and Military-Political Alliance
of the Socialist Countries
p For the European People’s Democracies the period from 1950 to 1956 was marked, on the one hand, by the continued consolidation of the people’s democratic regimes and, on the other, by the struggle of the people headed by their communist vanguard to overcome the difficulties which had arisen in the course of building the new society.
p In the economic sphere the European socialist countries launched long-term five- and six-year economic plans designed to lay the foundations of socialism. They envisaged high industrial growth rates, especially in countries which lagged behind industrially, and the creation of new modern industries.
p The first long-term plans were completed by Bulgaria in 1952, Czechoslovakia in 1953, Hungary in 1954 and Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Rumania and Albania in 1955. As a result, total industrial output in the European People’s Democracies in 1956 was 3.3 times above 190 the prewar level (Poland more than 5 times; Czechoslovakia, over 2.7 times, the German Democratic Republic, 2.2 times; Hungary, 3.2 times; Rumania, almost 3.3 times; Bulgaria, more than 6 times and Albania, over 11.5 times). During the same period capitalist industrial output increased only by 90 per cent.
p In 1956 the socialist countries produced more than 955 million tons of coal (as against 385 million tons in 1937), over 68 million tons of steel (24.7 million tons before the war) and 290,000 million kwh of electric power (as compared with 72,700 million kwh in 1937). Consolidation of the positions of socialism continued in all spheres of the European People’s Democracies. In industry the socialist sector fully triumphed and the organisation of co-operatives in agriculture proceeded at a steady pace. In Rumania, for example, as a result of the fulfilment of the first five-year plan, at the end of 1955 the socialist sector accounted for almost 100 per cent in industry, 100 per cent in the financial and banking system and foreign trade, 90 per cent in the transport services, and over 80 per cent in home trade. The share of the socialist sector in agriculture grew uninterruptedly. In Bulgaria the socialist sector accounted for 97.7 per cent of the gross industrial output in 1956. Collectivisation of agriculture reached 77.4 per cent (the share of land tilled by co-operatives).
p Economic co-operation of the Soviet Union and the People’s Democracies played an important part in the fulfilment of the long-term economic plans. This equal co-operation was effected both within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and under bilateral 191 agrcements. Particularly important was Soviet assistance in reconstructing the economy, laying an industrial basis, in scientific and technical guidance, designing and construction of important projects in heavy and light industries. Sixty large industrial enterprises were built in Poland with the Soviet help. In addition to complete plant from them, the Soviet Union delivered various machine tools, cranes, raw and other materials. The USSR also furnished considerable assistance to Rumania and other socialist countries.
p At that time foreign trade held a predominant place in socialist economic co-operation. In 1956 socialist countries accounted for 60 per cent of the entire foreign trade in Poland, 64 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 73 per cent in the German Democratic Republic, 78 per cent in Rumania, 84 per cent in Bulgaria and 97 per cent in Albania. Eighty per cent of all foreign commerce of the USSR was with socialist states. In 1955 the share of the USSR in the foreign trade of Poland was 27.5 per cent; Hungary and Czechoslovakia, more than 30 per cent; the German Democratic Republic, over 40 per cent; Rumania, 48 per cent; Bulgaria, 44 per cent, and Albania, more than 40 per cent.
p At this stage it was still impossible to apply such improved forms of economic co-operation as co-ordination of economic plans and industrial co-operation, because the initial economic levels of the countries were too diverse. The aim was common: to build up the economic basis of socialist society, but the concrete tasks facing each country did not coincide. More sophisticated forms of the socialist international division of labour and economic co-operation were 192 introduced in relations between member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance at the end of the 1950s.
p The problem of improving the forms of economic relations, however, had already arisen when the first long-term economic plans were being carried out. The initial steps in co- ordinating plans between the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries in some sectors were made at that time.
p The period between 1950 and 1956 witnessed the overcoming of serious difficulties in the economy of the People’s Democracies in Asia as well as in Europe. These difficulties, stemming from the economic backwardness of most of them, were exacerbated by substantial disproportions in the economy, which had arisen because of the priority given to sectors which were decisive for creating the material basis of socialism. For example, in Hungary and Poland the development of the primary industries and agricultural production lagged seriously behind general economic growth towards the end of this period. The disproportions in the economy of the German Democratic Republic were of a somewhat different nature: they arose largely because of the division of Germany by the imperialists in violation of the Potsdam agreements.
