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Reluctant Recognition

p Now that Soviet Russia had gained an opportunity to turn to the task of peaceful development, the governments of the bourgeois world found themselves in a quandary: what should be their relations with a revolutionary Russia? Should they resume trading with her? Should they meet with her representatives at international conferences? Or should they continue the blockade a"nd ignore the Soviet Government as before?

p During the past few years the Soviet Government had repeatedly declared in clear and unequivocal terms that it was interested in peace and in normal economic and political relations with all countries. "Our motto,” G. V. Chicherin, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, used to say, "has invariably been ’peaceful coexistence with other governments, whatever their nature’.” More than ten official overtures of peace were made by the Soviet Government just between August 1918 and May 1919. There had been no response. Nevertheless, having suffered a defeat in an armed clash with the Soviet Republic, the leading statesmen of the bourgeois countries undertook a reappraisal of values.

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p The new trend appeared, earlier and with greater force than elsewhere, in Great Britain, whose government was headed by Lloyd George. Lenin spoke of him as one of the bourgeois world’s most adroit politicians. As for the most violent opponents of any deals with Soviet Russia, these were: Winston Churchill, the "greatest Russia-hater”; Lord Curzon, one of the pillars of British colonialism; President Harding of the United States; and Premier Poincare of France. These four called for another war of intervention against Soviet Russia. No well-wisher of the Soviet state, of course, Lloyd George differed from the four only in that he expected to make short work of that country by economic means.

p Anglo-Soviet talks began in London towards the end of 1920. Soviet Russia was represented by L. B. Krasin, one of the first Soviet diplomats. Having received a technical education, Krasin had held responsible posts in the Soviet Government. Lenin described him as a man of exceptional talent. M. M. Litvinov, prominent Soviet diplomat, wrote of him in glowing terms: "In my memory Krasin embodies the virtues of a revolutionary, a Party member, a Soviet leader, and a diplomat. I remember him as a strong, energetic and very charming individual.”

p The atmosphere at these London talks was extremely strained: the reactionary elements did their best to prevent them from succeeding.

p The negotiations ended on March 16, 1921, in the conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet trade agreement. This was an eminent success for Soviet diplomacy. Italy followed suit and concluded a similar agreement. The firmness and restraint displayed by the Soviet Government and its consistent efforts to establish peaceful relations with all countries had produced very tangible results.

These early successes of Soviet Russia in the sphere of foreign relations showed that the Bolsheviks, besides being very able organisers of their country’s defence, were also able politicians and diplomats. Friendly interest in the workers’ and peasants’ state had begun to grow all over the world and in many different sections of its population.

The Genoa Conference

p In April 1922, newspapers and magazines in the capitalist world became preoccupied with Genoa, Italy, where the first international conference with the participation of Soviet Russia was shortly to meet. Eminent political figures of the bourgeois world, ministers, big capitalists, diplomats and press correspondents flocked to Genoa. They expected that there would be no more than some general talk about peace and the usual flood of 36 bourgeois demagogy. There was also the intention to dictate harsh peace terms to Soviet Russia, which would be made to pay up all the debts incurred by the tsarist and Provisional governments. Not content with that, the bourgeois money-bags wanted the Bolsheviks to admit hundreds of foreign experts into their country to exercise control over the settlement of those debts. The French and British capitalists wanted to put these “experts” and " advisers" in charge of the Soviet economic and financial departments. These plans of theirs were not destined to materialise, however.

p The Genoa Conference opened on April 10, 1922, in the crowded hall of the Palazzo di San Giorgio. The Soviet delegation had come to Genoa with a definite programme worked out by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government under Lenin’s personal supervision and outlining strategic and tactical objectives for the Soviet diplomats, top priority being given to the establishment of economic and commercial relations between the USSR and the capitalist world. The Soviet programme was a programme of peace and peaceful coexistence.

p In accordance with the decision of the Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party the Soviet delegation was to be headed by Lenin. Yet the troubled international atmosphere together with the presence of numerous Russian counter-revolutionaries in the various European countries made Lenin’s voyage abroad appear dangerous. A stream of letters to the Soviet Government kept pouring in meanwhile from people all over the country, asking that Lenin should not be sent abroad; and both the Central Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars decided to comply with these wishes.

