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p Since the beginning of the 1960s, when the Democratic Party came to power, government interference in the relations between labour and capital increased.

p The successes of socialism in the economic competition between the two systems, the revolutionising influence of those successes on processes taking place in the capitalist countries, the aggravation of internal class contradictions and fear of their continued growth—all this forced the leaders of the Democratic Administration to introduce a number of new factors into their policy. While continuing with its strong and unveiled support of the interests of the dominating class, the government began increasingly to resort to bourgeois-reformist manoeuvres, making individual social concessions with the aim of holding back the development of the working class’s economic and political struggle.

p A major feature in both the New Frontiers course of President Kennedy and President Johnson’s Great Society was the attempt to camouflage the intensified exploitation of the working people, to create the illusion of social unity and a community of interests between labour and capital. This was done with the help of more flexible government regulation of labour relations, the broad involvement of top labour union officials in carrying out the policy, and the significantly greater use than during Eisenhower’s presidency of the "human relations" tactic to try to establish "class peace" and "class collaboration”. As noted in the Main Document of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ 69 Parties held in Moscow in 1969, "in its actions against the working-class movement imperialism violates democratic rights and freedoms and uses naked violence, brutal methods of police persecution and anti-labour legislation. Moreover, it has recourse to demagogy, bourgeois reformism and opportunist ideology and policy, and is constantly in quest of new methods to undermine the working-class movement from within and ‘integrate’ it into the capitalist system.”  [69•1 

p As it prepared for the 1960 presidential election, the Democratic Party leadership undertook a series of steps to establish close relations with the leaders of the AFL-CIO. Unlike the Eisenhower Administration, which had pursued a crude and unveiled anti-labour policy which, in the 1950s, resulted in the breakdown of the alliance between the labour union bureaucracy and the bourgeois government (which had existed since the time of President Roosevelt’s New Deal), the Democratic Party realised that without the broad support of organised labour it could not hope to win in the upcoming election.

p Whereas in previous elections the labour unions were not solidly behind one or the other of the bourgeois parties, in 1960, the leaders of the AFL-CIO and the overwhelming majority of independent unions came out officially with a call to launch an intensive political campaign to get labour union members and their families to vote for the Democratic candidates.  [69•2 

p Strong labour union support was to a large extent won by Kennedy’s relatively liberal platform (in comparison with 70 the Republican platform) with respect to domestic affairs and, in particular, with respect to labour relations.

p The Democrats promised that if elected, their administration would take immediate and effective steps to improve living conditions, reduce unemployment, make radical improvements in aid to the jobless, raise the minimum wage and increase the number of categories covered by the minimum wage law and alleviate the situation of the farmers. The administration would also fight for the preservation and even the restoration of labour union rights, seek the re- examination and repeal of certain especially odious anti-labour laws, such as the "right to work" clause of the Taft-Hartley Act which obstructed the growth of labour union membership.

p Despite its limited nature, the programme proposed by the Democratic Party and its leader John F. Kennedy offered certain concessions to the American working class. It reflected the desire of the Democratic Party leadership and the bourgeois circles supporting it, as well as of Right-wing labour union leaders, to keep the dissatisfaction felt by masses of working people within bounds and prevent the economic struggle of the working class from growing into a political struggle.

p The generally strong support coming from organised labour clinched the election for Kennedy. In November 1963, he told the delegates of an AFL-CIO convention: "Three years ago and one week, by a landslide, the people of the United States elected me to the Presidency of this country, and it is possible that you had something to do with that majority of 112,000 votes.”  [70•1 

p President Kennedy’s new labour policy was in essence a new stage in government interference in labour-capital relations, primarily in the sphere of collective bargaining. It was undertaken in order to limit the rights of labour unions in negotiations with employers, above all in such vitally important questions as wages and hours. At the same time, Kennedy tried to create the impression that his policy was based on observing the interests of both workers and employers 71 and, moreover, in a way that would also be in keeping with the interests of the society as a whole. His administration, Kennedy said, would not be "a businessman’s administration, but neither will it be a labour administration, or a farmer’s administration. It will be an administration representing, and seeking to serve, all Americans.”  [71•1 

p The most suitable candidate for the job of carrying out Kennedy’s policy of class collaboration to the benefit of monopoly capital turned out to be Arthur Goldberg, a lawyer who for more than 12 years had been the chief legal counsellor for the AFL-CIO, its Industrial Union Department and several affiliates, including the steelworkers union. Goldberg’s ideas on the need to establish close co-operation between labour and capital, and especially his concrete proposals for implementing this co-operation through various committees in which the "three interested forces"—the employers, the labour unions and representatives of the “ public”—would take part, were the decisive factor in his becoming in December 1960 Kennedy’s Secretary of Labour.

