to eliminate a world outlook from the ideological life of society is an anti-scientific and futile effort. In any concrete field of knowledge people do not approach the study of phenomena unconsciously. It is precisely this conscious selection of specific phenomena for study and this conscious approach in drawing conclusions from and interpreting the results of research, that presuppose a world outlook, which every researcher has, no matter what concrete science he is working in. Therefore, because positivism denies the necessity of a world outlook on the basis of the fact that there are concrete sciences, it is untenable from both the practical and the theoretical standpoints.

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., pp. 678-79.

To deny the necessity of a general world outlook, as positivism does, is one thing, but it is quite another thing to recognise, as Marxist philosophy does, not only that a world outlook is necessary, but that it must be connected with the natural and social sciences. Without such a connection no world outlook could be called scientific.

But this was just what frightened Masaryk—that Marx's materialism was a truly scientific world outlook, a world outlook which found its expression and confirmation in the natural and social sciences. In other words, what really frightened him was that the Marxist philosophy had natural science and social science foundations. It was precisely the *scientific nature* of Marxist philosophy and, consequently, its *practical* role as a force for transformation, that so irked Masaryk. He bent every effort to distort the connection between Marxist philosophy and the concrete sciences and had no wish to recognise the fact that this connection was in no way related to positivism. On the contrary, the necessity of a scientific world outlook as such was already a direct negation of positivism. Masaryk "did not notice" this in Marxism, and since he was frightened by the scientific character of Marxism, he was against the connection between *Marxist materialist philosophy* and *science*. *Materialism* was what was most unacceptable to him, and all the criticism that he directed at Marxist philosophy and all the basic distortions he was guilty of in describing this philosophy were connected with the struggle against *materialism*. In *The Social Question*, he wrote that he recognised "Marx's importance" but that he could "accept neither his materialism nor communism. On the contrary, I consider materialism in general, and Marxian materialism in particular, to be a scientifically impossible world outlook."¹

Masaryk's hatred of materialism becomes quite understandable from the *class* point of view of the bourgeoisie, for whom Masaryk, the ideologist, spoke. From this class point

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., p. 118.

of view, it was the combination of materialism and socialism in Marxism that frightened him most. "In *The Holy Family*," Masaryk wrote, "he [Marx—M.S.] presents the history of materialism and tries to prove that materialism is the true and the only justified metaphysical basis of socialism and communism."¹ "We shall look into the question of whether and to what extent materialism serves as the foundation of communism."²

Masaryk was even willing to speak in positive terms of any "socialist" trend as long as it did not subscribe to Marxist materialism. He thought that socialism was getting closer and closer to philosophy, that profound social reform was impossible without a reformed world outlook, and that there could be no doubt as to the final phase of philosophical searchings: the Marxists would abandon materialism in all its forms because materialism was the *caput mortuum* of Marxism.

From a scientific and factual standpoint the above assertion is completely groundless. When and where have *Marxists* ever abandoned *materialism*? Obviously, this was pure invention and not a prognosis relative to Marxists. And how can one speak of Marxism without materialism, when, according to Masaryk's own statement, materialism is the *caput mortuum* of Marxism? Masaryk's assertions are clearly illogical and meaningless. Furthermore, in this somewhat later writing of his Masaryk no longer objected to treating philosophy as a world outlook, thus refuting his own revisionist criticism of Engels' understanding of philosophy.

But let us return to the question of materialism.

Why was it that Masaryk so zealously opposed not socialism in general, but the scientific socialism of Marx, the socialism founded on a materialist conception of history? And why was it precisely the *materialism* in socialist theory that bothered him most of all? This is not a difficult question

to answer, since, first of all, *materialism* bears upon the *material, economic* foundations of the capitalist system. Marxist materialism attacks capitalist *private property*, the bedrock of the exploitative system. This explains why Masaryk, being an ideologist of the bourgeoisie, was so vehemently against the materialism of Marxist philosophy.

As noted earlier, the bourgeois class position on which Masaryk stood made him a revisionist not of any "socialist" theory, but specifically of Marxist scientific socialism. It is understandable, therefore, why Masaryk was afraid of the *connection* between Marxist *materialism* and *science* and rebuked Marxism of positivism. No less irritating to Masaryk was *materialist dialectics*, which he also tried to stick into the category of positivism. His real objection, of course, was not to positivism—it simply does not exist in Marxism—but to *revolution*, which *materialist* dialectics regards as a necessary and natural outcome of the struggle between antagonistic classes. In *The Social Question* Masaryk wrote: "Marx and Engels also adhere to reality when they preach revolution. Reality, after all, is just as relative as truth and error—Uncritical positivism opens wide the door—and even the gate—to all kinds of arbitrariness; both historicism and positivism are nothing other than uncritical empiricism."¹

So the crux of the matter, it turns out, consists of *revolution*! That is why Masaryk thought materialism was bad and accused it of positivism and empiricism—and of being uncritical and so forth. As for something being uncritical, it is, of course, idealism, including Masaryk's, that is uncritical. Marxism, with its recognition of revolution, is a genuinely critical attitude to capitalist reality.

To understand the utter groundlessness of Masaryk's assertion that Marxism is guilty of positivism, let us examine a few more of his statements. He wrote in *The Social Question* that Marx and Engels held to natural science because

¹ Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

² *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

that was the fashion with most philosophers, especially the positivists. Natural science, Masaryk said further, thanks to its method and its practical discoveries is, of late, most modern and pragmatic. This modern natural science has displaced the old *naturphilosophie* (although not completely, as demonstrated by, say, Darwinism), and is now recognised as a model, from the standpoint of methodology, for the spiritual sciences and for philosophy. "I have pointed to this fact before. . . . But besides this, Marx and Engels latched on to natural science much more out of *social* and *political* considerations. With its antagonism towards the *old* philosophy, primarily towards theology, natural science appeared to be a genuine, democratic and even *revolutionary* science; its practical successes gave it a special *social* charm and it became a socio-political force. In any case, Marx and Engels became worshippers of naturalism not for *scientific*, but for *political* and *social* reasons [emphasis added—*M.S.*]."¹

As we can see, Masaryk was disturbed by the connection between Marxism and natural science because of the *revolutionary* character of each. Specifically, the revolutionary nature of natural science manifests itself in relation to the *old* philosophy and *theology*, and the revolutionary character of Marxism manifests itself in relation to the social system. In Masaryk's opinion, this connection between Marxism and natural science did not stem from scientific considerations, but from the social and political considerations of the founders of Marxism. Such an assertion, however, was completely groundless; it was motivated not by *scientific* considerations, but by the *class* and *social* considerations of Masaryk himself. Standing on positions of metaphysics and idealism and defending theology, Masaryk came out against the connection between philosophy, or world outlook, and the concrete natural sciences, since such a connection helped to reveal the anti-scientific nature of theology and idealist

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., pp. 109-10.

philosophy. By objecting to the connection between *philosophy* and *natural science*, Masaryk was actually coming out against a scientifically based philosophy.