p The elimination of economic difficulties proceeded amidst a sharp class struggle. Hostile elements within the People’s Democracies, relying on the imperialist bourgeoisie and in many cases acting on direct orders from the Western powers, exploited the difficulties and mistakes made in the course of industrialisation and co-operation of agriculture. The remnants of the defeated 193 exploiting classes would not reconcile themselves to the loss of dominating positions and did not withdraw from the scene without obstinate and bitter struggle. World imperialism, anxious to restore the exploiting regimes in the People’s Democracies, did everything in its power to aggravate the situation in Europe escalating the cold war in every way, resorting to provocations and ideological subversion. Escalation of the cold war in Europe and the aggressive actions of the United States in the Far East and Southeast Asia were closely interconnected, being components of the “global” policy of the ruling element of the United States and other Western powers spearheaded against the forces of socialism, democracy and peace. This policy, launched immediately after the Second World War (and even during its concluding phase), was specified and finally formalised in the aggressive North Atlantic pact.
p Paul-Henri Spaak, former Secretary General of NATO, defending the positions of the Western countries in his pamphlet Why NATO? ( published in 1959 for the 10th anniversary of the pact), referred to the territorial expansion of the socialist system after the war, to the development of the revolutionary movement in France, Italy, Greece, and other European countries as the main reasons which prompted the imperialists to set up this military bloc. It goes without saying that the unfounded attempt to ascribe the course of events to the "subversive activity" of the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is made by the ideologists of military blocs who follow the well-trodden path of those who justify their own aggressive policy with the help of 194 slander against the USSR. Here, however, it is important to stress that one of these ideologists frankly admits that the main purpose of whipping together aggressive blocs is not only to “contain” socialism, to stop the advance of the peoples along the road of social progress, but also to launch an attack against the world socialist system, against the unity of its member countries. [194•1
p In their campaign against the Soviet Union and other socialist states the ruling circles of the Western powers staked on the revanchist and militarist forces of West Germany. John Foster Dulles unequivocally explained what US imperialism regarded as a “prize” which a "revived, nationalistic Germany”, that is, a militarist German state, could represent for the West. Relying on it, he wrote, "the West can gain an advanced strategic position in Central Europe which will undermine the Soviet communist military and political positions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other neighbouring countries". [194•2 But since the decisive contribution of the Soviet Union to the defeat of the nazis and its participation in the postwar settlement made the rivival of German militarism over the entire country impossible, it was decided, as the US Newsweek magazine put it, to save for the Western powers at least a part of Germany. [194•3
p As a result of the divisive policy of the Western powers, pursued in league with the German reactionaries, the Federal Republic of Germany was 195 set up in September 1949 for the purpose of creating a bridgehead against socialist Europe. NATO’s sphere of operation was extended to the Federal Republic. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain and France, at their meeting in New York in September 1950, decided to incorporate the Federal Republic into the North Atlantic pact in one form or another and considered creating a West German army.
p The policy of drawing West Germany into NATO and its remilitarisation was covered up by talk about "terminating the state of war with Germany”. In reality this policy signified a flagrant violation of the commitments assumed by the governments of the United States and other Western powers under the Potsdam agreements. The real meaning of the New York decisions was exposed in the statement of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic made public on October 22, 1950. It pointed out that the Western powers wanted a free hand for using West Germany, its manpower and material resources in their imperialist interests for carrying out their strategic plans which concealed the striving of US rulingcircles to establish world domination. On the pretext of terminating the state of war with Germany, they sought to create conditions for openly incorporating West Germany into NATO and finally converting it into an instrument of their aggressive strategic plans in Europe.
p Subsequent developments fully confirmed the conclusions contained in this statement. A number of documents signed at a meeting of NATO members in Paris on October 23, 1954, admitted 196 West Germany into NATO and the Western European Union. This legalised the creation in West Germany of armed forces and a military industrial potential—the material basis for West German militarism and revanchism.