p Although Kennedy hoped that with Goldberg’s help he could strengthen ties between the government and the labour union bureaucracy, his choice did not entirely please the top officials of the AFL-CIO; there were serious objections to Goldberg even in the highest labour union circles. The leaders of the AFL-CIO wanted to see one of their own elected union officials as Secretary of Labour, but Kennedy rejected all five candidates proposed by George Meany. "The selection of Goldberg apart from his personal merit,” commented well-known expert on the labour movement George Morris, writing in The Worker, "is fresh confirmation of the fact that those who rule America nurse an undying antipathy toward the labour movement, even for its very conservative precapitalist labour leaders. They don’t trust their best friends in trade union leadership.”  [71•2 

p Immediately after his appointment, "labour’s man" Arthur Goldberg (following Kennedy’s lead) called for moderation and restraint in labour’s demands for higher wages and 72 a shorter workweek, although previously he had defended diametrically opposite views.  [72•1  Right-wing union leaders, not wishing to spoil relations with Kennedy’s Administration, at first took an extremely passive and conciliatory position on these vital issues.

p The conciliatory approach taken by the AFL-CIO leadership reached a point where, in working out a programme of basic demands that would serve as a basis for labour union alliance and co-operation with the Kennedy Administration, the Executive Council, meeting in January 1961, did not include the demand for reducing the workweek, a demand that had been part of the AFL-CIO’s traditional policy for many years.

p To carry out its new labour relations policy aimed at achieving "class peace”, the Kennedy Administration began from the outset to draw Right-wing labour union leaders into closer co-operation with government agencies. Various committees and commissions were set up to work out and co- ordinate labour-management policy, with the active participation and actually under the direction of government officials. The administration attached great importance to the President’s Advisory Committee on Labour-Management Policy, which was set up in early 1961. The committee consisted of 19 advisers: seven representatives of industry (including auto king Henry Ford and president of International Business Machines Thomas Watson), labour union representatives (George Meany, Walter Reuther, David Dubinsky, Joseph Keenan, David McDonald, George Harrison, and five labour relations experts representing "the public”. The committee chairmen were the Secretary of Labour and the Secretary of Commerce.

p The Committee’s job was not to look into conflicts or try to settle individual disputes. Its aims were much broader: to study problems of technological progress, unemployment and economic development, an J also "to give direction to the general movement of wages and prices so that the general welfare of this country can be served".  [72•2  "I deem this a most important committee,” declared President Kennedy. "It is my hope that the Committee may help to restore that sense 73 of common purpose which has strengthened our Nation in times of emergency and generate a climate conducive to co-operation and resolution of differences.”  [73•1  Its major task, the President noted, "is to help our free institutions work better and to encourage sound economic growth and healthy industrial relations.”  [73•2  An analysis made by Lloyd Ulman, Director of the University of California’s Institute of Industrial Relations, shows that the terms of reference of the new Advisory Committee were broader than those of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers. The committee dealt with problems of collective bargaining as well as many problems of economic policy that were usually considered the prerogative of the Council of Economic Advisers.

p It should be noted that the idea of instituting a series of conferences between top-level representatives of labour and management as a means of lessening the growing tensions in labour-management relations was first advanced by Goldberg in a lecture given at the University of Wisconsin in 1958.  [73•3  Two years later, AFL-CIO president George Meany made a similar suggestion. Immediately after a 116-day steel strike was halted Meany proposed that President Eisenhower call a conference to work out measures to prevent such strikes in the future and restore harmony in labour- management relations. Similar suggestions and projects were frequently made in the late 1950s by another famous labour union bureaucrat and proponent of a policy of "close collaboration"—David McDonald, president of the United Steelworkers of America. President Kennedy’s Advisory Committee on Labour-Management Policy, he declared at this union’s convention in 1962, "is the fruition of an idea which we have championed publicly for many years”.  [73•4 

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p Reformist labour leaders apparently felt that their active co-operation with representatives of big business and "the public" would demonstrate the “respectability” and "social responsibility" of labour unions and would help to solve a number of their serious problems. In June 1960, for example, a special resolution adopted at a convention of the Textile Workers Union in support of Meany’s “initiative” stressed that "a continuing national conference of management and labour can be the means of lifting the sights of both parties toward higher goals—-A regular exchange of views can lead to new and better ways of promoting economic expansion and insuring that such gains are shared equitably."  [74•1  It is noteworthy that a few months after the President’s Advisory Committee was set up, Right-wing labour leaders began suggesting that the President create similar committees for individual industries. The need for such a move was noted, for example, in a resolution adopted by a Special Collective Bargaining Convention of the United Auto Workers in April 1961.  [74•2 

p After a series of meetings, the Advisory Committee sent two reports to the President: one on January 11, 1962, entitled "The Benefits and Problems Incident to Automation and Other Technological Advances”, and one on May 1, 1962, entitled "Free and Responsible Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace”. While the first report went no further than to make a general statement about the complexity of the problems created by automation and express some good but not very concrete wishes, the second report outlined some proposals that considerably expanded the rights of government agencies in regulating labour conflicts and reexamined a number of facets of the existing collective bargaining system.