In fact, therefore, the connection between Marx's philosophical materialism and the concrete natural sciences—with the latter (as we shall show using the example of modern biology) fully confirming philosophical materialism—arises from *scientific* considerations—from the *scientific nature of each*. On the other hand, Masaryk's struggle against Marxist materialism and against its connection with the natural sciences turns out to be anti-scientific and dependent for support on theology and the old idealist philosophy. It is not "positivism" and some kind of social considerations that connect Marx's materialist philosophy with natural science, but the objective logic of scientific progress. This shows that Masarykism and not Marxism is unscientific; it reveals the reactionary class foundations of this doctrine which fights Marxism and natural science and supports theology and idealist philosophy.

Prompted not by scientific but by political and class considerations, Masaryk also tried to accuse Marxism of eclecticism. But, here again, his arguments were groundless, as was shown by Plekhanov. Let us cite part of Plekhanov's critical analysis.

"Thus," Plekhanov quoted Masaryk, "Marx's materialism is a rather complicated structure. It is quite obvious that Marx tried to make a synthesis of various views that had ripened in his time. An objective critic could hardly find this synthesis successful. The philosophy of Marx and Engels has all the earmarks of eclecticism. . . ." "So Marx and Engels turn out to be *eclectics*," Plekhanov writes further. "When we learned of this harsh verdict passed by Mr. 'Objective Critic', we were reminded of the deputy chairman of a criminal court who figures in an episode of Herzen's *Passing By* and who says: 'What do you think I am, my dear fellow, some kind of a Turk or Jacobin who would make the fate of some unfortunate even worse just

out of laziness', etc. Herzen says in relation to this: 'Note that the Jacobins have been accused of everything, but the deputy chairman of a criminal court has the honour of accusing them of laziness.' In just the same way, the honour of accusing Marx and Engels of *philosophical eclecticism* belongs exclusively to Masaryk. We congratulate the professor of the Czech University: in any event, he doesn't lack *originality*."¹

Masaryk's accusing Marxism of eclecticism stemmed from social and class considerations, to which fact Plekhanov also made special reference in his article. Plekhanov pointed out that Masaryk contended that the philosophy of Marx and Engels suffered from "eclecticism" because "this philosophy is a veritable *algebra of revolution*". "If its revolutionary content could be expunged," Plekhanov continued, "then 'critics' such as Mr. Masaryk would immediately cease their attacks on it, and it would find many adherents among those educated elements of the petty bourgeoisie who are ready to champion *social reforms*, but are horrified at the very thought of *social revolution*."

"'*Reformation, nicht Revolution!*' exclaims Mr. Masaryk in the 146th paragraph of his book—He accompanies this significant exclamation with a sermon on the theme that 'without a real reform of our thinking and our morals we will, by means of revolution, drive off the devil only to replace him with the Beelzebub', etc—And this sermon has all the greater effect on the feelings of the reader as the preacher piously raises his eyes to heaven."²

Masaryk stopped at nothing in his revisionist struggle against Marxist philosophical materialism, and this led him into logical inconsistencies and self-contradiction, which all the more reveal the groundlessness of his "criticism" and his utter lack of understanding of just what scientific materialism is and what vulgar materialism is.

Masaryk recognised, without reservation, only vulgar materialism and thought it possible to consider the views of Marx and Engels as materialist only with certain reservations because Engels had criticised the vulgar materialism of Vogt and Büchner.

In other places, however, Masaryk considered Marx's philosophical materialism as pure materialism and even attached the label of "vulgar" materialism to it. In *The Social Question*, for example, he wrote that Marx and Engels "embrace materialism *in toto* and consistently, and with it its entire *fundus instructus* of impossibilities and inaccuracies. Neither Marx nor Engels has left the confines of vulgar realism and materialism."¹

These and other logically contradictory statements made by Masaryk about the materialism of Marx and Engels demonstrate the groundlessness of Masaryk's "presentation" and "criticism" of Marx's philosophical materialism. Moreover, as Plekhanov noted in his article,² they reveal the fact that Masaryk had not the slightest understanding of materialism.

The struggle that Masarykism waged against Marx's philosophical materialism clearly confirms the proposition that the history of philosophy is the history of the struggle between materialism and idealism. That partisanship in philosophy—the class struggle—always manifests itself in this struggle can also be seen from the example of Masarykism, as can the fact that idealism stops at nothing in its distortion of materialism. The struggle of Masarykism against materialism and the idea of revolution also shows that Masaryk spoke as an ideologist of the bourgeoisie, which had become reactionary in the period of imperialism, and that all of Masaryk's expatiation about the objectivity of his criticism and the non-partisanship of his views was pure bourgeois demagogy.

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., pp. 669-70.

² *Ibid.*, p. 676.

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., p. 79.

² G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 680.

2. THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE IDEALIST POSITIONS OF MASARYKISM

Since Masaryk promised in his book not only to criticise, but also to give an account of Marxism, he could not, of course, side-step the fundamental question of philosophy. In this connection, he noted, referring to Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, that according to Marxism the highest and most important question in any philosophy was the relation of thinking to being, of the spirit to nature, of what existed first, spirit or nature, of whether the world had been created by God or had been in existence eternally. Philosophers were divided into two great camps—the idealists and the materialists—depending on how they answered this question. The idealists defended the primacy of spirit and hence ultimately assumed some kind of world creation; the materialists, on the other hand, considered nature as primary.¹

After presenting the Marxist view of the fundamental question of philosophy, Masaryk proceeded to express his disagreement with it: "The exclusive opposition of materialism and idealism is in itself strange: can all philosophical thought really be classified on the basis of these two broad categories?"²

A further examination of Masaryk's views, however, will show that it is just such a statement of the fundamental question of philosophy that is scientifically sound, and that Masaryk himself, being an idealist, fought specifically against materialism.

Masaryk was dead set against recognising thought and mental processes in general as the products of matter, and, specifically, of the human brain. He regarded such a viewpoint as vulgar materialism. At one point, for example, he cited Engels' proposition regarding thought and conscious-

ness, and whence they come, namely, that they are products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of Nature which has been developed in and along with its environment; and that these products of the human brain, being in the last analysis also products of Nature, do not contradict the rest of Nature but are in correspondence with it. Masaryk's response to this was: "Why, this is vulgar materialism of the purest kind, and its vulgar popularisers will be very pleased with it—"¹

He also disagreed with another formulation of the same Marxist proposition, namely, "that thought is merely a function of the brain. This wording suffers from considerable vagueness; therefore, I shall not go into it." Masaryk felt that this kind of materialism was both vulgar and obsolete.

Masaryk also objected to the proposition that spirit is the highest product of matter. Referring to Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, he first summarised the propositions contained therein to the effect that matter is not the product of spirit, but that, on the contrary, spirit is the product of matter; that the material world perceived by the senses and to which we ourselves belong is primary and objectively real; and that our thinking is the product of a material, corporeal organ—the brain. Then Masaryk completed his presentation with his own comment: "This was, in any event, pure materialism, and Feuerbach himself feared its consequences."²

Masaryk's crude revisionist distortion of dialectical materialism received just criticism in Plekhanov's article "About Masaryk's Book". Examining Masaryk's statement that "Feuerbach thought so critically that he could not swallow materialism whole, with all its consequences", Plekhanov wrote that "the professor [that is, Masaryk—M.S.] heard this from Engels, but Engels *knew* what these words, meant when he wrote them, and Mr. Masaryk *did not know* what

¹ See Masaryk, op. cit., p. 76.

