Novosti Press Agency Publishing House
Moscow, 1972
This is a collection of articles from the Soviet press, exposing the policy of the Chinese leadership for what it is---a policy harmful to the cause of socialism, and the world revolutionary and liberation movements.
[3] ~ [4] CONTENTS I Pseudo-Revolutionaries Unmasked..... 8 0. Vladimiroi', V. Ryazanov, Concerning the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China . 35 1. Alexandrov, Concerning the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China . . . . . 64 N. Lomakin, N. Petrovichev, Renunciation of the Principles of Marxism-Leninism.....80 II P. Fedoseyev, Maoism: Its Ideological and Political Essence............100 V. Lektorsky, G. Batishchev, V. Kurayev, Dialectics, Genuine and Spurious........123 L. Gudoshnikov, B. Topornin, Crisis in the Political Development of China........144 A. Arzamastsev, Maoism Preaches Poverty . . 165 T. Rakhimov, V. Bogoslovsky, Great-Power Chauvinism of Mao Tse-tung.......185 [5] Ill V. Glunin, A. Grigorycv, K, Kukushkin, M. Yuryev, The International Communist Movement and the Communist Party of China......196 /. Alexandrov, Regarding Peking-Washington Contacts ............232 G. Arbatov, Questions Requiring an Answer . . 242 /. Alexandrov, The Preaching and Practice of the Chinese Leaders.........2;>4 L. Kirichenko, Peking Foreign Policy Doctrines and Practice............277 Yu. Uladimirov, Concerning the Economic Relations Between the Soviet Union and China (1950--66) . 285 A. Nadezhdin, Peking Against the Socialist Community ............320 O. Ivanov, New Strategy for the Same Ends . . 332 D. Vostokov, The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China Since the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.......357 [6] __ALPHA_LVL1__ I __ALPHA_LVL2__ Pseudo-RevolutionariesThe centenary of the birth of V. I. Lenin has become a holiday for working people the world over. It has developed into a convincing demonstration of the triumph of Lenin's cause, the vitality of Lenin's ideas and behests. With the name of Lenin, with his all-triumphant teaching, are linked all the historical accomplishments of our agethe Great October Socialist Revolution and the building of socialism in the USSR, the establishment and consolidation of the world socialist system, the upsurge of the international working-class movement in the capitalist countries, the collapse of colonialism, and the emancipation of the oppressed nations.
The progressive world public has widely observed the Lenin centenary. Celebration of the birth centenary of the leader of the world revolution has served for the Communist and Workers' Parties, for all the fighters against imperialism, as a powerful stimulus in their entire ideological and political activities. The fraternal Parties have increased the struggle for the unity of the communist movement, for the cohesion of all antiimperialist forces.
In the minds and hearts of revolutionary fighters throughout the world Lenin's name is inseparably linked with the first socialist state and its Communist Party which consistently 8 implement his behests and continue his cause. The keynote of the Lenin celebrations in the majority of countries was recognition of the outstanding role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the world revolutionary process, expression of gratitude to the Leninist Party for its tireless heroic struggle, for its loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism, for its selfless assistance to all revolutionary liberation movements.
Socialism has achieved fresh successes in the world-wide battle for the minds and hearts of people. It has shown people everywhere the prospect for deliverance from imperialism, and more and more clearly demonstrates the superiority of its economic, social and political organisation. The community of socialist countries has become a force without which, and in defiance of which, not a single major problem of our time can be solved. The united might of the socialist countries and their active policy in defence of peace are effectively checking the aggressive ambitions of the imperialists and preventing the outbreak of a world rocket and nuclear war.
The celebration of the Lenin centenary has vividly reflected the growing tendency manifested at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties-the tendency towards united action of all revolutionary and progressive forces of the world; it has raised to a new level their ideological preparedness, and given a fresh and mighty impetus to the world revolutionary process which unites the three great forces of our time-the world socialist system, the international working-class and national-liberation movements.
9It is not surprising that the masters of the outgoing world are resorting to lies and slander in an attempt to discredit and belittle the historical accomplishments of Lenin's homeland, of the fraternal socialist countries, the world communist and working-class movement, and the fighters for national liberation. There is nothing new about their attempts to slander socialism, the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state.
The Soviet people and entire progressive mankind know the real reasons for the anti-socialist actions of imperialism. We first heard them more than half a century ago. What is worth noting is something else-the fact that during the days when the peoples of the world were celebrating Lenin's anniversary the Peking leaders came out in unison with imperialism's malicious anti-Soviet and anti-communist campaign. Peking has timed for the Lenin birth centenary a new phase of fanning animosity and hatred towards the Soviet Union, the countries of the socialist community, and the Communist and Workers' Parties of the world.
Hateful to Mao Tse-tung and his following are the successes of the USSR in the development of socialist industry, agriculture, science and technology, the steady rise in the living standard and cultural level of the masses, the strengthening of the defensive might of the Soviet Union, the tasks set by our Party for further intensification of socialist production for the purpose of building the material and technical basis of communism and strengthening the positions of world socialism. In its desire to discredit the inspiring example of the 10 Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, Peking propaganda resorts to incredible lies and distortions, abuses and slander.
Following in the wake of imperialist propagandists Peking repeats the lie about the `` aggressiveness'' of the USSR and the ``crisis'' of Soviet economy; it resuscitates Trotskyite ``ideas'' about "bourgeois degeneration of Soviet power,'' and equates US imperialism with the Soviet Union which they call "social-imperialism.''
Those in Peking stubbornly try to discredit the principles of socialist internationalism underlying the relations between the countries of the socialist community and declare that such community "does not exist.'' Things reached such a pass that Hitler's ravings have been dragged out into the open about the need to ``save'' the peoples from the "Slav danger.'' Following the leaders of the nazi Reich the Peking leaders are trying to portray the Soviet Union as a "colossus on clay legs,'' asserting that the USSR is only a "paper tiger" and threatening to "pierce it at one go.''
Such ravings make up the content of a series of articles published in April in the Jenmin jihpao, Hungchi and Chiefangchiun pao, and of an article marking May Day.
These publications show that Peking has made it a tradition to resort to methods of rabid political and ideological provocations so characteristic of imperialist propaganda.
Communists and all those who cherish the interests of peace and progress are deeply alarmed by the actions of the Chinese leaders in the international arena and seriously concerned about the destiny of the Chinese revolution.
The June 1969 International Conference of 11 Communist and Workers' Parties pointed out that recent events in China and the nature of the resolutions adopted at the 9th CPC Congress had a negative effect on the entire world situation and on the struggle of the anti-imperialist forces. The present CPC leaders are pursuing an anti-popular and anti-Leninist policy, carrying on subversive activities against the countries of the socialist community and seeking to split the ranks of anti-- imperialist forces.
The actions of the Chinese leaders following the International Conference, which Peking terms a "black gathering,'' show the soundness of the conclusions drawn by Marxist-Leninist Parties to the effect that the Chinese leaders have actually launched struggle against the world socialist system, the international communist movement and the revolutionary fighters all over the world.
All this calls for greater vigilance with respect to Peking's activities in the international arena and for watching closely which way the Mao group is leading China.
The entire home and foreign policy course of the Peking leaders is dictated by great-power and hegemonistic aspirations. It is for the sake of realizing these aspirations that China was turned into a proving ground of adventurous experiments, the burden of which fell heavily upon the shoulders of the Chinese people.
The People's Republic of China is going through an acute crisis in all spheres of its political, economic and cultural life. The Communist Party has been broken up. The constitutional bodies of people's power, trade-unions, 12 Komsomol and other democratic organisations and unions of artists and intellectuals have been dissolved. There is nothing left of the Communist Party except its name, for Mao and his associates are building up an altogether new political organisation which will serve as a tool of the militarybureaucratic dictatorship now being enforced in the country.
State power bodies in China are built on the militarist pattern inherited from Chiang Kaishek's rule. All power is concentrated in the hands of the military, Mao's yes-men, who are the bosses of the so-called revolutionary committees. The commanders of military areas, armies and garrisons are supreme masters in the provinces. They head the "revolutionary committees" and supervise the ``regulation'' of Party organisation!?. Army units are quartered at enterprises, educational establishments and offices. At industrial plants shops and teams are classed as companies and squads. The same militarist system is being introduced at government offices and educational institutions. The army controls the country's economy and culture.
Commanding army officers issue orders, which workers, peasants, office employees and students must carry out unconditionally. This is the way society is being run today in China, this is the way in which the ideas that all Chinese must be "obedient bulls,'' "eternally unrusting screws" and "Mao's good soldiers" are translated into practice. The Chinese people are being driven into barracks and are denied access to knowledge and culture: according to Mao Tse-tung, "the more a person knows, the more stupid he becomes.'' In the last four years not a single work of 13 fiction has been published and no feature film has been released in the country. All museums and libraries are closed down. Meanwhile, Mao quotation books and his other ``works'' are circulated in 3,000 million copies.
During these years more than 70 million children of school age were deprived of normal education in school. The country fell short of several million specialists, since the academic process at institutions of higher learning was broken off. Such is the result of the practical implementation of Mao's thesis: "Schools are little tombs out of which can come nothing but evil; they are shallow ponds swarming with turtles.'' Developing this thesis Mao said in 1964: "The course of science may be cut to half its present length. Confucius used to teach only six arts: ceremonies, music, arrow shooting, chariot driving, holy books and arithmetic... No matter how many books you read, you will not become an emperor... The point today is that, in the first place, there are many subjects and, secondly, there are many books.''
But despite all this, the Chinese rulers claim they are playing the part of Messiah in today's world.
Barracks, ignorance, arbitrariness and servitude-such is the order of things in China today. And the Maoists want to thrust it upon other nations, to "hoist the banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas over the whole world.''
The implementation of "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" has also led to grave consequences in the economic sphere. Instead of developing the economy in a planned and balanced way on the basis of the objective laws of socialism, Mao and his supporters, having discarded the Leninist 14 principles of economic management and replaced them by voluntarism, have caused the country to embark on the road of "big leaps" and militarisation. This resulted in total disorganisation of industry and agriculture.
The PRC's economy has twice in the last decade been hurled back below the level it had reached in 1957. Only the first Chinese five-year plan wa>3 carried out successfully; this was at a time when the CPC guided the country's economic development on the basis of the objective laws of socialism, drawing on the experience and relying on the all-round support and assistance of the USSR and other socialist countries. At that time the PRC ranked among the first in the world in development rates. But the second fiveyear plan was torpedoed by the "big leap,'' and the third by the "cultural revolution.'' As a result, industrial production has not reached the levels mapped by the second and third five-year plans. It has been marking time on the 1959 level.
According to Chinese statistics, the People's Republic of China in 1959 produced 41,500 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 348 million tons of coal, 3.7 million tons of oil, and 18.4 million tons of steel, whereas last year it produced 60,000--65,000 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 210--225 million tons of coal, 12--13 million tons of oil, and 12--13 million tons of steel. Grain production remained at the 1957 level and amounted to 185--190 million tons, while the cotton yield does not exceed 1.6 million tons.
It should be taken into account that the increase in population in the country, according to Peking statistics, is about 10 million a year. This means that in the last ten years per capita 15 production of many major industrial and agricultural items has not risen, but decreased.
Basic foods and manufactured goods are being supplied to the population under a strict rationing system.
The military-barrack regime in China, which is pictured by her propagandists as a kind of kingdom of universal equality, is really a caricature of socialist relations of production. The Peking leaders have lately been trying to get the national economy out of its logjam. Emergency measures are being taken to remedy the situation. Certain negative consequences of the " cultural revolution" in the sphere of production are being eliminated, especially chaos and anarchy in economic management. But the Peking leaders are endeavouring to solve this problem primarily by military-administrative methods,- by methods of coercion. Meanwhile living standards of the working people remain to be very low: the wages of the workers in the last four years have shrunk by at least 10--15 per cent and working hours have been increased.
The hardships of life in China are aggravated by the Peking authorities' concentration of the main effort on militarisation of the country. More than 40 per cent of the national budget is set for military purposes. This is done to the detriment of housing construction, which has all but, stopped, agriculture (appropriations for its modernisation have been slashed), and education, health and cultural advancement of the people.
The economy of the People's Republic of China is actually divided into two parts. One comprises a narrow group of sectors connected with military production. This part enjoys overall priority, 16 and has not been subjected to the "cultural revolution" treatment. The other part of the economy consists of the civil production sectors, which are told to "lean on their own resources,'' and not to expect investments.
This military deformity of the economy makes China's entire economic and social development lopsided.
The Peking leaders have distorted the essence of socialist industrialisation. By relying on smallscale enterprises they only preserve the country's economic backwardness. The social consequences of this policy are also most negative: the growth of an organised working class is being retarded.
In these conditions, the Peking propagandists seek to divert the attention of the population from the disastrous consequences of the economic policy which the Maoists have imposed on the nation, to deceive the people with vicious lies that the USSR and other socialist countries are worse off than China, and thus to neutralise justified discontent and criticism. The Chinese press publishes practically every day articles about an "economic crisis" in the Soviet Union. The Peking propagandists turn everything upside down in their attempt to belittle the achievements of the Soviet people, to conceal from the population of China the truth about our country.
The following facts are, of course, known to the Peking leaders, but they are carefully hidden from the people. In the 1960--69 period in the Soviet Union production of electricity went up from 292,000 million kilowatt-hours to 689,000 million kilowatt-hours; coal, from 510 million to 608 million tons; oil, from 148 million to 328 million tons; __PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2--193 17 steel, from 65.3 million to 110 million tons; and grain, from 125.5 million to 160.5 million tons.
The Soviet Union today ranks first in the world in the extraction of coal, iron ore and manganese ore, and holds first place in Europe and second in the world in the extraction of oil, smelting of steel, production of electricity, and the output of many key engineering items, chemicals and other important products.
Major successes have also been scored by the working people of other countries of the socialist community. For instance, industrial output in the member-states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance increased 6.3 times in the 1950-- 69 period. During the same period industrial output in the advanced capitalist states rose only 2.7 times. Today, the CMEA countries, whose populations make up only one-tenth of the world population, account for about one-third of world industrial output, and their share in world industrial production is steadily rising.
In the past few years the socialist countries took important steps towards raising the efficiency of social production through its intensification on the basis of scientific and technological progress. They are strengthening fraternal cooperation and working to promote socialist economic integration. The successes of the socialist world not only serve the interests of the socialist countries, but have a tremendous revolutionising effect.
The rapid development of the national economy of the countries of the socialist community, whose economic growth rate is outstripping that of the capitalist states; the improvement of the living standard of the working people; the fact 18 that socialism now leads in a number of fields in science and technology-all these real results of the creative effort of the peoples of the socialist countries most decisively help to ensure the victory of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism over imperialism.
This is confirmation of the truth of Lenin's teaching that we can make the greatest impact on the world revolution through our economic policy.
It is appropriate to note here that the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1956 pointed out the following: "The main purpose of the entire work of the Party is to satisfy to the utmost the material and cultural needs of the people. Thus it is necessary, on the basis of development of production, to improve the life of the people, which, in turn, is an essential condition for stepping up the production activity of the masses."/Peking now declares that concern for the people's welfare is "black economism" and "bourgeois degeneration.''
Thus, the basic economic law of socialism is being trampled underfoot in the PRC. As a result, production is made to serve the purpose not of steadily improving the material and cultural standards of the working people, but of building up a military potential necessary for carrying out expansionist activities in the world-aims totally alien to the interests of the working masses.
The Peking leaders have weakened the positions of the working class, undermined its alliance with the peasantry, and destroyed the socialist superstructure in China, creating antagonistic relations between the main social sections of society.
19Today, four years after the launching of the "cultural revolution,'' the contradictions besetting China's society remain acute, although it would seem that all measures have been taken to suppress and exterminate the genuinely revolutionary, internationalist forces in China, against which the "cultural revolution" was directed. This is why the Chinese press continues to call for the rooting out of the "handful of enemies,'' as all opponents of the anti-Leninist policy are called. Terror reigns in the country. Frame-up trials continue to be held in large cities ending in group executions in squares and stadiums in front of thousands of people.
The forcible assimilation of national minorities is one aspect of the anti-popular character of the present regime in China. Annually millions of new settlers are being sent from Peking, Shanghai and other cities to Hsinchiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and the Kwangsi-Chuang autonomous district. National minorities (that is, 45 million people!) are doomed to complete forcible absorption and disappearance as national, ethnic groups. In the course of the "cultural revolution" local autonomy, already limited, is turned into a fiction. The majority of national personnel and national intellectuals have been subjected to repression. The districts inhabited by the national minorities have become centres of "labour armies" and concentration camps. The age-old culture and distinctive features of the non-Han peoples-the Uigurs, Mongolians, Tibetans, Chuangs, Kazakhs, Koreans and others-are being systematically destroyed. This cruel policy has given rise to unrest and led to uprisings by the national minorities of China.
More and more troops are being dispatched to 20 break their resistance. Many units are being brought up to the borders of neighbouring states.
The native population is being driven out of the districts bordering on the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic. Yet despite all this Peking propaganda finds it possible to praise the order forced upon the national minorities of China and at the same time slander the Leninist policy of equality, friendship and fraternity of the peoples of the Soviet Union.
Here, again, the poisonous weapon of sland« tis required to prevent the truth about the USSR reaching the Chinese people.
The experience of national construction in the Soviet Union over a period of more than half a century has shown that the CPSU and the Soviet state, by implementing the Leninist principles of national policy, have succeeded in creating and strengthening the unshakable moral and political unity of all the peoples of the USSR, have ensured the genuine blossoming of their economy and culture. This is proved by data on the development of the Union Republics, former backward outskirts of tsarist Russia. During the years of Soviet power industrial output in Uzbekistan increased 70 times over the 1913 level, in Tajikistan 76 times, in Kazakhstan 124 times and in Kirghizia 152 times. These were areas with an almost 100 per cent illiteracy. Today they have institutes, universities and academies of sciences and a wide network of schools, libraries, theatres and medical establishments.
The solution of the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union (and this is one of the most acute and difficult problems of social life) is a major achievement of our socialist system, an 21 important step in mankind's social development. The attempts of the Peking leaders to discredit the Soviet Union's national policy only succeeded in exposing their own anti-socialist, great-Han policy.
The barrack ``communism'' which they try to establish in China runs counter to the requirements of a socialist society-the development of the productive forces and utilisation of the results of the scientific and technological revolution; it runs counter to the vital interests of the masses-improvement of their material and cultural standards, development of socialist democracy, and provision of genuine equality of nations; it runs counter to all the objective processes of social development which spell victory of scientific socialism.
The anti-Leninist course of China's present leadership is reflected in the field of foreign policy as well. Preparation for war has been declared a long-term political course for the entire nation. ``Legalised'' at the CPC's 9th Congress was Mao's thesis which boils down to the idea that war is inevitable and even desirable. "As for the question of world war,'' Mao said, "it is a case of either war provoking a revolution, or revolution preventing war.'' In explaining the meaning of this formula, Lin Piao at the CPC's 9th Congress, and later the Chinese press, invariably li iked revolution with war. Thus, the newspaper Chieh tang jihpao said that revolution "must of necessity develop into war.'' According to this thesis war is not only something that cannot be avoided; it is even some-
22 thing that should be sought. The paper deplores the fact that for a quarter of a century now there has been no world war.In one of their publications Chinese propagandists bluntly state: "The theory that war can be avoided is a dangerous one. . . There is no doubt that there will be a war. The question is only when, whether it will be soon or not. It is impossible to avoid war. A determined struggle must be waged against views claiming that war can be avoided in the obtaining situation.''
By preaching war the Maoists are writing off the interests of world socialism, the working people in all lands, and the world revolution. The Peking strategists proclaim that "a civilisation hundreds of thousands of times better" will be built up on the ruins of "crushed imperialism and social-imperialism.''
Thus at a conference of Party workers in Chengtu, Mao cynically declared: "If, for instance, the atomic bomb hits us, there is really nothing one can do except start building anew after the war when we may possibly obtain somewhat better results than now.'' In the last ten years whenever there was a heightening of international tensions, the Peking leadership invariably strove to achieve ona aim: that of heating up the situation still more and of prodding the world towards war.
After the CPC's 9th Congress the position of the present Chinese leaders on the issue of war and peace has been stated time and again in anti-- Soviet tirades which include the most recent articles. The Chinese leadership is trying to represent the Soviet Union as a more dangerous enemy than US imperialism. The current campaign of nation-wide militarisation conducted by the Maoists is 23 accompanied by calls for preparing for war against the USSR and the other socialist countries, for struggle to overthrow the socialist system in these countries.
The Chinese leaders are trying to divert the people's attention from the deep social and political crisis that has seized the country by whipping up a rabid campaign of jingoism and of hate towards the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and some of China's non-socialist neighbours. They are trying to lay the responsibility for all the suffering and misery which Mao's adventuristic course has caused the Chinese people on "external enemies,'' among whom Peking puts first not imperialism, but the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. The intensity of the false and provocatory Peking propaganda about the "threat of an attack on the PRC from the North" is a matter of common knowledge. Also common knowledge are the unfounded territorial claims that the leaders of the PRC have been making in recent years to China's neighbours including the USSR.
To further these claims and stir up hate toward neighbouring nations the leaders of the PRC engineered a number of frontier incidents. Behind the smokescreen of the war hysteria that has been created in China, a policy is being carried out at an intense pace of suppressing popular resentment, speeding up the country's militarisation and propagandising the inevitability of war.
In Peking pretexts are being sought to justify this policy. One such pretext has been discovered in the reactionary garbage of feudal notions about China's exclusiveness, about its historically ordained role of leader "beneath the heavens.'' This chauvinistic rubbish is clothed in the form of an "ultra-- 24 revolutionary" struggle to assert the "thought of Mao" in the world.
Thus all woven into one piece of fabric are petty-bourgeois adventurism and feudal greatpower concepts, ``super-revolutionary'' phrasemongering and what is actually anti-revolutionary practice.
The Chinese leaders have displayed great skill and cunning in passing themselves off as revolutionary fighters, and Peking as the epicentre of the world revolution. If we were to believe even for a moment the newspaper tirades and the speechifying of the Peking leaders, one might think that there they were working round the clock to promote the cause of the world revolution.
If the Chinese leaders wished to remain faithful to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism the PRC could greatly contribute to the actions of the revolutionary anti-imperialist forces, and imperialism would have a more limited field for manoeuvring and launching counterattacks against the revolutionary forces. However, Peking has made a different choice. China's present leaders must answer to the socialist countries, the international working-class and national-liberation movements for having placed the PRC in opposition to the common front of anti-imperialist forces.
In an attempt to hold back the world revolutionary process, the imperialists are uniting their efforts on an international scale. The Chinese leaders, however, are spearheading their foreign policies against the cohesion of the countries of the socialist community, they are trying to undermine the allied relations of the socialist states-members of the Warsaw Treaty, and interfere with the implementation of the plans for the further 25 development of socialist economic integration. And this, precisely, is what the imperialists have wanted to achieve.
In the last few years there has not been a single instance where, in a crisis world situation caused by aggressive actions of the imperialists, the PRC has joined the socialist community and the anti-imperialist forces in offering rebuff to the forces of reaction and aggression.
The leaders in Peking are responsible for dooming some detachments of the communist and national-liberation movement in Asia and Africa to defeat by imposing on these detachments their adventurist tactics. Tens of thousands of courageous fighters who had trusted the advisers from Peking lost their lives, and the revolutionary movement in some countries suffered serious setbacks and great losses-such is the bloody result of the adventurist intrigues and provocations of the Peking "ultra-revolutionaries.''
The escalation of the US imperialist aggression in Indochina, the continuation of Israel's aggressive actions against the Arab states, the military intervention of the imperialist powers in the domestic affairs of some states-all these actions are spearheaded against the national-liberation movement and the social progress of nations.
The Soviet Government's Statement of May 4, 1970, noted that "the escalation of the US aggression in Indochina makes even more imperative the need for unity and the strengthening of cohesion of all socialist and anti-imperialist and peace forces in the struggle against aggression.''
Such is the stand of our Party and Government and of the Soviet people. Such is the stand to which 26 the fraternal socialist countries and the MarxistLeninist Parties of the world adhere.
Under these conditions the negative consequences of Peking's adventurist and splitting policies, aimed at undermining the bonds between the main detachments of the anti-imperialist front, become particularly clear.
Thus, in Asia, the Chinese leadership has been conducting for some years a course of undermining the progressive regimes, of provoking conflicts between states, of isolating the national-- liberation struggle of peoples from their real alliesthe countries of the socialist community and the international communist and workers' movement. Moreover, this course of Peking is accompanied by attempts to slander the Soviet Union's internationalist policies. The "friends of people" from Peking are trying to present the political, economic and military support given by the CPSU and the entire Soviet people to the fraternal socialist countries, to peoples fighting against imperialist aggression, and to developing countries, as part of a " social-imperialist policy''; they even concoct monstrous lies about "Soviet neocolonialism.''
According to their logic, it would have been better for the nations fighting against imperialism to be severed from the basic revolutionary forces of our time and left to deal single-handed with a strong and treacherous enemy. This, of course, is actually what the imperialists are dreaming of as they plan their adventures.
In acting in this manner Peking is telling the imperialists that it does not intend to take joint measures with the USSR and other socialist countries against imperialist aggression. Such a stand undoubtedly offers great comfort to the 27 imperialist circles and encourages them to continue to engage in their anti-popular plans and designs. Yet another proof of this are the recent events in Indochina.
The leaders in Peking have made it quite clear by their actions that they are endeavouring to use the heroic struggle of the peoples for freedom for furthering their own global intrigues, for they proceed from great-Han dreams of becoming some new emperors of "great China" that would rule at least Asia, if not the entire world.
Such a policy contradicts the interests of the world socialist system, the international communist and workers' movement, the national-- liberation struggle of the peoples; it contradicts the real interests of the Chinese people. "Super-- revolutionariness" in word and betrayal of the class interests of the working people in deed-such is the meaning of Maoism in international relations.
The current Chinese leadership is compelled to reckon with the tremendous prestige enjoyed by Marxism-Leninism. Mao realizes, of course, that he will not be able to win the masses and keep them under his control with his name and his ``ideas'' alone. For a certain period he disguised himself as a Marxist, and now he is even trying to pass himself for a successor to Marx and Lenin.
There was a time when many of the notions that constitute Mao Tse-tung's ``thought'' were regarded as mistakes and delusions owing to Mao's lack of experience and theoretical background. Mao himself admitted that he "had 28 various non-Marxist views" and that he had "only a cursory bookish knowledge of Marxism.'' Mao often came under criticism in the CPC and in the Comintern.
The developments in China have revealed the real essence of Maoism, a reactionary Utopian petty-bourgeois conception, which, on the theoretical plane, is an eclectic hotch-potch of widely different views including elements of Confucianism, anarchism. Trotskyism, and petty-bourgeois nationalism.
Mao took the most conservative aspect of Confucianism-the preaching of submissiveness, the glorification of authoritarianism, the cult of the supreme ruler.
From petty-bourgeois views Mao borrowed the ideas about the special revolutionary character of the peasants, underrating the vanguard role of the working class. Reactionary Utopian ideas, born of historical backwardness, are elevated by Mao to the rank of a new theoretical discovery.
Mao took from the bourgeois nationalist doctrines great-power and chauvinistic views, transforming them into a Messianic theory about China's exclusiveness.
To the Trotskyites Mao owes his ideas about the precedence of political aims over the objective laws of social development; about the " tightening of the screws" and the militarisation of society; the theory that socialism cannot triumph anywhere before the victory of the world revolution; the theory of export of revolution, according to which a world war is the only way of carrying out a revolution on the world scale; and, finally, rabid anti-Sovietism and the methods of conducting subversive activities in the ranks of 29 the international communist and working-class movement.
Maoism is an anti-Leninist political trend based on ``Sinoised'' social-chauvinism, the " Sinoised Marxism" which was declared at the Ninth CPC Congress "an entirely new stage of Marxism-Leninism,'' accompanied by the suggestion that Mao be placed "on a much higher level than Marx and Lenin.'' This is an open attempt to replace Marxism-Leninism by Mao's ``ideas'' and political directives, which, in their class nature, are alien to the theory and practice of scientific communism.
But this attempt is doomed to failure. The anti-socialist character of Maoism, its theoretical impotency cannot be concealed. Spiritual poverty cannot be compensated for by the Mao cult.
However ``ultra-revolutionary'' they may sound, Mao's ideas boil down to aggressive greatHan chauvinism. This is the hidden mainspring of Peking's entire home and foreign policy. And this is fraught with grave danger, primarily for the cause of socialism in China.
The latest wave of anti-Soviet hysteria in Peking was caused by Mao himself; this was to be expected and is now confirmed by the press. Recent articles from the Chinese press contain direct references to Mao's pronouncements aimed at creating hate towards the Soviet Union among the Chinese people. Significantly, the articles also quote a statement Mao made in the mid-fifties when he came out with protestations of friendship and respect for the Soviet Union.
In 1956 Mao asserted at a CPC Central Committee's Plenary Meeting that "on the whole, Leninism has already been discarded in the Soviet 30 Union.'' Exactly a year later he said the following at the jubilee session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow devoted to the 40th anniversary of the Great October Revolution: "By creatively applying the Marxist-Leninist theory to the solution of practical problems, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has ensured for the Soviet people continuous victories in the building of a new life. The programme of the construction of communism in the USSR, put forward by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, is a great model.''
What is all this if not cynical perfidy as regards our Party and people?
Now that imperialism is pinning its greatest hopes on ideological subversion in the struggle against socialism, the subversive activities of the Maoists aimed at the weakening and collapse of socialist countries, at splitting the communist movement and mass progressive organisations, are actually making things easier for the class enemies of the working people. In this the Chinese leaders are steadily drifting towards anticommunism. A "shuttle communication" is under way between the Peking propagandists and the bellicose imperialist ideologists: they adopt each other's methods, terminology and "arguments,'' and both use the poisoned weapon of anti-- communism. No renegade or hireling of the proletariat's class enemies has ever done bigger damage to the world revolutionary process than the Peking leaders are doing today.
The latest articles from the Peking press and the Maoists' actions in the international arena show that Peking has renewed its subversive activities against the Marxist-Leninist Parties. The knocking together of renegade pro-Peking groups 31 in various countries for fighting the Communist and Workers' Parties and carrying out provocatory actions within the ranks of the working-class and national-liberation movements has become one of the basic elements of the tactics of the Peking leaders.
The interests of the world revolutionary movement call for resolute action to rebuff the subversive and splitting intrigues of the Maoists, for maximum unity in the struggle against imperialism on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
__*_*_*__For China there is only one way of socialist development, and this way was tested in practice by the Chinese people themselves in the years of their struggle for freedom, in the years of creating a new society within the ranks of the socialist community. It is the Leninist way to which, as developments in China have shown, the most experienced and mature sections of Communists and non-Party people, genuine internationalists, remain faithful. It is this way which the fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties have been calling on the Chinese people to follow.
Unity and solidarity with the forces of the world socialist community and the revolutionary liberation movement, rehabilitation and consolidation of the truly socialist basis of Chinese society -this is the only course that accords with the interests of the Chinese people.
The CPSU and the Soviet Government have been consistently pursuing a policy aimed at restoring and promoting friendly relations with 32 China. It is not through our fault that these relations have been spoilt and greatly aggravated. The present state of relations between the PRC and the USSR and other socialist countries is a result of the chauvinist policies conducted by the Chinese leadership, a result of its departure from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
While exposing the anti-Leninist, anti-popular essence of the political and ideological directives of the present-day rulers of China, waging a principled struggle against their factionalist activities within the communist movement and their great-power foreign policy, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government have been constantly striving to prevent ideological differences from affecting inter-state relations.
The Soviet Union takes a clear-cut and unambiguous stand on the Peking negotiations on the question of normalising the situation along the Soviet-Chinese borders. Our country believes that it is necessary to reach an agreement that would permit turning the borders into a line of goodneighbourliness. As it has been repeatedly emphasised by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, we, while not retreating from our just and principled positions and while defending the interests of our socialist homeland and the inviolability of its frontiers, will continue doing everything in our power to normalise our inter-state relations with the People's Republic of China.
We cannot, however, close our eyes to the fact that Peking is bent on whipping up militaristic psychosis, demanding that the people "prepare for famine, prepare for a war.'' Even the __PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3--193 33 launching of a satellite, made possible by the selfless efforts of Chinese scientists, engineers and workers, is used as an occasion for fanning nationalistic passions and issuing threats against our country.
If all this is being done with a view to bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union, one must say in advance that these are vain efforts. The Soviet people have strong nerves. Our people possess everything necessary to uphold the interests of our homeland.
We proceed from the belief that the vital and long-range interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples are far from being contradictory. In fact they coincide.
``In jointly following the road charted by Lenin, in waging a joint struggle against the sinister forces of imperialist reaction, for the triumph of the sacred cause of socialism and communism,'' L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said in his report at the meeting marking the centenary of the birth of Lenin, "lies the correct path for the future development of relations between China and the Soviet Union, and between China and other socialist countries.''
The Soviet people proceeding from this historical path, retain a friendly attitude towards the Chinese people. A genuinely socialist and internationalist policy is bound to triumph in China. Such is the objective logic of historical development.
Pravda, May 18, 1970
[34] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Concerning the 50thJuly 1, 1971, marked the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party of China. In the past half-century it has traversed a long and devious road of great achievements as well as grave setbacks. In 1921 small groups of Communists united to form the Communist Party of China. Relying on the support and experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of the entire international communist movement, the Communist Party of China grew into a mighty vanguard of the Chinese revolution. It guided this revolution and led the Chinese people to an historic victory in October 1949.
People's China led by the Communist Party became part of the socialist camp, and established friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other fraternal states. With their help the Chinese people concentrated their efforts on strengthening the national independence of the People's Republic of China, eliminating the remnants of the semi-- colonial, semi-feudal system and implementing broad democratic reforms. In accordance with the will of the multi-million working masses the Communist Party of China led the country along the road of building a socialist society, as defined in the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC held in September 1956. The first five-year plan for the __PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__ 3* 35 country's economic development was fulfilled in 1957. The Communist Party of China emerged as a major contingent of the world communist movement and enjoyed great prestige. It participated in the international meetings of communist and workers' parties in 1957 and 1960.
But in the late 1950's the CPC leadership initiated a foreign and home policy which deviated from Marxism-Leninism and essentially contradicted the principles of proletarian internationalism and the basic laws of socialist construction. It began to pursue a policy which combined petty-bourgeois adventurism with great-power chauvinism, camouflaged with ``left'' phraseology; it openly embarked on a course of undermining the unity of the socialist community, of splitting the world communist movement. Peking began to organise Maoist groups in a number of countries, in an obvious attempt to unite them and turn them against the world communist movement. This resulted in a considerable weakening of the positions of the Communist Party and the working class within China and an upsurge of petty-bourgeois, anarchist elements.
After adopting an ideological and political line which is incompatible with Leninism, on the main questions concerning the international situation and the world communist movement, the Peking leaders demanded that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union abandon the line adopted by the 20th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Programme. They conducted intensive anti-Soviet propaganda, presented territorial claims to the Soviet Union and even brought the matters to armed border clashes in the spring and summer of 1969.
The CPSU, together with other fraternal parties, resolutely countered the attempts to distort the 36 Marxist-Leninist teaching and to sow discord in the socialist community, the world communist movement and the anti-imperialist front. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government displayed restraint and refused to be provoked while doing everything they could to improve relations with China. The last one and a half years have seen some signs of a normalisation of USSRPRC relations, thanks to the initiative and efforts of the Soviet Union. At the same time the Chinese leadership continued to pursue an anti-Soviet line in their propaganda and policy; the 9th CPC Congress confirmed in its resolutions an anti-- Marxist course, hostile to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Peking's actions in the international arena testify that the foreign policy of the PRC has in fact broken away from proletarian internationalism and lost its class, socialist content.
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, said at the 1969 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties: "It is a big and serious task to make an all-round MarxistLeninist analysis of the class content of the events in China over the last few years, and of the roots of the present line of the CPC leaders, which is jeopardising the socialist gains of the Chinese people.'' It is all the more appropriate, on the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, to review the path it has travelled, to consider its glorious and hard destiny.
The Communist Party of China was founded as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type. At its First Congress the party set the task of carrying out a 37 socialist revolution, establishing the dictatorships of the proletariat and building a classless, communist society. The Congress adopted a decision on the party's joining the Comintern. In early 1922 Lenin had meetings with Chinese Communists.
The emergence and development of the Communist Party of China proceeded in extremely complex conditions as a result of China's economic, social, political and cultural backwardness and the insufficient numerical strength of the Chinese proletariat. The general revolutionary movement in China comprised three different currents: the struggle of the peasantry and the petty national bourgeoisie against the survivals of feudalism, the nation-wide movement against colonial imperialist oppression, for national independence, and the proletariat's struggle for socialism.
At the time when the CPC came into being the working-class movement in China was just beginning, and had not yet accumulated the necessary experience in class struggle. The November 1927 Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee pointed out: "The CPC began to take shape as a political trend and as a party at a time when the Chinese proletariat had not yet established itself as a class and when the class movement of workers and peasants was just emerging. The upsurge of the national-liberation movement in China, in which the bourgeoisie and especially the pettybourgeois intelligentsia played a major role in the earlier period, took place long before the class awareness and class struggle of the exploited masses assumed an appreciable scale.''
The formation of the revolutionary vanguard of the Chinese proletariat was adversely affected by the fact that prior to the Great October Socialist 38 Revolution in Russia Marxism was unknown in China. In the words of Mao Tse-tung, the gun salvoes of the October Revolution brought MarxismLeninism to China.
In his `Left-Wing' Communism - an Infantile Disorder Lenin wrote the following with regard to the history of the establishment of a proletarian party in this country: "Russia achieved Marxismthe only correct revolutionary theory-through the agony she experienced in the course of half a century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice, of unparalleled revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, devoted searching, study, practical trial, disappointment, verification, and comparison with European experience. ...Russia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, acquired a wealth of international links and excellent information on the forms and theories of the world revolutionary movement, such as no other country possessed.''~^^1^^
The Chinese revolutionaries had had no such experience.
Thus the formation of the Communist Party in China proceeded in extremely difficult conditions. But nevertheless it was a natural and necessary result of the revolutionary movement which emerged in China under the mighty impact of the October Revolution, which awakened the revolutionary activity of the working class, the broad working masses, including the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries, in all parts of the world.
The "May 4 Movement" was a response to the October Revolution and showed that the working people of China were ready for a decisive struggle against imperialist oppression. It was necessary then to merge the Marxist circles into a party _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 31, pp. 25--26.
39 capable of leading the struggle of the young working class, and the democratic and national-liberation forces against social oppression, against imperialism. Such a party came into being in the 1920s. Moreover, a strong Marxist core was formed within the communist movement in China with the help of the Comintern, which set a correct political course.The Second Congress which took place in July 1922 confirmed the CPC's striving to become a truly proletarian party. "We must be a real political party created by the proletarian masses, imbued with a revolutionary spirit, and ready to fight for the interests of the proletariat and lead the proletarian revolutionary movement,'' said the Resolution on the CPC's Rules. The Congress called for organisation of the party after the Bolshevik model and adopted a resolution on joining the Comintern, which subsequently guided the political and organizing activity of the Chinese Communists. The world communist movement invariably came to the help of the Chinese revolutionaries whenever they made mistakes.
The documents of the 2nd, 3rd (June 1923) and 4th (January 1925) Congresses regarded the proletariat as the party's mainstay, the vanguard and then the leader of the revolution, and the peasantry as the proletariat's chief ally whose active support was vitally important for the Chinese revolution. By the time of the 5th Congress (April-May 1927) the CPC had nearly 58,000 members, more than 50 per cent of whom were workers and about 19 per cent peasants.
The 6th Congress was an important landmark in the development of the Communist Party of China. It was held in June and July 1928 and was 40 attended by a delegation of the Comintern Executive. In February of the same year the 9th plenary meeting of the Comintern Executive adopted a Resolution on the Chinese Question which summed up the current developments and the specific features of the revolutionary movement in China and pointed out that "the Comintern Executive has directed all its sections to support the Chinese revolution in every way.'' Guided by this resolution the Congress adopted documents which in effect constituted the first comprehensive programme of the CPC. It outlined the main tasks of the Chinese revolution: expulsion of the imperialists and unification of the country, complete elimination of landlord ownership of land and liberation of the peasantry from all feudal bonds, struggle for the power of Soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies as the best form of government for implementing the democratic dictatorship of the working class and peasantry in China. On the advice of the Comintern Executive delegation the 6th CPC Congress gave special attention to the development of the peasant movement and guerrilla struggle under the slogan of agrarian revolution, with the aim of creating a regular Red Army of workers and peasants based on guerrilla detachments.
This showed a truly Marxist approach to the problems of the Chinese revolution, the solutions to which were worked out by the Communists-- internationalists.
But along with the Marxist, internationalist trend in the CPC another, essentially petty-bourgeois and nationalist, group was taking shape. At the time of the upsurge of the national liberation movement radical elements of the petty bourgeoisie joined 41 the party in great numbers. "Lifted by the wave of revolutionary enthusiasm of the initial period, lacking theoretical Marxist-Leninist schooling, ignorant of the experience of the international proletarian movement, isolated from the exploited lower strata of the Chinese people and having taken no part in the class struggle of the workers and peasants, a considerable part of these revolutionary petty-bourgeois elements, far from being assimilated by the party and becoming consistent proletarian revolutionaries, brought into the CPC all the political instability, inconsistency and indecision, the inability to organise, non-proletarian habits and traditions, prejudices and illusions characteristic of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary,'' stressed the November 1927 Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee. This tendency, associated mostly with Mao Tse-tung, later developed into a petty-bourgeois and nationalist trend which came to be known as Maoism.
The struggle between the Marxist, internationalist trend guided by the ideas underlying the Great October Socialist Revolution and the petty-- bourgeois, nationalist trend marked the entire history of the Communist Party of China. This struggle was reflected in the decisions of the party congresses, in the theories and the practical activity of the CPC leadership. The conflict between these two trends has been and remains characteristic of the Communist Party of China. Mao Tse-tung and his historiographers seek to distort the true picture, to confuse the issue. To this end they oppose the "true line" of Mao Tse-tung to a host of ``wrong'' lines, whose number grows in Peking publications every year. Recently most of the party cadres have been labelled "those vested with 42 power in the party and following the capitalist road.''
The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist part of the CPC was guided by the theses set forth in Lenin's works and in the documents of the international communist movement. These theses include the definition of the essential feature of the Chinese revolution as a combination of the struggle against feudal survivals and the struggle against imperialism; the need to promote the peasant movement and the revolutionary struggle in the countryside and to set up strongholds when the revolution is in decline; the expediency of an alliance with the petty and national bourgeoisie at the bourgeoisdemocratic stage of the revolution,- the thesis that in China armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution; the necessity of the union of the Chinese revolutionaries with the USSR, and others. It was the implementation of these theses by the Communist Party of China that made possible the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949. The attitude of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist faction was quite different. It did not and could not make any positive contribution to the development of the communist movement in China. The revolutionary movement suffered setbacks and defeats whenever the petty-bourgeois nationalists wittingly or unwittingly distorted the Marxist-Leninist theses.
Moreover, in the early years of CPC history the Maoists from time to time attempted to make the party follow their line, but were rebuffed and had to retreat. It is significant that Mao Tse-tung attended only three out of the six CPC congresses held at that time, and at the 5th Congress was deprived of the right to vote. The Maoists launched 43 fierce attacks on the CPC when the party met with difficulties.
After the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek coup in April 1927 the Communist Party of China functioned in conditions of ruthless terror from many sides -from the central Kuomintang government and the separatist military cliques, from the troops of the Western imperialist colonialists and the Japanese invaders. The party incurred heavy losses when the Chinese Red Army retreated to the remote north-western regions of the country following the tactics of the Maoists. Many fine sons of the party gave their lives in the struggle for the cause of the working people. The loss of the tried cadres devoted to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism seriously weakened the position of the CPC.
This was used to advantage by the representatives of the petty-bourgeois trend. In early 1935 they conducted the "enlarged session of the CPC Central Committee Politbureau" in Tsungyi and captured important posts in the party leadership. In the autumn of 1941, when the Soviet Union and the entire international communist movement were concentrating their efforts on the struggle against nazism, they launched a "drive to streamline the style of work" in the CPC. The aim of the campaign was to turn the Communist Party of China from the Marxist-Leninist stand to a petty-bourgeois, nationalist ideological and political platform (the 22 works selected for compulsory study during the ``campaign'' were mostly articles and speeches of Mao Tse-tung, Kang Sheng and other Orthodox Maoists) and remove the opponents by conducting campaigns of physical and moral terror. After more than three years of struggle 44 the petty-bourgeois nationalists managed to get the upper hand-the 7th CPC Congress held in 1945 was conducted in an atmosphere of deification of Mao Tse-tung and it approved "Mao Tsetung's ideas" as the ideological platform of the Communist Party of China.
At the same time the obtaining situation and the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Chinese people forced the petty-bourgeois nationalists to remain in the mainstream of the revolutionary struggle.
In 1935 the 7th Comintern Congress advanced the idea of a united anti-imperialist front, stressing its particular importance for countries in colonial bondage at a time of imperialist expansion. In keeping with this thesis a united front of the Communist Party and Kuomintang in the struggle of resistance against Japanese imperialism (1937--45) was proclaimed in China, which furnished the basis for rallying all segments of the Chinese people for the struggle against the foreign invaders. The petty-bourgeois nationalists sabotaged the united front, seeking every opportunity to undermine it. Yet they could not ignore the essential needs of the Chinese national-liberation movement, the courageous struggle of the Marxist-Leninist section of the CPC leadership for consistent implementation of the Comintern line, and were forced to retreat. The united front policy helped to make the CPC a mass party, the vanguard of the Chinese people, a political force of nation-wide significance.
The victory of the Soviet Union over Hitler nazism and militarist Japan was of tremendous importance for the Chinese revolution. In 1945--49 the centre of the Chinese revolutionary movement shifted to Manchuria where active preparation began with Soviet assistance for the final phase of 45 the struggle for liberating China from colonial and social oppression.
The routing of militarist Japan, in which the Soviet Union played a decisive role, strengthened the revolutionary forces in China. The People's Liberation Army had then a safe rear and was able to reorganise and improve its combat equipment with the Japanese arms and materiel captured by the Soviet troops.
