General and Complete Disarmament Urged

p The peace that followed the First World War proved unstable, and the armaments race was on again in the imperialist countries from the mid-1920s onward. This situation seriously alarmed public opinion throughout the world. In an effort to stifle resentment the bourgeois statesmen launched into an interminable discussion of disarmament problems. A Preparatory Commission was set up within the framework of the League of Nations, at whose endless meetings bourgeois diplomatists argued these problems. Reams of paper were used up and dozens of resolutions drafted. There was everything, in fact, except disarmament.

p In November 1927, however, a breath of fresh air swept through the spacious conference halls of the Palais des Nations at Geneva. A Soviet delegation arrived to attend the Preparatory Commission’s fourth session. It was led by M. M. Litvinov, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, noted for his activity in the sphere of international diplomacy in the 1920s and 1930s. A brilliant speaker and controversialist, a man of great erudition, Litvinov had ably defended the interests of the USSR at various international meetings.

p On the opening day of the session the Soviet delegation read the Soviet proposal on general and complete disarmament. The document created a profound impression: this was the first businesslike proposal in seven years of nothing but twaddle on the subject.

p Commenting on the Soviet proposal G. Lansbury, prominent British Labourist, said that if it had been submitted to an assembly 110 of ordinary men and women it would have been adopted by a unanimous vote. He called it the greatest event in the history of the fight for peace.

p As was to be expected, however, the Soviet proposal was voted down by the bourgeois diplomatists on the ground that general and complete disarmament was, allegedly, Utopian. In March 1928, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft convention on a partial reduction of armaments; and this proposal suffered the same fate.

p In 1932, a World Conference on Limitation and Reduction of Armaments opened at Geneva. Hundreds of politicians, diplomats and journalists once again gathered in the Palais des Nations. And once again the efforts of the Soviet Union to obtain even a partial solution of the problem proved fruitless. The Conference ended in failure because the capitalist countries did not want disarmament. As a matter of fact they were already preparing for a new war.

As to the value of the discussions on disarmament in the late 1920s and early 1930s, it may be said that a new factor had made its appearance in the international arena for all the world to see; a new force which took the issue out of the sphere of fruitless quibbling and proposed a realistic approach. The USSR submitted- a broad disarmament programme, which had a tremendous impact even though it was neither accepted nor even approved in principle by the Conference. Morally, the Soviet Union had won a notable victory.

Against the Menace of War

p In the mid-1930s the menace of a world-wide conflagration became very real. The Soviet Union fought stubbornly to avert its outbreak. As early as 1933 it offered a draft definition of aggression, of which the central item was the proposal to consider an aggressor any country that declared war on or invaded the territory of another. The decisive importance in the struggle against the aggressive designs of German fascism the Soviet Union attached to the setting up of a system of collective security of peace-loving states. France, Czechoslovakia, Poland and certain other states should conclude, according to the Soviet proposal, a series of mutual assistance treaties and join forces to block any aggression on the part of nazi Germany.

p An event of great significance was the signing, in May 1935, of a Franco-Soviet and a Czechoslovak-Soviet treaties. If these treaties had remained in force, as the Soviet side had wished, events in Europe might have taken a different turn. Instead, they 111 were treated as scraps of paper, for it had been all along the wish of the governing circles of Great Britain, France and the United States to bring about a clash between Germany and the USSR, which should weaken the one and the other. They worked against any system of collective security and did nothing to block German plans of aggression, in the expectation that Hitler would restrict himself to an eastward expansion.

p On March 13, 1938, Hitler occupied Austria without firing a shot. The Western powers took no notice. The only protest came from the Soviet Union. People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov sharply condemned the seizure of Austria and Warned that this action constituted a threat to all countries. "Tomorrow may be too late,” Litvinov said in a special statement, "but today there is still time, if only all states, especially the great powers, take a firm, unequivocal stand in regard to the problem of collective action to keep the peace.”

p The ruling classes of the Western states, however, were far from sharing this point of view. Hitler, having dealt with Austria, now began preparations for dealing in a similar manner with Czechoslovakia.

p The Soviet Government repeatedly called on Great Britain and France to act jointly in defence of Czechoslovakia, on the one hand, and, on the other, urged that country to offer resistance to the aggressors with the help of the Soviet Union. On September 25, 1938, the Soviet Government advised France that thirty Soviet divisions had been moved up to the western frontiers of the USSR and that the air force and tank units were in combat readiness. All the USSR needed was a Czechoslovak request for assistance. But that request never came.

p The last act of the tragedy opened towards the end of September. The Munich deal was to be that last and decisive act of the governments of Great Britain and France, which cleared the way for Hitler to unleash the Second World War. The USSR had been the only country to fight in defence of Czechoslovakia and peace in Europe.

p The short-sighted policy followed by Great Britain and France had miscarried. Contrary to their cherished ambition, which was to push Germany into a war with the USSR, the war broke out between Germany and the Anglo-French coalition.

p Great Britain, France and the United States would not come to an understanding with the Soviet Union, a socialist state, and the latter was forced to look to its own security. The threat of War had become still more apparent after the Munich deal. The Soviet people realised that an imperialist assault could not be averted and therefore set about strengthening the country’s defences.

p In August 1939, Germany offered to conclude a non-aggression pact with the USSR. The Soviet Government was perfectly aware that the offer by no means reflected any German desire for peaceful relations with the USSR, but it needed time the better to prepare for the impending war and was thus left no choice but to accept the offer, and a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was accordingly signed on August 23.

Soviet foreign policy, in the 1930s, had pursued one aim, and one only: that of averting war; a policy that was just and consonant with the aspirations of all peoples. And if it proved impossible to save the world from disaster in the shape of a world war unleashed by Germany, Italy and Japan, the blame lies with the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and France, which refused to ally themselves with the USSR to defend the peace and avert a war.