p In particular, the Advisory Committee suggested broadening the power of the Emergency Dispute Boards that are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service "in any collective- 75 bargaining situation in a major or critical industry which may develop into a dispute threatening the national health or safety”.  [75•1  Emergency Dispute Boards could be set up at any stage of negotiation, the report noted, and should have the right of recommending and approving conditions for averting conflicts. Moreover, the report, which, incidentally, was signed by some eminent labour union leaders, suggested strengthening certain provisions of the odious anti-labour Taft-Hartley Act, and particularly its provision for a cooling off period in labour disputes. According to the Taft-Hartley Act, the President had to receive court approval before he could "invoke the period”. Now, the decision would be left entirely up to him.  [75•2  If at the end of the 80-day cooling off period the sides do not reach an agreement, the report noted, the President can ban a strike, after submitting his proposals for averting the conflict to Congress.  [75•3 

p The Advisory Committee’s recommendations gave the government additional opportunities for direct interference in labour relations, regardless of how little the moves made by the government corresponded to existing laws.

p Another agency designed to help the government prevent labour-management confrontations was the 12-man National Labour-Management Panel, appointed by President Kennedy in May 1963 on the basis of the Taft-Hartley Act and consisting of six labour union representatives and six representatives of management. The duty of the panel, according to Section 205 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, is "at the request of the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, to advise in the avoidance of industrial controversies and the manner in which mediation and voluntary adjustment shall be administered, particularly with reference to controversies affecting the general welfare of the countrv".  [75•4  In a statement released at the time the panel was 76 reestablished,  [76•1  President Kennedy stressed that he had observed "a new willingness on the part of both sides" to "solve disputes peacefully".  [76•2 

p Another important job given to the National Labour- Management Panel was to co-ordinate the activities of so-called human relations committees and committees of investigation functioning in the steel, automobile, rubber, electrical, construction and other industries. All of these committees constituted a new form of closer government-controlled cooperation between the trade union bureaucracy and the capitalists. The aim of each such committee was, by continuous negotiations and often with the participation of a third, “neutral”, party, to find a compromise solution with respect to a new collective agreement. The Wall Street Journal revealed the real aims of such committees and their dependence on Government agencies when it wrote quite frankly that "Government men firmly intend to corral top management and union men in one room beforehand and tell them the outcome of their bargaining sessions; only the details will be left to private dickering and decision.”  [76•3 

p Perhaps the best known in the country was the Human Relations Committee working in the steel industry. Set up at the initiative of David McDonald and Arthur Goldberg after the 116-day steel strike in 1959, its function was to settle disputes between the eleven major steel companies and the steelworkers union in order to avoid similar conflicts in the future. Bourgeois experts on the labour movement and the bourgeois press lauded it as a model of a new “ responsible” approach in settling disputes "on a basis of reason, rather than muscle".  [76•4 

p Continuous secret negotiations between top level union and company officials actually deprived not only the union rank-and-file but also middle echelon union leaders of the chance to exert any influence whatever on the agreements being worked out. Indeed, the first collective bargaining 77 agreement with the steel companies that was concluded as a result of the Human Relations Committee’s negotiations in 1962 turned out to be the least favourable agreement, from the standpoint of the workers, in the entire post-war period. But it was an important victory for the steel companies: for the first time in 20 years they succeeded in avoiding the threat of a national steel strike. The government, individual bourgeois politicians and the bourgeois press naturally hailed the agreement, calling it a model of amicable handling of labourmanagement relations and one of the most important events in labour relations in the post-war period. As for David McDonald, he obligingly predicted that the new agreement would perhaps eliminate strikes in the steel industry " forever”.  [77•1 

p A similar objective was pursued by the Joint Study Committee set up in April 1963, consisting of representatives of the UAW, General Motors, Ford Motor Co., and Chrysler Corp. It should be noted that here, too, the initiative came from the union leadership, particularly from UAW president Walter Reuther, and was warmly supported by the government. The committee was expected to lay the groundwork for “unobstructed” collective bargaining in 1964, in order "to minimise the dangers of breakdown”, as Reuther put it in his letter to heads of the auto companies.  [77•2 

p Despite the government support it enjoyed, this form of class co-operation—this policy of "human relations" imposed on many unions by their leaders—met with strong opposition on the part of union rank-and-file. In the auto industry, for example, instead of the "peace and harmony" that was supposed to come with the help of the Joint Study Committee, a big strike broke out in 1964 when the workers rejected the terms of an agreement worked out by their leaders. And in 1965, the steelworkers, fed up with the policy of class collaboration pursued by David McDonald, voted that inveterate conciliator out of office in a union referendum.

