__SERIES__
the international
communist
and
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
[3] __TITLE__ Soviet Peace EffortsProgress Publishers Moscow
[4] __TRANSL__ Translated from the RussianREQUEST TO READERS
Progress Publishers would be glad to have your opinion of this book, its translation and design and any suggestions you may have for future publica-
Please send all your comments to 21, Zubovsky Boulevard, Moscow, USSR.
CCCP B BOPfaBE 3 A MHP HAKAHYHE BTOPOH MHPOBOH BOHHH
Ha aMJiuucKOM n3biKe
__COPYRIGHT__ First printing 1973 Second printing 1976„ 11102-742
58-76
014(01)-76
[5] __RUNNING_HEADER__ CONTENTSPage FOREWORD........................... 35
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
1938~ 1. AGREEMENT BETWEEN GERMANY, BRITAIN, FRANCE
AND ITALY
September 29.......................... 51
2. ANGLO-GERMAN DECLARATION
September 30............"............... 54
3. STATEMENT BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AT A SESSION OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COUNCIL
September 30......................... 55
4. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
October 1............................ 56
5. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
October 1............................ 57
6. TASS ANNOUNCEMENT
October 2............................ 57
7. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
October 2............................ 58
8. TELEGRAM FROM A SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
6
OFFICER IN JAPAN TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
RED ARMY
Octobers............................
9. TASS ANNOUNCEMENT
61October 4 ....'........................
10. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
October 12............................ 62
11. TELEGRAM OF THE US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN
FRANCE TO THE US SECRETARY OF STATE
October 13........................... 63
12. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
October 17........................... 65
13. LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
66October 19............................
14. EXCERPT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
67October 19.............................
15. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADORS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE
October 20...........................
16. EXCERPT FROM A DIRECTIVE BY THE REICH
CHANCELLOR AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF GERMANY
October 21...........................
17. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
October 22............................ 70
18. EXCERPT FROM A- LETTER FROM THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
October 25............................. 71
19. LETTER FROM THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN
GERMANY TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
POLAND
October 25...........................
20. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR October 29............................
74 7 21. LETTER FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
GERMANY
October 31............................. 76
22. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN THE USA
November 14.......................... 80
23. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR November 17.......................... 80
24. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE .
COUNSELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN POLAND
AND THE VICE-DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE POLISH MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
November 18..........................< 82
25. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR AND THE FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN THE
USSR
November 20.......................... 82
26. LETTER FROM THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USA TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF POLAND November 21.......................... 84
27. MEMORANDUM TRANSMITTED BY THE HUNGARIAN
LEGATION IN GERMANY TO THE MINISTRY FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GERMANY
November 21..................-.........' 87
28. TELEGRAM FROM THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR November 24.......................... .88
29. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
November 25..............:........... 90
30. MEMORANDUM OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
GERMAN ARMED FORCES---"NOTES FOR WEHRMACHTS
DISCUSSIONS WITH ITALY"
November 26.......................... 91
31. TASS COMMUNIQUE ON SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS November 27........................... 93
32. COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE PRESS DEPARTMENT -
OF THE POLISH MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO
GERMAN CORRESPONDENTS IN POLAND
November 28........................... 94
33. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
December 4...........................
34. FRANCO-GERMAN DECLARATION
96December 6...........................
35. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN AND LLOYD
GEORGE
December 6...........................', 97
36. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN AND THE CHIEF
DIPLOMATIC ADVISER TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN
SECRETARY
December 8............................. 98
37. LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
December 10.......................... 100
38. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE BRITISH MINISTER IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
December 10.......................... 102
39. TELEGRAM FROM A SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER IN JAPAN TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
RED ARMY
December 10.......................... 104
40. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF ITALY -AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN GERMANY December 15.......................... 104
41. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN
GERMANY TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
December 15.......................... 105
42. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE POLISH
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF POLAND
December 16........................... 106
43. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN AN
OFFICIAL OF THE DANZIG SENATE AND THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
December 16-17........................ 109
44. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
December 19........................... 109
45. REPORT FROM THE COUNSELLOR OF THE GERMAN
EMBASSY IN POLAND FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE OF A WESTERN POWER
December 20.......................... Ill
46. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
December 22.......................... 112
47. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
COUNSELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN POLAND
AND THE POLISH MINISTER IN IRAN
December 28.......................... 113
48. REPORT FROM THE COUNSELLOR OF THE GERMAN
EMBASSY IN POLAND FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE OF A WESTERN POWER
Not earlier than December 28................. 114
49. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
December 31.......................... 115
50. EXCERPT FROM THE DIARY OF THE ITALIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER
January 1............................ 118
51. EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH CHANCELLOR OF
GERMANY AND THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
POLAND
January 5............'................ 118
52. EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE POLISH
AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR
January 7............................ 123
53. EXCERPT FROM THE DIARY OF THE ITALIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER
January 8............................ 123
54. LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
January 11 ........................... 124
55. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
January 15 ........................... 126
56. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET REP-
10 RESENTATIVE AT THE SESSION OF THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS COUNCIL
January 15........................... 127
57. FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY AND THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF HUNGARY January 16............... ............. 128
58. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A
GERMAN JOURNALIST AND THE GENERAL
SECRETARY OF THE GERMAN SOCIETY FOR EAST
EUROPEAN STUDIES
January 19........................... 128
59. STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE AT THE SESSION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COUNCIL January 20........................... 130
60. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
January 20............................ 132
61. EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND
THE PRIME MINISTER OF YUGOSLAVIA
January 18-23....................•....... , 134
62. TELEGRAM FROM A SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER IN JAPAN TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
RED ARMY
January 23...........................'.-.- 137
63. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
FOREIGN MINISTER OF GERMANY AND THE FOREIGN
MINISTER OF POLAND
January 26............................ 137
64 NOTE E;ROM THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE TO THE EMBASSY OF GREAT BRITAIN IN FRANCE February 1 ............................ 139
65. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
February 1 ........................... 142
66. MINUTE FROM THE COUNSELLOR OF THE GERMAN
EMBASSY IN FRANCE TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR
IN FRANCE
February 1........................... 143
67. TASS COMMUNIQUE ON THE CLOSURE OF THE SOVIET
DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN BUDAPEST
February 2........................... 144
68. SOVIET PRESS REPORT ABOUT CLASHES ON THE
SOVIET-MANCHURIAN BORDER
February 2............................ 145
69. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ITALY AND AN UNOFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT February 2 ........................... 146
70. TELEGRAM FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
GERMANY
February 4........................... 146
71. STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
February 6............................ 147
72. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
February 6.......................... 147
73. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE POLISH
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE TO THE MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF POLAND
February .....'........................ 148
74. TELEGRAM FROM THE US AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN TO
THE US SECRETARY OF STATE
Februarys..........................
ISO
75. SOVIET PRESS REPORT ABOUT A CLASH ON THE
SOVIET-MANCHURIAN BORDER
February 9........................... 152
76. EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE FRENCH
AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR
February 9 ............................ 153
77. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
February 10.......................... 154
78. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
• FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
February 10 .......................... 155
79. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A
GERMAN JOURNALIST AND THE GERMAN
AMBASSADOR IN POLAND
February 13 .......................... 156
80. TELEGRAM FROM THE GERMAN LEGATION IN
RUMANIA TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OFGERMANY
February 14 .......................... 157
81. TELEGRAM FROM THE GERMAN LEGATION IN
12
RUMANIA TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF GERMANY
February 17 .......................... 158
82. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
February 19 ......................... 159
83. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR February 19 .......................... 161
84. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
February 20 .......................... 163
85. EXCERPTS FROM A SURVEY OF BRITISH FOREIGN
POLICY IN 1938 PREPARED BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
IN BRITAIN
February 25 .......................... 165
86. LETTER FROM THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN
GERMANY TO THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE GERMAN
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
February 25 .......................... 171
87. REPORT BY THE HEAD OF THE GERMAN ECONOMIC
DELEGATION TO RUMANIA TO THE COMMISSIONER
FOR THE FOUR-YEAR PLAN
February 27 .......................... 171
88. TELEGRAM FROM THE GERMAN MINISTER IN
RUMANIA TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF GERMANY
February 27 .......................... 175
89. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A
GERMAN JOURNALIST AND THE MILITARY ATTACHE
OF GERMANY IN POLAND
February 27 .......................... 176
90. TELEGRAM FROM THE US AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
TO THE US SECRETARY OF STATE
February 28 .......................... 177
91. LETTER FROM THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE
GERMAN MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN GERMANY
March 1 ............................ 178
92. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE
YUAN OF CHINA TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL
OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE USSR
March 1 ............................ 179
93. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
13
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
March 4 ............................ 180
94. TASS REPORT ON THE RECALL OF THE USSR
REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE NON-INTERVENTION
COMMITTEE
March 4............................ 182
95. EXCERPT FROM A REPORT OF THE BRITISH MILITARY
ATTACH^ IN GERMANY TO THE BRITISH
AMBASSADOR IN GERMANY
March 6 ............................ 182
96. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
ESTONIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 7 ............................ 183
97. REPORT ON THE SPEECH BY THE REICH CHANCELLOR
OF GERMANY AT A MEETING OF GERMAN MILITARY,
ECONOMIC AND PARTY REPRESENTATIVES
March 8 ............................ 183
98. EXCERPT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM THE BRITISH
AMBASSADOR IN GERMANY TO THE BRITISH
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
March 9 ............................ 185
99. TELEGRAM FROM THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN
JAPAN TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
POLAND
March 10............................ 189
100. EXCERPT FROM A BRIEF REPORT BY THE SOVIET
EMBASSY IN GERMANY ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION
IN GERMANY IN 1938
March 11............................ 190
101. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A
GERMAN JOURNALIST AND A COUNSELLOR OF THE
GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S OFFICE
March 13............................ 192
102. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
GERMANY TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 14............................ 195
103. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 15.......: :................... 196
104. MEMORANDUM OF~A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR March 16............................ 197
105. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE 14 USSR AND THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR March 17 and 18........................ 199
106. NOTE FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR
IN THE USSR
March 18............................ 200
107. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS QF^JHE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADORS IN GERMANY, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA /
March 18..........{.................. 202
108. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF'-THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADORS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE
March 18............................ 203
109. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADORS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE
March 18............................ 203
110. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET 15 AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR March 20............................ 212
118 EXCERPT FROM A REPORT BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN TURKEY ON A CONVERSATION WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN TURKEY March 21............................ 213
119. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
IN THE USA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 21............................. 214
120. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR March 21............................ 214
121. DRAFT DECLARATION OF GREAT BRITAIN, THE USSR,
FRANCE AND POLAND SUBMITTED BY THE BRITISH
AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 21........................... ..' 217
122. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADORS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE
March 22............................ 217
123. TASS ANNOUNCEMENT~
AMBASSADORS IN FRANCE AND BRITAIN
204, March 19.............................
111. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
March 22...........................
218FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
204 124. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 22............................ 219
125. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
IN LITHUANIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 22............................ 219
126. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
March 23............................ 220
127. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
IN LITHUANIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 23............................ 221
128. STATEMENT BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
OVERSEAS TRADE
March 23............................ 221
129. STATEMENT BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMMISSAR FOR
March 19............................
112. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 19............................ 205
113. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
March 19............................ 206
114. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE FRENCH
AMBASSADOR IN GERMANY TO THE MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE
March 19............................ 207
115. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 20............................ 210
116. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET~
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
211March 20...........................
117. EXCERPT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET
16 FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE MINISTER OF
LATVIA IN THE USSR
March 28............................ 223
130. EXTRACT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE RUMANIAN
MINISTER IN THE USSR
March 29............................ 225
131. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 29............................ 225
132. EXTRACT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE FRENCH
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN THE USSR
March 29............................ 226
133. FROM THE DIARY OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF ITALY
March 29............................ 226
134. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 30............................ 227
135. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 31............................ 227
136. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 31............................. 228
137. STATEMENT BY THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER ON
GUARANTEES TO POLAND
March 31............................ 231
138. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 31............................ 232
139. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR
April 1 .............................. 233
140. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR AND THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR
April 1 ............................. 234
141. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
17
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR AND THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR
April 2 ............................. 238
142. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 2......................'........ 240
143. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
April 3............................. 242
144. DIRECTIVE BY THE CHIEF OF THE HIGH COMMAND
OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES
AprilS............................. 242
145. EXCERPTS FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO
THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
April 4 ............................. 243
146. EXCERPTS FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE POLISH
AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR
April 4..............................244
147. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 4 ............................. 246
148. COMMUNIQUE ON TALKS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN
MINISTER OF POLAND AND THE PRIME MINISTER
OF BRITAIN IN LONDON ON APRIL 4-6, 1939
April 6............................... 247
149. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 6 . ............................ 248
150. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April? ..............................250
151. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 8.............................~^^252^^
152. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 9 ............................. 253
18 153. EXCERPTS FROM A LETTER FROM THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 9...............................254
154. TELEGRAM FROM A SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER IN JAPAN TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
RED ARMY
April 9.............................. 256
155. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
April 10.............................. 256
156. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
April 10............................ 257
157. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
April 11............................. 257
158. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
April 11 ............................ 260
159. PLAN OF GERMANY'S ATTACK ON POLAND ("
OPERATION WHITE")
April 11 .............................. 260
160. DECLARATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON
GUARANTEES TO GREECE AND RUMANIA
April 13 '............................ 264
161. DECLARATION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON GUARANTEES TO GREECE, RUMANIA AND POLAND April 13 ............................ 265
162. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
April 13 . . -. '......................... 266
163. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 14 ............................ 266
164. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 14 .............................,.' 267
165. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR
19
April 15 ............................ 268
166 TELEGRAM FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR
COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS TO THE SOVIET
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN TURKEY
April 15 ............................. 269
167 TELEGRAM FROM A SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER IN JAPAN TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
RED ARMY
April 15 ............................ 270
168. TELEGRAM FROM A SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER IN JAPAN TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
RED ARMY
April 15............................ 270
169. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADORS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE
April 16 ............................ .271
170 MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR April 17 ............................ 272
171. PROPOSAL PRESENTED BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE BRITISH
AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR
April 17 .............................273
172. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 18 ............................ 275
173. TELEGRAM FROM THE GERMAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
IN BRITAIN TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF GERMANY
April 18 ............................. 276
174. TELEGRAM FROM THE US AMBASSADOR IN BELGIUM
TO THE US SECRETARY OF STATE
April 18 ............................ 277
175. TELEGRAM FROM THE US SECRETARY OF STATE TO
THE US AMBASSADOR IN BELGIUM
April 18............................ 278
176. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
April 19 ............................. 278
177. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 21 .......................... 279
178. EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE TURKISH
AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR
April 21 ............................• -279
179. TELEGRAM FROM THE US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN
THE USSR TO THE US SECRETARY OF STATE
April 22..............................281
180 TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
April 23 ............................ 281
181. LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
April 23............................. 282
182 EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE CHINESE
AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR.
