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[introduction.]

The working masses, the Communist and Workers’ Parties of countries embarking on the road of socialism and creating their own armies have been drawing on the experience gained by the Soviet Union in the development of its Armed Forces. The question of the basic principles underlying the development of the Soviet Armed Forces is therefore of major interest and pressing importance for all countries of the world socialist system and for the states which have embarked on the non-capitalist road of development.

Correlation of the Foundations and Principles of the Armed Forces Development

p The organisation and development of the Soviet Armed Forces is directly bound up with the nature of the socialist state.

p The objective socio-economic and political foundations of the development of the Armed Forces are the Soviet socialist social and state systems, the alliance between the working class and 229 the peasantry, the socio-political and ideological unity of society, the unity and friendship of the Soviet peoples. The material, technical and economic foundation of the might of the Soviet Armed Forces is the socialist economy, notably heavy industry, transport, communications, and socialist agriculture.

p The ideological and theoretical foundation of the development of the Soviet Armed Forces is Marxism-Leninism and its teaching on war and the army, the communist ideology, which is the only ideology in the country.

p By its leadership, organisational and ideological work the Communist Party guides the development of the economic and socio-political foundations so as to ensure the strengthening of the defensive might of the Soviet state, the might of the Soviet Armed Forces. This is promoted also by the use of the Marxist-Leninist teaching in the development of the Armed Forces, by the education of the Armed Forces personnel in the spirit of its noble ideas. The leadership by the Communist Party of the Armed Forces is the fundamental basis underlying Soviet military development.

p While the concept “foundations” answers the question of what determines the social nature and purpose of the armed forces of a socialist state, the concept “principles” answers the question: in what way should the armed forces development be carried out so as to secure that they will correspond to the nature of the socialist state, will be able to fulfil their purpose and the tasks facing them at every stage of the development of socialist society.

p The principles of Soviet Armed Forces development are the basic ideas or propositions by which the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are guided in their military policy, in the development of the Armed Forces, and also those guiding all military departments, commanders and chiefs, and the Party organisations in the Army and the Navy. They are determined notably by the social and state system, by the aggregate of social relations, and by a number of other factors. As regards their content, these principles scientifically reflect the regularities of the class struggle in the world, the building of socialism and communism, the nature and possibilities of the socialist system at the various stages of its development, and also the 230 development of means and methods of warfare. They reflect the real links and relations between the social and state system and the Armed Forces, between the Armed Forces and the people, the CPSU and the Soviet Army and Navy, and those within the Armed Forces themselves. In other words, the principles are a scientific reflection of the socio-political and economic foundations, a concrete application of the Marxist-Leninist teaching in the military field.

p The armed forces development is a complex and manyfaceted process. In keeping with the basic aspects of this process it is expedient to divide the principles underlying the development of the Soviet Armed Forces into the following three groups: 1) socio-political principles; 2) organisational principles, and 3) principles of training and education. Naturally, the division into these three groups is but relative and conditional.

The development of the Soviet Armed Forces is indissolubly linked with the principles of general state and Party development and is, in effect, a concrete application of these principles to the specific tasks of the military organisation. Lenin said that the experience gained in the development of the Armed Forces should not be considered in isolation from the other fields of Soviet organisation. “The development of our army,” he emphasised, “led to successful results only because it was carried on in the spirit of general Soviet organisation."  [230•1 

Socio-Political Principles

p On the one hand, the socio-political principles of the Soviet Armed Forces development reflect socialist social relations and the state system, and on the other, express the conscious, purposive activity of the Communist Party and the Soviet state in the military field, are a practical application of Marxist-Leninist ideas.

p The Programme of the CPSU, Party Congress decisions and other Party documents emphasise the decisive role of the leading, organising and educational activity of the Communist Party in the development of the Armed Forces. “The Party works unremittingly to increase its organising and guiding influence on the entire life and activity of the Army, Air Force and Navy, to rally the servicemen round 231 the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, to strengthen the unity of the Armed Forces and the people, and to educate the soldiers in the spirit of courage, bravery, heroism and comradeship with the armies of the socialist countries, of readiness at any moment to take up the defence of their Soviet country, which is building communism,"  [231•1  says the Programme of the CPSU.

p The increase in the leading role of the Communist Party in the life of the Armed Forces, the strengthening of the influence in them of Party organisations are the main sociopolitical principle, the most important regularity in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

p The leading and guiding activity of the CPSU in the development of the Armed Forces assumes many forms. It embraces a wide range of questions—from military policy to the training and education of the personnel—and is carried out in accordance with the Leninist Party principles pertaining to the leadership of the Armed Forces.