² Ibid., p. 79.

¹ Ibid., pp. 81-82.

² Ibid., p. 77.

they meant when he copied them. Therefore, he confirms them with this kind of thinking: 'That is why we find him [Feuerbach—*G. P.*] making up such original excuses as when, in answer to the question, where does the soul come from, he answers that it comes from the same place the body comes from, that it develops along with the body, etc. . . .' What is so 'original' here? The same thing was said, for example, by *La Mettrie*, who of course accepted materialism 'with all its consequences'. And why are these 'excuses'? Do any facts contradict what Feuerbach says about the relationship between 'spirit' and matter?"¹

Masaryk also took exception to the Marxist proposition that the actual unity of the world lies in its materiality, and that this unity is proved by the lengthy development of philosophy and natural science.²

While attacking materialism in general, and Marxist materialism in particular, Masaryk defended the religious-idealist understanding of the world. For example, in *The Social Question*, he attacked Marxism because "Marx and Engels have put *matter* in the place of *God* [emphasis added—*M. S.*] and have placed themselves at the mercy of blind chance. . .". "In a blind and insignificant world," he continued, "there is no place nor time for happiness and love. When Christ died, the evangelist tells us, there was a darkness over all the earth and the sun was darkened. So does man's inner world grow dark when the deity dies within him or when man himself kills it in himself. Hegel killed God just as did Schopenhauer. Feuerbach, Strauss, Stirner and Marx completed Hegel's work. And darkness fell and the sun's light failed."³

Masaryk's religious preaching was sharply criticised by Plekhanov. For example, he wrote the following in regard to the statement quoted above: "There is no question about

it: Mr. Masaryk certainly writes well about God! Our Messrs. Struve and Berdyaev also write fairly well now and then about this 'substance', but they have a long way to go to match Masaryk: they don't have that loftiness and that sensitivity which distinguish the divine sermons of the professor from the Czech University. True, Messrs. Struve and Berdyaev have only recently begun to write about the 'sublime'. They still lack the proper skills; but in time they, too, will probably improve."¹

Masaryk devoted two pamphlets solely to his religious views: *The Struggle for Religion* (1904) and *Review of the Latest Philosophy of Religion* (1905).

Since he stood on religious-idealist positions in philosophy, Masaryk considered the absence of theology in Marxism, the fact that it was an anti-religious teaching, to be one of its shortcomings.

Thus, Masaryk stood on religious positions in the fundamental question of philosophy, putting *God* in the place of *matter*. As for his understanding of mental processes, he stood on the ground of subjective idealism. He felt that ideology and all the various forms of social consciousness had to be examined from the standpoint of individual psychology; his position, therefore, was that of psychological individualism.²

Marxist philosophical materialism and modern natural science confront idealism with the indisputable fact that there is no thinking outside the brain. Thinking is a function of the brain; it is its product and is inseparable from it. Thinking, Lenin pointed out, "is a function of that particularly complex fragment of matter called the human brain".³

It is not our purpose to give here a full account of how Marxist philosophical materialism resolves the fundamental

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 679.

² See Masaryk, op. cit., p. 83.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 315-16.

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 677.

² See Masaryk, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 258-60.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 228.

question of philosophy. Our aim is to reveal the scientific groundlessness of Masarykism and to show how Masaryk misinterpreted Marxism. We pointed out earlier that the strength and scientific validity of Marxist philosophy lies, in particular, in the fact that it has its foundations in the concrete natural and social sciences. This connection is in no way accidental, for *Marxist philosophy* and the *concrete sciences* are to an equal extent a scientific reflection of reality; they understand and view the world as it exists in reality, without introducing any idealist inventions into it. It was this scientific orientation of Marxist materialism and, consequently, its connection with the concrete natural sciences, that evoked such strong opposition to it from Masaryk.

Let us examine some of the natural science premises of the materialist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy. There is a body of experimentally verified scientific data which proves the scientific validity of the Marxist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy and demonstrates the groundlessness of Masarykism and its revision of philosophical materialism on this question.

Present-day science, and particularly the physiology of higher nervous activity, views mental processes as the highest function of the brain.¹

The scientific disclosure of the material nature of mental processes began with the works of the great Russian physiologist I. M. Sechenov. Prior to that, an unscientific understanding of the nature of mental processes had prevailed, taking the form either of a vulgar materialist understanding of the material nature of the psyche—as, for example, the materialism of Vogt, Moleschott and Büchner—or of an idealist understanding—as, for example, the physiological idealism of Helmholtz and Müller.

Beginning with the extensive experimental research of I. P. Pavlov and his school of physiology, the material na-

ture of the spiritual, of the mental, was established and the mechanism of nervous processes in the brain which underlie mental activity was revealed. This research fully confirmed the proposition in Marxist philosophy that thought and consciousness are the product of the brain and constitute its highest function. Pavlov and his school gave a strictly scientific explanation to such concepts as mind, volition, feeling, etc., on the basis of data gathered in a "strictly objective study of higher nervous activity. This is how he [Pavlov—*M.S.*] conceived the superimposing of the phenomena of psychic activity onto physiological facts, the 'fusion' of the psychological and the physiological, the establishment of relationships and coincidences among the things that previously had been described by subjective physiology. The highest function of the brain, which we call mental activity, was for Pavlov the unity of the subjective and the objective."¹

The data of modern biology and, in particular, the teaching of Pavlov and his followers in physiology, reveal in greater and greater depth the veracity of the propositions of Marxist philosophical materialism, which hold that mental processes, including thought itself, are a function of the brain which is inseparably linked with the higher nervous processes taking place in its cortex. Masaryk's idealist criticism of the materialist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy, therefore, receives no substantiation from science.

Equally groundless is Masarykism's objection to Engels' proposition, mentioned above, that thought and consciousness, as products of the human brain, as products of Nature, do not contradict the rest of Nature but are in *correspondence with it*.²

But, here again, Engels' proposition is fully substantiated by modern biology and particularly by the physiology of higher nervous activity. In 1930—many years after his pio-

¹ See *Scientific Session on the Problems of Academician Pavlov's Teaching in Physiology*, Moscow, 1950, p. 62 (in Russian).

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

² See Masaryk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 81-82.

neering experimental work—Pavlov himself, in his "Answer of a Physiologist to Psychologists", summed up the basic conclusions drawn from his work as follows: "Man is, of course, a system (more crudely, a machine), and like every other system in nature this system is governed by the inevitable *laws common to all nature*; but it is a system which, within the field of our scientific vision, is unique for its extreme power of self-regulation. . . . The chief, strongest and most permanent impression we get from the study of higher nervous activity by our method is the extraordinary plasticity of this activity, and its immense potentialities: nothing is immobile, intractable, everything may always be achieved, changed for the better, provided only that the proper conditions are created.