p In response to this threat to peace, the socialist countries took new steps to safeguard European security. A conference of European countries was held in Moscow between November 29 and December 2, 1954, attended by representatives of the Soviet Union and the other European socialist countries (except Yugoslavia); a representative of the People’s Republic of China attended as observer. In the declaration adopted at the conference, the signatories warned of the serious danger that would arise in Europe if the Paris agreements were ratified. "The ratification and implementation of these agreements,” the declaration said, "increase the war danger and will threaten the national security of peace-loving European states, particularly states neighbouring on Germany.” [196•1
p The conference proposed to all European countries to take measures for creating an all- European security system. At the same time it noted that the existing situation dictated the adoption of measures for strengthening the defensive powers of the socialist camp and safeguarding its security.
p “The existing situation raises the issue of uniting the efforts of the states represented at this conference for the purpose of safeguarding their security,” the participants in the Moscow conference noted. "The peace-loving states are 197 compelled to take urgent measures to oppose the aggressive forces of the military bloc of Western powers with the combined might of the peaceloving states in the interest of safeguarding their security.” [197•1
p The states participating in the conference proclaimed their resolve to carry out, if the Paris agreements were ratified, joint measures in organising armed forces and their command and other steps for reinforcing the defensive powers of the socialist countries.
p Despite this warning, the Paris agreements were ratified by the Western powers and came into force on May 5, 1955. This further worsened the situation in Europe, increased the threat to the security of the socialist states and the danger of another war. By implementing the Paris agreements, which created in Europe a new aggressive group with the participation of the West German revanchists, the imperialist powers expected to reinforce their positions and to tilt the strategic balance of forces in their favour.
p For their part, the militarist and revanchist circles of the Federal Republic associated with the Paris agreements their far-reaching plans for rebuilding the military potential and extending their power to the entire territory of Germany within her prewar frontiers. Operating through the military groups of the Western powers, to which Bonn was admitted, they expected to strengthen their positions in Europe and to draw their partners into reckless ventures. Konrad Adenauer, who was then Federal Chancellor, frankly stated: "The creation of a politically strong Europe 198 is the only way for Germany to recover her eastern territories. It is one of our prime tasks." [198•1 According to the revanchists, NATO, the integration of Western Europe and the Common Market were to serve their interests and put the Federal Republic at the head of the West European countries.
p The West German military openly proclaimed slogans calling for the immediate building of a powerful army for new campaigns in the East, against the USSR and other socialist countries. At the same time, relying on such an army, it wanted to dictate its will to Western countries, too.
p The West German Gcneral-Anzeiger stressed at the end of 1956 that "Strauss (shortly before he was appointed Federal Defence Minister—Sh.S.) wants to make the Bundeswehr something not only the Soviets, but also Britain and France would have to reckon with". [198•2
p The imperialist powers, staking on West Germany’s militarist and revanchist forces in the struggle against the socialist states, undermined the foundations of European security. Possibilities arose not only for the remilitarisation of West Germany but also for new military ventures and aggression. In these conditions the Soviet Union and other socialist states were naturally compelled to take steps for strengthening their defensive powers and collective measures for reinforcing the security of their frontiers.
p To this end, a conference of European states for safeguarding peace and security in Europe was held in Warsaw from May 11 to May 14, 199 1955. The conference was attended by Albania Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, [199•1 Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, with a representative of the People’s Republic of China present as observer.
p The conference participants discussed changes in the international situation resulting from the ratification of the Paris agreements and came to the conclusion that the ratification of the agreements which provided for the setting up of a military group in the form of the Western European Union with the participation of a remilitarised West Germany and its incorporation into the North Atlantic bloc, increased the danger of another war and created a threat to the national security of the peace-loving states. They therefore concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Co- operation and Mutual Assistance to safeguard their security and maintain peace in Europe.
p The Warsaw Treaty, signed on May 14, 1955, is a major landmark in the development of the military-political alliance of socialist countries. It is a treaty of a purely defensive nature dictated by the aggressive measures of the Western powers. It greatly contributed to the strengthening of the economic, political and military co- operation of socialist countries, the creation of a reliable system of collective security; it played a big 200 part in furthering the unity of socialist countries and rebuffing imperialist attacks against them.