The revolutionary forces of China received extensive material assistance from the Soviet Union. In Manchuria the Soviet Army and Soviet civilian organisations helped in every way to rehabilitate the economy, to repair communication lines destroyed during the war. Thanks to Soviet aid the main railways in central and southern Manchuria were restarted in a short time and large formations of the People's Liberation Army of China were able to regroup and concentrate, which helped to complete the rout of the Kuomintang army and its expulsion from Manchuria, and furnished favourable conditions for the decisive offensive in the south.
The Chinese people were able to express their will freely in the areas liberated from the Japanese by the Soviet Army and began to set up people's democratic bodies of power.
At that time the USSR Government did everything to prevent open military intervention by the United States in China, above all in Manchuria.
The visits by Chinese delegations from the people's democratic regions of Manchuria to the Soviet Union in 1945 and 1949 and other forms of consultation (a group of Soviet party officials stayed in Manchuria from 1945 to maintain close contact with the North-Eastern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee; in early 1949 a responsible 46 representative of the CPSU had a meeting with the Chinese leaders) were of great importance to the CPC for elaborating a correct political line. This assistance was all the more valuable since the petty-bourgeois, nationalist section of the CPC leadership, and Mao Tse-tung first of all, went from one extreme to another in assessing the forces in the Chinese revolution. In 1945--46, for example, they overestimated their forces and displayed " revolutionary impatience,'' ignoring the need to conserve forces in order to prepare conditions for a decisive blow and the need to combine the political and diplomatic forms of struggle with the build-up of the military potential. On the contrary, in 1948--49, after the Kuomintang offensive and the loss of Yenan in 1947, the same group in the CPC leadership showed disbelief in the possibility of an early victory and proved helpless in dealing with practical questions connected with the establishment of people's power all over China.
Manchuria with its well-developed industry and the large share of the country's working class, its strong party organisations, and also thanks to the fact that it borders on the Soviet Union, became in 1945--49 a strategic bridgehead from which the People's Liberation Army was able to launch a powerful offensive and quickly liberate the whole country from the Chiang Kai-shekites and their imperialist patrons.
The long and heroic struggle of the Chinese people was crowned with a glorious victory. In the vanguard were Communists true to Marxism-- Leninism and proletarian internationalism. At every stage of that struggle the Communist Party of China had leaders who represented everything best in the Chinese revolutionary movement. These were 47 the Chinese Communists whose real role was subsequently ignored or wilfully distorted by the Maoists for the sake of extolling Mao Tse-tung as the only leader of the Chinese revolutionary movement and creating a myth about his infallability. Many of them perished in revolutionary battles or were forced out from the CPC leadership, but their glorious memory lives on.
The fraternal union of the Chinese revolutionaries and the USSR compensated for the relative weakness and disunity of the Chinese working class; it promoted the consolidation of the internal forces of the Chinese revolution and protected them against the import of counter-revolution. The victory of the Chinese people convincingly proved the correctness of Lenin's thesis that ''. . .this revolutionary movement of the peoples of the East can now develop effectively, can reach a successful issue, only in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against international imperialism.''~^^1^^
The formation of the People's Republic of China and the establishment in China of people's demo- : cratic power under the guidance of the Commun- i ist Party, the extensive and disinterested assistance I of the USSR and other fraternal countries, and the changed balance of class forces in the international arena in favour of socialism opened before the Chinese people broad possibilities of successful building of socialism. In the first years after the establishment of the People's Republic of China the _-_-_
^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 30, p. 151.
48 Communist Party drafted concrete ways of carrying out socialist construction. In 1953 the CPC's general line in the transition period was made public, which called for mobilising all the forces for making China a mighty socialist state.In 1956, the 8th CPC Congress elaborated and endorsed the course of building a socialist society in the People's Republic of China. At the same time the Congress proclaimed that "the Communist Party of China is guided in its activity by Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism alone correctly interprets the laws of social development, shows the correct ways of building socialism and communism.'' This thesis did away with the idea of "Sinoised Marxism" and with "Mao Tse-tung's thought" as the CPC's ideological platform set forth at the 7th Party Congress in 1945.
The cause of socialism seemed to have acquired a strong foundation in China. But the petty-- bourgeois nationalists in the CPC leadership did not lay down their arms. They continued to deal underhand blows at the section of the party leadership and rank-and-filers that adhered to positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
In the mid-50's the People's Republic of China entered "the core of the revolutionary course,'' to use Lenin's expression. Radical changes were carried out in the non-socialist economic sectors. The achievements of the first five-year plan period furnished the basis for further advancement, for organising large-scale socialist production under strict government control. The prospect of complete elimination of the petty-owner element became quite real. This naturally aroused the resistance of that element, greater vacillations, which, in turn, __PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4--193 49 affected the petty-bourgeois, nationalist elements in the CPC leadership. "In April 1956 ... we began to advance our own line of construction,'' Mao Tsetung admitted at a meeting of the CPC Central Committee in 1958.
Lenin characterised the vacillations of the pettyowner element as follows: "This wavering flows in two `streams': petty-bourgeois reformism, i.e., servility to the bourgeoisie covered by a cloak of sentimental democratic and `Social-Democratic' phrases and fatuous wishes; and petty-bourgeois revolutionism-menacing, blustering and boastful in words, but a mere bubble of disunity, disruption and brainlessness in deeds.''~^^1^^
At first Mao Tse-tung and his followers took the road of petty-bourgeois reformism. Even within the framework of CPC's general orientation to scientific socialism they advanced "new political stipulations,'' which reflect right-wing opportunism.
In April 1956 the Maoists proclaimed a "course of prolonged coexistence of the Communist Party with bourgeois-democratic parties and reciprocal control between them" (italics added) which in practice undermined the CPC's leading role in society and provided the bourgeois parties which remained in the People's Republic of China with an effective instrument for struggle for power. In practice the Maoist slogan "May hundred flowers blossom" amounted to legalising anti-Marxist, anti-socialist views and undermined the authority of the proletarian ideology in the country. The theory of "contradictions within the people" which considered the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie as non-- antagonistic, lulled the vigilance of the working people _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 21.
50 and played into the hands of the enemies of socialism.The national bourgeoisie took advantage of these "new stipulations" to launch an open attack on socialism in the spring of 1957. The social and political system in the People's Republic of China, the system of economic management, all public organisations were being criticised and discredited. Demands were made to annul the changes that had been carried out in capitalist industry, handicraft production and agriculture. Calls were made for physical extermination of Communists, for smashing the CPC and its leadership. The petty-bourgeois, nationalist CPC leaders, concerned about their own safety, above all else, hastened to introduce corrections in their "new stipulations.'' The working class and the Communists beat back the bourgeois onslaught. But the shift in the CPC leadership's policy to the right, the proclaiming of opportunist ``courses'' and ``slogans'' had done their job-they further increased the influence of the petty-- bourgeois ideology.
The successful completion of the first five-year plan, the growth of the country's economic and military might and of the international prestige of the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China were appraised by the Maoist leaders from a petty-bourgeois standpoint. Now they turned eagerly to petty-bourgeois revolutionism, reflected by the so-called three red banners policy announced in 1958. Replacing the former CPC general line which provided a definite plan of socialist construction a new "general line" was proclaimed in the form of a vague appeal: "To strain all forces, to strive forward, to build socialism according to the principle 'more, faster, better and more __PRINTERS_P_51_COMMENT__ 4* 51 economically.'~" The "great leap" and the setting up of "people's communes" were declared the basis of the country's economic policy. In the international arena the line was to heighten tension, attain world hegemony, worsen relations with the USSR and other socialist states.
The Communist Party of China found itself unable to cope with the consequences of these " innovations,'' and a considerable portion of its membership began to waver. This happened not only because the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres had been paralysed and ousted from leadership by that time. The fact is that owing to the specific conditions in which the party had developed, and to the cadres policy that had been pursued for many years by the petty-bourgeois section in the party, the petty-owner elements had become the dominating trend in the Communist Party of China.
According to official Chinese data, in the late 50s the share of workers among party members was 14 per cent and of peasants, 69 per cent.
We must not forget in this connection Lenin's warning that ''. .. we constantly regard as workers people who have not had the slightest real ex- I perience of large-scale industry. There has been case after case of petty bourgeois, who have become workers by chance and only for a very short time, being classed as workers''.~^^1^^ Thus it happens that the proletarian character of a party does not rule out a possible predominance, and in a very short time, of petty-owner elements.
Neither should we forget Lenin's teaching that whenever former small owners join the party in vast numbers ''. . .the proletarian policy of the _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 254.
52 party is not determined by the character of its membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige enjoyed by the small group which might be called the Old Guard of the Party.''~^^1^^To be sure, the difficulties faced by the Communist Party of China were not insurmountable. As experience shows, the petty-bourgeois threat can be coped with if the party follows the Marxist-- Leninist teaching at all times and in everything, if it tirelessly works to strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the former, if it is guided by the basic interests of the working people. Yet the Maoists staked on petty-bourgeois prejudices, ignoring the basic interests of the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia. Moreover, the systematic ``purges'' struck first of all at the party old guard, eliminating the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres.
The home and foreign policy advanced by the petty-bourgeois, nationalist section in the CPC leadership had a disastrous effect on China's economy and brought about real calamities in the country. Added to this were severe droughts and floods for three years in succession. As a result, according to various estimates, the gross national product in the People's Republic of China fell by one-third, industrial output was halved and the national income shrunk by more than one-quarter.
In the face of this the CPC leadership made changes in its home policy, although the "three red banners" slogan was not officially retracted. At the cost of tremendous efforts of the working people and thanks to the return, to a certain extent, to _-_-_
^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 257.
53 socialist economic forms, the People's Republic of China managed to regain the 1957 level of industrial and agricultural production by the end of 1964. But the country's population grew considerably during this period. In 1964 China exploded its first atomic bomb and joined the nuclear-rocket arms race despite its limited resources. Enormous sums had also been spent by Peking since 1960 for propaganda and subversion against the world communist movement and for pursuing its great-power foreign policy. The rupture of the PRC's cooperation with socialist states did irreparable damage to the country. As a result, difficulties continued to mount in China.The strife inside the CPC leadership was further aggravated. The key issue now was the question of the country's further development. The choice was between returning to the time-tested practice of socialist construction in close cooperation with the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, and following the petty-bourgeois, nationalist road. In his talks with foreign visitors Mao Tse-tung admitted that attitude to the Soviet Union represented a main aspect of the strife within the CPC leadership.
It should be stressed that the positions of the working class in the PRC were seriously weakened at that time. The destruction, during the "big leap,'' of large-scale industry which Lenin called the proletariat's "vital basis" and the curtailment of industrialisation deprived it of its class strength and undermined its ability to resist petty-bourgeois vacillations. Meanwhile the influence of the pettyowner, anarchist element on developments in the country and its fluctuations continued despite the fact that agriculture was put on a cooperative 54 basis. Lenin thus characterised the main features of this element: "It will take collectives, collective farms and communes years to change this.''~^^1^^ The Maoists took advantage of all these factors to get the upper hand in the CPC leadership.
Quite obviously this course of events was not fatally inevitable, even in the complex conditions of the People's Republic of China. After the successful completion of the first five-year plan in 1957 the country was on the threshold of new achievements in economic and cultural development, in promoting democracy, and in foreign affairs. Such achievements would undoubtedly have taken place had the CPC leadership pursued a genuinely Marxist-Leninist policy, had it safeguarded and enhanced the party's leading role, had it promoted in every way the growth of the ranks of the working class, its political awareness and its influence in society. But it was China's misfortune that the party and the country came to be guided by the representatives of petty-bourgeois, nationalist views and aspirations. Their activity furnished conditions for further attacks by the small-owner element against the working class, which gradually turned into a frontal assault. It began at a signal from Mao Tse-tung who called for "opening fire at the headquarters" (i.e., party organisations). It became the notorious "cultural revolution.''
Lenin wrote the following with regard to the possible outcome of the struggle against the anarchist element represented by the small owner: _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 27fi.
55``Either we subordinate the petty bourgeoisie to our control and accounting (we can do this if we organise the poor, that is, the majority of the population or semi-proletarians, round the politically conscious proletarian vanguard), or they will overthrow our workers' power as surely and as inevitably as the revolution was overthrown by the Napoleons and the Cavaignacs who sprang from this very soil of petty proprietorship. That is how the question stands. That is the only view we can take of the matter. . .''~^^1^^
The negative results of the "cultural revolution" are generally known. The situation in the People's Republic of China developed in the direction of the second variant predicted by Lenin. In the course of the "cultural revolution" the political system of the People's Republic of China as a state governed by the working class was destroyed. The bodies of people's power ceased to function. The Communist Party of China itself as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type was paralysed from top to bottom. The trade unions, the Young Communist League, all other public organisations, including the young pioneers, were disbanded. All spheres of socio-political, economic and cultural life were put under the army's control. The result was what Lenin called a "shitt of power,'' the ousting of the working class from the real bodies of power and the loss by its party of the leading position in society. A military-bureaucratic dictatorship came into being in China. The proletarian ideology-- MarxismLeninism-was deprived of its leading role in society and replaced with "Mao Tse-tung's ideas.''
In order to step up and legalise this process of _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 332. 56
56 ``shift of power" the Maoists broke away completely from the ideological and organisational principles formulated by the Communist Party of China at its 8th Congress in 1956. This took place at the 9th CPC Congress held in April 1969. The Congress confirmed the omnipotence of the army whose representatives headed the "revolutionary committees" that replaced the elective local bodies of power in the course of the "cultural revolution.'' The army actually seized the highest party organs set up by the Congress, for career servicemen formed a majority of the members and candidate members of the Central Committee Politbureau (15 out of 25) and the CPC Central Committee (145 out of 279); this did not include persons who formerly served in the army or were closely connected with it. The Congress advanced as a programme slogan the preparation for war and approved the Maoist thesis on militarising the country. The Party Rules adopted by the Congress proclaim "Mao Tse-tung's thought" to be Marxism-Leninism of the modern epoch. Though the Maoists use the term "democratic centralism" quite often in the official press, in reality all their activity is aimed at abolishing inner-party democracy and establishing barracks rules in the party. The Party Rules in effect envisaged the creation, under the name of the Communist Party of China, of a new political organisation which would serve as an obedient tool of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship.However, the formation of such an organisation dragged out in the face of serious difficulties. Thus Peking propagandists are forced to return once again to the question of "streamlining and upbuilding the party organisations,'' "cleaning up the 57 party,'' etc. On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China the work of forming provincial party committees was stepped up, although many district and other local party organizations had not yet been established. The delegates to the conferences (called ``congresses'' by the Chinese press) which form provincial party committees were in fact appointed by the heads of the respective "revolutionary committees.'' The latter became the leaders of the new party committeesnearly all of them being representatives of the army.
One indication that the petty-bourgeois nationalists are running into difficulties is the fact that they are forced to restore the former organisational structure which was crushed during the "cultural revolution" under their instructions. The party Central Committee continues to exist, though only formally, as does its Politbureau, and medium-- level and lower party links are being formed, though slowly. They have been and are being "set up" by methods far removed from the Marxist-Leninist party norms. Their members are predominantly servicemen, while the Politbureau includes people closely connected with Mao Tse-tung (his wife, his private secretary, his former bodyguard, etc). But this structure may come to play a positive part should conditions in the party and the country take a favourable turn. Besides, the present CPC leadership is faced with the necessity of reinstating some of the former party cadres, who were persecuted or discredited during the "cultural revolution.''
Another indication of such difficulties encountered by the Maoists is that despite the many years of propaganda and mass ``brainwashing'' and the 58 ``re-cducation" of the CPC members and party functionaries in the "May 7 schools,'' which differ only slightly from concentration camps, and the worst manifestations of the personality cult, the attempt to inculcate "Mao Tse-tung's thought" in the minds of the Chinese Communists and the advanced sections of the Chinese people has obviously met with resistance. Only this can explain why, in the conditions obtaining in the People's Republic of China today, the Peking press has suddenly begun pointing out the need to study the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. There is little doubt that the main purpose of this ``study'' is to bolster the influence of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist ideology-"Mao Tse-tung's thought"-under the slogan of " disseminating Marxism-Leninism.'' The People's Republic of China has printed, along with Mao Tse-tung's works, ten million copies of the works of Marx and Lenin. This is, of course, a mere drop in the ocean, considering the enormous population of the People's Republic of China and the fact that during the "cultural revolution" the number of copies of Mao Tse-tung's ``quotations'' and other works exceeded the astronomical figure of three thousand million, and that the publication of Mao Tse-tung's works is continuing.
The resistance encountered by the Maoists in implementing their plans testify to the unceasing opposition offered by the healthy forces inside the CPC. The true Communists of China are in a difficult position now, but they are there, and in no small number. They have the constructive programme for China's development along the socialist road and the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress, which the 9th Congress had nothing to counter with.
59However complicated the present situation in China may be, the resurgence of the Communist Party of China as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type, its reunification with the world communist movement, the return of the People's Republic of China to the road of scientific socialism and friendship with the USSR, its cohesion with the socialist community-these are objective demands of Chinese society. All the more so since there remain elements of the socialist basis in China. And despite the fact that these surviving socialist elements in the economy and social structure are neutralised by the military-bureaucratic dictatorship and deformed by the anti-socialist policy, so long as the economic basis of society has not undergone qualitative, radical changes, it can serve as the basis for China's development in a positive direction.
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 1969 Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties: "We do not identify the declarations and actions of the present Chinese leadership with the aspirations, wishes and true interests of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people. We are deeply convinced that China's genuine national renascence and its socialist development will be best served not by struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, against the whole communist movement, but by alliance and fraternal cooperation with them.''
__*_*_*__The 50-year experience of the Communist Party of China is highly instructive not only to the parties functioning in countries whose level of development is similar to that of China, but to the entire 60 communist movement. The main conclusion to be drawn from this experience is that a Communist Party must constantly strengthen its combat efficiency. Lenin stressed, when speaking of the need for a determined struggle against the forces and traditions of the old society: "The force of habit in millions and tens of millions is a most formidable force. Without a party of iron that has been tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the confidence of all honest people in the class in question, a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, such a struggle cannot be waged successfully.''~^^1^^
The fate of the Communist Party of China confirms once again Lenin's thesis that the struggle ".. .against the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois national prejudices, looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of the task of converting the dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e., existing in a single country and incapable of determining world politics) into an international one (i.e., a dictatorship of the proletariat involving at least several advanced countries, and capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a whole).''~^^2^^ These words deserve special attention in our time when the world socialist system is emerging as a decisive factor in mankind's development.
Maoism as an ideological and political trend is essentially hostile to Marxism-Leninism; it substitutes sophistry and eclecticism for materialist dialectics and voluntarism, for a materialist interpretation of history. A parasite drawing sustenance _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 31, pp. 44--45.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 148.
61 from socialist ideology, this trend in effect denies the guiding role of the working class in the socialist transformation of society, the role of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the working class, and in every way belittles the role of the masses in history. While employing anti-imperialist verbiage the Maoists are in fact opposed to the international communist movement; they engage in subversive activities against the Marxist-Leninist parties and seek to force their nationalist programme on the latter.That is why in waging a struggle against Maoism one must proceed from an awareness of the incompatibility of the aims of Maoism as a form of social-chauvinism with the aims of the world communist and liberation movement, with the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism concerning socialist construction, international affairs and revolutionary strategy and tactics. The defence of violence and overestimation of the power of the bayonet, great-power chauvinism and claims for world hegemony, the so-called revolution in the sphere of superstructure, which means substitution of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship for the people's democratic social system, and militarisation of society-all this has nothing in common with scientific socialism.
That is why the 24th CPSU Congress fully approved the principled Leninist line and the concrete steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government in Soviet-Chinese relations. It noted: "In a situation in which the Chinese leaders came out with their own specific ideological-- political platform, which is incompatible with Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist countries and at creating a split of the international 62 communist and the whole anti-imperialist movement, the CC CPSU has taken the only correct stand-a stand of consistently defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening of the unity of the world communist movement, and protection of the interests of our socialist Motherland.''
Our party, all Soviet people firmly reject the slanderous fabrications of the Chinese propagandists with regard to the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, borrowed from the arsenal of Chiang Kai-shek clique and other anti-communist fanatics.
At the same time the 24th Congress confirmed the CPSU's course of normalising relations between the USSR and the PRC, of restoring good-- neighbourly relations and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party Soviet Communists send fraternal greetings to the Communists and working people of China. The Soviet people are convinced that ultimately good-neighbourly relations and friendship will be restored between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, since this meets the basic interests of the Chinese and Soviet peoples, the interests of the world socialist system, of the revolutionary, liberation movement of all the oppressed, the interests of universal peace.
Kommunist, No. 10, 1971
[63] __ALPHA_LVL2__ ConcerningHalf a century ago, on July 1, 1921, the inaugural congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) took place in Shanghai. It proclaimed the foundation of the Communist Party of China, a proletarian party of a new type. The congress documents stated that the Party's aim was to bring about the dictatorship of the proletariat, build socialism and fight for communism, and that the Party was connected with the Communist International.
Since then the CPC has traversed a long and thorny path. It headed the struggle of the Chinese people for national and social liberation, led them to the victory of the revolution, and directed China along the socialist road of development. The Party was able to fulfil this task because the Communists, guided by the great Marxist-Leninist teaching, expressed the aspirations of the people and waged an unremitting struggle against imperialism, the compradore bourgeoisie and feudal lords, against petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, left-wing and right-wing deviations, chauvinism and nationalism. The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist-- minded members of the Party constantly fought against the petty-bourgeois, nationalist forces to bring about the triumph of the ideals of scientific communism.
64The founding of the Communist Party of China was a result of the stepped-up political activity of the rising working class and the upsurge of the revolutionary democratic and national-liberation movement in the country in the wake of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the successes of young Soviet Russia.
Li Ta-chao, pioneer of Marxism in China and, later on, a co-founder of the CPC and one of its leading theorists, a Communist-internationalist, said the following about the significance of the October Revolution for China:
``We should greet the Russian revolution with pride as the beacon of a new world civilisation. We have to lend an attentive ear to the news from new Russia which is being built on the principles of freedom and humanism. Only then shall we keep up with world progress.''
In China, the struggle for social emancipation of the working people was closely tied in with the tasks of antinimperialist struggle. The main obstacle to the revolution at the time was imperialism which had made the country its semi-colony. Lenin's view that capital is "an international force" was confirmed in the course of the liberation struggle which developed in China under the Party's guidance. An international alliance of workers, their international brotherhood, is needed to vanquish this force, he wrote. The Communist Party and the people of the Soviet Union, the world communist and workers' movement became a reliable ally for the CPC and the working people of China.
The Communist International and the Soviet Communists gave the Chinese revolutionaries the __PRINTERS_P_05_COMMENT__ 5--193 65 necessary practical assistance in organising the first Marxist groups which appeared in China after the anti-imperialist "Fourth of May Movement" of 1919, and in rallying them on the basis of proletarian Marxist-Leninist ideology. The decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist International and Lenin's speeches at this congress on the national and colonial questions served as an impetus and ideological basis for the unification of Chinese Marxist-revolutionaries. The Communist International gave considerable assistance to the Chinese revolutionaries in assimilating Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of the Leninist Party of Bolsheviks.
Right from the first the CPC found itself in the crucible of the national-democratic revolution and put forward an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal programme. The period between the first and third congresses of the CPC, that is prior to 1924, was a period of Party organisational and ideological growth. In 1922 the CPC was admitted to the Communist International. At its Third Congress (1923) the Party advanced the policy of building a united national-revolutionary front with the Kuomintang then headed by the great revolutionary democrat Sun Yat-sen.
The anti-imperialist action of the people, with the working class as its chief force, kept mounting in China. For this reason it became urgent for the CPC to ensure proletarian hegemony in the national revolution at that time. The Hong Kong and Canton sailors' strike, the general strike of the Shanghai workers, and the growth of the peasant movement in the country showed that the proletariat was the main support of the Party, the vanguard of the revolution, and that the peasantry was 66 the principal ally of the proletariat, an ally without whose support the victory of the revolution in China was impossible.
The counter-revolutionary coup staged in 1927 by the right wing of the Kuomintang headed by Chiang Kai-shek led to the collapse of the united front. The Communist Party of China and those supporting it were subjected to bloody terror. Hundreds of thousands of sons and daughters of the Chinese people were victimised. Among those who perished were such outstanding leaders of the CPC as Hsiang Chung-fa and Chu Chiu-po, CPC Central Committee General Secretaries,- Peng Pai, a prominent leader of the peasant movement; Chang Tai-lei, CPC leader and organiser of the Young Communist League of China; Su Chaocheng, leader of the famous Canton Commune, and Fang Chih-min, founder of one of the first revolutionary bases of the CPC.
Another feature that complicated the situation was the right-wing deviation that developed in the CPC at the time. It led to undermining the Party's ties with the masses, hampered making use of the experience of the world communist movement and implementing Comintern recommendations. The Sixth CPC Congress (1928), convened at such a critical time for the Party, discussed the tasks of the Party in the new situation. The Congress resolutions were elaborated with a view to the international experience of the revolutionary movement and dealt with basic problems such as the strategy and tactics of developing the agrarian revolution, the building of the armed forces and the establishment of strongholds in the rural areas. The directive worked out by the Congress defined ways of developing the Chinese revolution.
67The late twenties and first half of the 30's again proved quite complex for the Party. The Communists were constantly persecuted by the reactionaries. In the Party proper petty-bourgeois elements became active and in the mid-30's seized the key Party positions.
The Chiang Kai-shekites launched terror against the CPC, while conducting an anti-Soviet campaign, followed by armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. The Chinese Communist-- internationalists resolutely exposed the reactionary meaning of Chiang Kai-shek's slogan calling for war against the Soviet Union and slanderously trying to accuse the USSR of "red imperialism.''
Everyone is aware of the disaster which befell the Chinese people as a result of this counter-- revolutionary policy. Subsequent events showed that every time the enemies of China, the enemies of socialism inside the country attempted to weaken the revolutionary movement, to make it deviate from the right course, they inevitably whipped up a wave of anti-Sovietism. Such was the case in the years of the struggle for the liberation of China. The same was true of nationalist and bourgeois elements later on.
In that trying period for the CPC, the Soviet Communists initiated a mighty international movement in defence of the Chinese patriots. The Comintern called upon all the Communists of the world to render "every kind of support to the Chinese revolution.''
The Japanese imperialist aggression against China caused a reshuffling of forces in the country, and made the question of saving the nation paramount. Speaking at the Comintern in 1936, 68 G. Dimitrov stressed that the task of the CPC, was to "achieve unification of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders.'' The CPC Central Committee took the initiative in establishing a united anti-Japanese front. This slogan conformed to the main interests of the Chinese people and, because of its importance in the anti-Japanese struggle, the CPC became a very influential national force.
The war against Japan was long and hard. The defeat of Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism made possible China's final liberation from the Japanese invaders. The decisive part in winning victory over these ultra-reactionary forces of imperialism was played by the Soviet Union. This provided highly favourable conditions for the victory of the people's revolutions in a number of countries of Europe and Asia, including China. The liberation mission of the Soviet Union in the Far East, the routing of Japan's crack Kwangtung Army, the liberation of Manchuria with the active participation of the troops of the Mongolian People's Republic, the Chinese and Korean guerrillasall this resulted not only in the surrender of Japan and ridding China of the foreign yoke, but also predetermined the possibilities for the subsequent defeat of the Chiang Kai-shekites. Thanks to the Soviet Union, US intervention of China was prevented.
The military-revolutionary base set up by the Chinese Communists with the assistance of the Soviet Army and Soviet civilian specialists in Manchuria greatly contributed to the victory of the Chinese revolution. This was the bridgehead from which the completely reorganised, trained and rearmed National Liberation Army under the 69 leadership of the Communist Party of China drove out the Kuomintang reactionaries from China.
The victory of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution in China was a major event which greatly influenced world development. The success of that revolution marked the victory of Marxism-Leninism in China. International solidarity, the close ties of Chinese revolutionaries with the international communist and working-class movement, the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union and other countries of the world socialist system ensured the victory of the Chinese people, the Chinese workers, peasants and intelligentsia in the many-year selfless struggle they had waged under the leadership of the Communist Party of China.
The victory of the revolution paved the way for the Chinese people to radical political, social and economic transformations. The objective requirements of the further development of the revolution, with China taking the socialist road, as well as the threat posed by imperialism, made it imperative for China to establish the closest friendly ties with the USSR and other socialist countries which could render the PRC the necessary political, military and economic support and assistance.
True to the great principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism, the CPSU and the Soviet people, just as during the years of revolutionary struggle, rendered the Chinese people all the necessary support in building socialism. With the assistance of the USSR more than 250 large modern industrial enterprises and other projects were built 70 in China. As the leaders of the CPC admitted, these enterprises became "the backbone of China's industry.'' "The assistance of the Soviet Union in the economic construction of our country," Jenmin jihpao wrote at that time, "both quantitatively and in scale is unprecedented in history.''
During the first decade following the founding of the PRC, the basis of socialism was laid in the country-an economic basis which provided opportunities for further socialist construction.
The 8th CPC Congress, held in 1956 under the banner of strengthening the Marxist-Leninist forces in the Party, occupies a special place in the Party's history, in the life of the Chinese people. It confirmed the general line of building socialism in close alliance with the countries of the world socialist system.
The 8th CPC Congress gave a principled rebuff to the nationalist and chauvinist tendencies in ideology and policy which had been manifested in the Party and the country. In the "Fundamental Theses of the Programme" of the CPC Rules adopted by the Congress, the ideological-theoretical foundation of the Party was resolutely stressed: "The Communist Party of China is guided in its activities by Marxism-Leninism.''
Having mapped out concrete ways and means of continuing socialist transformations and having determined the major tasks in developing the country's national economy, the 8th Congress stressed that the basic aim of the Party's entire activities is "the fullest satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of the life of the people.''
In the foreign policy sphere the Congress defined as the major task the need "to continue to strengthen and consolidate the eternal and 71 inviolable fraternal friendship with the great Soviet Union and all People's Democracies.''
Aware of the complex tasks of socialist construction facing the Party and the country, and mindful of the lessons of CPC development, the Congress urged the Party to be vigilant and resolutely combat all manifestations of great-power chauvinism and petty-bourgeois nationalist ideology. The resolution of the Eighth Congress read: "If we submit to the influence of non-proletarian ideology, display conceit and complacency, fancy ourselves infallible, and stop learning with all modesty, we shall, as before, fail to avoid the evil of subjectivism.'' Further developments showed how timely this warning was.
Nurturing plans which were entirely at variance with the line of the Eighth Congress, the greatpower nationalist elements within the CPC considered the time was not ripe to implement them and, concealing their true intentions, had to vote for the basic propositions of the Congress. Later on, however, Mao Tse-tung and his following took action to scuttle the Congress decisions. They opened the lock-gate to the surging wave of petty-- bourgeois pressure on the Party and the working class. Capitalising on the Chinese people's desire to build socialism in the shortest possible space, advocates of this course used ``left''-revolutionary slogans to plunge the country into the voluntarist "great leap" experiments. At the 1959 Lushan Plenum of the CPC Central Committee, Marxist-Leninist forces in the Communist Party of China characterised this line as an expression of "petty-bourgeois fanaticism,'' for which even then the Chinese people had paid dearly.
The nationalist group in the CPC leadership 72 kept enforcing their own platform on the Party and the country. By working up nationalist and jingoist sentiments, they sought to gear Chinese home and foreign policies to the attainment of hegemonic aims in the international arena.
The present leaders of the Communist Party of China spoke out against the world communist movement line jointly evolved by communist and workers' Parties, the CPC included. They put forth their own ideological and political platform, inconsistent with Leninism on major questions concerning international affairs and socialist upbuilding. Since the CPSU and other fraternal parties upholding Marxism-Leninism had effectually thwarted all attempts to revise this science from ``left''-opportunist and nationalist positions, the Peking leadership launched an unprecedented smear campaign and subversive activity against our Party and other fraternal parties. This activity was extended to include not only the socialist system and the communist movement but also the entire anti-imperialist front.
Such a policy evoked opposition in the CPC ranks and among the vast masses of the Chinese people. To do away with this opposition, Mao Tsetung and his followers started a fight against Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres within the CPC, against politically-conscious workers, peasants and intellectuals. This was the primary goal of the "cultural revolution" which dealt the CPC a telling blow and during which many outstanding Party veterans and hundreds of thousands of Communists fell victim to reprisals.
At the 9th Congress of the CPC Mao Tse-tung and his entourage tried to legalise their home and foreign policy line, which in essence was hostile 73 to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and to make it an enduring programme. Speaking about the construction of socialism in China they, at the same time, came up with the thesis on the ``impossibility'' of the victory of socialism before the triumph of the world revolution. Breaking away from Marxist-Leninist principles of socialist construction they made the task of " preparing for war" and turning the entire country into a military camp the goal of China's economic development and the country's socio-political life. Militant anti-Sovietism became a programmatic task.
The objective laws of socio-economic development, as well as the basic interests of the Chinese people require a genuinely socialist policy based on the principles of scientific communism.
However, the economic foundations of socialism, laid in the first decade of the PRC, are now subjected to dangerous deformation as a result of the policy pursued by the present Chinese leadership who seek to place the country's resources at the service of their great-power and hegemonic aims. This policy imperils the socialist gains of the Chinese people and impedes the country's progress.
The attempts of the present Chinese leadership to cast aspersions on the experience of the USSR and other fraternal parties, and statements made against the socialist community create additional obstacles to building socialism in China.
As to hostile fabrications concerning CPSU policy and the Soviet state, they are resolutely rejected by the Soviet people. It is all the more harmful to sow discord between the USSR and China when the imperialists are stepping up hostile activities against the socialist countries and freedom-loving 74 peoples. US imperialism and Japanese militarism nurture aggressive plans against China as well as the USSR. Therefore, the policy of using anti-- Sovietism to flirt with imperialism, of supporting territorial claims of the Japanese revanchists encourages the reactionary circles of the United States, Japan and other imperialist powers and harms the anti-imperialist front. Now, more than ever before, the situation in the world and in Asia demands solidarity and joint action of all anti-imperialist and revolutionary forces. This was stressed again at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. The trend of present-day world development fully confirms the urgency and great importance of this conclusion.
The Soviet people and our Communist Party have regarded and continue to regard the development of friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people and the Chinese Communists as an important prerequisite for strengthening the positions of world socialism and promoting the unity of the international communist movement and the entire anti-imperialist front.
It is precisely this that determines the principled and consistent line of the CPSU and the Soviet state in relation to China. This policy, its aims and essence were clearly described in the decisions of the 23rd and 24th Congresses of our Party, at plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee and in speeches by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
75After thoroughly analysing questions pertaining to Sino-Soviet relations, the 24th CPSU Congress fully approved and confirmed the principled Leninist course and concrete steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government with regard to Soviet-Chinese relations. When Chinese leaders advanced their ideological-political platform which is incompatible with Leninism and spearheaded against the socialist countries and at splitting the international communist movement and the anti-imperialist movement in general, the CPSU Central Committee took to the position of consistently upholding the principles of MarxismLeninism, making every effort to strengthen the unity of the world communist movement and protecting the interests of the socialist community of nations.
At the same time, the CPSU is firmly against carrying over existing serious ideological differences to inter-state relations. It strives to normalise relations between the USSR and the PRC, and does everything to restore the good-neighbourly, friendly relations between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.
The CPSU proceeds from the assumption that the objective requirements of China's socialistoriented development provide opportunities for this normalisation. The long-term vital interests of the peoples of the USSR and China do not clash; on the contrary, they make it imperative to restore and develop their cooperation and friendship.
The numerous constructive steps for normalising relations with the PRC which were taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, are widely known and approved of.
76Soon after the meeting of the heads of government of the two countries held in Peking in 1969 on the initiative of the USSR, Soviet-Chinese talks on border questions began. Taking a constructive approach to this matter, the Soviet side proposes that measures be taken to promote mutual understanding and a final solution of all border disputes be achieved by concluding a new border treaty. However, in order for the talks to be successful both partners must show goodwill and seek to reach an agreement.
Of late the PRC Government, too, has made statements to the effect that ideological differences "should not interfere with the maintenance of state relations between China and the Soviet Union on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.'' We take into consideration the statements by the Chinese side of their willingness not to carry over ideological differences to inter-state relations.
Expressing the will of our Party and the people, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress:
``We shall never forsake the national interests of the Soviet state. The CPSU will continue tirelessly to work for the cohesion of the socialist countries and the world communist movement on a MarxistLeninist basis. At the same time, our Party and the Soviet Government are deeply convinced that an improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would be in line with the fundamental, long-term interests of both countries, the interests of socialism, the freedom of the peoples, and stronger peace. That is why we are prepared in every way to help not only to normalise relations but also to restore 77 neighbourliness and friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and express the confidence that this will eventually be achieved.'' This just and constructive stand of the CPSU and the Soviet state in relation to the PRC meets with the understanding and approval of fraternal socialist countries, communist and workers' parties, all progressive and peace-loving forces, including the Chinese people.
__*_*_*__The difficult half-century road of the Communist Party of China confirms that Marxism-Leninism alone equips the revolutionaries with a clear understanding of the objective laws and trends of social development and a scientific approach to evolving strategy and tactics in the struggle for the transformation of the world and the construction of socialism and communism. Fidelity to MarxismLeninism and proletarian internationalism guarantees the success of the activities of the Communists. Inversely, when a detachment of the world communist movement departs from these principles it is doomed to defeat and harms the common cause of the world army of the Communists.
Chinese Communist-internationalists have invariably stressed that unity with the CPSU, the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is of vital importance for the victory of the revolution and successful advancement along the road of socialism. On the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, the Soviet Communists, the Soviet people pay their respects to the heroism and selflessness of the 78 Chinese Communists, to all who, fighting for the implementation of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, have not spared and do not spare efforts for the Chinese revolution to triumph, for China's advancement along the road of progress and socialism.
Pravda, July 1, 1971
[79] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Renunciation of the PrinciplesN. Lomdkin and N. Petrovichev
The International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in June 1969 was a major success of the communist, working-class and liberation movements. It was an important step towards greater international cohesion of Communists on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
Immense importance attaches to the conclusion made at the Conference to the effect that Communists must consistently uphold their principles, work for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism and, depending on the specific situation, combat right and ``left'' opportunist distortions of theory and policy, and adopt an uncompromising stand against revisionism, dogmatism and ``left'' sectarian adventurism. Fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism is a vital condition for the correct orientation and successful activity of the Communist and Workers' Parties.
The harm that can be inflicted on the world communist movement by a departure from Marxism-Leninism and a rupture with internationalism is shown by the actions of the present leadership of the Communist Party of China. This 80 was thoroughly analysed at the Conference by L. I. Brezhnev, who led the CPSU delegation. "Almost ten years ago,'' he said, "Mao Tse-tung and his supporters mounted an attack on the principles of scientific communism. In its numerous statements on questions of theory the CPC leadership has step by step revised the principled line of the communist movement. In opposition to this it has laid down a special line of its own on all the fundamental questions of our day.. .
``The facts show that the Chinese leadership speaks of struggle against imperialism while in fact helping the latter, directly or indirectly, by everything it does. It helps the imperialists by seeking to split the united front of the socialist states. It helps them by its incitement and its obstructions to relaxation of international tension at| ttmes of acute international crises. It helps them by striving to hamper the emergence of a broad anti-imperialist front, by seeking to split the international mass organisations of youth, women and scientists, the peace movement, the trade union movement, and so on.
``Naturally, the imperialists make the most of Peking's present orientation in the field of foreign policy as a trump in their political struggle against world socialism and the liberation movement.''
The actions of the CPC leaders were also criticised by the heads of delegations from the absolute majority of other Parties represented at the Conference.
It is a pity that the CPC leadership did not want to listen to this criticism. They continue to stand in the way of the unity of the socialist countries, unity based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian __PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__ 6---193 81 internationalism, and are not giving up their attempts to split the international communist and working-class movement. The propaganda put out by the Chinese leaders is grist to the mill of the reactionary, imperialist forces striving to break up the community of the socialist countries.
The erroneous and harmful tenets of the Maoists and their anti-Leninist line were given the status of official Party policy at the Ninth Congress of the CPC, which was held last year. In effect, the character of the decisions passed by that Congress was predetermined by the artificially created situation in which the Congress itself was prepared and held. In the course of the "cultural revolution" the lawfully elected leading Party organs were uprooted. The "revolutionary committees" headed by the military took over the management of Party affairs. The old Party cadres and all who disagreed with the Maoist line or doubted that it was correct were defamed, put on the list of the "black gang,'' and subjected to mockery and repressions. Everything was done to foster a turbid wave of anti-Sovietism and nationalistic passion. In a situation like this there naturally could be no question of a free discussion of questions worrying the Party and the country.
Delegates to the Ninth Congress were not elected but nominated from among the Maoists. There are grounds for stating that this was not a regular congress of the Communist Party of China, which has fine revolutionary traditions, but the first congress of a new political organisation called upon to serve China's military-- bureaucratic leadership. This is admitted, though indirectly, by the Maoists themselves. How else is one 82 to interpret, for instance, their official slogan: "Long live the great victory of the Ninth All-- China Congress of the Communist Party of China"? A victory over whom or over what? All the indications are that this is a victory over the Party's healthy forces, over those who make the Party a Marxist-Leninist organisation that had once occupied a prominent place and enjoyed recognition in the world communist and working-class movements.
A new situation fraught with serious negative consequences for the cause of communism has thus arisen. Marxist-Leninists, naturally, cannot fail to see this or pass it over in silence. They feel that their duty is to expose the anti-Leninist, anti-popular essence of the Maoists' ideological and political concepts.
New Party Rules were adopted at the Ninth Congress of the CPC. There is, of course, nothing unusual in the very fact that new Rules have been adopted. Every revolutionary party bases its activity on the two main documents-the Programme and Rules. The Programme determines the nature of the Party, and clearly sets out and scientifically substantiates its aims. The Rules define the Party's organisational principles, the norms of its inner life and the methods of work used by Party organisations. There is a close link between the Programme and the Rules. While the Programme is the foundation of the Party's ideological unity, the Rules are the foundation of its organisational cohesion. Without organisational unity there cannot be ideological unity and, conversely, ideological unity is inconceivable without organisational unity.
__PRINTERS_P_83_COMMENT__ 6* 83In working out a more or less long-term strategic line, each Marxist-Leninist party sees to it that its organisational forms, the rules governing its life and the methods used in its practical work conform to the new political tasks and ensure their fulfilment. Therefore, from time to time Communist and Workers' Parties amend or supplement the operating Rules or adopt new Rules.
Life introduces corrections into the specific forms of the parties' organisational make-up and into the methods of work employed by them, and this must be reflected and recorded in their Rules. Organisationally, in the choice of the forms and methods of its work and in its entire political activity, the Party relies on revolutionary theory r.id on a comprehensive and thorough analysis of coucrel? historical conditions.
Soviet Communists know from their own ex- | perience how important it is to make sure that I the Party Rules and the provisions recorded in I it should conform to the requirements of the day ' and enable the Party to successfully carry out its tasks. For that reason they understand the concern that the fraternal parties show for this I problem.
I
In the case of the Communist Party of China, this is a particularly pressing problem for a number of reasons. We shall recall only two circumstances. First, although nearly fifty years have passed since the CPC was founded, it has no Programme to this day and this adds weight to its Rules as the only basic Party document. Second, in flagrant violation of the Rules operating earlier, no Party Congress was convened for thirteen years. Consequently, it is important to enhance the role 84 of the Rules and introduce into them provisions that would prevent violations of inner-Party democracy and serve as a guarantee that the principles and norms of Party life are strictly observed by all its members.
This is the approach that should be taken if the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the party is used as the guideline.
What, in fact, are the new CPC Rules that have been adopted at the Ninth Congress? A close scrutiny provides grounds for saying that they flagrantly contravene the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the party and run counter to the views of the Communists on the questions of party development. In all respects the new Rules are not an improvement of but a step back from the former Rules, which were passed in 1956 by the Eighth Congress of the CPC. They constitute a direct retreat from the Marxist-Leninist positions that were adopted by that Congress. The Rules have been reinterpreted with numerous additions so as to turn the party into an obedient tool of the present leadership for carrying out their greatpower, chauvinistic policies.
In the former Rules of the CPC the first section was headed "Fundamental Provisions of the Programme.'' It gave a definition of the Party and the cardinal principles underlying its development. It outlined the ways and means of achieving socialist transformations in China and named the tasks that had to be carried out in the sphere of industrialisation, agriculture, science and culture and in the matter of attaining a higher standard of living. Tasks were formulated also with regard to the national relations, and it was emphasised that "particular attention must 85 be paid to preventing and surmounting greatHan chauvinism.'' On the whole, this section actually filled the void caused by the absence of a Programme. In the new Rules, this section has been cut by two-thirds. If we bear in mind that the Communist Party of China has no Programme, this curtailment is in itself puzzling, to say the least. Moreover, the content of the new section upsets everything worthy of description as a Marxist party.
The new Rules of the CPC actually endorse the hegemonistic, divisive, anti-Soviet foreign policy of its present leadership. The former Rules stated: "The Party bends every effort to promote and strengthen friendship with the camp of peace, democracy and socialism headed by the Soviet Union.''
The new Rules declare that the CPC "unites with genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties" and jointly with them fights to defeat imperialism headed by the USA, and modern revisionism,'' it being understood that the Chinese leaders regard the "Soviet revisionists" as the hub of this revisionism. Everybody knows what the Maoists mean by "genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties.'' These are the divisive, subversive groups set up by them in various countries and consisting of renegades and turncoats who act on their instructions. Although they are numerically weak and ill-assorted, they have inflicted quite a lot of harm on the world communist movement, and for this they are lavishly praised by Peking. The Peking leaders classify as ``revisionists'' the overwhelming majority of the Communist and Workers' Parties adhering to Marxism-Leninism and 86 rejecting the theoretically untenable and politically erroneous and harmful Maoist tenets.
They accuse the Communist Parties of France, India, the United States of America, Italy, Latin America and many others of the deadly sins of ``revisionism'' and "apostasy.'' Naturally, they make every effort to slander the Communist Parties of many socialist countries, above all, the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee, which they regard as enemy No. 1. Matters have reached a point where the Chinese leaders place in the same category imperialism and the Soviet Union, the country that blazed the road to socialism and is now leading the way to communism. Barefaced, undisguised anti-Sovietism is one of the major if not the key element of Maoist foreign policy.