"A system (a machine) and man, with all his ideals, aspirations and achievements—at first glance, how terribly discordant a comparison it seems! But is this really so? Even from the generally accepted point of view, is not *man the pinnacle of nature*, the highest embodiment of the resources of infinite nature, the incarnation of her mighty and still unexplained laws? Is this not rather calculated to enhance man's dignity, to afford him the deepest satisfaction? And everything vital is retained that is implied in the idea of free will, with its personal, social and civic responsibility."¹

In arguing against the materialist understanding and solution of the fundamental question of philosophy and against recognising the spiritual as the highest product of matter, Masaryk even questioned whether the solution of such a question lay in the province of science in general and of biology in particular. "Can modern science, and especially biology, venture to offer a teaching alleging that spirit is the 'highest' product of matter, as Engels puts it? I think that there is no need for me to say that for a long time now no serious investigator has made such an asser-

tion. But Engels does not tolerate any doubt in his materialist dogmatism."¹

Plekhanov exposed the weakness of Masaryk's argument in the following way: "...We open the French translation of Huxley's book on Hume, and there, on page 108, we find this: '*At present, no one standing at the height of modern science and knowing the facts will doubt that the basis of psychology must be sought in the physiology of the nervous system. That which is called the activity of the soul is the aggregate of brain functions, and the material of our consciousness is the product of brain activity* [emphasis added—G.P.]'. Is this not the same thing that Friedrich Engels said. . .? Engels called *spirit* exactly what Huxley called *elements of our consciousness*. Or, perhaps, the famous English naturalist wasn't a *serious student of nature*?"²

This statement of Masaryk's that Plekhanov criticised was not accidental. On the contrary, Masaryk later developed his views to the point of declaring any biological and, consequently, physiological, explanation of mental activity to be vulgar materialism.

"This materialism, dating back to the 18th century," Masaryk wrote in another part of his book *The Social Question*, "is odious to Engels because it is too mechanical; but does it become more correct if the mechanical explanation of spiritual life is replaced by a chemical and biological one, as Engels wants? Will materialism be less vulgar if it is understood biologically?"³

First of all, it should be noted that Engels did not at all consider 18th century materialism vulgar, even though he did expose its mechanistic character. So, Masaryk was already distorting Engels' view on that point. But let us turn to the substance of Masaryk's assertions about a biological explanation of spiritual life.

To get an experimentally substantiated, scientific answer

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., p. 81.

² G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 679.

³ Masaryk, op. cit., p. 81.

¹ I. P. Pavlov, *Complete Works*, Vol. 3, 1949, p. 454. (in Russian).

to the question involved, let us refer to biology itself. Present-day biology fully refutes Masaryk's assertions, while Engels' propositions remain correct and scientific to this day. It was above all up to *biology* to settle the question as to whether mental processes, including human thinking, are the highest product of matter, the function of our brain. And the problem has been solved scientifically by Pavlov and his students and followers. Speaking before a scientific session devoted to Pavlov's teaching in physiology, Academician Bykov said that "a decisive blow to reactionary idealist theories was struck by the great representative of the science of *biology*, physiologist I. P. Pavlov, who showed in practice the correctness of the new and higher stage in the development of our views on the organism [emphasis added—*M.S.*]"¹

It turns out that Masarykism is completely groundless in respect to this question as well.

As we have seen above, in his attempt to undermine Marxism, Masaryk bent every effort to counterpose its philosophical propositions to the various natural sciences, biology in particular. He tried to do the same thing when it came to the question of the origin of life, a question which is part of the fundamental question of philosophy. Since it was biology that Masaryk tried to counterpose to statements made by Engels on this question, here again we shall examine the natural science foundations on which the Marxist propositions stand, showing also just how scientifically unsound Masaryk's position was. For example, in *The Social Question*, Masaryk made the following statement: "They tell us that the original germs out of which man developed came, by means of chemical action, from *protoplasm* or *protein bodies*. Needless to say, modern biology is far from considering this such a simple matter [emphasis added—*M.S.*]"²

¹ *Scientific Session* . . . , p. 13.

² Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

Once again, in an effort to oppose Engels' propositions to biology, Masaryk distorts Engels' view. Engels did not conceive the matter to be as simple as Masaryk would have us believe he did, and he did not say what Masaryk said. Engels was not speaking of the germ out of which man developed; he was speaking of living organisms and their specific differences from inanimate nature. This was particularly stressed by Engels in the following definition of life: "Life is the mode of existence of protein bodies, the essential element of which consists in *continual metabolic interchange with the natural environment outside them*, and which ceases with the cessation of this metabolism, bringing about the decomposition of the *protein*."¹ As we can see, Masaryk did a thorough job of distorting Engels' propositions.

In the first place, Engels spoke of life as a means of *metabolic interchange*, and in the second place, he spoke specifically of *protein metabolism*. Engels' propositions on this score are still scientifically valid today and have been given experimental confirmation in the works of outstanding biologists. Present-day natural science is in complete agreement with Engels' statement that the essential feature of life is *metabolism*. An organism lives only as long as it is able continually to assimilate substances and the energy connected with them. Along with assimilation, there is also the opposite process—dissimilation. The substance of a living organism never remains static; it is continually breaking down and building up again as a result of numerous and closely interlaced processes of decomposition and synthesis. In other words, there is a continual process of *metabolic interchange*.

Analysis of the *protoplasm* of living organisms shows that *proteins* play an important role in *metabolism*. They undergo chemical changes themselves and involve other protoplasmic substances in these changes. The results of

¹ F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, Moscow, 1966, p. 301.

many studies have shown that any *protoplasmic* substance can actually participate in *metabolism* only by interacting with a specific *protein* and forming a definite compound with it.¹

In concluding our examination of Masarykism and its revisionist criticism of Marxism on the fundamental question of philosophy, we can state the following: Masarykism is a variant of subjective idealism with a religious base; it calls for putting God in the place of matter. It also denies the material nature of mental phenomena, including human thought. The criticism of Marxism found in Masarykism is scientifically groundless, just as are Masaryk's basic religious-idealist premises. Masarykism's alliance with religion makes it not only incompatible with genuine scientific propositions, but reactionary in the social sense.

3. THE AGNOSTICISM OF MASARYKISM IN THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Masarykism is just as scientifically untenable when it comes to its criticism of the Marxist theory of knowledge.

For Engels, Masaryk stresses, the relation of thought and being had another side—what is the relationship between the world and our thoughts about it? Can our thinking understand the real world? Are we able to produce the correct picture of reality through our thoughts and notions?²

He goes on to note that, in Engels' opinion, such philosophers as Hume and Kant answered this question in the negative and that their various idealist and philosophical "inventions", in Engels' opinion, could be quite easily and conclusively refuted: "Experiment and industry irrefutably prove that our thinking has a quite accurate conception of nature. This proof lies in the fact that we can create natural

processes ourselves and make them serve our own purposes, thus putting an end to Kant's 'thing in itself and all similar inventions. At present, this 'thing in itself is being produced by chemistry; thus, for example, alizarin is a 'thing in itself. For this reason, in Engels' opinion, it is absolutely senseless for German neo-Kantians and English agnostics to be enthusiastic about ... the ideas of Hume and Kant."¹

Having presented Engels' propositions, Masaryk almost immediately pounces on them. His indignation is most of all in behalf of Kant and Hume, who had a decisive influence on his (Masaryk's) agnosticism. He even exclaims: "Chemistry ... is proof against Kant!"² He then proceeds to question the existence of any materialist theory of knowledge at all. Nowhere, he says, do Engels or Marx make a detailed analysis of the origin of knowledge and the process of thinking, although one would expect such an analysis, since they transformed Hegel's dialectics. But what, Masaryk asks, does this modification consist of and what, generally speaking, is the substance of the new dialectics? What, strictly speaking, is the materialist process of cognition? With Hegel, dialectics was the "life and soul of scientific research"; what is its Marxist substance? asks Masaryk, adding that philosophers since Kant have done no little cogitation on the essence of our thought synthesis, and Kant himself wracked his brain over an analysis of this synthesis in order to determine as precisely as possible what we receive from the object and what the cognising subject creates out of himself, and where the remarkable system and integrity of our knowledge spring from.³ All this, however, does not prevent Masaryk from lashing out against the Marxist theory of reflection, the cornerstone of the materialist theory of knowledge. He focuses his attention on individual words, and, not understanding the

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., p. 79.