p After the Democrats captured the White House, government interference in labour-management relations grew, 78 primarily through various kinds of mediation and conciliation organisations. The main purpose of the latter was to prevent aggravation of the struggle between labour and capital, i.e., to paralyse the struggle of the working people.  [78•1  Particularly noticeable was the heightened role of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, which had been established in 1947 on the basis of the Taft-Hartley Act. Its function was to facilitate adjustment of labour disputes, but its decisions were not to be considered binding on the parties involved. However, in the early 1960s the FMCS began, with administration backing, to take on pressure functions during collective bargaining negotiations. "Mediation with a club" is what the American press called the Kennedy Administration’s labour policy. FMCS director William Simkin noted that "the federal government is stressing preventative mediation to encourage continuing talks between labour and management to cut down the possibility of strikes".  [78•2  Strongest labour union criticism was levelled at the FMCS for exceeding its authority. Answering such criticism in May 1962 at a conference on collective bargaining, Simkin said: "We do believe that FMCS has a duty and responsibility to exert all reasonable efforts. .. to be of assistance. What we have labelled ’more aggressive mediation’ for want of better words is nothing more than utilisation of tactics that the best mediators have always used.”  [78•3 

p Nearly half of the strikes taking place in the country in 1964, including the biggest ones, were settled with the direct participation of government mediation and conciliation 79 services.  [79•1  Every year, about 95 per cent of all labour disputes are settled with the active participation of organisations and arbitration committees of various kinds.  [79•2  The newspaper The Worker aptly noted that "... in the atmosphere of the current monopoly drive to destroy the labour movement, arbitration has become a key factor on the side of the employers.”  [79•3 

p Thus, the Democratic Administration protecting the interests of the monopolies, made wide use of its alliance with the union bureaucracy in carrying out a policy of strike prevention. It understood full well—as Willard Wirtz, who replaced Goldberg as Secretary of Labour, admitted—that disputes between employers and unions, in a way similar to international conflicts, had now become too serious to rely only on force to settle them.

p Yet both the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations did not hesitate to use force in banning and suppressing strikes whenever they could not, with the help of obsequious Rightist union leaders, "human relations committees”, and various kinds of mediation and conciliation services, bring about a “peaceful” adjustment of labour disputes in key industries.

p Typical of the many examples of open government interference in labour-management relations was the total support given by the government to the monopolies in one of the hardest and most stubborn battles that the American working class has had to fight in recent years, namely, the struggle of the railway workers to defend their right to work.

p The railway conflict arose in 1959 when employers announced their intention to introduce new working conditions. The owners held that the accepted system of work was obsolete and that unnecessary operational costs and the maintenance of “superfluous” labour power were causing tremendous losses and were a drain on the railroads’ competitive power. What was contemplated was an immediate layoff of at least 40,000 stokers and 25,000 employees in other categories, and the layoff of another 200,000 railway workers in the near future.

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p It was obvious that implementation of this plan would be a serious blow to the labour unions, virtually reducing to naught the results of years of struggle by the railway workers and establishing a precedent for continued arbitrary rule by the railroad companies. The railway workers’ unions denounced the programme and threatened to strike if it was implemented. But President Eisenhower intervened and the strike was banned on the basis of the Railway Labour Act. A special commission was appointed to settle the dispute.

p In February 1962, after three years of investigation, the commission submitted its recommendations (by that time to President Kennedy), fully approving the plans of the railroad companies. The unions then filed suit, but their hopes for a fair decision were in vain: the courts at every level, right up to the Supreme Court, decided in favour of the employers. The strike question was again put on the agenda; the unions announced that as soon as the "new rules" went into effect, the railway workers would automatically stop work. But on April 3, 1963, President Kennedy declared a state of emergency on the railroads on the basis of that same Railway Labour Act, and the strike was again postponed. A new commission was appointed to study the causes of the controversy. Its findings differed little from the ones that came before. Nor did Labour Secretary Wirtz’s stepping in as government arbitrator do any real good, even though an agreement to continue negotiations was reached.

p At the end of July 1963, the negotiations came to a dead end. The railroad companies, feeling full support from the government, refused to make any concessions. Meanwhile, President Kennedy, again seeking to delay final solution to the problem, introduced a bill that would turn the dispute over to the Interstate Commerce Commission for investigation. Having exhausted peaceful means of struggle, the union issued a strike call for August 29, 1963. The day before the strike deadline, both Houses of Congress (the Senate by a vote of 90 to 2 and the House of Representatives by a vote of 286 to 66) quickly passed a new emergency bill calling for compulsory arbitration in railway disputes. President Kennedy promptly signed the law.