p Following this decision the Soviet Government appointed G. V. Chicherin, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, as vicechairman of the Soviet delegation with full exercise of the rigkts of chairman. Since 1918 Chicherin was for twelve years in charge of the Soviet diplomatic service. A man of great culture and an authority on international law, he was a convinced and devoted Party worker. Lenin greatly valued his contribution to the activities of the Soviet diplomatic service.

p Chicherin was accompanied to the conference by V. V. Vorovsky, L. B. Krasin, M. M. Litvinov and Y. E. Rudzutak. At Genoa, the interest of those who came to attend the conference was largely focussed on the Soviet delegation. What were they like, these mysterious Bolsheviks from Russia, concerning whom so many yarns were being spun in the capitalist world? Would they be able to hold their own against the crafty politicians of the bourgeois countries?

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p The atmosphere in the conference hall, on April 10, was one of suspense. Hundreds of reporters and correspondents made ready to take down the declaration about to be made, for the first time in history, by a delegation of a socialist country at an international conference. They saw a man, slight of build, with a keen, intelligent glance, wearing a short beard, mount to the rostrum: this was Chicherin. He spoke in Russian, himself interpreting his speech in French. He read the statement prepared by the Soviet delegation, urging the necessity of peaceful co-existence of their socialist country and the capitalist powers. "While abiding by the principles of communism,” the statement read, "the Russian delegation admits that in the present historical epoch, which makes possible the parallel existence of the old and the rising new socialist systems, economic co-operation between countries representing these two systems of property is an imperative necessity for universal economic reconstruction.”

p The statement further urged a businesslike approach to the problem of a general reduction of armaments and support of any measures designed to lighten the burden of militarism if they provide for a reduction in the size of the armies of all states and an amendment of the rules of warfare completely prohibiting the use of particularly savage methods, such as poison gas, air warfare, destructive weapons aimed at the civilian population, etc. In short, the Soviet statement envisaged peace and disarmament. The statement made it clear to the working people throughout the world that Soviet Russia was determined to fight for peace and universal prosperity, against the policy of aggression and an armaments race.

p Among the delegates of the capitalist powers the Soviet statement produced a reaction of extreme irritation and nervousness. Meeting followed meeting, luxurious limousines sped in all directions, carrying perturbed bourgeois diplomats from place to place. They were busy looking for a "satisfactory answer" to the Russian problem and seeking agreement on joint demarches against the Soviet delegation.

p The peace offers made by the Soviet Republic were turned down by the Western diplomats. "The minute the Russian delegation proposes consideration of the problem [of disarmament.—Ed.]," said the French foreign minister, "it will encounter on the part of the French delegation not only a cool reception or a protest, but a pointed, categoric, final and decisive refusal.” This declaration was supported by the Italian prime minister; and the Soviet proposals were as good as turned down by Lloyd George as well.

p Two attitudes thus became clearly apparent to the judgement of public opinion. Soviet Russia urged peaceful co-existence and 38 disarmament; and the capitalist countries wanted to re-establish bourgeois rule in Soviet Russia and refused to disarm. The schemes of the bourgeois politicians, however, intended to force crippling economic terms on Soviet Russia, miscarried grievously. The Soviet delegation rejected their importunities. In fact it brought about a schism in the united anti-Soviet front.

p It should be mentioned that the Genoa Conference was the first international conference, since the war of 1914-18, to be attended by a German delegation. Under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty the German bourgeoisie was carrying a heavy burden which it was anxious to lighten. The situation had given birth to forces among the German ruling circles which considered that it would be useful to establish economic and political relations with Soviet Russia. The Soviet delegation, taking advantage of this development, entered into negotiations with the German representatives. As for the Germans, they were at once anxious for and fearful of any agreement with Soviet Russia.

p The German delegation, which had been given accommodations at Rapallo, a few miles out of Genoa, sat up all through the night of April 15 discussing whether to enter negotiations with the Russians or not. At 2 a.m. Chicherin telephoned to inform the German delegation that Germany would receive preferential treatment in trade with Soviet Russia in the event of the conclusion of a Soviet-German treaty. Chicherin’s message strengthened the Germans’ interest in a treaty. Lengthy consultations by telephone between the German delegates and Berlin took place on the following day, resulting in a decision; and in the evening of April 16, 1922, the two sides signed the Soviet-German Treaty of Rapallo.