³ Ibid., pp. 82-83.

¹ See A. M. Oparin, *The Origin of Life*, Moscow, 1952, pp. 11-13 (in Russian).

² See Masaryk, op. cit., p. 76.

substance of the matter, tries to discredit the concept of cognition as the "reflection" in our consciousness of the phenomena of reality.

"I suggest," he writes, "that if the reader carefully examines Marx's or Engels' explanation, he will immediately run into some veritable theoretico-cognitive monsters." He then gives examples by citing Engels' famous propositions to the effect that the influences of the external world upon man express themselves in his brain, are reflected therein as feelings, thoughts, impulses, volitions, and that everything that sets men acting must find its way through their brains—even eating and drinking, which begin as a consequence of the sensation of hunger or thirst transmitted through the brain, etc. After citing these perfectly true and clear propositions, Masaryk exclaims: "Is there any need to point out that this whole explanation and each expression in it are exceedingly loose? How is one to conceive, for example, that the motive for a feeling is the reflection or expression in the brain of the external world?"

"It is also impossible to imagine psychologically just what Engels' 'image' (*Abbild*) of things is—And what exactly is the 'reflection' (*Reflex*) of the external world, about which Engels speaks in other places?"¹

Once again, however, Masaryk's criticism is scientifically groundless. His inability to understand all this is what really looks monstrous. For it is precisely in the form of *reflection*, in the form of *reflexes*, that all our mental processes take place. The higher psychical processes, as has been established by modern physiology, function according to the principles of conditioned reflex elaboration.

Psychical processes as reflexes of the brain were first substantiated by the great Russian physiologist I. M. Sechenov in his work *Reflexes of the Brain*. Major contributions to the discovery and experimental study of the reflex mechanism of the brain were made by Pavlov and other

¹ Masaryk, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

outstanding Soviet physiologists. Modern biology has determined that "one of the most important phenomena in the animal organism is the *reflex*. All processes in the normal course are accomplished with the help of the *reflex*."¹

Mental processes—the highest function of the brain—also take place according to the reflex principle. Pavlov called these reflexes *conditioned* reflexes, or temporary connections. The *conditioned* reflex, according to Pavlov, is the most elementary and basic phenomenon in the cortex of the cerebral hemispheres. Through the nerve cells of the cortex a temporary connection is established between the external world (the stimulus) and the work of the internal organs. Conditioned stimuli are signals, as it were, for the organism's activity, and they greatly extend the temporary connection of the internal organs with the environment.² The conditioned reflex is formed on the basis of the unconditioned reflex. Conditioned reflexes are also easily elaborated in human beings in response to verbal stimuli, the mechanism of such reflexes being essentially the same as the mechanism of conditioned reflexes to sound, light, odour, etc.

The conditioned reflex, or temporary nerve connection, as Pavlov pointed out, "is the most universal physiological phenomenon both in the animal world and in ourselves. It is at the same time a psychical phenomenon—what psychology calls association, be it the formation of combinations derived from all manner of actions and impressions, or combinations derived from letters, words and thoughts. What basis could there be for differentiating, for separating apart, what the physiologist calls a temporary connection and the psychologist an association?"³

¹ *Scientific Session* . . . , p. 16.

² See K. M. Bykov, *New Developments in Pavlov's Theory of Higher Nervous Activity*, Moscow, 1947, p. 7 (in Russian).

³ I. P. Pavlov, *Complete Works*, Vol. 3, p. 561.

On the basis of his experimental work, Pavlov advanced a cohesive theory of two signal systems, both functioning on the principle of conditioned reflexes. He differentiated between the direct impressions from the various agents in the environment, on the one hand, and words, pronounced, heard or seen (that is, written), on the other. His theory of the first and second signal systems of the brain is built on this basis.¹

It should be stressed that it is through the second signal system—the vehicle of verbal thought and of speech—that "inter-human signalisation", as Pavlov put it, the "grandiose signalling function of speech", takes place. Therefore, the socially determined nature of the historical evolution of the second signal system, its development in the life of each individual, is unquestionable. But the first signal system in man also develops in social conditions and in conditions of constant interaction with the second signal system.²

"If our sensations and notions relating to the surrounding world," Pavlov wrote, "are for us the primary signals of reality, the concrete signals, then speech, chiefly the kinaesthetic stimulations flowing into the cortex from the speech organs, are the secondary signals, the signals of signals. They represent in themselves abstractions of reality and permit of generalisations, which indeed makes up our added *special human mentality*. . . ."³

Thus, we find that in this difficult problem of natural science it has now been proven by experimental means that for man the word is just as real a conditioned stimulus as are all the other stimuli he and the lower animals are exposed to in common.

Through his experimental research, Pavlov gave scientific substantiation to the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge,

which recognises the existence of the objective world outside us and independent of our consciousness, a world that is *reflected* in the sensations and in the consciousness of man. And he revealed the mechanism by which the "subjective image of the objective world" is formed through complex reflex activity.

To be sure, Masaryk wrote *The Social Question* before Pavlov completed his study of higher nervous activity. But Pavlov's work only gave experimental proof to what Engels had already said earlier. Besides this, even at the time Masaryk was writing his anti-Marxist book, some eminent scientists were publishing works in which they substantiated the *reflectory* nature of mental activity. In particular, Sechenov's *Reflexes of the Brain* came out at that time. It was only Masaryk's overall orientation—expressed, in part, in his denial of any necessary connection between philosophy and the natural sciences—that led him to embrace anti-scientific, revisionist views of the theory of reflection. This anti-scientific tendency in Masarykism, as mentioned earlier, was conditioned above all on the social and class considerations of Masaryk himself. The propositions of modern biology presented above clearly reveal the total worthlessness of Masaryk's clamorous assertions against the Marxist theory of knowledge.

In dealing with the question of social relations, Masaryk also argued from the positions of positivism and agnosticism, of Kant's understanding of experience, of reducing scientific cognition to the registration of facts, and, consequently, of denying the possibility of cognising the essence of social phenomena.

We have seen above that the theory of reflection is a truly scientific theory of knowledge, backed by data flowing from various natural sciences. We have seen the untenable position from which Masaryk tried to distort this theory. As far as Masaryk was concerned, such scientific concepts as reflection (*Reflex*) and image (*Abbild*) were just so many stylistically unfortunate expressions; he did not grasp the

¹ *Sec Scientific Session*. . . , pp. 100-01.