Many of the participants in the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties denounced this line of the Peking leadership. They underscored the colossal role that the Soviet Union and the CPSU had played in the historic battle against imperialism, for the triumph of the cause of peace, national liberation, democracy and socialism.
The present CPC leaders see our Leninist Party as being the main obstacle standing in the way of their hegemonistic ambitions. That is why they have specially written anti-Sovietism into the Rules as official party policy. Though, formerly, the Chinese leadership was also free-handed in its anti-Soviet attacks, now it has received even greater freedom of action-the new Rules allow opposition to and open acts of hostility against the CPSU and other communist and workers' parties.
The new Rules of the CPC revise the Party's 87 ideological and theoretical foundations and replace Marxism-Leninism with Maoism. It was stated in the former Rules: "In its activity the Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism. Only Marxism-Leninism correctly explains the laws of social development and correctly indicates the ways of building socialism and communism.'' In the new Rules it is recorded: "The Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism and the thought of MaoTse-tung as its theoretical foundation determining its ideals. The thought of Mao Tse-tung is the Marxism-Leninism of the epoch when imperialism moves to its total collapse and socialism advances towards victory throughout the world.'' Although the words ``Marxism-Leninism'' are used there this is nothing more than camouflage. The only reason they are used is to delude people inexperienced in politics and ease the transition from Marxism-Leninism to Maoism.
There is not the least doubt that it is a question of precisely such a transition. What else explains the fact that the provision in the Rules about the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" is assessed by Chinese propaganda as a "great victory of the cultural revolution"? Mentioning MarxismLeninism in order to distract attention, the authors of the new Rules give it an interpretation Which emasculates it completely. In their view, which is recorded in the Rules, Mao Tse-tung "inherited, upheld and developed Marxism-- Leninism, and raised it to a new level.'' The purpose of these and similar arguments is starkly clear: Maoism is the modern Marxism-Leninism and is, therefore, the guide. Marx and Lenin belong to the past. In the world today there is 88 only one "leader,'' Mao, and one has to follow him without burdening oneself with thoughts about where and how he will lead.
Of course, Marxism-Leninism is by no means a fossilised teaching. As no other theory it is linked with life, with the working-class and national-liberation movements, with the struggle for socialism and communism. As a science, it demands that it should be treated as such, that it should be constantly developed and advanced. But the Marxist-Leninist teaching has nothing in common with a revision of its basic propositions, with attempts to evolve national variants.
Such attempts are leading to the rejection of Marxism-Leninism as an integral science of the laws of social development, of the construction of socialism and communism. They destroy the very foundation of the internationalist unity of the international communist and working-class movement, breaking it up into national "islands.''
Having invented "Sinoised Marxism,'' the present Chinese leaders have thereby made it clear that ``conventional'' Marxism, i.e., Marxism in its true and generally accepted sense, does not suit them. They have gone even further, declaring that the thought of Mao Tse-tung is the "summit of Marxism-Leninism of our epoch.'' However, no subterfuges over wording can conceal the obvious fact that the "thought of MaoTse-tung" is a glaring contradiction of MarxismLeninism.
The new Rules of the CPC officially propagate the personality cult, which is alien to MarxismLeninism, in the Party and in the country as a whole.
It should be remembered that the report to the 89 8th CPC Congress on the changes in the Rules said in part that the CPC "rejects the deification of a personality as alien to its policies.'' The former Rules stressed that "activities putting the personality above the party" are inadmissible within the party, that the party should be especially concerned with "modesty and discretion.'' These lines have disappeared from the new Rules which, instead, now enthrone Mao Tse-tung as the leader of the Communist Party of China. Not only is the emperor named, but his successor also. "Comrade Lin Piao,'' say the Rules "is always holding high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas; he is the most devoted and persistent adherent of the proletarian revolutionary line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Comrade Lin Piao is the closest comrade-in-arms of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the continuer of his cause.'' Thus, it is declared in advance who is to ``inherit'' and ``supervise'' the party.
All of these statements of course, directly contradict the scientific, materialistic teaching on the question of personality and the role of parties, classes and the people at large in history. As is known, Marxism-Leninism accords to proletarian parties and their leaders a high role in the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of society. Without a party and experienced leaders, the working class is incapable of achieving success in the struggle for the triumph of communist ideals. But Marxism-Leninism bases its teaching on the decisive role played by the working people in history, at the same time paying tribute to those leaders who correctly understand and express the basic interests of the working class and all working people. This is the cornerstone of the Marxist-- Leninist philosophy, of the communist outlook.
90In the past the Chinese leaders repeatedly declared their fidelity to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the decisive role of the working people in social development. They proclaimed their belief in the people. But later this line was abandoned and a new policy emerged-one of unrestrained glorification of the person of Mao Tse-tung who was henceforward to be reverently worshipped. Immodesty and self-advertisment of the CPC leadership know no bounds. Even the comparison of Mao with the sun seems inadequate to some of his worshippers for the sun shines only in the daytime, while Mao Tse-tung "shines always.'' Anyone guilty of casting the slightest doubt on the infallibility of Mao or of glorifiying him with insufficient zeal, is anathematised, described as a "black revisionists" and persecuted. As for the mass of the people, Mao Tse-tung said about them the following: the Chinese people are "a blank sheet of paper on which the most beautiful hieroglyphs can be written and the most beautiful pictures drawn.'' And indeed the Maoists are busily ``writing'' and ``drawing'' for all they are worth. The multi-- million people with an ancient culture are looked upon as being no more than an object of political self-seeking. What is this if not an outrage against everything that is sacred for all Communists, for their ideology?
In the new Rules of the CPC the provisions on membership of the Party have been drastically amended. The purpose of these amendments is to renew the Party's composition in the direction desired by the Maoists. It is suggested that those "who fail to reform after educational work has been conducted with them" should be forced to leave the Party, and that "the Party 91 organisations should be constantly improved by removing the unworthy and enlisting the new.'' Facts show that the words "removing the unworthy" are directed not against actual class enemies but against people who do not share the Maoist ideas, against those who can be suspected of disloyalty to the aims of the Maoists. People linked with "Soviet revisionism,'' i.e., those who have preserved their friendly feelings towards the Soviet Union and its Leninist Party, are classified as the most dangerous.
Proving the necessity of the so-called regulation within the party, Lin Piao said, menacingly, at the 9th CPC Congress: "Anyone who dares to come forward against Chairman Mao Tse-tung and against his ideas, no matter what the circumstances, will be censured by the party and punished by the whole country.''
As regards the ruling on "enlisting the new,'' its meaning is elucidated by the simplified procedures of admission to Party membership and the introduction of new provisions opening the floodgates to petty-bourgeois elements. In the former Rules it was stated that only a person who does not exploit the labour of others can be a member of the CPC. Today this demand has been deleted from the Rules, although in China, according to the admission of the Maoists themselves, its significance has not diminished to this day. Under the present Rules the "Chinese worker, poor peasant, lower middle peasant, revolutionary serviceman or other revolutionary element" can become a member of the CPC. One can understand the purpose of this wording in the Rules if one bears in mind that the Maoists regard as genuine revolutionary elements the 92 hungweipings and tsaofans and all who unquestioningly follow the Maoist chauvinistic, divisive, anti-Soviet policy. This opens wide the door to Party membership precisely for these elements and allows the present CPC leadership to bring into the Party the forces which it regards as its mainstay.
No data on the CPC's social composition or, as a matter of fact, any other data characterising the situation in the country have been published for a long time. No information of this kind is contained even in the documents of the Ninth Congress of the CPC. It is known that in 1957 the CPC had nearly 13 million members of whom less than 14 per cent were workers. There are grounds for believing that as a result of the disbandment of workers' organisations and the mass injection of "new blood" into the Party through the admission of hungweipings and other elements, this percentage is today even smaller. The organisational principles of Marxism-- Leninism require that the Party should be built up on a democratic foundation allowing for the utmost encouragement of the initiative and activity of Communists. In all questions of the Party's policy and practical work, Party members should have the decisive say. Lenin stressed that only he is worthy of the lofty name of Communist who independently ponders over his Party's destiny and bears a personal responsibility for it.
There was a time when in the CPC this was recognised as an indispensable condition of the Party's militancy. In the former Rules it was stated, for example, that it was necessary "to take effective measures to promote inner-Party democracy and to encourage the activity and 93 creative initiative of all Party members.'' There is not a word about this in the new Rules, where the accent is on something quite different. In effect, the purport of the amendments is to abolish inner-Party democracy, enforce barrack practices in the Party and turn Communists into submissive, mechanical executors of the leadership's instructions. To justify these amendments it is stated that in China there "is a threat of subversion from within and of aggression by the imperialists and modern revisionism.''
The demand that all Party members should be absolutely, categorically and unconditionally true to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" creates an atmosphere in the Party which leaves no room for inner-Party democracy and a free exchange of opinions. However, this is not all. Although, like the old, the new Rules provide for convening periodic congresses of the CPC, Party congresses in the localities and Party meetings, they contain the addition to the effect that "in special cases they (congresses, meetings.-Author) may be convened earlier or postponed.'' Nothing is said about who has to decide on this and under what circumstances this may be done. The door is thus opened wide to arbitrary decisions, to a ``legal'' infringement of one of the key norms of Party life. True, even when this reservation was non-existent, the CPC leadership ignored the provision in the Rules on the time-limit for convening congresses and meetings, but now this can be justified with references to the Rules.
The former Rules envisaged a democratic procedure for forming the Party's leading organs. It stated: "Elections shall be held by secret ballot, and the electors shall be ensured the right 94 to criticise, outvote or replace any candidate.'' In lieu of this provision, the current Rules contain a deliberately loosely worded clause to the effect that "the leading Party organs at all levels shall be elected on the basis of democratic consultations.'' Obviously, this can be interpreted in any way and given any meaning, which is evidently what the Maoists want.
A new provision has been introduced, stating that "the convocation of congresses and the composition of the Party committees in the localities and in the Army shall be approved by higher Party organisations.'' This affords the Maoists the possibility of manipulating the composition of the leading Party organs at their own discretion and appointing to leading positions persons devoted to them. Significantly, the provisions on central and local Party control commissions have been deleted altogether. The setting up of Party control agencies is no longer envisaged.
There are clauses consolidating the position held by Mao Tse-tung and his entourage in the CPC. These clauses endow the Chairman of the CC, his Deputy and the Standing Committee of the CC Political Bureau (altogether five persons) with virtually unlimited power. In particular, it is stated in the Rules that "some necessary compact and operational organs to conduct the current work of the Party, the Government and the Army are established under the guidance of the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CC.'' The purpose of this is, first, to justify antedatedly the disbandment, in the course of the "cultural revolution,'' of democratically elected Party committees and the setting up of organs not 95 envisaged by the Rules, such as the notorious headquarters for "cultural revolution" affairs, and, second, to give the top leadership a free hand in the future. If necessary, they will establish "compact and operational" agencies legally and rely on them in the struggle against any opposition.
The position occuppied by ruling parties such as that of the Communist Parties in socialist countries requires that the forms and methods of their work and the principles underlying their leadership of state and public organisations should be clearly denned in their Rules. This has been done in the Rules of the CPSU and other fraternal parties. The former Rules of the CPC also contained the appropriate provisions, which specified the functions of Party organs at all levels, spoke clearly of the need to rule collectively and denned the Party's relations with state and public organisations. There were sections headed "Party Groups of the Leadership in NonParty Organisations" and "The Party and the Young Communist League.'' None of these provisions and sections is to be found in the new Rules. Instead, there is a provision stating: "The state organs of power of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the People's Liberation Army as well as the Young Communist League, the revolutionary mass organisations of workers, poor peasants, lowest middle peasants and Red Guards, and other revolutionary mass organisations shall be subordinate to the leadership of the Party.''
It is hard to reconcile this provision with the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the role played by the Communist Party and the character of its relations with state and public organisations. Worded as an order it, too, serves the purpose of 96 placing all power in the hands of the Party leadership with Mao at the head.
Leninism teaches us that in exercising political leadership of all state and public organisations the Party does not have recourse to administration by injunction and does not take over their functions. Being the nucleus of socialist society's political structure and coordinating and directing the work of the mass organisations of working people, the Communist Party at the same time bends every effort to enable them to operate with self-assurance and confidence within the context of their rights and functions. This means that in societies building socialism and communism, along with the growth of the tasks to be carried out, the upswing of the people's activeness and the heightening of the Party's role, a process is under way of the enhancement of the role played by state and public organisations, and of the development and improvement of socialist democracy. This is one of the laws governing the development of socialist society, and one of the many laws the Maoists are grossly violating.
__*_*_*__The CPSU's point of departure is that the Soviet and Chinese peoples have common basic interests, and it is doing everything in its power to sustain fraternal friendship between them. At the same time, the Soviet Communists and all other Marxist-Leninists consider it their duty to wage an uncompromising struggle against the divisive policy, great-power foreign-policy line and anti-Leninist and anti-popular ideological and political tenets of the Peking leaders.
__PRINTERS_P_97_COMMENT__ 7--193 97An analysis of the amendments introduced into the Rules by the Ninth Congress as compared with the Rules adopted by the Eighth Congress shows that while formally retaining the Party's former name, the CPC leadership is steering towards the creation of a fundamentally different political organisation. Underlying its structure and activity are the personality cult, extreme centralism, militarism and the renunciation of inner-Party democracy. In its aims and tasks this is a nationalistic and chauvinistic organisation with pronounced anti-Soviet tendencies.
In short, the new Rules of the CPC are an open revision and abandonment of the Marxist-- Leninist principles of party development. The future will show whether the CPC has the strength to halt the process of degeneration, to resume the positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and to rejoin the united front of the world's Communist and Workers' Parties. This would conform to the vital interests of the Chinese people and to the interests of the world proletariat and the working people of all countries.
Kommunist, No. 4, 1970
[98] __ALPHA_LVL1__ II __ALPHA_LVL2__ Maoism: Its IdeologicalP. Fedoseyeu
The course of world development and the events in China clearly show the hostility towards socialism and Marxism-Leninism of the special ideological and political platform set forth by the Chinese leadership on fundamental issues of international life and the world communist movement.
The theoretical and practical activities of the Maoists, their efforts to split the revolutionary forces, and their great-power and hegemonic ambitions do serious harm to the anti-imperialist struggle, to the world communist and workingclass movement, to the forces fighting for democracy and national freedom and to the entire cause of socialism and the social progress of mankind.
Strongly rebuffing Maoism, Marxist-Leninists consider it necessary to expose completely its ideological and political essence and its social roots. Great attention was devoted to these questions in the Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union delivered by Leonid Brezhnev to the 24th Party Congress and in his speech at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in June, 1969. Communists all over the world have studied these questions deeply and are continuing to do so, as was shown by the 100 speeches of many other participants in the 1969 Meeting and as has also been demonstrated at the Congresses of a number of fraternal Parties.
__*_*_*__The ruling core of the Maoists consists of a rather narrow group of interdependent people, who, in one form or another, are dependent on Mao and his closest associates. This group carefully conceals its real convictions and aims, seeking to present Maoism as a certain "development of Marxism in modern conditions.'' As one can see, Mao and the Maoist leadership need this kind of camouflage to confuse the issue of the social support of the current Peking regime.
An analysis of the history and present-day essence of the ideology and policy of the Mao Tse-tung group shows that Maoism now finds support, first and foremost, in the nationalistically-minded non-proletarian, petty-bourgeois, and, to a considerable extent, declasse strata of Chinese society.
In the past, too, the Mao Tse-tung group represented a petty-bourgeois nationalistic trend. However, its non-proletarian essence was not so clearly shown during the stage of national-- liberation struggle, when it was necessary to unite different social forces against imperialism. The differences of principle between Maoism and scientific communism were revealed after the victory of people's power in China, when fundamental socio-economic changes were in progress.
The experience of many countries shows that the pressure of the ideology and psychology of 101 the petty bourgeoisie on the proletarian front increases sharply during the course of a revolution, and especially when socialism is in the process of being built, when a drastic breaking-up of old social relations takes place. It is precisely at such a turning-point that petty-bourgeois leaders go over from a petty-bourgeois revolutionary stand to one of struggle against the proletarian leadership of society. And this was what happened in China too.
Literature on Maoism frequently expounds the view that Maoism is an ideology, an expression of the interests of the undeveloped, backward peasant masses, which have for centuries constituted the great majority of the population of China. But this opinion is unacceptable. To accept it would mean admitting that the Maoists have an extensive social base in the form of the peasantry, and, by the same token, that the peasantry is responsible for the anti-popular essence of the Maoist policy.
To regard Maoism as an expression of the views of the entire peasantry means identifying the petty-bourgeois, primitive, anarchistic prejudices of the peasantry with its fundamental interests. Indeed, can it be asserted without deviating from Marxism-Leninism, that the "cultural revolution,'' the smashing-up of the Party, tradeunion, and YCL organisations, and the destruction of socialist democracy express the vital interests of the peasantry? Of course not.
The bonds linking Maoism with the ideology of the Chinese peasantry are not straightforward. They are of a complicated and contradictory nature, and can be correctly understood only on the basis of a consideration of the class essence 102 of Maoism as a petty-bourgeois, nationalistic socio-political trend.
Marx and Engels disclosed the social heterogeneity and dual nature of the peasantry. They showed how to distinguish between its prejudices and reason, between its past and its future, between its small-proprietor narrow-mindedness and its natural gravitation, as a toiling class, towards an alliance with the revolutionary proletariat in the struggle for a new life free from exploiters and parasites. Opponents of Marxism alleged that Lenin, in his criticism of petty-bourgeois reaction, identified the whole of the peasantry with it. In refutation of this falsification, Lenin said: "I was not attacking the working peasants when I spoke of the petty-bourgeois element. Let us leave the working peasants alone-that's not what I am talking about. But among the peasantry there are working peasants and pettybourgeois peasants, who live like petty proprietors at the expense of others; the working peasants are exploited by others, but they want to live at their own = __NOTE__ Footnote marker definitely missing from end of this quote. expense.''^^1^^
Both Marx and Lenin repeatedly pointed to the crying contradictions in the life and activities of the peasantry, which in some conditions spontaneously and energetically rose up in struggle against the exploiters, and, in others, either humbly let themselves be led off to be shot or whipped by the police, or else even made up the basis of the support for the reactionary forces.
This is, to a considerable extent, also true of the Chinese peasantry, which, earlier, under feudalism and patriarchalism had become stratified and, therefore, disunited. The bulk of the Chinese _-_-_
^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 27, p. 311.
103 peasantry was cruelly exploited, and starvation was common. Spiritually enslaved by feudal ideology with its ruler cult and worship of the traditions of ancestors, the Chinese peasants, being in their mass downtrodden, illiterate and scattered, for many years remained very submissive and fully subordinated to the authorities. The backwardness and patriarchalism of the Chinese peasantry were a major source of the national narrow-mindedness and the nationalist outlook.At the same time, the Chinese peasantry has rich revolutionary traditions. More than once it rose in struggle against the landowners. Furthermore, the peasantry made up the main force of the revolutionary armies both in the nationalliberation struggle and in the revolution. The Chinese peasantry quickly took to cooperative farming on the road of socialist development of the countryside. It was precisely these peasant masses, who, under the leadership of the working class and its vanguard, the Party of MarxistLeninists, could have become an active force in working for the triumph of a genuinely socialist way of development.
But this, regretfully, did not take place. Starting from the late fifties, and especially in the course of the "big leap" drive, and, later, in the "cultural revolution,'' a serious blow was struck at the organisations of the working class and the Party. The Party divorced itself to a considerable extent from the working class and the peasantry, and disunity was deliberately sown among the working class. As for the peasants, most of them were deceived by the pseudorevolutionary slogans of the Maoists. The rest were intimidated by a terror campaign, and, 104 although they did not accept the "cultural revolution,'' neither did they dare to put up any open resistance.
In the process of its moulding and development, Maoism came under the political and ideological influence of the urban petty bourgeoisiethe relatively large army of artisans and handicraftsmen, and petty businessmen and tradesmen. This social grouping came into being in feudal China, and its members were, for the most part, distinguished by their conservative views and nationalist outlook.
But the urban petty bourgeoisie is not 100 per cent reactionary. A sizable section of it took an active part in the Chinese revolution. It, too, under the leadership of the working class, could have taken the socialist road together with the overwhelming majority of the people.
The tragedy of the Chinese revolution is that in the struggle between the two courses-the course of proletarian internationalism and that of petty-bourgeois nationalism-the latter prevailed at a certain stage. In these conditions, the Party was unable to withstand the pressure of the petty bourgeoisie and to secure the leading role of the working class.
The national bourgeoisie has still been preserved in China. It was not subjected to repressions in the years of the "cultural revolution.'' Representatives of the exploiting classes which, as admitted by the Maoists themselves, comprise more than 50 million people, hold important positions in the management of the economy, and continue to exert an influence on the economic and political life of the country. Because they subscribe to a nationalistic ideology and are 105 advocates of great-Han chauvinism, the nationalbourgeois elements support the nationalistic ideas and actions of the Maoists.
A particularly complicated question is that of the attitude of the Maoists towards the working class. They keep talking all the time about the leading role of the working class and the Communist Party, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the proletarian revolutionary character, etc. However, the ideology and policy of the Maoists are actually of an anti-proletarian nature, although, in pursuit of their aims, by means of demagogy, they try to make use of certain sections of the workers.
It is generally known that the Chinese working class is heterogeneous. Its greater part consists of the peasants of yesterday, who have not gone through a real schooling of socialism and internationalism. But it has a militant core, which has many revolutionary traditions. As was shown by the events in the "cultural revolution,'' it was precisely the militant core of the working class which came to the aid of the Party organisations which were attacked by the hungweipings. In the factories and plants the Maoists failed to achieve the scale of the "cultural revolution" which they desired. Although the working class of China is still relatively small in number (it barely exceeds 10 million in a country with a population of over 700 million), it was the backbone of the Chinese revolution and of the cause of socialism in China and it still is. The working class is the real force which is exerting a restraining influence on the spreading and consolidation of Maoism in the life of the country.
The army officers' circles exerted a great 106 influence on the rise and evolution of Maoism. These circles have always played an active part in the social and political life of China.
In the history of China, militarism for centuries represented a relatively independent, influential force, and energetically intervened in political life. In the course of revolutionary wars, many officers went over to the side of the struggling people. Although they were the opponents of imperialism, and of the landlords and the comprador bourgeoisie, most of these military men, nevertheless, did not become either internationalists or Marxists. Many military men joined the Communist Party, but only some of them acquired Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary training, and those who did were subsequently purged. A large number of sincere internationalists, real supporters of socialism, were expelled from the army. Mao Tse-tung, leaning upon nationalistically-minded elements loyal to him, reformed the army, implanting in it a spirit of nationalism and great-power chauvinism, a spirit of blind subordination and idolisation of his personality.
At the same time Mao Tse-tung and his retinue fear the army, especially its revolutionary backbone of career officers who went through the crucible of the war for national liberation. Unquestionably a considerable section of the career command personnel of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which has splendid revolutionary traditions and experience in fighting not only the internal counter-revolution but also international imperialism, cannot be indifferent to the fact that the Maoists are transforming the people's army into an all-China police force-a force directed against the people and designed for 107 their suppression. Although drawing the army into the work of the "cultural revolution" did help the Maoist regime to strengthen itself, at the same time it led to the intensification of the discontent within the Chinese army and the freeing of a certain section of the servicemen from their illusions and a fanatical faith in the wisdom of the "great helmsman.'' It also enabled many of the army men to understand, from their own experience, the danger of the anti-popular course of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage. Therefore, as was only to be expected, the army has now become a dangerous hotbed of anti-Maoist moods, and that is why the Maoists are carrying out purge after purge, and repression after repression against many career military men, ruthlessly suppressing in its very embryo the antiMaoist movement in the People's Liberation Army of China.
Removed from under the control of Party and state bodies, and placed at the service of the hegemonic, chauvinistic ambitions of Mao and his group, even before the development of the "cultural revolution,'' the army was preparing to carry out the role allotted to it. This was the militarisation of all public life-conducted under the sham slogan of ``revolutionisation''-and the establishment of a military-bureaucratic order in the country. But, having carried out the " cultural revolution,'' in which the army played the decisive role, Mao then struck a blow at the army leadership, so that now Lin Piao no longer figures as Mao's "successor,'' as had been announced at the Ninth Congress of the CPC.
The reason for this manoeuvre of Mao's is quite clear, although Peking prefers to keep 108 silent about it. The revelation of the substance of the intrigues that permeate all of Mao's activities and the entire existence of the Maoist top clique would not do the "great helmsman" any good, and this is understood very well in Peking.
Maoism claims to be accepted by different strata of the country as an all-national ideology and a political doctrine expressing the national interests of the entire Chinese people. The nationalistic aims are even advanced as a unifying factor. This shows the nature of the petty bourgeoisie, which strives to ``rise'' above the classes and present its egoistic interests as the interests of the nation as a whole.
The Peking leadership thoroughly camouflages its petty-bourgeois class nature and tries to manoeuvre between the different classes, taking advantage of the weakness and lack of organisation of the proletariat. These tactics make it difficult to discern the class nature of Maoism and they also serve as a means of attracting to its side politically unstable elements drawn from different classes of the population.
Marx and Lenin called such tactics Bonapartism, which, in a way, grew out of the revolution and was called on to defend it, although it had actually always served the bourgeois or pettybourgeois reaction. Lenin cited Kerenskyism, which served as a cover for an anti-proletarian policy, as an example of Bonapartism of modern times. In exposing Bonapartism, he defined its characteristics as reliance on the military, manoeuvring between the classes, and unbridled social and nationalistic demagogy.
An analysis shows that the policy and tactics of Maoism have quite a number of features 109 resembling those of Bonapartism, in the specific Chinese setting, of course: firstly, a reliance on army circles loyal to Mao; secondly, a reliance on a combination of different, sometimes diametrically opposed, social forces, on a manoeuvring between classes, making use first of some social groups, then of others, first of high-school and college students, then of working youth, and especially of the petty-bourgeois, backward peasant strata of the population, lumpen-proletarian elements, etc; thirdly, boundless social and political demagogy: the shouting of the most revolutionary slogans covering a reactionary-- chauvinistic policy, verbal calls for defending the proletarian line covering its actual rejection in home and foreign policy, appeals to the people in words and their suppression in deeds.
Marx included among the Bonapartist manifestations the deification of the supreme leader and the mystical faith of the broad masses in the ruling personality. Mao Tse-tung exerted every possible effort to have his personality glorified and his views advertised, and he placed his favourites in the most important posts in the party, the army and in the machinery of state.
The "barrack-room communism" now being implanted in China is in keeping with the moods and needs of the society's petty-bourgeois and lumpen-proletarian strata. It corresponds to the hegemonic ambitions of the Maoists, for it helps them to carry out the militarisation of the economy and the entire life in the country for the sake of the realisation of the great-power adventurist plans in the international arena.
For an understanding of the essence of Maoism, a consideration of its historical, ideological 110 and theoretical origins is quite important. The lengthy domination of feudalism and militarism, economic and cultural backwardness, the undeveloped public and social relations, the small number of proletarians and the absolute predominance of petty-bourgeois elements created special difficulties for China's revolutionary development.
The militarists' traditional participation in ruling the country and the extensive dissemination in the course of centuries of one of the reactionary aspects of Confucianism-the cult of the supreme ruler-facilitated the establishment of a military-bureaucratic regime with an idolised ruler at the head.
The Maoists made use of historical and demographic facts for their own ends to spread great-power and chauvinistic moods. China has rich historical traditions. For a long time the country held the leading place in Eastern Asia. China is the home of an ancient culture. The Chinese are the most numerous people in the world. The existence of a comparatively high civilisation was made use of by the feudal rulers of China for cultivating chauvinistic views on the superiority of the Chinese. All other nations were declared ``wild'' and "barbarous,'' and all "barbarians.'' China's eternal enemies. For thousands of years the idea was cultivated in China that she was the centre of the world. That is how the Chinese ethnocentrism was formed, later acquiring the features of great-Han chauvinism.
In the period of the anti-imperialist struggle nationalism was the ideological weapon of the progressive forces which were fighting for national liberation and social progress. It was the 111 ideological basis for rallying and uniting the broadest sections of the Chinese population, pushing into the background in some cases social differentiation and differences in class interests. After the victory of the anti-imperialist, democratic revolution in China and its growth into a socialist revolution, nationalism exhausted itself as an ideological basis for uniting the progressive forces of the nation in its struggle against foreign capital-its struggle for national independence. A very sharp conflict ensued in Chinese society between nationalism and internationalism.
In present-day conditions Chinese nationalism, which has grown into great-Han chauvinism, has been fully adopted as a weapon of Mao Tsetung's ruling group. Great-Han chauvinism is the basic motif of anti-Sovietism and the activities of the Maoists which are designed to disrupt the socialist community and the world communist, workers' and anti-imperialist movements.
__*_*_*__The principles of Marxism-Leninism are alien to the Maoists. But they understand very well that there is no other ideology capable now of winning over the minds of the peoples of the world. That is why the Maoists decided to monopolise the right to interpret and ``develop'' Marxism-Leninism, to transform it in their own way and thereby to turn it into an instrument for achieving their great-Han, hegemonic aims.
Initially this was called "the creative application" of Marxism-Leninism in China's specific conditions. It was done under the guise of the 112 realisation of Lenin's thesis to the effect that the peoples of the East have to find their own ways of carrying out Marxist ideas. Then appeared the formula of "Sinoised Marxism,'' which for a long time was viewed by some Marxists as the process of creative quests for ways and means of developing the revolution and the transition to socialism in the specific conditions of China. But the Maoists had their own understanding of this formula. For them this was an important step towards adapting Marxism to their own nationalistic schemes and aims. This began to reveal itself with the appearance of the assertion that Mao Tse-tung's ideas are an interpretation of Marxism for all the countries of the East. Thus the concept of "Asian Marxism" made its appearance. The next step was taken during the "cultural revolution" and at the Ninth Congress of the CPC, when Mao was proclaimed to be the teacher of all peoples, the only Marxist theoretician of the entire world communist movement, and Mao's ideas the apex of scientific thought, the Marxism-Leninism of the current epoch. But this slogan is only a cover. The real meaning of the decisions of the Ninth CPC Congress is that an attempt was made to replace Marxism by Maoism. That is how the concealed, previously thoroughly camouflaged chauvinistic, hegemonic schemes of the Maoists were revealed.
In their attempt to achieve the recognition of Mao Tse-tung as the only leading world theoretician and law-maker in the sphere of ideas, and the CPC as the centre of the entire revolutionary movement, the M.aoists hurled accusations of degeneration and revisionism, and of compromise with imperialism, against large and authoritative 113 Communist Parties, including the CPSU, and against the entire world communist movement. All who do not agree with Mao Tse-tung are haughtily ``excommunicated'' from Marxism-- Leninism, from the revolution and from socialism, and declared to be enemies. A fierce struggle covered by Marxist phrases and revolutionary slogans has been launched against the " dissenters.'' And in this struggle no methods are barred, not even military provocations.
What then is Maoism from the standpoint of its ideological and theoretical content?
The influence and eclectic mixture of the most diverse doctrines, views, theories and concepts are clearly felt in the sum-total of the political, economic, philosophical, sociological and tactical concepts of Mao and the Maoists. These include:~
feudal Chinese philosophy (mostly Confucianism and Taoism), and as a rule that part of this philosophy is taken which is characterised by scholasticism, idealism, primitive dialectics, the preaching of the spirit of submission, the glorification of imperial power, and the exaggeration of the role of the subjective factor in history;
petty-bourgeois socialism, especially Proudhonism with its utmost vulgarisation of Hegel's idealistic dialectics and understanding of the unity of opposites as the mechanical sum of ``bad'' and ``good'' phenomena irrespective of their socio-economic, class substance;
the petty-bourgeois-peasant, semi-Narodnik, semi-avantgardist views ascribing spontaneous revolutionism to the peasantry;
the bourgeois-nationalistic, great-power and chauvinistic assertion of the exclusiveness of China;
114Trotskyite views, which were more or less widespread in the Chinese revolutionary movement in the twenties and early thirties;
anarchist ideas, which acquired considerable influence in China at the start of the twenties. Mao Tse-tung, according to his own admission, went in for anarchism quite actively in that period.
It is through the prism of all these views that Mao Tse-tung accepted certain ideas of MarxismLeninism. As far as Marxist-Leninist theory in general is concerned, neither Mao Tse-tung nor his closest associates ever made a systematic study of it, limiting themselves to reading popular articles. Mao has never had an integral Marxist-Leninist world outlook.
The Maoists widely used Trotskyite views and adapted them to their interests. Maoism ignores the objective laws of social development, as does Trotskyism, and exaggerates the role of the subjective factor in social processes. Adventurism in politics, and voluntarism and subjectivism in economics are characteristic for both. An antiMarxist, anti-Leninist concept of the world revolutionary process is a feature common to both Maoism and Trotskyism. For demagogic purposes the Maoists made use of the Trotskyite theory of "the export of revolution,'' regarding world war as the only way of solving the problems of revolution on an international scale. Finally, characteristic of both Maoism and Trotskyism is the tactics of splitting the revolutionary forces, with crude slanderous attacks against the Marxist-Leninist parties and the socialist states, rabid anti-Sovietism and subversive activities within the 115 ranks of the international working-class and communist movement.
An idealistic-voluntaristic theory of violence (in which a subjective-idealist, militarist interpretation is substituted for the materialist interpretation of history) is the basis of Maoist ideology.
The theoretical construction of Maoism is pivoted on "Sinoised dialectics,'' and particularly on Mao's ``teaching'' on contradictions, which is called upon to serve as the theoretical basis of the strategy and tactics of the Maoists, as a justification of their negation of a principled class policy, and of their policy of making unprincipled deals with the forces of imperialism and all kinds of renegades from Marxism. Most characteristic in this respect is the way the Maoists artificially devise the "great contradictions" of our time, declaring as enemies of the peoples fighting for freedom the "two superpowers"~the United States and the Soviet Union: the citadel of imperialism, the bulwark of world reaction, is placed on the same level as the first socialist country, this powerful force of world progress. This false concept is further proof that the Maoists have turned away from the Marxist-Leninist appraisal of the main contradictions of the present day, from a principled class approach to the alignment of forces in the world arena.
The Maoists have greatly surpassed Proudhon in the ``art'' of arbitrarily designing contradictions. They proclaim a state of ``unity'' or of "struggle,'' of anyone with anyone, so long as this facilitates the attainment of their greatpower, hegemonistic aims.
116These, in the most general way, are the ideological background of Mao Tse-tung and his followers. And it is no accident that the ideology and policy of Maoism quite often link up with the ideology and policy of imperialism. It is no accident, either, that the theoretical revelations and deeds of the Maoists are invariably lauded to the skies by imperialist ideologists and politicians, and are used by them in their battle against the forces of peace and democracy, of social progress and socialism.
While noting the eclectic nature of Mao Tsetung's views, it should be borne in mind, that, as a retrospective approach to his ideas clearly shows, great-power nationalism is the leading and organising force behind his miscellany of ideas. From diverse ideological and theoretical concepts, Mao Tse-tung is primarily interested in taking and using those that serve nationalist and great-Han-chauvinist aims. This emphasises the purely utilitarian and pragmatic nature of the theory and practice of Maoism. Mao Tse-tung and his followers advance and uphold those theoretical theses and political slogans which directly serve their ends in the present historical period, and they bury in oblivion those of their own conclusions which have ceased to be in accord with their utilitarian aims, without showing any concern for logic or the continuity of ideas.
Devoid of a firm, stable social support, the Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist group goes from one extreme to another in its domestic and foreign policies, as it seeks the support of both the leftist extremist elements, and, directly or indirectly, of the most reactionary circles of bourgeois society.
117 __*_*_*__Maoism, in its theoretical principles and political practices is in basic contradiction with, and hostile to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The essence of Maoism is certainly not a revolutionary, but a reactionary ideology. Maoism adds grist to the mill of imperialism and reaction. Therefore the struggle against Maoism should be regarded primarily from the viewpoint of the incompatibility of the aims of Maoism-as a form of social-chauvinism-with the objectives of the world communist movement and the national-liberation movement, and with the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism on fundamental issues of socialist construction, world development, and revolutionary strategy and tactics.
The most eloquent and concentrated expression of Maoism was seen in the course of the " cultural revolution" and in the resolutions of the Ninth CPC Congress, which is an important landmark in the development of Maoist policies, strategy and tactics, and is of decisive importance for an understanding of the innermost tendencies of Maoism, and of its long-term goals.
The recent interpretation by the Maoists of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, the political course of the Maoists both inside the country and in international relations, as also in the communist movement, and the resolutions of the Ninth CPC Congress, cannot be explained away as a dogmatic-sectarian ``leftist'' interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.
Maoism is a Chinese version of social-- chauvinism, with Chinese social militarism as its nucleus. This is an anti-Leninist political trend, which 118 endeavours to adapt Marxism-Leninism to greatHan nationalist aims and to make a demagogicutilitarian use of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and of the revolutionary and communist movement, to attain these goals. At the same time the Maoists camouflage their selfish, great-power designs and plans with clamorous revolutionary phrases.
Even as it declares its irreconcilability with imperialism, the Mao group weakens and splits the world's anti-imperialist forces, undermines the national-liberation movement and specifically interferes with the establishment of unity of action to support the just struggle of the peoples of Indochina, and actually pursues a policy of conciliation with the imperialist forces, on an antiSoviet foundation.
Although the Maoists shout a lot about socialism, they have launched a wild political campaign against most of the socialist countries, have started pursuing a course of outright hostility to the USSR, and are creating in China a situation of war hysteria.
Although verbally they champion the idea of world revolution, and make much ado about their "revolutionary nature,'' Mao's supporters at the same time slander the working class of the capitalist countries, accusing it of reformist degeneration. They also attack most of the Communist Parties, and undermine the workers' and democratic movement.
Events of the past decade show that the Maoists are indifferent to the destinies of the revolution, if its development does not conform to their great-Han nationalistic interests. But they understand very well that only an orientation towards revolution can offer any historical prospect. That 119 is why they are so amazingly insistent-and unstinting in efforts and means-in their attempt to use the world revolutionary process for their own ends, and theoretically and politically to occupy a leading position in it, so as to mould it to the requirements of Chinese nationalism: the implementation of the ambitious dreams of the supporters of the great-Han policy contemplating China as the centre of the world. This is the strategic design of the Maoist leadership.
The whole policy of the Maoists has shown a great discrepancy between their words and deeds, and between their theoretical concepts and practice. While proclaiming themselves the most resolute fighters against imperialism and declaring that imperialism is a "paper tiger,'' they actually do nothing but shout slogans and at the same time link up with imperialism on the basis of anti-Sovietism.
The Mao Tse-tung group, which adheres to the stand of great-power chauvinism, preserves leading positions in the PRC. However, in Chinese society and in the world arena there are powerful social, political and ideological forces at work whose efforts are directed at the protection, strengthening and development of socialist gains, the restoration and consolidation of the theory and policy of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism in China.
Maoism is opposed in the first place by the objective tendency of the socialist development of the country. This is embodied primarily in the foundations of socialism built by the efforts of the Chinese working class and all the working people of China with the aid of the USSR and the 120 other socialist countries. The military-- bureaucratic degeneration of some elements of the political superstructure does not mean the automatic collapse of the socialist basis. Of course, deformations in the basis can and do take place under the influence of reactionary changes in the superstructure.
Broad sections of the Chinese population are interested in carrying out a socialist policy in China-the main core of the working class, the progressive part of the peasantry, broad masses of the intelligentsia, and the revolutionary section of the army. The Maoists cannot ignore the interests and sentiments of these strata. Indeed, Maoism clings like a parasite to the socialist sentiments and strivings of the Chinese working people. A great many Chinese Communists take a socialist stand. Although genuine Communists have suffered a temporary defeat in the struggle against Maoism, they have not given up.
The world socialist system, its successes and the principled Leninist policy of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, exert an influence on the development of the political struggle in China. Broad sections of the Chinese people remember that the USSR is the first country of socialism, and they remember the aid which the USSR rendered the working people of China during the years of the anti-- imperialist struggle, the revolution and the construction of socialism. No anti-Soviet hysteria can do away with this sympathy.
The world communist and working-class movement also affects developments in China. The condemnation of Maoism by the majority of the Communist Parties of the world and the resolute 121 criticism of Maoism at the International Meeting of 1969, at the Congresses and in the press of the fraternal Parties cannot fail to have an influence on the situation in China.
The ideology and policy of Maoism do not correspond to the objective course of the development of society and the requirements of the socialist development of China. Maoism suffers one defeat after another and its ultimate failure is historically inevitable. There can be no doubt that the Communists, the working class and all the working people of China will find the strength to embark once again on the road of a close unity with the fraternal peoples of the socialist countries and ensure the success of the great cause of socialism in the PRC.
This prospect is met by the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state. The November Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee noted that the Politbureau of the Central Committee is consistently carrying out the line of the 24th Congress regarding the People's Republic of China and expressed full agreement with the position of the Politbureau in solving associated practical questions. The Soviet Union is working for the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese inter-state relations. This aim is also promoted by the ideological-political struggle against ``left-wing'' revisionism which Lenin called "petty-bourgeois revolutionism.''
Genuine Marxist-Leninists regard the exposure of the anti-Leninist chauvinistic ideology and policy of Maoism as essential to the strengthening of the unity of world socialism, the communist movement and the anti-imperialist movement.
Pravda, December 5, 1971
[122] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Dialectics, V. Lektorsky,
G. Batishchev, V. Kurayeu
The 24th CPSU Congress emphasised that criticism of bourgeois and revisionist concepts remains an important component of the Party's theoretical work. "The Congress considers,'' says the Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress on the Report of the CPSU Central Committee, "that the creative development and propagation of the Marxist-- Leninist teaching and the struggle against attempts to revise it must remain a central task in the Party's ideological work.''~^^1^^
Revisionist concepts of both right and ``left'' varieties, and the Maoist ideology in particular, are particularly dangerous forms of the many attempts that have been made to rob Marxist-- Leninist theory of its revolutionary content and misrepresent socialist and communist construction. While posing as defenders of the ``purity'' of Marxism-Leninism and employing ``Marxist'' and ``revolutionary'' terms, the Maoists seek to foist on the world communist and workers' movement an ideological and political platform of their own which is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. _-_-_
~^^1^^ Information Bulletin Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism Publishers, pp. 235--236
123 They have launched a virulent campaign against the CPSU and the Soviet Union, setting out with their divisive policy to undermine the revolutionary struggle and sow discord in the ranks of the anti-imperialist fighters. ''. . .the Chinese leaders,'' Leonid Brezhnev said in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Party Congress, "have put forward an ideological-political platform of their own which is incompatible with Leninism on the key questions of international life and the world communist movement, and have demanded that we should abandon the line of the 20th Congress and the Programme of the CPSU.''~^^1^^Characteristic of the Maoist revision of MarxistLeninist theory is the attempt to ``substantiate'' the splitting actions of the Chinese leaders and their adventurist policy by references to materialist dialectics. This circumstance makes it imperative for Marxist scholars to examine such claims critically in order to distinguish between true materialist dialectics and the distorted versions put out by the Maoists.
Some years ago a blatant ideological campaign was launched in China against the "theory of combining two into one" and advocating "the principle of dividing one into two.'' Ostensibly, the campaign was directed against distortions and falsifications of the core of materialist dialectics, the law of the unity and struggle of opposites. But its actual aims were utilitarian-political, not scientific, since its purpose was to justify the special views held by Mao and his adherents. The polemic over the problem of contradictions, of the unity and struggle of opposites flared up (or, to _-_-_
^^1^^ Information Bulletin, Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism Publishers, p. 15.
124 be more exact, was artificially produced) precisely when there was a need for "philosophical substantiation" of the policy of splitting the ranks of the international communist and working-class movement and conducting an openly anti-Soviet line. The "theory of dividing one into two,'' which served as philosophical justification of the need for a prolonged confrontation between classes under socialism, provided tremendous scope for arbitrary construction of ever new `` contradictions'' and "antagonisms,'' and creating a sociopolitical atmosphere for encouraging the interminable political squabbles and clashes and the use of extreme measures and the military-- bureaucratic dictatorship.The actual socio-political and ideological aim of the spate of bombast let loose in China in 1963--64 around the law of the unity and struggle of opposites is obvious. It has been exhaustively demonstrated in a number of works of Marxist theoreticians, some of which were printed in the journal Questions ot Philosophy.~^^1^^ The Maoist interpretation and application turned dialectics into a political gimmick, demagogically designed to camouflage and vindicate Mao Tse-tung's political line. If this presented a purely historical interest, referring even to the very recent past, there would hardly be any need to return to an analysis of the specifically Maoist interpretation and application of materialist dialectics. As it is, it is still very much the practice in present-day China _-_-_
~^^1^^ E. V. Ilyenkov, Dialectics or Eclecticism. No. 7, 1968; L. P. Delyusin, 'Discussion on Socialism in China and Contemporary Reality, No. I, 1969; E. Ya. Batalov, Destruction of Practice, No. 3, 1969.
