p The Soviet entry into the war against Japan was prompted by a vital and objective necessity. A swift, powerful and active operation in the Far East could cut the knot, crush the Japanese invader and eliminate the seat of war and aggression in the East, deliver the Asian peoples from the Japanese imperialist yoke and help them attain political independence and freedom, secure the sovereign interests of the USSR in the Far East, prevent any dragging out of the Second World War and bring closer the day of peace.

p With the US imperialists trying their hand at atomic blackmail, it was of the utmost importance to show the world there was a force uncowed by the intimidation. Besides^ the action was in complete accord with the responsibility of the USSR as an ally meeting commitments.

p The Japanese Command received advance information of the imminent Soviet campaign due to the loquaciousness of US and British military and political leaders. But it did not think the term of two or three months (from the day of Germany’s surrender) sufficient for the Soviet Union to move troops and arms and deploy for combat in the East. At best, it held, this would take 10 to 12 months, and planned to strike first.

p But under Communist Party guidance, the Soviet people accomplished what all foreign military experts—not just the Japanese—thought impossible. In a matter of three months (May-July) the railwaymen of the world’s longest, TransSiberian track shuttled 136,000 troop and freight cars  [259•2  to the Far East and Transbaikal. (The need to carry certain freights was obviated by the Party’s concentrated effort in building up the Soviet Far East economy.) The railwaymen and soldiers displayed unexampled endurance. Despite the heat, 260 desert sand and water shortage, infantry units marched 40 kilometres daily, and tanks and motorised troops as much as 15O.  [260•1 

p Hostilities were to be unfolded mainly in Northwest China (Manchuria) where the main Kwantung Army forces were deployed. The Japanese militarists had been preparing methodically in Manchuria for aggression against the Soviet Union since 1931, had strongly fortified zones in the most important sectors, especially along the border with the Soviet Maritime Territory. The terrain, too, was favourable for defence, with powerful .mountain ranges, partly covered by dense forests, many large and lesser rivers, and large stretches of swampland. The battlefront would be over 5,000 km long and more than 800 km in depth.  [260•2 

p Considering the strength of the Kwangtung Army and characteristics of the war theatre, British and American military observers held the Soviet Union could not count on a rapid success. Hanson Baldwin, the New York Times pbserver, wrote that any swift advance was out of the question in face of the overwhelming odds.  [260•3  The British Daily Telegraph commentator, Lt.-Gen. Henry Martin, maintained there was little hope of serious progress in less than 6 months.  [260•4  These and other articles to the same effect, obviously written in advance, appeared on the first day of the operation, reflecting the secret hopes of the US and British ruling element, as well as the opinion of then" writers.

p On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Government addressed a statement to Japan, saying that "after the crushing defeat and surrender of Hitler Germany, Japan is the only great power still desiring to continue the war”. The USSR, therefore, the statement said, was bent on "bringing closer the day of peace, delivering the peoples from further sacrifice and suffering, and enabling the people of Japan to escape the danger and destruction suffered by Germany after she had rejected unconditional surrender"   [260•5  Acting on these considerations, and thereby fulfilling its duty as ally, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan as of August 9.

p The lofty Soviet war aims were reflected in the strategic plan, based on the conviction that a rapid and crushing stroke against the Kwantung Army would compel the Japanese Government to accept the unconditional surrender, saving the Japanese islands from direct involvement in the hostilities. The Soviet action was aimed exclusively against Japan’s armed forces, unlike that of the British, and, especially, American commands. No intention existed of making war on civilians.

p Three fronts were formed under Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky—the Transbaikal and the ist and and Far Eastern—to destroy the Kwantung Army. A prominent part was assigned to the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

p The main blow, by the Transbaikal Front, was delivered from the Mongolian People’s Republic in a straight line at Changchun and Mukden across desert terrain and the Great Khingan Mountains. In the meantime, the two Far Eastern Fronts thrust forward from north and southeast towards Harbin, which was also to be sidewiped by the left flank of the Transbaikal Front. The lacerating drives from three directions converged towards the heart of Northeast China. This was a mammoth strategic operation, also involving the Amur Naval Flotilla.