April 23 ............................ 283
183. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 24............................ 286
184 TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 25 ............................ 287
185. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 25 .............................. 288
186. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
April 25 ............................ 289
187 TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
April 26 ..............................290
188. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 26 ............................,291
189 TELEGRAM FROM THE GERMAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
IN BRITAIN TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF GERMANY
21
April 26 ........................... 292
190. EXCERPT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTER
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GERMANY TO THE GERMAN
AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN
April 26 ............................ 293
191. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
April 27 ............................ 296
192. EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE VICE-DIRECTOR OF THE
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE POLISH MINISTRY FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR
IN POLAND
April 27 ............................ , 296
193. DRAFT AGREEMENT BY FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE
USSR PRESENTED BY THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER
TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
April 29............................ 297
194. EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
April 29 .........,.................. 298
195. TELEGRAM FROM THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR April 30 ............................ 298
196. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A
GERMAN JOURNALIST AND A COUNSELLOR OF THE
GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S OFFICE
May 2 ............................ 299
197. TELEGRAM FROM THE SO VIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
May 3.............................. 304
198. TELEG RAM FROM TH E DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR May 3 ............................. 306
199. TELEGRAM FROM THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR May5.............................. 306
200. TELEGRAM FROM A SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER IN JAPAN TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
RED ARMY
May5 ........................... 310
201. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FO
REIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
May 6..............................
202. MINUTE FROM THE COUNSELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN POLAND FOR THE INTELLIGENCE SER
311VICE OF A WESTERN POWER~
May 7.............................
203. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
314USSR AND THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR~
May8.............................
204. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR AND THE AMBASSADOR OF BRITAIN IN THE USSR
May 8 .............................. '
205. AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED BY THE AMBASSADOR OF
BRITAIN IN THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
May 8
206. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
May8............................... 319
207. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
May 9..................................320
208. TASS COMMUNIQUE
May 10............................. 321
209. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
May 10.............................. 322
210. TELEGRAM FROM THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR May 10............................. 323
211. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
ESTONIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
May 10............................. 323
212. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE AMBASSADOR OF POLAND IN THE USSR May 11............................. 324
213. AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
23 214. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADORS IN ITALY AND GERMANY
May 14............................. 326
215. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN AN
OFFICIAL OF THE DANZIG SENATE AND THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
May 15............................. 327
216. EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM THE GERMAN
FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE AMBASSADOR OF
GERMANY IN JAPAN
May 15............................. 328
217. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
IN THE USA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
May 16............................. 330
218. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR
OF POLAND IN BRITAIN TO THE MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF POLAND
May 19............................ . 331
219. EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE
AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN IN THE USSR
May 19............................. 332
220. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR AT THE SESSION OF THE COUNCIL
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
May 20.............................. 332
221. EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM THE GERMAN
AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN
MINISTER
May 20...............................333
222. TELEGRAM FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
USSR AT THE SESSION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
COUNCIL TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
May 22............................. 334
223. STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR
AT THE SESSION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
COUNCIL
May 22.............................. 334
224. EXCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE
AT THE GERMAN REICH CHANCELLOR'S
May 23............................. 335
225. COMMUNIQUE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
24
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
May 24............................. 338
226. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A
GERMAN BUSINESSMAN AND THE COUNSELLOR OF
THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN POLAND
May 25............................. 339
227. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
May 26............................. 341
. FROM THE DIARY OF THE ITALIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER
May 26...............
229. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR AND THE AMBASSADOR OF BRITAIN AND THE
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF FRANCE IN THE USSR
May 27 ...........................
230. DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE USSR HANDED BY THE AMBASSADOR OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE CHARG^ D' AFFAIRES OF FRANCE IN THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
343 347iviay i, /...........
231. EXTRACT FROM A DISPATCH FROM THE NAVAL
ATTACHE, OF ITALY IN JAPAN TO THE NAVAL
MINISTER OF ITALY
May 27
232. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR. A REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS AND PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE~
USSR. USSR
T A SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE
350May 31............................
233. DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE USSR HANDED BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE AMBASSADOR OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF FRANCE IN THE USSR June 2.............................. 360
234. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
June 3............................... 361
235. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE ESTONIAN MINISTER IN THE USSR
25June 5.............................. 363
236. TELEGRAM FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
JAPAN TO THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GERMANY
June 7...............................364
237. EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN AND THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS June 7.............................. 364
238. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRIT
AIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
June 8.............................. 368
239. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
June 10............................. 370
240. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN.
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
June 10............................. 371
241. AN EDITORIAL FROM PRAVDA: "THE QUESTION OF
THE DEFENCE OF THE THREE BALTIC COUNTRIES
AGAINST AGGRESSION"
June 13............................. 372
242. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
STATE SECRETARY OF THE GERMAN MINISTRY FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR
IN GERMANY
June 13............................. 376
243. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
June 14............................. 378
244. EXCERPT FROM THE DIARY OF THE ITALIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER
June 14............................. 379
245. DOCUMENTS HANDED BY THE AMBASSADORS OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE USSR TO THE
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR
June 15............................. 379
246. AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE AMBASSADORS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE USSR June 16............................. 380
247. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET 26 AMBASSADORS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE
382June 16............................
248. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
June 19..............................383
249. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A
GERMAN JOURNALIST AND A COUNSELLOR IN THE
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
GERMANY
June 19.............................. '384
250. CONTRACT FOR THE DELIVERY OF SPECIAL
EQUIPMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION TO CHINA
June 20 .............................. 387
251. CONTRACT FOR THE DELIVERY OF SPECIAL
EQUIPMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION TO CHINA
June 20............................. 388
252. TASS COMMUNIQUE
June 21............................. 389
253. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
ESTONIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
June 21............................. 390
254. DRAFT OF ARTICLE I OF THE TREATY OF MUTUAL
ASSISTANCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND
THE USSR HANDED BY THE AMBASSADORS OF
BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
June 21............................. 390
255. AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE AMBASSADORS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE USSR June 22............................. 391
256. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADORS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE
June 23............................. 391
257. LETTER FROM THE US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN
FRANCE TO THE US SECRETARY OF STATE
June 24.............................. 392
258. TELEGRAM FROM A SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER IN JAPAN TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
RED ARMY
June 24.............................. 394
259. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
June 24............................. 395
260. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
June 25............................. 396
261. TASS COMMUNIQUE
June 26............................. 396
262. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
STATE SECRETARY OF THE GERMAN MINISTRY FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN
GERMANY
June 27............................. 398
263. TASS COMMUNIQUE
June 27.............................. 400
264. TASS COMMUNIQUE June 28.........
400 265. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
June 28..........................-. . . .401
266. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FINLAND TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
June 28............................. 402
267. LETTER FROM THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE
GERMAN MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
June 28............................. 402
268. THE JAPANESE PROVOCATION IS CONTINUING (TASS
COMMUNIQUE)
June 29.......................'....... 403
269. AN ARTICLE BY A. ZHDANOV "THE BRITISH AND
FRENCH GOVERNMENTS DO NOT WANT AN EQUAL
AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR"
June 29............................. 403
270. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE
June 30.............................. 406
271. DOCUMENTS HANDED BY THE AMBASSADORS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
• July 1.............................. 407
272. TELEGRAM FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN
THE USA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
July 2.............................. 408
273. DOCUMENTS HANDED BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
28AMBASSADORS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE USSR July 3 ............................... 409
114. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADORS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE July3 .............................. 411
275. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
ESTONIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
JulyS ............................... 412
276. JAPANESE PROVOCATEURS ARE NOT CALMING DOWN
(TASS COMMUNIQUE).
July 6 ......... ' ...................... 412
277. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
.414
278July 7.............................
. DRAFT ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET AGREEMENT HANDED BY THE AMBASSADORS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
414July 8
............
279. DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY LETTER TO THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR, BRITAIN AND FRANCE
HANDED BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE AMBASSADORS OF
BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE USSR
July 9............................... 417
280. TELEGRAM FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
July 12..............................418
281. TELEGRAM FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN
ESTONIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR -
July 13 ..............................
282. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
July 14
283. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
July 14............................. 420
284. TELEGRAM FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN
ESTONIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
July 14............................. 421
285. THE JAPANO-MANCHURIAN PROVOCATION IS
CONTINUING (TASS COMMUNIQUE)
July 14 ............................. 422
286. DOCUMENTS HANDED BY THE AMBASSADORS OF
BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
July 17 ...................;......... 424
287. TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE
AMBASSADORS OF THE USSR IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE
July 17 ............................. 425
288. EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
July 19 ............................. 426
289. MEMORANDUM OF THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN
July 21.............................. 427
290. NEW VIOLATION OF THE BORDER BY JAPANESE
FORCES (TASS COMMUNIQUE)
July 23............................. 431
291. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
July 24............................. 432
292. LETTER FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
GERMANY
July 24.............................' '434
293. EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM BY THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE FOUR-YEAR PLAN OF GERMANY July 24 ............................. 437
294. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
July 25 ............................. 443
295. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
July 25 .................,...........(.. 443
296. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET NAVAL ATTACHE IN
JAPAN TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY
July 25............................. 444
297. JAPANESE PROVOCATION CONTINUES (TASS
COMMUNIQUE)
July 27 .......................•...... 445
298. TELEGRAM FROM THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE GERMAN MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
30 GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
July 31............................. 446
299. LETTER FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GERMANY
August 1 ............................ 447
300. TASS STATEMENT ON ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THE
DELAY IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH BRITAIN
August 2.............................. 448
301. DRAFT DEFINITION OF THE TERM "INDIRECT AGGRESSION" HANDED BY THE AMBASSADORS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S. COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR August 2............................. 449
302. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN AND THE CHIEF INDUSTRIAL ADVISER TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT August 3............................ 450
303. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
August 4............................ 456
304. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
August 4............................ 457
305. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE USSR AND THE AMBASSADORS OF BRITAIN
AND FRANCE IN THE USSR
August 5............................ 458
306. MANDATE OF THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET
DELEGATION FOR THE CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE
SIGNING OF A CONVENTION ON QUESTIONS OF
ORGANIZING THE MILITARY DEFENCE OF BRITAIN,
FRANCE AND THE USSR AGAINST AGGRESSION IN
EUROPE
August 5............................ 459
307. THE JAPANESE REFUSE TO CALM DOWN (TASS
COMMUNIQUE)
August 6............................ 460
308. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A
GERMAN JOURNALIST AND THE GERMAN AIR
ATTACH^ IN POLAND
August 7..................v.......... 461
309. TELEGRAM FROM THE US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN
BRITAIN TO THE US SECRETARY OF STATE
August 8............................' 462
310 TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET CHARGfi D'AFFAIRES
IN GERMANY TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
August 9............................ 463
311 LETTER FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN THE
USSR TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY
August 10 ........................... 463
312 TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AIR ATTACHE IN
BRIT' AIN TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY
August 12 .......................'. . . . 464
313 FROM MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH CHANCELLOR AND THE
ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
August 12 ........................... 465
314 RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY
MISSIONS OF THE USSR, BRITAIN AND FRANCE
August 12 ........................... 466
315 RECORD OFTHE MORNING SESSION OFTHE MILITARY
MISSIONS OF THE USSR, BRITAIN AND FRANCE
August 13 ........................... 472
316. RECORD OF THE EVENING SESSION OF THE MILITARY
MISSIONS OF THE USSR, BRITAIN AND FRANCE
August 13 ........................... 479
317. RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY
MISSIONS OF THE USSR, BRITAIN AND FRANCE
August 14 ........................... 486
318. TELEGRAM FROM THE HEAD OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION TO THE WAR MINISTRY OF FRANCE August 14 ........................... 496
319. RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY
MISSIONS OF THE USSR, BRITAIN AND FRANCE
August 15 ........................... 497
320. TELEGRAM FROM THE HEAD OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION TO THE WAR MINISTRY OF FRANCE August 15............................ 507
321. TELEGRAM FROM THE WAR MINISTRY OF FRANCE TO
THE MILITARY ATTACHE OF FRANCE IN WARSAW
August 15 ........................... 507
322. TELEGRAM FROM THE ACTING MILITARY ATTACHE
OF THE USSR IN JAPAN TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF
THE RED ARMY
August 15 ........................... 508
323. TELEGRAM FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
August 16 ........................... 509
324. MINUTE FROM AN OFFICIAL OF RIBBENTROP'S SEC-
32RETARIAT TO THE PERMANENT LIAISON OFFICER OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY ATTACHED TO THE REICH CHANCELLOR August 16 ...........................' 510
325. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN POLICY SERVICE OF THE
GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY AND AN OFFICIAL
OF THE BRITISH AIR MINISTRY
August 16 ........................... 512
326. LETTER FROM THE FRENCH MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS OF FRANCE
August 16........................... 515
327. RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY
MISSIONS OF THE USSR, BRITAIN AND FRANCE
August 16 ............................517
328. RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY
MISSIONS OF THE USSR, BRITAIN AND FRANCE
August 16 ............................ 525
329. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USA IN THE USSR August 16........................... 530
330. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
IN GERMANY TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
August 16 ........................... 532
331. RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY
MISSIONS OF THE USSR, BRITAIN AND FRANCE
August 17 ............................ 533
332. TELEGRAM FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE IN
THE USSR TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS'OF
FRANCE
August 17 ..................,........' 545
333. TELEGRAM FROM THE HEAD OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION TO THE WAR MINISTRY OF FRANCE August 17.............................. 545
334. TELEGRAM FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE IN
THE USSR TO THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE IN
POLAND
August 17 ........................... 547
335. TELEGRAM FROM THE MILITARY ATTACHE OF
FRANCE IN POLAND TO THE WAR MINISTRY OF
FRANCE
August 19 ........................... 54g
336. TELEGRAM FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE IN
THE USSR TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
FRANCE
August 20 ..........;............... 548
337. MINUTE OF THE WAR MINISTRY OF FRANCE.
MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS WITH MOSCOW
Not earlier than August 20.....................549
338. TASS COMMUNIQUE
August 20 ........................... 550
339. RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY
MISSIONS OF THE USSR, BRITAIN AND FRANCE
August 21........................... 551
340. TELEGRAM FROM THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN FRANCE TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY August 22 ........................... 558
341. EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
August 22 ........................... 559
342. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
HEAD OF THE SOVIET MILITARY MISSION AND THE
HEAD OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION
August 22 .......................... .559
343. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
August 23 ........................... 565
344. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
IN JAPAN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
August 24 ...........................566
345. EXCERPT FROM THE DIARY OF THE SOVIET CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES IN GERMANY
August 24 ............................ 567
346. TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
August 26 ........................... 567
347. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN
THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE CHINESE
AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR
August 26 ............................. 568
348. INTERVIEW WITH THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET
MILITARY MISSION, K. Y. VOROSHILOV ON THE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MILITARY MISSIONS OF
BRITAIN AND FRANCE
August 27 ............................ 571
349. TELEGRAM FROM THE ACTING MILITARY ATTACHE
OF THE USSR IN JAPAN TO THE RED ARMY GENERAL
STAFF
August 31 ........................... 573
SOVIET PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON THE LIQUIDATION OF THE REMNANTS OF JAPANESE-MANCHURIAN FORCES IN THE FRONTIER ZONE OF THE MPR
...... 574
September 1 NOTES ..