p This new anti-labour law created a dangerous precedent for increased presidential and congressional interference in 81 labour disputes, especially in industries of national significance. "No worker in America is safe in his job,” said president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters James Hoffa, "if this (compulsory arbitration.—A.M.) is to become the policy of our government.”  [81•1 

p Pursuant to the emergency law, the railway strike was postponed for six months. The seven-man arbitration board appointed by Kennedy was charged with the task of investigating the dispute and rendering a final decision that would be binding on both sides. Four months later, the board announced its decision, as a result of which 40,000 workers were laid off.

p At the end of February 1964, as soon as the term of the emergency law expired, the fierce and exhausting war between the railroad companies and the labour unions entered a new stage. Negotiations (this time held separately) between individual companies and the railway workers’ unions again failed. The railroad magnates declared unconditionally that they would put the "new work rules" into force, that is, they would begin a new round of layoffs. In response, the unions said they were prepared to strike, and set April 22, 1964 as a deadline. Over 200,000 workers were ready to take part in a strike that threatened to paralyse the country’s entire economic life.

p In connection with the threat of a nationwide strike, President Johnson stepped into the dispute. Labour and management representatives were summoned to the White House to continue negotiations under the personal supervision of the US President. They were given 15 days to settle the dispute, and on April 21, 1964, under heavy pressure from Johnson and Secretary of Labour Wirtz, an agreement was signed. The threat of the biggest railway strike in the country’s history was averted.

p “They won a skirmish and lost a battle,” was how the progressive newspaper, People’s World, assessed the results of the five-year struggle of the railway workers’ unions.  [81•2  And indeed, although through the new agreement the unions 82 had won for the workers a certain wage increase, small compensation payments for involuntary work stoppages and a few additional paid holidays, they had to give in on what was most important: they had to agree to layoffs and labour intensification, that is, to the introduction of what were in essence the "new work rules”. Following the new agreement, 49,000 railway workers had to give up their jobs in the transportation industry.

p As became known later, the number of people employed by the railroads was reduced by 150,000 through layoffs and resignations since the beginning of the dispute.  [82•1  Yet the conflict arose when 65,000 workers’ right to work was threatened.

p During that period, the profits of the railroad magnates went up considerably: in 1961, the profit figure was $382 million, in 1962—$571 million and in 1963—over $650 million.  [82•2  In 1964, The Wall Street Journal predicted that the profits of the railroad companies would increase by many millions of dollars after the first group of workers—11,500 firemen—were laid off.  [82•3  Exactly one year later, The New York Herald Tribune estimated that the layoffs of the firemen, 30 per cent of whom were still jobless at that time, gave the companies a “saving” of $75 million.  [82•4 

p US monopoly capital properly assessed the services of the government and the personal contributions of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in “regulating” this, one of the biggest and most prolonged labour disputes in recent years. As for the working class, it got one more graphic confirmation of the fact that the government in a bourgeois society is always on the side of big business.

p The government’s use of every means of struggle against the railway workers’ unions (beginning with pressure applied personally by Kennedy and Johnson and ending with the invocation of old and new anti-labour laws) showed that the ruling circles were openly striving to deprive the labour unions of their most effective weapon for protecting the interests of the working class—the right to strike.

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p Active government intervention in labour-management disputes, having become widespread under President Kennedy (the railway conflict was an example of this) was continued and developed even further under President Johnson. Pointing to this feature of the Johnson Administration’s anti-labour policy, Secretary of the National Committee of the Communist Party of the USA George Meyers wrote: "... President Johnson finds it necessary to intervene directly in labour disputes, openly placing the strength and prestige of the administration branch of the government behind the corporations. He tries to limit much-needed wage increases in the face of ‘guidelines’. He has endeavoured to dictate contract settlements detrimental to labour.”  [83•1 

p A prime feature of Johnson’s anti-labour policy was the effort made by government organs to prevent or ban strikes, above all in industries producing for the war in Vietnam. In October 1966, provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act were invoked to prevent a strike in a number of enterprises of the General Electric Corporation, where workers were demanding wage increases and better working conditions. Johnson tried to justify his anti-labour actions by saying that an electricians strike would jeopardise national security. General Electric, he said, "is a leading producer and developer of a wide range of munitions, electronic equipment and missiles for the armed forces. It makes power plants for our ships and submarines. It supplies the engines for the F-4 Phantom fighter and for our helicopters, machine-guns for many of our combat aircraft and battlefield radar equipment.

p “Our men in Vietnam need these planes, these helicopters, these weapons.... And they need them now, not next week or next month.”  [83•2 

p Similarly, in November 1966, a steel strike in Indiana was blocked because it would have disrupted the Pentagon’s plans for the production of new jet fighters and helicopters for the Vietnam war. Upon direction of the President, the matter was turned over to a federal circuit court, which duly enjoined the strike on the basis of the Taft-Hartley Act.