125 to twist Marxist dialectics to the advantage of the Maoist line of thought.The most recent and instructive example of the Maoist interpretation and application of materialist dialectics is provided by the article "The Theory of Combining Two into One" published in the March 1971 issue of the magazine Hungchi. Coming from "a group of authors of revolutionary criticism" of the Higher Party School of the CPC Central Committee, the article criticises the "reactionary and absurd thesis of 'combining two into one' advocated and spread by the traitor and provocateur Liu Shao-chi" and gives the ``correct'' i.e., Maoist, interpretation of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites. As the authors see it, reduced to simple terms, the basic law of materialist dialectics means that "in human society and in Nature the whole always splits up into unequal parts" which are engaged in a constant struggle, leading to "one side overcoming the other, defeating and destroying the other.'' For instance, the revolutionary always destroys the reactionary, the correct destroys the erroneous, etc. "By advancing the proposition of the division of one into two,'' the authors go on to say, "Mao Tse-tung has summed up most profoundly and laconically the law of the unity and , struggle of opposites, and has pinpointed the very I gist of materialist dialectics. Mao Tse-tung has | demonstrated that both in Nature and in human I society and consciousness there exist contradictions and struggle, not the law of 'combining two into one'.'' All talk of combining opposites is , nothing more or less than theoretical substantia- | tion of the "counter-revolutionary, revisionist line j directed against the socialist revolution with 126 the aim of combining the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, Marxism with revisionism, and socialism with imperialism and social-imperialism.'' The present polemic between those who adhere to the "theory of dividing one into two" versus those who support "the theory of combining two into one" is regarded as a "reflection of the bitter and complex class struggle of that period (the first half of the 60's) in the ideological sphere within and without the country. In the final analysis, the point at issue was whether the dictatorship of the proletariat should be upheld and the socialist system consolidated or the proletarian dictatorship should be liquidated and the capitalist system restored.'' If one adds to this the opinion expressed by the present Peking propagandists that "the reactionary and thoroughly metaphysical 'theory of combining two into one' has been dominant in the USSR since the mid-50's as the interpretation of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites and serves as theoretical justification for the 'restoration of capitalism' in that country and as an instrument of 'collusion with the US imperialism','' one will readily see that the latest campaign of ``repudiating'' the "theory of combining two into one" has farreaching political and ideological aims. But what are these aims and what, in general, is the place and the real value of Maoist ``dialectics'' in the present-day political and ideological struggle?
__*_*_*__The Maoists have grown very fond of the formula of the need to "divide one into two,'' which they view as the ultimate philosophical justification of their splitting policies. They have grown 127 so fond of it that the thesis of the "synthesis of opposites into one" appears to them as out-- andout "revisionism.'' Characteristically, however, Mao Tse-tung and his adherents only recall that "the division of one into two" is progressive and inevitable when they find it politically advantageous, completely ``forgetting'' about it when, for some reason or other, they consider it disadvantageous. They are particularly outspoken in lauding the benefits of ``division'' when it concerns the communist movement, the differences and contradictions within its ranks, for then the Maoists find it highly beneficial to themselves. One can hardly deny that, for it is indeed beneficial, only the question is-to whom? General formulas, however sound, keep ``silent'' on that question. This accounts for the predilection of Peking `` dialecticians'' for endless repetition of general and abstract schemes which they stick like labels on concrete and particular cases whenever it is thought "advantageous,'' but which they refrain from using when it appears to be disadvantageous to them. Advantageous or disadvantageous-such, in the final analysis, is the criterion of acceptability (and practical use) of a given dialectical proposition employed by the Maoists.
The language of materialist dialectics has, in Maoist hands, become simply a euphemism, at once a realisation and a disguise for practical political action, a kind of instrument kit consisting of a meagre collection of labels and nicknames. The Maoists' treatment of the theoretical wealth accumulated by materialist dialectics is a striking example of unprincipled, purely the pragmatic comprehension and use of ideas which, irrespective of how they came about or their nature, are 128 regarded as very pliant material that does not commit one to anything, and which can be used as one pleases, turning it inside out if necessary, so long as the desired effect is achieved. The history of social thought knows a number of examples of a well-developed social idea being used for two diametrically opposed purposes. One, when it becomes the property of those social forces whose aspirations and vital needs accord with the idea, social forces which have achieved a sufficient level of spiritual development and are able to perceive its inner meaning and make it their ideological banner. The other, when it is appropriated by people who are far removed from such an idea, who seize on it, not for its real content, but because of its appeal, the authority of its originators and the effectiveness of its implications.
Marxism has long emerged as the most influential world outlook of our time known for its convincingness. Its appeal is recognised even by those who are not Marxists. But it has so much to offer it is a tempting inducement to social forces which, alien to and often far removed from Marxism, lack a banner of their own that will carry weight and evoke the desired response.
Attempts to ``borrow'' and use some elements of Marxism have been made more than once by various petty-bourgeois, nationalistic and other circles at crucial moments or when starved for ideas. Their leaders often cannot resist the appeal of Marxism. "Extremely wide sections of the classes that cannot avoid Marxism in formulating their aims,'' Lenin wrote in 1910, "had assimilated that doctrine in an extremely one-sided and __PRINTERS_P_129_COMMENT__ 9--193 129 mutilated fashion. They had learnt by rote certain 'slogans/ certain answers to tactical questions, without having understood the Marxist criteria for these answers.''~^^1^^ Even then Lenin warned against the danger of this tendency, which leads to the emasculation of the inner spirit of Marxism, to the drowning out of its essence by slogan-shouting, so that "nothing but the phraseology" remains of it.
However, in those days this tendency had not yet reached the point it has today under Maoism; and while the utilitarian tendencies must be described, and were described by Lenin in his time, as vulgarisation, they may appear as something not far short of refined thought compared with present-day samples. In the writings of Maoists, whether they be newspaper or even magazine articles, formulas such as "division of one into two" and empty slogans do not merely supplant logical thinking; they go so far as to lend verbal decisions an almost physically tangible character by their sheer bluntness, their grossness in putting across the practical political motive.
However, paradoxical as it may seem, it is precisely this extreme down-to-earth attitude and practical candidness that causes them to soar to the heights of abstraction. The most specific is found in close proximity with the infinitely general, and is, moreover, derived from the latter. So, while appearing to talk about particulars, they do not merely express particular, ordinary ideas taking shape in people's minds and subject to their critical comprehension, but utter _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll Works, Vol. 17, pp. 42--43. 130
130 incontrovertible, absolute truths. This unlimited universalisation of the most banal things, this constant performance of dizzying leaps from `` global'' generalities to particulars, and constant attempts to pontificate, uttering "universal truths,'' are garbed in the terminology of Marxist dialectics, the idea being that only this ludicrous exploitation of some of the turns of phrase typical of Marxist dialectics make it truly authentic!In the rhetoric of Mao and his followers one can find any number of such "great leaps" from the most general to the most particular. A typical feature of this mode of thinking is the art of making such "great leaps" without bothering to investigate the particular cases or to ensure consistency in the transition from the general phrase to a particular problem or the real state of affairs. This kind of logic is applied each time there is theoretical substantiation of Maoism's political actions. In seeking to substantiate a thesis on the need to split the international communist movement, for instance, the line of reasoning adopted is as follows: any process in nature, society or thought develops through the "division of one into two.'' No process can take place without the "division of one into two.'' Hence, the international communist movement, too, must be "divided into two" which is viewed as a triumph of dialectics.
It is not so difficult to understand why unbridled universalisation-constantly recurring flights towards ``absolute'' and ``universal'' truths-- predominates in Maoist writings. Absolute universality is proclaimed, not for the sake of disinterested intellectualism, scientific cognition or ideology, but simply to give these writings the character __PRINTERS_P_131_COMMENT__ 9* 131 of unchallengeable authority. Any particular, concrete proposition can be scrutinised, critically appraised, verified, corrected in some aspects or even rejected altogether. In the case of particulars, one can dare to sort them out for oneself. But when the voice of the oracle is heard, when the demands proclaimed are those of the world absolute which bestows on people "universal truth" through the lips of its earthly ambassadors, then all other voices must remain silent!
The procedure, then, is simple enough. First, the universe is supplied with a set of abstract formulas and slogans, which are ``urgently'' needed, a kind of quiver with appropriate ideological arrows, and then, with much fanfare, it is discovered that the necessary slogan has been ``shot'' by the universe itself.
It must be remembered that this hovering among the "universal truths" is simultaneously called upon to disguise the very earthly political passions which are the cause of the action being justified and the source of practical slogans. These passions are presented as the "essence of the world,'' which allegedly is responsible for them and which is garbed in dialectical terminology. As a result the crux of the matter seems to lie in dialectics, after it has been subjected to such barefaced manipulation.
When put to such use, the dialectical terminology becomes a device of political demagogy, the language of such demagogy, designed to influence people who respect Marxist-Leninist theory. Direct justification of any act of brazen voluntarism by abstract universal philosophisms is meant to create a semblance of profound philosophical substantiation of what is in fact a 132 freakish and essentially harmful policy. You object to the split in the ranks of the international communist movement. Well, then you are opposed to the thesis of "dividing one into two,'' hence also to dialectics. You maintain that the main law of dialectics is not reduced to the struggle of opposites but presupposes also ``unity'' of opposites. Then you are betraying the line of Chairman Mao and preach capitulation in face of the domestic bourgeoisie and collusion with international imperialism.
It is hardly necessary to go to any length to prove that genuine materialist dialectics has nothing to do with such unprincipled use of it. Nevertheless, some explanations and comparisons are in order, if only to take a closer look at the patterns of thought whereby Maoists not only betray the spirit of dialectics, but break even with the terminological semblance of " dialecticalness,'' even with the letter they have borrowed from the dialectical vocabulary. With this end in view let us go back to the Maoist "principle of dividing one into two" and the bitter, mutually destructive antagonism between extremes, which they misrepresent as the dialectical law of the unity and struggle of opposites.
That the Maoists in this case have fallen foul of the letter of Marxist-Leninist dialectics, is perfectly obvious, for in the Maoist reading of this law unity has been dropped, so that what remains is struggle all the way through. Anyone at all familiar with the rudiments of dialectics will know that, according to Marx, "what constitutes dialectical movement is the coexistence of two contradictory sides, their conflict and their fusion 133 into a new category."~^^1^^ Lenin, too, repeatedly spoke of the need to be able to unite, or synthesise, opposites. In his speech "On the Trade Unions" he pointed out that those who studied Marxism even superficially "have learned how and when opposites can and must be combined,'' drawing the important conclusion that ".. .in the three and a half years of our revolution we have actually combined opposites again and again."^^2^^ Moreover, the law of the unity and struggle of opposites and the Maoist "principle of dividing one into two" lie within totally different frames of reference. Indeed, the two could be compared only if the law of the unity and struggle of opposites were simply an abstract universal ontological statement of facts (``everything in the world is such that in the given case or example this or that takes place'') along with other such statements. However, in reality the entire spirit of dialectics, especially in its consistent, Marxist embodiment, its whole message-the message of concreteness-is directed against empirical facts being ``explained'' by superimposing on them universalised rules, by-passing the complex chain of intermediate links connecting the methodological principles of the highest order with empirics, bypassing the investigation of the specific whole whereby, and in the context of which, particular facts can be explained. Dialectical laws in general and the law of the unity and struggle of opposites in particular, as Lenin stressed, stem from the whole experience of the cognitive work of man's thought: each is "a law of cognition (and _-_-_
~^^1^^ Marx The Poverty of Philosophy, M., 1955, p. 126.
~^^2^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 27.
134 . . .a law of the objective world.)''~^^1^^ Nothing, therefore, is further removed from materialist dialectics and more alien to it than an attempt to present it as a set of abstract rules covering everything under the sun and excluding, by their very nature, a creative approach to anything.Having shown that the universalised " principle of dividing one into two" is incompatible with anything in dialectics, it is only natural to consider if there is anything, any concept, with which it can be compared, and to attempt to compare the latter with dialectics to find the connecting links.
Such a concept (if it can indeed be called a concept) exists in the folklore, mythology and religions of many peoples-the concept of two world principles locked in eternal conflict. In such a world, indeed, there is no unity, and strife and absolute division rule supreme. The question of a whole does not arise for the simple reason that from the outset two principles are presupposed, which have nothing in common, are not related in any positive way, hence, the eternal conflict between them can never be resolved. Being omnipresent, they rend asunder every object into warring extremes and plunge them into a futile and ruthless universal holocaust. But because the opposing absolutes are supposed to have nothing in common, precisely by virtue of their absolute disunity and absolute insurmountable division, the war of extremes has no perspective of any kind, it does not and cannot result in any progress, any synthesis, nothing new can emerge from it: the same drama repeats _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 38, p. 359.
135 itself over and over again. For the victory of one extreme immediately leads to its being split, in turn, into the same feuding poles.It is fairly evident that this archaic mythologem which paints a lurid picture of the world as a perpetual St. Bartholomew Massacre sheds no light on the logic and real problems of real struggle. It can only serve as a means of fanning mass hysteria.
But it is this mythologem which the Maoist ideologists, who have advanced the slogan: " Revolutionary division is a good thing, not a bad thing,'' regard as an example and a model for their world outlook. In accepting the mythologem about the impossibility of combining extremes, these ideologists devote their current campaign to ``rebuffing'' the idea of unity of opposites, rebuffing not even the idea, but the word "unity,'' which inspires them with mortal fear. As they themselves admit, "the gist of the theory of combining two into one" lies in the word "combination.''
A devout revolutionist obsessed by "division which is a good thing" has no right to practise or contemplate any kind of "combination,'' he is even forbidden to pronounce this heretical and hateful word. This line, if pursued to its logical limit, could predictably lead the fanatics of interminable division to change the slogan "Workers of all countries, unite!" into "Workers of all countries, disunite!" And in this way they would betray their true political motives.
Let us examine, then, the relation between the historical tradition of dialectics and the archaic mythology of universal duality, division and destruction. Casting a retrospective look at the past 136 ages, we see that dialectics proper originated and took root precisely in contrast to the mythologem about the two world absolutes, to the fatalism of the eternal confrontation of opposites, to the idea that the world is doomed to revolve forever in one and the same circle. The core of dialectics has always been, not dualism, not repetition of fate, not statics, but development spurred by contradictions, creation of the new in the process of destruction and elimination of the old.
Denial, too, holds a definite place in dialectics, but it is truly dialectical denial, and not a nihilistic one, a denial that draws a clearcut line between the idea of the struggle of opposites, or, to be more precise, their unity and struggle,^^1^^ in the sense of a general outlook, of dialectical logic; a struggle in the direct social meaning of the word, implying the interaction of human wills as a result of which people part with their past, with the obsolete, and build their future, on the one hand; and the specifically antagonistic forms of the social struggle, on the other. One of the rudiments of Marxism is that neither in the first, nor in the second interpretations of the concept of contradiction does the struggle of opposites represent the extrapolation to the entire world of the cult of fierce hostility or the attribution to Nature and culture of constant pugnacity. At the same time genuine Marxism essentially differs from the Maoist version in its interpretation of the essence and the role of antagonistic forms in social development.
_-_-_~^^1^^ We may recall here Lenin's definition: "Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be.. . identical.. .'' (Coll. Works, Vol. 38, p. 109), i. e., not only combined, but in unity leading to identity.
137Let us explain briefly what it means. In examining antagonisms by themselves it is impossible theoretically to understand correctly either their nature or the nature of contradictions generally. For a correct understanding of the nature of antagonisms it is necessary to reveal scientifically the character of the contradictions (and the ``struggle'' of opposites) in general, so as to explain on this basis the specifics of antagonistic forms. This leads, in Marxism, to the following picture: in an antagonistic society a class struggle ultimately develops because the progressive, or revolutionary, class seeks to resolve the contradictions inherent in the old society and to break through its confines in order to create a new society, while the conservative, or reactionary, class opposes this solution and this creation (or even strives to restore the old), attempting to restrict activity to the framework of the obsolete social structures. Hence, the class struggle is being waged over two alternatives: either to resolve the contradictions, i.e., the historical tasks and problems, the nature of which constitutes the "struggle of opposites,'' or to reproduce them in the old form and to obstruct the solution of the historical tasks and problems. So in essence it is a struggle for the creation, for the synthesis of the new,- hence, consistent revolutionaries are, by their historical mission, true champions of the creation of the new, for the sake of which they negate the obstacles standing in their way.
The inability to examine antagonisms from the standpoint of the universal nature of contradictions, the inability to understand the specific character of the antagonistic contradictions, cannot 138 be regarded merely as an innocent gnosiological mistake. In dealing with such an "inability,'' one must not forget which social forces are apt to reduce the antagonistic type of contradictions to some distinct and absolutised essence, to an ideological principle. It is characteristic of ``ultra-left'' extremists to have a tendency to regard as the criterion of revolutionariness, not creation representing sober-minded historical responsibility, but irresponsible fanatical militancy blinded by the spirit of total destruction and nihilism. Absolutisation of the antagonistic form of contradictions provides them with a concept that suits their ends.
In reality, the antagonistic form of contradiction is an effect of certain objective causes-- contradictions, historical tasks, etc. And the real sense of this antagonistic confrontation of hostile class forces ultimately is manifested in whether they fight tor or against the solution of these contradictions and tasks. It is manifested also in whether these social forces seek to transform the objective logic of the "unity and struggle of opposites" into a logic of building new social relations and structures, or to destroy the conditions for such creative work. Whenever an antagonistic contradiction is treated by itself, the objective tasks and problems either disappear from view altogether or are regarded as some purely derivative thing, as something artificial, as some enemy scheming. In this case, what is required of a revolutionary is not a thorough understanding of the real, subtle and intricate dialectics of history, in its concrete situations, but unbridled bellicosity, a professed determination "to annihilate the enemy,'' as well as a readiness to resort to 139 the most ferocious, most violent measures against those who, unaffected by the passion for " universal division into two,'' try to understand the objective logic of social development instead of inventing high-sounding slogans. Lenin in his time showed how irresponsible this "super-- revolutionarism" with its extremely ``left'' phrases was.
By revolutionarism Marxism means not vindictive destruction or bellicose hysterics justified by the absolutised form of antagonism, but, on the contrary, a form of social activity which theoretically and practically overcomes the inert framework of the antiquated antagonistic class society and works out new forms of a socialist and communist society. Truly revolutionary activity is activity based upon the creative energy of the masses, so that even at the height of the struggle against the political, class enemy the inner logic of the historical process is never lost sight of. Genuine revolutionaries will never allow the real laws of the class struggle to be supplanted by doctrinaire mythologising. Genuine revolutionaries know how to subject even the most drastic and rapid breakdown of antiquated social structures to the logic of creation of the new, the logic of their most humanistic aims-the aims of building the new society precluding social antagonisms. Absolutisation of the role of antagonistic contradictions in the process of establishment and development of socialist society and the cult of militant destruction are phenomena alien to the dialectics of resolving real contradictions. At the same time ultra-left, nihilist destructiveness denies the creative, problematic content of the struggle for socialism and communism and is essentially reactionary. When the Maoists act as 140 preachers of revolutionariness that is tantamount to destructiveness they become apostles of reactionary "revolutionariness.''
__*_*_*__It will be seen that the "absolute truths" of the Maoist ideologists, when put to the test, prove to be mere euphemisms for a situative political tactic mythologically codified by the symbolics of the political passions of the time. All the `` dialectical'' talk about "division of one into two" and other world ontological depths supposedly fathomed by them turns out in reality to be nothing but pompous garb disguising both the splitting policies of the Maoists in the international communist movement and their repressive measures within the country.
The true dialectics of Marx and Lenin is, primarily, a method used for an objective and scientific examination of reality, the Alpha and Omega of it being a concrete analysis of a concrete subject, without any disguises or substitutions. In contrast, in the hands of the Maoists, dialectics has become something incompatible with any kind of analysis. Even calling a spade a spade is out of the question, not to speak of a thoroughgoing analysis. As a result, the ideological heralds of universal truths are not concerned about a vitally important action to be taken or the reaction to the difficulties and problems in which the Chinese politicians have become entangled, but only doctrinaire fancies. The real result of attempts to blame everything on universal rules, of the sleight of hand involving their substitution for the earthly political passions, has been 141 merely to translate their very concrete failures, their destructive measures, their internecine strife and splitting policies into the language of universal recommendations. After causing enormous political harm at home these ideologists are trying to make a universal law of this mess and to impose this law upon the world. Having proved totally incapable of drawing any lesson from their sad experience of "dividing one into two" they undertake to teach others the universal truths. And so the Maoists accuse our Party of all the mortal sins because it has ``revised'' those universal truths, which, they assent, call for world-wide dissension and strife, violent rebellion and vindictive repression.
``Viewing socialist society from the standpoint of division of one into two, it must be admitted,'' say the authors of the article referred to above, "that throughout the socialist stage, from beginning to end, there are classes, class contradictions, class struggle, a struggle between two paths-the socialist and the capitalist, there is a danger of the restoration of capitalism.''
The attempts of the present Chinese leaders to practise this theoretical recommendation based upon references to the law of the unity and struggle of opposites show that the Maoist "class struggle" is spearheaded against the working masses of China, against the world socialist system and the international working-class movement. Its purpose is deliberate provocation of conflicts between socially homogeneous classes fanned to the point of class antagonisms.
The progress of a developed socialist society in which the exploiting classes have been destroyed is free from antagonisms. Any attempt to 142 introduce into it the methods of ``division'' into mutually opposed classes, any tendency deliberately to identify the uncompromising class struggle the proletariat is waging against hostile bourgeois and revisionist ideologies with the creative quest in the constructive endeavour to consolidate and develop socialism, are utterly inadmissible and alien to the nature of socialism, and to the creative dialectics of its development. Such dialectics has nothing in common with the pitiable myths which the Maoists have adopted as their weapon and which increasingly reveal themselves as miserable fakes of Marxist dialectics.
Voprosy filosofii, No. 8, 1971
[143] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Crisis in the PoliticalL. Gudoshnikov, B. Topornin
Developments in China clearly show that the notorious "cultural revolution" is entering the final stage of its long-drawn-out existence. This is shown particularly by the political manoeuvres of the Mao Tse-tung group aimed at stabilising and consolidating its rule, stemming the tide of wanton tyranny, lawlessness and the deliberate derangement of the life of society and state that they themselves let loose, and confining it within the strict and definite limits of the ``new'' order. No longer bothering to keep up the pretence of struggle against bourgeois influences in art, science and education and against all those "following the bourgeois path,'' the Peking leaders have lately been openly pursuing purely political objectives in order to maintain their power.
There is no doubt that the political development of China is an extremely involved process, multi-dimensional and contradictory externally as well as internally. This is because its essence, forms and trends are due to economic, political and social factors-which differ as to the force, time and duration of their action-and also to the special national features and historical traditions of the vast country. Concealed behind the ample evidence of opposition-often indistinct and even imperceptible-of the social forces, is shrewd calculation and the cunning political line of the Maoist ruling clique.
144 __ALPHA_LVL3__ THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THEIt emerges more and more clearly that what is now taking place in China is a radical restructuring of the entire social-political, and especially state-legal, mechanism that was established after the victorious revolution and the proclamation of a People's Republic in China and was fixed in essence in the 1954 Constitution. Much of the political organisation of Chinese society have since been destroyed, although the Constitution and many other laws, constituent acts, policy documents and fundamental party decisionsincluding the documents of the 8th CPC Congress-have not been repealed or much amended. At the same time new bodies and organisations are springing up in China, and a political system is emerging which is evidently called upon to perform the functions of a Maoist dictatorship.
It is no accident that Mao Tse-tung and his group should have set out to destroy by force the state apparatus and the entire political system of China as they had been until early 1966, when the notorious "cultural revolution" was unleashed. The fact of the matter is that the mechanism of people's government in China was built and developed on the Leninist principles of socialist statehood, which were studied and applied in practice, as well as on the basis of the experience accumulated by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.
Although the conditions under which China __PRINTERS_P_145_COMMENT__ 10--193 145 had to develop were extremely challenging and difficult owing to the economic and cultural backwardness inherited from the past, to the small working class and to the influence of the semifeudal habits and customs, the people's government very soon achieved considerable success in developing and building up democratic institutions and arousing the political consciousness of the people. Under the 1954 Constitution, the People's Republic of China was declared a people's democracy led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The working people exercised their power through a system of representative bodies-assemblies of people's representatives-which were set up both in town and countryside. The state apparatus was built on the principle of democratic centralism, a combination of collective and oneman management, and control by the people. The leading role belonged to the Communist Party of China which proceeded under the banner of Marxism-Leninism together with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties. The CPC relied in its activities on the United Popular Democratic Front which comprised all the democratic classes, parties and groups, popular organisations and democratic elements not in the Party.
But both the structure and the working of such a mechanism had their defects. This was due to lack of experience and competent personnel and, particularly to the Maoist distortions, which were perceptible even at the earliest stages of China's post-revolutionary development, although not as clearly as now. As a social-political and theoretical-ideological current. Maoism did not 146 take shape at once, showing suddenly against the background of the "cultural revolution,'' but emerged and gained in strength gradually, leaning on the petty^bourgeois element and playing on the backward nationalistic, hegemonic ambitions of the immature masses. The mechanism of people's power that had been developed failed to conform to the Maoist idea of the content and form of power, being alien to it in principle. Moreover, the continued existence of such a mechanism even after repeated campaigns for ``amendment'' and "improvement,'' against the ``right-leading'' and ``bourgeois'' elements, made it impossible for the Maoists to feel politically secure.
The Maoist political-legal doctrine was more than a revision and denial of the fundamental primary principles of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the substance and political forms of power during the establishment and strengthening of the socialist system. The doctrine is based primarily on the thesis that the "dictatorship of the proletariat is a dictatorship exercised by the masses.''~^^1^^ This proposition which Mao Tse-tung laid down as early as 1957,~^^2^^ and which was widely publicised during the "cultuml revolution,'' made it possible to disregard the leading role of the working class and ignore its genuine needs and interests as well as its views. At the same time it suggested that society should be divided, not on a class principle but according to political views or, to be more precise, on people's _-_-_
~^^1^^ Jenmin jihpan, July 19, 1968.
~^^2^^ See Mao Tse-tung, Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, M., 1967.
__PRINTERS_P_147_COMMENT__ 10* 147 attitude to the policies of the Maoist rulers. All the social forces that supported the adventuristic nationalist and hegemonic Maoist line were assumed to be "the people,'' while all those under the least suspicion of being disobedient or disrespectful to the "great helmsman" were declared enemies of the people and "capitalist-- supporters.''Maoist ideologists often refer to the special features of China's social development and especially to the fact that the peasants form the bulk of the population while the proletariat is very small. Indeed, this is of importance to social reforms. The Chinese revolution was carried through and the first successes in socialist construction achieved largely because the CPC had managed to win over and lead the peasantry. But the concrete historical conditions should have precisely made it of primary concern to the government and Party to provide for the leadership of the working class, to help enhance its leading position in the alliance with the peasants and to work to introduce proletarian ideology among the rural population. Under such conditions the bodies of political power must be particularly careful not to let the influence of the petty-bourgeois element among the peasantry eclipse or distort the interests and aims of the workers, the genuine exponents of social progress and consistent fighters for socialism, who although not numerous by comparison, are to lead society.
The Maoists, however, have no faith in the creative ability and revolutionary energy of the people; moreover, they are suspicious of any voluntary activity or initiative of the workers. 148 Instead, they offer a grotesquely inflated personality cult which serves to suppress the democratic relations and norms of the party and public life, as well as criticism and control from below, and enforces unquestioning blind obedience to the will of the absolute "leader.'' Nor are the masses required to understand the meaning and purpose of the decisions for, as the Chinese press points out, you must "carry out Mao's instructions no matter whether you have as yet grasped their meaning or not.''~^^1^^
Taking its cue from the semi-feudal traditions of deifying the supreme ruler, the peasants' ageold habit of obedience to authority, etc., Maoist propaganda is, in effect, trying to preserve and perpetuate the political apathy of the masses and to implant a system of bureaucratic administration and handle all social and political issues in a subjective way.
These days the Peking leaders never recall what the classics of Marxism-Leninism had to say about the role played by the individual in history in general and in revolutionary change in particular. They try to put it out of people's minds that V. Lenin, the head of the Party and the Soviet state, resolutely checked all attempts to extol his work. The Maoists fiercely attack the resolutions of the CPSU and other fraternal communist and workers' parties which condemn the manifestations of the personality cult in some countries and which preclude subjectivism and arbitrary action by individuals. Carrying on " unreserved propaganda of Mao's ideas and arming _-_-_
^^1^^ Jenmin jihjiao, June 16, 1967.
149 the people with them"~^^1^^ is declared to be the main point of the Maoist doctrine.To Lenin's conception of democratic centralism which he saw as a combination of the management of society from a single centre and on a single plan, and of subordination of the lower to the higher bodies, with an overall development of local initiative and creative activity of the masses, the ideologists of Maoism oppose a scheme of their own. It boils down to the most rigorous centralism, the unreasoning execution of all directives "from the top,'' and to a rigid official hierarchy in the Party apparatus as well as that of the government. Moreover, the very concept of democracy-which, one might think, presupposes the extensive development of various forms of government by the people and the enlistment of broad sections of the population in public activities-is now interpreted in China as something synonymous with "centralised leadership" and a means of enforcing centrally-made decisions. "The Most Recent Directives of Chairman Mao,'' which are quoted in the joint editorial of Jenmin jihpao, Chiehfangchiun poo and Hungchi of January 1, 1969, state that democracy must provide for "proper centralism.''
It is plain that the Maoist political-legal doctrine extremely exaggerates the role of coercion in the carrying out of social reforms. It views compulsion as very nearly the key to all social problems including those (e.g., in the economic field) which require a different approach, such as reasonable estimates, a wise distribution of _-_-_
~^^1^^ Jenmin jihpao, January 16, 1969. 150
150 manpower, or provision of the necessary facilities. The slogans "Power comes from the barrel of a gun" and "Politics takes command,'' which were adopted long ago at the time of the armed struggle against the Japanese invaders, the Maoist rulers retained in peace-time and not only while revolutionary government was being established but also later on, during the building of socialism. With the start of the "cultural revolution,'' with the hungweipings and tsaofans going on the rampage and the army acting as a shield, violence actually became the Maoists' sole means of handling, not only all political issues that presented themselves, but also those arising in the sphere of science, culture and education.Of course Marxism-Leninism never denied that proletarian power might have to resort to violence in order to carry out its functions. Nevertheless, Lenin often underlined that ''. . .the dictatorship of the proletariat is not only the use of force against the exploiters, and not even mainly the use of force.''~^^1^^ The main thing about the state power of the proletariat is its constructive and creative aspect which manifests itself in the way it organises the people for the building of socialism.
As they shift the centre of gravity to the use of force, the Maoists openly ignore the Constitution and defy socialist law. The Maoists instituted repressive actions against the working people long before the "cultural revolution.'' They carried out this policy by sending the local bodies of power obligatory quotas of so _-_-_
^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 29, p. 419.
151 many per cent of the population to be dealt with as enemies of the people. The rules concerning the administration of justice by the courts alone, the independence of the judges, and centralised Procuracy were declared harmful and "bourgeois.'' Practically nothing was done to codify laws while proposals for endorsing new codes voiced at the 8th Congress of the CPC, came to be viewed two years later as "subversion of the people's democratic dictatorship''. The Maoist rulers regarded the citizens' democratic rights and liberties as empty declarations which, if anything, ought to be limited and curtailed, not enhanced by legal and material safeguards.The political-legal views of the Maoist rulers and the entire ideological and theoretical platform of the nationalistic, adventuristic and megalomaniac course imposed on China by its present Peking leadership, are not in any sense an adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the complex and special features of the vast country. Still less are they the "acme of revolutionary theory,'' as Mao's followers claim. Rather, they are a hotchpotch of quasi-revolutionary phrases and bombastic slogans betraying lack of faith in the creative capacity of the people and a denial of the leading role of the proletariat, and put forward to excuse violence, the cult of personality, and extreme nationalism. And what is most important, these are not isolated mistakes such as may be due to growing-pains or a fresh outbreak of the infantile disorder of leftism in communism, but rather a fully-developed system of anti-- Leninist views and a betrayal of the key principles and objectives of the world communist movement.
152 __ALPHA_LVL3__ THE POLITICAL CHANGE: ITS CAUSES AND FORMSThe causes, motive forces and forms of the political coup the Maoists are trying to bring off under the guise of the "cultural revolution" certainly need to be studied and analysed further. For example, we still have to find satisfactory explanation of why it was that the Maoists were able to set off the so-called "cultural revolution,'' destroy much of the former social-political and state-legal system, and begin to establish the mechanism of an absolute military-bureaucratic dictatorship. Why was there no force within the Party and the state strong enough and sufficiently well-organised to stand in the way of Mao Tsetung and his group, to defend the purity of Marxist-Leninist teachings and provide for China's successful advance along the socialist road?
Of course an examination of these questions will require a most detailed and extensive analysis of a variety of social factors.
Notwithstanding their boastful declarations, the Maoists have not yet managed to achieve complete victory. Chinese developments connected with the "cultural revolution" are not yet over. At the same time it would be useful to noteeven if only tentatively and touching mainly on the political-legal sphere-some of the circumstances that have played an essential part in Chinese affairs.
The first thing to point out is the inadequate general development of the political life in China, the absence of sufficiently strong traditions and habits of socialist democratism. This may be explained in part by the historical past of China 153 whose downtrodden people not only suffered from semi-feudal forms of exploitation but were also deprived of elementary rights and liberties and were oppressed by military cliques and foreign interference. It is equally noteworthy, however, that after the Chinese revolution had been accomplished and people's government established, not enough was done to end the onerous legacy of the past. The socialist democratic forms stipulated in the 1954 Constitution were never completely realised. Even at the time when they were most active, representative bodies never played quite so important a part as they were legally entitled to. They did not exercise the necessary control over the executive bodies and their organisational work among the people, e.g., the relations between deputies and constituents, was nothing more than a formality.
As is known, Lenin considered the realisation of democratic principles-such as the raising of the political and cultural level of the working people sufficiently to ensure their effective participation in governmetit-of paramount importance. Speaking at the 8th Congress of the RCP (Bolsheviks) he stressed that there remained no legislative ''. . .hindrances, but so far we have not reached the stage at which the working people could participate in government. Apart from the law, there is still the level of culture, which you cannot subject to any law.''~^^1^^ In a situation of this kind the organising and guiding effort of the Communist Party and socialist state in developing the political awareness, activities and initiative of the people becomes particularly _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 29, p. 183.
154 important. But in China the party and state development proceeded in such a manner that it not only failed to further the cause of socialist democracy but actually held back all progress in that direction.It must be borne in mind that although at the preceding stages of China's development Mao Tse-tung had not always revealed his political schemes and at times had been forced to follow the Marxist-Leninist line, he had nevertheless caused considerable harm in the matter of the formation and building up of people's government. As the demagogic "big leap" and " people's communes" policies succeeded one another, many bodies and institutions were thrown out of gear, and many thousands of genuine Communists were dismissed from office and viciously abused. Nor is it to be left out of account that Mao's policy led to the isolation and estrangement of the Party and state from the population so that the working people came to look at the state bodies, laws, and even important Party and government officials as a force hostile to the people.
Every now and then the normal course of political life in China has been interrupted by vociferous campaigns accompanied by mass-scale repression. For example, as they were preparing their "big leap,'' the Maoists launched a " struggle against the rightist bourgeois elements.'' At first this seemed to be aimed at the bourgeois liberal intellectuals from the democratic parties but soon spread to the Chinese Communist Party and to government institutions. The campaign swiftly developed into a mass persecution of Communists who were sincerely trying to carry out 155 the resolutions of the 8th CPC Congress, democratise the social and political life and establish fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The policy of "people's communes" in the countryside, besides dealing a blow at the agricultural production, actually caused the destruction of representative bodies in the countryside and discredited a large number of local leaders devoted to the Party.
Not only did the Maoists disregard the need to observe revolutionary law, but they went out of their way to paralyse the very institutions whose function was to strengthen overall civil discipline and maintain socialist law and order. As early as the late fifties they started a rabid persecution of the workers in political and legal institutions, particularly of the courts, procurator's offices and the people's control organisations. Many prominent workers in these institutions, devoted champions of law and order, were dismissed from office and branded as " counterrevolutionary elements" who had wormed themselves into the Party. During the "big leap" the fundamentally wrong practice of setting up "task groups" was started. These groups performed the combined functions of the courts, procurator's offices and public security bodies. The Committee of People's Control, which was established soon after the victorious revolution and which rested on the system of local bodies and on the active citizens as a whole, was first reorganised into a common ministry, and later on, both central and local people's control agencies were finally eliminated.
Already before the "cultural revolution" the part played by the system of representative 156 bodies in the country's life was very small. Most of the important decisions-e.g., on the "big leap" and "people's communes"-were adopted without being submitted to the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives, which was not even convoked, or to local elected bodies. People's assemblies were no longer called regularly, their activities were more and more circumscribed and finally stopped altogether. Since the launching of the "big leap" policy, elections to representative bodies have been held only once, in 1964, although under the law there should have been during that time at least two elections to the AllChina Assembly of People's Representatives and four, to the local people's assemblies. Real power, both in the centre and at grassroots level, gradually shifted to the executive bodies which became increasingly ponderous and unwieldy, and pervaded by officialism and sycophancy. State administration separated itself from the people by walls of red tape.
The Communist Party of China continued to lose its former standards of organisation and efficiency, forfeiting its prestige among the working people to a considerable extent because, on the one hand, the more progressive cadres were now and again subjected to persecution, being made the target of ``purges'' and assorted " campaigns,'' and, on the other hand, because it based its activities on peremptory army-style commands and one-man decisions instead of on the state bodies. The principle "The first secretary of the Party Committee is the commander-in-chief,'' which the Maoists have propounded in Party work at all levels since the late fifties and early sixties, in actual practice meant that many 157 decisions were made by just one individual. This destroyed confidence in collective leadership, and at the same time caused the state institutions to develop a formal, indifferent and irresponsible attitude.
All the revolutionary triumphs and socialist gains of the Chinese were ascribed to Mao, and all blunders and flops were attributed to the machinations of his enemies or failure to understand his "great directives.'' There arose a situation in China where important Party and government leaders, whose great services to the people were well-known, could not-if they objected to Mao's policies and the actions of his aides-speak out against the Mao personality cult and had no option but to support it publicly, often excusing their particular view by their concern to see the ideas of "the reddest sun" translated into life to the very best effect.
At the beginning of the "cultural revolution" the Peking leaders increasingly set out to make use of young people and even schoolchildren, misrepresenting the outrages perpetrated by the hungweipings and tsaofans as a largely spontaneous mass movement. The Maoists deliberately set these young storm troopers upon their own real or imaginary opponents, encouraging savage acts of terrorism. It is significant that in the widely circulated resolution of the CPC Central Committee of August 8, 1966, the prospective hungweipings were granted free pardon in advance for any crimes and offences they might commit "in the course of the movement" short of murder, poisoning, arson, sabotage, theft of state secrets and counter-revolutionary crimes " whereof explicit evidence should be available.''
158Still, Mao and his followers depended mainly on the army. China's armed forces played a decisive role in the progress of events, becoming the Maoists' "steel wall" and mainstay. It was not by chance that the army was not broken up, reorganised or even seriously criticised. The removal of some military commanders and even disturbances in some army units were due to the political purge reflecting the course of events in China rather than to any other cause. The special features of the formation, leadership and ideological guidance of the army were used by the Maoists, who had seized commanding positions in the army in good time, to divorce it from the people and educate it in the spirit of iron discipline and blind obedience to Mao Tse-tung. In actual fact, the army has long been independent of Party and government control and, as developments have shown, has placed itself above society.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE MAOISTWhat are the characteristics of the Maoist political system that is developing? Time is sure to make its corrections in the answer, for the propensity of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters for shifting ground and turning right about, for dealing in demagoguery and just deceiving the people must naturally leave its mark on China's social and public life. Notwithstanding this, the outline of the Maoist dictatorship emerges quite clearly.
159As things stand, political power in China has been seized by a tiny group led by Mao Tsetung. This group is controlling the social and public life and has taken on itself the functions of the top party and government bodies. From the standpoint of Chinese constitutional law a group of this kind cannot be identified with any of the established institutes of the political system and chiefly resembles the half-advisory, halfruling institutions of a monarchy or an absolute dictatorship. The "Maoist headquarters,'' as the dictator group is officially described, is a vague enough notion, not fixed in any legal or other act; it has neither a clear-cut structure, nor an apparatus of its own, nor any fixed body of people. Moreover, the circle of Mao's followers keeps contracting and extending by turns as the objectionable ones are kicked out or-as happens more seldom-those who win back their place by ``repentance'' or zealous prosecution of Maoist objectives, return.
Placed at the hub of the entire political mechanism is "Chairman Mao,'' whose moves and decisions are never debated. Mao's prestige serves to cover unprecedented infractions of democracy and law, savage repression and outrages against those suspected of "sedition.'' This inflated prestige is used by the Maoists to ensure the obedience of the multi-million people. Mao Tse-tung has appointed Lin Piao, Minister for Defence, his official successor, as if Mao were a monarch.
Liu Shao-chi, who had been elected Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic under the Constitution, was persecuted as the "black band leader,'' "power-holder who follows the capitalist 160 path" and finally removed from all his jobs in the party and government without the slightest regard for law. The All-China Assembly of People's Representatives and its Standing Committee are no longer convened and have practically stopped functioning. As for the State Council of China, it is still carrying on in certain respects but is kept under strict supervision by the Maoist ruling clique.
In the provinces, autonomous areas, centrallygoverned cities and, more recently, also in the countries and communes, "revolutionary committees" have been set up. These have replaced Party committees as well as local assemblies of people's representatives and their executive bodies, people's committees. To all intents and purposes, the Maoists hope that the "revolutionary committees,'' described in the Chinese press as an "outstanding victory of the cultural revolution,'' will be their ohief support and will provide the basis for the new political mechanism. "Revolutionary committees" are formed of carefully picked ``loyal'' military men, the old cadres, and representatives of the "revolutionary masses.'' The leading place in these committees, with respect both to the number of seats and amount of influence, is, in most instances, reserved for the army. The Maoists have been wary of announcing an election to the "revolutionary committees,'' although in 1966 they made declarations to the effect that these new bodies of power would be elective.
The army holds a special place in the system of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, and the Peking rulers pay careful attention to keeping it under control. Today the Chinese armed forces __PRINTERS_P_161_COMMENT__ 11--193 161 are not so much concerned with national defence as with the management of the state, the economy, and education. They have thus become the chief instrument of Mao's policies. The army, which was in the background early in the " cultural revolution,'' is now setting the pace of China's social development. With its assistance, Mao Tsetung crushes his opponents and also deals with those who, like the hungweipings, used to loom large in the political scene but then got out of hand and even became dangerous to the regime. The army has become the chief means of maintaining public order and labour discipline, which, in itself, is without precedent in the history of world socialism. Army units have invaded the factories, where, under the guise of Maoist propaganda, have taken charge of production, forcing the workers to work without any material incentive.
The Mao dictatorship relies on a system of brutal suppression and intimidation of the people. Apart from the army, punitive functions are exercised by a formidable apparatus commanding numerous prison camps and prisons. The merger of public security agencies, the courts and people's procuracy into the "committees for stamping out counter-revolution" or "departments of proletarian dictatorship" had been a flagrant violation of the Constitution. These departments have, from time to time, staged so-called trials which are held in absolute contempt of the defendants' rights. These travesties of trials often terminate in public executions.
The military-bureaucratic dictatorship is propped up by numerous prison camps and prisons. Besides imprisonment, another current method of 162 suppression practised on a mass scale is the exiling of city dwellers to the country.
In the process of rebuilding the political system the Maoists have uprooted influential and strong organisations such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the Young Communist League. These organisations, which had extensive revolutionary experience and were devoted to Marxism-Leninism and friendship with the Soviet Union, seemed dangerous to the Maoists. Yet, as they would like to pass off the "cultural revolution" as a popular movement and draw the mass of the working people into their gambles, the Peking leaders have lately started to organise "work brigades for the propagation of Mao's ideas.'' These brigades are usually mustered and directed by servicemen and fulfil auxiliary functions in restoring order in the provinces. "Work brigades" are eagerly exploited by the Maoists who seek to show in this way how loyal they are to the slogan of working-class leadership. They also rely on these brigades to get rid of the hungweipings-so that no blame should attach to the army-and achieve political stability.
Recently the Maoist ruling clique set some schemes on foot concerning the Communist Party of China. It is well known that during the " cultural revolution" the CPC had to take many hard knocks. More than 130 of 174 members and candidate members of the CPC Central Committee elected by the 8th Congress were subjected to persecution. The Political Bureau and Secretariat are not functioning. Party committees in the provinces, autonomous regions, towns and communes are paralysed. The "cultural revolution group" while claiming to speak on behalf of the Party, __PRINTERS_P_183_COMMENT__ 11* 163 actually set the hungweipings and tsaofans upon the Party and attacked and took repressive action against Communist Party officials. However, in late 1968, the Peking leaders started on another course, setting out to purge the Party, substitute Maoism for Marxism-Leninism, replenish the Party by recruiting new members from among the tsaofans, restructure the Party apparatus and make further use of the army style of work. They want to turn the Party into an obedient tool. They mean to turn to account the Party's revolutionary past, its distinguished liberation-war record, its prestige among the working people, and its immense organisational and educational potential. For all practical purposes, what they are setting up in China under the name of the Communist Party of China is a new political organisation which is intended to serve as a support for Maoist rule.
Soviet State and Law, No. 5, 1969
[164] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Maoism Preaches PovertyA Arzamastseu
Poverty is not an inevitable accompaniment of mankind's development. It is unavoidable only as long as the productive forces are not sufficiently developed and the economy has not risen above a production level that meets only immediate needs. Exploitation in class society, new requirements and the accumulation of wealth aggravate poverty and awaken in the people a desire to put an end to oppression and privation. However, insufficient economic development has for a long time prevent the possibility of discovering the correct way for ending poverty. This became possible only when Marxism came into being in the middle of the 19th century. Till then numerous Utopias were evolved in a futile attempt to discover the laws of social development.
Solution of this problem is a complex and contradictory process. The developed production is certainly essential for the elimination of inequality and poverty. Historical experience shows, however, that advanced production in itself cannot bring about social harmony. It is necessary only to consider the example of the USA. The social factor is no less important. On the other hand, the beneficial effect of the social element may be negligible in the absence of sufficient material prerequisites. The basic mistake of most Utopian projects was precisely this: overestimation of the social factor and underestimation of the material one. Many Utopians saw the source 165 of social evils in the sphere of distribution of the good things of life. They asserted that the wealth created by human labour should immediately be made the property of all on an equal basis. This demand was best expressed by the sort of egalitarian communism which praised, for the sake of primitive equality, the "noble simplicity" of the poor who have no requirements, rejected culture, proclaimed the primacy of village over town, and regimented everyday life. This doctrine was first advanced by the preachers of early Christian communities. In the Middle Ages it was promoted by Thomas Mvinzer, and in modern times by Tammaso Campanella, Gabriel Mably, Domenico Morelli and other Utopian Communists. The bourgeois egalitarian socialism of William Godwin and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon is in spirit close to this doctrine. However, the experience of primitively-communist sects, fraternities, towns and communities of various epochs proves that such equality is unattainable. Economic and ideological alienation assumed unheard-of dimensions in these communities. The worker had to be satisfied with the bare minimum, while his whole life depended on the authorities.