577 [35] __ALPHA_LVL1__ FOREWORDThe year 1975 marked the thirtieth anniversary since the end of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people. This anniversary has revived memories of events which plunged the greater part of the world into a catastrophe and brought untold sufferings to millions. Speaking over American television L.I. Brezhnev said: "The Soviet people, perhaps better than any other people, know what war is. In the Second World War we achieved a victory of worldwide historical importance. But more than 20 million Soviet citizens died in that war, 70,000 of our towns and villages were razed to the ground. One-third of our national wealth was destroyed.''~^^*^^ This-anniversary urges us to address ourselves again to a study of the causes of the Second World War. To understand the causes of a war, Lenin said, it is necessary to "examine the policy pursued prior to the war, the policy that led to and brought about the war''.~^^**^^ The lessons of history must not be forgotten if we want to prevent a new war whose consequences would be even more terrible.
However, the international situation today is not what it was on the eve of the Second World War. The strength of the Soviet Union has grown tremendously. A number of new social phenomena have appeared in the world. Of these the most significant are the emergence of the world socialist system, the growing _-_-_
^^*^^ Pravda, June 25, 1973.
^^**^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 23, p. 33.
36 __RUNNING_HEADER__ FOREWORD influence of the working-class and communist movement, and the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism. They have caused a change in the balance of world forces in favour of socialism.In thinking of the future, no honest, intelligent person can afford to ignore the lessons of the past, of the events of the 1930's, when efforts failed to create a broad and united front against aggression and to prevent the fascist powers from hurling mankind into the abyss of a world war.
In this book the reader will find answers to many questions concerning the politico-diplomatic history immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World War. The answers are given in a most convincing language---the language of contemporary diplomatic documents. These documents testify to the persistent efforts of the Soviet Government to create a collective peace front. At the same time they expose the shameful game that was played with the destinies of the peoples and of peace by the ruling circles of the Western Powers in their repeated attempts to direct the fascist aggression against the Soviet Union.
This book begins with documents relating to the Munich collusion, an event which represented the culmination of the policy of encouraging fascist aggression, and which did much to enable fascist Germany to unleash a world war. In the Munich deal the rulers of Britain and France gave Hitler a sizeable portion of Czechoslovakia's territory in the hope that this would pave the way to his expansion eastwards, against the Soviet Union. By paying the price of betrayal of Czechoslovakia, the Western Powers thought they could win Hitler's respect for their interests, and avert the danger of fascist aggression.
Unlike Britain, France and the USA, the Soviet Union was prepared to render Czechoslovakia all the necessary assistance against Hitler's aggression.
Shortly before the Munich collusion the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR declared in the League of Nations: "When... the French Government... approached us with an enquiry about our position in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, I gave, on behalf of my Government, a clear-cut and unambiguous reply, namely, that we intended to meet our obligations under the Pact and, together with France, to render assistance to Czechoslovakia....''^^*^^
_-_-_ ^^*^^ New Documents on the History of Munich, Moscow, 1958, p. 125 (Russ.
ed.).
The Soviet Government suggested that negotiations be started between the General Staffs of the USSR, France and Czechoslovakia on concrete preparations for joint action. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, as is known, was prepared to go beyond the requirements of its treaty obligations in helping Czechoslovakia. It Was prepared to give military aid even without France, provided the Czechoslovak Government requested it and Czechoslovakia herself resisted German aggression. This was later recalled by C Gottwald in an account of his conversation with J.V. Stalin in the middle of May 1938. However, the ruling circles in Prague led by President Benes chose to capitulate, while the French Government betrayed its ally.
The Soviet Union promptly dissociated itself from the shameful Munich deal and from the very beginning condemned it as illegal (see Documents Nos. 13, 14 and others).
Many documents concerning the aggressive plans of Germany, Japan and Italy have already been published. These imperialist plans were elaborated in strict secrecy. The documents included in this book present a more complete account of how the war was prepared. They help to clarify certain points, notably the question of how the Hitlerites worked out the various stages of their aggressive plans in the West and in the East. The documents show how soon after Munich the Hitlerites decided that, following the seizure of the whole of Czechoslovakia, they would crush Poland and France and bring Britain to her knees. Only after all this had been accomplished was an attack to be mounted against the Soviet Union (see Documents Nos. 50, 58, 64, 89, 97, 101, 167, 196, 202 and others).
These documents help to show how odious were the intensive efforts made by the Anglo-French ruling circles in late 1938 and early 1939 to turn Munich into a starting point for close political and economic co-operation among the four Powers---Britain, France, Germany and Italy---while Nazi Germany continued, with the actual blessings of Chamberlain and Daladier, her aggression in the East. The history of the six post-Munich months, during which time the British and French ruling circles conducted a policy based on such illusions, has been less thoroughly studied than that of other pre-war periods. The new material included in this book will enable historians to form a more-complete picture of this period.
The policies of the then ruling circles of Poland were no less 38 odious, as the documents included here show. It was none other than Poland that was intended by the Nazis to be their next victim after Czechoslovakia. And yet the rulers of Poland, blinded by their class hatred of the USSR and dreaming of further seizures of Soviet lands, went on with their plans for a campaign against the USSR together with fascist Germany and militarist Japan (see Document No. 24).
At the same time, the documents confirm the farsightedness of the Soviet Government's policy in the extremely complex situation that existed on the eve of the Secorfd World War. It is important to note that the Soviet Government was in possession of reliable and sufficiently complete information concerning the events of the day. The Soviet Embassies in Britain, France and other countries were aware of the dishonourable plans of the ruling quarters of those countries. As for the plans of the aggressive countries, reports on them were received from both the Embassies and military attaches. Soviet military intelligence also provided the Soviet Government with timely information about the predatory plans of the aggressive Powers.
The Soviet Government was therefore in a position to correctly appraise the words and the deeds, and to assess the policies and the intentions of the governments of all countries that had a role to play in the events preceding the war, and to take the appropriate decisions.
In informing Moscow on October 19, 1938, of the comments made by Lord Beaverbrook, a prominent figure in the British Conservative Party, on the post-Munich policy of Britain, the Soviet Ambassador in Britain wrote that Chamberlain "is prepared to capitulate further to the aggressors, above all at the expense of third countries," that Chamberlain was not considering any kind of resistance to German expansion in Southeastern Europe, and that, on the contrary, he anticipated that all this would "push Hitler into hostilities with the USSR" (see Document No. 14). The Soviet Ambassador in France reported on October 29, 1938, that after Daladier's last speech "there is no longer any doubt that he is determined to come to terms with Germany and that to achieve that aim he is prepared to sacrifice the last vestige of collective security and the Mutual Assistance Pacts" (see Document No. 20).
At the 18th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the report of the Central Committee, which was delivered on March 10, 39 1939, by J.V. Stalin, condemned the fascist aggressors and exposed the essence of the Munich policy which the Western Powers were pursuing under the cover of ``non-intervention'' and "appeasement." "The policy of non-intervention," the report said, "means connivance at aggression and war... In the policy of nonintervention one can see an attempt and a desire not to hinder the aggressors from doing their sinister work, not to hinder, say, Japan from becoming involved in a war with China or, better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder, say, Germany from becoming immersed in European affairs and getting involved in a war with the Soviet Union, to let all the belligerents sink deep into the quagmire of war, to spur them on in this on the sly, to let them weaken and exhaust one another and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to come forward---of course, 'in the interests of peace'---with fresh forces, and dictate their terms to the weakened belligerents.
``A nice and easy way of doing things!"~^^*^^
The report of the Central Committee warned the Munichmen: "The big and dangerous political game started by the proponents of the non-intervention policy may end very badly for them.''^^**^^
Early in 1939, it became clear that the Munich policy of the Western Powers was misfiring. The first sign of this was the exacerbation of Franco-Italian relations. A second sign was the renunciation by the Hitlerites of their plans to create a vassal Carpatho-Ukrainian state, which was to have become a base for subversion against the Soviet Ukraine. Instead, Transcarpathia was handed over to Horthyist Hungary.
The report of the Central Committee to the 18th Party Congress noted these first failures of the Munich policy. "Some politicians and newspapermen in Europe and the USA, having waited in vain for a 'campaign against the Soviet Ukraine', are beginning to disclose the real meaning of the policy of non-intervention. They are now plainly saying and writing in so many words that the Germans have cruelly `disappointed' them, since, instead of moving farther East, against the Soviet Union, they have, you see, turned to the West and are demanding colonies. It seems that a part of Czechoslovakia was given to the Germans as a price for _-_-_
^^*^^ The 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Stenographic report, Moscow, 1939, p. 13 (Russ. ed )
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 14.
40 starting a war against the Soviet Union and now the Germans are refusing to deliver the goods...''~^^*^^On March 15, 1939 the Hitlerites liquidated the Czechoslovak state. The seizure of Czechoslovakia was followed by predatory claims against Poland, that is, against another ally of France, and then by the seizure of Lithuanian Klaipeda, the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Poland and the Naval Agreement with Britain, and claims for the return to Germany of her colonies that had been taken over by Britain and France under the Versailles Peace Treaty. All these predatory political acts of fascist Germany showed that the ruling circles of Britain and France, even at the price of betraying Czechoslovakia, had failed to obtain Hitler's guarantees of their interests and their security. It became obvious that the Anglo-German and Franco-German Declarations (see Documents Nos. 2 and 34), which were signed soon after the Munich Agreement and were tantamount to nonaggression treaties, were not taken seriously by Hitlerites. It may be recalled that on his return from Munich Chamberlain broadly advertised the significance of the bargain he had struck for the preservation of peace and security and the protection of the British interests. Thus, the aggressive actions of fascist Germany placed the British and French Governments in an awkward position before their own people and world public opinion. The broad masses in Britain and France, and even a sizeable part of the bourgeois circles in those countries were calling for renunciation of the policy of making deals with the aggressor and were for co-operation with the Soviet Uniorr and a j oirit 'struggle against fascist aggression.
Such was the situation in the spring of 1939 when the British Government thought it necessary to establish some contacts with the Soviet Government and begin a political dialogue on important issues---a dialogue which failed to yield positive results because the Western participants in it had no real intention of abandoning their policy of collusion with the aggressor.
For its part, in the spring of 1939, as the threat of war increased, the Soviet Government continued to wage a vigorous struggle for the creation of a peace front. On March 18 the Soviet Union proposed that a conference be held of representatives of the _-_-_
^^*^^ The 18th Congress of the Ail-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Stenographic Report, Moscow, 1939, p. 14 (Russ. ed.).
41 USSR, Britain, France, Poland, Rumania and Turkey (see Documents Nos. 109 and 110). On April 17, 1939, the USSR proposed the conclusion of a treaty of mutual assistance and a military convention between the USSR, Britain and France (see Document No. 171). On May 10 the Soviet Government told the Polish Government that the "USSR would not refuse assistance to Poland if she desired it" (see Document No. 210).There is hardly any need to give a summary of the AnglbFranco-Soviet negotiations here---the relevant documents speak for themselves. But it may be useful to state the conclusion suggested by an analysis of the documents relating to these negotiations.
The Soviet and foreign documents included in this book prove beyond all doubt that the British Government did not want any genuine co-operation with the USSR. The French Government, though rather more perturbed by the German menace, nonetheless trailed in the wake of the British Government. The first British proposals were almost openly designed to drag the USSR into a war with Germany while preserving freedom of action for the Western Powers. Under the pressure of public opinion in their countries and at the insistence of the Soviet Government, Britain and France subsequently had to modify their position and agree to undertake certain obligations. Even so, however, the British and French Governments would not stop all the loopholes enabling them to avoid taking part in a war if it should begin with a German attack on the USSR, but not on Britain or France. The British Government refused to assume clear-cut and precise obligations in the event of fascist aggression in the Baltic region. Although Britain and France had undertaken to guarantee Poland and Rumania in the event of either direct or indirect aggression, they tried to avoid pledging assistance to the Baltic states and the USSR if the Germans should penetrate the Baltic region through indirect aggression. In shunning joint action with the USSR to repulse any form of fascist aggression in the Baltic region, the Munichmen were in effect showing the Hitlerites which strategic direction and what method for starting a war against the USSR they could resort to without making Britain and France abandon their neutrality and their role of onlookers.
Still more convincing evidence of British and French reluctance to co-operate with the Soviet Union in opposing aggression is provided by the negotiations between the military missions of the 42 three Powers in August 1939. The British and French missions arrived in Moscow led by persons without a mandate to sign any agreements. What is more, they had instructions not to enter into a discussion of the question of passage of Soviet troops through Polish and Rumanian territory; this means that the USSR, having no common frontiers with Germany, could not take part in military actions against her. It was obvious that the British and French representatives had arrived in Moscow without any serious intentions of reaching agreement on joint action in the event of German aggression.
All. this became quite obvious to the Soviet Government already then, in the summer of 1939. Today we have ample documentary and other evidence of the decided unwillingness on the part of the British Government at that time to conclude a mutual assistance treaty with the USSR.
But it was not only that the British Government was unwilling to co-operafe with the USSR. It is now beyond all doubt that the Government led by Chamberlain tried to use the negotiations with the USSR as a means of pressuring Hitler into a rapprochement with Britain. In the summer of 1939 there were reports in the press that simultaneously with the publicly announced negotiations in Moscow, secret Anglo-German talks were being held in London. Understandably, the Soviet Government could not remain indifferent to such reports (see Document No. 291).
Documentary mateiral published after the war, an important part of which is included in this book, shows that Chamberlain's trusted aides (H. Wilson, R. Hudson and others) conducted secret negotiations with the Hitlerites at the same time that the AngloFranco-Soviet negotiations were taking place in Moscow. Farreaching proposals for Anglo-German co-operation were communicated by the British negotiators to the Hitlerites. They envisaged the conclusion of an agreement on the division of spheres of influence between Britain and Germany on a world-wide scale as well as co-operation with a view to discovering new, and exploiting existing, world markets, with China and the USSR being listed by the British among the countries whose markets were to be covered by such ``co-operation'' (see Documents Nos. 289, 292, 293, 299 and others).
In short, Hitler was offered a scheme for a redivision of the world. Under this scheme Eastern and Southeastern Europe were to be handed over to Germany as her sphere of influence. Hitler 43 was also promised that if he would come to a serious agreement with Britain, Poland would be sacrificed and the negotiations with the USSR broken off (see Documents Nos. 289, 299 and others). Thus, for the British Government the negotiations with the Soviet Union and the ``guarantees'' given to Poland were nothing but a means of enhancing Britain's worth in the eyes of the Fiihrer, of frightening him with the prospects of Germany's "encirclement," and of prodding him into taking a more favourable attitude towards a collusion with Britain.
Germany's Ambassador in London, von Dirksen, was not mistaken, when he wrote on August 3, 1939, that for the British ruling circles "the ties that had been formed in the last few months with other Powers were only a subsidiary means which would cease to be operative as soon as agreement with Germany, the all-important objective worth striving for, had been really attained." Even "the bringing in of France and Italy" would play "a secondary role" (see Document No. 302).
The "ties with other Powers" referred to by von Dirksen were, specifically, the guarantees offered by Britain to Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey. It follows that the British Government was prepared to hand over those countries to Hitler as a payment for a broad agreement with him on the redivision of the world which would serve the interests of British imperialism. And if Hitler had accepted this, London was prepared not only to break up negotiations with the USSR and give him Poland and Rumania, but also to betray its closest ally, France.