² *Ibid.*

³ I. P. Pavlov, *Complete Works*, Vol. 3, p. 490.

fundamental scientific meaning of these concepts, concepts which accurately reflect what is taking place in reality.

Let us now turn to another aspect of the matter, namely, whether cognition based on the reflection of reality—either in the form of images or in the form of concepts (generalisations)—is just as dialectical as reality itself. Masaryk, being an idealist and metaphysician, denied the dialectics of concepts, trying thereby to distort Marx's and Engels' theory of knowledge. In *The Social Question*, for example, he wrote: "According to the theory of knowledge of Marx and Engels, a concept is simply the reflection of things in the brain. Just what this reflection is and how, generally speaking, it is possible, we shall not go into at this point, but it is obvious that from such a point of view Hegel's dialectics of concepts is impossible."¹

This and other statements made by Masaryk to deny the dialectical nature of cognition were criticised by Plekhanov, who pointed out that the dialectics of concepts is fully consonant with the Marxist view of cognition as reflection of reality. "The whole question," Plekhanov wrote, "obviously depends on *how things happen in nature*: if everything happens in it—as Engels says—*dialectically*, then it is clear on the face of it that *concepts, which are the 'reflection of things in the brain'*, must be of a dialectical nature. Strange that Masaryk didn't come up with such a simple, and one may say, *unavoidable* conclusion. Evidently he was just *absent-minded*."²

Plekhanov also justly criticised the following statement of Masaryk's: "In any event, Marx and Engels looked for a substantiation of dialectics only in nature. . . . But from nature dialectics gets into the brain (the brain is, after all, also nature!), and in the end materialism has the same method as idealism."³

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., p. 66.

- G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 670.

³ Masaryk, op. cit., p. 67.

"What our critic is now saying," Plekhanov wrote apropos the above statement, "shows how thoughtlessly and prematurely he began to assert that the dialectics of concepts is impossible: after all, if the processes of nature are dialectical processes, and if 'from nature dialectics gets into the brain' (amazing style!), then it is clear that the dialectics of concepts is *both possible and necessary*."¹

Masaryk further concluded that Engels was obliged to secretly acknowledge subjective dialectics as well. This fallacious conclusion, based on false premises, was also aptly criticised by Plekhanov: "We think that Engels acknowledged subjective dialectics not only *unter der Hand* but quite directly and openly. This can amaze only those who understand nothing in Engels' world outlook. Evidently Mr. Masaryk is among them. If he ascribes to Engels only secret . . . acknowledgement of subjective dialectics, it is because he himself finds *any* acknowledgement of it *amazing*. Yet what can be simpler and more natural? If our concepts are a 'reflection' of processes in nature, then they *cannot be deprived of the dialectical element*. Whoever acknowledges the existence of dialectical processes in nature *must acknowledge 'subjective dialectics'*. Who can find this amazing?"²

Being an agnostic in respect to the theory of knowledge, a metaphysician in respect to the method of cognition and an idealist in his interpretation of cognisable phenomena, Masaryk completely twisted and misunderstood Marxist teaching on objective, relative and absolute truth, on the stages of cognition—sensation, perception, representation and logical thinking—on practice as the criterion of truth, etc. At this point we should look into some of these questions. Let us examine, first, Masaryk's ideas about the method of cognition.

Masaryk wrote: "In contrast to modern positive science,

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 672.

- Ibid., p. 673.

that is, essentially to natural science, the *old* philosophy and *metaphysics* used an *ideological* or a *a priori* method; it did not try to learn the characteristics of an object *from the object itself*, but purposefully from *ideas* about the object. Marx and Engels consider this obsolete method to be an *ideological* method, or *ideology in general*. But *ideology* means 'dealing with ideas as independent essences, developing independently and governed by their own laws'.

"Engels does not deny that *this* was a legitimate method in the past. It was necessary, he says, to study *things* first, and only later did it become possible to study *processes* [emphasis added—*M.S.*]."¹

Not a single statement in the above excerpt is well grounded, and the only aim behind all of them is to distort the views of Marx and Engels and to defend idealism and metaphysics.

Firstly, Masaryk confuses "ideology" and "idealism"; moreover, he ascribes this confusion to Engels by defining "*ideology*" with words Engels used in referring to "*idealism*". Marx and Engels, however, made a fundamental distinction between the concepts "ideology" and "idealism".

Secondly, Masaryk connects "the old philosophy and metaphysics" with idealism only, or as he expressed it, with the "ideological method". Actually, however, it is not only the various kinds of idealism that are related to the "old philosophy", but also varieties of pre-Marxist materialism. It is also not true that metaphysics is reduced to idealism only; a good many trends in pre-Marxist materialism also used the metaphysical method.

Thirdly, we find that in the first paragraph quoted above, Masaryk speaks of idealism—of cognising *not the object itself*, but the *idea* about the object, while in the second paragraph he speaks of studying the objects *themselves*, of studying things before it was possible to study processes

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

(and, here also, not *ideas* about processes, but the processes *themselves*). Therefore, references to Engels in the second paragraph have no relation whatever either to Engels or to idealism, which is the subject of the first paragraph. Masaryk tries to reinforce what he says about idealism in the first paragraph with the propositions he advances in the second paragraph, the latter having to do with the materialist, albeit metaphysical, method of study. Needless to say, this kind of switching of issues only testifies to the theoretical weaknesses of Masaryk himself. He produces all this revisionist distortion of Marx's and Engels' views, and all this absurd logic for the sole purpose of defending idealism and idealist metaphysics. The metaphysical method in the hands of idealism, as we shall see below, amounts to denying the possibility of knowing reality—that is, agnosticism.

"Marx and Engels," Masaryk writes, "recognise only the dynamic factor, therefore they separate it from the static factor, creating out of the two methodological categories, thereupon one historical category. However, there is no doubt that a dynamic, historical examination is impossible without studying things themselves as they are *without any relation to motion and development* [emphasis added—*M.S.*]."¹

What Masaryk is saying, in essence, is that the dialectical method recognises only motion without that which moves. This is, of course, absurd. Marxists view motion as a process that is inseparable from matter, phenomena. Motion for them is the mode of existence of matter, of things. Consequently, Masaryk's assertions do not in any way apply to Marxism and constitute nothing but Masaryk's own distorted revisionist idea of the dialectical process of cognising reality. But what was Masaryk himself after? He was advocating the study of "things as they are *without any relation to motion and development*". But this is out-and-out metaphysics in the theory of knowledge—an artificial

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

separation in time and space of things and phenomena, which move and develop, from their motion and development. At a certain stage in the development of human cognition, man did study the properties of things and phenomena in isolation from their function and state of development; but that stage, in the eyes of modern science, belongs to the distant past.