The current revival of certain features of primitive communism in China, as reflected in the policy of the "people's communes,'' the "both worker and peasant" course, the setting up of self-sufficient, autarkic economic cells and the "introduction of rationally lower wages and salaries,'' presents a vain attempt to solve the problem of poverty and hunger with the help of the outdated and fallacious concept of levelling.
Only socialism which unites the material and social factors is capable of resolving this 166 problem and ending poverty. Socialist revolution cuts the very roots of poverty and ends the glaring inequality of people. The all-round development of production and the attainment on this basis of complete social homogeneity are essential for the elimination of poverty. To achieve this takes more than good intentions, since production has its own laws of development. One must have certain capital, establish a new labour discipline and a new organisation of labour, teach people new skills and techniques and make the workers interested in the results of their efforts.
The only way to get rid of poverty is through creating a more advanced mode of production and through raising labour productivity.
Beginning the reorganisation of production presents great difficulties, especially in economically backward countries where a socialist revolution has occurred. The discrepancy between the advanced socio-political system and the poor economic base may result in grave complications, and even in the loss of the socialist gains. The efforts of the working class in fighting the imminent dangers and endeavouring to get production going are opposed by all the evils and difficulties inherited from the past-an underdeveloped economy, famine, poverty and the resultant demoralisation of certain sections of the people, and their loss of interest in work. This is what the young Soviet Republic experienced just after the revolution. The imperialist war followed by the civil war had completely disrupted the country's feeble economy. Famine and economic dislocation threatened to destroy the world's first socialist state. Higher labour productivity was the only way out, but labour productivity was falling 167 steadily, and factories and plants were closing down because of famine. Lenin wrote: "We get a sort of vicious circle: in order to raise productivity of labour we must save ourselves from starvation, and in order to save ourselves from starvation we must raise productivity of labour.''~^^1^^
The republic could not count on external economic aid. It had to rely on its own strength to break the vicious circle. The strength came from the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people who made sacrifices in the name of victory and a better future. The accomplishment of tasks, which would be unthinkable at other times, is made possible by revolutionary heroism each time a new social system is born. The October Socialist Revolution evoked an unprecedented enthusiasm. For the first time in history people were making a revolution for themselves, and for the first time in history they had real opportunity to display their capabilities. The heroism at the fronts of the civil war was rivalled by the heroism of the workers in the rear, of which the communist subbotniks were only one example. Conscientious work had a great effect on the economic life of the country. It raised labour productivity and improved labour discipline.
An atmosphere of general inspiration and the readiness of the working people to sacrifice themselves at the initial stage creates the impression that revolutionary enthusiasm is enough to put an end to all difficulties. "... We expected to accomplish economic tasks just as great as the political and military tasks we had accomplished by relying directly on this enthusiasm,'' Lenin said.~^^2^^ _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 29, p. 426.
~^^2^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. S3, p. 58.
168 However, ``pure'' heroism cannot last forever, and Lenin saw the danger in time. In his speech at the combined meeting of the delegates of the 8th Congress of Soviets and members of the AllRussia and Moscow Councils of Trade Unions who were also members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on December 30,1920, Lenin pointed to the need and importance of material incentive for shock work: "The preference part of priority implies preference in consumption as well. Otherwise, priority is a pipe dream, a fleeting cloud, and we are, after all, materialists. The workers are also materialists; if you say shock work, they say, let's have the bread, and the clothes, and the beef.''~^^1^^It was enthusiasm, bolstered as far as possible by material incentive, that made it possible to break the vicious circle. This was an important discovery of Marxism. The combination of moral and material stimuli will remain an effective lever of economic development till the time when communism is built.
The problem of socialist changes also faced China after the 1949 socialist revolution. Its economy was then even more backward than that of Russia in 1917. The pulse-beat of economic life could hardly be felt after the many years of Japanese occupation and the civil war. The few undamaged industrial enterprises were lost in the ocean of primitive farm production, and were unable to exert any noticeable influence. The feeble links between various parts of the country were breaking. Famine was rife. The Communist Party of China set about the task of ending the _-_-_
^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 28.
169 famine, the poverty and the rural backwardness, and of attaining abundance. The external conditions were favourable. The country received comprehensive economic, cultural and military assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Neither was popular enthusiasm lacking. The vast country began socialist construction. Factories and plants were rehabilitated and reconstructed, and new industries were built with the help of the Soviet Union. The moral uplift and material incentive promoted labour productivity and a new labour discipline. By following this road China could build an advanced socialist economy in a few decades. There were no insurmountable obstacles in the way, since socialism met the basic demands of both the working class and the peasantry. The danger lay elsewhere.Under certain conditions politics is known to conflict temporarily with its economic base and hinder its development. State leadership in China fell into the hands of people whose petty-- bourgeois views and sentiments kept them from becoming true Marxists. The initial successes in China and the people's willingness to work selflessly for the common cause evoked adventurist leanings in the leadership who sought to ignore the laws of social development, which is so characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie. Primitive petty-bourgeois mentality raised to the level of ideology culminated in voluntarism, the personality cult, nationalism and anti-Sovietism.
Lenin's tested formula for successful socialist development-enthusiasm plus material incentivehas been altered by Mao Tse-tung to enthusiasm plus poverty. The new formula flatly rejects all material incentive, making enthusiasm the one 170 and only motive force. Mao Tse-tung's variety of enthusiasm is evidently devoid of the element of awareness and reason and borders on fanaticism. Although exaltation whipped up by extreme nationalism can take hold of a section of the population, mostly the youth, it cannot be universal or lasting. Reality with its daily cares is a sobering factor, and the intoxication cannot last.
The second half of the formula, poverty, is inseparable from the first. A person seized by `` super-revolutionary'' enthusiasm, according to Mao, need not and should not possess any material benefits beyond the bare minimum. Poverty should be part of universal self-denial.
It is no accident that the Maoists have made use of this idea. Poverty and equality have been always regarded by the oppressed as being as closely related as their opposites-wealth and inequality. All egalitarian Utopias emphasise and praise poverty as the key requisite of universal equality. Poverty was lauded by Proudhon, one of the founders of petty-bourgeois egalitarian socialism, who even developed an economic theory to justify the perpetuity of poverty. He held that nature had given man two opposed qualities-a limitless capacity to consume and a limited capacity to work. Poverty was therefore claimed to be man's natural condition to which man must reconcile himself. "It is clear that we cannot even think of escaping tihis poverty-tHie law of our nature and our society,'' wrote Proudhon. "Poverty is a boon, and should be regarded as the basis of our joys.''~^^1^^ This was said over a hundred _-_-_
^^1^^ P. J. Proudhon, Poverty as an Economic Principle, Moscow, 1908, p. 16.
171 years ago, at the time of the first industrial revolution, and is being repeated by Mao Tse-tung in the age of atomic energy and of turbulent scientific and technological advancement.In Maoism the Leninist principle of material incentive gives way to the idealisation of " poverty.'' But can poverty as it exists in real life serve as a stimulus to work? Poverty means hunger, cold, disease, stupefaction, humiliation, and a degree of dehumanisation to which man could never be Teconciled. It invariably evokes protest, bitterness and resistance. Work becomes senseless when it fails to provide a tolerable living for the worker. Real poverty does not go together with construction, least of all socialist construction. Mao Tse-tung advanced his own "programme of attitude" to poverty, praising poverty as a blessing. He stated: "In addition to its other special features, the 600-million population of China is conspicuous for its poverty. This may seem bad but is in fact good. Poverty calls for changes, action, revolution. On a spotlessly clean sheet of paper one can write the most beautiful hieroglyphs, create the newest and most beautiful pictures.''~^^1^^
So the way out of the difficulty was to accept poverty, to adorn it with a halo of sanctity and nobility, to turn it into something to be sought after and carried with pride and delight by everyone. Only then would it become a source of joy, creative quest, selfless labour and heroism.
__FIX__ Look for underlining within a certain distance of a footnote region bar. 2007.12.29.Having received this instruction of Mao's, the Chinese ideological machine swung into action. Its main job now was to create a new type of worker who would labour for the good of society, _-_-_
~^^1^^ Hungchi, "About One Cooperative,'' 1958, No. 1.
172 demanding no material remuneration. All newspapers, magazines and the radio joined in the drive to ``emancipate'' the individual. The purpose was to instil in people an aversion to material well-being, comfort and cultural advancement-to free their souls from the "chimeras of civilisation."' The ideal held up was for a man to reduce his requirements to the bare minimum, the resulting vacuum to be filled with love for the leader and nationalistic ravings about the hegemony of the "Greater China.'' Such a person should derive consolation for the loss of material and cultural benefits from the grandeur and might of his country.It is obviously a case of wishful thinking when the Chinese press serves the reader with numerous instances of cures from egoism and greed. For example: "Formerly one young communemember would not do hard work and was angry when he was given very few work-units. Recently, when the commune-members had to bring fertilizer from a place 13 kilometres away, he brought more than 50 kilograms on a yoke. He was asked: 'How many units do you want this time?' He replied: 'I don't care for work-units any more, for I am tilling the land in the name of the revolution.'~"~^^1^^ The commune member completely suppressed his egoism and got rid of the state of dissatisfaction which people erroneously call poverty~!
Poverty is often unavoidable in the transitional stage between capitalism and socialism. But Mao presents poverty as being a desirable state in itself. Poverty is claimed to be a force that will lead people to communism. To be sure, this is _-_-_
~^^1^^ China Reconstructs, 1968, No. 9, p. 40.
173 not the communism o£ which millions dream and which the classics of Marxism prophesied, but a "special Chinese communism.'' The "great helmsman" visualises the road to it as a road of moral purification from the vice of material and cultural requirements. The kingdom of ``pure'' communism will come when people do away with all ``revisionist'' survivals, learn to make do with little, and get rid of their personal interests; when class distinctions will be removed and social equality achieved. "And the objective world which is to be remoulded,'' Mao Tse-tung wrote in his article On Practice, "includes the opponents of remoulding, who must undergo a stage ot compulsory remoulding (i.e. the recalcitrants should go to concentration camps or do field work in remote areas-A A.) before they can pass to a stage of conscious remoulding. When the whole of mankind consciously remoulds itself and changes the world, the era of world communism will dawn." ^^1^^ (Emphasis added-A. A.} When speaking of communism, Mao does not say a word about economic development or the improvement of living standards. This is only to be expected, since his kind of communism "is not far distant.'' To achieve it the working people only have to perform a revolution in their souls.It is not our intention to belittle the importance of "consciously transforming oneself.'' Communism is not all economy, well-being and cultural development. It is also a highly organised society. But to reduce one's "conscious transformation" to ascetic self-sacrifice and mortification of the flesh and spirit means to violate the human and social nature of man. Man's awareness and _-_-_
~^^1^^ Mao Tse-tung, Sel. Works, L., 1954, Vol. 1, p. 297.
174 discipline should manifest themselves, not in suppressing the acquired cultural demands but in regarding himself as a creator and master who is responsible for everything that takes place in society.History of social thought knows numerous instances of the artificial transformation of real, objective hardship-the constant companion of the working man in the world of private propertyinto exclusively subjective, idealised hardship existing only in the human brain. To remove such hardship is not at all difficult-switch your thought to something else and you will attain peace of mind and tranquillity. This is how the German Young Hegelians, the Bauer brothers, and their followers in their time fought the Prussian feudal reality. They held that the evils plaguing the workers existed only in the minds of the sufferers. Real life remains outside the field of vision of philistine philosophers, its investigation being unworthy of a thinker. The consciousness of select personalities is proclaimed the creative force of history. Its beneficial influence on the uncritical consciousness of workers will, it is claimed, finally free the working people from the slavery of their own ideas, and make them change their opinion of themselves and the world around them. After this metamorphosis society will arrive at socialism.
The methodological basis of such transformations is speculative dialectics. Real poverty as a phenomenon alienated from man is taken only in a speculative form and is abstracted into "poverty in general.'' This category is then considered as an independent entity. After that, hunger, privation, and disease, as manifestations of 175 real poverty, are easily made into the products of our imagination. As a result we have, on the one hand, the general concept of poverty existing as an independent entity outside the human world, and, on the other, various kinds of poverty (hunger, privation, etc.) born of "poverty in general.'' Having performed this operation, the critical philosopher finds himself in a purely theoretical medium, beyond the confines of reality. It is not so hard for the speculative ideologist to attain any victory he chooses, such as turning poverty into a blessing. All it takes is for a worker to put out of his mind the thought that he is poor. Marx pointed out that this bravery of the Young Hegelians stemmed from Hegelian idealism. "He (Hegel-A A.) stands the world on its head and can therefore dissolve in the head all the limitations which naturally remain in existence for evil sensuousness, for real man.''~^^1^^ But Hegel was a great thinker, and his speculative contradictions often contained "elements of the true characteristic of human relations;" the Young Hegelians were pygmies. That is why the speculative method of Bruno Bauer and his circle was a caricature of Hegel's method, devoid of any understanding of the dialectics of social life.
Let us turn to Mao Tse-tung. To give a semblance of scientific substantiation to the idea that poverty becomes a blessing, the "great helmsman" also uses or, rather, abuses, dialectics. His sayings, couched in Marxist terms, sound very much like the maxims of ancient Chinese philosophers. That is why a comparison of the Young _-_-_
~^^1^^ K. Marx and F. Engels, The Holy Family, M. 1956, p. 254.
176 Hegelian and Maoist dialectics can only be made on the basis of Mao's final conclusions. In his speech at the llth enlarged sitting of the Supreme State Conference on February 27, 1957, Mao said: "In certain conditions bad may lead to good results and good, in its turn, may lead to bad results.'' (Mao Tse-tung, On the Question of the Correctly Resolving Contradictions Within the People, M., 1957, p. 43.) Mao illustrates this thesis by the following examples:The counter-revolution in Hungary was bad, but it became good in the process of its suppression. Hungary got rid of its enemies and grew stronger,
Japan's attack on China was bad. But China learned a great deal in the course of the war and was victorious. Thus a bad thing became good.
It will be bad if a third world war breaks out. But a nuclear war conflagration will finally do away with the capitalist world, and that is good. .. If one is to employ this kind of logic, not only poverty, but also war, counter-revolution and disease can be made out to be good things! In other words, everything that brings misfortune to people, particularly to working people, and which they vigorously resist, is, according to Mao, a source of future happiness. Now we can understand these words of Mao's: "It is terrible to think of the time when all people will become rich.'' To him this would mean the end of development, for "only poverty calls for change, action, revolution.'' According to Mao, it follows that not the striving to end poverty, but poverty itself, is an inexhaustible source of creative energy and progress. There is nothing scientific about this reasoning, __PRINTERS_P_177_COMMENT__ 12--193 177 not even a thought to exclude or prevent what is bad. The arch-dialectical verbiage camouflages a plain statement of facts and the unwillingness to analyse them in all their complexity.
The ideal of a poor worker, "as undemanding as a pumpkin,'' capable of limiting his requirements and making do with very little, meets with little sympathy among workers and intellectuals. Since not everybody was as quick of comprehension as Chairman Mao would like, and the souls of many had been thoroughly permeated with ``capitalist'' and ``revisionist'' delusions, the Mao clique had to class them as enemies of `` communism'' and subject them to the severe repression prescribed by the demands of the "stage of transformation based on coercion.'' Concentration camps were set up all over the country. Millions of people familiar with any cultural and technological achievements, with the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, are being banished from towns for "re-education by labour" in the village. Barracks discipline is introduced at factories and in rural communes, and civil administration is replaced by military rule. In keeping with the so-called principle of unity of industry, agriculture and military service, everyone is obliged, besides his main occupation, to work in agriculture (if he is an industrial worker) or in industry (if he is a peasant), and also to undergo military training. Conscious discipline is out of the question and order at production enterprises is maintained exclusively through non-- economic coercion. The military uniform is an indispensable part of every working collective. The private life of every Chinese is strictly regimented. He must devote all his free time to studying 178 the leader's maxims. Everything that might remind people of material or cultural values is to be destroyed. Monuments are being pulled down, books are being destroyed, and musical works are prohibited. Universal levelling is also reflected in clothing-blue trousers and a buttoned-up cloth or quilted jacket have become a compulsory uniform for everybody. This is how the ideals of egalitarian communism are put into practice and a regimented society is created.
The attempt to establish barrack-room communism in a country which had social ownership of the means of production naturally invited several questions ~. Why did Mao Tse-tung select poverty as a means of implementing his adventurist plans? Is egalitarian communism possible in practice?
The preaching of asceticism, and of universal poverty as the most effective means of ending social inequality, accompanied many actions of peasants and artisans in the Middle Ages (T. Miinzer, the Taborite movement in Bohemia, etc.). It was also present in the first actions of the proletariat (the Babouvists). So strong were these sentiments that Marx paid considerable attention to this trend in communist thinking at the beginning of his socio-political activity when his materialist and communist outlook was taking shape. He devoted one chapter of his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts ot 1844 to the criticism of egalitarian communism. Marx's basic idea was that this primitive communism, with its praiseworthy intention of doing away with private property and creating a just society, had not gone beyond, had in fact not even attained to, private property. It strove not to master __PRINTERS_P_179_COMMENT__ 12* 179 all the wealth created in conditions of predominant private property, not to transform and greatly expand the economic, political and cultural base of man's liberation from exploitation, of satisfying the requirements of people, and of the fuller manifestation of their abilities, but, on the contrary, to discard everything that had been achieved. The reason given for this attitude is that the available material and cultural benefits cannot be shared by all because of the limited means required for their production. Hence the rejection of culture and talent for the sake of primitive, arithmetical equality. The negative attitude of egalitarian communism to private property is nothing but envy by poor private property of the richer private property. "How little this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilisation, the regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even attained to it,'' wrote Marx, adding that crude egalitarian communism is "in its first form only a generalisation and consummation of this relationship.''~^^1^^ That is why it reflects all the iniquity of the old world. Work is not an end in itself in this society but a means of obtaining a certain amount of food. A guaranteed food minimum becomes the only aim in life, the summit of happiness. The production of life's necessities (bread, vegetables, etc.) is accordingly declared the most important activity. Physical _-_-_
~^^1^^ K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, M., 1967, pp. 93, 94.
180 labour is opposed to mental work as the only worthy occupation. The individual is reduced to the state of a dumb animal blindly following the orders of the leader of its herd. Under such a ``communism'' equality in work and income does not compensate for a man's loss of individuality and the wealth of multi-faceted activity aimed at transforming the world.Marx said that the transfer of private property to common ownership would be accomplished by a communism which would keep intact all the wealth of previous development and would return "man to himself as a social (i.e. human) man.''~^^1^^ The necessity of its establishment is conditioned by the entire history of industrial development. Incomplete communism of the egalitarian kind looks backwards, not forwards, in proving its right to existence, and seeks justification in the existing state of affairs. It cannot count on the future and is destined to share the fate of private property whose prisoner it is. The universal spread of poverty does not save mankind from social upheavals. ".. .and. with destitution,'' wrote Marx and Engels, "the struggle for necessities and all the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced.''~^^2^^
Ideas of equal distribution have been appearing in countries with mainly small-scale production both in agriculture and industry, where abundance of products is only a dream. They have always held a place of prominence in _-_-_
~^^1^^ K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, M., 1967, p. 95.
~^^2^^ K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, M., 1964, p. 46.
181 Chinese social Utopia. To many progressive thinkers egalitarianism and poverty seemed the only way of ending hunger and oppression. These ideas are to be found in the works of the ancient Chinese philosophers, Lao-tse and Mo-tse, and of the thinkers of modern times, such as Kung Tse-chen, Hung Hsiu-chuan and others. Still fresh in the people's memory is the first peasant state, Tai Ping Tien kuo-the Heavenly State of Great Welfare (1851--64)-where the first attempt was made to introduce equality in land tenure. Hung Hsiuchuan, the ideologist and leader of the Taiping uprising, wrote: "It is necessary that all inhabitants of the Heavenly Empire enjoy equally and jointly the great happiness granted by our true master, the heavenly father, the Lord God; that land be tilled jointly, that food be taken together, that clothing be used and money expended jointly. Equality must be observed everywhere, all should be properly fed and clothed.''~^^1^^ Taiping laws obliged every peasant family to give the entire harvest to the state without compensation, saving only what was absolutely necessary. The surplus thus collected was distributed among artisans in towns and used for the upkeep of the army and administration. This organisation of life evoked no protest among the masses in view of the everpresent danger of returning to bondage under landlords.The ideals of egalitarian communism played a progressive role in feudal times. The idea of universal equality was an immense mobilising force among the poorest peasants, based as it was on the demand to confiscate the landlords' land. The _-_-_
~^^1^^ Selected Works of Progressive Chinese Thinkers of the Modern Times, M., 1961, p. 69.
182 peasant uprisings undermined the foundations of feudalism and prepared conditions for the emergence of new social relations.The Maoists' dependence on poverty as an accelerator of economic development, and their narrow petty-bourgeois interpretation of communism as egalitarian, barrack-room communism, doom the people as a whole to privation and misery. "Regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man" is contrary to the human and social nature of modern man, and it shackles his freedom and conscious activity by restricting it exclusively to the satisfaction of primitive needs. This activity cannot be a life necessity for the individual. It becomes instead a coercive force, a heavy burden, something that is devoid of any creative element. In this case the development of production cannot be promoted either by poverty, or by "big leaps,'' or by " cultural revolution.''
This "vicious circle" can be broken only by recognising human dignity. Full development of all aspects of human life can be ensured only by socialism whose productive efforts will be used, in Lenin's words, not only to meet the daily needs "but with the object of ensuring full wellbeing and free, all-round development for all the members of society.''~^^1^^ The half-century history of socialism has borne out this thesis of Lenin's. The great accomplishments in science, technology and culture are the fruits of the labour of the new man whose interests coincide with the final goal of the socialist mode of production. "The scientific conception of communism has nothing in common _-_-_
^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 6, p. 54.
183 either with the pharisical ``philosophy'' of poverty as a ``blessing'' or with the bourgeois-philistine cult of things. Material wealth in the Marxist-- Leninist understanding is created to satisfy the reasonable requirements of people and is a necessary prerequisite for the development of human abilities, for the individual to find fulfilment.''~^^1^^ The attempt to revive egalitarian communism in the epoch of the triumphant ideas of scientific communism and of the scientific and technological revolution, can only be viewed as a reactionary petty-bourgeois Utopia.Philosophical Sciences, No. 3, 1971
_-_-_~^^1^^ On the Centenary of the Birth of V. 1, Lenin. Theses of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M., p. 54.
[184] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Great-Power ChauvinismT. Rakhimou, V. Bogoslovsky
The "cultural revolution" in the Chinese People's Republic demonstrated that the country's outlying areas were the most troublesome for its organisers. For instance, Tibet and Sinkiang were th^e last provinces in the country to set up the so-called revolutionary committees. This happened on September 5, 1968. Official press reports still carry warnings to the effect that "class enemies there have refused to accept their defeat and continue to hinder the country's progress to socialism.''
The Maoists find it difficult to effectively administer the outlying areas inhabited by nonChinese nationalities, not just because they lie far from Peking, but mainly because the local people know from long and bitter experience the meaning of the "nationalities policy" pursued by Mao Tse-tung and his group.
Relations between nationalities in a multi-- national state are always complicated. And China, with her more than 100 nationalities and ethnic groups numbering a total of nearly 45 million people, has a formidable problem. All these peoples are officially referred to as "national minorities.'' But many of them, such, for instance, as the Uigurs (4 million people), Mongolians (1.5 mln), Tibetans (3 mln), Chuangs (nearly 8 mln) live in compact groups and outnumber other nationalities over large areas. Their histories span 185 centuries, and they have had long periods of independent development. Most of the non-Chinese peoples differ greatly from the Hans (the Chinese) both ethnically and culturally. They also profess different faiths.
The Chinese state became multi-national in the course of centuries of conquest. The annexed lands were intensively colonised. Meanwhile the conquered nations were partly exterminated and partly assimilated by the Chinese. This naturally caused the non-Chinese peoples to distrust the Chinese.
All this made it necessary for the Communist Party of China and the state to proceed with caution in dealing with the nationalities question, to take the interests of all peoples inhabiting Chinese territory into account, and to strictly observe Marxist-Leninist theses on the nationalities question.
In the early years of the People's Republic of China, when Communist-internationalists still predominated in the CPC and the Mao group had not yet thrust its openly chauvinistic course on the Party leadership, a great deal was done to raise the living standards and the cultural level of the non-Chinese peoples. A number of industrial enterprises were built in the areas populated by the minorities, an agrarian reform was carried out and schools and health facilities were opened. State and Party authorities of the PRC worked out a positive programme for solving the nationalities question. "All nationalities are equal,'' said Article 3 of the Constitution of the PRC (1954). "Discrimination against, or oppression of, any nationality, and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities are prohibited.'' The Party 186 Rules adopted by the 8th Congress in 1956 demanded: "The Communist Party of China must make special efforts to raise the status of the national minorities, help them to attain self-- government, endeavour to train cadres from among the national minorities, accelerate their economic and cultural advance, bring about complete equality between all the nationalities and strengthen the unity and fraternal relations among them. . . Special attention must be paid to the prevention and correction of tendencies of great-Hanism on the part of Party members and government workers of Han nationality.''
All this seemed to tend towards solving the nationalities question in the PRC. But great-power chauvinistic tendencies, affecting the legal status of the non-Chinese nationalities in particular, made themselves increasingly felt in the policy of the Chinese leadership.
From the very first these peoples, numbering 45 million, were denied the right to self-- determination, to statehood. They were granted so-called regional autonomy. "The People's Republic of China,'' says Article 3 of the Constitution, "is a unified multi-national state. . . Regional autonomy applies in areas entirely or largely inhabited by national minorities. The national autonomous areas are an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China.''
But the status of "regional autonomy" (an empty word since autonomous regions are as `` independent'' as provinces) was granted only to five (out of the one hundred) national minorities. Among the nationalities denied this right are the Yitsu (3.3 mln), Miao (2.5 mln), Manchurians (2.4 mln), Koreans (1.2 mln). 187 But even the peoples (the Tibetans, Uigurs, Tungans, Mongolians, Chuangs) that were nominally granted the right to "regional autonomy" were allocated territories demarcated in a rather peculiar way. The Tibetan people were actually torn apart, and less than half of them now live in the Tibetan Autonomous Region while the rest reside in the provinces of Chinghai, Szechwan and Yunnan. The Mongolians in ``autonomous'' Inner Mongolia constitute a mere 10 per cent of the local population and may be rightly called a national minority.
These great-power tendencies in treating the nationalities question have become predominant since the about-turn in domestic and foreign policies of the Mao group in the late 1950's. The "cultural revolution" made it clear that the CPC policy vis-a-vis the nationalities inhabiting China is to ``sinoise'' them against their will.
The non-Chinese peoples are all but divested of political rights. All the people's committees called upon to represent the interests of the national minorities, have been dissolved. Power has been transferred to the so-called revolutionary committees set up by the army command on Peking's orders and under complete army control. The "revolutionary committees" are headed by Chinese. Thus the "revolutionary committee" of Inner Mongolia is under Teng Haiching, one-time Deputy Commander of the Peking Military Area, that of the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Regionunder Lun Shu-chin, former commander of the Hunan Military Area.
Acts of repression on a mass scale and persecution of the local cadres, party functionaries, statesmen, intellectuals have become commonplace. 188 The mass drive to eliminate the so-called Rightist deviation and Pan-Turkism was let loose in 1958 in the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region. Many people were slandered and victimised, among them Liya Samedi, a prominent Uigur writer. Chairman of the local Writers' Union, Ibrahim Turdy, a poet, Abdurahim Saidi, mayor of Urumchi, and Ganibatyr, a revolutionary and a staunch fighter for the people's cause during the time of the Kuomintang.
There was wide-spread persecution of the national minorities during the "cultural revolution.'' Practically all the intelligentsia and Party and state cadres of the minorities were accused of counter-revolutionary activities and complicity with imperialism and "Soviet revisionism.'' Among those victimised are Ulanfu, Chairman of the People's Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Alternate Politbureau Member of the CC CPC, and Iminov, Vice-- Chairman of the People's Committee of the SinkiangUigur Autonomous Region.
The notorious "big leap" and the "people's communes" had an even more harmful effect on the minorities than on China at large. Production slumped at the few factories that were in existence. Farm production declined and famine struck whole regions.
The economy of China's outlying areas is largely colonial in character. The few industrial enterprises are either put to military use, or the products they manufacture are shipped to the country's central areas. The engineers and skilled workers they employ are the Chinese settlers from central areas. The local nationalities do unskilled arduous jobs only. In this way the 189 advancement of the working class in the country's outlying areas is intentionally retarded.
The only type of construction still undertaken there is the building of strategic roads, air fields, and atomic-weapon testing grounds. Non-Chinese peoples are forced to work on these projects en masse.
Communes were set up in the areas populated by the minorities in order to seize as much as possible of their produce so as to feed and clothe the countless thousands of Chinese soldiers stationed in the national areas, and to supply the big cities.
The migration of the Chinese to the national areas undermines the economy of those areas and lowers the status of the local population. The Chinese in the Sinkiang-Uigur and Tibet areas now constitute approximately half the local population. The proportion of Mongolians in Inner Mongolia has been halved. The settlers are given the best plots in Sinkiang where there has always been a shortage of arable land. In Inner Mongolia pastures are being put to the plough to provide new settlers with land.
According to official propaganda the Chinese are being resettled en masse, and most of the 25 million citizens being sent to the countryside will go to the national areas. Calls to revert to the communes of the "big leap" period are becoming more frequent.
By colonising the outlying areas, the Maoist group does not merely seek to ``relieve'' the country's central areas of ``redundant'' people, or get rid of trouble-makers. The mass migrations of the Chinese have the objective of turning the local populations into national minorities by 190 saturating the resettlement areas with the Hans, thereby preparing the ground for an eventual assimilation of the non-Chinese peoples. Nor do the Maoists intend to postpone the assimilation, and measures are being undertaken to that end. On numerous occasions girls of Uigur, Kazakh, Tibetan and other nationalities have been compelled to marry Chinese on pain of severe punishment.
But measures towards ``cultural'' assimilation are even more serious.
For years now the languages other than Chinese have been "sinoised.'' The minorities are forced to adopt the Chinese script, and not only internationally accepted words, but also the basic vocabularies are being superceded by the Chinese vocabulary. The minorities are no more taught their native languages at school. One of the charges levelled against Ulanfu was that he demanded that the Mongolian language be taught at national schools at least on a par with Chinese.
The Maoists have even worked out "theoretical premises" towards assimilating the non-Chinese peoples. In 1960 Sinkiang Hungchi wrote that the nationalities of the PRC were merging into a single entity on the basis of the Chinese nationality. It was echoed by Sinkiang jihpao which went so far as to claim that the assimilation was "Marxist and communist.'' "Those who oppose such assimilation oppose socialism, communism and historical materialism.'' These are not empty words. Those who demand that modern industry be built in the outlying areas, that a working class be formed there, that local engineering and managerial personnel be trained and national cultures promoted, are branded as exponents of ``black'' views and supporters for "an open 191 revision of the fundamental principles of MarxismLeninism.'' The implications of such charges are clear enough.
It is very easy to see the essential difference between Marxist-Leninist theses on mutual rapprochement and the ultimate merging of nations and these distorted "theories.'' The Maoists deliberately confuse the rapprochement of nations (which occurs in the period of socialist and communist construction during the full-scale economic and cultural advancement of socialist nations) with the merging of nations, which will lead to the creation of a single world language and culture on the basis of many languages and cultures. This can only happen after communism triumphs throughout the world.
In this connection it is significant that the new Party Rules adopted at the so-called 9th Party Congress make no mention of the nationalities policy or the non-Chinese peoples. The Maoists make believe that non-Chinese peoples no longer exist in the PRC, that they have already been assimilated.
It is only natural that the great-power, chauvinistic policy pursued by Mao and his group is encountering the growing resistance of the nonChinese peoples, which often takes the form of armed action such as the continuing guerrilla struggle being waged by thousands of Tibetans, and the numerous instances of armed action by Mongolians, Chuangs, Uigurs. In January, 1969, over 4,000 people were killed in an armed clash in Sinkiang.
There is every reason to believe that the `` troublesome'' regions will cause Mao Tse-tung and his group even more trouble in the years ahead.
192The nationalities question in the PRC can be solved only on a genuine Marxist-Leninist basis The rich experience accumulated in the course ot the economic and cultural development of the national minorities in other socialist countries could serve as a useful guide.
Asia and Africa Today, No. 7, 1969
__PRINTERS_P_193_COMMENT__ 13--193 [193] ~ [194] __ALPHA_LVL1__ III __ALPHA_LVL2__ The International CommunistV. Glunin, A. Grigoryev, K. Kukushkin, M. Yuryev
Founded fifty years ago, in July 1921, the Communist Party of China radically transformed the development of the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle for national and social emancipation. It led the popular revolution, whose triumph in 1949 gave birth to the Chinese People's Republic. The development of the new China began with the abolition of feudalism and of the domination of China by the imperialist powers, with revolutionary changes in town and country, initiated by the Communist Party of China with the building in the 1950's of the foundations for socialist industrial and cultural development, and with collectivisation in the countryside. The membership of the Communist Party grew from about 60 in 1921 to nearly 20 million in the mid-1960's.~^^1^^
The Communist Party of China has traversed _-_-_
~^^1^^ Official data regarding the membership of the Communist Party of China over the last ten years are not available. In his speech made on June 30, 1961, on the occasion of the Chinese Party's 40th anniversary, Liu Shao-chi said the Party had over 17 million members (Jenmin jihfiao, July 1, 19G1).
196 a complex and difficult path during the last half-century. It has known ups and downs at the various stages of its development, both before the victory of the people's revolution and also during the existence of People's Republic of China. On the way to victory, the CPC had twice-in 1927 and 1934-experienced the bitterness of defeat. But that did not break the will of the Chinese Communists to fight. Thousands and millions of new fighters took the place of the fallen. The Party was outstandingly successful as leader and organiser of the working people in the period of economic rehabilitation (1949--52) and of the first five-year plan (1953--57), and enjoyed increasing prestige at home and in the international arena. In the first half of the 1960's, the Party shouldered all the difficulties caused by the adventuristic "big leap" policy that the Mao Tse-tung group had imposed on the Party and country.In the course of its history, the CPC has experienced sharp clashes and long periods of intraParty struggle, sometimes open and sometimes hidden, which reflected the confrontation of the two opposing tendencies in the Party development-the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist line and the nationalistic line.
The Party gained extensive experience of fighting and mass organising during the course of the national revolution (1925--27), during the revolutionary struggle under the slogan of Soviets (1927--36), during the liberation war against the Japanese invaders (1937--45) and the civil war against the Kuomintang reactionary forces (1946-- 49) and during the construction of the People's Republic of China. Within the Party there were experienced organisers and military leaders who 197 were looked on as the backbone of the Party because of their revolutionary staunchness and devotion to the people's cause.
The rich experience of the Communist Party of China forms part of the treasure-house of the world revolutionary movement. The names of Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po, Chang Tai-lei, Teng Chung-hsia, Pen Pai and other prominent leaders of the Party, its founders, organisers and theorists, are revered by Communists and revolutionaries all over the world. Their great work cannot be depreciated by the deviations that have taken place in the development of the PRC and the CPC, by imperialism's slander regarding the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese Communists, or by the unbridled campaign launched by the Maoists in recent years to defame the Party, its noble traditions and tested cadres, and veterans of the revolution.
The fifty-year history of the Communist Party of China provides ample food for thought in connection with the fate of the revolutionary and communist movement in China and other countries with a similar socio-economic structure. There is no need to prove the vast scientific and political significance of analysing the major processes that determined the essence and paths of development of the CPC. Even our ideological and political opponents are well aware of this fact. The history of the CPC and the elucidation cf the key facts and stages in its development have long been the subject of acute ideological controversy. Since the early 1960's, when the divergence of the Mao Tse-tung group from the concerted line of the international communist movement became conspicuous, the interpretation 198 of Maoism and its course have come to the fore as one of the central problems of the ideological struggle, in which the Marxist-Leninist treatment of the history of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party is opposed by bourgeois historians of various persuasions, by Maoists, revisionists and ``Left'' radicals.
An analysis of bourgeois works dealing with the history of the Chinese Communist Party brings out a common feature: nearly all the works devoted to the general problems, to separate periods or even to separate events in the history of the CPC somehow concentrate on the question of its relationships (political, ideological, etc.) with the international communist and revolutionary movement-with the Comintern and its largest section, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and with the countries and communist parties of the world socialist system.
Since the time when the first anti-Marxist versions of the history of the Chinese Communist Party appeared, a certain change has taken place in the bourgeois treatment of the Chinese Party's relationships with the international communist movement. In the 1920's-40's, bourgeois authors tended to present the CPC as a ``hand'' and ``weapon'' of the Comintern. After the victory of the Chinese revolution, the American Sinologists (J. Fairbank, B. Schwartz, R. North, and C. Brandt~^^1^^) put forward the idea that the Chinese _-_-_
~^^1^^ C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, J. K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, Cambridge, 1952; R. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford University Press, 1958; B. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, Cambridge, 1958.
199 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/20071228/299.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2007.12.29) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ people had triumphed in 1949 because the Party leadership had acted counter to the theory, practice and recommendations of the international communist movement. Attempts were also made to reduce the CPC's political course in the 1940's to the ideas and principles of Mao Tse-tung. As the Maoist leadership of the Chinese Communist Party stepped up its outright attack on the concerted line of the international communist movement, this view began to predominate in bourgeois Sinology. It has been developed and `` deepened'' in the works of American and West European Sinologists dealing with the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, in biographies of Mao Tse-tung, and in books and articles on Maoism. The ``deepened'' view consisted in the tracing, by many American and West European Sinologists, of Mao Tse-tung's `` special'' course, which had allegedly determined the ultimate victory of the Chinese revolution and the opposition of his line to that of the Comintern, back to the 1930's and even the 1920's. The works, published in the 1960's, of S. Schram, Y. Chen~^^1^^ and especially of J. E. Rue~^^2^^, all develop this theme.Setting up the Communist Party of China in opposition to the international communist movement shows the attempt to play upon the nationalistic ambitions of some of the Chinese leaders. In other words, the ideas advanced by bourgeois _-_-_
~^^1^^ S. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, L., 1963; Y. Chen, Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, L., 1966.
~^^2^^ J. E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927--35, Stanford, 19G6.
200 Sinologists paved the way for those circles in capitalist countries which counted on the "erosion of world communism" and on the nationalistic degeneration of certain groups in the leadership of the socialist countries and the communist and workers' parties. The attacks of our ideological opponents are therefore directed against one of the major sources of strength of the international revolutionary movement, namely, the unity of its various contingents of its main streams-the socialist countries, the working-class and the national-liberation movements. The theories of bourgeois Sinologists coincide with, and in some cases draw on, the distorted ideas of Maoist historiography, one of the central themes of which is also the opposition of Mao's ``special'' course (presented as that of the whole Party) to the concerted policy of the international communist movement.The essence of the Maoist version of the history of the Chinese Communist Party, spelled out in a number of official documents issued by the Maoist leadership and in books on the Party history circulated in the 1950's in the PRC and elsewhere, is this: already in the 1920's, Mao Tsetung had drawn up his own--"the only correct"-- line for the development of the Chinese revolution; but it did not become the Party's policy until the mid-1930's, until he and his followers came to the leadership of the Communist Party of China. The entire history of the Party is accordingly divided into two major stages-the "stage of defeats" (before Mao's advent to power) and the stage in which the Party and the revolution in China achieved victory, allegedly by translating Mao Tse-tung's ``ideas'' and "principles" 201 into reality.~^^1^^ In the 1940's-50's, the Maoist versions and assessments of the history of the Chinese Communist Party insisted on the thesis that the Party's policy, its ideological and political platform and its best cadres were shaped without any help from the international communist movement. We quote literally from the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC concerning the decision of the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee to disband the Comintern: "The best cadres of the Chinese Communist Party were moulded without the slightest outside help.''~^^2^^ In his report, "On the Party" to the CPC's Seventh Congress (1945), which whipped up the personality cult of Mao Tse-tung and endorsed his ``ideas'' Liu Shao-chi said that the CPC's platform consists of ''. . . great theories ot their own. . ." ( ItalicsAuthors). ''. . .Since the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party there has been created and developed unique, integrated, and correct theory concerning the people's revolution and national reconstruction in China,'' the report added. "This theory is none other than Mao Tse-tung's theory of the Chinese revolution-Comrade Mao Tsetung's theory and policy in regard to Chinese history, Chinese society and the Chinese revolution.''~^^3^^
Ever since the late 1950's, when the Maoists began to follow and propagate their "special _-_-_
^^1^^ For a detailed account of the Maoist historiography of the CPC, see: V. Glunin, A. Grigoryev, Maoist Falsifications in the History of the Chinese Communist Party, Moscow State University Gazette, Vostokovedeniye (Oriental Studies), No. 1, 1970.
~^^2^^ Chicnhfang jihpao, May 27, 1943.
~^^3^^ Liu Shao-chi, On the Party, Peking, 1954, pp. 30, 31.
202 course,'' their opposition to the policy of the international communist movement became increasingly evident. Chinese textbooks and other publications no longer contain even the well-known facts about the interaction of the CPC and the Chinese revolution with the forces and contingents of the world revolutionary process; nor do they mention the assistance given to the CPC by the Comintern, the world revolutionary movement, the CPSU and the Soviet state.~^^1^^In the course of the "cultural revolution,'' the falsification of the history of the Chinese Communist Party, its relationships with the international communist movement became still more blatant. Earlier Mao Tse-tung was depicted as the Party's sole ``infallible'' leader, whereas now he is also represented as its one and only founder. "The CPC was founded and fostered by Mao Tse-tung,"^^2^^ Lin Piao said in his report to the Ninth Congress of the CPC. We are presented with a frankly idealistic outline of the history of the Chinese Communist Party-its successes are attributed to Mao Tse-tung alone. All the former _-_-_
~^^1^^ The influence of the Maoist historiography of the CPC on bourgeois Sinology during those years is particularly clear in J. E. Rue's book to which we have already referred. Written in a quasi-scientific manner (with a multitude of references, imposing contents, index, bibliography, etc.), it is an absolutely uncritical reproduction of the basic assertions of Maoist historiography. We need only say that in his principal conclusions, Rue relies on the 1951--53 editions of Mao Tse-tungs early works (although at that time practically all of Mao's works were heavily revised and re-- edited), and on Mao's own biography authorised by himself and expounded by Edgar Snow; Rue completely ignores the CPC's documents and press of those years---the most valuable and reliable sources.
~^^2^^ Jenmin jihpao, April 27, 19G9.
203 outlines and works which gave an already falsified version of the history of the CPC and the PRC are now considered to be ``inadequate'' and said to "belittle the role of Mao Tse-tung and his ideas in the history of the CPC and the international communist movement.'' Because they mentioned just a few facts about the assistance of the Comintern and the CPSU to the CPC, the People's Republic of China and the Chinese revolution, their authors are accused in official publications of showing sympathy with "contemporary revisionism.'' The Maoist leadership's latest directive article, published on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, likewise outlined the Party's history without making any mention whatsoever of the international communist movement.~^^1^^Although Maoist and bourgeois historiographers may have different motives, they all exploit the fact that the events connected with the history of the Chinese Communist Party have been inadequately studied until recently in order to distort the real nature of the relations between the CPC and the international communist movement.
While examining in the present article the problems of the relationships of the CPC with the international communist movement, the authors have based themselves on recently published Soviet historical works which are the outcome of research into new factual material concerning the history of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party.^^2^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ Jenmin jihpao, July 1, 1971.
~^^2^^ See B. Liebzon, K. Shirinya, Turning Point in the
Comintern's Policy, M, 1965; Birth Centenary of Sun
__NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 205.
204
In the period of the Comintern's foundation and
formation, V. Lenin worked on the fundamentals
of the relationships of the international
communist movement with the communist and other
revolutionary forces in the colonial and dependent
countries in the new historical era ushered in by
the Great October Socialist Revolution. We shall recall the chief points of Lenin's
approach to the problems of the interaction between
the international communist movement and its
contingents and other revolutionary forces in the
Eastern countries. When he advanced the policy of establishing
the closest international ties between the
communist and working-class movement in the
developed countries and the communist and
nationalliberation movement in the East, Lenin was
proceeding from the fact that the efforts of the
Communists of various countries, and their policy of
international cohesion and mutual assistance
provided a means for realising the potentialities
_-_-_
__NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 204.
Yatsen, 1866--1966
At the same time, Lenin stressed that regulating that interaction and establishing stable international ties were by no means an easy process that would take place automatically. He maintained that in the colonial and dependent countries of the East, this process, together with the tremendous political development of their revolutionary forces, might bring about specific, `` secondary'' difficulties owing to the preponderance there of non-proletarian strata and to the various nationalistic prejudices of the masses. The experience of the first contacts with the representatives of various trends of national revolutionary forces in the Eastern countries brought Lenin to the conclusion that the involvement of the non-- proletarian masses there in revolutionary activity might, besides resulting in naked nationalism, prompt the representatives of these forces to ``repaint'' the non-proletarian liberation trends and platforms in the "colour of communism.''^^2^^ Lenin pointed to the possibility, under these circumstances, of a partial, distorted perception of the principles of the international communist movement, and of a mechanical adoption of certain tactical slogans without understanding their essence and the reason why they had been advanced in the first place.
The development of the revolutionary forces in China at all its stages and the history of the _-_-_
~^^1^^ See Lenin and the Comintern, M., 1970, p. 199.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 201.