The secret Anglo-German talks in 1939 were not known to the Soviet Government in all their details and in all their truly monstrous perfidy. But the reports that were leaked to the press were sufficient to make the Soviet Government and the Soviet people still more vigilant in respect of the intentions of the British ruling circles. Together with the obvious reluctance of Britain and France to conclude an effective treaty on mutual assistance and joint military action to repulse German fascist aggression, the reports on secret Anglo-German talks revealed to the Soviet Government the full extent of the danger implicit in the obtaining situation. The Soviet Union had no grounds to hope that it would succeed in organizing, with Britain and France, an anti-Nazi front which would be aimed at defeating the fascist aggressor, and which would stand a good chance of preventing war altogether. The Soviet Government remained isolated in the face of Hitlerite
44aggression that threatened at any moment to crush Poland, whose government, blinded by its class hatred of socialism, refused Soviet assistance thereby dooming Poland to seizure by Nazi Germany. For the Soviet Union, with its then existing frontier, the rout of Poland by the Hitlerites would mean that Nazi forces would quickly appear on the near approaches to Minsk and Vitebsk in the Moscow strategic direction. In case of a German attack in those conditions the USSR not only could count on no British and French assistance, but had to reckon with the possibility that the German fascists might be aided by the Western Powers, especially Britain.
And the Soviet Union was threatened from yet another quarter. It was faced with the menace of a war with militarist Japan. In fact, the war---though an undeclared one----had already started. In the summer of 1939 sizeable Japanese forces invaded the Mongolian People's Republic and carried on military operations in the area of Khalkhin Gol river against Mongolian armed forces and Red Army units that had come to the aid of the MPR in accordance with the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Protocol of 1936.
In the Far East, as in Europe, the British, French and the US Governments were pursuing a policy of connivance at aggression. On July 22, 1939, Britain and Japan entered into the so-called Arita-Craigie Agreement (Arita was the Japanese Foreign Minister at that time and Craigie, the British Ambassador in Tokyo) under which Britain undertook not to countenance any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment by Japanese forces of their objects in China.~^^*^^ With Japan conducting hostilities against the USSR and the MPR in the region of Khalkhin Gol river, the Arita-Craigie Agreement strengthened the position of Japan in general, and particularly the position of the Japanese forces in China, the springboard from which they were operating against the USSR and the MPR. In other words, the British Government was giving diplomatic support to Japan in her aggression against the MPR and its ally, the USSR, at a time when the AngloFranco-Soviet negotiations were proceeding in Moscow.
The United States also continued to adhere to a policy of connivance at aggression. In the summer of 1939 the US _-_-_
^^*^^ Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939, Third Series, Vol. IX, p.
313.
``Fear has been expressed to me that the action of Congress might be the decisive factor in the next move of the aggressors which is feared to be imminent and that it might be a contributing cause to possible speedy hostilities.''
It is noteworthy that although in the Far East the interests of the United States were more directly affected than in Europe, the USA gave China no help in the latter's struggle against Japanese aggression. On the contrary, the American monopolies supplied Japan with all she needed to conduct the aggressive war against China.
The only state to give effective political and military assistance to China in her struggle against Japanese aggressors was the Soviet Union. In 1938 two agreements were signed in Moscow under each of which the USSR would extend to China credits amounting to 50 million US dollars. An agreement signed in June 1939 provided for a new Soviet credit to China to the sum of 150 million US dollars. Under those agreements the Soviet Union supplied China in 1938-39 with approximately 600 aircraft, 1,000 guns and howitzers, over 8,000 machine guns, transport facilities, ammunition, and other military supplies. This could not but arouse greater hostility on the part of the Japanese militarists towards the USSR. The Japanese ruling circles were hoping that Germany would attack the Soviet Union and assured the Hitlerites that "in the event of Germany and Italy starting war with the USSR Japan will join them at any moment without raising any conditions" (see Documents No. 236 and others).
Thus, in August 1939 the Soviet Union found itself in an extremely dangerous situation: in the West there was the threat of Nazi armies appearing at the gates of Minsk and Vitebsk; in the Far East hostilities with Japan threatened to develop into a fullscale armed conflict. The Soviet Union was faced with the possibility of, having to fight a war on two fronts against two powerful military states---and in complete international isolation.
Since attempts to create an effective front against the aggressor and in defence of world peace had failed owing to the negative 46 attitude of Britain and France, the Soviet Union was compelled to look for other ways of ensuring its security. In the meantime, Germany had approached the Soviet Union with a proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact. This meant that at least for a short time Hitler was inclined to live at peace with the USSR. The Nazis were aware that a war with the Soviet Union would involve Germany in enormous difficulties. Actually, the Hitlerites even then underestimated the strength of the USSR, but nevertheless they considered the Soviet Union sufficiently strong as to make, it expedient for them to look for an easier prey and to strengthen their military and industrial potentials at the expense of other European countries. At that time the Hitlerites still showed a measure of realism in their thinking which they subsequently lost as a result of easy victories in the West.
For weeks the Germans dropped hints of their interest in normalizing to some extent Soviet-German relations, but the Soviet Government did not take them up until it had finally lost all hopes of achieving co-operation with the Western Powers. This was well understood by Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow and an experienced diplomat, who, in his dispatch of August 4, 1939, reported that the Soviet Government "is fully determined to conclude a treaty with Britain and France.''^^*^^
This was, indeed, the state of affairs until the middle of August, when in the course of the negotiations with the British and French military missions the Soviet Government finally became convinced that the Western Powers had no intention of concluding an effective and equal treaty with the USSR. When the last doubts on this score had been dispelled the Soviet Government accepted Germany's proposal to sign a non-aggression pact. "The military negotiations with England and France were not broken off because the USSR had concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany," declared the People's Commissar for Defence, K. Y. Voroshilov, head of the Soviet military mission. "On the contrary," he continued, "the USSR concluded the non-aggression pact with Germany because, amongst other things, the military negotiations with France and England had reached a deadlock as a result of insurmountable differences of opinion" (see Document No. 348).
_-_-_ ^^*^^ Akten zur deutschen auswdrtigen Politik. 1918-1945, SerieD, Bd. VI, S.
894.
By concluding a treaty of non-aggression with Germany the Soviet Government secured a postponement of the war---for almost two years, as it turned out. Of course, the Soviet Government had never harboured any illusions that the Nazis would remain loyal to their pledge. It regarded their proposal to conclude a non-aggression treaty merely as a sign that in the immediate future Hitler preferred to avoid a war with the USSR. Thus, after the treaty was signed the Soviet Union did not reduce, but intensified its efforts to build up the country's defences, and carried out a series of measures to strengthen its economy, equip its army with more modern types of weapons, establish many new military formations and prepare the people politically for a possible military attack on the Soviet Union by the Hitlerites.
By concluding the non-aggression pact with Germany the Soviet Government thwarted the designs of the Munichmen who had sought to bring about a German-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet war which would place the Western Powers in the position of an arbiter and enable them once again to assume the role of masters of the world, a role which they had gained as a result of the imperialist war of 1914-18. In September 1939 the war started---but not in the way the Munichmen had wanted. They had wanted Germany and Japan to attack the USSR while they played the part of the complacent onlooker. In reality, the war broke out within the capitalist world, between two groups of imperialist powers.
By June 1941, when Nazi Germany attacked the USSR, the international situation had changed radically as compared with August 1939. Britain was in a state of war with Germany. The United States was soon afterwards to be embroiled in the war. In the summer of 1939 the USSR was isolated diplomatically, and faced with the threat of a war on two fronts, in the West and in the Far East. Now, by June 1941, objective conditions had appeared for the creation of a powerful anti-Hitler coalition. Britain, which had been reluctant to enter into co-operation with the USSR in 1939, now saw that only such co-operation could save her from defeat. The respite gained by the USSR in consequence of signing the non-aggression treaty with Germany had enabled it to avoid getting involved in a war in the extremely unfavourable international conditions that had developed in the summer of 1939.
The respite was not long enough, however, for the country to complete its preparations for war---especially since by that time 48 the Hitlerites had at their disposal the resources of almost the whole of Western Europe. Their military-industrial potential was greater than the Soviet Union's, despite the immense strides made by the USSR in the first five-year plan periods in industrializing the country. The USSR could not arm itself as swiftly as Germany had rearmed with the help of the industry of the entire West European continent. But nonetheless, the Soviet Union's defence preparations had advanced far enough to enable the,heroic Soviet armed forces to achieve, in the extremely arduous initial phase of the Great Patriotic War, a result of paramount importance: they frustrated the strategic concept of the Nazi leadership---to effect a lightning-like rout of the Soviet Union. "The fighting in the initial period of the war already showed that the military adventure of the Hitlerites was doomed to failure. The rout of the Germans at the approaches to Moscow was the beginning of a turning point in the war.''^^*^^
The Soviet people have not forgotten the history of the outbreak of the Second World War, and in particular the perfidious attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, or the first months of the Great Patriotic War against the Nazi invaders. History teaches many object lessons. It reminds the Soviet people of the following words said by Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state: "The first precept of our policy, the first lesson that emerges from our governmental activities..., the lesson which must be learned by all workers and peasants, is to be on the alert...''^^**^^
__*_*_*__The documents included in this book cover the period from September 1938 to August 1939. Most of the documents herein are being published for the first time. The book includes a generous selection from the correspondence between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Soviet Ambassadors in Britain, France, Germany, the United States and other countries; memoranda of conversations, and texts of notes and proposals addressed by the Soviet Union to foreign states or received by the Soviet Union from the latter, statements by Soviet _-_-_
^^*^^ 50 Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Theses of the CC CPSU, Politizdat, Moscow, 1967, p. 19.
^^**^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 148.
49 officials, TASS communiques and various material that was published in the Soviet press and that relates to the subject of this book. The book also includes dispatches of Soviet military attaches and the Soviet military intelligence concerning the aggressive plans of Germany, Japan and Italy.A number of foreign documents, most of which have been taken from official British, American, German, Italian and Polish publications, are also included.
The documents in the book are presented in chronological order.
The texts of the Soviet diplomatic documents are for the most part reproduced in English translation from original documents reposited in the archives. This is indicated by the note "From the archives" immediately following the text. If a document has previously been published the title of the relevant publication is given after the text.
The foreign diplomatic documents included in this book are also followed by a reference to their source (publication or archives).
In the case of most of the documents included in this book, the full texts are given. The parts of a text that have been omitted are denoted by three dots in square brackets. The omitted parts either have no bearing on the subject of the book or else are devoted to inconsequential matters. The customary forms of personal address or complimentary phrases at the beginning and close of letters as well as various official marks on the documents are also omitted.
The titles indicate the type of document (telegram, letter, memorandum of a conversation, declaration and so forth), the sender, the addressee and the date. The names of the addressee and the sender (unless they appear in the text) are given in a footnote following the first mention of the persons concerned. The place from which a document was sent is not indicated.
All place names are given as they appeared in the originals. Where necessary, their present-day names are indicated in footnotes.
__ALPHA_LVL0__ The End. [END] [50] ~ [51] __Numeric_LVL1__ No. 1. __ALPHA_LVL1__ AGREEMENT BETWEEN GERMANY, BRITAIN,Munich, September 29, 1938
Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfilment---
1. The evacuation will begin on the 1st October.
2. The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October without any existing installations having been destroyed and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.
3. The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.
4. The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on the 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map~^^*^^ will be occupied by German troops in the following order:
_-_-_^^*^^ Not included herein.
52 __RUNNING_HEADER__ DOCUMENTS AND RECORDSThe territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October, the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October, the territory marked No. Ill on the 3rd , 4th and 5th of October, the territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October.
The remaining territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th October.
5. The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international armed forces until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.
6. The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. This commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers---Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy---in certain exceptional cases minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.
7. There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.
8. The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.
Adolf Hitler
Edouard Daladier
Benito Mussolini
Neville Chamberlain
Munich, September 29, 1938
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.
When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.
(Same signatures)
__ALPHA_LVL2__ SUPPLEMENTARY DECLARATIONMunich, September 29, 1938
The four Heads of Government here present agree that the international commission provided for in the agreement signed by them today shall consist of the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, the British, French and Italian Ambassadors accredited in Berlin, and a representative to be nominated by the Government of Czechoslovakia.
(Same signatures)
__ALPHA_LVL2__ SUPPLEMENTARY DECLARATIONMunich, September 29, 1938
All questions which may arise out of the transfer of the territory shall be considered as coming within the terms of reference to the international commission.
(Same signatures)
54 __ALPHA_LVL2__ SUPPLEMENTARY DECLARATIONMunich, September 29, 1938
The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective^ Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present.
(Same signatures)
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 2. __ALPHA_LVL1__ ANGLO-GERMAN DECLARATION~^^2^^September 30, 1938
We, the German Fiihrer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.
We regard the agreement signed last night~^^*^^ and the AngloGerman Naval Agreement^^3^^ as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.
We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other question that may concern 'our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe.
Adolf Hitler Neville Chamberlain
From Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939, Third Series. Vol. II, London, 1949, p. 640.
_-_-_^^*^^ See Document No. 1.
55 __NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 3. __ALPHA_LVL1__ STATEMENT BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FORSeptember 30, 1938
I should like to assure the representative of China of our sympathy with, and appreciation of, his dissatisfaction with the report presented to us. I agree with him that the report does not correspond to what China had a right to expect of the League of Nations. Such reports will not contain the aggressors or check the aggression. The fact that we are compelled to limit ourselves to such reports is all the more regretful at the present moment, when so much is being done outside the League to encourage aggression and to help the aggressors achieve their ends. My Government would be prepared to go further than this report and to take part in collective measures that would enable the League of Nations to meet all its obligations to China. Individual measures can do little to halt aggression unless they are carried out by other members of the League. My Government would be prepared to participate in such a co-ordination of collective measures, but since other governments do not find it possible to do so, we shall have to vote for this report.^^4^^
From Pravda, No. 272 (7597), October 2, 1938.
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 4. __ALPHA_LVL1__ TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR INOctober 1,1938
I have learned from Foreign Ministry circles that at Munich the Czechoslovak observers told Chamberlain of their bewilderment over the fact that he, after having prompted Czechoslovakia to
_-_-_^^*^^ M. M. Litvinov.
^^**^^ S. S. Alexandrovsky.
56mobilize her army and having publicly stated, in no uncertain terms, that England and France would take joint action with the USSR against Germany if Hitler should use force to settle the Sudeten question, was now openly sacrificing the interests of Czechoslovakia and demanding the withdrawal and demobilization of the army that had just been mobilized. Chamberlain replied with cynical frankness that he had not taken all this seriously, and that it had merely been a manoeuvre to exert pressure on Hitler; in other words, it was a counter-bluff by Chamberlain. People are saying, citing Mastny, * that at Munich the Czechoslovak observers were treated rudely and in a humiliating fashion. Daladier being the most insolent of them all. Despite all that has happened, the Czechoslovak Government has been asking England and France for advice on the question of the Polish ultimatum, and seeking assistance in getting a postponement in the spirit of the Munich decisions, but it was rapped over the knuckles by France which bluntly told it to agree and obey. The Foreign Ministry is now debating whether or not to forestall the likelihood of a Hungarian ultimatum by offering to cede to Hungary certain portions of territory. Today, October 1, the socalled ``twenty'', made up of representatives of the coalition parties, met in Parliament. As a result of yesterday's demonstrations the Government of Syrovy** has decided to resign but has postponed this step until the completion of the first phase of the transfer of the ceded territory. The protest resolution adopted by the ``twenty'' and the standing committee of parliament against the violence done to Czechoslovakia has been revised by Benes* * * and turned into an innocuous appeal to the world public. It was decided to send a delegation to France and England to ask for assistance in establishing the areas of the plebiscite and in. holding it. The delegation to England was to have been led by Hodza, * * * * but he left in haste for Slovakia and refused to have anything to do with the affair. They cannot find prominent politicians for this kind of missions. The Czech Social-- Democrats suggested sending an unofficial delegation to Berlin to ex-
plore the possibility of signing a treaty of eternal friendship with Germany. The Agrarians were opposed to this for tactical reasons. There is no question in anyone's mind that the Mutual Assistance Pact with the USSR^^5^^ should already be regarded as nullified, and everyone is wondering whether Munich might not mean the abrogation of the Franco-Soviet Pact as well.^^6^^
Ambassador
From the archives.