Let us see how Masaryk develops his "theory of knowledge" further. Rejecting *idealism*, he writes, Engels "gives us an equally unacceptable definition of materialism", "he tries in the following way to prove that it is impossible for cognition to have *philosophical* foundations: principles, he says, are not the starting point of research, but its end result; principles are not applied to Nature and human history, but are *derived* from them; it is not Nature and the realm of humanity which conform to these principles, but on the contrary, the principles are valid only insofar as they are in conformity with Nature and history...". Masaryk's reply to this is that "it is not true that in our cognition it is a matter of the historical development of a given experience, a matter of a special kind of *experience* that has been *put into order* and *organised into a system*. *Abstracting*, of which Marx and Engels continually speak with a certain amount of disdain, is *precisely such a principle which systematises experience*. But the criterion of truth, the criterion of certainty which philosophers have been seeking since the beginning of thought, is something other than the abstraction of general propositions and the investigation of whether they agree with experience (emphasis added—*M.S.*)."¹

With these propositions Masaryk again introduced confusion and distorted Marx's and Engels' theory of knowledge in order to defend his idealist viewpoint.

Firstly, in rejecting idealism Engels was showing the impossibility of *idealist philosophical* foundations of cogni-

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., p. 84.

tion and not the impossibility of philosophical foundations of cognition in general. On the contrary, Engels argued that *materialist philosophical* foundations of cognition are necessary, and that is why he included a theory of knowledge in Marxist philosophy, one of whose founders he was himself. Here again, as we see, Masaryk distorted Engels' views. Engels stood firmly on *materialist philosophical* positions when he argued that principles must be the result of the scientific cognition of reality. In Masaryk's opinion, however, principles in the form of abstraction should be thought up by philosophers and introduced into reality. When Masaryk spoke of abstraction, he did not mean the generalisation of human knowledge about reality, otherwise he would not have objected to the kind of abstraction Engels had in mind when he spoke of principles being "derived" from reality and thus constituting the end result of scientific study and not its beginning.

Secondly, then, Masaryk distorted Marx's and Engels' views on *abstraction* by giving the word an *idealist* interpretation. As for Marx's and Engels' attitude towards abstraction, it is not at all true that they spoke of abstraction with disdain. On the contrary, Marx not only recognised abstraction, but considered it to be the basic method of political economy. In the first volume of *Capital* Marx even gave a special explanation, which, incidentally, Masaryk must have been aware of, since he had made a futile effort to "reveal the contradictions" between the first and third volumes of that work. "In the analysis of economic forms," Marx wrote in the preface to the first volume of *Capital*, "...neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of *abstraction* must replace both [emphasis added—*M.S.*]."¹ This shows, therefore, that Marx's basic work *Capital* is inseparable from scientific abstraction. Similarly, Engels often stressed the need to apply the method of abstraction, or the method of logic, in such a

¹ K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1965, p. 8.

science as political economy. Hence, to say that Marx and Engels held abstraction in disdain means to distort their views by ascribing to them an attitude they did not have.

The crux of the matter, then, is that Masaryk defended *abstract idealist* calculations and not *scientific abstraction* as a method of generalising and cognising the essence of phenomena.

Let us now turn to another proposition appearing in the excerpt from Masaryk's book quoted earlier. According to Marxist theory, practice is the criterion of the correctness of our knowledge. Masaryk also tried to show that the criterion of truth is the extent to which this or that general proposition agrees with *experience*. But what kind of experience? In Masaryk's opinion, "experience" must be *systematised by a principle* expressing a philosophical *idealist abstraction*. Hence it turns out that the criterion of truth is not practice but a philosophical *idealist abstraction*. Such is the Masarykist subjective-idealist conception of the relationship between reality and abstraction.

The propositions we have examined above clearly indicate that Masarykism is a variety of agnosticism according to which the source of our cognition does not lie in reality, but in idealist philosophy, in our thinking, in the abstractions of philosophers. Furthermore, as established earlier in our discussion, Masaryk did not regard the *reflection* of reality by our thinking as the *process of cognition*. Therefore, according to Masarykism, cognition of reality, in essence, turns out to be impossible.

Rejecting materialism in the theory of knowledge and in philosophy in general, Masarykism emerged as a reactionary revisionist ideology directed against the proposition that the real world is knowable. In contrast to it, "materialism," as Lenin wrote, "in general recognises objectively real being (matter) as independent of the consciousness, sensation, experience, etc., of humanity. Historical materialism recognises social being as independent of the social consciousness of humanity. In both cases conscious-

ness is only the reflection of being, at best an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) reflection of it. From this Marxist philosophy, which is cast from a single piece of steel, you cannot eliminate one basic premise, one essential part, without departing from objective truth, without falling a prey to bourgeois-reactionary falsehood."¹

4. THE ANTI-DIALECTICS AND METAPHYSICS OF MASARYKISM

As much of a characteristic feature of Masarykism as its struggle against materialism is its struggle against dialectics and its defence of idealist metaphysics. Here again we find that it is not the interests of science, but the selfish class considerations of Masaryk as an ideologist of the bourgeoisie that are basic. Since the main task of our book is to expose Masarykism as the *source* of various *revisionist* trends against Marxism, the chief emphasis will be given to revealing the untenability and class motivations of Masaryk's *revision* and criticism of dialectics. This does not mean, however, that we shall not look into the metaphysical and idealist positions of Masarykism itself. With this brief introduction let us turn now to Masaryk's views on dialectics.

In *The Social Question*, he wrote that "objective dialectics simply does not exist. Dialectical contradictions do not exist in things themselves. We may speak of attraction and repulsion in the natural science sense of the word, of love and hate and of war and peace in human society, but all this is neither Hegel's dialectics nor Marx's dialectics."² This unsubstantiated statement about the absence of dia-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 326.

- Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 69. Masaryk's denial that dialectics exists in nature was criticised by Plekhanov, who wrote: "'Objective dialectics simply does not exist.' We have heard this, but we ask you, Herr Professor, to prove it to us. 'Dialectical contradiction does not exist in nature.' Again, this is not *proof*, but a *repetition* of that which we

lectics is already refuted by Masaryk's enumeration of *contradictory* phenomena. Besides this, Masaryk thought that attraction and repulsion in the *natural science* sense of the word is not concrete scientific confirmation that dialectics exists in nature and that this is why there exists a *natural science* reflection in the categories "repulsion" and "attraction". We can already see that Masarykism opposes *science* in that it rejects something that the natural sciences recognise as being in conformity with laws. Obviously not understanding dialectics at all, Masaryk called Hegel's dialectics "simple hocus-pocus" and a "*metaphysical cob-web*".¹

This untenable hanging of labels on dialectics only shows how incapable Masaryk was of examining the substance of its propositions, to say nothing of the fact that calling *dialectics* a *metaphysical cob-web* shows complete scientific illiteracy; it can only cause one to doubt whether Masaryk knew *what dialectics is* and *what metaphysics is*.

But let us see what Masarykism has to say. Trying to undermine the scientific significance of materialist dialectics, Masaryk resorted to distortion only to get tangled up in his own contradictory arguments. He wrote, for example, that at first Marx was a Hegelian, but then went over to Feuerbach's point of view. From Hegel he borrowed the dialectical method and from Feuerbach—materialism. But dialectics and materialism are incompatible: "Materialist dialectics is a *contradictio in adjecto*."²

"Marx and Engels did not understand," Masaryk continued, "that dialectics was inappropriate for them. This is a very important circumstance; we find a great many contradictions in the details of their system, and this is explained by the contradiction in the theoretical foundation

have been asking Mr. Critic to *prove*. . . . The rest of the phrase we have cited is also *not proof*, but a *restatement of that which requires proving*" (G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 674).

¹ Masaryk, op. cit., p. 63.