206 Chinese Communist Party have borne out Lenin's prediction about the importance and character of the interaction of the international communist movement with its separate national contingents. The interaction and close ties of the CPC with the international communist movement, and the allround assistance it received from the Comintern and communist parties were a powerful impetus and one of the decisive prerequisites for the victory of the revolution in China. At the same time, Lenin's warning against the possibility of the Marxist doctrine being distorted by representatives of the nationalistic, non-proletarian forces provides a key to understanding the social and gnoseological roots of the theory and practice of Maoism.China's revolutionary movement of the 1920'' s40's bore the imprint of the directing theoretical, political and organisational activity of the Comintern. At the most important stages of the development of the Chinese revolution, the Comintern's assistance to the Chinese Communist Party and close connection with it, armed the Party with decisions and conclusions based on the achievements of the theoretical and political thought of the world communist and liberation movement. The young Communist Party of China was able to utilise in its struggle the experience of the Marxist-Leninist parties with the Comintern as their centre and forum, and rely on their support. That is an example of the big part played by the international factor in the formation and development of the communist parties and the communist movement in colonial and dependent countries. The foundation in July 1921 of the Chinese Communist Party at its First 207 Congress was the first major landmark of this interaction and represented the result of the tremendous work done by the first Chinese Marxists and the Comintern's envoys in order to disseminate the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the October Revolution, and to organise China's revolutionary forces that were attracted to Marxism. The first communist groups in China were founded with the direct organisational and other help of the Comintern. There can be no doubt that had the Comintern not provided assistance in the form of instructions, advice, funds, training of leaders, laborious political and organisational work in which its representatives engaged daily in China, the pre-foundation period in the history of the Chinese Communist Party would have dragged on for many years.~^^1^^
Without underestimating the role of the objective internal factors favouring the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in China, or the importance of the work and creative search of Chinese Communists, full credit must be given to the immense help of the Comintern and the CPSU in elaborating the theoretical and political foundations of the Marxist conception of the 1925--27 revolution in China, and in building up the Party during the period of the preparation and accomplishment of the revolution.
For the Chinese Communist Party, one of the most difficult aspects of the Chinese revolution was the theoretical and practical problem of combining and interrelating the national and class features of the revolutionary movement. To supplement the theses of the Comintern's Fourth _-_-_
~^^1^^ For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 242--299.
208 Congress on the Eastern question with reference to the conditions of China, the Comintern Executive Committee adopted, on January 12, 1923, a special resolution "On the Chinese Communist Party's Attitude Towards the Kuomintang,'' which proved the necessity for setting up a unified front in China and elaborated a concrete means by which this might be achieved-by the Communists' joining the Kuomintang while retaining the independence of the Chinese Communist Party.~^^1^^ For the first time the Comintern squarely faced the CPC with the peasant question. The Directive of the Comintern Executive Committee to the Third CPC Congress on January 12, 1923, stated: "The peasant question is the central issue of the entire policy. . . Only by placing the slogans of the antiimperialist front on an agrarian basis can we hope for real success.'' That is why the CPC, being the political leader of the masses in the unified front, "is obliged constantly to propel the Kuomintang towards an agrarian revolution." ^^2^^ In the same Directive, the Comintern raised the question of a people's liberation war in China against the militarists, feudal lords and foreign imperialists as a means of developing the Chinese democratic revolution. Proceeding from this general principle and replying to the request of Sun Yat-sen, the CPSU and the Soviet state actively helped the Kuomintang to build up the National Revolutionary Army of China, and to plan and carry out its operations. _-_-_~^^1^^ See The Comintern's Strategy and Tactics in the National-Colonial Revolution as Exemplified by China, M., 1934, pp. 112--113.
~^^2^^ Ibid., pp. 114--115.
__PRINTERS_P_209_COMMENT__ 14--193 209On the basis of Lenin's ideas contained in the resolutions that the Second and Fourth Congresses of the Comintern passed on the colonial question, the Comintern Executive Committee, in a number of directives to the CPC and in special resolutions on the Chinese question-particularly Resolutions VI (March 1926) and VII ( NovemberDecember 1926) of extended plenary meetingsgave profound theoretical backing and practical recommendations on such fundamental problems of the Chinese revolution as the character of a revolution and the place of the various classes in it, the hegemony of the proletariat and its allies, the agrarian question, the tactics of the united national front, the role and applicability of armed struggle, relationship of the national and class features of the revolution, and so on. A selfstyled theorist, Mao Tse-tung later arrogated some of these instructions to himself, distorting them in the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic manner.
The Comintern's help facilitated the spread and consolidation of internationalist ideas among the Chinese Communists and the shaping in its leadership of a communist internationalist group that resolutely combated any manifestations of nationalism and other anti-proletarian views in the Party. As a result of the interaction of the Communist Party of China and the international communist movement during the years of the formation of the CPC, and of the Comintern's consistent line towards a united front against both ``Left'' and Right vacillations in the ranks of the CPC, the Party had already become an important factor in the country's political life by the mid1920's, i.e., in the period of the 1925--27 revolution.
210The elaboration of the revolutionary strategy and tactics by the Chinese Communist Party in close cooperation with the Comintern was a prolonged and complex process in the course of which various conclusions and recommendations were tested in practice, incorrect or obsolete principles were cast aside, the successes of the revolution were summed up and the causes of its failures (especially in the period of struggle under the slogan of Soviets) analysed. In Marxist literature these matters are not made sufficiently clear because the events of this difficult, and at times contradictory, period in the history of the CPC have been but poorly studied.
Maoist historiography is largely responsible for that. In the official document of the Central Committee of the CPSU entitled "Resolutions on Some Questions in the History of Our Party,''~^^1^^ which set stereotyped patterns for all works on the history of the CPC published in China, the Maoists have crossed out all the Party's experience in those years, and under the pretext of criticising the "Wang Ming-Po Ku line" they virtually deny any positive role played by the Comintern in mapping out the strategy and tactics of the Chinese Communist Party. The Maoists assert that the Party leadership of those days, headed by Wang Ming and Po Ku, was ``unaware'' of the need to build up armed forces for the Party took a wrong approach to the agrarian question, and did not realise the importance of organising _-_-_
~^^1^^ Adopted by the Seventh Plenary Meeting (sixth convocation) of the CC CPG in April 1945, on the eve of the Seventh CPC Congress (see Mao Tse-tung, Scl. Works, London, 1956, Vol. 4, pp. 171--218.).
__PRINTERS_P_211_COMMENT__ 14* 211 revolutionary bases in the countryside and of the proper balance between the Party's work in town and country, i.e., it totally "failed to understand" and ``rejected'' the correct line of the Chinese revolution, allegedly already drawn up by Mao Tsetung in those years.Furthermore, after the event, the Maoists laid claim to the credit for having critically interpreted and summed up the rich and complicated experience of the revolutionary struggle in that period-credit that legitimately belongs to the international communist movement and to the Marxist-Leninist forces within the CPC. The Comintern, jointly with representatives of those MarxistLeninist forces, drew up a number of valuable conclusions and recommendations on the fundamental questions of the Party's strategy and tactics, whose practical implementation ensured the further development of the Party and its armed forces and the triumph of the revolution in China.~^^1^^
A major milestone in the cooperation between the international communist movement and the Chinese Communist Party in that period was the Sixth CPC Congress (June-July 1928), which took place in Moscow with the participation of the delegations of the Comintern Executive Committee and the communist parties of the Soviet Union and other countries. The Sixth Congress summed up the experience and lessons of the struggle of the CPC during the revolution of 1925--27 and gave a correct appraisal of its nature and present _-_-_
~^^1^^ For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 313-- 349.
212 stage of its development. Embracing all aspects of the Party's work, the decisions of the Congress became practically the first comprehensive programme of the Communist Party of China.~^^1^^ The ideas embodied in these decisions and their further development and realisation in the early 1930's became an integral part of the strategy and tactics of the CPC. Of paramount importance for all the subsequent activity of the Chinese Communist Party was the acceptance by the Congress of the Comintern's assessment of the Chinese revolution as a bourgeois-democratic one.^^2^^ This dealt a blow to the attempts of the Trotskyite and ``Leff'-sectarian elements within the Party to distort the immediate tasks of the revolutionary struggle and provided the soundly-based forces with a basis for combating the ``Left''-extremist tendencies that constantly showed up in the Party.After summing up the experience of the revolutionary struggle in China, the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of China, at the recommendation of the Comintern, adopted the tactics for the immediate future of making a retreat and rallying its forces in the towns, while waging fullscale guerrilla warfare and building up revolutionary bases (Soviet zones) and a Red Army in _-_-_
~^^1^^ The Sixth Congress passed the decision to prepare the official programme of the Party for the next congress. The decision, as everyone knows, remains unfulfilled up to this day (see Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the CPC, Book 6, Resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the CPC, M., 1930).
~^^2^^ In that period Mao Tse-tung believed that the revolution in China had entered the socialist stage (see Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the CPC, Book 2, M., 1930, pp. 80--81).
213 the countryside.~^^1^^ The experience of the revolutionary struggle at the time of the Sixth Congress was as yet uncapable of indicating how the revolution would proceed: whether the revolutionary struggle would centre in town (as the 1925--27 revolution did), or whether the revolutionary forces would rally at their bases in the countryside. Subsequent developments showed that despite the temporary abatement of the revolutionary movement in the towns, the revolutionary bases and armed forces of the Party in many rural areas gained strength.In 1930--31 the Comintern, having analysed this situation never before witnessed by the revolutionary movement, boldly mapped out new ways of development for the Chinese revolution. The letter of the Comintern Executive Committee to the CC CPC regarding the Li Li-san doctrines (September 1930) and the resolution of the Comintern Executive Committee Presidium on the tasks of the Communist Party of China (August 1931) set out the chief task as that of reinforcing the Red Army, which "shall become the centre for rallying and organising the revolutionary forces and the key lever for heightening the entire revolutionary movement...''; they proposed the idea of "encircling the towns, including the major and largest ones, by a ring of peasant revolts." ^^2^^ These objectives, based on the Comintern's _-_-_
~^^1^^ That course was endorsed in the resolutions on the agrarian revolution, the peasant movement and on the building of Soviet zones and the Red Army (see Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Hook 6).
~^^2^^ The Comintern's Strategy and Tactics in the NationalColoninl Revolution as Exemplified by China, pp. 289, 296.
214 recommendations, were formulated in the CC CPC decisions of April 4, 1932: "The specific feature of the Chinese revolution is manifested in the fact that the proletariat is leading the masses and extending Soviet power from the countryside to the towns, and from small towns to big cities.''~^^1^^ These Comintern and CPC documents demonstrate the inconsistency of Maoist historiography's assertions that the course towards unfolding the revolution in rural areas and towards encircling the towns by the revolutionary countryside was advanced by Mao Tse-tung to counter the allegedly erroneous lines of the CPC leadership of those days. Contrary to the Comintern's course towards achieving proletarian leadership in the Chinese revolution, Mao Tse-tung made an absolute of the importance of peasant war and in effect rejected the idea of proletarian leadership. Today the Maoists are trying to extend their anti-- Marxist views on the importance of the peasant war in China to the world revolutionary process.A big part in building up the armed forces of the Communist Party of China was played by the Comintern's recommendations (worked out by the organisers of the armed forces of the CPC and Soviet Communists-experienced military leaders) concerning the foundations for the formation, the strategy and tactics of China's Red Army and the principles of its relations with the population. The implementation of these recommendations allowed the Chinese Communist Party, in 1932--33, _-_-_
~^^1^^ CC CPC resolution "On Opportunist Vacillations in the Party's Ranks Over the Question of the Primary Victory of the Chinese Revolution," Materials on the Third ``Left'' Line, Collected Documents and Materials, Vol. 1, Peking, 1957, p. 85) (Chinese ed.).
215 to become a major political as well as military force.The Comintern's help in exploring the agrarian and peasant question was particularly important for the Communist Party of China, which from 1927 to 1949 operated mainly in rural areas. The decisions of the Party's Sixth Congress on the agrarian question and the peasant movement~^^1^^ were the first comprehensive, scientifically-based platform of the Party. On the whole, the policy on the agrarian-peasant question, laid down in the CPC decisions and Comintern recommendations in the late 1920's-early 1930's, served the Chinese Communist Party as a reliable guide throughout the subsequent period of its revolutionary activity in the countryside. It was precisely these decisions and the experience of these years (the principles of determining class appurtenance, etc.) that formed the basis of the Party's decisions on agrarian reorganisation in the late 1940's-early 1950's.~^^2^^
The Party's attention to the agrarian-peasant question, its organisational work in preparing the peasantry for the agrarian revolution, and the development in the countryside of bodies of power, armed forces, the economy, educational and other institutions, resulted in the fact that by the mid1930's it had accumulated abundant experience as practically the ruling party. This experience became one of the chief sources of strength for _-_-_
~^^1^^ See Policy Documents of Communist Parties in tlte East, M., 1934, pp. 34--51; Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Book 6.
~^^2^^ In 1947--48, several documents of the early 1930's were re-issued in full to be used as a guide for the agrarian reform.
216 the Party and one of the requisites for its victory.The Seventh Congress of the Comintern (1935) and its historic decisions opened up a new stage in the development of the world communist and national-liberation movements. Its decisions also signified a turning point in the development of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolution. The policy of the united national front brought the Communist Party allies from the population at large and turned it into a powerful political force. During the period from the Seventh Congress of the Comintern to the victory of the people's revolution in 1949, the CPC grew into a more than three-million party, having at its disposal a strong army, vast liberated areas, and enjoying the support of the masses and of the entire international communist movement, particularly the Soviet Union and the CPSU.
The fulfilment of the decisions of the Comintern's Seventh Congress proceeded in the face of a fierce struggle between the internationalist forces and the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic forces within the CPC.~^^1^^ This was because there was a massive flow of peasants, petty-bourgeois elements and former members of the exploiting classes into the Party (they totalled more than 90 per cent of its membership by 1945), and to the weakness of the proletarian core and the preponderance of nationalistically-minded elements in the Party leadership.
The struggle within the Party immediately centred on the attitude towards the Comintern's directives and decisions and on the correlation of the national and international tasks of the _-_-_
^^1^^ For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 350--379.
217 liberation movement in China. The Chinese Communist-internationalists, one of whose leaders was Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu), defended the course aimed at the unification of all potential allies into a single national front for struggle against Japanese imperialism. They interwove into a single whole the national and international tasks of the Chinese revolution, regarding the cohesion and support of all contingents of the international communist movement as the most important factor for the victory of the revolution in every individual country, particularly in China.The nationalistic, petty-bourgeois^forces within the Chinese Communist Party, with MaS'Tse-tung as their spokesman, took a chauvinist, egoistic approach to the question of internationalism and international support. For quite a long time, especially when the Party's own forces were relatively small (1935--37), they contended that a direct armed attack by the Soviet Union together with the Communist Party of China against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek would be the best international help to the Chinese revolution and the world revolutionary process. They were not much interested in the Soviet Union's fate in the face of the growing threat of attack by Nazi Germany, or in the fate of the international anti-fascist camp and the united national anti-Japanese front in China itself. During the Second World War, the nationalistic forces within the Chinese Communist Party sought to make the best of international support not so much for waging war against Japanese imperialism as for preserving and increasing their own armed forces.
The development cf the Chinese revolution after the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, and 218 until its victory in 1949, proved that, despite all the attempts of Mao's nationalistic leadership of the CPC to steer the liberation struggle along the "specific Chinese path,'' the revolutionary movement in China triumphed as part of the world liberation process. This was practical confirmation of the universal applicability of Marxist-Leninist teaching and the importance of the united action of all the contingents of the world communist movement.
The victory of the Chinese revolution was the result of the alliance between the international communist movement and the national-liberation, mainly peasant, movement in China. This alliance materialised in the form of the ideological and political support given to the CPC and the Chinese revolution by the international communist movement, as well as in economic, moral, military and diplomatic assistance from the Soviet Union and later on from the People's Democracies.
The victory of the revolution in China became possible as a result of the radical changes that took place in the international situation after the Second World War. The aggressive forces of imperialism were checked by the unprecedented might and prestige of the Soviet Union, the formation of the world socialist system and by the powerful upsurge of the communist and nationalliberation movements in the world. The only imperialist power that had gained in strength at the time-the USA-was compelled under the circumstances to refrain from direct military intervention in China. Besides, it was more concerned with the rehabilitation of capitalist Europe, where 219 the influence of the communist parties had increased.
The victory of the people's revolution in China was made possible by the execution of the fundamental strategic plans jointly worked out by the Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party to give impetus to the liberation movement (the policy of the united national front; the peasant movement as the main part of the democratic revolution in China; the leadership of the Communist Party in the peasants' armed struggle as the basic factor for the victory of the revolution; the alliance of the Chinese liberation movement with the international proletariat and primarily with the USSR and the socialist camp). So the Chinese people won their historic victory against domestic reaction and the foreign forces of imperialism in close fraternal unity with and assistance of the forces of the world communist movement.
The carrying out of the basic tasks of the people's democratic revolution in the interests of the working people as a whole paved the way for China's advancement along the socialist path. The successes scored by China in the early years of the people's power-when increased fraternal help was coming from the Soviet Union, when there was all-round cooperation between the two countries and their parties, and when there was wide publicity in China of the Soviet example and experience-created a favourable situation for the further growth of the proletarian, Marxist-- Leninist forces and tendencies inside the Chinese Communist Party. On the other hand, the Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist trend in the Party as yet lacked a firm foothold to mount a counteroffensive. It was manoeuvring, biding time, 220 accumulating strength and searching for a stratagem suited to the new historical situation. This enabled the Party's internationalist forces, with the support of the CPSU and the world communist movement, to take the initiative and put the Party and country on the path of socialism.
The Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China (September 1956) was a significant event in the life of the Party and the Chinese people. It summed up the experience of one of the largest communist parties over a long period, during which the people's revolution had triumphed and the first achievements in socialist construction had been made. At the time of the Eighth Congress the CPC had 10,700,000 members and candidate members (14 per cent of them workers, 69 per cent peasants, 12 per cent intellectuals).~^^1^^ Such a composition was bound to affect its ideology, policy and activity. The petty-bourgeois, nationalistic tendencies in the Party continued to exist and develop covertly. The fate of socialism in China depended on the outcome of the struggle between the nationalistic tendencies and the proletarian, internationalist forces. And the outcome could not but affect the interests of the international communist movement as a whole.
The main feature of the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC is that they endorsed the Party's general line towards socialist construction in conformity with the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, on the basis of close cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance with the world socialist community and all progressive, _-_-_
~^^1^^ Sec Materials of the Eighth All-China Congress of the Communist Parly of China, M., 1956, p. 65.
221 revolutionary trends of the day. The consistent realisation of the socialist programme hammered out by the Eighth Congress was to ensure for China continuing social progress and a speedy growth of the productive forces, which meant a better standard of living for the working people as a whole.In the years between 1949 and 1957, the People's Republic of China, following the basic principles of building socialist society, and relying on the help and international solidarity of the socialist countries and their parties, made the first substantial steps towards the construction of socialism. But this was fiercely opposed by the petty-bourgeois forces and trends. The development of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese People's Republic in that period was not straightforward, but highly complicated, contradictory and confused. By the end of the period there was an unmistakable growth of the pettybourgeois, nationalistic trends, which the Party was incapable of overcoming.
In the late 1950's and early 1960's, the nationalistic forces interfered with the Party's constructive interaction with the international communist movement, its course of development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and its pursuance of the concerted line of the international communist movement. They imposed the "big leap" policy on the Party by exploiting, on the one hand, certain weaknesses in the Party (the disunity of its organisations, feeble democratism, the personality cult of Mao Tse-tung, etc.), and, on the other, by making great use of avantgardist slogans when the country was in a state of animation and indulging in nationalistic distortions 222 of the true causes of the successes of the People's Republic. The basic features of the Mao group's ``special'' course were the opposition of the policy of the CPC to the concerted line of the fraternal parties and the attempt to revise its fundamental precepts. Soviet party and political literature quite comprehensively and explicitly shows the sources, causes and essence of that ``special'' course in the PRC's domestic and foreign policy as a continuation in the new conditions of the confrontation between the two lines, the two trends inside the Communist Party of China.~^^1^^ The ``special'' course and its consequences (sharp economic and political crisis) ultimately led to the "cultural revolution" and initiated a new stage in the intra-Party struggle.
An analysis of the Chinese Communist Party's complex development, especially after the advancement of the ``special'' course, prompts certain conclusions concerning the attitude of the various forces within the CPC to interaction with the international communist movement, and concerning the influence of the international communist movement on the positions of different forces within the CPC. The intricate composition of the CPC and the numerical preponderance of members of non-proletarian background, influenced by all sorts of nationalistic and pseudo-socialist _-_-_
^^1^^ Sec B. Xancgin, A. Mironov, Ya. Mikhailov, On Events in China M., 1967; Roots of the Present Events in China; A. Bovin, L. Delyusin, 'The Political Crisis in China, M., 1968; Perilous Course, Collection of Articles, M., 1969; The Anti-Imperialist Essence of the Views and Policy of Mao Tse-tung, M., 1969; Yu. Yaremenko, The "Big Leap" and "People's Communes" in China, M., 1969; Foreign Policy of the Chinese People's Republic, M., 1971.
223 theories, brought about differences in the approach to the platform and policy of the international communist movement within the CPC. These differences, with all their shades, may be classified into two major categories.The genuine internationalists in the ranks of the CPC-Li Ta-chao, Chang Tai-lei, Chu Chiu-po, Yun Tai-ying, Su Chao-cheng, Teng Chung-hsia, Peng Pai and many others who had made a decisive contribution to the dissemination in China of Marxist-Leninist ideas and implanted internationalist traditions in the Party with the aim of mastering Marxist-Leninist theory and using it as a basis for the political line of the CPC-- proceeded from the fact that Marxism-Leninism is a universal internationalist doctrine. Boldly raising the problems of the specific development of the working-class and peasant movement in China, and taking account of the special role of the particular forms of political struggle and of the special features of the Party's formation and activity, they never considered these special features to be justification for renouncing the combination of the national and international tasks of the Communist Party of China and those of the world communist movement as a whole. When combating nationalism and chauvinism in the Party and elsewhere, they based themselves on their conviction in the unity of all contingents of the world communist movement. They have always maintained that the most important factor for the favourable development of the Chinese revolution is solidarity with the international communist movement and support from the Soviet people.
The nationalistic forces had a different attitude 224 to international unity and interaction with the fraternal parties, and to assistance from the Comintern, the CPSU and the Soviet Government. In the course of the history of the CPC, they have worn all sorts of disguises, ranging from an attempt to receive help unilaterally from the Comintern, the CPSU and other fraternal parties, to an almost unconcealed attempt to play on the contradictions between the forces of socialism, democracy and progress on the one hand, and international imperialism on the other. They have always regarded the world communist movement and the forces of socialism, whose help they sought to use in furtherance the nationalisticallyunderstood interests of China, as a ``third'' force.
As early as the 1920's and 1930's, various avantgardist theories and platforms became a characteristic ideological cover for such nationalistic view in the CPC. For example, Cheng Chaolin, subsequently expelled from the Party for his Trotskyite views, put forward the idea of transferring the centre of the world revolution to China.~^^1^^ In 1930 a group of CPC leaders headed by Li Li-san, propagated and tried to carry through a programme according to which the Chinese revolution was to become the main seat, the ``pillar'' of the world revolution. Li Li-san and his followers counted on an "international war" by which they hoped to ``prompt'' the world revolution, thereby ``guaranteeing'' the successful development of the revolution in China. Mao Tsetung too backed up these views.~^^2^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ See Hsian Dao, No. 128, November 7, 1925, p. 1182.
~^^2^^ For details of the leftist platform emerging in the CPC in 1930, see Letter of the Comintern Executive Committee __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 226. __PRINTERS_P_225_COMMENT__ 15--193 225
The ``special'' course persistently imposed by the Mao group on the Party and the country ever since the late 1950's has hidden under its avantgardist veil all the elements involved in the nationalistic approach to relations with the forces of world socialism and the international communist movement.
However, the policy of the nationalistic forces in the CPC could not completely destroy the influence exercised by the ideological and political platform of the international communist movement, and by its experience and its recommendations, on the political and ideological positions of the Party.
The status of the CPC as a section of the Comintern and, more important, the entire course of the Chinese revolution-which had borne out the correctness of the Comintern's main conclusions and recommendations relating to the strategy and tactics of the Communist Party of China-the high prestige of the Comintern and the CPSU among the majority of Chinese Communists played an important role in that even the nationalistic elements in the Party's leadership had to take the Comintern's experience and recommendations into account when choosing the Party's political course. Yet the nationalists were either unable to, or did not want to, assimilate entirely the platform of the international communist movement, although they adopted, employed and "crammed,'' as Lenin put it, certain tactical slogans. Inside the Party, covertly or _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 225. to the CC CPC Regarding the Li Li-san Doctrines; The Comintern's Strategy and Tactics in the National-Colonial Revolution as Exemplified by China, p. 290; The Comintern and the East, pp. 313--349.
226 openly, clumsy conceptions and theories were advanced that exaggerated the importance of various aspects of the situation in China and the experience of the Chinese Communist Party, giving a narrow interpretation of the results of the Party's work and those of the entire revolutionary process in the country-an interpretation that took no account of objective factors, both national and international. On the other hand, the pursuance of the political courses mapped out by the international communist movement facilitated the advancement of the CPC in the general current of revolutionary struggle and at times veiled the real attitude of the nationalists within its ranks towards Marxism-Leninism and the general platform of the international communist movement.The history of the Communist Party of China shows that in the periods when the Party's international ties were weakened (either as a result of objective causes or vacillations in its leadership), the nationalist forces within the Party increased their activity. That was precisely the case in 1934--35, when the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, during the retreat from Kiangsi in the north-west of the country, had no liaison with the Comintern for some time. The same is true of the period of the Second World War, especially the years of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people.
The nationalists knew that, in order to improve their own position in the Party, it was necessary to weaken the Party's ties with the international communist movement and to lessen the influence of its platform and experience on the Party. The offensives of the nationalistic forces were always __PRINTERS_P_227_COMMENT__ 15* 227 accompanied by attacks, camouflaged or open, on the line of the international communist movement, and by their attempts to discredit and distort it. Li Li-san and his followers imposed their platform under the slogan "The Comintern misunderstands the situation in China.'' The advent of the Mao group to the Party leadership in the late 1930's-early 1940's was likewise accompanied by attacks on the Comintern's platform, which were masked by criticism of the "Wang Ming-Po Ku line,'' and by the calls to "do away with foreign patterns" and to "give Marxism a Chinese interpretation.'' The new stage of the offensive by the nationalistic forces in the CPC in the late 1950's, and their imposition on the Party of the "big leap" and "people's communes" course, were also prepared and accompanied first by covert, and then by more and more open `` criticism'' of the international experience of socialist construction, of the concerted foreign policy course followed by the socialist countries, and of the international communist movement's concerted general line enshrined in the Declarations and Statements adopted by the Moscow Meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957 and 1960. The Maoists concentrated their attacks on the USSR and the CPSU because, as Communists all over the world have correctly noted, the Peking leaders regard the prestige of the USSR and the CPSU as the chief obstacle to the spread of their ideas and influence. At the same time, the attacks on the CPSU were meant to pave the way for revising the general line of the world communist movement.
The historical experience of the CPC prompts another important conclusion. Up to 1957, the 228 ties of the CPC with the CPSU and other communist parties, the stand of its internationalist forces and the striving of most of its leaders to rely on the help of world socialism, created the necessary external and domestic conditions for wiping out the avantgardist and nationalistic trends and the resulting sharp crises within the Party. The departure of the Party's leaders in the late 1950's from the concerted line of the international communist movement gave the nationalist forces considerable freedom of action.
That conclusion is borne out by the lessons of the intra-Party struggle during the last decade, and by the course and results of the massive Maoist onslaught on the Communist Party of China, called the "cultural revolution.'' Soviet publications have dealt at length with the causes, development and results of the "cultural revolution.''~^^1^^ We should like only to emphasise that one of the causes of the severe defeat suffered by the Party was the vacillation of a considerable number of its leaders (including those who became victims of the "cultural revolution'') on the fundamental questions of the general line, and their departure, temporary though it may have been, from a number of its basic principles. This circumstance enabled the Mao group gradually to oppose the Party's platform to the general line of the international communist movement, to isolate the anti-Maoists in the Party from the international movement, and to carry out the ideological re-orientation of the country's population, _-_-_
~^^1^^ See The Present Situation in China and tlic CPC, Kommunist, No. 4, 19G9; Policy of the Mao Tse-tung Group on the International Arena, Kommunist, No. 5, 1969.
229 especially the young people who were later charged with the task of destroying the leading bodies of the Party. __*_*_*__The history of the Communist Party of China over these past years shows that its departure and self-isolation from the international communist movement and from its general line and experience, led to serious mistakes in the Party's activity, to great intra-Party crises and damage, and to the loss of revolutionary gains. The way out of the critical situation in which the CPC found itself as a result of the actions of the Maoist group is to restore relations with the international communist and working-class movement, to return to the latter's concerted line, and to base the Party's entire activity on Marxism-- Leninism. The fifty-year development of the Communist Party of China has borne out the importance and relevance of the Leninist proposition that.. . "The urgency of the struggle against. . . the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois national prejudices, looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of the task of converting the dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e., existing in a single country and incapable of determining world politics) into an international one (i.e., a dictatorship of the proletariat involving at least several advanced countries, and capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a whole).''~^^1^^ While combating Maoism as the ideological and political trend of petty-- bourgeois nationalism, it is essential first of all to see _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 31, p. 148.
230 that it is incompatible with the objectives of the world communist and liberation movements and with those of the Chinese Communist Party's development along the socialist path.That is why the 24th Congress of the CPSU, which fully approved the principled Leninist course and the steps taken by the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government in Soviet-Chinese relations, noted: "In a situation in which the Chinese leaders came out with their own specific ideological-political platform, which is incompatible with Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist countries and at creating a split of the international communist and the whole anti-- imperialist movement, the CC CPSU has taken the only correct stand-a stand of consistently defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening of the unity of the world communist movement, and protection of the interests of our socialist Motherland.''~^^1^^ The Congress also endorsed the consistent course of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union towards normalising relations between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic and establishing good-- neighbourliness and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples: "Improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would meet the vital, long-term interests of both countries, the interests of world socialism, the interests of intensifying the struggle against imperialism.''~^^2^^
Voprosy htorii, No. 8, 1971
_-_-_~^^1^^ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Documents, APN Publishing House, M., 1971, p. 212.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 213.
231 __ALPHA_LVL2__ Regarding Peking-WashingtonI. Alexandrou
As has been reported, talks were recently held in Peking between Premier Chou En-lai and the US President's adviser Kissinger. During the talks, Chou En-lai, on behalf of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic, invited President Nixon to visit China, and the invitation was accepted.
Addressing American televiewers. President Nixon called his forthcoming trip to Peking a visit in the name of peace. He declared that the purpose of the planned meeting was to establish new relations with China, adding that this decision would do no harm to America's "old friends,'' and was not directed against any country.
Nixon's statement is being cited by circles close to the Administration as an expression of Washington's ``peace-making'' policy. Yet, there is a big difference between the preaching and practice of the US ruling circles. In deeds the United States continues the aggressive war in Indochina, supports the Israeli extremists, and hinders a relaxation of tension in Europe. It is not any accident that many people in the United States itself view the contacts with Peking as a continuation of this reactionary anti-communist line.
In China there have been no official comments on Nixon's forthcoming visit. Anti-imperialist sentiments continue to be expressed and loud assurances are given about support for the anti-- imperialist movement of nations. At the same time, the 232 anti-Soviet policy and the ``splitting'' activities against the anti-imperialist, revolutionary forces do not cease.
The confidential Sino-American talks, the agreement on the US President's visit to China and its possible consequences for international developments-all this has given rise to lively discussion in the world press. Some sections of the world public apprehended such a far-reaching advance in Chinese-American contacts as a great sensation.
Such a reaction to the news can probably be explained by the fact that the true political intentions of the two countries are veiled by a dense propaganda screen and that the declarations and statements of the two governments are quite often in complete contradiction to their actual political line. All this time Peking is known to have been calling for an uncompromising fight against US imperialism, and for the overthrow of the Nixon Administration, while the United States has just as demonstratively boycotted the People's China and supported the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan.
In the press and speeches, statesmen and public leaders have voiced the most diverse opinions and very often given contrasting assessments of the Peking-Washington contacts.
Still, a great many of the views expressed have had one thing in common-satisfaction at the opportunity to normalise relations between the Chinese People's Republic and the United States However, the reasons behind this satisfaction vary considerably.
Some say that the recognition by Washington of the PRC signifies a turn towards realism in the policy of the US Administration. It is also noted 233 that the invitation extended to President Nixon to visit Peking apparently means a desire on the part of the Chinese leadership to secure a special position in the international arena by means of a detente with a number of capitalist states, and a prompt one with the United States.
Reactionary anti-communist quarters link with the Chinese-American contacts the hopes to undermine the unity of the anti-imperialist forces and weaken the position of world socialism.
The most reactionary press of the USA interprets the President's forthcoming visit as a foreign policy manoeuvre dictated by the aims and interests of anti-communism. The New York Daily News wrote with utter cynicism about the hope that President Nixon had been pursuing a far-- reaching Machiavellian policy of setting Red China and Red Russia against each other.
The US big press is not quite as frank but, nevertheless, outspoken enough in its comments on the direction of Washington's strategy. The New York Times wrote that the White House would like to capitalise on the coinciding intention of both Peking and Washington (although the latter has its own, special reasons) so as to bring pressure to bear on the USSR and its foreign policy. The newspaper quotes Washington officials who allege that Nixon's visit to Peking will become a turning point in US diplomacy and that the Chinese leaders are worthy partners in such an affair. The New York Post reported that Washington's present contacts with Peking had been the result of the strategic decision that neither China's interests nor her potential capabilities were a threat to American might and influence and that Moscow was the only real danger.
234The US bourgeois press also notes that Peking's invitation has done Nixon a good turn in his electoral campaign and has helped him to elude the demands that serious consideration should be given to the new peace initiative of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and an end should be put to the dirty US war in Vietnam.
While giving its approval to Washington's and Peking's move, the West-European bourgeois press expresses anxiety that Washington does not hesitate to solve its problems at the expense of its allies in military-political blocs and to disregard them by flirting with China. The London Times remarks that the ideological dispute between Washington and Peking has been put aside by both and that the nationalistic interests have taken the upper hand. The West German press, along with the enthusiastic comments of the extreme right-wing newspapers of the Springer concern, refers to the hegemonic, global aspirations of the United States and points out that Washington's move "has dealt a blow at the Third World countries.''
The progressive press stresses that the peoples would like the Sino-American contacts to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the consolidation of peace, but notes at the same time that both sides give more than sufficient evidence to cause serious doubts about their real intentions.
Rude Pravo, organ of the Central Commitec of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, writes:
``As to the attempt to normalise relations between the Chinese People's Republic and the United States, the world public is unanimous that such 235 an act, which, incidentally, has been urged ever since 1969, could only be welcomed if it meant a policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. For, indeed, it has been the absurd policy of the United States for many years to ignore the existence of a new social system in China.''
The Hungarian Nepszabadsag notes that the peoples and the governments of the socialist countries more than anyone else have exerted efforts to secure a firm and lasting peace. The socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, have, for over 20 year, been defending the interests of the Chinese people, urging international recognition of the PRC and the restoration of its lawful rights in the United Nations. The newspaper says that anti-Sovietism is a platform on which the ChineseAmerican detente is taking place.
``It is difficult to predict how the relations between the USA and China will develop in the future,'' writes the Polish Trybuna Ludu. "One thing is, however, clear: China's departure from the socialist community and the departure of the Communist Party of China from the world communist movement were meant, above all, to clear the way for broader contacts with the imperialist states and the United States in particular.''
The Bulgarian News Agency in a commentary published by Rabotnichesko Delo says: "The implications of the contemplated rapprochement are becoming clearer against the political background on which it is taking place. On the one hand, this is a deliberate anti-communist US policy whose essence, just as of the entire policy of imperialism, is aggressiveness towards the socialist community and particularly towards its leading force, the 236 Soviet Union. On the other hand, this is the policy of rabid anti-Soviet propaganda conducted by the Chinese leaders and their efforts to split the international communist and working-class movement and weaken the anti-imperialist front. Under such circumstances the question can be raised: Isn't it the intention to join forces along a definite direction-an intention having nothing in common with a genuine concern for peace and international understanding-that underlies the desire for ' normalisation'?''
Commenting on the US President's forthcoming visit to China, the communist press, together with the entire progressive press, speculates on what effect this step will have on the situation in Indochina.
L'Humanite, the newspaper of the French Communist Party, emphasises that it is US imperialism that is committing aggression in Indochina and has inspired the reign of terror in Indonesia. The American imperialists waged a scorched-earth war in Korea, and they were the authors of the notorious "Guam doctrine" which sets Asians against Asians. "The policy of US imperialism, which is opposed to a relaxation of international tensions,'' says the newspaper, "depends on differences among the anti-imperialist forces.''
President Nixon's decision to visit China, says Akahata, the Japanese Communist Party newspaper, means the bankruptcy of the aggressive US policy in Indochina. The present rapprochement with China, according to the newspaper, is a typical example of the divide-and-rule policy.
No one should be deceived about Mr. Nixon's motives, says the Morning Star, the newspaper of the British Communists. As before, he is the 237 leadcr of an imperialist power waging a brutal aggressive war in Indochina. One of Nixon's goals is to provoke still greater differences between the socialist countries, the newspaper remarks.
In its editorial on July 19, 1971, the Vietnamese Nhan Dan wrote that the implementation of the Nixon doctrine had led to the intensified military activity of US imperialism in that region of the world. The newspaper added that the US policy was aimed at scraping together an alliance of counter-revolutionary forces in every region and also at splitting the socialist countries.
``Nixon's policy," Nhan Dan pointed out, "has ended in failure. It is driven into a corner. The whole of the United States and all the world loudly demand: End the aggressive war in Vietnam immediately and bring all US soldiers home! Finding himself in this predicament, Nixon began a feverish search for a way out. But he went in the wrong direction. The door for exit was open, but he has entered a blind alley.''
The Daily World of the US Communists, referring to the Peking-Washington contacts, writes that the contradiction between the motives and aims proclaimed by Nixon, and the real policy and actions, gave rise to natural suspicions.
The Lebanese Al-Nida remarks that the interest of the West in China was growing as the Peking leadership stepped up its anti-Soviet, divisionist tactics.
The progressive press of Asian, African and Latin American countries assesses the moves towards a Peking-Washington rapprochement as testifying to the hegemonistic aspirations of the ruling quarters of both powers. It is pointed out that the talks about Nixon's official visit to China help to expose 238 the Maoist propaganda which served to camouflage the moves taken by the Chinese leaders to reach an understanding with imperialism. The Cairo AlGoumhouria says that the forthcoming visit to Peking cloaks the intention of US diplomacy to divide the anti-imperialist camp and, above all, drive a wedge between the USSR and the People's China.
Thus, the world comments on the Chinese-- American negotiations reflect the attitude of modern political and class forces to the basis and aims of the detente between Washington and Peking. All the progressive, peace-loving forces are watching closely the manoeuvres of certain circles which would like to use the normalisation of ChineseAmerican relations to the detriment of socialism, of the international communist and workers' movement, and of the peoples which are fighting imperialist aggression.
The Soviet Union does not see in the ChineseAmerican contacts any cause for sensation. Soviet people regard the contacts from the viewpoint of the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the international situation and of the basic tendencies of world development that was made at the 24th CPSU Congress. The congress clearly defined the Soviet Union's policy in its relations with the Chinese People's Republic and the United States, and international developments confirm the correctness of this policy. The Soviet Communist Party and state support the normalising of relations between the USSR and the PRC and the restoring of friendship between the two peoples, which would be in the interests of both countries, of world socialism and would help to step up the struggle against imperialism. But the Soviet Union is waging a 239 consistent struggle against the anti-Leninist platform of the Chinese leadership, and its splitting tactics aimed at undermining the anti-imperialist front, the socialist community and the world communist and workers' movement. It rejects the great-power chauvinistic policy of Peking and the slanderous fabrications of Chinese propaganda about the policy of the Soviet Communist Party and state.
The Soviet Union unswervingly implements the principle of peaceful coexistence. It is ready to develop relations with the USA as well if this is in the interests of the Soviet and American peoples and the interests of universal peace. But the Soviet Union will continue to oppose firmly the aggressive actions of the USA and the policy of force. Together with the revolutionary, anti-- imperialist front, the USSR will continue the struggle to curb aggressors and frustrate their dangerous schemes.
The Soviet Union, in close cooperation with the fraternal socialist states, consistently pursues the Leninist foreign policy for consolidating peace, security, freedom and the independence of nations, and the positions of world socialism. Proof of this is the support and all-round assistance that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries give to the heroic people of Vietnam, the patriots of Laos and Cambodia, the peoples of the Arab East and to all the peoples in their just liberation struggle. The Soviet Union believes that the well-known proposals put forward by the DRV Government, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the United National Front of Cambodia and the Patriotic Front of Laos are a constructive and realistic basis for solving 240 the Indochina problem. The Soviet people support these proposals.
Future developments will reveal more clearly the actual intentions of Peking and Washington. The Soviet Communist Party and state will take into account all the possible consequences of the Sino-American contacts. Any hopes Peking and Washington may entertain of using these contacts to bring pressure to bear on the USSR or the states of the socialist community are unrealistic.
The Soviet Union believes that political decisions should be aimed, not at complicating the international situation, but at easing tensions. Undoubtedly, the long-term interests of the Chinese and American peoples, just as the interests of all peoples, call for decisions which would strengthen peace and security, and not for political plotting against other states. As history shows, such plots eventually turn against those who sponsored them.
The Soviet Union, as in the past, is ready to cooperate actively with all states, including the PRC and the USA, in the name of universal peace and the freedom, independence, progress and prosperity of nations.
Pravda, July 25, 1971
__PRINTERS_P_241_COMMENT__ 16--193 [241] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Questions Requiring an AnswerG. Arbatov
The news of the forthcoming visit of the US President to Peking has lost its novelty. At first a sensation, it is now a matter for businesslike discussion of a question of considerable public interest. People would like to know what effect the change in US-Chinese relations, which is in the air, will have on the world situation. Will it lead to a lessening of tension and normalisation of international relations, or will it merely further sharpen the conflicts that are tearing the world, and cause new ones?
President Nixon's projected visit to Peking, as far as it goes, does not give grounds for definite conclusions about the future of US-Chinese relations and their effect on world developments. Nevertheless some ideas are already suggesting themselves.
To begin with, it would be interesting to take a look at the forces in the USA that are behind the tendency for a change in that country's policy towards China, a tendency which became apparent some time ago.
At first glance, this all seems quite straightforward. US policy vis-a-vis China began to change when the unfriendliness of China's leaders towards the Soviet Union, and their attempts to split the revolutionary and liberation movements, revealed 242 themselves. This, however, does not mean that all Americans are in favour of improving US-Chinese relations solely for the reason that such a course is counter to the interests of the other socialist countries.
The matter is not as simple as it might seem. Without doubt, the factor just mentioned is largely responsible for the shifts in official US policy and in the views of some of those US statesmen who, only a short while ago, were ready to call a traitor anyone advocating recognition of the Chinese People's Republic and an end to US enmity towards China and the Chinese people. Today many of these statesmen have turned into ardent advocates of detente with China. And this, naturally, gives some food for thought. It also cannot be ignored that detente with China is being welcomed in many countries by bitter adversaries of the Soviet Union, including counter-revolutionary emigrants from socialist countries and Zionist militants.
At the same time, there are also people of a different kind in the USA who stand for better relations with China. Progressive people in America have long objected to the cold-war policy of their government. Supporting efforts directed towards peace, they have been demanding an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist states, China included.
Progressive Americans have been really alarmed and disappointed by what has taken place in China in recent years, notably the slide of the Chinese leadership into nationalistic and chauvinistic positions in foreign policy. While expressing doubts as to the motives behind the projected changes in their country's official policy at the present time, they nevertheless believe that changes are __PRINTERS_P_243_COMMENT__ 16* 243 necessary. They consider that the United States must change its attitude to China and recognise the country's right to be installed in the United Nations, and that it must put an end to its cold-war policies directed against the USSR, China, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba, etc. Moreover, progressive circles in the United States fully realise that the hard trials which have fallen to the lot of the Chinese people, and for which the Peking leadership must bear the main responsibility, are partly the result of the imperialist policy of isolating China and putting obstacles in the way of her peaceful construction.
Such are the two extreme poles of the rather motley collection of trends and attitudes which support the change in US policy towards China.
But it is not only a change in the attitudes which can be discerned at the poles of the USA's political life that is concerned. A change is also to be seen in the attitudes of the US public at large. This is due, to a certain extent, to the active campaign for better relations with China which all progressive people have been waging for many years. Furthermore, confronted with troubles of both an international and a domestic nature, the US public is growing increasingly aware of the need to put an end to the cold-war policy and achieve a detente. This fact cannot be ignored by the US ruling circles.
But this is not the whole story. There is also the matter of the changes which are taking place in bourgeois public opinion which is generally shaped by official propaganda. After its hatred campaign against China, which had gone on for many years, this propaganda changed its tone and direction. It is impossible not to associate this change 244 with China's switch-over to anti-Sovietism and with its policies aimed at splitting the revolutionary liberation movement.
It might have been expected that bourgeois elements in the US would be shocked by the " cultural revolution" with its excesses, by Peking's support of all leftist adventuristic forces and extremist groupings in different countries, including the USA itself, by its propaganda moves against peaceful coexistence, and, finally, by its fierce verbal attacks on the United States. Yet nothing of the kind happened. The bourgeois element judged China's policy by her deeds and not by her words. And her deeds convinced the practical American bourgeoisie that China, despite the vehemence of her denunciations, posed no real danger to US policy, and that in any event China could be dealt with, no matter what the Peking leaders might say or the Chinese press write. Name-calling, after all, never hurts anyone.
Among bourgeois and petty-bourgeois circles, which as a rule go on supporting Washington's official policy until it gets them into trouble, the belief that China had ceased to be too " revolutionary,'' too "communistic,'' engendered hopes that, with Peking's help, the United States would be able to finish the war in Vietnam to their own satisfaction. These hopes were greatly encouraged by the news of Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking. Agreement on this visit was most opportune indeed.
Washington's imperialist policy had long been running into tremendous difficulties created by the heroic resistance put up by the Vietnamese people and the support given them by the socialist countries and by progressive people throughout the 245 world. Even in the United States, this war was regarded as the most unpopular of all the wars which that country had ever waged. The shock publication of the secret Pentagon documents deepened the rift caused by the war. The mounting public protest in the USA and the new peace initiatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam gave the Nixon Administration the alternative of either stopping the war or exposing itself to the danger of political defeat. The news of the forthcoming Peking summit was used to stave off a decision on ending the war in Vietnam. The US ignored the Vietnamese peace proposals and there was talk in certain US circles about the possibility of reaching agreement on this issue behind the backs of the Vietnamese people.