p “The solidarity of the socialist countries,” it is pointed out in the Declaration of the 1957 Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, "is not directed against any other country. On the contrary, it serves the interests of all the peace-loving peoples, restrains the aggressive strivings of the bellicose imperialist circles and supports and encourages the growing forces of peace. The socialist countries are against the division of the world into military blocs. But in view of the situation that has arisen, with the Western powers refusing to accept the proposals of the socialist countries for mutual abolition of military blocs, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, which is of a defensive nature and serves the security of the peoples of Europe and peace throughout the world, must be preserved and strengthened.” [200•1
p The military-political co-operation of the Soviet Union and European socialist countries was developed on the basis of the Warsaw Treaty. Specifically, co-operation of the German Democratic Republic with other fraternal countries was further extended.
p A treaty on relations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic was signed on September 20, 1955. It confirmed that " relations between them are based on complete equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and non- interference in internal affairs". [200•2 The German 201 Democratic Republic "is free in deciding issues of domestic and foreign policy, including relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, and also the establishment of relations with other states”. Article 3 provides for the further development of economic, scientific, technical and cultural ties between the two countries, the mutual rendering of all possible economic assistance and the implementation of the necessary economic, scientific and technical co-operation. "Soviet troops now on the territory of the German Democratic Republic in accordance with the existing international agreements shall remain there temporarily with the consent of its Government on terms which shall be specified by an additional agreement between the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the German Democratic Republic. These Soviet forces shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the German Democratic Republic and in the country’s socio-political life" (Article 4). The parties agreed to proclaim once again that the achievement, through negotiation, of a peaceful settlement for all of Germany was their basic aim. "Accordingly, they shall exert the necessary efforts for a settlement by a peace treaty and the restoration of Germany’s unity along peaceful and democratic lines" (Article 5).
p Thus, between 1950 and 1956, co-operation among socialist countries, despite the many obstacles, grew stronger and the consolidation of the world socialist system continued.
p The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from February 14 to 25, 1956, had a tremendous impact on these processes, just as on all socio-political development in the socialist countries.
202p The 20th Congress noted that the historical experience in the development of all socialist countries fully confirmed the Leninist proposition regarding the transition to socialism in different countries.
p “At present,” it was pointed out in the Resolution of the Congress, "alongside the Soviet form of reconstructing society along socialist lines, there is the form of People’s Democracy. It has withstood all-round tests for ten years and has fully proved its merit.” [202•1
p Utmost consolidation of fraternal relations with all People’s Democracies was proclaimed a primary task in foreign policy by the 20th Congress which emphasised that the more solid and powerful the socialist states are, the more reliable is peace.
p The 20th Congress was held in a complex international situation inasmuch as imperialist reaction had stepped up its aggressive actions against the socialist states both in Asia and in Europe. It was during this period that the US ruling circles raised subversive activity against socialist countries to the level of official state policy by adopting special laws on financing hostile actions of subversive organisations both internationally and within these countries. The armed revolt in democratic Berlin, capital of the German Democratic Republic, which was organised by Western intelligence agencies in June 1953 and ended in complete 203 failure, was one of the serious and dangerous manifestations of this policy.
p The counter-revolutionary armed uprising in Hungary was directed against the new system, the people’s state, against the socialist gains of the Hungarian people. Analysing the causes of the 1956 events in Hungary, Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, pointed out at the Party’s 7th Congress at the end of 1959 that, in the opinion of the Party’s Central Committee, an essential part had been played by the mistakes of the country’s former leaders, Rakosi and his group. "These mistakes,” Kadar pointed out, "mainly consisted in ignoring the specific features and national distinctions of Hungary, as a result of which after a certain time Rakosi and his entourage proved incapable of properly applying in the conditions of our country the main laws of building socialism which are of international significance. These mistakes, further, consisted in violating Party democracy and socialist legality, and also in distortions in economic policy.” [203•1
p Former ruling classes, landowners and capitalists, who after loss of power became the accomplices and allies of international imperialism were the main force behind the counter- revolutionary uprising. A leading place among them was held by the "Crossed Arrows" fascist group which had organised mass pogroms and acts of terror. Even sworn enemies of socialist Hungary like the renegade Francois Fejto had to admit that during the counter-revolutionary rebellion 204 “alarming demonstrations of a fascist nature could be seen on the streets of Budapest and, even more so, on the streets of provincial towns with a poorly developed industry. The ’Grossed Arrows’ party tried to revive its organisation. . .. There were regrettable instances of manhunts and settling of personal scores. . " [204•1
p International imperialism was the organising and directing force of the uprising. "International imperialism headed by US reactionary circles was the most powerful factor in the counter- revolutionary uprising in Hungary,” Kadar pointed out at the 7th Congress of the Party. "From the first days of our country’s liberation, they supported enemies of the Hungarian people of all degrees and ranks with every means. For many years the imperialists engaged in a whispering campaign, they incited and organised the counter-revolutionary rebellion, and, at long last, unleashed it with the help of their agents and political allies, Imre Nagy and his group, and also with the aid of bourgeois counter-revolutionary forces within the country. In fact two forces united in a bloc attacked the Hungarian People’s Republic—the internal counter-revolution and international imperialism.” [204•2 That is why the defeat of the counter-revolutionary rebellion was more than the internal affair of the Hungarian people, it also vitally concerned the entire socialist community.