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p In March 1967, President Johnson intervened in a strike by electrical workers in 13 West Coast ports. Secretary of Defence McNamara, under whose intercession the conflict was stopped, said that the strike had created critical difficulties in the repair of ships used for carrying military cargo to South Vietnam.

p The Taft-Hartley Act was also invoked to prevent a strike of 4,800 UAW members at the Avco Corporation’s helicopter engine plant in New Haven, Connecticut. On April 18—the day after the strike began—the federal government ordered a temporary court injunction prohibiting the strike. On April 25, a federal court also prohibited a strike of 500 Avco Corporation office and laboratory workers. According to Assistant US Secretary of Defence Vance, strikes at the Avco plant could cause an "irreparable setback" in the production of items sorely needed by the US armed forces in Vietnam.

p The Democratic Party and President Johnson, in an effort to win the 17,000,000-strong labour union vote in the 1964 presidential election, solemnly announced their readiness to ihtroduce a number of legislative measures that would improve the legal position of the labour unions. Again, as in 1960, the promise was made to re-examine the notorious Section 14b of the Taft-Hartley Act, on the basis of which anti-union "right to work" laws existed in 19 states. However, after the election, the promises were not kept. Moreover, the Johnson Administration not only made wide use of existing anti-labour laws, but became the author of new anti-labour legislation.

p In his message to Congress in January 1966, President Johnson recommended that legislation be passed prohibiting strikes in the transportation, communications and municipal services fields. The bill was introduced in Congress one month after a long strike by New York city transport workers had ended in a union victory. The bill reflected the apprehension felt in the ruling circles over the very real prospects of similar strikes in the future. It is noteworthy that Johnson’s clearly anti-labour recommendation had, as reported in the New York Herald Tribune, received preliminary approval from AFL-CIO president George Meany and was later supported by UAW president Walter Reuther. On 85 January 16, 1966, meeting with big businessmen at the Economic Club in Detroit, Reuther declared that actions such as the transport workers’ strike in New York were “obsolete” and that society could not tolerate them.  [85•1 

p The US monopolies welcomed a statement made by Johnson in 1966 to the effect that Congress should pass a compulsory arbitration law which would further limit the labour unions’ right to strike. And after the congressional elections in the autumn of 1966, it became known that President Johnson appointed a special committee to work out new antistrike legislation.  [85•2 

p The Johnson Administration’s moves to reduce to a minimum conflicts between labour and capital that were so “ costly” to employers were highly satisfactory as far as the US monopoly circles were concerned. The American press noted with open satisfaction the trend toward more extensive and intensive co-operation between government and big business. In January 1966, for example, Fortune magazine wrote: "This new outlook in Washington is the deepest reason for the rapprochement, during the Johnson Administration, between government and business. The two still have and will always have different responsibilities and aims. But they are beginning to use the same working language, depend on the same kinds of people, and get at tasks and decisions in the same way. More than administrative style is involved in this Washington shift. The whole framework of US politics is changing.”  [85•3 

Frank statements made in the press by representatives of business indicated how much confidence the big bourgeoisie had in Johnson and how much it approved of his administration’s labour policy. In November 1964, when a dispute again broke out between employers and the railroad unions, a representative of one of the railroad companies frankly and confidently predicted that decisive intervention by the President would be effective and that no strike would take place. "All the President has to do (to prevent strikes.—A.M.) is to pick up a telephone,” he said.  [85•4 

86 And in 1965, when a big steel strike was threatened, one steel magnate frankly expressed the opinion of the employers: "It should be a short strike. I don’t think President Johnson, the way he’ has been operating, will let it be anything but short.”  [86•1 

p Although, on the whole, the ruling classes were satisfied with the labour policy pursued by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the more reactionary circles of big business felt that it was not as decisive or effective as it could be. In 1963—especially after the successful strike by New York printers that lasted over 100 days, the longshoremen’s victory in East Coast and Gulf Coast ports, and threatened strikes in the steel and railroad industries—the monopolies stepped up their demands for stronger repressions against the working class and the labour unions.

p In an effort to contain worker dissatisfaction with automation, unemployment and rising prices, and also to undermine the struggle of the working people for their economic and labour union interests, a group of ultra-Rightist senators introduced a number of bills in Congress in 1963, aimed above all at curtailing labour’s right to strike. Among the authors of these bills were such well-known reactionaries as Senators McClellan, Eastland, Goldwater, Stennis, Ervin, Tower, Curtis, Thurmond and Bennett.

p A bill introduced in February 1963 by Senator McClellan, known for his hostile attitude toward labour unions, outlawed strikes by transportation workers in which more than one union local was involved or if the strike would seriously affect interstate commerce or foreign trade. Violation of the bill’s provisions by rail, truck, air or water transport workers was punishable by a fine of $50,000 to be levied against the labour union and a year’s imprisonment for the union leaders.

p Another bill introduced by McClellan outlawed any strikes at missile proving grounds and defence enterprises. This bill was an open attempt to ban worker action against the monopolies, since government defence orders are, as a rule, handled by enterprises belonging to the leading monopolies.

