p The phoney war had a most demoralising effect on the army and people in France and Britain. It affected war production, basically no higher than in peacetime, with a 50 considerable quantity of arms, vehicles and equipment routed to Finland.

p Germany, meanwhile, lost no time in stepping up arms output, building up her armed forces and charting the plan of a war in the West.

p On October 19, 1939, the German High Command completed the first variant of an offensive known under the code name of Fall Gelb (Operation Yellow), which by and large reproduced the German plan in the First World War, the Schlieffen Plan. The main blow against France was envisaged across the northern Belgium and southern Holland, hooking round the Maginot Line, and followed by an invasion of northern France.

p By the end of December 1939 this variant was scrapped and replaced with a new one: Army Group B would pin down the enemy frontally in northern Belgium, drawing away the main forces, while Army Group A would break through in depth with a large mobile force to the Channel across Luxembourg, the Ardennes and northern France, cutting off the main mass of enemy troops.

p Adopting this plan, the German High Command counted on the drooping morale of the British and French trqops, and especially the low morale of their commands. The largescale flanking manoeuvre would expose the German forces to possible encirclement. Success depended on the paralysis spreading swiftly among the British and French military leaders. Hitler’s generals counted on it.

p There was one more reason that prompted the German command to abandon the original Operation Yellow variant. The monopolies, eager to lay their hands on the Belgian, Dutch and French industries, wished them to escape the destruction that hostilities would be sure to wreak. They wanted them as a supply source for the subsequent phases of the war for world supremacy. A frontal assault in the industrial north would impair its economic potential; a flanking movement left the hope of averting destruction.

p Success hinged largely on whether or not the French and British commands would deploy their main forces in Belgian and Dutch territory north-west of the planned Army Group A hooking manoeuvre. To mislead the allies, the nazi command decided to let one of the earlier variants of Operation Yellow, envisaging a frontal attack, fall into enemy hands, disregarding the fact that this would put the Anglo-French 51 leaders wise to nazi preparations of a Western offensive (which the allies were long inclined to consider unlikely). On January 10, 1940, a German aircraft with Helmut Reinberger, a liaison officer carrying blueprints of the early Operation Yellow variant, faked a forced landing near the Belgian town of Michelin. The pretext it had lost its bearings. Now the French and British were convinced that if Germany were to launch an offensive, she would strike in the north, though it would be more logical to surmise that the Germans would abandon the captured variant.

p In the meantime, Berlin decided to conquer Denmark and Norway before launching out on Operation Yellow. The two countries were on the right flank. They were seafaring nations, and, besides, the German monopolists displayed a keen interest in the Scandinavian iron ore; also, the move was prompted by the obvious Anglo-French intention of introducing allied troops into Norway.

p The Weserubung (Weser Exercise), code name for the invasion of Denmark and Norway, was launched on April 9, 1940. The Danish king and government abandoned every thought of resistance, ordering the Danish forces to lay down their arms. The Norwegians, however, resisted staunchly. Their shore guns sank a nazi heavy cruiser and two light cruisers. Fierce fighting broke out on land. But the nazi agents in the country—traitor Quisling, Norway’s War Minister, among them—succeeded in disrupting the resistance. Quisling’s name eventually became the synonym of treachery.

p The British reacted by landing troops in Northern Norway. But these were soon defeated, Germany gaining complete control of the country. The nazi flank and rear were thus well covered, communications with Norway and Sweden protected, and the German air and naval forces gained new bases against France and Britain.

p Having occupied Denmark and Norway, the Germans struck on May 10, 1940, invading Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and France. That was the end of the phoney war.

p By then Operation Yellow had been completely reworked and replaced by the Sichelschnitt (Sickle Cut) plan, to which the German command committed 136 divisions against the 142 Allied divisions, 2,580 panzers against 3,000 Allied tanks and 3,500 aircraft against the Allies’ mainland-based 2,738 52 (with another 1,246 stationed on the British Isles).  [52•1  Army - Group A, the strike force, had 45 divisions, of which seven panzer and three motorised (all in all, Germany engaged ten panzer divisions against France).  [52•2 

p Until May 10 Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg had been neutral countries. For want of a pretext to attack them, the hitlerites. again resorted to a provocation. Freiburg, a German university town, was bombed during the night and early, morning of May 10. The raiders’ demolition bombs hit a girls’ boarding school and a hospital. The casualties were appallingly high. Bomb fragments were dug up from the ruins of buildings and promptly placed on the Freiburg burgomaster’s desk. He was horrified to see a German trade mark on them. After the war the secret came out: the raid was by the 5ist Luftwaffe squadron. It was to create the appearance that the German thrust into the neutral states was in response to the latter hitting’ Freiburg from the air.

p The German invasion of Belgium and Holland spurred the Anglo-French command i&to action. Troops left their fortifications and marched to meet the foe. One of the weakest French armies, half of it poorly trained reservists (and Army of 5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions), was deployed to cover the frontier with southern Belgium. The French gth Army (6 infantry, 2 cavalry and i motorised divisions), somewhat to the north of it, was no better prepared for combat.  [52•3  In the breakthrough area, the nazi Army Group A held an overwhelming advantage in strength. Its panzer force breached a 90 kilometre frontage between Sedan and Namur and drove north-west to Paris, wreaking havoc in the rear of the French and British troops. The French Government discussed a possible German entry into the capital. But the nazis veered sharply north and headed for the Channel.