p Apart from co-operating with the ground forces, the navy was ordered to capture Japanese ports and naval bases in North Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles.

p The Soviet Armed Forces were amply primed for their assignment. Their superiority in numbers was 1.3 : i, tanks 4.8 : i and planes 1.9 : i.  [261•1  The Soviet force consisted of 80 divisions, 4 tank and motorised corps and 64 brigades.  [261•2  But superior ordnance was not enough to overcome enemy fortifications in the perplexingly difficult terrain. Superior morale was also essential. The Soviet soldiers had been properly prepared for their mission of liberation. Once more, just as in the war against Hitler Germany, they displayed fervent patriotism, a deep sense of their internationalist duty and a high degree of morale. Hence their tenacity and willingness to contend with all but insuperable difficulties, their wholesale heroism. The superior quality of the Soviet system over the capitalist was the decisive factor.

p The soldiers were inspired by the justice of their cause and mission. The internationalist duty of the Soviet Union and its national interests required that the Far Eastern aggressor should be crushed and hundreds of millions of people delivered from Japanese oppression.

p The armed forces of the Mongolian People’s Republic, which declared war on Japan on August 10, fought shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops. The people’s armies and partisans of other Asian countries—China, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaya, etc.—also assumed the offensive, and the population of Manchuria, too, extended aid and comfort to the Soviet Army. . .

p The offensive began in the early hours of August 9, 1945 despite heavy rains which made the roads all but impassable, especially in the Great Khingan area. The Japanese resisted desperately. But the courage and stamina of the Soviet troops, their high morale, guaranteed success. Many soldiers — I. Batorov, A. Firsov, G. Popov and V. Kolesnik, to mention a few—displayed courage beyond compare. Pilot M. Yankov, whose plane was hit, steered his flaming aircraft into military installations in the North Korean port of Rashin, causing an explosion that demolished the installations. Examples of this kind were many.

p In the first six days the Soviet troops made major strategic advances. The Transbaikal Front crossed the Great Khingan Mountains and drove forward 250-400 km, thrusting deep into the enemy’s rear and moving towards the large industrial centres of Kalgan, Jehol, Mukden, Changchun and Tsitsihar. The ist Far Eastern Front suppressed enemy resistance in the east of Manchuria, progressed 170 km and cut off the Kwantung Army from Korea. The 2nd Far Eastern Front, meanwhile, breached Japanese long-term defences and crossed the Amur and Ussuri rivers with the co-operation of the Amur Flotilla, advancing 120 km and nearing Harbin and Tsitsihar. Part of its troops were diverted for an operation liberating South Sakhalin.

p On August 14 the Japanese Government became conscious of the disastrous plight of the Kwantung Army. The Supreme War Council, the government and the Emperor decided to proclaim surrender, while continuing armed resistance. And since no real capitulation ensued, the Red Army carried on with the offensive.

p The US Government, meanwhile, chose to betray its 263 duty as ally, proclaiming August 14 as Victory Day. Addressing a press-conference, President Harry Truman declared he was satisfied with the Japanese Government’s decision and that cease-fire orders were being issued to the Allied Armed Forces.  [263•1 

p On the following day, General Douglas MacArthur, nominally Allied Supreme Commander in the Far East, issued a directive terminating the hostilities. The US Military Mission in Moscow forwarded it to the Supreme Soviet Command "for execution”. This US attempt to prevent the final elimination of the Kwantung Army, to prevent the Soviet Army from moving ahead, was another bit of evidence of the expansionist designs of the US monopolists. And it was clumsy in the extreme, because neither operationally nor in any other respect could the Soviet Armed Forces be subject to MacArthur’s commands. The directive was rejected, whereupon the Military Mission said a mistake had occurred and the directive had been forwarded not "for execution”, but "for information".  [263•2 