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p Senator Dirksen introduced a bill prohibiting strikes by seamen on all oceangoing vessels. Labour disputes were to be regulated with the help of government agencies and through compulsory arbitration.

p A serious threat to labour unions was also posed by a bill introduced in 1963 by Senator Goldwater, the aim of which, according to Goldwater, was to curtail the excessive power of the labour unions. The bill gave the government new and even greater power to prevent strikes and outlawed the closed shop. Moreover, it contained a provision prohibiting unions from using their treasury funds for any purpose other than those indicated in their collective bargaining contracts. "In other words,” it was noted at a convention of Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America in September 1963, "the GOP-possible for President would prevent unions from defending themselves against all of the attacks in Congress . . . while employers would still have their powerful lobbies to press these same attacks and others.”  [87•1 

p A prominent role in organising the anti-labour campaign was played by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the American Chamber of Commerce and the monopolies’ press organs. Using the threat of stiff anti-labour laws, they demanded that the unions relinquish their most effective weapon—strikes. The Wall Street Journal, for example, warned that "if union leaders persist in wielding their power irresponsibly, they will have no one to blame for restrictive legislation except themselves.”  [87•2 

p In its effort to get federal laws passed that would substantially limit the rights of labour unions, in 1962 the NAM worked out a three-year programme to curb union monopoly power. One of its aims was to ban both industry-wide and company-wide collective bargaining. It also sought to prohibit unions from establishing a national policy on wages and fringe benefits, and also prohibit industry-wide strikes. An important point in the programme was the demand for a law requiring unions to agree to the hiring of non-union workers.  [87•3 

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p The NAM planned a broad anti-labour campaign to influence public opinion. Among the measures figuring in the "plan and timetable" of the NAM—a secret document that fell into the hands of the labour union and was reported in the labour press—were such points as: putting on a TV special programme on union "monopoly power" and getting sponsors for such a programme; recruiting "idea salesmen" in the campaign for various geographical areas of the country; sponsoring competitive contests among high school students (NAM awards would be given for the best composition on the topic, "What Union Monopoly Power Means to America”); setting up a group of "sympathetic journalists" who would work with the "Centre for the Study of Union Power”; putting out a "fully documented and objective movie" on union "monopoly power”; preparing a propaganda package against unions for women’s clubs; compiling a "speaker kit" for businessmen and "opinion molders”; carrying on a special drive for the clergy. The NAM document, reported The Worker, bragged that many individuals active in the unfolding programme "were appointed on the direct recommendations of leading senators and congressmen".  [88•1 

p The US Chamber of Commerce came out with similar proposals for stringent anti-labour legislation. A ten-point programme outlined by Ladd Plumley, the Chamber’s president, amounted primarily to a demand for legislation making anti-trust laws applicable to labour unions, banning industry-wide contracts and further extending the compulsory open shop provision of Section 14b of the Taft-Hartley Act.

p Particular emphasis in the anti-labour campaign has been given in recent years to demands for legislation that would fetter the labour unions with a system of compulsory arbitration. After the long railroad dispute of 1959-1964, the US monopoly circles began working toward legislation requiring that all major labour-management conflicts be handled by a board of arbitrators, whose decisions would be binding. In October 1964, for example, the American Association of Ports Authorities proposed a law under which the US President could appoint an arbitration commission to 89 settle possible conflicts long before the current labour contract expired.  [89•1 

p Meanwhile, various employer organisations were recommending ways to prevent or “justly” settle labour disputes. At a convention of the North Atlantic Ports Association in May 1965, for example, it was suggested that a special federal court be set up to deal with labour relations problems on a permanent basis. It was envisaged that that court would render decisions, binding on both parties of a dispute, whenever negotiations, even with the help of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, fail. It was noted at the NAPA convention that having a special federal court deal with labour relations regulation was preferable to a system of compulsory arbitration because "compulsory arbitration had acquired a ’tained label’.”  [89•2 

p At the beginning of 1965, the US Supreme Court upheld the application of anti-trust laws to areas not usually coming under the jurisdiction of these laws. It was a serious blow to the labour unions and the existing system of collective bargaining contracts. The Supreme Court held that unions could be prosecuted and be required to "compensate for losses" if a court determines that the wage, hour and working conditions terms of a collective labour contract are a “ conspiracy” with employers aimed at squeezing competitors out of a given sphere of production.  [89•3 