p This act was a manifestation of the policy of peaceful co- existence between states with different political systems. Under the terms of the Treaty of Rapallo the Soviet Republic and Germany withdrew all reciprocal claims and cancelled all pending payments in settlement of military and other disbursements. Germany and Russia, two great European powers, resumed diplomatic and consular relations, and expressed their desire to establish commercial and economic relations on mutually advantageous terms. The Rapallo Treaty signified the defeat of the imperialist policy of isolating the Soviet Republic.

p The ruling circles of Great Britain, France, and other countries met the Soviet-German treaty with extreme irritation and even undisguised anger. French Prime Minister Poincare called an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers, which decided to lodge a protest. Lloyd George demanded that Germany should abrogate the treaty, threatening to expel the German delegation from Genoa if this were not done. Alarmed by such serious 39 repercussions, the Germans requested the Soviet delegation, on April 19, to abrogate the signed document; which the Soviet representatives, naturally, refused to do. And the treaty remained in force.

p The activities of the Soviet delegation at the conference were continuously directed by Lenin, even though it was very difficult to maintain contact between Moscow and Genoa. Telegrams were dispatched via London, so that messages from Genoa reached Moscow nearly twenty-four hours later; diplomatic pouches made the trip in five or six days. The Western publications gave distorted accounts of the proceedings. All these difficulties notwithstanding, the Soviet delegation never for a day felt itself neglected by Moscow. Lenin watched the conference with great attention. On April 18 he brought up in the Political Bureau the question of publishing the text of the Treaty of Rapallo, and on the 19th it was duly given in the Soviet press.

No decisions were made at the Genoa Conference, but it did signify initial success for Soviet foreign policy and the principles of peaceful coexistence as formulated by Lenin.

Soviet Republic Aids Eastern Nations

p Under the tsarist regime and also under the Provisional Government, Russia had been a prison-house for her peoples. Besides being that, however, she had been unscrupulous in the exploitation of her economically weak neighbours. For in this respect the Russian rulers were no better than the British, German, French and American imperialists.

p Her southern and southeastern neighbours were Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Never since history began had any of the great powers concluded a single treaty or agreement with any of these countries on terms of Fairness and equality of rights. After October 1917, however, the situation changed.

p On January 17, 1918, the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs notified Asad Khan, the Persian envoy, that the Soviet Government declared all treaties and agreements incompatible with the freedom and independence of the Persian people abrogated. The news caused rejoicing throughout Iran. The Soviet diplomatic representative at Teheran reported: "The impact of this news upon the Persians is beyond description. Teheran has been literally rocked by the burst of universal joy. Endless deputations and individuals coming to greet me leave me not a moment’s time. I have been receiving ovations even in the streets.”

p By the spring of 1918 the Soviet Republic had completed the withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran, thereby opening the road 40 to Iranian independence and to the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries.

p A Soviet-Iranian treaty was signed in Moscow in February 1921, confirming the abrogation of all unequal treaties, conventions and agreements concluded with Iran by tsarist Russia. It provided for the cancellation of all Persian debts and the return to Iran of all concessions and property acquired by tsarist Russia. That was the first equal treaty ever concluded with Iran, and it proved extremely helpful to the Iranian people.

p Progressive elements in Iran expressed a high opinion of Soviet Russia’s policy in regard to the Iranian people. The newspaper Rah-nema wrote: "In the murk that enveloped our political horizons there came blinding flashes of lightning that created an extraordinary impression in the dark night of Persian politics. .. . This brilliant flash came out of the North, and its source was Moscow. Out of Moscow it flashed with surprising force to illuminate the darkness in which we live.”

p Relations improved between Soviet Russia and Turkey, too. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the eminent statesman then at the head of the Turkish Government, realised the importance of friendly relations with Soviet Russia. A Turko-Soviet treaty was 41 concluded on March 16, 1921—the first equal treaty in Turkish history—and in implementation of this treaty there was a heavy movement of export goods to Turkey during 1921 and 1922, to the great advantage of that country.

In 1921 similar treaties were concluded by the Soviet Republic with Afghanistan (February 28, 1921) and Mongolia (November 5, 1921). Thus did Lenin’s diplomatic methods lay the foundation of a new, Soviet policy in respect of the countries of Asia, the salient elements of which were: support of national liberation movements; economic and political aid; and defence of sovereignty and independence.