² *Ibid.*, p. 66.

of the entire system."¹ These empty assertions imputing that Marx and Engels had subscribed to idealist dialectics have already been exposed by Plekhanov, who pointed out that Masaryk had proved nothing at all about materialist dialectics, but only got himself in a tangle. The following admission made by Masaryk is one evidence of this: "It is true that Marx and Engels revolt against Hegel and condemn his method." If that is so, Plekhanov wrote, "the question is, what about that 'very important circumstance' of their not understanding that Hegel's dialectics was inappropriate for them?"²

Already in a tangle and having missed the distinction between *idealist* and *materialist* dialectics, Masaryk went on to contradict himself conclusively. He wrote: "Generally Marx . . . *quite consistently rejects* Hegel's dialectics. Engels and Marx also praise Feuerbach for having overcome Hegel's dialectics, and then, suddenly, *they accept this* dialectics in its entirety [emphasis added—M.S.]"³ Such statements only prove that Masarykism is groundless and that it distorts Marxist views. In the first volume of *Capital*, which Masaryk so often quoted in *The Social Question*, Marx said the following: "My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. . . . The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion."⁴

Thus, neither earlier nor later did Marx embrace Hegel's dialectics, and Masaryk's assertions on this score are a gross distortion of Marxism and deliberate concealment of what Marx said about his materialist dialectics.

Regarding the fact that Marx and Engels praised Feuerbach for having "overcome" Hegel's dialectics, it should be remembered that they were referring to idealist dialectics, towards which they held a negative attitude

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

² G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 674.

³ Masaryk, op. cit., p. 67.

⁴ K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 19.

ever since. But when they defended and advocated the dialectical method, they were talking about materialist dialectics, which had rendered them such great service in putting socialism on a scientific basis. There is absolutely no contradiction in this.

"At first, Masaryk undertook to prove to us that *materialist* dialectics is a *contradictio in adjecto*," Plekhanov pointed out. "But now he fails to distinguish between this dialectics and *idealist* dialectics and states that Marx and Engels, having first rejected the latter, 'suddenly' accepted it in its entirety. One would have to be quite mixed up in one's arguments to make such unexpected. . . logical jumps."¹

Now that it is perfectly clear that Masaryk had absolutely no *scientific* grounds for his *revisionist* views on materialist dialectics, let us ascertain just what reasons Masaryk did have for his anti-scientific and irresponsible distortions of dialectics. As we shall see below, the real reason behind these distortions lies in the political and social ideas of Masaryk as an ideologist of the bourgeoisie in the period of imperialism. The whole point is that dialectics views *social revolutions* as the *natural result* of the development of a society based on class antagonism. Distorting Hegel's views and again confusing Hegel's dialectics and materialist dialectics, Masaryk wrote: "Hegel already had an idea of development and progress, but that idea does not correspond to present-day views. . . . He conceived of progress through catastrophes, through large upheavals and contradictions. In this he was followed by Feuerbach, and following them both was Marx."²

Again, Masaryk was saying something that wasn't so. Hegel never said that development took place only "through catastrophes, large upheavals and contradictions". Hegel felt that development also consists of infinitely small changes and contradictions. At the same time, he pointed out that these infinitely small changes and contradictions not only do not exclude "large upheavals and contradictions" but

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., pp. 671-72.

² Masaryk, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

sometimes inevitably lead to them. Hegel called in question the famous metaphysical proposition to which Masaryk so zealously subscribed¹: "nature makes no leaps". If Masaryk finds, Plekhanov wrote in his article, "that Hegel's arguments are groundless, then let him refute them. But he doesn't even try to do this. *He confines himself to distorting Hegel's idea*. There's a 'critic' for you!"²

This distortion is in itself characteristic; it reveals the *social* side of all the attacks against Hegelian dialectics. This dialectics, said Plekhanov, is odious to philistines because it justifies "*large upheavals*". *Das ist des Pudels Kern*.³ Of course, the bourgeoisie and its ideologists are much more disturbed from a class standpoint by *materialist* dialectics, and Masaryk's distortions of materialist dialectics and of Marx's philosophy as a whole are explained by the fact that this dialectics and this philosophy, as Plekhanov correctly noted, are a veritable *algebra of revolution*.⁴

This, then, is why dialectical philosophy was so annoying to Masaryk. "For it [dialectical philosophy] nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side: it recognises that definite stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and circumstances; but only so far. The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its *revolutionary* character is absolute—the only absolute dialectical philosophy admits [emphasis added—M. S.]"⁵

¹ See Masaryk, *The Beginning of a Socialist Society*, Russ. ed., St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 20.

² G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 675.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 675-76.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 676.

⁵ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, pp. 339-40.

CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF MASARYKISM

1. SOCIETY AND THE HUMAN ESSENCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM

As in questions of general philosophy, Masaryk was also an idealist and metaphysician in questions of sociology. He rejected the proposition that human consciousness is determined by material social being.¹ He maintained that man's spiritual life is independent of the economic conditions of society, and he pointed to the behaviour of Hus, the strong faith of Luther and the scientific works of Newton, etc., as examples allegedly confirming his position. We shall discuss these examples later²; but at this point, let us examine the positions from which Masarykist sociology proceeds.

The initial positions of Masarykism in sociology are characterised by a religious-idealist understanding of the development of society, by a combination of this understanding with a subjective-idealist interpretation of society, inasmuch as Masaryk viewed society from the standpoint of extreme *individualism*.

In *The Social Question*, he wrote: "One thing is certain: the masses *resp.* classes do not constitute the ultimate motive force of history. The masses—be they organised politically, economically, intellectually, religiously or as a nation—are always a large and, in practice, often decisive force; but *individuals*, existing alongside them and within them in *all*

spheres of life, are also a *decisive force*; and standing above them as a *decisive force* is criticism and the recognition of *other individuals*, contemporaries or descendants... We must envisage the relation between *individualism* and collectivism much more precisely and more critically than did Marx and Engels... And history as a science is not only the history of mass movements and the class struggle; it is also the *history* of many *individuals* [emphasis added—*M. S.*]."¹

Holding to subjective-idealist positions, Masaryk developed his individualism in the understanding of society as *psychological individualism*; he saw sociological questions in terms of psychological experiences. "The social question," he wrote, "at the present time—is the anxiety and dissatisfaction, the desire and trepidation, the hope and despair, the suffering and the bitterness of thousands and millions of people."²

The anti-scientific nature of the initial positions of Masaryk's psychological individualism becomes apparent from the outset. Masaryk reduces the social question to the psychological feelings of people, although it is obvious that the social question is a question of *social* organisation, of the structure of society and not at all a question of the psychological feelings of people. Psychological feelings are a problem of psychology, not of sociology. As we turn to what Masaryk wrote following his definition of the social question, we find even greater confusion and absurdity: "Concretely and practically, the social question at present is the question of socialism..."³ But everyone knows that socialism is a *social system* and not the aggregate of the psychological feelings of people. Here again we see that Masaryk intended to make a crude switch—to substitute a *psychological* question for the *social* question. Although this substitution makes no sense from the standpoint of *science* and *logic* and sounds

¹ Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*

¹ See Masaryk, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-28.

² See sections on the class struggle and on the national question.