p The CPSU determines the policy of the military department, guides it directly and sees to it that the outlined political course is followed. As early as in 1918 the Central Committee adopted at Lenin’s proposal the decision “On the Policy of the Military Department" which stated that “the policy of the Military Department, as indeed that of all other departments and institutions, shall be pursued on the basis of the general instructions given by the Party as represented by its Central Committee, and under its direct control".  [231•2 

p Subsequent CPSU decisions stressed that this is one of the most important principles of the Leninist Party in the leadership of the Army and Navy which must be strictly observed in military development.

p The new universal military service law is a further development of these principles.

p Systematic, efficient Party-political work is one of the Leninist principles for the guidance of the Armed Forces and is an important means by which the Communist Party 232 influences the life and activity of the Army and Navy. Lenin noted that a sound foundation for the Soviet Army had been built thanks to the selfless organisational and Party-propaganda work carried on by Communists and Party organisations, by the finest people of the working class.

p Party-political work strengthens the military might of the Soviet Army and Navy, military discipline among the personnel, and educates the soldiers in the spirit of devotion to the country, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, of friendship between peoples and proletarian internationalism, in the spirit of revolutionary vigilance and hatred for the enemies of communism. Party-political work helps the soldiers correctly to understand the policy of the Communist Party, develops among the servicemen a feeling of personal responsibility for the defence of the country, for the combat readiness of all units.

p The Communist Party takes effective measures to further improve Party-political and ideological work, to strengthen its links with the practice of communist construction, with the tasks of raising the military might and combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

p The Party-political work in the Army and Navy is carried on by political bodies, commanders at all levels, political workers, Party and Komsomol organisations.

p The political bodies are a component part of the organisational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces; they hold an important place in their life and military activities. A specific feature of the political bodies is that they combine Party and administrative functions. In the field of Partypolitical work they are the leading bodies of the CPSU in the Armed Forces.

p The entire ideological and political work of the political bodies is aimed at improving the combat training and combat readiness of the troops, at fostering in the soldiers devotion to the country, to the cause of communism and hatred for the enemy, faithfulness to their oath of allegiance, the striving strictly to observe laws and field regulations.

p The political bodies expertly go into all aspects of the combat training and political education of the personnel, 233 organise Marxist-Leninist studies for the officers, help the commanding personnel rectify shortcomings in their work, strengthen the one-man command principle and military discipline. They control the Party organisations on the basis of Leninist principles and standards of Party life, develop the initiative and creative activity of every Party organisation in the fulfilment of the decisions of the CPSU and the tasks set to the Armed Forces by the Party and the Government.

p Party organisations play an enormous role in implementing the policy of the Party in the Armed Forces, in carrying on Party-political work among the soldiers. They are called upon to look into all aspects of the combat training and political education of soldiers, closely to coordinate Party-political and educational work with the concrete tasks of the personnel, to direct all the powers and energy of the latter at the excellent mastery of modern weapons and equipment, at the strengthening of military discipline. The Party organisations in the Army and Navy constantly raise the vanguard role of Communists in combat training and political studies, in military discipline, see to it that Communists should zealously pursue the Party policy and be ahead in everything.

p The Komsomol organisations are the Party’s true helpers in the work with young soldiers. They work under the guidance of the political bodies and Party organisations. The Komsomol organisations are called upon to support all patriotic undertakings in the troops, to imbue the Komsomol members and all the young people with MarxistLeninist ideas, selfless devotion to the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, faithfulness and selflessness in their service to the country. They organise cultural and sports activities among the soldiers, and thereby raise their physical fitness and cultural level.

p The CPSU is strong and invincible because it not only teaches the masses, but also learns from them, carefully studies the signs foreboding future developments and actively supports every initiative of the working people that promotes the cause of communism. Lenin said that success can be achieved only by him who immerses himself deeply into the stream of the people’s creative endeavour, who is able to associate himself closely with the 234 masses and to direct their creative activity at shaping new forms of social life.

p The CPSU takes care that commanders and political workers, Party organisations and all Communists should always be in close touch with the mass of the servicemen, study their feelings and requirements and react to them without delay. The Party organisations and Communists holding command posts should always support the creative initiative of the soldiers, introduce and popularise the experience of advanced officers, NCOs and men.

p In addition to collective forms of work much importance is attached to the educational work Communists conduct with individual servicemen, to the thorough study of the abilities of servicemen and the causes of their difficulties and successes, to giving them comradely assistance in their studies and the fulfilment of their various duties.

p Such close contacts with the soldiers promote the development of criticism and self-criticism, help opportunely to reveal shortcomings in the training and education of the soldiers, and in Party-political work, and to take measures to remove these shortcomings.

p An important place in the life of the Soviet Armed Forces is held by various links of the Army and Navy Party organisations and the political bodies with local Party organisations. Communist servicemen participate in the work of Party conferences and congresses, have the right to elect and be elected to the relevant territorial Party bodies.

p Political bodies and local Party committees inform each other of the Party-political work they are carrying on, organise lectures by representatives of local Party and government bodies in which the soldiers are informed of the working people’s achievements in communist construction, while servicemen address the working people.