p In practice, this meant that the system of the so-called model collective agreements, when unions conclude an agreement with one company or group of companies and then extend this “model” to all other companies in order to establish the same wage increase in all the enterprises of the given industry, could at any moment be classified as a “ conspiracy” and illegal activity. The Supreme Court decision opened the door to arbitrary rulings, where, as Justice Goldberg said, "a judge or jury may determine, according to their own notions of what is economically sound, the amount 90 of wages that a union can properly ask for or that an employer can pay....”  [90•1 

p Between 1966 and 1971, a period in which there was an upsurge in the strike movement, the monopolies and their men in the US Congress carried on a new campaign for legislation to ban most, if not all, strikes. Thirty-five of the country’s leading employer associations, headed by the US Chamber of Commerce, the NAM and the National "Right to Work" Committee, worked out a programme of "union reform”. At the same time, they organised what The New York Times described as the same kind of propaganda campaign as preceded the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 and the Landrum-Griffm Act in 1959.  [90•2  The "union reform" programme called for removing settlement of labour-management disputes from the jurisdiction of the National Labour Relations Board and turning it over to special 15-man "labour courts" which would determine the legality of strikes and render binding decisions.  [90•3  Moreover, the monopolies’ objective was to extend anti-trust laws to cover labour unions whenever they, for example, support other striking unions, conclude collective agreements on an industrywide basis, combine the efforts of various unions within a particular industry during collective bargaining, etc.  [90•4 

p In early 1971, President Nixon asked Congress for more effective legislation to prevent strikes in the transport industries. Under his proposed legislation he would be able to extend the length of the cooling off period, take over the operation of some of the railways and appoint a neutral panel which would select "the best of the last offer made by either side in a dispute" as the final binding contract. Under the new law labour disputes on the railways and the airlines would no longer be dealt with under the Railway Labour Act but would come under the Taft-Hartley Act which governs disputes in other major industries.  [90•5 

p Frightened by the upsurge in the struggle of the working class for its vital interests and union rights, the reactionary 91 monopoly circles are prepared to go to any length to suppress the labour movement. Shunning no means, these circles have in recent years increased their use of private police and detective agencies, sent paid informers and stool pigeons into the unions for the purpose of compiling black lists in preparation for repressions against active union members and progressive labour leaders.

p Since the beginning of the 1960s an important role in the system of anti-union organisations has been played by an organisation working for the monopolies called the American Security Council (ASC), one of whose functions is to help employers check on employee loyalty, keep workers under surveillance and co-ordinate the activities of numerous investigation services operating throughout the country. Toward the end of 1960, a confidential letter written by Robert Galvin, president of Motorola, Inc., and an ASC board member (now its chairman), appeared on the pages of some American newspapers to reveal that over 1,000 companies were represented on the American Security Council. By February 1962, the organisation embraced over 3,000 companies. Many ASC officials are ex-FBI agents. The executive director, for example, is former FBI agent John Eason, and the chairman of the "planning committee" is Milton Ladd, once an assistant to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover.

p Each year the ASC black lists and dossiers on workers who "arouse suspicion" get bigger and bigger. In 1962, they contained the names of over 2,000,000 workers suspected of "subversive activities”. According to instructions issued to ASC agents, anyone who expresses dissatisfaction with exploitation or anti-labour laws, or takes an active part in union activities should be classified as “suspicious”.

p The 1960s also saw intensive anti-union activity by various ultra-Rightist organisations, financed and directed by influential groups representing US monopoly capital. Such reactionary organisations as the John Birch Society, the Liberty Lobby, We the People, the Minutemen, the Patric Henry Society, the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, the American Nazi Party and many others, have stepped up their activity in recent years, openly advocating doing away with labour unions, destroying the labour movement and 92 adopting fascist methods of government. As one union paper, The Advance, noted in May 1967, "The Right wing spend millions annually, collected largely from big business, to campaign against unions".  [92•1  Much of the money is spent on trying to frighten the public and disorient public opinion with propaganda to the effect that US labour unions have become "traitorous organisations”, an "instrument of world communism”. One example was a John Birch Society leaflet, entitled "USA in Extreme Danger. Help Destroy Communism”, which said that "union leaders continuously push the workers to the polls with instructions to vote for Left-wing traitors who are selling America down the Red river. Many of today’s most powerful union bosses, such as Walter Reuther and David Dubinsky have only one thing in mind. They want to convert America into a total socialist state, a necessary first step to establishing a communist state.”  [92•2 

Direct intervention by the Democratic Administration in labour disputes, open use of executive power to help the corporations and to prevent or terminate strikes, widespread invocation of existing anti-labour laws and continuous efforts by the monopolies to get new anti-labour laws passed —all this has aroused growing discontent and increased resistance on the part of the union rank-and-file. Despite the fact that the Rightist leaders of the AFL-CIO, sticking to their conciliatory policy, have sought to preserve their alliance with the government and have refused to take decisive action in mobilising the working people for the struggle to defend their economic interests and union rights, the working people themselves have shown a growing militancy in resisting this anti-labour policy.