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 5. __ALPHA_LVL1__ TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR INOctober 1,1938
At 11:45 today I learned from the President's office that the Government had given in to the Polish ultimatum too. The transfer of the Teschen area to Poland is to begin today. It seems that several Ministers handed in their resignations on the 28th in protest against the defeatist policy of the Government. Prague and the country are calm. The Council of Ministers is apathetic in view of a possible dissolution.
Ambassador From the archives.
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 6. __ALPHA_LVL1__ TASS ANNOUNCEMENTOctober 2, 1938
In a report sent to New York by the United Press correspondent in Paris it is alleged that the Soviet Government had authorized Daladier to speak on behalf of the USSR at the four-power Munich Conference. TASS is authorized to announce that the Soviet Government had not, of course, given such powers to M. Daladier and it had nothing to do either with the conference in
1938.
Czechoslovak Minister in Germany.
Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, September 22 to November 30,
President of Czechoslovakia, 1935 to October 1938, " Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, 1935 to September 22, 1938.
58SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
59Munich or its decisions. The United Press report is a clumsy fabrication from beginning to end.
From Izvestia, No 230 (6697), October, 2, 1938.
3. Lloyd George is very gloomy about the immediate prospects. The Western ``democracies'' have sustained a cruel defeat. France had definitely become a second-rate power (Lloyd George regards Daladier as a weak man and Bonnet* as simply a traitor who maintains criminal ties with the German Government).
4. The League of Nations and collective security are dead. International relations are entering an era of the most violent upsurge of savagery and brute force and the policy of the mailed fist. Hidebound reaction is reigning in Britain, and the most conservative bourgeois circles, who fear communism above all else, are in power. Chamberlain, who has now realized his dream of a "Four-Power Pact" (Lloyd George told me about this over a year ago) and of playing the role of ``appeaser'' of Europe, will doubtless try to make a profit out of the political capital he has acquired. Therefore, new elections may be expected in the immediate future which, to judge by all the signs," will strengthen for another four or five years the domination of the most BlackHundred-like elements of the British ruling classes.
The USSR remains the one and only bright spot against this gloomy background, and from now on progressive and democratic circles everywhere will be turning to it more than ever before.
Burn, whom I saw yesterday and today, says that during tomorrow's parliamentary debate on the Munich Agreement the Labour Party will definitely criticize the British Government and Chamberlain personally. Thefe is information that the Govern1 ment will also be opposed by Churchill, Emery**, probably Eden * * * and some other Conservatives. On the other hand, Chamberlain's followers are planning to give him an ovation at tomorrow's session.
5. The mood in the country is slowly beginning to change. In the first two days common folk were elated over the successful avoidance of war, although the more responsible political circles, including Conservative ones, immediately voiced anxiety and apprehension with regard to the terms and the circumstances of the Munich Agreement. Curiously, the.Daily Telegraph and the
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 7. __ALPHA_LVL1__ TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR INOctober 2, 1938
1. On the morning of September 30, when the terms of the Munich agreement became known in London, I called on Masaryk * * to express my deep sympathy for the peoples of Czechoslovakia and my profound indignation at the betrayal of Czechoslovakia by Britain and France. Masaryk---a tall, strong man, somewhat cynical in normal circumstances--- fell on my breast, kissed me and burst into tears like a child. "They have sold me into slavery to the Germans," he exclaimed through his tears, "just as Negroes were once sold into slavery in America!''
2. Yesterday I had a long talk with Lloyd George ***, during which he told me, among other things, that about ten days ago, at the height of the crisis, Baldwin * * *•* called on Chamberlain and told him: "You must avoid war at the cost of any humiliation." And then Baldwin spoke about Britain's unpreparedness for war, about the weakness of her armaments, about the organization of air defence, the glaring shortages of anti-aircraft guns, and the like. In conclusion Baldwin said: "If war begins and all these shortcomings come to light, the indignant public will simply hang us both from the lampposts." Lloyd George is convinced that the conversation with Baldwin played no small part in preparing the Munich capitulation.
I. M. Maisky.
Czechoslovak Minister in Britain. Prime Minister of Britain, 1916-1922. Prime Minister of Britain, 1935-1937.
* French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
" * British Conservative Party Leaders, Members of Parliament. '" * British secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1935 to February 1938.
60SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
61Beaverbrook* press adopted a sober and even critical tone from the outset. The entire ``Left-wing'' press (the Manchester Guardian, the Daily Herald, the News Chronicle, the Economist, and others) promptly attacked Four-Power Treaty with various degrees of vehemence. Now the man in the street is beginning to calm down somewhat, while doubts and protests among those more aware of things are mounting. Significant in this connection is the resignation of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Duff Cooper, prompted by his disagreement with Chamberlain's policies. Nonetheless there is not the slightest doubt at present that the Prime Minister has behind him not only the overwhelming majority of the Conservative Party but also the overwhelming majority of the voters. If new elections were held in the coming weeks, Chamberlain could count on retaining, or perhaps even increasing his present majority in Parliament.
Ambassador
From the archives.
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 8. __ALPHA_LVL1__ TELEGRAM FROM A SOVIET MILITARYOctober 3,1938
I have learned from the Military Attache*** that after the Sudeten question has been settled the next problem will be the Polish, but that it will be settled in a friendly way between Germany and Poland in view of their joint war against the USSR.
Ramzai From the archives.
61 __NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 9. __ALPHA_LVL1__ TASS ANNOUNCEMENTOctober 4, 1938
On September 30 the mouthpiece of the Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Prager Presse carried a dispatch from its Paris correspondent under the heading ``Paris-London-Moscow'' which alleged that the Governments of France and England had been regularly informing the Government of the USSR about the Czechoslovak question and that, moreover, there had been lengthy discussions on that question between M. Bonnet and Comrade Surits,* and between Mr. Halifax** and Comrade Maisky. From this the Prager Presse correspondent drew the conclusion that the Munich Conference "was not simply a fourpower pact.''
TASS is authorized to state that the above-mentioned dispatch by the Prager Press correspondent is completely discordant with reality. TASS is authorized to state that during the meetings between M. Bonnet and Comrade Surits and between Mr. Halifax and Comrade Maisky which have taken place of late, both ambassadors of the USSR were only given information as was published in the daily press. There have not been any discussions, and still less so, any agreements between the Governments of the USSR, France and England concerning the destinies of the Czechoslovak Republic and concessions to the aggressor. Neither France nor England consulted with the USSR; they merely informed the Government of the USSR of accomplished facts. As already stated in the TASS announcement of October 2 of this year, the Soviet Government has had nothing to do either with the conference in Munich or its decisions.
From Izvestia, No 232 (6699), October 4, 1938.
* British newspaper magnate and a prominent Conservative. * * R. Sorge (Ramzai). *** The German Military Attache in Japan, Colonel Matzky.
Soviet Ambassador in France.
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
62SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
63 __NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 10. __ALPHA_LVL1__ EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE SOVIETUSSR and, to a considerable degree, even in the eyes of Britain, has diminished her influence and her role as an ally. [...]
USSR Ambassador to France Surits
From the archives.
October 12, 1938
In this letter I do not intend to dwell upon the various stages of the recent events. They are still too fresh in everyone's memory, and therefore there would hardly be any sense in reproducing them in their chronological order. It is far more important to try and to find out the causes that have brought France to her present Sedan.
Every Frenchman is now aware that France has lived through her second Sedan and that at Munich she sustained a terrible defeat.
Even those who but recently shouted themselves hoarse as they greeted Daladier at le Bourget and showered flowers on his triumphal procession to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier have by now realized several indisputable and rather unpleasant truths, namely, that:
1) Germany, with France's help, has increased her population by more than three million without firing a single shot, that is, to more than twice the population of France;
2) Germany has enlarged her territory by more than 27,000 sq. km;
3) Germany has received a gift of several well-equipped factories and plants and extremely important mineral resources;
4) Germany has now seized a line of fortifications that has always been regarded as the most serious barrier to German aggression in Central Europe; while at the same time France:
(a) has lost her most reliable ally in Central Europe,
(b) has lost an army which in time of war could have been brought to a strength of between one million and 1.5 million and, relying on fortifications now lost, could have held up a German army at least equal in size,
(c) has now lost all her allies, undermined her relations with the
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 11. __ALPHA_LVL1__ TELEGRAM OF THE US CHARGE D'AFFAIRESIN
October 13, 1938
The Chief of the Far Eastern Division at the Foreign Office* said to me this afternoon that the Japanese invasion of South China which has begun with the landing of troops at Bias Bay** had been under consideration by the Japanese authorities for a long time. The Japanese Navy had always wanted to take this action but the Foreign Office had opposed it for fear of complications with foreign powers. With the fall of Ugaki* * * and decline of Foreign Office influence, the navy view had prevailed.
Hoppenot believed the first Japanese objective will be to cut the railway in the section north of Kowloon and that for this purpose troops will be landed on the east bank of the Canton River in addition to those landed at Bias Bay. After this has been done he expects the Japanese to attack Canton but believes that in order to avoid the difficulties of an approach overland through the mountain and lake regions the Japanese will move troops on junks up the Canton River. He said that the force of some 35,000 men already landed at Bias Bay should be sufficient to cut the railway. A considerably larger force will be needed to capture Canton although his information indicates that the Chinese military at Canton are lukewarm about putting up a strong defense and that recently the best troops which had been stationed there have been moved to the north.
* Henri Hoppenot. * * An inlet of the South China Sea. *** Japanese Foreign Minister in May-September 1938.
64SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
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65He believes that the Japanese, intend to set up an autonomous government in Kwangtung and that while they will be albe to accomplish their objectives in this area, including cutting off of supplies going to Hankow from Hong Kong, this will have little effect upon the ultimate outcome of the conflict.
Hoppenot said that he did not like the looks of things. The Japanese are becoming ``excited'' and unpleasant in conversations in Tokyo between the Foreign Office and the French Embassy and between the Japanese Embassy and the Foreign Office here. The Japanese Embassy had potested because a few Chinese officers and soldiers in mufti had been allowed to cross Tonkin going from Kwangsi to Yunnan. The French Foreign Office had replied that they could not prohibit Chinese transiting Tonkin, that a few Chinese soldiers in civilian attire could not be distinguished from ordinary civilians and that in any case there was no declared war and France had no obligation to prohibit even Chinese troops from crossing Indo-China. The Japanese Embassy, however, maintained its point of view and insisted that the French should do something yeoman (regarding?) situation [sic]. Also the Japanese Counsellor (the Ambassador is quite ill) had lately protested a decree authorizing the authorities in Indo-China to prohibit the export of iron ore and manganese. Hoppenot had explained that this decree had been issued only in order to permit the prohibition of exports if it should appear in the future that these ores were needed in Indo-China and had pointed out that the decree had not been applied and that Japan was continuing to receive shipments of these ores. Japanese Counsellor nevertheless had insisted that Japan had the ``right'' to obtain these ores and had been unpleasant about the matter.
Hoppenot stated that there was a clear relation between recent events in Europe and the changing attitude of the Japanese. Throughout the month of September it had seemed as if the Japanese attitude in the Far East and the German attitude in Central Europe had been synchronized. The British had noted this as well as the French. Hoppenot expressed the opinion that the only hope of preventing the situation in the Far East from steadily deteriorating would be for the United States to express its views strongly to Japan on the necessity of reasonable behaviour by the latter. I asked if he felt that French interests were menaced by this new Japanese invasion. He said that - he feared there would be difficulties concerning the French Concession at Canton and
also that the Japanese might seize Hainan. I asked what the French would do in this latter case. He said that France would protest. France would certainly not go to war with Japan over Hainan.
Hoppenot said that the Japanese had charged that shipments of war material to China were continuing to pass over the French railway in Indo-China. The French Government had replied that for the past two months not a single rifle had been carried on this railroad and had asked the Japanese Government to produce facts to substantiate its charges. The Japanese had insisted that shipments were going forward all the time and that it would be beside the point to present detailed information. I asked Hoppenot if it were really true that the French were not letting any shipments of war material go over the railway to Yunnan. Hoppenot said that this was absolutely true. I remarked that this was bad luck for the Chinese. He said that it was indeed bad luck but no matter how much the French might love the Chinese they could not risk war with Japan on their account.
I asked if the Russians were increasing their shipments of war materials to China. Hoppenot replied that they were. They also were sending large numbers of aviation instructors as well as a number of military experts to take the place of the German mission. With the cutting of the Canton-Hankow Railway, the shipment of Russian war material will have to be overland via Sinkiang since the Burma route is not yet in condition.
Wilson
From Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1938, Washington, 1954, Vol. 3, pp. 318-320.
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 12. __ALPHA_LVL1__ EXERPT FROM A LETTEROctober 17, 1938
Your conversations with representatives of the Opposition produce the impression that the latter is quite helpless. The imme-
66SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
67diate future evidently belongs to Chamberlain, unless Hitler and Mussolini really go too far. Indeed, if the. English and French were able previously to offer resistance but did not want to, the question now is whether they, having lost their positions, will be able to oppose, the onslaught of the aggressors even if they want to, and whether there really is any limit to their compliant attitude [...]
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 14. __ALPHA_LVL1__ EXCERPT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIETOctober 19, 1938
Today Beaverbrook told me the following:
1) Despite the experience of Munich and the criticism of the Munich Agreement in the. country, Chamberlain remains convinced that a European peace can be achieved through diplomatic negotiations with Hitler and.Mussolini, without resort to stronger measures. This is not surprising for Chamberlain is prepared to capitulate further to the aggressors, above all at the expense of third countries, and if it should prove unavoidable, even at the expense of the British Empire. Thus, according to Beaverbrook, the Premier is not considering any kind of resistance to German expansion in South-Eastern Europe and Turkey. On the contrary, he anticipates that the creation of "Middle Europe" will push Hitler into hostilities with the USSR. Chamberlain is, furthermore, ready to return to Germany her former colonies, perhaps with the exception of Tanganyika (which is of very great strategic importance for England) and South-West Africa (under Ihe mandate of the Union of South Africa, which has categorically refused to part with it). The Premier is inclined to compensate Germany for this with the Portuguese colony of Angola and a part of the Belgian Congo. Though the question of returning the colonies to Germany would arouse great concern in the country, particularly among the Conservatives, Beaverbrook feels, nonetheless, that Chamberlain would be in a position to carry through this operation. [...]
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 15. __ALPHA_LVL1__ TELEGRAM FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOROctober 20, 1938
Our Embassy in Rome has learned from an absolutely trustworthy source that the Anglo-Italian talks have been com-
From the archives.