p The leadership of the Armed Forces by the Party is based on the creative application of the Marxist-Leninist teaching. This is the unshakeable ideological and theoretical basis of the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Speaking of the enormous difficulties the Communist Party had to cope with in forming for the first time ever an army of a new type, Lenin said that this entirely novel task had 235 been successfully fulfilled because the Party had consistently been guided in it by the Marxist teaching.

p At all stages of military development the Marxist- Leninist theory guided the practical activity of the Communist Party, the Soviet state and the entire people, directed at strengthening the defensive capacity of the country.

p Marxism-Leninism is the theoretical foundation of Soviet military science and military doctrine, determining the development of the Armed Forces and the way in which they are used in modern war.

p ihe most important socio-political principle governing the development of the Soviet Armed Forces is the further consolidation of the unity between the Army and the people. As distinct from the exploiter classes, who do everything to isolate the army from the people, the Communist Party considers that the stronger the links between the army and the people, the more successfully will the army fulfil its historical mission of being the defender of the people’s interests and freedom, of their socialist gains.

p The close links between the Soviet state and the masses, its close links with the workers and peasants are the political basis upon which rests the unity between the Armed Forces and the people.

p The love and care of the people for their Armed Forces is manifested in many ways: they supply the Army and Navy with first-class weapons and military equipment, food, and uniforms. Of enormous importance to the soldiers of the Soviet Army is the people’s moral support, which inspires them to heroic exploits in battles against enemies.

p A striking manifestation of the unity between the Soviet Army and Navy and the people is direct participation by the working people in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, such as universal military training, home guard detachments (during the foreign intervention and the Civil War), people’s volunteer corps, anti-paratroop battalions, local anti-aircraft units (during the Great Patriotic War), and the fruitful activity of the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy.

p The Party educates Communists, all Soviet people in the spirit of constant readiness to defend the socialist country, of love for their army. It promotes in every way the activities of voluntary defence organisations.

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p Another aspect of the practical embodiment of the unity between the army and the people in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces is the soldiers’ boundless love for their people, their selfless defence of the people’s interests.

p A vivid manifestation of this was the mass heroism, courage and bravery of the Soviet troops in the defence of their country. The unity between the army and the people is also displayed by the various links of units, formations, military institutions and military educational establishments with collectives of industrial plants and building sites, collective and state farmers, schoolchildren and students, and members of voluntary organisations. Commanders, political workers and army propagandists participate actively in propaganda, cultural and educational work among the working people in town and country, and in carrying out various socio-political campaigns. The Soviet soldiers also help the working people in economic development.

p The participation of servicemen in the work of the Soviets and local Party and Komsomol organisations is also an important form of links between the Armed Forces and the people. The extension and strengthening of the links of Party organisations, political bodies and military councils in the Army and Navy with local Party, government, Komsomol and trade union organisations render invaluable help to the Armed Forces in the patriotic education of the soldiers, help them to realise and feel their unity with the people even more deeply.

p The class principle once played a major role in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. It expressed the class nature of the state and of the Armed Forces, the fact that they were a weapon of the proletarian dictatorship. This principle was manifested and implemented in various forms: in the selection and distribution of the command personnel; in the recruitment of the Army and Navy, in which much attention was given to increasing the percentage of workers in the Armed Forces, while non-working, exploiter elements were banned from the ranks. This principle was also expressed in the content of the ideological and political education of the soldiers.

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p Some of the forms expressing the class principle in the development of the Armed Forces changed when the remnants of the exploiter classes in the country had been abolished and the moral and political unity of society achieved.

p This change is expressed in particular in the way in which the Army and Navy personnel is recruited, in the selection and appointment of the officers. Before the triumph of socialism in the USSR there were limitations for non-working people, for people descending from the former exploiter classes (kulaks, merchants and others); as of 1936, however, these limitations were removed because they were no longer pertinent following the liquidation of these groups. The right and duty to defend the socialist country applied in equal measure to all Soviet citizens.

p Social origin is also disregarded in the selection and promotion of officers. At present the Armed Forces are officered by the best representatives of all layers of Soviet society. The main criterion in promotion in the Army and Navy are devotion to the people and the socialist country, high moral-political and business qualities, individual abilities.

p Another principle governing the development of the Soviet Armed Forces is the principle of strengthening socialist internationalism and the friendship of the peoples of the USSR. It is expressed in the fact that all socialist nations and nationalities in the USSR have a single military organisation—the multinational Armed Forces; that the equal right and duty of all citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their nationality and race, to fulfil their military duty, is strictly observed; that the education of Soviet soldiers is carried on in the spirit of friendship and fraternity between the peoples of the USSR, in the spirit of friendship with the peoples of the socialist countries and the military co-operation with their armies, in the spirit of deep respect for all working people, of the awareness of their internationalist duty to the working people of all countries.