p International imperialism wanted to crush the Hungarian People’s Republic, just as it did the 205 Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919. But in 1956 the imperialist bourgeoisie did not and could not succeed in repeating the events of 1919. The Hungarian Soviet Republic had been defeated because at that time Soviet Russia was beating back the furious attacks of numerous internal and external enemies and could not render direct military help to proletarian Hungary. But in 1956 the Western powers were already deprived of the possibility of restoring the power of the landowners and capitalists in Hungary by armed force. The Hungarian people, with the help of other socialist states, the Soviet Union first and foremost, routed the counter-revolutionary forces and upheld their revolutionary gains. "The defeat of the counterrevolution in Hungary,” writes Dezso Nemes, a noted Hungarian public figure and historian, "was a victory for the working class and the people of Hungary, a victory for the socialist camp as a whole. . . .” [205•1
p At the request of the Hungarian Government Soviet troops stationed in Hungary came to the aid of the country’s socialist forces in their struggle against counter-revolution. Acting in accordance with Article 5 of the Warsaw Treaty, the USSR helped the revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government of Hungary to bar the way to reaction and fascism. The unity and solidarity of the socialist countries, their concerted action in defence of the socialist gains in Hungary and in other fraternal countries, played a decisive part in repulsing international imperialism.
p The Declaration of the Soviet Government on 206 the Basic Principles for the Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Co- operation between the USSR and Other Socialist Countries, published on October 30, 1956, was of considerable significance for overcoming the difficulties which had arisen earlier in relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. "United by common ideals of building socialist society and the principles of proletarian internationalism,” it was pointed out in the Declaration, "the countries of the great community of socialist nations can arrange their relations only on the principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. This, far from precluding, on the contrary, presupposes close fraternal co- operation and mutual assistance of the socialist countries in the economic, political and cultural spheres.” [206•1
p The Soviet Government proclaimed its readiness to discuss, jointly with the governments of other socialist countries, measures ensuring the consolidation of economic ties between them so as to eliminate any possibility of violating the principles of state sovereignty, mutual benefit and equality in economic relations. The Declaration specifically spoke of the Soviet readiness at once to examine the expediency of the further stay of Soviet specialists, engineers, agronomists, scientists and military advisers in the People’s Democracies. By that time highly competent national personnel in all spheres of economic and military development had been trained.
207p The Soviet Government expressed its readiness to examine with other Warsaw Treaty member countries the presence of Soviet troops on their territory (Hungary, Rumania and Poland) in accordance with this Treaty and inter-governmental agreements.
p The Declaration of the Soviet Government was received with approval by the peoples of all socialist countries. Their governments stated their approval of the principles enunciated in the Declaration and support of the propositions it contained. The German Democratic Republic acclaimed the Declaration as fully coinciding with the point of view of its Government. The Polish ’frybuna Ludu pointed out editorially that the publication of the Declaration was an exceptionally important world event. Public opinion in Poland, the newspaper noted, received the Declaration with satisfaction, being vitally interested in alliance with the USSR and in strengthening this alliance and friendship on the basis of full equality and sovereignty of states.
p In keeping with the principles expounded in the Declaration, negotiations between the USSR and other socialist countries began shortly after its publication. At the end of 1956 Government Delegations of Poland and Rumania visited Moscow. Major questions of interstate relations were discussed during the talks and settled in the interest of further strengthening friendship and equal co-operation of the USSR and the People’s Democracies.