Litvinov
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 13. __ALPHA_LVL1__ LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAROctober 19,1938
Bonnet's latest statement made during his conversation with you about unchanging relations and so forth has as little significance as the British and French statement that "they do not intend to exclude us from the solution of European questions." There is no reason why they should have such intentions, and it may well be that they do not have them, for it is not they who will be solving the questions, but Hitler, whom they are not going to oppose on this matter anyway. There is no doubt that for the sake .of reaching an agreement with Germany and Italy Chamberlain and Daladier-Bonnet will go to any lengths. Of course, it is not to their advantage to make a clean break with us right now, as they would then lose their trump card in negotiations with Berlin. They will turn to us only if no agreement can be wangled with Berlin and if the latter puts forward demands even they would find unacceptable.
From the archives.
Litvinov
68SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
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69pleted and that the question is to be submitted for Parliamentary approval early in November. Chamberlain has again capitulated by agreeing to mere withdrawal of the Italian wounded. Insistent attempts by London to secure further withdrawal of volunteers and the removal of materials and aircraft were of no avail. The Italians merely promised to give favourable consideration to those demands after ratification of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. From another source, friendly to Italy, we have learned that of the 9,000 evacuated Italians 6,000 are wounded, sick and generally unfit for service. The remaining 3,000 are said to have been insisting on their return to their, families. About 27,000 Italians and 6,000 Germans are to remain in Spain.
People's Commissar From the archives.
The preparations to be made by the Wehrmacht for this eventuality will be considerably less in extent than those for Operation "Green,"^^7^^ on the other hand, as planned mobilization measures will have to be dispensed with, they must guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness. The organization, order of battle, and degree of preparedness of the units earmarked for that purpose are to be prearranged in peace time for a surprise assault so that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The aim is the speedy occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations must be so made that the defense of the western frontier (Grenzsicherung West) can be carried out simultaneously.
The following are the individual tasks of the Army and Air Force:
A. Army
The units stationed near the Czech frontier and certain motorized formations are to be detailed for surprise attack. Their number will be determined by the forces left to Czechoslovakia; quick and decisive success must be assured. The deployment and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not required are to be kept in readiness in such a manner that they either can be used for securing the frontier or can follow up the attacking army.
B. Air Force
The rapid advance of our Army is to be assured by the early elimination of the Czech Air Force.
For this purpose the rapid move of the formations near the frontier from their peace stations is to be prepared. Whether even stronger forces will be required for this purpose can only be seen from the development of the military and political situation in Czechoslovakia.
In addition, the simultaneous deployment of the remainder of the offensive forces against the west must be prepared. [...]
Adolf Hitler Certified correct: Keitel*
From Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. IV, pp. 99-100.
__NUMERIC_LVL1__ No. 16. __ALPHA_LVL1__ EXCERPT FROM A DIRECTIVE BY THE REICHOctober 21, 1938
The future tasks of the Wehrmacht and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later directive.
Until this directive comes into force, the Wehrmacht must at all times be prepared for the following eventualities:
1. Securing the frontiers of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks.
2. Liquidation of the remainder of the Czech State.
3. The occupation of Memelland. *
LIQUIDATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE CZECH STATE
It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of the Czech State, should it pursue an anti-German policy.
* Klaipeda region.
Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces.
70SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
71No. 17.
TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
October 22, 1938
Today the Chinese Ambassador, Quo Tai-chi, came to see me and, probably under the fresh impressions of the defeat at Canton and the bad news from Hankow, began speaking in a rather panic-stricken way about the critical situation that has taken shape in China. Unless China was immediately rendered more effective support, he was afraid that the tendency towards ``peace'' among leading Chinese circles and among the broad masses of the Chinese people would prevail, and the Chinese Government would have to accept ``peace'' with Japan, with all the ensuing consequences. To this day the British had actually not moved a finger to help China. Throughout the duration of the war the Chinese had received from them only 36 aircraft of medium quality, plus a certain amount of ammunition and chemical products, all for cash payments. The Chinese Government had received not a penny from London even though the Chinese Government had in this regard brought pressure to bear on the British Government in every possible way open to it. France had acted and was acting no better. The USA was rendering assistance to China indirectly, through purchases of Chinese silver, through the unofficial ban on sales of aircraft to Japan, through sales of weapons and aircraft to China and so forth. This was valuable but insufficient. The only country that had been, and was seriously helping China with arms, aircraft and other things was the USSR. For this China was extremely grateful to us, especially sfnce our planes were first-rate. They were better than both the British ones and those that China was getting from the USA. Quo Tai-chi had heard such comments on more than one occasion, and coming from different quarters, the last time was from a recent visitor of his, the former Aide de Camp of the German General Falkenhausen who had worked for a long time as military adviser to Chiang-Kai-shek. * Nonetheless the situation in China had now become so critical that this was no longer
enough. Could we do something more effective? Were there no prospects for a new Hasan? In reply I said to Quo Tai-chi that the general line of our policy towards the Sino-Japanese war was known to him and that I had not heard of any changes in that line. Then Quo Tai-Chi castigated Munich and especially the British Government in very strong language, and began asking me whether the rumours being disseminated in the press and among political circles to the effect that the USSR was `` withdrawing'' from an active foreign policy and switching to a policy of isolation were true. I replied that the Soviet Governmefit was studying the situation that had come into being as a result of Munich and was in no hurry to draw conclusions. In any event, whatever conclusions the Soviet Government might in time arrive at, our friendly attitudes to China, which was fighting for its independence and freedom, would remain unchanged. Quo Tai-chi seemed to be somewhat reassured.
Ambassador
From the archives.
No. 18.
EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM
THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
October 25, 1938
[...] 2. What line is the Premier going to take? Once again, summarizing all the material in my possession, I am coming to the very definite conclusion that Chamberlain's "general line" will be aimed not at resistance but at a further retreat in the face of the aggressor. You already know of Chamberlain's capitulation to Mussolini on the Spanish question. No serious attempts by Chamberlain to oppose German expansion in South-Eastern Europe are to be expected. On the contrary, it was from his entourage that I heard this remark: "What sense is there in feeding a cow which Hitler will slaughter anyway?" Even on the question of colonies Chamberlain is taking a plainly, defeatist stand. I have already communicated to you Beaverbrook's opinion on this sub-
Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army and leader of the Kuomintang.
72SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
73ject. Since then I have obtained confirmation of this view from various sources. I know that Chamberlain has recently appointed a special committee to work out a plan, or plans, to meet Germany's colonial claims. It is still too early to speak of the committee's conclusions, but from what I have heard, the committee is thinking along the lines of the draft elaborated last autumn by Schacht and Goering in their conversation with Halifax during the latter's well-known meeting with Hitler. The essence of the draft is that Germany will create for herself an " African Empire" made up of Togo, Cameroons, Angola and most of the Belgian Congo. I do not know to what extent Hitler would now be content with such a gift, but this very draft is what his English benefactors have in mind at present. There is, of course, not the slightest doubt that, having obtained the colonies, Hitler will denounce the Anglo-German Naval Treaty^^3^^ (if he will not have done so before), but Chamberlain is prepared to capitulate on this point too, in the belief that a big navy is not built in a day and that at least in this field Great Britain is assured of an unquestionable advantage for a long time to come. The current theory in circles close to the Premier is that Germany is being ``truculent'' only because she has an "empty stomach". When that ``stomach'' becomes a bit fuller, Germany will quiet down. In this connection I recall that as early as last spring the well-known Horace Wilson, * who plays such an important role under Chamberlain, had intimated to me that with the formation of "Middle Europe" attenuating influences" would come into play, and that the belligerency of the German beast "must considerably abate." [...]
Ambassador of the USSR in
England
/. Maisky
No. 19.
LETTER FROM THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN GERMANY TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
POLAND
October 25, 1938
In a conversation on October 24, over a luncheon at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel* was present, M. von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of issues ... between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In exchange M, von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-- German frontiers. As a possible sphere for future co-operation between the two countries, the German Foreign Minister specified joint action in colonial matters and the emigration of Jews from Poland, and a joint policy towards Russia on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact.^^8^^ M. von Ribbentrop asked me to communicate his suggestions to you. He would like to discuss these matters with you, with my participation.
In my reply I referred him to the Chancellor's declaration on the Danzig question, made to me on November 5, 1937, and repeated to you in Berlin on January 14, 1938.
I also pointed to the importance of Danzig as a port to Poland, and repeated the Polish Government's principle of non-- interference in the internal life of the German population in the Free City, where complete self-government is established.
Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the substance of this conversation to you.
After the conversation M. von Ribbentrop invited me again to call on him and, mentioning the issue of the union of Sub-Carpa-
* Chief Industrial Adviser to the British Government.
* Permanent Liaison Officer of the German Foreign Ministry attached to the Reich Chancellor,
74SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
75thian Ruthenia with Hungary, put to me the question whether I was raising it with the German Government as a Polish postulate. He added that, if the Polish Government agreed to the German conception regarding Danzig and the Motor Road, the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia could be solved in accordance with Poland's attitude to the matter. I answered that my only task was to inform the German Government of Poland's attitude in regard to Hungary's postulate in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, as Poland had also done to the Italian Government.
has not yet spoken up) is explained by fears of losing the Socialists and finding themselves in the embraces of the Rightists alone.
Yesterday I saw Mandel*. He is now in a far less rebellious mood than before. He is inclined to place a certain share of the blame for the capitulation on the Czechs themselves. That the Czechs would surrender without a struggle was something "he had not expected". In his thinking he had proceeded from the certainty that the Czechs would fight and thereby thwart the Chamberlain-Bonnet game. To begin now to restore what had been lost and to revive the system of collective security would not be easy. This would in any event require the most "radical internal political measures" (he did not say what kind).
As far as he knows, Francois-Poncet** has brought back no concrete proposal from Hitler. So far nothing more than probing and generating a "favourable atmosphere" is under way. At the moment the question of the colonies is next on the list. Here the Rightists will be against concessions, but the Socialists may give in.
From the military point of view the most vulnerable colonies are Tunis and Indo-China. As regards the Far East, the experts differ in their opinions. Some still believe the war will be a protracted one, but the majority feel that the Japanese will soon come to terms with the Chinese ("the moderates who have strengthened their positions there") and will then most likely set upon the USSR. As for Spain, Mandel does not doubt that preparations are afoot to recognize Franco and that the first result of Fran£ oisPoncet's appearance in Rome will be the complete blockage of transit.
From Official Documents Concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations. 1933-1939, London, 1939, pp. 47-48.
No. 20.
TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
October29,1938
After Daladier's speech^^9^^ there is no longer any doubt that he is determined to come to terms with Germany and that to achieve that aim he is prepared to sacrifice the last vestige of collective' security and the Mutual Assistance Pacts. This is clearly evidenced not only by his passionate appeals to Germany but also by his statement that the objective of France's foreign policy should be confined to protecting "her own national interests". This is exactly what Hitler has been striving for all along, in proposing direct negotiations and bilateral agreements. The domestic policy appears to^be in full keeping with such a foreign policy line: the Popular Front must be done away with, war must be declared on the Communists, the Parliamentary majority must be altered and the workers must be rigidly held in check. The timid opposition put up in Marseilles by the Left-wing (Herriot*
Ambassador
From the archives.
President of French Chamber of Deputies.
* French Minister for Colonies. ** French Ambassador in Germany (1931-38) and in Italy (1938-40).
76SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
77No. 21.
LETTER FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
GERMANY
October 31, 1938
Subject: The British Government's intentions regarding the commencement of talks with Germany.
Thanks to invitations for the last two week ends I have had the opportunity of having detailed exchanges of views with two members of the Cabinet---the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, and the Minister of Transport, Burgin; these conversations were supplemented by conversations with other people in political life closely acquainted with the Prime Minister. I draw from this the following picture of the attitude of the British Government towards Germany:
I
Chamberlain has complete confidence in the Fiihrer. The taking over of the Sudeten-German territories without a hitch and the demobilization of the German Army have strengthened his conviction that the course he took, leading up to the Munich decisions, was the proper one. Now Chamberlain intends to take new steps shortly to bring about a settlement with Germany. As a result of the settlement of the Czech-Sudeten-German problem and also of the Fiihrer's declaration that Germany had no further territorial claims to enforce in Europe, basic obstacles in the way of an Anglo-German settlement had also, in his view, been simultaneously removed. The Munich protocol* had laid the foundation for a reshaping of Anglo-German relations. A lasting rapprochement between the two countries is regarded by Chamberlain and the British Cabinet as one of the chief aims of British foreign policy, because world peace can be secured in the most effective manner by this combination.
In the opinion of authoritative political circles, to which Sir Samuel Hoare also gave expression, no time is so favourable as
the present one for bringing about such a settlement; in Chamberlain the British Government possesses a statesman for whom the attainment of the objective of an Anglo-German rapprochement was simultaneously dictated by the head and by the heart. As a result of the part which Chamberlain had played in the September crisis, his position was extraordinarily strong among the British public. The Conservative majority was unassailed. A general election to be held in the not too distant future would stabilize it for a number of years. The present mood of the public was favourable for an Anglo-German settlement, despite the intrigues of the Opposition which are conditioned by domestic politics.
From the mood prevailing in Government circles it can be expected that Chamberlain will shortly make proposals to the Fiihrer for a continuation of the policy initiated at Munich.
II
For such talks, agreements on the armaments question and the humanizing of war are to be regarded as those subjects which interest the British most. In particular, an exchange of views on questions of air warfare is naturally regarded as urgent here. What questions are to be put forward in detail cannot be established at present with complete certainty. One thing only is certain, namely, that the ministries concerned are at present occupied in examining the proposals which might be submitted to the German Government.
According to statements made to me by Sir Samuel Hoare, they will apparently involve two sets of subjects:
(1) Questions of humanizing air warfare (ban on poison gas and bombing of cities).
(2) Discussions on compiling definite guiding rules for the construction of bomber aircraft with a view to opposing the excessive extension of their range caused by technical progress.
Sir Samuel Hoare stated in this connection that during his 7 years as Air Minister he had been able to observe how technical progress had tended to slip from human control.
The great difficulties facing German agreement to quantitave limitation are appreciated here. Britain therefore understands that all discussions on limiting air armaments will have to be carried out with Germany simultaneously keeping an eye on Soviet air power. At least, in answer to my statements regarding this, Sir
* See Document No. 2.
78SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
79Samuel Hoare let slip the observation that, after a further rapprochement between the four European Great Powers, the acceptance of certain defense obligations, or even a guarantee by them against Soviet Russia, was conceivable in the event of an attack by Soviet Russia.
formerly German East Africa for the time being still meets with strong opposition in certain circles; matters are not substantially different in the case of German Southwest Africa.
IV
Consideration is likewise being given here to the technical implementation of the discussions envisaged with Germany. Chamberlain is considering the question whether he should make proposals for such discussions at once or whether it would be more expedient to wait until the German Government has completely settled the urgent domestic and foreign problems which have arisen through the cession of the Sudeten-German territories to the Reich and the reorganization of Czechoslovakia's relations with her neighbors.
This much can be regarded as certain concerning the general attitude of Chamberlain or of the British Cabinet: for the British Government a satisfactory solution of the armaments question, which would allow it in particular to save face at home, is the starting point for the negotiations vis-a-vis the public; the British Government would prefer to reach its objectives by means of direct and bilateral discussions with Germany. If these direct bilateral Anglo-German discussions should not lead to this objective, the attempt would probably be made from the British side to include Italy and France in quadripartite negotiations.