p In the first years of the Soviet power Lenin advanced the idea of the military unity of the Soviet Republics, which has been successfully realised. Such measures as the establishment of a single command over all formations of the Red Army, the strict centralisation in the distribution of all 238 forces and resources of the socialist republics, the unification of supply, transport and other vital branches, were among the decisive conditions securing the Soviet Republic’s victory in the Civil War.

p The military unity became even stronger and acquired a qualitatively new content and form when the peoples of the fraternal Soviet socialist republics united in a single state—the USSR, and created single Armed Forces.

p The idea of uniting the military efforts of the socialist states for the joint rebuff of imperialist aggressors is of enormous importance in present-day conditions. It has been embodied in the defensive alliance of the Warsaw Treaty member-countries and the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, and also in the bilateral treaties between the socialist countries on friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance. “If the need arises, the closely knit family of signatories to the Pact will rise solidly in defence of the socialist system, in defence of the free life of our peoples, and will deliver a crushing blow to any aggressor."  [238•1 

It was stated at the 24th CPSU Congress that “the Party highly values the patriotic spirit of Soviet people and their readiness to devote themselves wholly to promoting their socialist motherland’s prosperity and defending the gains of the Revolution and the cause of socialism".  [238•2 

Organisational Principles

p The concrete historical conditions in which the proletarian revolution is carried out and in which socialist construction is launched, determine the character of the military organisation of the socialist states.

p The Soviet Government encountered enormous difficulties in creating the Army and Navy because there was no experience in the development of the armed forces of a socialist state. “The organisation of a Red Army,” Lenin said, “was an entirely new question which had never been dealt with before, even theoretically."  [238•3 

p Karl Marx and Frederick Engels advanced the idea of creating a proletarian military organisation of a new type. 239 On the basis of an analysis and generalisation of the experience of the 1848-1849 revolution, and especially of the Paris Commune, they drew the conclusion that the first commandment of any victorious revolution is to smash the old army, to disband it, and to create a new one in its place.

p In defining the character of the victorious proletariat’s military organisation, Marx and Engels proceeded, first, from the premise that the socialist revolution would triumph simultaneously in all or in most of developed capitalist countries; second, from the state of the armed forces and military skills in the second half of the 19th century; third, from an analysis of the internal nature of socialist society.

p They therefore believed that wars between socialist countries and bourgeois or pre-bourgeois states would be possible only during the first period of the revolution and that the socialist state would need a massive armed force during that period only. Marx and Engels took into account also the fact that in the past century a strong military bureaucratic machine had been created only in the large European continental states (France, Germany, Russia), while Britain and the USA did not as yet possess such forces. In view of the above Marx and Engels formulated the proposition that in the process of the socialist revolution the bourgeois army must be replaced by the general arming of the people, by a socialist militia.

p The Russian Marxists, headed by Lenin, developed this Marxist proposition and rendered it concrete.

p Lenin and the Bolshevik Party worked out a military programme for the proletarian revolution in the new historical conditions. They advanced the task of smashing the old army and creating a military organisation of the socialist state, and laid a theoretical foundation for the need to carry out these tasks.

p Before the October Revolution and immediately after its triumph, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government did not intend to create a regular army, but were guided by the Marxist proposition of replacing the regular army by a socialist militia. The armed intervention of international imperialism and the vast scope assumed by the Civil War made it necessary to revise this proposition. It was Lenin’s great merit that he was the first Marxist 240 courageously to advance and to lay a theoretical foundation for the idea that the Soviet state needed a regular army.

p The basic principles for the organisation of the Soviet army were laid down in Lenin’s works and in Party decisions. The main principles underlying this organisation are: the setting up of regular Armed Forces; the improvement of their structure; the co-ordinated development of the services and arms of the services, their constant combat readiness; the selection and appointment of officers in accordance with their business and political qualities, and their education in the spirit of boundless devotion to the socialist country and to the cause of communism; centralism in the organisational structure and in the control of the troops; one-man command and strict military discipline. The Soviet Armed Forces were created while desperate battles were waged against numerous enemies coming on from all sides. The lack of any experience in this field posed additional difficulties to the Party and was responsible for some mistakes: there were people who did not understand that the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army would be unable to fulfil its historical mission without strict military discipline and a centralised command.

p The enemies of the Soviet Union took advantage of all these difficulties. They frenziedly resisted all measures taken by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in the development of the Army and Navy. The SocialistRevolutionaries, Mensheviks and various anarchist elements, all opposed the setting up of a regular, disciplined army with a single centralised command. The Communist Party headed by Lenin fought these opponents resolutely.

p At the Eighth Party Congress Lenin and his followers decisively rebuffed the “army opposition”, which was against strict discipline and centralised command of the army, insisted on a continuation of the partisan tactics inherited from the past, and thus obstructed the setting up of a regular army. The views of the “army opposition" were rejected and branded wrong and harmful. The Congress adopted Lenin’s proposal to set up a regular Red Army. At the same time the Congress pointed out that it would be possible to make the transition to a socialist militia, when this would be warranted by the international situation.