Although discussion of China's attitude to the Vietnam question deserves a special article, it is necessary to say a few words about it. The projected visit of the US President to Peking could have been presented as a sensation only to credulous people who implicitly believed the earlier propaganda about Peking's irreconcilability with US imperialism. Yet, the timing of the invitation impressed many, both in the USA and outside it, as a move obviously prejudicing the cause of the Vietnamese patriots. The New York Post was genuinely puzzled and suggested that it was up to the Sinologists and Maoists to explain why the Chinese Communists had decided to make things easier for the President.
But as far as the United States is concerned, an analysis of the attitudes prevailing in that country leads one to the conclusion that the recent 246 Washington-Peking contacts and Nixon's projected trip to China enjoy wide approval, albeit for different, often mutually exclusive, reasons.
Hopes for much support were evidently no small factor in prompting the decision on the Peking summit. On the eve of the presidential elections, the US Government is concentrating on anything which may help the ruling Republican Party to defeat its political rivals.
An understanding of the different motives that prompt the various political groups and social strata in the USA to support the idea of improving relations with China is important, not only to explain the reasons for the recent developments, but also to forecast the possible consequences of those developments. With the emphasis in US-Chinese relations being shifted to the sphere of political decisions, the different motives, initially obscure though they were, are bound to become increasingly clear.
This can already be sensed in press comments and in speeches by US political and public leaders. And it is becoming increasingly clear that many Americans feel some anxiety about the possible long-term results of the political move made by the US Administration.
Some of these comments assert that, by deciding on Nixon's visit to Peking, the US Administration is evading outstanding political issues such as the necessity to put an end to the war in Vietnam or the need for changes in the existing practice of adopting political decisions by which the President could plunge the country into war without the 247 knowledge of the public or even the Congress. Others are concerned about the effect the trip may have on Soviet-American relations and the prospects for reducing the arms race and achieving a detente. And many among the US ruling circles are beginning to feel uneasy about the possible impact of the Peking rendezvous on the USA's relations with its West European allies, with Japan and other countries. In fact, the news of the planned visit was received by many of them with unconcealed alarm, to say nothing of the confusion it caused in the camp of the US puppets in Taiwan, Seoul and Saigon.
These and other problems are making themselves felt with increasing sharpness in the discussion, now under way in the USA, on President Nixon's projected visit to Peking. Even those who unreservedly approve of this step fully realise that a meeting as such, even a summit one, cannot automatically solve the problems facing the country. Moreover, some US leaders fear possible disillusionment in the very near future which, after the great expectations that have been raised, may have the effect of a political boomerang. What will be the outcome of Nixon's visit? What will be its overall effect on the presidential elections to be held in the fall of 1972? How well has the President "figured it out"? These are the questions that some of the leaders of the ruling party are asking themselves.
They realise that US policy is up against a multitude of complicated problems which cannot be disposed of by a sweeping diplomatic gesture but which need radical political solutions, at times painful for Washington. The US President himself was forced to throw cold water on the overly 248 optimistic at a recent press conference by advising against entertaining ``illusions'' about the Peking trip.
Many questions connected with the President's projected visit to Peking, notably those pertaining to the future of US-Chinese relations and US policy in general, remain basically unanswered. Neither Washington nor Peking is in a great hurry to answer them, their obvious desire being to build up an atmosphere of secrecy around many things concerning their relations. According to the US press, the American public is particularly anxious about the possible effect of the move undertaken by the US Administration on US relations with the socialist countries, particularly with the Soviet Union. This is understandable, if one takes into account the political, economic and military prestige of the Soviet Union on the world scene-- prestige which it has gained as a result of its might and its peaceful constructive policy-and if one takes into account the role of the Soviet Union in world developments. There are many people in the United States who clearly see that much of what is important for both countries and for the world at large depends on US-Soviet relations.
It is already evident that Americans are very divided on the subject. Some put forward proposals to combine efforts to normalise relations with China with equally vigorous efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the overall international situation. Others try to figure out how best to use every step towards detente with China for stepping up pressure on the Soviet Union, for blackmailing it, and for forcing concessions from it. Still others are advocating a long-term policy of pitting the governments of "Red China" and 249 ``Red Russia" against one another, as the reactionary New York Daily News put it.
As regards US official policy, it has so far confined itself to giving assurances that the Peking summit, and normalisation of US-Chinese relations, will not interfere in any way with the interests of other countries.
The Soviet people cannot ignore the fact that the US press itself gives a very ambiguous interpretation of such assurances. The Washington Post, for instance, writes that, despite all formal refutations issued by the US Government, officials in the Nixon Administration privately express views to the effect that it is not in the interests of the United States to dispel the Soviet Union's suspicions about some details of US-Chinese relations which may give reason for dissatisfaction or concern in Moscow.
It is worth noting that US press comments on the recent hearings in the Senate commission for foreign affairs have a definite orientation. Among the commentators one finds former officials of the State Department who were victimised in McCarthy's time for their advocacy of US-Chinese detente. Explaining their attitude of those days, they emphasise that they understood detente as a means of alienating China from the socialist camp. By taking advantage of Mao's readiness to seek ways for improving relations with Washington, which had been in evidence since the forties, they hoped to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and China. By such comments, the US press is openly persuading the reader of the benefits of detente with China for stepping up anti-Soviet intrigues.
This line reveals, to say the least, the extreme political shortsightedness of its initiators. A 250 dialogue, as difficult as it is important, has long been going on between the United States and the Soviet Union. Covering a wide range of serious problems, it requires confidence more than anything else for successful completion. But what can be less conducive to confidence than underhand diplomatic proceedings, backstage intrigues and duplicity? But let us proceed to the question of how Washington's official assurances concerning its intentions should be treated.
For over twenty years now the Soviet Union has pressed for the international recognition of the legitimate rights of the Chinese People's Republic. It can only be regretted that the United States has taken so long to acknowledge realities and make its first steps toward renunciation of its cold-war policy towards China. It is also to be regretted that this step has been taken under the circumstances which cast doubts upon the motives.
As to the question of what is actually behind these changes in the American policy, what will be the outcome of the struggle of various forces shaping this policy, the answer will be found in the actions of Washington, and not in the words about its intentions.
President Nixon has called his intended visit to Peking a "peace trip" and Washington wants to present it as a practical step in pursuance of the policy of transition "from the era of confrontation to the era of negotiation" which it proclaimed several years ago.
The sincerity of statements is tested only by practice. And this is true of the case in question, all the more so since the world public knows that the speeches and assurances of US politicians have often been at variance with their deeds.
251There are many problems in the tackling of which the United States could demonstrate whether its policies are motivated by a desire for peace, detente and normalisation of the international situation, or by new imperialist designs which fit into the traditional scheme of the positions-- ofstrength policy. These are the problems of Vietnam, the Middle East, European security, curtailment of the arms race, US relations with the socialist countries, etc. If the steps toward improvement of relations with China are accompanied by a change to a more constructive US attitude to these and other questions, then we shall have good reason to take Washington's protestations about its good will and peaceful intentions seriously. Such a change would undoubtedly be viewed favourably in the Soviet Union. A sincere policy aimed at lessening tension has always met with understanding and enjoyed support in the Soviet Union. And it is from this position that we must appraise the intentions of Peking.
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at effecting a change in the course of world affairs, at implementing measures intended to normalise the situation, and at consolidating peace and security throughout the world. This is the sum and substance of the foreign policy course charted by the 24th CPSU Congress-its proclaimed peace programme. As was reaffirmed at the 24th Congress, the Soviet Union is in favour of improving relations with China and the USA, developing relations with other countries, and promoting bilateral, regional and international cooperation aimed at consolidating peace and the security of nations.
Among the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union there are some which require the 252 consideration of all the major powers, including China. In this context, China's participation in the discussion and solution of problems such as a curtailment of the arms race, the complete banning of all weapons of mass destruction and the replacement of exclusive military blocs by continental systems of collective security, is very important.
Such a development would be to the benefit of all nations, including the USSR, China and the USA, and Soviet policy supports it.
At the present time, however, there are many reasons to expect a different development of events, as US policy remains unchanged, except in relation to China, and presents the main obstacle to eliminating sharp world conflicts and normalising the world situation. This being so, Washington's steps toward detente with China can have only one meaning. Definite conclusions suggest themselves accordingly. But the Soviet Union and world socialism are strong enough to meet any possible tide of events.
__*_*_*__The answer to the major questions arising in connection with the US President's visit to Peking and changes in US-Chinese relations will be provided, not by the words or diplomatic manoeuvres of the states in question, but by their actions in the coming months.
The Soviet Union and other countries will be keeping a watchful eye on these actions and on developments in general, for the problems involved are of great importance for the Soviet Union, for world socialism, for the entire world situation and for the cause of world peace.
Pravda, August 10, 1971
[253] __ALPHA_LVL2__ The Preaching and PracticeI. Alexandrov
The present epoch is characterised by gigantic revolutionary transformations radically changing the face of our planet. The forces of world socialism, of the communist and workers' movement, and of national liberation are developing their offensive against the positions of imperialism. This historic confrontation encompasses all sides of public life-economy, politics, ideology and culture.
Experience has convincingly confirmed the correctness of the conclusion drawn by the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969 that "the world system oi socialism is the decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle." It has become a powerful accelerator of the historical progress that was started by the Great October Revolution, a mighty bulwark of peace and the security of the peoples.
In the countries of socialism, pursuing a Leninist course of domestic and foreign policy, the working people of the whole world see a reliable bulwark of peace, freedom and social progress. The stronger the fraternal alliance of socialist countries, the stronger become the forces of peace and progress in the whole world, and the more resolute becomes the rebuff to any aggressive designs of imperialism. The support and aid given to heroic Vietnam, and to the peoples of Laos and Cambodia by the USSR, the other 254 socialist countries and by all progressive forces are a vivid example of this.
At the same time, the members of the anti-- imperialist front of struggle cannot but be alarmed by the anti-Leninist, great-power chauvinistic course of the present leadership of China directed towards undermining the unity of revolutionary, anti-imperialist forces and inflicting serious damage on their common cause.
More than ten years have passed since the Chinese leadership, for the first time, openly proclaimed a special ideological-political platform on the main issues of our time, the development of world socialism, and of the communist and workers' movement.
They revised the Marxist-Leninist principles of socialist construction and foreign policy that were implemented in the first ten years of the PRC's existence and recorded in the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC (1956). Some time later, contrary to the Marxist-Leninist line of the international communist movement jointly worked out by the communist and workers' parties, including the CPC, the Chinese leaders advanced their own ``Left'' theses that allegedly were to facilitate the speediest destruction of imperialism and an acceleration of the world revolution by any means, not ruling out a world thermo-nuclear war. They tried to impose this platform on the international communist and workers' movement. Actually Maoism's ``Leftism'' only camouflaged the conceited hegemonistic designs of the Maoists to which Peking's entire domestic and foreign policy was subordinated.
255In the field of domestic policy, Mao Tse-tung and his entourage decided to put the economic basis, the foundations of socialism that were laid in the country during the first decade after the victory of the revolution, at the service of their aims. Having discarded the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC aimed at the systematic building of socialism and ensuring the people's well-being, Mao Tse-tung and his group plunged China into the voluntarist adventure of the "big leap,'' of building the "people's communes,'' proclaiming their intention to effect a transition to communism in 3-5 years, and declaring that "three years of hard work would bring ten thousand years of happiness.'' Apart from other things, the course of the "big leap" pursued the ambitious aim of assuming a vanguard position among the socialist countries. This appealed to the Maoists' hegemonistic aspirations.
Built on an anti-scientific, subjectivist-- voluntarist conception, contradicting the objective laws of socialist construction, the "big leap" has turned for the Chinese people into a tragedy of vainly wasted efforts, has led to a serious economic crisis, and to a still further lowering of the already low living standards of the people.
In order to protect themselves from the discontent of the popular masses, the Mao group blamed the Party and state cadres, who had allegedly "poorly followed Mao's instructions,'' for the failure of the "big leap.''
Then followed a sharp zigzag in the tactics of the Chinese leadership, when it stated that it was impossible to build socialism in China in the lifetime of the present generation, that this would take many decades if not centuries. It proclaimed 256 poverty to be the ``basis'' of revolutionism, and the desire to improve the life of the people-" revisionism,'' "bourgeois economism.'' They galvanised the old Trotskyite anti-Leninist thesis of the `` impossibility'' of successfully building socialism before the triumph of the world revolution.
In the sphere of foreign policy the Maoists took the line of sharpening international tension, pushing other countries and peoples towards armed conflicts. They rejected any proposals aimed at a relaxation of international tension. Peking met with hostility the treaties on banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and on the non-proliferation of such weapons, on banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor, rejected the idea put forward by the Soviet Union of creating a system of collective security in Asia and opposed many other constructive proposals of the socialist countries.
This course was covered up by noisy ``Leftist'' slogans about the need to immediately destroy imperialism. Calls for a "people's war" in all countries, on all continents, were issued. The thesis "the world can be changed only with the rifle" was proclaimed as a universal truth.
No matter what ultra-revolutionary phraseology was used to cover up this course, its essence remained unchanged: the striving for hegemony in a war-devastated world. In this connection even a nuclear-missile war in which, as estimated by Mao Tse-tung, half of mankind might perish, was declared a sort of boon. Speaking with the American journalist Strong in 1965, Mao called on the peoples of the world not to fear nuclear war because "China will survive it.'' On the ruins left by this __PRINTERS_P_257_COMMENT__ 17--193 257 war the Maoists intended to build "a civilisation a thousand times more wonderful,'' naturally, according to their own recipes. Mao Tse-tung spoke in detail about this in his conversation with Jawaharlal Nehru and in his speech at the 1957 Moscow Conference. These ideas were developed in a number of Chinese articles printed in April 1960 in connection with the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth and also in a later period, for instance, in an article in the May 14, 1969 issue of the Chiehfang jihpao.
But the Chinese leadership was not and is not at all eager to rush into battle against imperialism. It would like to use for the attainment of its plans the military and economic might of the socialist countries, the strength of the international working class, the possibilities of the national-liberation movement, trying to turn them into a tool of their great-power hegemonism. Although the Maoists declare that they are "prepared for the greatest national sacrifices" their deeds show differently. They prefer the position of "sitting on the mountain and observing the tigers fight.''
Marxist-Leninist Parties throughout the world resolutely rejected the ideology, policy, strategy and tactics of Maoism, subjecting them to a thorough principled criticism as alien to Marxism-- Leninism, objectively untenable and harmful from the point of view of the international and national tasks of the communist, workers' and national-- liberation movement. The Maoist justification of war evoked indignation and protests from the broadest segments of the international public.
Together with the other fraternal Parties the CPSU consistently upheld the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, 258 pressing for a strengthening of the position and the unity of world socialism, the cohesion of the world communist movement and the national-- liberation, democratic and peace-loving forces in the struggle against imperialism, reaction and war. So the CPC leaders took the line of splitting the communist movement, of creating in other countries Maoist groups and trends opposing the fraternal Parties, and of eroding the socialist community.
The Chinese leaders spearheaded their struggle against our Motherland, against our Party and its consistent Leninist course.
The Maoists demanded of Soviet Communists that they renounce the decisions of the 20th Congress and the CPSU Programme, started intensive anti-Soviet propaganda and from the middle of 1960 began systematically to organise provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border, developing them into armed clashes in the spring and summer of 1969. In an atmosphere of anti-Soviet psychosis and militaristic frenzy that was simultaneously generated in China, the course hostile to the Soviet Union was proclaimed an official doctrine at the 9th CPC Congress.
Mao and his entourage are steadily scaling down economic and other ties with the USSR and other socialist countries, while simultaneously expanding in every way the ties with leading imperialist powers, first of all with the United States.
Suffice it to say that the share of socialist countries in the PRC's foreign trade dropped to 25 per cent in 1966, as against 68 per cent in 1959. The volume of Soviet-Chinese trade in 1969 was about one sixth of that in 1966.
It is indicative that Peking develops its relations __PRINTERS_P_259_COMMENT__ 17* 259 with imperialist countries on the basis of undisguised anti-Sovietism, to the detriment of the interests of world socialism and the revolutionary, national-liberation movement.
But all the efforts of the Chinese leadership to split the international communist movement, to create in Peking a centre opposed to it, to gain ground in the attainment of its great-power hegemonistic ambitions by asserting on the international scene a sort of exclusiveness for China and for its role as leader of the Third World-"the world village"-against the "world town"-and thereby to establish an anti-socialist, anti-Soviet front, proved futile. The untenability of the strategy and tactics of the Maoists was proved by the course of historical development, and their adventuristic aims turned out to be unattainable.
The Maoist subversive groups and factions in various countries, based actually on an anti-- communist, anti-Soviet platform, began to fall apart. In pursuing their plans to assume leadership of the Third World on the basis of their extremist platform, the Chinese leaders encountered the resistance of peace-loving, developing states, especially neighbouring ones against which they made territorial and other claims.
Serious failures in domestic and foreign policies led to a socio-political crisis in China and to widespread dissatisfaction in the ranks of the CPC and among the working people. A split developed in the CPC leadership. The Maoists faced the real danger of having to bear grave responsibility to ' the party and the country.
'
Precisely these reasons prompted Mao and his grouping to carry out what actually amounted to a political coup in the country, implemented in 260 the form of a "cultural revolution" and which, as admitted by the Chinese leaders themselves, was a "struggle for power.'' A military-bureaucratic system began to be implanted in the country.
Party, trade union, and youth organisations and unions of creative workers were demolished in the course of the "cultural revolution" and the constitutional bodies of people's power were paralysed. Large masses of Communists, workers, peasants and especially intellectuals were subjected to repressions. The ideal of ``democracy'' as proclaimed in China was to turn the entire people into "loyal soldiers" and "obedient buffaloes of the great helmsman.''
The blow was dealt first of all at those Communists who saw the perniciousness of the voluntaristic ideas of the "big leap" and the anti-popular foreign political course for the cause of socialism in China, at those who in the period of the escalation of the American aggression in Vietnam proposed to settle differences with the CPSU, to achieve unity of action of the socialist countries in the struggle against imperialism's aggressive intrigues.
At the same time the organisers of the "cultural revolution" continued the campaign of hatred and slander against the Soviet Union and other socialist states, trying to ascribe to them plans of creating a ``circle'' around China in collusion with imperialism. Under this pretext the Maoists started the militarisation of the country, calling upon it "to prepare for hunger, to prepare for war.'' It is monstrous, though it is a fact, that the Maoists began to call for a "cultural revolution" in other socialist countries, alleging that without such a revolution "capitalism will be restored.'' Peking went 261 so far as to call for an "assertion of the banner of Chairman Mao's ideas over the entire globe.''
The 9th CPC Congress, held in 1969, was called upon to legalise the military-bureaucratic system in China. Mao Tse-tung and his group actually started to build the Communist Party anew, throwing aside the political, ideological and organisational principles of the Marxist-Leninist Party. Mao's ideas were presented at the congress as "the Marxism-Leninism of the present epoch.'' Declaring a "ruthless struggle" against "modern revisionism,'' by which Peking has in view the leadership of most socialist countries and Communist Parties, the 9th CPC Congress thus signified a new stage in the evolution of the ideological and political theses of Maoism as an anti-Leninist, petty-bourgeois, chauvinistic ideology.
But the Maoists did not derive the results they wanted either from the "cultural revolution" or from the "line of the 9th Congress of the CPC.'' On the contrary, in the period from 1966 to 1969 they aggravated the state of crisis and the country's even greater international isolation. Although by methods of violence, terror and demagogy the Chinese leadership succeeded in suppressing open resistance to its course and in imposing this course on the country, it could not help seeing that it would not be able to overcome by these means either the domestic crisis or the international isolation.
The Chinese leaders could not but realise the full extent of their defeat and the collapse of their plans when the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow reaffirmed the unshakable loyalty of the world army of Communists to the principles of Marxism-- 262 Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and demonstrated the growing unity of the communist ranks on this principled basis. The Conference strengthened the position of the international communist, workers' movement as the most influential political movement of our time, the vanguard of anti-- imperialist forces in the struggle for the triumph of the cause of peace, national liberation and socialism. The Conference highly assessed the role of the Soviet Union and the CPSU in the liberation struggle and the USSR's peaceful foreign policy.
The development of the present international situation is characterised primarily by the growth of the forces of world socialism, the consolidation of the unity of the world communist movement and the cohesion of the forces of the anti-- imperialist front. The historic offensive by revolutionary forces against imperialism's positions, their growing activity in the struggle for peace and security of nations compel the Peking leaders to review their tactics, to use methods often contrary to those they had only recently proclaimed.
The time came when the Chinese leaders had to mothball some ultra-``Left'' slogans and even to remove from the front of the stage the persons who had compromised themselves most by excessive zeal in promoting the "Mao line" during the "cultural revolution.'' The Maoists are making a new zigzag in their policy. And once again Mao and his group are trying-for the umpteenth time -to blame the barbaric nature of the "cultural revolution" with its mass repressions and excesses on those whom they themselves had set against the 263 CPC, and used to clear the way to the establishment of their domination. A ``respectable'' appearance is being hastily given to Peking's policy which is now being pursued by more ingenious methods.
Facts show, however, that if any changes have been made in Peking's tactics they amount only to a giving up of the attempts to accelerate implementation of the old line, and not renunciation of its aims, to the use of subtler methods of manoeuvering intended to deceive the Chinese people and also to confuse the international revolutionary liberation forces.
Whereas previously the policy of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, consistently promoted by the USSR and other fraternal countries, was labelled in Peking as a `` betrayal'' and "collusion with imperialism,'' now the Chinese leadership even teaches others how to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese Government has officially proposed the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" as the basis of relations between the PRC and the United States. At the same time it has enlivened its contacts with many Western countries, having established diplomatic relations with a number of them. Peking has tuned down outright propaganda of the thesis of the inevitability of a world thermonuclear war and, more than that, now tries to feign love of peacefulness.
The tone of Chinese propaganda statements in respect of the United Nations Organisation has also changed. China has started expressing its obvious desire to restore its rights in that organisation, although only recently Peking maintained that it wanted to have nothing to do with it. As is 264 known, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have invariably come out and continue to come out for the restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC in the United Nations.
In reviewing their foreign policy tactics, the Peking leaders evidently arrived at the conclusion that the hungweipings damage first of all China's prestige not only in the socialist and developing countries, but also in the West. Outwardly the anti-Soviet campaign carried on in official statements by Chinese leaders was somewhat altered. In 1969 the Chinese leaders agreed to a meeting of heads of the governments of the USSR and the PRC proposed by the Soviet side and also to the holding of Soviet-Chinese talks on border and other questions of intergovernmental relations.
Striving for a lessening of international tension, for consolidation of peace and the security of nations, people of goodwill would like to see a manifestation of elements of realism in China's foreign policy behind the changes in the method of action of the Chinese leadership, elements that would serve the aims of strengthening the anti-- imperialist front and the cause of peace and friendship among the peoples. The Soviet people, too, sincerely want this.
The question that naturally arises is: what, in deed, is the essence of the changes in the foreign policy of the Chinese leadership at the present stage, and in what measure do they accord with the aspirations of the peoples, including the people of China? In fact, this is a question of the correlation and interconnection of the Chinese leadership's strategy and tactics in the present conditions. Only facts, their thorough and objective analysis can produce the answer.
265The facts are such that neither in its statements nor in its practical deeds, has the Chinese leadership yet renounced a single provision of its special, incompatible with Leninism, ideological-political platform on the main questions of international life and the world communist movement. The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in the autumn of 1970 reaffirmed the "militant tasks of the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China" and the advancement to the fore of "intensification of preparations for war.'' The Chinese leadership opposes collective security in Europe and Asia, and the USSR's and Poland's treaties with the FRG. Peking spares no effort to transfer the situation of military psychosis to Albania in the hope of sowing the seeds of tension in the Balkans by this or other methods. Under cover of bombastic declarations, the Chinese leadership as before opposes concrete steps directed at the attainment of agreements on questions of disarmament and prohibition of nuclear weapons. The Government of the People's Republic of China turned down the Soviet proposal to convene a conference of five nuclear powers, stating that "China's nuclear weapons are still in the testing stage...''
The Chinese leadership continues to engage in intensive hostile propaganda against our Party and country. It is in the Soviet Union, in the policy of the CPSU, in the successes of the working people of our country and the fraternal countries of socialism that it sees the main obstacle to the attainment of its hegemonistic ambitions in the international arena. The Maoists are trying to keep from the Chinese people the facts which shed light on the life of the Soviet people, which show the 266 real course of the historic struggle between the forces of socialism and imperialism. All the good that is connected with the Soviet Union, which supported the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle in the course of many decades and gave it fraternal assistance in its advance along the road of socialism, is deliberately erased from the minds of the Chinese working people.
The Chinese leaders continue to declare that they will conduct an "implacable struggle" against the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and Marxist-Leninist Parties. At the close of 1970, speaking with his old acquaintance, US journalist E. Snow, Mao Tse-tung said that the ideological differences between the CPSU and the CPC are "irreconcilable.''
The Chinese leaders continue to conduct subversive activities against the world socialist community, they oppose the collective international organisations of socialist countries, the Warsaw Treaty and the CMEA. In its time Peking deemed it possible to express its solidarity with the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia and their imperialist patrons and then to bemoan the failure of their counter-revolutionary plot. Vicious attacks against socialist Poland sounded from Peking in unison with the anti-Communists.
The policy of the Chinese leadership toward socialist countries clearly shows a striving, which coincides with the machinations of imperialist reaction, to set the socialist states at loggerheads, to set one against the other and to prevent the implementation of the joint political line of fraternal countries in the international arena.
Whereas previously Peking waged a broad propaganda offensive against all socialist countries, at 267 present it is trying to "narrow the field" of struggle, and applies a ``differentiated'' approach to socialist countries in an effort to draw some of them into the orbit of its policy. In so doing it makes alluring gestures and promises. For the time being Peking does not ask much from those it flirts with. The Chinese leaders would be pleased with any step which, in their opinion, might cause a crack, if only a small one, in relations between socialist countries.
Lenin wrote: "Capital is an international force. To vanquish it, an international workers' alliance, an international workers' brotherhood is needed. We are opposed to national enmity and discord, to national exclusiveness. We are internationalists.''~^^1^^ Contrary to Leninism, contrary to the communist logic of class struggle Peking rejects the idea of united action of socialist countries, of all the revolutionary forces in the struggle against imperialism. Thus the Chinese leadership assumes a grave responsibility for creating an opportunity for the imperialists to step up their actions and attempts, on a number of sectors, to mount a counter-- offensive against the world revolutionary movement, suppress the liberation movement in South-East Asia and support the Israeli aggression in the Middle East.
Persistent propaganda advancing the demagogic thesis of struggle against "two superpowers,'' a thesis absolutely alien to Marxism-Leninism, has become for the Chinese leadership a means of continuing its hostile course against the Soviet Union. The Chinese leadership tries to place US _-_-_
~^^1^^ "Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 30, p. 293.
268 imperialism, which strives to play the role of a guarantor and custodian of the international system of exploitation and oppression, which brings destruction, death and suffering to many peoples of the world, side by side with the Soviet Union-the homeland of Leninism, the first socialist country, the bulwark of the anti-imperialist struggle of all the revolutionary forces.The Peking leaders need "the theory of two superpowers" for the same purpose as they did their old "theory of struggle of the world village against the world town.'' In both of these theories, nationalistic, great-power motives take the place of a class approach. Having failed in their attempts to divide the world into the economically developed ``town'' and the ``village'' fighting for its liberation or the developing "village,'' the Peking leaders decided to narrow "the front of attack" and direct it, first of all, against the Soviet Union. Now they urge all countries-capitalist, developing, and socialist-to fight against the "two superpowers.'' Meanwhile, the Chinese press emphasises that China will never be a ``superpower'' and during personal contacts between Chinese leaders and representatives of different countries it is stressed that China is the best defender of countries fighting against the "two superpowers.''
The term ``superpower'' was borrowed by the Chinese leaders from the imperialist ideologists of the USA. The latter invented it in order to defend capitalist principles, to mislead the American people, in the first place, and the world public and somehow to camouflage the imperialist, aggressive nature of US foreign policy. Characteristically, the expression "one or two superpowers" has been heard in Peking during the efforts to establish 269 Sino-American contacts. Apparently it was decided in expectation of Nixon's visit to tone down the propaganda hullabaloo: "It is not you we have in mind.''
The putting forward of the patently false thesis of "two superpowers,'' allegedly opposed to all the other states, is in fact an act of class betrayal. Peking is trying thus to play down the confrontation between the two world systems-socialism and capitalism-trying to evade (and it does evade in practice) real struggle against imperialism. It even goes so far as to advise West European states and monopolies on how they should pool their efforts in order best to oppose the "one or two superpowers.'' Meanwhile the Chinese leaders have legalised their own political flirting with US ruling circles.
In an attempt to theoretically ``corroborate'' the rupture with world socialism, the actual betrayal of the class interests of the working people, to justify their line towards a collusion with imperialism, Mao Tse-tung and his associates deliberately confuse questions related to the contradictions of the contemporary world, substituting the Pekingfabricated formula of "four big contradictions" for the true contradictions, and especially the main one-the contradiction between imperialism and socialism. If this formula is cleared of rhetoric, its essence boils down to uniting the world in the interests of the achievement of Peking's hegemonistic goals under the pretext of resolving these contradictions and of struggling against "the two superpowers.'' Not long ago, in an article in the magazine Hungchi this formula, proclaimed at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China, was directly adapted to the demagogic conception 270 of "the two superpowers.'' And following the usual ultra-revolutionary phraseology about "colossal upheavals" and ``re-grouping'' of forces taking place in the world, the above article upholds China's tactics of forming blocs with any, including imperialist, forces for achieving Peking's foreign policy aims. It would not be amiss to recall that the thesis of the ``re-grouping'' of forces had been repeatedly applied by Mao Tse-tung before for political intrigues.
The article openly justifies the tactics of political double-dealing, under the name of "revolutionary dual tactics.'' One of the latest Peking's " revolutionary dual tactics" in regard to the Soviet Union, was the recent interview by the Prime Minister of the PRC Chou En-lai to The New York Times observer Reston. Chou En-lai drew attention to the anti-Soviet essence of Peking's platform and of its steps aimed at a rapprochement with Washington. He palmed off to Reston, who was glad to take up the provocative thesis of a Soviet military threat to China. In another interview, with a correspondent of a Yugoslav newspaper, Chou En-lai discoursed at length about "one or two superpowers,'' and again spoke of the mythical threat to China from the North, from the USSR, using the opportunity to stress some special, ``liberating'' mission of China in Asia.
As to the threat to China "from the North,'' it is well known that the Soviet Union has never presented and does not do so now any territorial claims to China and believes that the Soviet and Chinese peoples have no cause for conflicts.
The CPSU and the working people of the Soviet Union, like the fraternal Parties and the working people of the other socialist states, regarded and 271 still regard the development of relations of friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people, with the Chinese Communists, as one of the important conditions for strengthening the position of world socialism, and consolidating the unity of the international communist movement and the entire anti-imperialist front.
It is this that determines the principled and consistent line of the CPSU and the Soviet state in regard to China, a line that has again been authoritatively confirmed in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th Congress of the Party and in the Resolution of the Congress, in the Decisions of the Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the speeches of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.
Our Party and people unanimously approve the policy of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government of maintaining restraint and not yielding to provocations, and of doing everything the USSR can to achieve the normalisation of relations with the PRC and the restoration and development of mutual friendship and cooperation of the Soviet and the Chinese peoples on the basis of the principles of MarxismLeninism and proletarian internationalism.
The constructive line of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in relation to the PRC meets with the understanding and approval of the fraternal socialist countries, of the Communist and Workers' Parties, and of all the progressive, peaceloving forces. It evokes the sympathy of all who cherish the true national interests of China, unbreakably bound with the interests of world 272 socialism, of friendship of the PRC with the Soviet Union.
This line is an inalienable part of the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union, of the allembracing programme of activities of our Party and the Soviet state in the international arena-a programme of struggle for the further consolidation and development of the forces of socialism, for a relaxation of international tension and for strengthening peace, for rallying the ranks of the world communist and working-class movement, for the consolidation of all the forces coming out against imperialism and colonialism, reaction and aggression. The peace programme set forth by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, answering the vital interests of the peoples of the entire planet, has already become a most important factor of contemporary international life.
People in the Soviet Union regard with due appreciation the development of normal relations between states, and on this plane, the normalisation of relations between the PRC and the USA is no exception. But the Soviet people cannot help giving attention to the fact that in its overtures to Washington, the Chinese leadership again frankly stresses its hostility towards the Soviet Union.
In so doing, it certainly realises that the ruling imperialist circles, first of all in the USA, draw appropriate conclusions from this kind of `` respectable'' manoeuvres of the Chinese leaders, of their anti-Soviet direction. And it is no accident, apparently, that allusions to Peking's present ``obligingness'' and the possibility of imperialism cashing in on it, slip into the pages of the bourgeois American press.
__PRINTERS_P_274_COMMENT__ 18--193 273Of course, while waging a resolute ideologicalpolitical struggle against the great-power chauvinistic theses of Peking in its foreign policy course, we are doing everything to protect the interests of the Soviet people, who are building communism, the interests of our friends and allies, against any encroachments.
Seeing the unprincipledness, the nationalistic pragmatism of the Chinese leadership, the public in many countries of the world is asking the question: is not a deal being hatched against socialism behind the scenes in Peking and Washington, a deal at the expense of the interests of the peoples fighting for national independence and freedom?
An examination of the Maoist slogans and the Maoist practice both at home and in the international arena gives good reason to pose such a question.
The ideological-political essence of the Maoist platform, its strategic aims, despite all the tactical manoeuvres of the Chinese leadership, remain unchanged. The conceptions of the Chinese leadership and its actions have been and are based on the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist ideology of Maoism.
Maoism has exposed itself in deeds as a pettybourgeois ideological-political movement basically alien to Marxism-Leninism, parasitising on the principles of scientific socialism, on the striving of the popular masses of China for socialism. The goals and practice of Maoism are incompatible with the tasks of the world communist, liberation movement. Here one should fully take into account that Maoism, in its present struggle against the Marxist-Leninist teaching, the communist movement, the socialist community, objectively links 274 up with the most diverse political forces hostile to socialism-the imperialists and racialists, Trotskyites and reformists, forming a kind of "united front" with them.
Experience shows that if certain progress has been made in some spheres of the Chinese economy in recent years, this was not due to but despite Maoist concepts. None of the concepts of Maoism, none of Mao's ideas has stood the practical test of socialist construction in China and development of international life. Maoism lacks any constructive content. The more dangerous therefore is the striving of the Peking leaders for hegemony in the world communist movement, and for leadership in the Third World. The aim and practice of Maoism are causing tremendous damage to the international communist and workingclass movement, to the national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle. The recipes of the Maoists are doing irreparable harm to those who give them credence (we all remember the tragic fate of the Communist Party of Indonesia and of some other Communist Parties whose leadership listened to advice from Peking).
The Communists are confronted with the task of enhancing in every way their political vigilance in the face of the hostile ideology and subversive actions of Maoism, with the task of further thoroughly exposing the real essence of Maoist ideology and policy. The Communists are fighting resolutely and on a principled basis against the theory and practice of Maoism, against Maoists' machinations in the world communist movement, in the ranks of the anti-imperialist front. They are waging a consistent ideological and political __PRINTERS_P_275_COMMENT__ 18* 275 struggle against the anti-socialist, anti-Leninist platform of Maoism so that the Chinese people can again take the path of alliance and fraternal cooperation with socialist countries, with all revolutionary, progressive forces of the time, forces fighting tor peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.
Pravda, September 4, 1971
[276] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Peking Foreign PolicyL. Kirichenko
Observers of the world scene never stop wondering at the zigzags of Chinese foreign policy. One might almost think Peking had been following entirely different policies at different times.
But although there have been several distinct periods in China's foreign policy of the past twenty years, the changes might be likened to the insulation of electric wire, which may be of different colours though the wire is the same. The methods and tactics have changed, but the essential policy, the objectives have not.
Though they protested time and again in former days that they wanted friendly, equal relations with other nations, though they vowed and swore fidelity to proletarian internationalism, Mao Tsetung and his entourage have in fact always proceeded from the Sinocentrist doctrines cultivated by the Chinese emperors. They have always thought in terms of China as a superpower able to impose its will upon others and ordain the pattern of international relations; in all periods their actions have been geared to the object of restoring the "Celestial Empire" and making China the ``central'' power of the world.
The first period covered the years 1949--58. The Chinese People's Republic was weak, it strove to make maximum use of other coutries' experience and support to consolidate its position and build up its economy. Close cooperation was practised 277 with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. But even at this period the Chinese leaders made plans to swallow up the Mongolian People's Republic and complained about China's having ``lost'' large areas of Southeast Asia which the armies of the Chinese emperors had reached once upon a time. At the Asia and Oceania trade union conference at the end of 1949 the Chinese representatives declared that all peoples fighting for national liberation must follow "the path of Mao Tse-tung.'' In 1950--51 the Maoists tried to impose their own programme on the Communist Parties of India and Indonesia: in these predominantly peasant countries the revolution had, they claimed, to follow the same lines as in China. Later on they put out the famous formula about "the wind from the East beating the wind from the West,'' which was certainly rather equivocal.
After China successfully completed the first five-year plan, laying the foundations of an industrial structure, they decided they could proceed differently. At home the Chinese leaders launched the "big leap forward" and started setting up the communes; the purpose was to make a big spurt in building Chinese economic and military power, through maximum restriction of the people's living standards and all-out mobilization of effort. Abroad, they tried to get the socialist community under their thumb and use it for their chauvinist ends.
The attempt to gain control of the socialist community did not succeed; the communist parties found the doctrine Peking advanced to be adventurist. Thereupon Peking changed its tactics.
On June 14, 1963, the leaders of the Communist Party of China published a document entitled 278 ``Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement" (the "25 points''). In it they denied the decisive influence of the socialist system on the course of world development, belittled the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries, contraposed the national-liberation movement to the socialist world system and the working-class movement, advocated adventurism in foreign policy and continuance of the cold war, preached sectarianism and putschism in questions of revolution, and sought to justify factionalism in the communist movement. Anyone who refused to accept the Maoist "general line" was labelled a "revisionist,'' a "traitor to Marxism.''
Mao also injected a new meaning into his "intermediate zones" conception. The way it now came out was that the two poles in the worldwide struggle were China, on the one hand, and US imperialism and the Soviet Union, on the other, and that between these poles lay all the other states-socialist, developing, and imperialist. The countries of this intermediate zone were treated as reserves and potential allies not only against US imperialism but against the Soviet Union. In Lin Piao's 1965 article "Hail the Victory of the People's War!" was formulated the "people's war" strategy, the gist of which was that Asia, Africa and Latin America were the "world village,'' that it was here the revolution would develop, and do so on the Chinese model and hence under China's leadership, and that the world-wide victory of the socialist revolution would come through the revolutionary "world village" closing in on the "world city"-Western Europe and North America.
279On the practical level, the Chinese leaders attempted at this time to break up the socialist community and then unite what they could around Peking. In the Third World they tried to persuade the Asian, African and Latin American peoples that China was the staunchest and most consistent fighter against imperialism -and colonialism, sought to isolate the national liberation movement from the socialist countries and the world communist movement, and impelled the freedom-- fighters towards adventurist action. They set their face against any move to lessen international tension, campaigned for armament-building, and tried to provoke international conflict wherever possible. In doing so they declared that war would speed up the world revolutionary process, that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'' In talking like this, Mao was not original. He was echoing almost word for word the conception of the ancient philosopher Shang Yang (4th century B. C.), who declared that "if a country is poor but bends its efforts to war... it will certainly become powerful. If a country is rich but fights no wars... it is certainly enfeebled.'' To be sure, Mao somewhat modified that conception: he preferred the fighting to be done by others, and pinned his chief hopes on a nuclear clash between the USSR and the USA.
By 1966 it was apparent that Peking had lost out. The socialist countries, with just one exception, had declined to support its policy. The Third World nations had perceived that it was an adventurist and irresponsible policy, and only two or three of them had remained on friendly terms with China. As may be seen from the secret Pentagon papers now published in the United States, 280 the US Government had taken advantage of Peking's divisive line to launch its aggressive war in Indochina. The Chinese leadership and Mao personally were responsible for having exposed to attack the Communist Party and other progressive forces of Indonesia.
A bitter struggle developed within the Chinese leadership as a result. Some members of it criticised Mao's adventurist line, proposed more realistic policies, objected to the personality cult, recommended ending Mao's incompetent interference in the economy.
Leaning on the army and using the youth whom they made their dupes, Mao and his group smashed their opponents. A military-bureaucratic regime was instituted in the country.
During the "cultural revolution" the Maoists attempted to provoke "people's wars" in other countries, and to start a hungweiping movement on a world scale. They engaged in hostile actions against all socialist countries except Albania. They interfered grossly in the affairs of India and Burma, Nepal and Ceylon, Laos and Cambodia, Malaysia and Indonesia and various African nations.
In the heat of conflict the Maoists revealed their true intentions to an extent which they now seem to regret. They threatened to make short work of other peoples, laid claim to territories belonging to neighbouring countries, declared that China must lead the world, vowed to "plant the banner of Mao Tse-tung" in other countries' capitals.
The "cultural revolution" further discredited Peking. China found herself in oppressive international isolation. Many of the splinter groups 281 which Maoist agents had formed with so much difficulty in some countries fell to pieces.
Starting with the latter half of 1969, as the "cultural revolution" was back-pedalled, the methods and tactics of Chinese foreign policy again began to change. Peking has been trying to make its policy look respectable. Interference has been less crude, it has been covered up carefully with smiling yuan diplomacy. But underneath all this camouflage the long-term objectives remain the same.
By means of a differentiated approach to the socialist countries the Chinese leaders are trying to erode the socialist community, to oppose some countries to others, to get at least some to adopt an anti-Soviet platform. With some countries Peking flirts, forgetting that only a short time ago it was calling them insulting names; against others it keeps up the hostile campaign. Chinese propaganda spreads false tales about Soviet policy and misrepresents the purposes of the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The Chinese leaders gloat no less than the imperialists over any temporary difficulties in this or that country.
Peking is wooing many Asian and African countries, endeavouring to make them bases of its activity. Exploiting the difficulties in Pakistan and the complications between that country and India, it is trying to catch the Pakistani leaders in its net. Chinese emissaries are hard at work in Africa, seen as a convenient field to apply the Maoist conceptions and an area where it is relatively easy to create seats of international conflict. The aid given some Asian and African nations is meant to break their links with the 282 socialist states, make them dependent on Peking and turn them into instruments of its policy.
Peking is extending relations with the imperialist states; it is anxious to lay hands on their technological achievements and be able to influence their policy.
While posing as "staunch,'' ``firm'' allies of the national liberation movement and accusing others of ``collusion'' with imperialism, the Chinese leaders forget all about their duty to that movement as soon as they see a chance to make a deal with the imperialists that will serve their nationalistic ambitions. That is the light in which the progressive forces see a number of recent moves by Peking.
The main theme in Chinese foreign policy at the present time is a clamour against "the monopoly of the two superpowers.'' Ignoring the class approach and attempting to equate the imperialist United States and the socialist Soviet Union, the masters of the "Celestial Empire" have produced the idea of a united front of the "small and medium countries.'' This new doctrine is of much the same order as the "intermediate zones" conception. Its chief purpose is to prove that it is for China to be leader of the "small and medium countries.'' In an interview given a French journalist last September, the Peking leaders declared that China was "the only country in the world capable of ending the world supremacy of the two superpowers.'' And in statements repeated recently, China's Premier has offered China as protector to the ``small'' and ``weak'' countries.
Referring to the Chinese Premier's remarks about "the hegemony of the two superpowers,'' General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 283 USA Gus Hall observes (Daily World, June 12): "Is the role of the Soviet Union and US imperialism the same in the Mid-East, in Africa, in Latin America? They are at the opposite dialectical poles. One is the main force of oppression and exploitation, the other the main outside force of support to the forces of liberation and freedom. To speak about them in general terms as ' superpowers' is a service to US imperialism.''
We see that whereas formerly Peking laid claim to leadership of the revolutionary forces of the contemporary world, now it is calling for a bloc that would alike embrace socialist countries, developing nations and imperialist powers. In so doing it betrays its secret aim-to become, on the pretence of opposing "the two superpowers,'' the greatest superpower of all. Isn't it like the fairytale Wolf trying to imitate Mother Goat's voice so as to eat up the goat's little ones?
However the Chinese leaders may disguise their true ambitions, their policy was and is a chauvinist, great-power policy fraught with danger to the peoples and to the cause of peace. That will come home in time even to those who today have illusions about it and even repeat the Maoist rubbish about a "monopoly of the two superpowers.''
Only abandonment of chauvinist ambitions and unprincipled adventurist policies, a return to the path of normal relations with other countries, based on generally accepted standards of intercourse, can bring China the standing and prestige in the world that the great Chinese people is entitled to enjoy.
New Times, No. 30, 1971
[284] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Concerning the Economic RelationsYu. Vladimirov
The events which have taken place in China in recent years make it quite clear that the Maoist group which usurped power in the country with the help of the armed forces, is following a policy that is directly opposed to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Defying all the revolutionary forces of our time, the Maoists have launched China on a path of economic, political, ideological and military adventurism that has not only harmed the cause of socialism in that country and jeopardised the socialist gains of the Chinese people, but has weakened the socialist community of nations and precipitated serious differences in the international communist movement, thereby greatly harming the cause of socialism throughout the world.
Being well aware of the fact that the main barrier to the accomplishment of their adventuristic, great-power ambitions is the Soviet Union and its Communist Party, the Maoists have declared the Party of Lenin and the world's first state of working people to be their main enemy. Besides their continuous slandering of our country the Maoists are attempting to whip up hatred for the 285 Soviet Union which has always stood as the symbol of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. As part of this campaign the Maoists are presenting Soviet-Chinese economic relations in such a way as to belittle the importance of Soviet economic aid to China, and are accusing the USSR of wanting to subjugate China to its economic and political interests. In their efforts to keep the world national-liberation movement apart from the Soviet Union, the socialist community and the international communist movement, with the aim of turning it into a tool of their great-power policy, the Maoists are misrepresenting the nature of Soviet economic assistance to the Chinese People's Republic by describing China as a ``victim'' of Soviet foreign economic policy, and are ``warning'' the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America against having any economic or other contacts with the USSR.