p The rapidity of their advance exposed them to peril. General Rundstedt’s forces cut a narrow corridor between the enemy armies. If the latter converged, the nazi breakthrough force would be between the hammer and the anvil. The matter was debated by the governments and military leaders of France and Britain, but nothing of practical value was 53 done, although by then the intentions of the German command were clear.

p As soon as the nazi objective of breaking through to the coast ceased to be a secret, the British Admiralty ordered shipowners (on May 14) to prepare their vessels for a possible evacuation of the British expeditionary corps. The co- ordination of French and British troops diminished visibly.

p On May 21, Rundstedt reached the coast and on the following day captured Boulogne. By that time Army GroupB was approaching Ostend and Zeebrugge from the east. Forty-nine Allied divisions—22 Belgian (which surrendered on May 25), 9 British and 18 French—were pressed against the shoreline by the giant German horseshoe in the Dunkirk area,  [53•1  facing the prospect of total annihilation.

p At a critical hour for the Anglo-French, however, assault was called off. Visiting Rundstedt’s headquarters in Charlesville on May 24, Hitler issued the order to desist. He did not explain why, thus creating one more secret of the Second World War.

p Today, we have sufficient evidence to unravel the mystery known as the Dunkirk miracle. The “miracle” was the prelude to a nazi scheme: to obtain the surrender of France in a day or two, conclude an armistice with Britain, and then, with her support, attack the Soviet Union. A fairly transparent hint of this is contained in Fieldmarshal Erich von Manstein’s memoirs.  [53•2  Hitler’s speeches of the last few months of the Third Reich contain a revealing statement to the same effect. "Churchill,” the Fuehrer rued, "was quite unable, to appreciate the sporting spirit of which I had given proof by refraining from creating an irreparable breach between the British and ourselves. We did, indeed, refrain from annihilating them at Dunkirk."  [53•3 

p The Dunkirk evacuation (Operation Dynamo) from May 26 to June 4, 1940, was carried out under the protective cover of the British Navy and the French ground army. Tens of thousands of British civilians —fishermen, sportsmen and merchant sailors—helped save the British expeditionary troops, shipping 338,000 men who had abandoned all their 54 heavy arms, across the Channel. The bulk of the French soldiers, however, were abandoned to their fate.

p On June 5, the German offensive was resumed. By then the French had but 60 divisions left. Defeat and occupation was imminent. The evil flower of treason bloomed. Treason, in fact, had been implicit in the policy of the French government since the push-off of the German offensive as an outcome of its entire preceding policy. Men who favoured surrender were quickly inducted into the cabinet. VThe final step was taken on May 18, when Marshal Petain was made VicePremier. Already on May 15, the French cabled London: "We have lost the battle... The road to Paris is open."  [54•1  On June 10, General Maxime Weygand, French Commanderin-Chief, said he saw hardly any way of preventing the enemy from overrunning all of France. He, Petain and Reynaud (who assumed the Premiership) rejected Churchill’s advice of adopting guerrilla warfare rather than lay down arms.  [54•2 

p On June. 10, fascist Italy joined the war against France and Britain. Her rulers wanted a share in the spoils. Count Ciano, Italy’s Foreign Minister, said later that Mussolini, too, wanted to pillage.  [54•3 

p In Canget, a castle near Tours, during a cabinet sitting on May 13, Weygand argued in favour of immediately abandoning Paris and of total surrender. He referred to the danger of “anarchy” and "social disorders”, resorting to the favourite “argument” of all traitors—the bogey of communism. "Maurice Thorez,” he said, "has installed himself in the Elysee Palace.” The Communists had begun seizing control of Paris.  [54•4  His lie was instantly repudiated. Home Minister Georges Mandel telephoned the Paris Prefect, Langeron, who replied: "Paris is calm."  [54•5  But the traitors in the government could not care less for the truth: they decided not to defend the capital. Surrender thus became a foregone conclusion.

p William Bullitt, US Ambassador to France, undertook to mediate the surrender of Paris. On June 14, 1940, German troops entered the French capital unresisted. And on June 22 France signed an act of surrender. Displaying a sense for 55 the dramatic, the nazis staged the signing ceremony in the same railway carriage near Rethondes in Compiegne in which the French accepted the German surrender on November u, 1918.

p The national tragedy of France was a natural sequel to the preceding events. Not the Germans became the tool of the imperialist policy of the USA, Britain and France; it was the last-named that fell victim to the Germans, and it began to look like Britain would soon be next, and then the United States. Having isolated the USSR, the British and French governments destroyed every chance of unity against aggression and were then themselves isolated in face of the fascist German aggression. True, German military superiority and employment of new effective offensive tactics did play a certain part in the French defeat, but military superiority alone, without the political factors, was never decisive. But British and French military strategy was an offshoot of the Munich policy. The Munich “appeasers”, preoccupied with hatching war against the Soviet Union, exposed their countries to nazi aggression, covering themselves with shame as traitors and gravediggers of their own peoples.

p The betrayal of the French ruling group extended to long after the armistice. The invaders divided the country into two zones: the east, north and west of France, with the bulk of the nation’s industry, was occupied by the nazis, while the south and part of the central territory comprised the unoccupied zone. The Petain government of this zone, installed ia Vichy, consisted of traitors and collaborators. The Vichy dictatorship centred its efforts on breaking the resistance of the people and furnishing the German fascists with every facility in the unoccupied part of the country. Petain and his ministers opposed the popular resistance and helped the nazis combat the patriots.

But neither the disgrace of surrender nor the Vichy regime could destroy the fighting spirit of the French. What had happened in Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium and Holland, held true again: the government surrendered, the people fought on.