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p A regular army is superior to the militia system. The troops of a regular army are much better trained, disciplined and organised.

p The formations and units of the regular army are raised and stationed irrespective of the place of domicile and work of the draftees. Citizens called to the colours are freed from all other kinds of work for a long time, and military service becomes their main occupation. This makes it possible to organise their systematic training. The nucleus of the regular army is the cadre commanding echelon which is made up of professional soldiers.

p The regular army of the socialist state is formed on the basis of the universal military service. The Constitution of the USSR says that military service in the Armed Forces of the USSR is the honourable duty of citizens of the USSR. In accordance with the above the new Law on Universal Military Service stipulates that all male citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their race, nationality, faith, education, social and property status shall serve in the Soviet Armed Forces. The law provides for military service also of women having medical or other specialised training. The law provides for the training for the Army and Navy of specialists from among young people prior to.their being called up for active service.

p The regular army is superior to a militia type of organisation when a military attack threatens the country and in times of war. The regular army is able to take action and rebuff a sudden attack of the enemy without preliminary mobilisation. This is particularly important in contemporary conditions, when the threat of sudden nuclear strikes by the aggressors hangs over the socialist countries.

p Regular armed forces therefore form the basis of the military organisation in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. As long as the imperialist powers have powerful regular armies and reject the idea of general and complete disarmament, the socialist countries are compelled to preserve and improve their regular armed forces.

p The principle of the organisation of a regular army and navy is indissolubly linked with the principle of the continual improvement of their organisational structure, the proportionate and co-ordinated development of the services 242 and arms of the services, the maintenance of constant combat readiness in accordance with the development of military affairs and the tasks of the armed defence of the socialist country.

p The CPSU does not believe in looking for an absolutely correct form of Party organisation, one that would be suitable at all the stages of the revolutionary process, and also of methods for the work of such an organisation. The forms of the organisation and the methods of its work depend wholly on the specific historical situation and the tasks arising from it.

p As applied to the development of the Armed Forces this principle means that the question of the structure of the Armed Forces, of changes in organisational forms and the correlation of the services and arms is decided by the Communist Party on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the country’s internal affairs and international situation, of the development of the means and methods of armed struggle, in accordance with the tasks of defending the socialist country.

p The Communist Party has always shown great concern for the development of the new services and arms, vigilantly followed the rapid development of new weapons and equipment in the capitalist world. Prior to the industrialisation of the country, however, the Soviet state had only very limited possibilities in this field. Socialist industrialisation has created a powerful defence industry which has made it possible to technically re-equip the Soviet Army, to create new services so as to keep pace with the contemporary level of military affairs.

p A powerful Air Force and Navy, artillery units, armoured and mechanised troops, and special technical troops were set up and infantry units and formations were supplied with new arms and equipment. The organisational structure of the Armed Forces improved accordingly.  [242•1 

p The continuous improvement of the organisational structure, the development and correct correlation of all services and arms were important to ensuring the supremacy and victory of the Soviet Armed Forces over the nazi Army and Navy in the Great Patriotic War.

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p In connection with the revolution in military affairs and the important changes in the international situation in the post-war years, the CPSU and the Soviet Government have continued to give their unrelenting attention to improving the organisational structure of the Army and Navy.

p The consistent use of the Leninist organisational principles, tested and corroborated by the long-standing experience of the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, is an important condition for the correspondence of the organisational structure of the armed forces to the modern level of military affairs and the complex tasks of ensuring the security of the Soviet Union and of the entire socialist community.

p Of the greatest importance to the development of the Soviet Armed Forces is the principle of centralism. It is an adaptation to the specific conditions in the Soviet Armed Forces of the principle of democratic centralism, which underlies Party and government development.

p The need for strict centralisation in the Armed Forces is dictated by the nature of their tasks. The leadership and control of the troops must secure the maximum of organisation and discipline, the flexibility and rapidity of action necessary to fulfil combat tasks in actions against a strong and skilled enemy, and to establish co-operation in combat. An efficient centralised leadership and control of the troops is particularly important in modern conditions, when the Army and Navy are equipped with nuclear weapons, when there is the danger of a sudden attack by imperialist aggressors, who may use all and every means of mass destruction.

p The principle of centralism in the organisational structure of the Armed Forces and in the system of their control consists in the subordination of all formations of the Army and Navy and of their command bodies to the central bodies of the state power, to a single supreme command. The lower command bodies shall strictly fulfil the orders, directives and instructions of superior bodies and account to them for their activity, for the morale, political state, combat efficiency and combat readiness of the troops. Centralism in the development of the Armed Forces is ensured by their nation-wide structuring, the appointment 244 of the higher commanding personnel by the government bodies and the relevant command, by the rigid control over compliance with orders effected by senior links over subordinates.