HI
The colonial question was not broached in my conversations with official personages. From information I have received from friendly persons about the attitude of Chamberlain and other members of the Cabinet towards this question and from the treatment of the colonial question in the press here, the general attitude of the British Government can nevertheless be established with certainty.
The British Government is fully aware that satisfaction of Germany's legitimate colonial claims is a prerequisite for a complete Anglo-German settlement. It is even possible that it will take the initiative. The press, too, is already discussing the colonial problem in detail.
Reports from the City point to equally intense preoccupation with the colonial problem and here they are concerned with the question how Germany could pay compensation for capital invested in our former colonies since the end of the war; the heavy fall in many gold shares is likewise to be traced back to the discussion of the colonial question. The fact also deserves to be emphasized that anxiety about colonial demands by Poland prevents a positive attitude from being adopted towards our colonial claims.
It is pointed out in political circles that a thorough and lengthy preparation of British press and public opinion is a prerequisite for a favourable settlement of the colonial question; in contrast to the leading political circles (Parliament, etc.) the average elector does not correctly understand the cession of overseas territories under British rule. There is a certain unmistakable tendency in the press to draw attention to impending changes of territory by pointing out the difference between colonies and those mandated territories ceded to Britain for temporary trusteeship only. They have already gone so far as to recognize Germany's theoretical claim to the removal of the degrading terms of the dictated Treaty of Versailles and to the return of the whole of her colonial ppssessions; in actual practice, the demand for the return of what was
I confined myself for the most part to listening when the arguments described above were discussed. To statements on the question of the limitation of armaments, I replied on the lines of the guiding principles laid down by the Fiihrer. Whenever I was asked about the colonial question, I expressly pointed out that, as a logical consequence of the shameful provision of the dictated Treaty of Versailles, Germany's claims to their return included the total extent of her former colonies.
v. Dirksen
From Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. IV, pp. 319-323.
80SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
81No. 22. EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM
THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
TO THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN THE USA
withstood even the shortest of wars---even against Czechoslovakia alone. Without any prompting on my part Skrach drew the conclusion that Czechoslovakia had been sacrificed precisely because all the participants in that tragedy were horribly afraid of the collapse of the Hitlerite regime, afraid of perishing under the ruins of that colossus, afraid of the inevitable revolution which would then have affected not only France but also Britain, and the whole of Europe for that matter. According to Skrach's information, it was only for the benefit of the outside world that Hitler was assuming a strident tone and an arrogant stance. In conversations with Chamberlain he had allegedly put it to the former quite bluntly that it was not only war that would signify an early social revolution, but that a mere setback for Hitler would, in the final analysis and in the very near future, lead to the collapse of the National-Socialist system and to the triumph of Bolshevism in Europe. This had allegedly coincided with Chamberlain's assess• ment: hence his zeal in saving Hitler and his regime. Skrach is certain that France, as well as the ruling upper crust in Czechoslovakia herself, had been quickly led to the same conviction. The French betrayal is therefore understandable and natural, and it is also beyond question that there was the betrayal inside Czechoslovakia. In terms of socio-political groupings it is quite clear who had directly inspired that betrayal and who had perpetrated it. These were the Agrarian Party, the Right-wing of the People's Socialists and undoubtedly some of the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party. The purely fascist groupings probably did not-take part since their role was negligible and they were remote from the affairs of government. Skrach does not directly suspect Benes but he is strongly suspicious of Benes's closest associates. [...]
Ambassador of the USSR in Czechoslovakia
Alexandrovsky From the archives.
November 14,1938
[...] We shall be marking the fifth anniversary of the establishment of relations in a very modest way in our press. It is difficult to comment on the significance of that event without mentioning the reasons why there is no desired political effect. And those reasons are to be found in the complete passivity of the American Government which has in fact long been practising Isolationism. Despite its President's Sermons on the Mount about peace, America cannot deny her share of responsibility for the present international situation. f...l
From the archives.
Litvinov
No. 23.
EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
November 17, 1938
[.-..] Referring to his ties with the Sudeten Germans and through them with the democratically-minded Germany, Skrach* repeatedly assured me that he regarded Czechoslovakia's capitulation as the greatest of misfortunes precisely because the Hitlerite regime in Germany was thoroughly rotten and would not have
* Chief custodian of the personal papers of the former President of Czechoslovakia, T. Masaryk.
82SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
83No. 24.
MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE COUNSELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN POLAND* AND THE VICE-DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE POLISH MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
November 18,1938
Kobylanski said: "The Minister cannot speak as openly as I can. The question of Carpathian Ruthenia is of decisive significance for us. You see the unrest this question has stirred up in our Ukrainian regions. We have been suppressing and will go on suppressing that unrest. Do not make it impossible for. us to pursue our policy. If Carpathian Ruthenia is incorporated into Hungary, Poland would agree subsequently to join forces with Germany in a campaign against the Soviet Ukraine. But if Carpathian Ruthenia remains a hotbed of unrest, you will be making such action impossible for us. Understand what this means!''
From the archives.
me that we should be addressing that question to England and France: how did they perceive the consequences of the Agreement? Payart then said that he approached me not on instructions from his Government but in a personal capacity. Since he considered himself an advocate of collective security he wanted to know whether 1 still believed a collective security policy was possible. To this I said the following.
We consider the Munich Agreement to be an international misfortune. England and France will now hardly succeed in retreating from the policy they have charted which amounts to the unilateral satisfaction of the demands of all three aggressors, Germany, Italy and Japan. They will present their claims in turn, and England and France will offer them one concession after another. I believe, however, that they will reach the point where the peoples of England and France would have to stop them. Then they will probably have to return to the old path of collective security, for there is no other way to organize the peace. England and France will certainly come out of this greatly weakened, but even then the potential forces of peace will be superior to the potential forces of aggression.
To Payart's question whether I felt it possible to get Poland and Rumania also to join in such a collective security policy I replied that at present this would hardly be possible, particularly in so far as Poland was concerned, for she, and to a lesser extent Rumania, were especially mistrustful of English and French policy. First, the Great Powers must unite, and when they proved by deeds their ability to pursue a firm and consistent policy, other countries would begin to group around them and US support would be assured.
Payart declared that in his view we ought to be interested in seeing a strong French Government, even a Right-wing and antiSoviet one, for only such a government could offer resistance to an aggressor. This, however, was not in line with the Comintern Manifesto in which he discerned an appeal for the overthrow of the present Governments of England and France. At this point he showed me the relevant passage in the Communist International, where it is indeed proposed that governments of treachery and betrayal be overthrown. I remarked to Payart that if the Chamberlain and Daladier Governments identified themselves with the definition in the Manifesto, they could have a grudge against the Comintern. We, however, were not responsible for the Comintern.
No. 25.
MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN
THE USSR
November 20, 1938
Payart asked me what I thought of the present international situation and its future development. I replied that the new situation had been created by the Munich Agreement, and it seemed to
* Rudolf von Scheliah, Counsellor of the German Embassy in Warsaw. Born into a well-known aristocratic family, he detested Hitler and the Nazis, regarding them as upstarts. He supplied information about Germany's aggressive plans to a German businessman whom he took for an intelligence agent of a Western country but who in reality transmitted the information to Soviet military intelligence (Pravda, July 1, 1967).
84SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
85The Comintern and the Soviet state had certain parallel interests but they were not connected. I could not imagine a French Government declaring itself to be strong (such declarations were meaningless) and being believed by others to be strong unless it had the support of friends. France alone could not resist the onslaught of Germany, Italy and Japan. I did not think, therefore, that an anti-Soviet government would create the impression of strength. I likewise doubted whether in democratic countries a government could be strong if it were opposed by the working class.
Payart thanked me for the clarification of views and expressed agreement with my remarks. I do not think, however, that in his heart he really agreed with me.
In his conversation with me Bullitt displayed considerable pessimism, declaring that the spring of 1939 would undoubtedly again be very troublesome and that the situation would be aggravated by the constant likelihood of war and threats from Germany and by the complexity of European relations. He agreed with me that the gravity centre of the European problem had shifted from the West to the East, for the capitulation of the democratic states at Munich had revealed their weakness vis-- avis the German Reich.
Then Bullitt told me of Great Britain's complete unpreparedness for war and of the impossibility of gearing British industry to the mass production of war material, especially aircraft. As regards the French army, he referred to it with great enthusiasm, adding, however, that the French air force was obsolete. To judge from what the military experts had told Bullitt during the crisis of last September, the war would last at least six years and, in their view, it would end with the complete disintegration of Europe and the triumph of Communism in all states, which ultimately Soviet Russia would doubtless take advantage of.
As regards Soviet Russia, Bullitt spoke of it with disdain, pointing out that the latest purges, particularly the removal of Blyukher* had brought about complete disorganization in the Red Army, which was incapable of any active military operations. In general, he said, Russia was at present "the sick man of Europe" and he compared it to the pre-war Ottoman State.
Of the German Reich and Chancellor Hitler he was sharply critical and spoke with great abhorrence saying that only the use of force and, ultimately, war could stop the frenzied expansion of Germany in the future.
When I asked him how he saw that future war he replied that, first of all, the United States, France and England should quickly rearm to counter Germany's might. Only when the proper moment had come, Bullitt continued, should decisive action be taken.
I asked him how that decisive action could be launched if, say, Germany did not first attack England and France, and [I said]
From the archives.
Litvinov
No. 26.
LETTER FROM THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN THE USA TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
POLAND
November 21,193 8
The day before yesterday I had a long talk with Ambassador Bullitt who is spending his vacation here.
At the start of our conversation he told me he had established very cordial relations with our Ambassador in Paris, Lukasiewicz, and that he was always glad to see him.
Bullitt had regularly informed President Roosevelt about the international situation in Europe and particularly about Soviet Russia, and President Roosevelt as well as the State Department had treated his reports with great attention. Bullitt is a very colourful and interesting raconteur, for during the conversation he takes into account all aspects of the complex European problems, but, as a rule, his conclusions are negative; his attitude to European events reflects the opinion of a journalist rather than that of a politician.
Marshal of the Soviet Union and commander of the Special Far Eastern
Army.
86SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
87that in that case I simply could not see the starting point of that entire combination.
Bullitt replied that the democratic states would undoubtedly need at least another two years to rearm themselves completely. In the meantime the German Reich would probably direct its expansionist drive towards the East, and for the democratic states it would be desirable that there, in the East, matters should reach the point of war between the German Reich and Russia. Although the potential strength of the Soviets at present was still unknown, it was quite likely that, operating far from its bases, Germany would be compelled to wage a protracted and exhausting war. Only then, said Bullitt, could the democratic states attack Germany and force her to capitulate.
To my question whether the United States would take an active part in such a war he replied that there was no doubt about it, but only after England and France had acted first. Public opinion in the United States, he said, was so strongly opposed to Nazism and Hitler that already then American society was overcome by the same psychosis as in 1917, just before the United States declared war on Germany.
Then Bullitt asked about Poland and about our situation in Eastern Europe. He agreed that Poland was another state that .would take up armed resistance should Germany violate its borders. "I fully understand," he said, "the problem of having a common frontier with Hungary. The Hungarians are also a courageous people, and if they acted jointly with Yugoslavia, a solution to the question of defence against German expansion would be considerably facilitated.''
Then Bullitt spoke of the Ukrainian problem and of German encroachments on the Ukraine. He asserted that Germany had a fully prepared and manned Ukrainian Staff which in future was to assume power in the Ukraine and establish an independent Ukrainian state under the aegis of Germany. Such a Ukraine, Bullitt continued, would, of course, pose a great danger for Poland since it would have a direct influence on the Ukrainians in Eastern Poland. "Even today," he said, "German propaganda is being conducted completely along Ukrainian nationalistic lines. The base for all these actions in the future is to be Ruthenia in whose existence Germany is doubtless interested mainly from the strategic point of view.''
Bullitt showed himself to be not particularly well informed
about the situation in Eastern Europe and his thoughts on the subject were superficial.
Ambassador of the Polish Republic Jerzy Potocki
From the achives.
Published in Polnishe Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges,
Auswartiges Amt, Erste Folge, Berlin, 140, S. 8-9.
No. 27.
MEMORANDUM TRANSMITTED BY THE HUNGARIAN
LEGATION IN GERMANY TO THE MINISTRY FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GERMANY
November 21,1938
The basic principle of Hungarian foreign policy since the formation of the Berlin-Rome Axis^^10^^ has always been association with this Axis, and in the implementation of the Vienna Award this association is assuming an even more complete form.
On the basis of this consideration the Hungarian Government deems it necessary for the purpose of strengthening its relations with the German Reich to enter into negotiations with the Reich Government in both the political and the economic fields.
As far as political questions are concerned, the Hungarian Government has in mind first of all the common fight against Bolshevism. Hungary was perhaps the first state which never deviated from its course in the fight against Communism and which was never open to any sort of settlement or compromise with Bolshevism.
The anti-Bolshevist attitude of the Axis Powers has always found understanding and approval among us, and if the Axis Powers consider it important, we should be prepared to adhere to the Anti-Comientern Pact.^^6^^
In the economic field there are new possibilities, and Hungary, which has carried on a considerable part of her foreign trade with the Axis Powers in the past, too, would be prepared not only to cultivate economic relations still further, but to intensify and give
oo
SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
them greater stability and develop them practically in a mutually complementary way.
We believe that in this manner we should come closer to the goal of consolidating our relations with the Axis Powers and thereby creating a situation which would be well adapted to serve the interests of the Axis Powers as well as those of Hungary.
From Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. V, pp. 336-337.
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
89follows. He was touched by the attitude of the USSR to Turkey's national grief^^11^^ and to his own election as President of the Republic. In letting us know of his appreciation, he noted that he attached exceptional significance to our reaffirmation of the invariability of Soviet-Turkish friendship, which he had regarded and continued to regard as the basis of Turkey's foreign policy. He would instruct Sarajoglu to report my statement to the Council of Ministers and it would doubtless give the Turkish people a feeling of calm confidence in the immutability of friendship between the USSR and Turkey which had already waged a joint struggle against foreign interventionists. Such confidence was particularly necessary in the present tense situation which was threatening the world with great upheavals. Inonu assured us that if those upheavals broke out, Turkey would never be in the camp hostile to the USSR. If an attempt was made to attack the USSR, Turkey would bar the aggressor's way on its side and would not let him through to our frontiers. Inonu declared this most explicitly and requested that his statement be brought to the atteniton of the Soviet Government. On more than one occasion the Turkish Government had asked itself whether the treaty relations existing between the USSR and Turkey should not be broadened. At present Inonu believed that those relations, which had withstood the test of almost twenty years' time, were stronger and more reliable than treaties such as the USSR had with Czechoslovakia or France. Turkish-Soviet relations were more than friendly. They were in effect an alliance of the USSR and Turkey. The significance of that alliance was in no way lessened by the fact that Turkey used the resources of imperialist countries which offered credits, provided her with arms and supplied her industry with equipment. This did not impose any political obligations on Turkey. To this day neither England nor Germany had by a single word attempted to draw Turkey into their foreign policy orbit or to wrest Turkey away from the USSR. They knew only too well that this was impossible. If, however, anyone were to try and lead Turkey onto that path, the Turkish Government would most vigorously declare that this it would never accept. Inonu wanted the Soviet Government to know this and to believe his word which was weighed, considered and firm. The Soviet Government itself had maintained and continued to maintain economic relations with countries hostile to it. This Turkey was doing, too, for the sake of strengthening herself in the economic and, particularly,
No. 28.