p It will be recalled that in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty and governmental agreements between its members, Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary and Rumania. In Poland and the 208 German Democratic Republic, Soviet troops were kept in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty and the Potsdam agreements of the four powers: Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States. It was stressed in the joint Statement of the Party and Government Delegations of the Soviet Union and the Polish People’s Republic of November 18, 1956, that the threat to Poland from the revanchist forces of West Germany and the existing international situation would confirm that the "temporary presence of Soviet units on the territory of Poland is still expedient, which is also linked with the necessity for the presence of Soviet troops in Germany on the basis of international treaties and agreements". [208•1 The Statement outlined the principles defining the status of Soviet units on Poland’s territory, according to which their temporary presence could in no way affect the sovereignty of the Polish state and could not lead to their interference in the internal affairs of the Polish People’s Republic.
p The temporary presence of Soviet military units, in conformity with the Warsaw Treaty, on the territory of Rumania was also considered expedient in the joint statement of the Government Delegations of the Soviet Union and the Rumanian People’s Republic of December 3, 1956. [208•2 Subsequently, in May 1958, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member 209 states approved the proposal of the Soviet Government, agreed upon with the Government of the Rumanian People’s Republic, on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania. [209•1
p Thus, the principles of the Soviet Government’s Declaration were consistently implemented, which was noted at the Budapest meeting of representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. " Representatives of the countries,” it was stated in a communique after the meeting, "noted with satisfaction that the provisions of the declaration are successfully being implemented in relations between socialist states, which facilitates the further cohesion of the socialist camp, the further economic and cultural advance of the socialist countries, the strengthening of friendship and development of fraternal mutual assistance between their peoples.” [209•2
Having jointly repulsed the offensive of international imperialist reaction, having upheld the socialist gains and eliminated the past mistakes in relations between them, the Communist and Workers’ Parties of socialist countries paved the way for closer economic, political, cultural and military co-operation, for the successful solution 210 of major problems of socialist construction. A new stage had arrived in the history of the world socialist system, in the development of socialist international relations, a stage marked by the consolidation of political forces in the People’s Democracies, further extension and strengthening of fraternal relations.
Notes
[194•1] P. H. Spaak, Pourquoi I’OTAN?, Paris, 1959.
[194•2] J. F. Dulles, War or Peace, New York, 1950, pp. 156-57.
[194•3] Newsweek, July 24, 1947.
[196•1] Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglashenii i konventsii. . ., Issue XVI, p. 63.
[197•1] Ibid.
[198•1] International Affairs. No. 8, 1957, p. 94.
[198•2] Ibid.
[199•1] On January 25, 1955, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree ending the state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany. This decree proclaimed the termination of the state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany and the establishment of peaceful relations between them (Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglashenii i konvcntsii. . ., Issues XVII and XVIII, Gospolitizdat, 1960, pp. 229-30).
[200•1] The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism, pp. 12-13.
[200•2] Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglashenii i konventsii..., Issues XVII and XVIII, p. 18.
[202•1] XX syezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovietskogo Soyuza 14-25 fevralya 1956 goda. Stenografichesky otchot (20th Congress of the CPSU, February 14-25, 1956. Verbatim report), Vol. II, Gospolitizdat, 1956, p. 415.
[203•1] Janos Kadar, Selected Artides and Speeches, Russ. ed., Gospolitizdat, 1960, p. 502.
[204•1] Francois Fejto, La tragedie hongroise, Paris, 1956, p. 309.
[204•2] Janos Kadar, Op. cit., pp. 503-04.
[205•1] Deszo Nemes, Hungary in 1945-1961, Russ. ed., Gospolitizdat, 1962, p. 61.
[206•1] Pravda, October 31, 195G.
[208•1] Deklaratsii, zayavleniya i kommyunike Sovietskogo Pravitehtva s pravitelstvami inostrannykh gosudarstv ( Declarations, Statements and Communiques of the Soviet Government with Governments of Foreign Countries), Gospolitizdat, 1957, p. 229.
[208•2] Ibid., p. 237.
[209•1] Matcrialy sovyeshchaniya politickeskogo konsultativnogo komitcta gosudarstv—uchastnihov Varshavskogo dogovora o druzhbc, sotrudnichcstve i vzaimnoi pomoshchi. 24 maya 1958 g. (Materials of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of Member Countries of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. May 24, 1958), Gospolitizdat, 1958, p. 5.
[209•2] Deklaratsii, zayavleniya i kommyunike..., p. 327.