p The system of centralised command is characterised by the demarcation of the functions of the central command apparatus and the links subordinated to it, since this promotes broad initiative and the necessary independence of action in the fulfilment of their tasks. Particular importance is attached to the maintenance of constant links between the command and the troops.

p The principle of one-man command is a most important principle in the Armed Forces development.

p Lenin laid the theoretical foundation for the need to apply one-man command, especially in the army. He emphasised that under socialism there is no fundamental contradiction between socialist democratism and the vesting of extensive authority in individuals because such authority is vested in the latter by the genuinely popular Soviet power, which selects them from among the most worthy representatives of the people, who are able successfully to implement the policy of the Party and the Government, correctly to express the will of the working people. Every commander acts under the constant supervision of the Party and the Soviet government and is accountable to them.

p One-man command emerged and developed in the Armed Forces as an expression of the objective need for ensuring the unity of will and action of large masses of people, iron discipline and organisation to achieve definite aims, for example, the concentration of all forces to rout the enemy. This unity and purposefulness of action can be attained, Lenin said, by subordinating the will of thousands to the will of one, by the strict subordination of the mass to the single will of the commanders. The experience of the Red Army clearly supports the need for one-man command which has proved to be the best method of command. “This experience,” Lenin said, “is worth thinking about. Developing systematically, it passed from a corporate form that was casual and vague to a corporate form elevated to the status of a system of organisation and permeating all the institutions of the army; and now, as a general tendency, it has 245 arrived at the principle of one-man responsibility as the only correct method of work."  [245•1 

p Considering one-man command the most suitable form of command, the Communist Party resolved this question by taking into account the social make-up of the commanding personnel, their training and political maturity, and also the willingness of the masses to accept a definite form of command.

p In the first years of the development of the Red Army, when a large number of ex-officers of the old tsarist army were among the commanders, and also in the headquarters, while the Red commanders did not possess sufficient military-theoretical knowledge and experience in political work, a form of command had to be found that would serve- the interests of the proletarian dictatorship and would at the same time suit the specific features of the military organisation. Dual command, under which a unit was headed by two persons—the commander and the commissar—was such a form.

p During the Civil War and the foreign armed intervention the commissars played an exclusively important role in the formation and consolidation of the Red Army. They introduced organisation and iron proletarian discipline into the ranks, inspired them to heroism in action, consolidated them round the Bolshevik Party. In addition to carrying on Party-political work, the commissars supervised all the specific army activities—drill, administrative and logistic work, combat training, etc.

p When alien and unworthy commanders had been weeded out and the political and military-theoretical level of commanders hailing from the working people had risen, it became unnecessary for two persons to deal simultaneously and in parallel with command, administrative and logistic questions. The increase in the share of Party members among the commanders, and the intense political education of the commanders created conditions for the merging of the two lines of command—the military and the political. Therefore, in keeping with the decisions of the Party CC, preparations were made for the introduction of one-man 246 command throughout the army as early as 1924, and it was implemented in 1928.

p Later, the institution of commissars, vested with wide powers, was reintroduced for a short period in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War. After the military commissars had carried out their functions one-man command was reinstated in the Armed Forces in October 1942. Many commissars and political workers were transferred to commanding posts and others were appointed assistant commanders for political matters in units and formations.

p One-man command in the army means that the commander is personally responsible to the Party and government for all aspects of the life and activity of the unit under his command (warships, units and institutions of the Soviet Army and Navy), that he is in charge of training, political, administrative and economic matters.

p The concentration of all command functions in his hands enables the commander to make the work of all his subordinates extremely purposeful. One-man command creates particularly favourable conditions for smooth and flexible control during combat action, for the effective use of the material and technical means and human resources in the fulfilment of combat tasks, and ensures the unity of the personnel’s will and action.

p One-man command in the armies of socialist countries differs fundamentally from one-man command in the armies of exploiter states. This distinction is conditioned by the different socio-political content of the functions carried out by the commanders in armies of countries with opposing social systems. This opposition is at the root of differences in, first, the possibilities of the commanders in these armies, second, in the methods used to maintain military discipline, and, third, in the type of one-man command.

p In the armies of the socialist countries the commanders rely on the assistance of the Party and Komsomol organisations, use all forms of mass work possible in the Armed Forces to ensure the active participation of the men in the implementation of the tasks connected with combat training and political education, in the strengthening of military discipline and the adherence to the field regulations. Among them are soldiers’ meetings and conferences attended by various categories of servicemen, the press, socialist 247 emulation drives, etc. All commanders and chiefs are obliged to develop and encourage criticism and self-criticism, which is an important means of revealing and removing shortcomings in the life and activity of the units.

p The orders of officers are not subject to criticism, which is explained by the specifics of the military organisation and the tasks fulfilled by the army.