p However, there were additional facts testifying to the intents of the US rulers. Acting unilaterally, in defiance of the principles of international co-operation, President Truman announced on August 16 that Japan would be placed under the control of the US Command.  [263•3  He ordered Admiral Chester Nimitz to capture Dairen. But the order was abortive, because Soviet troops came there first.  [263•4  An American paratroop unit landed northwest of Mukden, but also missed the bus, for Soviet troops were there before it.  [263•5 

p On August 18, in a message to the Soviet Government, Truman insisted on US air bases on the Kuriles. Two; days .later the matter was raised in US Congress, which declared its desire to have US bases in the area.  [263•6  Also, negotiations began between MacArthur’s headquarters and Chiang Kaishek, on the one hand, and the Japanese Command, on the other, for Japanese troops to help combat the national liberation movements in China and other Asian countries.

p Meanwhile, the Soviet offensive continued, repulsing frantic Japanese counter-attacks. From different directions the Soviet troops converged on central Manchuria, to which the remnants of the Kwantung Army were fast retreating. Although the Japanese were still in command of extensive territory, their plight deteriorated rapidly. No longer did they have their- fortifications. Moreover, they were cut off from Japan and from the Japanese troops in China.

p Red Army operations grew in scale and, co-operating with the Pacific Fleet, moves were made to clear Korea and the Kuriles.

p The Kwantung Army Command had no choice but to order its troops to lay down arms on August 17. In Japan proper, an extremist fascist group, meanwhile, attempted a coup d’e"tat to prevent the surrender. It was poised to capture the Imperial Palace, but was denied army support, and failed.  [264•1 

p The surrender order was disobeyed by many Kwantung Army units, and the Soviet Command redoubled the pressure. The offensive was speeded by paratroop landings in the biggest Manchurian cities, one of them in Changchun, seat of Kwantung Army Headquarters. A Soviet officer suddenly appeared on the threshold of General Otosoo Yamada’s quarters, handing him a demand to effect the surrender without further delays. The Commander and his staff were taken prisoner.  [264•2 

p As of August 19 the remnants of the Kwantung Army began surrendering en masse, but some seats of resistance were not wiped out until early September. Liberation of South Sakhalin was completed on August 25, and that of the Kuriles on September i.

p Japanese prisoners taken in the Soviet campaign totalled nearly 600,000.  [264•3 

p The Kwantung Army defeat was a decisive factor in Japan’s capitulation. General Claire Chennault, Commander of US air forces in China, told The New York Times correspondent that "Russia’s entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped — Their (of 265 Soviet armies— Ed.) swift stroke completed the circle round Japan that brought the nation to its knees."  [265•1 

p The instrument of unconditional surrender was signed by representatives of the Allied Powers and of vanquished Japan on board the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. The Second World War was over. The anti-Hitler coalition had won.

p US and British armed forces contributed substantially to the victory over Japan. However, their success in the Pacific rested upon the Soviet victories in the main war theatre, the Soviet-German. Germany was the most powerful of the fascist allies, and Japan’s condition depended on Hitler’s. Regardless, it was the defeat of the Kwantung Army by the Soviet Armed Forces that was the immediate factor that compelled Japan to lay down her arms.

p Swift and determined action covering Soviet arms with fresh glory, considerably reduced the duration of the Second World War, preventing more casualties. Also important was the fact that the Japanese aggressors were crushed before the pretenders to their role of Far Eastern imperialist gendarme succeeded in taking over. The Red Army victory over Japan was an effective aid to the peoples of Korea, China, Vietnam and many other Asian countries—those under Japanese occupation and those, which, though they had escaped its horrors, had by their own experience known the horrors of foreign imperialist oppression.

The victory of the Soviet Union and all other freedomloving nations over the Japanese militarists opened a new chapter in world history, highlighted by liberation from colonialism of the peoples of Asia and then of Africa.