TELEGRAM FROM THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR
Ankara, November 24,1938
Yesterday I talked with Inonu* in the presence of Terentiev and Sarajoglu**. The conversation lasted about an hour and a half. I began by reminding Inonu of the invariability of the foreign policy of the USSR which steadfastly strove for peace and actively supported any initiative aimed at securing that peace and impeding attempts by aggressors to violate it, and which has victoriously rebuffed all encroachments on its rights and interests, and showed the entire world an example of loyalty to treaty obligations. Illustrating what I said with facts, notably from the sphere of our relationships with Czechoslovakia and Japan, I told Inonu that Turkey could rest assured of the invariability of our friendship. For our part we too saw in Inonu's election as President of the Turkish Republic genuine guarantees of the stability of Turkey's friendly co-operation with the USSR in future. Nonetheless in the present situation, which was giving rise to the danger of major upheavals and causing a realignment of international forces, it would be useful for us to know how Inonu himself regarded future Soviet-Turkish relations.
Inonu responded with a lengthy statement whose gist was as
President of Turkey.
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey.
90SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
91the military field. The Turkish Government would prefer to use the resources of the USSR alone for that purpose. It was hoping that the Soviet Government would be quite objective and would understand the position of Turkey which was compelled to seek the means to strengthen herself everywhere. Considering the close friendship between the USSR and Turkey, the Soviet Union could not be indifferent to the strengthening of the latter. Inonu regarded mutual confidence as the basis of that friendship. Whenever doubts or misunderstandings arose between the USSR and Turkey it was necessary immediately to remove them through frank and forthright discussions. Turning to the domestip situation in Turkey, Inonu wished to inform the Soviet Government that there was complete order in the country, and that the Turkish Government would never forget that it had itself been created by the people in a great national revolution. In conclusion Inonu very cordially requested us to convey his greetings to the Soviet leaders and to assure them that the friendly welcome accorded to him in the USSR would forever remain in his memory.
the last two months taken no part whatever in resolving the fate of Czechoslovakia. Germany and Italy have been given complete freedom of action in determining the boundaries of Czechoslovakia, her economic policy, her internal regime and so forth. Official circles here make no more mention of England and France guaranteeing Czechoslovakia's boundaries. It is my impression that Chamberlain is laying the groundwork for a refusal to fulfil that obligation and is merely seeking a suitable form in which to do so. [...]
Ambassador of the USSR in Britain
/. Maisky
From the archives.
No. 30.
MEMORANDUM OF THE GENERAL STAFF
OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES---"NOTES FOR
WEHRMACHTS DISCUSSIONS WITH ITALY"
November 26, 1938
1. Nature of Negotiations
Negotiations will be initiated by the Reich Foreign Minister in conjunction with the Chief of Staff of OKW. The further negotiations to be conducted by the Wehrmacht departments except in the case of questions which are being dealt with by the OKW [text illegible] in OKW (cf. paragraph 5).
2. Basic Principle of the Negotiations
No local joint warfare under unified command but allocation of special tasks and theatres of war for each state, within which areas it will act independently.
3. Military-Political Basis for the Negotiations
War by Germany and Italy against France and Britain, with the object first of knocking out France. That would also hit Britain, as she would lose her bases for carrying on the war on the Continent and would then find the whole power of Germany and Italy directed against herself alone.
Combined with:
Strict neutrality of Switzerland, Belgium and Holland.
From the archives.
Potemkin
No. 29.
EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN TO THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
November 25, 1938
[...] After Munich it is becoming ever more plain that Chamberlain's main objective is not a genuine "Four-Power Pact", but a "Two-Power Pact" (England and Germany) formally decked out as a "Four-Power Pact". In accordance with Chamberlain's ``philosophy'', France and Italy must from now on merely play the part of "junior partners" under Great Britain and Germany.
For the time being, however, Chamberlain is seeking to clear the ground for his future ``appeasement'' measures and to do all he can to win Hitler's goodwill. It is most significant, for instance, that despite the Munich decisions England (and France) has in
92SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
93Benevolent neutrality towards Germany and Italy: Hungary
and Spain. Doubtful attitude: Balkans and Poland.
Hostile attitude towards Germany and Italy: Russia.
The non-European powers can be left out of the picture at the
beginning.
4. Outline of Allocation o"f Tasks
(a) Germany
General. Concentrate all land, sea, and air forces on the western front.
By strict observance of Belgian and Dutch neutrality the extension of this front would be prevented and the enemy probably also compelled to observe the neutrality of those countries.
War on Land. Concentrated German attack against France between the Moselle and the Rhine in a southwesterly direction, the eastern flank on the western escarpment of the Vosges.
(Break-through of Maginot Line perfectly possible. Proved by experimental bombardment of the Czech fortifications, which are modeled on the Maginot Line. We have available the most modern means of attack and long-range artillery with armoured protection within our own fortifications. Reasons for this opinion will be given orally in greater detail.)
War at Sea. Action against the British and French sea communications in the North Sea and the Atlantic. Details as to the definition of the limits of naval theatres of war and questions of mutual assistance (supplementing of fuel and equipment, dockyards, etc.) will be matters for decision in the discussions between the two navies.
War in the Air. Simultaneous offensive air warfare against Britain and northern France. Cutting off of British sea communications in collaboration with the Navy.
(b) Italy
General. Maintenance of Balkan neutrality (common supply base), increase of pressure of Spain, occupation of Balearic Islands (no passage for troops or aircraft by France). Threaten British and French spheres of influence in North Africa, Egypt, Palestine, and the East. Active encouragement of the insurgent movement in Morocco. By a concentration of all these means, to disperse the British naval and air war effort.
War on Land. Tying down of largest possible French forces on the Italian Alpine front.
Prevention of threat to Germany on her eastern and southeastern frontier by sending Italian forces (in conjunction with Hungarian forces) against Poland, if the latter adopts a threatening attitude.
Attack against French North Africa and capture of Corsica.
War at Sea. Operations against the British and French sea communications in the Mediterranean, especially against France's communications with North Africa. Elimination of Gibraltar. Regarding delimitation of naval theatres of war, see 4(a).
War in the Air. Air war against France south of the line from Lake Geneva to La Rochelle, against the North African colonies, and the French sea communications in the Mediterranean. 5. Wehrmacht Questions in General
(a) Participation by Italy in all active and passive defense measures by Germany.
(b) Exchange of intelligence between departments of the armed forces.
(c) Participation by Italy in war censorship as regards foreign countries.
(d) Collaboration in propaganda warfare and economic warfare.
(e) Collaboration in the sphere of raw materials and armament production.
(f) Collaboration in the sphere of communications.
From Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. IV, pp. 530-532.
No. 31. TASS COMMUNIQUE ON SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS
November 27,1938
A series of conversations recently held between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Litvinov, and the
94SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
95Ambassador of the Polish Republic, M. Grzybowski, has revealed that:
1. Relations between the Polish Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics remain founded as hitherto on all the existing treaties in their full scope, including the Non-Aggression Pact signed in 1932; this Pact, concluded for five years and extended until 1945, has a sufficiently broad basis, guaranteeing the inviolability of peaceful relations between the two states.
2. Both Governments will take a favourable attitude to the expansion of mutual trade.
3. Both Governments are agreed as to the necessity of a positive settlement of several current questions arising out of their mutual treaty obligations and in particular of questions still outstanding, and of the liquidation of the frontier incidents that have occurred recently.
From Izvestia, No. 275 (6742), November 27, 1938.
participation in European politics is needless. Today as before it upholds that view. For that matter, the Soviet-Polish Declaration was issued on a Soviet initiative.
From the archives.
No. 33.
EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN
December 4, 1938
1. I was glad to see from your last report that you are not overrating the successes of the English Opposition. The outcome of the by-elections indicates that in the event of new elections at the present moment we could expect merely a reduction in the votes for, and in the number of, pro-Chamberlain members, but on no account the defeat of Chamberlain. Even the ami-Jewish pogroms, despite the emotions they have aroused in England, would not have changed those results. The aforementioned emotions are undoubtedly of a temporary nature and will soon subside.
The further implementation of Chamberlain's appeasement plans could be impeded only by France, if, having strengthened herself with a German-French Declaration, she wanted to put up serious opposition to the Italian aggression and if she were to resolutely resist the granting to Franco of belligerent rights. It would be too optimistic to count on that, however. The French will, most likely, yield on the Spanish question too, in exchange for a temporary suspension of Italian agitation in respect of Savoy, Corsica, etc.
2. I trust you are under no illusions about Anglo-Soviet relations and that you are not overrating the significance of the favourable attitude of Government members to your luncheon invitations. It is frequently the case that attempts are made to compensate a substantial covert deterioration of relations by minor overt manifestations of correctness, which is taking place in this case too.
3. A new rise of tension in our relations with Japan may be expected in the very near future. Although she could hardly have
No. 32.
COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE PRESS DEPARTMENT
OF THE POLISH MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO
GERMAN CORRESPONDENTS IN POLAND
November 28, 1938
The following comments are of a confidential nature and they are being issued only to German correspondents. They are to be used without reference to the source.
In the last months tension between Poland and the Soviet Union rose to a level of which the public could not have been fully aware since it had been preoccupied with the Czechoslovak crisis. Signs of dangerous tension in Soviet-Polish relations were to be found in Litvinov's statement to Grzybowski in September^^12^^ and the large-scale concentration of Russian troops on Poland's eastern border. The Polish-Soviet Declaration * just published is aimed merely at normalizing relations. In her foreign policy Poland has always been of the view that the Soviet Union's
See Document No. 31.
96SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
97DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
hoped that a new fishing convention would be signed, she was evidently certain nonetheless that we would at least, as in the previous two years, extend the existing temporary agreement for another year. A day or two ago, however, I said to the Japanese Ambassador that we would refuse even to begin negotiations about a new fishing convention until Japan fulfilled her guarantee in respect of Manchukuo's payment for the Chinese Eastern Railway. I intimated to him, however, that we would be prepared at best to conclude an agreement for one year but on new terms, namely by putting sections up for sale, though we were excluding about forty sections completely from Japanese exploitation for strategic and fishery protection considerations. You are probably aware of the role played in our relations with Japan by the fisheries question, and you could therefore imagine her reaction to our statement.
Incidentally, Goering recently told the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, that there would be no peace in Europe and that in German-English relations there could only be a step forward and a step backwards, but that in the final analysis the interests of the two countries could not be harmonized. From this Goering drew the conclusion that it was necessary to achieve further rapprochement among Germany, Japan and Italy and expressed regret over Mussolini's vacillation. [...]
Litvinov
From the archives.
elements of the consolidation of the situation in Europe and of the preservation of general peace. Consequently both Governments will endeavour with all their might to assure the development of the relations between their countries in this direction.
2. Both Governments agree that no question of a territorial nature remains in suspense between their countries and solemnly recognize as permanent the frontier between their countries as it is actually drawn.
3. Both Governments are resolved, without prejudice to their special relations with third Powers, to remain in contact on all questions of importance to both their countries and to have recourse to mutual consultation in case any complications arising out of these questions should threaten to lead to international difficulties.
In witness whereof the Representatives of the two Governments have signed the present Declaration, which comes into force immediately.
Executed in duplicate in the French and German languages at Paris, on December 6,1938.
Georges Bonnet Joachim von. Ribbentrop From the archives.
No. 35.
MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN AND LLOYD
GEORGE
December 6,1938
On December 6 Lloyd George invited me for lunch at Parliament. As always, he was brilliant, witty and interesting. He talked mostly about Hitler's future plans. In Lloyd George's opinion, Hitler is bound to act soon. But where, in what direction? The colonies? Right now that is out of the question. The whole of Britain would rise, as one man, against the cession of colonies to Germany. The same goes for France. Switzerland? Not likely, for it is a mountainous and, in itself, a poor country, with unfertile soil, and devoid of valuable minerals. It is far more likely, there-
No. 34. FRANCO-GERMAN DECLARATION^^13^^
December 6, 1938
M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, and M. Joachim von Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Reich, acting in the name and by order of their respective Governments, have agreed on the following points at their meeting in Paris on December 6, 1938:
1. The French Government and the German Government fully share the conviction that pacific and neighbourly relations between France and Germany constitute one of the essential
98SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
99fore, that Hitler will turn to the East. Where exactly? Lloyd George believes that Lithuania (Memel) is far too small a job for Hitler (though of course he will take Memel too). Poland is another matter. In the last months Polish-German relations have deteriorated considerably. Not for nothing is Poland now trying to improve her relations with the USSR. Hitler's plan boils down to taking back the ``Corridor'' and Silesia and wresting from Poland her Ukrainian part, uniting the latter with Subcarpathian Ukraine and turning both into a vassal Ukrainian state of the Czechoslovak type. Such is the immediate task. In the more distant future Hitler may perhaps contemplate action against the Soviet Ukraine, but just now he will not risk it. He is not strong enough. His army is far from being as excellent as it is thought to be. There is great discontent in the country. In this connection Lloyd George was interested in our views concerning the European situation. In particular, he was preoccupied with this question: would we calmly watch Hitler carry out his Polish plan or intervene in one way or another in the course of events? I evaded making any predictions, stating that the principal line of our foreign policy was sufficiently well known to Lloyd George, while its application in this or that specific case depended on a great many circumstances which it was difficult to take into account in advance.
attitude to Chamberlain's policy. He was particularly indignant over the Premier's forthcoming visit to Rome which will take place despite the aggravation of Franco-Italian relations. He was inclined to believe that the Tunis claim was serious and that Mussolini would insist on it. Having once begun such agitation he would have to go further and further for considerations of prestige if for no other reason. It was known furthermore that Mussolini had long since been clamouring for a ``prize'' for the assistance he had rendered Hitler on the Austrian and Czechoslovak questions. Perhaps the moment for the presentation of the Tunis claim did not fully coincide with Hitler's plans, but that was a minor point. Essentially, Hitler would of course support Mussolini. At the same time Vansittart noted that neither England nor France would agree to the transfer of any colonies to Hitler or Mussolini. Most of all Vansittart was concerned over what Hitler was going to do in 1939. According to his information, Hitler did not intend to rest on his laurels for very long. In the coming months he might be expected to launch some new campaign. In which direction? According to Vansittart, a widespread view among British government circles was that Hitler would strike the next blow in the East, specifically, against the Soviet Ukraine. He personally had not yet reached a definite conclusion on this question. Here Vansittart began asking me about our views on the subject. I described our position in detail. Vansittart expressed satisfaction over the improvement of Polish-Soviet relations and emphasized the importance of improving relations with Rumania. At the end of our talk he came to the conclusion that the government position probably required serious revision. Vansittart asked me to call on him in a day or two, when he would be better familiarized with the state of affairs, for an exchange of views on current questions.
From the archives.
Ambassador of the USSR in England
/. Maisky
No. 36.
MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRITAIN AND THE CHIEF DIPLOMATIC ADVISER TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN
SECRETARY
December 8,1938
On December 8, Vansittart and his wife had lunch with us. They had only just returned from a six-weeks' holiday in the south of France. Vansittart made no secret of his sharply critical
Ambassador of the USSR in Britain
/. Maisky
From the archives.