p While the order itself is not subject to discussion and must be carried out without remonstrance, the question of how to ensure its execution in time and in the best possible way can and must be discussed at Party and Komsomol meetings, at conferences and meetings of servicemen, when conditions permit the holding of such meetings and conferences. Such discussions help the soldiers to understand their tasks, mobilise the soldiers for their fulfilment.

p One-man command in the Armed Forces, even though it is the main form of command, does not exclude collegiate forms, but is rationally combined with them.

p Military councils are bodies of collective leadership. They incorporate not only the military leaders, but also leading Party functionaries. The military councils discuss key questions concerning the life and activity of the troops. This gives commanders greater confidence in controlling their troops, in implementing the policy of the Party and the government.

p Party-political work, the active participation of the commanders in its organisation and implementation, are a necessary condition for carrying out and strengthening one-man command.

p Thanks to the constant care of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, the commanders are well trained in military-technical and operational-tactical respects, educated in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, socialist patriotism and internationalism, and enjoy well-deserved authority with their subordinates.

p The commanders (chiefs) in the Army and Navy enjoy authority because they are competent in their profession, are experienced leaders and organisers, and because the Party and government have placed trust in them. Incontestable authority is enjoyed by commanders who constantly take pains to raise their military and political standards, give an example to their subordinates of unreproachable 248 conduct, of strict observance of laws, regulations, orders and instructions. To build up their authority commanders should maintain constant contacts with the officers and men, personally guide the combat training and political education themselves, take care to ensure the satisfaction of the material and spiritual requirements of the servicemen, to be demanding on themselves and on their subordinates, just and polite.

p The maintenance of strict military discipline based on the high consciousness of the soldiers is one of the most important principles in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. This principle is specific in that it arises from the social nature of the Soviet Army and Navy as a military organisation of a new type, and at the same time underlies both the organisation of the Armed Forces development and the training and education of the troops.

p Military discipline is an inalienable part of any army. Discipline in the Soviet Army differs radically from the discipline in the armies of exploiter states. Relations of cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance between the working people, and the social and political unity of the people, are the social basis of Soviet military discipline; communist consciousness, the understanding and conscious fulfilment by the servicemen of their military duty are its ideological basis.

p Counterposing Soviet military discipline to the brutal and unthinking discipline in bourgeois armies, Lenin said: “An army needs the strictest discipline... . The Red Army established unprecedentedly firm discipline—not by means of the lash, but based on the intelligence, loyalty and devotion of the workers and peasants themselves."  [248•1 

p In the USSR military discipline “is based not on fear of punishment or on coercion, but on the high political consciousness and communist education of the servicemen, on their deep understanding of their patriotic duty, the internationalist tasks of their people, on their selfless devotion to the socialist country, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. But persuasion does not exclude the adoption of coercive measures to servicemen who are negligent in the 249 fulfilment of their military duties."  [249•1  Lenin said that coercion, when it is necessary, can be used successfully only if it is based on persuasion. “Persuasion,” Lenin said, “must come before coercion."  [249•2 

p In the Soviet Army and Navy military discipline cannot be maintained mechanically, as it is in the armies of the imperialist states, where it is imposed by means of violence and the duping of the soldiers, and also by bribing part of the servicemen. When the socialist revolution begins, a different discipline is born, one based on trust and the organisation of the working people, on comradeship, respect, independence and initiative.

p Emphasising the decisive importance of persuasion in maintaining strict military discipline, M. V. Frunze, a Soviet military leader, said that “the best commander will be the one who fulfils his task without resorting to repressive measures".  [249•3  This does not mean, of course, that there should be indulgence of servicemen who commit serious breaches of military discipline. In those cases coercive and disciplinary measures should be used without hesitation, but they should be used wisely so as to be educative.

p The main task is to inculcate in the soldiers a deep understanding of the importance and necessity for perfect organisation and strict military discipline.

p To ensure the constant combat readiness of the troops, Lenin said, it is necessary to secure “military discipline and military vigilance of the highest degree. . .".  [249•4 

p Lenin’s instruction has acquired particular importance in present-day conditions when the danger of the use by the imperialists of mass-destruction weapons has grown immeasurably. At present the enemy cannot be vanquished in battle without the most efficient organisation and strictest discipline, which requires an accurate and unconditional fulfilment of the orders and instructions given by commanders.

p Strict military discipline is possible only if the 250 regulations are firmly observed, if strictness by the commander is combined with daily educational work, if Party and Komsomol members show an example of accurate execution of duties and of perfect conduct.

Public pressure on servicemen neglecting their duties plays a major role in strengthening military discipline. Such pressure may take the form of discussions of their conduct at servicemen’s meetings, in the Komsomol organisation, criticism in the press, etc. Of greatest importance is the personal example and authority of commanders and chiefs, and their strictness. Genuine strictness is incompatible with rudeness to one’s subordinates. The CPSU supports strict and just commanders and chiefs, but condemns all distortions of the principles of Soviet military discipline, all errors in its enforcement.

The Principles of Education and Training

p The Soviet Armed Forces have a streamlined system for the military training and political education of the personnel, the unshakeable ideological basis of which is Marxism-Leninism. The main task of that system is to develop soldiers’ faculties in all respects for the defence of the socialist country, to educate in them high moral and combat qualities, to arm them with profound political and military-technical knowledge, to help them work out practical skills and the ability to wage armed struggle.

p The means and methods of educational work, the organisation of combat training and political education must correspond to the aims and tasks of education and training. The unity of the aims, means and methods is achieved by the consistent application of principles of education and training which reflect the objective regularities of the education of members of socialist society, the education and training of Soviet soldiers.

p The general principles of training and education are: communist purposefulness and devotion to the Party; the close connection of training and education with the practical tasks of communist construction, with the task of strengthening the might and combat readiness of the Armed Forces; the education and training of soldiers whilst they are going through service and their active participation in that process; the combination of mass forms of training and 251 education with a differentiated approach to the trainees, individual work with them; the combination of strictness to subordinates with respect for their personal dignity and concern for their needs.

p Alongside with these general principles applying to training and education in all fields, there are specific principles, applying primarily to the various fields of the training of Soviet soldiers, for example, such principles as the use of visual methods, simplicity, etc.

p The specific feature of these principles is their clearly expressed purposefulness, their subordination to the fundamental tasks the Soviet people and their Armed Forces have to implement. This is strikingly demonstrated, for example, by the principle of communist purposefulness and devotion to the Party. The process of the education and training can be effective only if the educators have a clear understanding of the aims of communist education, if the ideological level of the measures taken is high and tends to grow further, if it takes into account the future trends of training and education. This principle incorporates purposefulness in the choice and use of the means and methods used by the commanders, political workers, Party and Komsomol organisations.

p The application of the principles of training and education of the personnel presupposes, first and foremost, the fulfilment of the requirements of the CPSU in the ideological field, the ideological and political education of the servicemen.

p The proper application of the principles of training and education depends largely on the officer corps, on the educators. Therefore, the education of leaders, of the educators themselves, is a highly important task. All officers in the Army and Navy, irrespective of the posts they hold, are the leaders and educators of their subordinates. They must therefore possess high Party qualities, master the MarxistLeninist theory and concrete sciences to perfection and apply them in practice. “The Party,” the Programme of the CPSU says, “will work indefatigably to train Army and Navy officers and political personnel fully devoted to the communist cause and recruited among the finest representatives of the Soviet people. It considers it necessary for the officer corps tirelessly to master Marxist-Leninist theory, to 252 possess a high standard of military-technical training, meet all the requirements of modern military theory and practice, strengthen military discipline."  [252•1 

p The greater demands made upon the commanders in connection with the equipment of the troops with complicated weapons and the more complex tasks facing them in the training and education of their men make it necessary for every commander to possess the qualities of a leader, to be proficiently trained in all military fields, to be an organiser and educator. These qualities are worked out and developed by daily studies and self-education. Only those officers, who systematically study and are familiar with the great achievements in the social and natural sciences, technology and military science, can become good educators and leaders. Military leaders must know how to work with people, must know the fundamentals of pedagogics and psychology, constantly show concern for the living conditions, studies and the organisation of the leisure of their subordinates.

p Special attention is given to the education of young officers, the education and training of sergeants, the most numerous commanding personnel and the assistants of the officers in the education and training of men.

p An important means of educating and training soldiers, of ensuring a high combat efficiency and constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces is a well-planned and efficiently organised combat training and political education of the ranks. In the Soviet Armed Forces they are fully subordinated to the requirement of teaching the soldiers what is needed in war, training the troops to vanquish a strong and technically well-equipped opponent. Training must therefore be carried out in conditions resembling combat as closely as possible and in a spirit of active offensive operations against an aggressor with a view to routing him utterly.

p The principle of the unity of training and education is consistently- implemented in the combat training and political education of Soviet soldiers. This is a necessary condition for raising the quality of combat training, the 253 education in the soldiers of love for the army, a conscious attitude to the subjects of study, a striving to use the knowledge they acquire in the most eificient way.

p A specific feature of all training and education in the Soviet Armed Forces is that it is deeply scientific. The CPSU proceeds from the view that defects in the training and education of the servicemen cannot be remedied in the course of a war. Therefore, training and education must be arranged so that decisive results are obtained in peacetime. This must be promoted by the corresponding moral and psychological preparation of the soldiers.

The results of the training and education of the soldiers find concentrated expression in the constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces, which is determined by the readiness of all services and all arms, and also of the logistics agencies. At the same time constant combat readiness depends on every serviceman, on his energy, knowledge, skill and initiative, on the various sub-units, crews, units, warships, etc.