Imperialist propaganda seizes upon such Maoist pronouncements in order to defame the socialist community and impugn the cause of communism as a whole. However, no slander or fabrications by the enemies of the Soviet Union and communism can conceal the fact that while China was marching together with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries it scored major successes in overcoming the economic, social, ideological and political effects of the country's long period under the domination of foreign imperialists and its own feudal bureaucracy, and great successes in the subsequent construction of the foundations of socialism. Conversely, when China, under the pressure of the Maoists, isolated itself from the Soviet Union and other socialist states by its 286 policy of hostility, it ran into a blind alley and was thrown back more than ten years in its development. The Maoists have been unable to blot out the memory of the internationalist aid, unprecedented in scale and effectiveness, which the Soviet Union rendered to China in its economic development. Neither the Chinese people nor the rest of the world have forgotten it.
The economic ties between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, dealt with in this article, are an important aspect of Soviet-Chinese relations. A study of these ties affords a good idea of the state of Soviet-Chinese relations in the period between 1950 and 1966.~^^1^^
At the beginning of the 1950's China was an economically and technically backward country. The war in Korea in which the People's Republic of China took part, and the economic blockade organised by the imperialist states delayed the overcoming of this backwardness and the building of the foundations of socialism in China. In those conditions the People's Republic of China found it very difficult to rebuild its national economy, to effect deep-going socio-economic changes, and to build the foundations of socialism. _-_-_
~^^1^^ This period is marked, on one side, by the conclusion on February 14, 1950, of a Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance which paved the way for comprehensive inter-state relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, and, on the other, by the llth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (August, 1966) at which the Maoists, contrary to the interests of the socialist countries, and especially against the interests of the Chinese people, enunciated their anti-Soviet line as the official policy of the People's Republic of China, stretching Soviet-Chinese relations to breaking point.
287 The People's Republic of China was in need of all-round assistance. The only country whose assistance could, in its scale and technical level, meet the requirements of the PRC was the Soviet Union, and this assistance the Soviet Union was ready to provide in line with the principles of proletarian internationalism.China required massive investments, large quantities of modern industrial equipment, and experienced engineers, technicians, and skilled workers in order to restore its national economy and eliminate its economic backwardness and its dependence on the imperialist states, and to build the material and technical basis of socialism. In the first years after the formation of the People's Republic of China the country had none of these things. The magnitude of the economic and technical assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to China was unprecedented in its scale and effectiveness. The USSR provided this assistance at the most critical period for the People's Republic of China, when the restoration and development of the national economy was a question of life and death for new China. In that complicated domestic and international situation Soviet economic and technical assistance provided the means for solving extremely difficult political, social, economic and other problems. This assistance enabled the People's Republic of China to restore and reconstruct its national economy in record time and lay the foundations of a modern industry which made it possible for China to eliminate the economic backwardness of the country and build the material and technical basis of socialism.
Soviet assistance to China was not in the form 288 of surplus goods it could find no use for. The Soviet Union shared with the People's Republic of China what it often needed itself. In this the Soviet Union was motivated by a desire to help the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people to turn China into an industrial socialist state and an ally in the common struggle for the triumph of communism. The Soviet Union was also guided by its desire to strengthen the socialist community as a whole-this powerful factor of the world revolutionary process.
Helped by the Soviet Union, the Chinese people restored the war-ravaged economy over the short period between 1950 and 1959, and built more than 250 large industrial enterprises, factories and various industrial projects, all of them complete with the latest machinery and equipment.~^^1^^ Besides expanding and modernising the old industries, such as the production of iron and steel, non-- ferrous metals, and power industry, China now had brand-new industries for the manufacture of aircraft, cars, tractors, power and heavy machinery, instrument-making, electro-technical and radio-technical industries, and some important branches of the chemical industry. The factories and plants built in the People's Republic of China with Soviet assistance, helped to raise the country's annual output to the following: cast iron--8.7 million tons, steel--8.4 million tons, rolled metal--6.5 million tons, coal--17.2 million tons, aluminium--38 thousand tons, ammonia--150 _-_-_
~^^1^^ See 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, The Policy of the Soviet Union '-Towards the People's Republic of China: Socialist Internationalism i?i Action; The Leninist Policy of the USSR Toward.': China, Collection of Articles, M.. 1968, p. 201.
__PRINTERS_P_289_COMMENT__ 19--193 289 thousand tons, sulphuric acid-250 thousand tons, heavy machinery-60 thousand tons, mining equipment-20 thousand tons, oil processing and chemical equipment-40 thousand tons, steam and hydraulic turbines (capacity)-1.7 million kw., power generators (capaoity)-0.6 million kw., tractors (in conventional units)-42 thousand, lorries-30 thousand, metal-cutting machines-3.7 thousand, and steam boilers for thermal power stations-total capacity of 7 thousand tons of steam an hour. At the power stations built and reconstructed with Soviet assistance, turbo-generators with an aggregate capacity of 4 million kw. were put into operation.~^^1^^ In 1960 the factories and plants built with Soviet assistance turned out 30 per cent of the total production of cast iron in the country, about 40 per cent of the steel, more than 50 per cent of the rolled metal, 80 per cent of the lorries, more than 90 per cent of the tractors, 30 per cent of the synthetic amonia, 25 per cent of power, 55 per cent of the steam and hydraulic turbines, about 20 per cent of the power generators, 25 per cent of the aluminium, over 10 per cent of the heavy machinery, etc.^^2^^The 250 large industrial projects built with Soviet technical assistance are only a part of the sweeping fifteen-year programme of Soviet technical assistance to the People's Republic of China providing for the construction, reconstruction and expansion of more than 400 large industrial _-_-_
~^^1^^ See O. Borisov, B. Koloskov. The Policy of the Soviet Union Towards the People's Republic of China: Socialist Internationalism in Action; The Leninist Policy of the USSR Towards China, Collection of Articles, M., 1968, pp. 202--203.
^^2^^ Ibid., p. 203.
290 enterprises, factories and individual projects. The scale of this programme is evident from the fact that the USSR undertook to help the People's Republic of China to build 12 metal-smelting plants and factories with a designed annual capacity of 28 million tons of cast iron, 30 million tons of steel and 25 million tons of rolled metal; three plants for the production of aluminium with a total capacity of 738 thousand tons a year; factories for the production of tin with a total capacity of 25 thousand tons a year; seven plants for the manufacture of metallurgical, mining, oilrefining and chemical equipment with a total capacity of 240 thousand tons of goods a year; seventeen plants for the production of steam, gas and hydraulic turbines and generators for them, with a total annual capacity of 11.2 million kw; 100 factories and plants working for national defence.~^^1^^ This programme would have been implemented had it not been for the Maoist group which began, in 1961, to scale down the scientific and technical and other ties with the Soviet Union.When work began in China on the restoration of its national economy .and on the implementation of the extensive programme for economic rehabilitation, it had very few skilled engineers, technicians or scientists. That is why China found it extremely difficult to build a socialist economy unaided, especially its industry. Because of this, the Soviet Union, between 1950 and 1960, sent over ten thousand highly skilled specialists to China, and organised the training of Chinese scientific and technical personnel and workers at _-_-_
~^^1^^ Op. cit, p. 201.
__PRINTERS_P_291_COMMENT__ 19* 291 Soviet industrial establishments, at colleges, and at design and research organisations. In the period between 1951 and 1962, more than eight thousand Chinese citizens received their industrial and technical training in the Soviet Union. In the same period more than 11 thousand Chinese students and postgraduates studied at Soviet educational establishments. About one thousand scientific workers from the Academy of Sciences of China underwent training at research institutes of the USSR Academy of Science. In addition to this, over 1,500 Chinese engineers, technicians and scientists visited the Soviet Union to study the scientific and technological achievements and experience of this country.The assistance the USSR rendered to China in the scientific and technical sphere was of tremendous significance for socialist construction in the People's Republic of China. Over the 1954-- 59 period alone, the USSR handed over more than 24 thousand sets of scientific and technical papers to China. The scope and effectiveness of Soviet assistance in this sphere is evident from the fact that in China at present all industries without exception turn out certain types of products which have been developed according to Soviet blueprints, technical specifications and technological papers handed over to China. All those papers which foreign experts valued at thousands of millions of dollars, were turned over to China free of charge. However, the value of Soviet assistance lay, not so much in its monetary value, as in the fact that China would not have been able to get from elsewhere the up-to-date technical and engineering information she needed in order to undertake extensive economic reconstruction. 292 None of the advanced capitalist countries wanted to help China to overcome her economic backwardness. But even if any of them had agreed to do so, the People's Republic of China would either have had to pay large sums in foreign currency (which China did not have at that time) for this assistance, or would have had to sacrifice its political and economic independence. Moreover, the Soviet Union, in 1950--61, extended to China long-term credits on easy terms, totalling 1,816 million foreign exchange (convertible) roubles.~^^1^^
Besides economic, scientific and technical aid to China for the development of her national economy, the Soviet Union played an important role in building up China's modern defence industry. In addition to technical assistance in building factories and plants for defence and equipping them with modern machinery, the Soviet Union furnished China with a great deal in the way of blueprints and technological specifications for the production of modern armaments and military equipment. China also received large amounts of modern military materiel, armaments, and other equipment for the People's Liberation Army of China.
Trade played an important part in the system of Soviet-Chinese economic relations over the period under review. The People's Republic of China received from the Soviet Union all that was necessary for the restoration and development of her national economy, and exported her own goods to the Soviet Union in return for the _-_-_
~^^1^^ M. A. Suslov, On the Struggle of the CPSU for the Unity of International Communist Movement, M., 1964, p. 53.
293 financial and other forms of assistance. The following figures illustrate the importance of SovietChinese trade for the People's Republic of China. Before the creation of the People's Republic of China a mere five per cent of China's foreign trade was with the USSR,^^1^^ but in 1950 this was increased to 23 per cent, and in 1958 to 50 per cent.^^2^^ During the first five-year plan period (1953--57) in China, 57.1 per cent of China's foreign trade was with the USSR.Because of the bad economic situation in the People's Republic of China in the first few years of its existence (a backward economy crippled by war, and rather poor export possibilities), and in view of its need for rapid economic rehabilitation and development, as well as for increased defence capability, the Soviet Union made sizeable economic and military credits available to China. These enabled China to import from the USSR large amounts of goods, which were of vital importance for the restoration and development of China's economy, for the strengthening of her national defence and for ensuring the vital needs of the Chinese people. Between 1949 and 1955 the Soviet exports to China exceeded its imports from it. Over a period of six years this excess of export over import ran into 947.3 million roubles.
The active balance in Soviet-Chinese trade meant therefore that the Soviet Union allocated from its national income and extended to China _-_-_
~^^1^^ An Economic Profile of Mainland China, Studies prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1967, p. 592.
~^^2^^ See Our Friend China, M., 1959, p. 371.
294 long-term credits for the urgent economic needs of the People's Republic of China. As the People's Republic of China used up the Soviet credits in the restoration and development of its national economy, its resources increased and export possibilities grew accordingly. Beginning in 1956, when the national economy of China had been completely restored and developed, and when many of its branches met the targets of the first five-year plan ahead of schedule, it began to pay off its debts to the Soviet Union. It was from 1956 on that China's exports to the USSR exceeded her imports from this country. Over nine years (1956--64) the People's Republic of China overcame the imbalance in its trade with the Soviet Union by additional deliveries of commodities and by making some payments in foreign currency.The structure and character of Soviet export to China were determined primarily by our country's desire to render the greatest possible assistance to a fraternal country in the restoration of its national economy, in the satisfaction of the vital needs of the Chinese people, in the creation of a firm basis for socialist industrialisation and for the development of the People's Republic of China on socialist lines. During the restoration period in China, the main Soviet export items to China were machines and equipment, ferrous metals, oil products, etc. Between 1950 and 1952, the Soviet Union delivered to China 276.93 million roubles worth of machinery and equipment, or 21.6 per cent of the total cost of Soviet exports to China in that period. Moreover, while in the first several years of the restoration period the Soviet Union delivered mostly separate types of 295 machinery and equipment necessary for the restoration and reconstruction of industrial projects built before the establisment of the PRC, in later years, after 1951, the Soviet export to China consisted to an increasing extent of complete sets of plant. The reason for this was that the USSR began providing equipment for 50 industrial establishments, which had been completed or were being built with its help. These included the Anshan metal-manufacturing combine, the Fengman hydro-power station, and the thermal power stations in the cities of Penhsihu, Taiyuan, Chungching, and Sian. During the first five-pear plan period when the People's Republic of China was launching an extensive programme of industrialisation and the country needed machinery and equipment, the Soviet Union supplied 639 million roubles' worth of industrial plant.~^^1^^ Machinery and equipment made up almost half of Soviet exports to China. In 1957 the share of complete sets of plant in Soviet exports to China was 77 per cent. At a time when the steel industry of the People's Republic of China was just being restored and the country was producing no more than 1.3 million tons a year, the Soviet Union shipped 943 thousand tons of iron and steel to China between 1950 and 1952, or ' 40 per cent of Chinese production for that period. During the first five-year plan period when China was suffering from a metal shortage the ! Soviet Union shipped 300,825 million roubles' worth of rolled steel and tubing which were in I short supply in China (almost two million tons).
_-_-_~^^1^^ See M. Sladkovsky. Development of Trade Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 1959, No. 10, p. 7.
296In old China the highest output of petroleum products ever reached (mainly obtained from shale) was 320 thousand tons. Local oil refineries operated exclusively on imported oil. It was because of this that Soviet shipments of petroleum products were of such great importance to the People's Republic of China. In the years of reconstruction China produced 943 thousand tons of petroleum products (including 216,000 tons of benzine and 71,500 tons of kerosine). Over the same period the Soviet Union delivered to China 1.5 million tons of petroleum products (including 506,000 tons of benzine, 477,000 tons of kerosine, 160,000 tons of diesel fuel, and 154,000 tons of lubricants). As a result of Soviet assistance the output of petroleum products in the People's Republic of China rose from 436,000 tons in 1952 to 1,460,000 tons in 1957. But in spite of this increase the Soviet Union remained China's main supplier of petroleum products. In the course of the first five-year plan period the Soviet Union delivered about seven million tons of petroleum products to the People's Republic of China. In 1957 alone the USSR exported 1,803 thousand tons of petroleum products to the People's Republic of China.~^^1^^
In the first few years after the formation of the People's Republic of China the Soviet Union exported to it large quantities of cotton fabrics and other consumer goods, such as sugar, shoes, clothing, and tobacco. However, as the national _-_-_
~^^1^^ See M. Sladkovsky, Soviet-Chinese Economic Cooperation. Ten Years of the People's Republic of China, M., 1959, p. 186; M. Sladkovsky, Development of Trade Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, pp. 4, 7, 8.
297 economy of China was being restored and as it became more and more capable of supplying its population with consumer goods, their import from the USSR was sharply reduced and stopped altogether at the end of the first five-year plan period.The People's Republic of China greatly benefited from the import of goods from the Soviet Union. The economic blockade and embargo on trade with China imposed by the United States and other imperialist states made the socialist countries, and especially the Soviet Union, the only supply source of modern means of production for the People's Republic of China. "Over a number of years means of production dominated our import. It helped greatly to restore and develop industrial and farm production, and speeded up the successful socialist industrialisation of the country,'' wrote Yeh Chi-Chuang, PRC Minister of Foreign Trade. "We would like to emphasise the fact that the fraternal socialist countries, and especially the Soviet Union, rendered us tremendous disinterested aid which helped to expedite socialist construction in our country and create the mainstay of socialist industrialisation.''~^^1^^
China also imported Soviet goods which it used for the strengthening of its defences. The delivery of goods for military purposes was particularly intensive in 1950--53 when the People's Republic of China and the Korean People's Democratic Republic were fighting against _-_-_
~^^1^^ Yeh Chi-Chuang. The Foreign Trade of Our Country Over the Past Decade, Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 1959, No. 10, p. 14.
298 American imperialism and China was defending its frontiers. But even after the war the shipment of Soviet weapons rated high in China's import, while the country was modernising its armed forces. As the modernisation of the People's Liberation Army of China came to an end, and defence industry enterprises built with Soviet assistance were completed, the import of military equipment from the Soviet Union was sharply reduced. The large military deliveries from the Soviet Union between 1950 and 1957 were of tremendous importance for the People's Republic of China. On the one hand they helped to quickly re-equip the People's Liberation Army of China with modern weapons. On the other hand, the Soviet deliveries of weapons, munitions and equipment enabled China to use considerable manpower and material resources to speed up the process of restoration and peaceful development of China's national economy.Soviet deliveries to China not only helped to satisfy China's economic demands, to strengthen its defence potential and meet the vital needs of the Chinese people, but also helped to develop China's export capacity. China needed greatly to increase exports to meet the bill for its growing import of industrial goods which it needed for the restoration and reconstruction of its national economy and later for launching an extensive programme of economic development. At the same time China wanted to export the goods which were in fairly large supply on the home market. Considering the economic situation in China and its export possibilities, the Soviet Union imported from China, between 1950 and 1960, raw materials for the production of foodstuffs, rare and 299 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/20071228/383.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2008.01.01) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ alloying metals (tin, mercury, tungsten, molybdenic concentrates, spodumen, beryllium, etc.), textile fibre (raw silk, wool, jute, hemp, etc.), textiles (silks and woollens, linen table cloths, and other articles), such raw materials as tung oil, ethereal oils, bristle, hides, etc., some chemicals, hand-- crafted articles, haberdashery, rugs, etc.
At the same time, having rehabilitated the national economy destroyed by the nazi invaders, the Soviet Union was speeding up socialist construction. Beginning with 1953, a large number of measures were taken in the USSR to ensure the growth of all the branches of the national economy, especially agriculture. The economic advance in the Soviet Union led to a marked improvement in living standards. In an effort to satisfy the needs of th'e Soviet people as far as possible and to promote the further progress of the Soviet economy, the Soviet Communist Party concentrated on the development of our country's internal reserves and resources. However, the import of goods from abroad was welcome at this time and this favoured the export of Chinese goods to the Soviet Union.
Right from the first years of its existence the People's Republic of China exported most of its goods to the Soviet Union and it is not possible to overestimate the importance of the capacious and stable Soviet market for China, especially at the time when she was boycotted by the United States and many other capitalist countries. Even in 1957 when the imperialist policy of economic blockade and trade embargo had failed,~^^1^^ and _-_-_
~^^1^^ In 1957 the capitalist countries of the West relaxed their restrictions on trade with China. They were compelled to __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 301. 300 more than 70 countries and areas of the world had established economic relations with the Chinese Peopled Republic,~^^1^^ its export to the Soviet Union was as follows: 100 per cent of its export of jute sacking, 96 per cent of coconut oil, 87.1 per cent of apples, 76.6 per cent of wool, 69.5 per cent of tin preserves, 66.8 per cent of tobacco, 64.8 per cent of frozen pork, 59.1 per cent of peanuts in the shell, 58.1 per cent of citrus fruit, 50.8 per cent of frozen veal and mutton, 50.1 per cent of soya beans, 41.3 per cent of resins, 37.6 per cent of shelled peanuts, 36.9 per cent of bristle, 31.6 per cent of rice, 28.7 per cent of tea, 91 per cent of tungsten concentrate, 85.2 per cent of tin, 82.9 per cent of molybdenum concentrate, 80 per cent of cement, 53.4 per cent of cast iron, 28.4 per cent of caustic soda, 95.3 per cent of woollen textile, 62.5 per cent of manufactured silk.
It should also be borne in mind that the People's Republic of China, as a newly developing country, with its poor choice and quality of goods, found it difficult to get into the world market, and to withstand the competition of other developing countries, as well as of the economically _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 300. do so by the economic difficulties in the capitalist world and by the adverse situation on the capitalist market. Besides they saw that China was getting all that was necessary from her trade with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. On May 30, 1957, Britain announced that it would sell to China goods open for sale to the USSR and the countries of people's democracy. Similar announcements were made later by Holland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Portugal, France, West Germany, Japan and Italy. As a result, 33.9 per cent of China's foreign trade in 1957 was with the capitalist countries.
~^^1^^ Duivai Maoi (Foreign Trade), 1958, No.~1.
301 advanced capitalist states. It was only China's close economic ties with the socialist countries, and especially with the USSR, that enabled her to export large quantities of industrial and agricultural^^1^^ raw material and other commodities at fixed prices.Trade between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in 1950--67 was carried out under the inter-governmental trade agreement signed on April 19, 1950. The goods from the USSR to China and from China to the USSR were delivered in accordance with inventories which were reviewed and agreed upon by both sides -every year. The trade agreement of April 19, 1950, was pronounced effective from January 1 to December 31, 1950, that is, for a term of one year. However, the governments of the USSR and the People's Republic of China regularly extended the term of this agreement by a further year. This means that, in effect, Soviet-Chinese trade was carried on without a long-term trade agreement.~^^2^^ Nevertheless it is wrong to say, as _-_-_
~^^1^^ Unprocessed and processed agricultural raw material and the produce from farmers' subsidiary plots of land made up 90.7 per cent (in 1950) and 71.6 per cent (in 1957) of China's exports. See Ten Great Years. Statistics of the Economic and Cultural Achievements of the People's Republic of China, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1960, p. 176.
~^^2^^ On April 23, 1958, the governments of the USSR and China signed a treaty on trade and navigation. In this document the two sides expressed a desire to take all the necessary measures to develop and consolidate commercial relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The treaty stipulated that the governments of the USSR and China would conclude agreements, including long-term ones, for promoting goods turnover to meet the needs of the national economy of each of the signatory states. The USSR __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 303. 302 some bourgeois authorities do, that Soviet-Chinese trade had no long-term legal basis, and that it was the Soviet Union which did not want to commit itself to any long-term trade agreement with the People's Republic of China. The fact is that, in the first place, in the period between 1950 and 1964 Soviet-Chinese trade meant more than a mere commercial operation. Soviet exports to the People's Republic of China included, besides purely commercial deliveries, deliveries under an economic aid programme and under a military aid programme. Chinese exports to the USSR included trade deliveries and payment for Soviet economic and military credits to China and interest on them. As for economic aid, military aid and credits, they were extended to the People's Republic of China on the basis of long-term agreements. In the second place, the Soviet Union repeatedly suggested that both sides review the question of signing a long-term agreement in order to provide for stable commercial ties between the USSR and China. The Chinese side, however, permanently declined to discuss this question.
All practical questions concerning Soviet-- Chinese trade relations were regulated at first by "The General Terms of Delivery of Goods by Soviet and Chinese Foreign Trade Organisations,'' signed on March 29, 1952, and later by "The General Terms of Delivery of Goods from the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China and from the People's Republic of China to the Soviet Union" _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 302. and the People's Republic of China also announced that they would accord each other favoured-nation treatment on all questions concerning trade and other types of econoni'c relations.
303 which were discussed and signed by both sides twice-on February 12, 1955, and on April 10, 1957. "The General Terms" included a large number of questions concerning Soviet-Chinese trade, including "terms of delivery, dates of delivery, quantity and quality of goods, containers and markings, consignment notifications, payment procedure, sanctions, complaints, arbitration, and general matters.''The question of prices is of tremendous importance for the Soviet-Chinese trade relations. In its letter to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party of February 29, 1964, the Mao Tsetung group said that prices on many goods and equipment imported from the Soviet Union were much higher than those on the world market.~^^1^^ That is not true. The Soviet-Chinese trade agreement of April 19, 1950, stipulated that prices in Soviet-Chinese trade would be determined "on the basis of world market prices in roubles.'' In the course of the Soviet-Chinese trade talks in 1950 all sale and purchase prices were based on the world capitalist market prices of equivalent commodities for the preceding year. This system of price setting was largely in use until 1958. The principle of stability of prices used in trade between the USSR and China, as well as in trade between the USSR and other socialist countries, was aimed at protecting the prices established in trade between socialist countries from the harmful effects of the unstable capitalist market. This _-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Peking, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964, p. 33.
304 inevitably led to situations when the USSR and China sold each other goods at prices either higher or lower than those on the world capitalist market. According to some Chinese sources, the prices of various machines imported by China from the USSR during, and immediately after, the Korean war were some 20--30 per cent lower, and on some types of equipment for heavy industry 30--60 per cent lower than the prices of the equivalent types of equipment on the British and American markets.~^^1^^ Somewhat later, as a result of a change in prices on the world capitalist market, the Soviet Union, in turn, could buy wool, rice, jute, tung oil, black tea, raw silk, tin, tungsten concentrate, etc., at prices which were lower than those on the world market.^^2^^Following this change in prices on the world market which affected the prices of certain goods in Soviet-Chinese trade, some price readjustments were made in the course of 1950--58, by agreement between the two trading partners. In 1958 prices were again reviewed by mutual consent. The new prices were set by both sides in line with average annual prices on the major world markets for 1957 and have since remained unchanged by agreement between the two sides.
The principle of price setting was worked out in two letters (April 23, 1958, and February 26, 1959) exchanged between the sides, and was reaffirmed in annual trade protocols on the Soviet-- _-_-_
^^1^^ Sec Peng Ming, The History of Friendship Between the Soviet and Chinese Peoples, in Chinese, Peking, 1955 p. 138.
^^2^^ Yeh Chi-chuang, Speech at the 4th Session of the AllChina Assembly of People's Representatives, July 11, 1957, Jenmin Jihpao, July 12, 1957.
__PRINTERS_P_305_COMMENT__ 20--193 305 Chinese trade at the suggestion of the Chinese side and with the consent of the Soviet side. Thus the Chinese statements made after 1960 that the prices on many types of Soviet goods and equipment were much higher than the prices which existed on the world market, and that for this reason trade with the Soviet Union brought no returns to China are at variance with the facts. The prices adopted in 1958 by both sides still operate in Soviet-Chinese trade.Another question raised in connection with Soviet-Chinese trade is that of the quality of goods exchanged between the two countries. Some bourgeois propagandists who are concerned not so much with the economic interests of the People's Republic of China as with the fast growth of Soviet trade with many countries and who regard the Soviet Union as a serious competitor on the world market, are trying to convince the trading partners of the USSR (especially the developing countries) that Soviet goods are of an inferior quality and they refer to "China's experience" in this matter. But as no direct statements about poor quality of Soviet goods have been made by Chinese officials, these propagandists resort to dubious methods. One American authority on Sino-Soviet economic relations, Chy-yuan Cheng,^^1^^ cited some Chinese official figures on breakage of imported Soviet equipment, which had actually been caused by the lack of experience of Chinese workers and technicians. This was in order to cause doubts about the quality of Soviet-made goods.
It is possible, of course, that the flood of _-_-_
~^^1^^ Chy-yuan Cheng. Op. cit. 300
306 machinery, equipment and other goods which was sent to China from the USSR over many years, contained some substandard samples. For example, the People's Republic of China often imported large quantities of first models of the latest Soviet equipment. This fact was hailed with great satisfaction in China. The Chinese press repeatedly pointed out that the Soviet Union had helped China install equipment which factories and plants in the USSR did not have themselves. It stands to reason that some of this equipment, which had not passed the test of time, must have had faults which called for readjustment of design. In every case such faulty equipment was either replaced or brought up to the required standards by Soviet specialists and at the expense of the Soviet side, in accordance with established international commercial practice. The Chinese goods imported to the Soviet Union were treated in a similar way: when a commodity from China did not meet the required standards the responsibility for it was borne by the Chinese side. On the whole the quality of Soviet goods delivered to China was high. The 250 industrial enterprises, factories and projects built with Soviet assistance and equipped with Soviet-made machinery, tens of thousands of machine tools and instruments manufactured from Soviet blueprints and with the help of Soviet equipment and now working at Chinese factories are evidence of this.The volume of trade turnover between China and the USSR rose in the 1950--59 period (in 1953 it doubled over the 1950 figure and in 1959 was 43 per cent higher than in 1953), and fell beginning with 1960. This is a specific feature of Soviet-Chinese economic relations. In 1966 the __PRINTERS_P_307_COMMENT__ 20* 307 volume of trade exchange between the USSR and China was only 15.5 per cent of its 1959 volume and was 50 per cent less than the 1950 volume. This sharp reduction of Sino-Soviet trade cannot be explained only by the fact that after 1960, following the failure of the "big leap" and the " people's communes" policies, China's foreign trade took a downward turn which continued up to 1963. The sharp reduction of Soviet-Chinese trade relations did not stem from the economic situation but from the anti-Soviet political line of Mao Tse-tung and his group.
This group regarded China's external economic policy as part of its foreign policy and as its tool. Therefore the changes taking place in the foreign policy of the leadership of the Communist Party of China were immediately reflected in its economic policy. The deterioration of relations between the Soviet Communist Party and the Mao Tse-tung group, caused by the hegemonic aspirations and divisive activities of the latter, affected the interstate economic relations between the Soviet Union and China. At the end of 1959 the Mao Tse-tung group took a course aimed at terminating economic relations with the Soviet Union. In 1960 trade was down 19 per cent on the 1959 level. In 1961 it was reduced by 46 per cent compared with I960; in 1962 it declined by another 22 per cent, and in 1963 by a further 20 per cent. And whereas in 1959 the Soviet Union accounted for 50 per cent of China's foreign trade, in 1960 its share went down to 40 per cent, in 1961 to 31 per cent, in 1962 to 28 per cent and in 1963 to 21 per cent, and continued to sharply decline in subsequent years. In 1965 a mere 15 per cent of China's foreign trade was with the Soviet 308 Union, and in 1966 this fell to 7 per cent and in 1967 to 2 per cent.~^^1^^
Following the directions of the Mao Tse-tung group, the representatives of the People's Republic of China at the Soviet-Chinese talks cut down the volume of goods negotiated for trade, rejecting many items which had become traditional Soviet exports to China. For example, in December 1961 the Chinese negotiators announced that the import of Soviet complete sets of plant would be reduced to about a fifth as compared with the preceding year, and that in 1962--63 it would be terminated.~^^2^^ The political implications of this move by the Chinese leadership are quite obvious, since the People's Republic of China was at the same time importing industrial plant from the capitalist countries. For example, China purchased industrial plant for 20 factories from Britain, Italy, West Germany, France and Japan.
The anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership in the sphere of foreign trade led to a sharp reduction of Soviet exports to China. In terms of value Soviet exports to China fell from 859.1 million roubles in 1959 to 157.8 million roubles in 1966. The Soviet Union made every effort to check the downward trend in trade turnover with China. Soviet representatives at trade talks offered to expand the volume of Soviet exports to China, but they encountered opposition from the Chinese side. At the same time the Chinese representatives refused to increase the delivery to the Soviet _-_-_
~^^1^^ See 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, Op. cit., pp. 193, 200, 212, 240; M. Kapitsa, To the Left of Common Sense, M., 1968, p. 66.
~^^2^^ See O. Borisov, B. Koloskov. Op. cit., p. 198.
309 Union of goods needed by the Soviet people, including those goods which China was exporting in large amounts to capitalist countries and which had been traditional Chinese export items to the USSR. As a result, the shipment of these commodities to the Soviet Union was sharply reduced. Over the 1959--65 period China reduced its export to the Soviet Union-of tin to 2.5 per cent of its former level, mercury to 3.1 per cent, molybdenic concentrate to 4.2 per cent, tungsten concentrate to 23 per cent, raw silk to 2.8 per cent, tung oil to 8.3 per cent, wool to 15.4 per cent, bristle to 18 per cent.The Chinese representatives tried to camouflage this policy, which was aimed at terminating Soviet-Chinese economic relations, with talks about China's desire to increase the volume of trade with the Soviet Union. They offered in an increasing volume the goods which China found difficult to sell on the world market, and, at the same time, reduced the volume of goods which had become traditional Chinese exports to the Soviet Union. This manoeuvre of the Chinese leadership inevitably led to a sharp reduction in Sino-Soviet trade in the years which preceded the so-called cultural revolution in China. Between 1959 and 1966 the volume of trade between China and the Soviet Union decreased by almost 85 per cent. SinoSoviet currency relations are an important aspect of the economic ties between the USSR and China. In the early stages of Soviet-Chinese economic relations, when China was still suffering from inflation, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China agreed upon the rate of exchange of their currencies. On June 1, 1951, the governments of the USSR and China signed an agreement on the 310 exchange rate of the rouble in relation to the yuan of the People's Bank of China. The agreement stated that "the two sides unanimously agreed to establish the parity of the rouble in relation to the yuan of the People's Bank of China in line with the official price of gold.'' On the day the agreement was signed the rate of exchange was established at 6,754 yuans to the rouble. The agreement came into effect immediately and was considered effective "until the accomplishment of the currency reform in China and the establishment of the amount of pure gold carried by the currency of the People's Republic of China.'' On September 22, 1953, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, a protocol agreement was signed in Peking establishing the exchange rate of the yuan of the People's Bank of China in relation to the rouble. According to this protocol, all monetary operations between the USSR and China were to be conducted on the basis of the agreed ratio of 5,000 yuans to the rouble (instead of 6,754 as was stipulated in the agreement of June 1, 1951). The new ratio between the rouble and the yuan was intended to simplify the working of the forthcoming currency reform in China and to strengthen the yuan against the currencies of other countries. After the monetary reform in March, 1955, in the course of which 10,000 old yuans were exchanged for one new yuan, the exchange ratio between the yuan and the rouble remained the same: 0.5 yuan to the rouble (two roubles to one yuan). Since no fixed gold content of the yuan was specified by the reform, this official exchange rate of the yuan in relation to the rouble remained unaltered, by agreement between the governments of the Soviet Union and China. On December 30, 1957, the 311 governments of the USSR and China signed a protocol agreement on an increase in the exchange rate of the yuan for non-commercial payments. Under this agreement, which came into effect on January 1, 1958, the exchange rate of the yuan in relation to the rouble in non-commercial payments was raised by 200 per cent. This increase in the value of the yuan in non-commercial payments raised the Chinese currency to 16.67 yuans to 100 roubles (600 roubles to 100 yuans). The exchange rate of the rouble to the yuan for noncommercial payments was established on the basis of prices of manufactured sample goods and foodstuffs, and prices of services, and was in line with the prices for equivalent commodities and services in the USSR.
The protocol agreements of October 23, 1956, and December 30, 1957, established the rate of exchange between the rouble and the yuan for non-commercial payments. This new exchange rate was subject to review and verification by agreement between the State Bank of the USSR and the People's Bank of China in case the retail prices on goods and services were changed substantially either in one of the countries or in both of them. After the Soviet Union increased the gold backing of the rouble on January 1, 1961, the buying power of the rouble was also increased. As a result, the exchange rate of the rouble in relation to other currencies, including the currency of the People's Republic of China, was altered. The State Bank of the USSR and the People's Bank of China agreed upon a new exchange rate between the rouble and the yuan: 45 roubles to 100 yuans in commercial payments, and 77.52 roubles to 100 yuans in non-commercial payments.
312These facts show that the currency relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China rested on an objective economic foundation and on the basis of mutual agreement, and that the Soviet Union did not seek to use its currency transactions with China to its own advantage.
The credit relations between the USSR and China were an important part of Sino-Soviet economic relations. They facilitated the building of socialism in the People's Republic of China, and helped to strengthen its national economy and defences. The credits the Soviet Union extended to the People's Republic of China meant that part of the surplus product which forms the accumulation fund, was temporarily taken out of the Soviet national economy and was transferred to China in the form of credits, instead of being used for the expansion of the productive capital or for capital construction in the cultural and service spheres which could have brought additional benefits to the Soviet people. From the purely commercial point of view the Soviet Union stood to gain nothing from its credits to China. Under the planned system of economic management, the Soviet Union would have gained much more from using them for its own domestic needs-for the expansion of production, in order to export the additional products in exchange for the necessary commodities, instead of shipping equipment and machinery (especially complete sets of plant) on credit to China. The payment of interest on its credits - which, by the way, was much lower than on the capitalist market - serves as only a partial compensation for the losses sustained by the Soviet national economy through the temporary 313 withdrawal of a part of the national product from it. This means that the Soviet Union, true to the principles of proletarian internationalism, extended credits to China at the expense of the development of its own national economy and the promotion of the living standards of its people.
The Soviet credits were quite different from the so-called assistance rendered by the capitalist states to developing countries. Soviet credits are not aimed at exploiting people. Nor is their purpose the economic expansion of the Soviet Union, the making of super-profits, or the wresting of political or military concessions from weaker states. The Soviet credits were aimed at helping the Chinese people to build a socialist society in their country. They were extended to the People's Republic of China at the most difficult times of its existence - during the first few years after the revolution when the restoration and development of the national economy was a question of life and death for the young republic; during the 1950--53 period when the People's Republic of China was participating in the Korean war; in 1961 when the adventuristic policy of Mao Tsetung created an extremely difficult economic and political situation in the country.
As a rule these credits were provided in the form of commodities. China also received investment credits which went for the construction of industrial projects designated by the Chinese government. Gold and freely convertible currency as credit means were used on a limited scale in the economic relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. One of the features of the Soviet-Chinese credit relations, as well 314 as the interest on them, was the fact that the Soviet investment and commodity credits were repaid in traditional Chinese export goods. This provided China with a stable guaranteed market for her goods, enabled many of her industries to work to capacity, provided employment for her population and consolidated the fiscal situation in the country.
Most of the credits extended by the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China were in roubles. The credit extended to China on February 14, 1950, was in American dollars, while the credits granted in 1951--55 were in roubles with a gold backing of 0.222168 grams of gold. On January 1, 1961, the gold backing of the rouble was established at 0.987412 grams of gold which accordingly raised the exchange rate of the rouble in relation to the currencies of other countries. The new exchange rate went a long way towards eliminating the difference between the level of world prices and the internal wholesale prices of commodities offered for sale on the world market. The increased gold backing of the rouble made it necessary to recalculate the debts of the People's Republic of China and other recipients of Soviet credits. As a result, the total debt owed to the Soviet Union was reduced by 77.5 per cent. At the same time the prices of goods under the existing agreements on commodity exchange and other deliveries were reduced by exactly the same percentage. Therefore the amount of goods delivered against the Soviet credits, and the rate at which the debts were to be repaid, did not change. The upward revaluation of the rouble did not affect the commodity and credit transaction concluded earlier between the Soviet Union and China. In fact, 315 China lost nothing from the recalculation of the funds specified in these agreements in terms of new roubles.
The Soviet credits to the People's Republic of China went to pay for industrial equipment, machinery, transport, technical assistance, military deliveries. Soviet property handed over to China, and to settle the debts of trading operations. The Soviet credits were offered to the People's Republic of China on advantageous terms-at an annual interest of not more that two per cent-some of the credits were interest-free. The credits were extended, used and repaid with due consideration for the national economic plans of the two countries, and this helped both China and the USSR to fulfill their mutual commitments.
It is important to stress here that the Soviet Union did not claim to provide China with all the means necessary for the industrialisation programme of the whole country, with its collossal population and territory. The aim of Soviet financial assistance to China was to help the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people to make the best use of their domestic resources and internal possibilities in order to create the primary basis of socialist industrialisation, to build a complex of industrial establishments, which the People's Republic of China could use in order to advance at the fastest possible rate, and to eliminate backwardness and grow from a poor agrarian country into a powerful socialist nation. Such an industrial base was created in China with the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. According to Li Hsien-nien, China's Minister of Finance, Soviet loans provided 2 per cent of 316 China's total revenue over ten years.~^^1^^ This figure does not mean that the Soviet loans played a small part in the industrialisation process of the People's Republic of China and in the promotion of its defence capability. The money offered by the Soviet Union was spent very concentratedly, and not within the framework of the national economy as a whole. It went into the building of large, modern industrial establishments-the basis of China's industrialisation. The Soviet military credits were used for modernising the People's Liberation Army of China, for making it a modern army. The very fact that the People's Liberation Army of China was fully equipped with modern materiel, equipment and weapons ( including jet planes, modern tanks, artillery, submarines, and surface war ships) received from the Soviet Union or manufactured according to Soviet blueprints at Chinese factories, and with Soviet aid, speak for the scope, effectiveness and significance of the Soviet credits for the People's Republic of China. Soviet military credits were also used for the building of barracks and for providing the soldiers and officers of the People's Liberation Army of China with foodstuffs and equipment. Soviet credits were provided in sufficient quantities to have a decisive effect on the progress of China's economy and on the building of her defences.
The unceasing political, ideological and military provocations, numerous hostile acts and intrigues of the Maoists against the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party might raise the question whether the aid the Soviet Union _-_-_
^^1^^ The Glorious Decade, Collection of articles, Peking, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, p. 196.
317 extended to China between 1950--66 strengthened the positions of the Maoist group pursuing a nationalistic and anti-Soviet line? The answer is "no,'' because by doing so the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet people did their internationalist duty to the world revolutionary movement. The aim of the Soviet Union was to help the Chinese people to transform their country into an advanced socialist state and to make China its powerful ally in the struggle against imperialism. This was largely achieved. In the years when the People's Republic of China was cooperating with the Soviet Union, and when the Communist Party of China was making wide use of the experience of the Soviet Communist Party, socialism put down deep roots in China. The events which are now taking place in China show that the efforts of the Maoists over the years to loosen these roots have run into opposition from the Chinese Communists and from wide sections of the Chinese population.In the early 1950's the Mao Tse-tung group obviously regarded the Soviet assistance and experience as a means of realising its chauvinistic and hegemonic designs. However, as the Chinese people built the foundations of socialism, drawing on Soviet experience and aid, this process became increasingly at variance with the anti-- Marxist adventuristic and great-power aspirations of the Mao Tse-tung group. The building of socialism in China necessitated the observance of certain objective laws of socio-economic development and an internationalist attitude towards the USSR and other socialist countries, whereas Mao Tsetung and his supporters deliberately ignored these facts. It was precisely for this reason that Mao Tse-tung, in the last few years of the first five-- 318 year plan, followed a political line aimed at discrediting the assistance and experience of the USSR, at undermining the confidence of the Chinese people in the CPSU and in the Soviet Union. This was in preparation for carrying out his adventuristic and chauvinistic designs.
The divisive, anti-Soviet policies of the Mao Tsetung group are not only sapping the unity of the socialist community and weakening the world revolutionary movement, but are also hindering the process of building socialism in China, and are detrimental to the interests of the Chinese people themselves. Therefore, the working people of our country continue to believe, in spite of the difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations, that the present situation in China is transitory by its very nature, and that friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and China will ultimately triumph.
Voprosy Islurii, No. 6, 1969
[319] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Peking AgainstA. Nadezhdin
In the confrontation of the two world systems the Maoists have in effect assumed the role of an instrument serving imperialism in its efforts to ``soften'' and break up the socialist community, that decisive factor in the development of the world revolutionary process. Indeed, the nationalistic Chinese-Albanian estrangement from the socialist community is welcomed by the imperialist policy-makers as the best possible contribution to the attainment of this strategic objective at a time when direct military pressure on the socialist states is clearly not only ineffective but also dangerous. Imperialism today hopes to achieve with Peking's assistance what it failed to accomplish through years of reliance on its own forces alone.
The present Chinese leadership sees the main obstacle to its hegemonistic great-power ambitions in the solid, science-based revolutionary unity of the socialist countries and the entire international communist movement. This unity is also the main barrier to the realization by world anti-- communism of its hopes of being able to destroy the socialist system and halt the forward march of history. Although the aims of the imperialists and the Peking leaders are not identical, the course they are steering to achieve them is virtually the same. It lies through struggle primarily against 320 the most powerful citadel of the world's socialist forces-the Soviet Union. This is why antiSovietism, long the core of the ideology and policy of anti-communism, has become basic also to the ideology and policies of the present Chinese leadership. In concentrating on attacking the USSR, both the imperialists and the Peking leaders are prompted by the hope that world socialism can be defeated by hammering at its leading detachment. By underscoring their hostility towards the Soviet Union they count on dulling the vigilance of the other socialist countries and forces and persuading them that anti-Soviet actions do not jeopardise the interests of the rest of the socialist community. In other words, both anti-communists of every hue and the Chinese leaders employ anti-Sovietism as an instrument for dividing and weakening the world socialist system. Though both of these reactionary forces claim to be irreconcilably opposed to one another, the fact remains that they have in effect joined in a united front against world socialism, against the international communist movement.
The hostility of the present Peking leaders to the interests of the international proletariat is patent in the Maoist slogans, and Peking's practical policies have given it tangible form. Every action taken by the USSR and other socialist countries towards strengthening world socialism, lessening international tension and organising broad resistance to the stepped-up activity of the forces of imperialism and reaction invariably evokes a flood of invective and slander from Peking. This was the case during the Caribbean crisis in the autumn of 1962 when the Soviet Union took a number of __PRINTERS_P_331_COMMENT__ 21--193 321 steps essential to help the Cuban people defend their revolutionary achievements. The same happened in 1967, when the USSR and other fraternal countries came out against the Israeli aggression in the Middle East, and in 1968, when they barred the way to counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia. As a matter of fact, there is not an area of international relations in which Peking over the past ten years has not in one way or another, directly or indirectly, fallen in line with the imperialist reaction and served its interests. And nothing accords with these interests more than the divisive policy pursued by the Chinese leaders towards the world socialist system. Peking has helped to animate diverse ``Leftist'' trends in the international working-class movement, given encouragement to proponents of bourgeois nationalist ideology and both ``Leftist'' and Rightist splinter groups, all of which see in Maoist China a backer of their anti-socialist machinations. Indeed Peking has repeatedly promised them every assistance.
In its efforts to divide the socialist community Peking is not only working to undermine the world revolutionary movement, but impeding the building of socialism primarily in China, and also in Albania. For these countries, which inherited an onerous legacy of social and economic backwardness from the old order, close unity with world socialism is a decisive condition of successful socialist development. As long as they stood together with the other socialist countries, they registered successes. The Soviet Union and other developed socialist countries rendered them extensive assistance in resolving the key problems of socialist construction.
322In 1950--59 the USSR pledged the Chinese People's Republic help in the building, expansion and reconstruction of more than 400 major enterprises, separate factory departments, and other projects. Of these over 250 were completed or partly put into operation. In 1952--61 other European socialist countries built or helped in the building in China of more than 260 enterprises, factory departments, technological installations and other economic projects. Already by 1960 enterprises built with Soviet help produced 8.7 million tons of pig iron and 8.4 million tons of steel, and accounted for 80 per cent of the motor trucks, over 90 per cent of the tractors, 55 per cent of the steam and hydraulic turbines, 25 per cent of the electric power and 25 per cent of the aluminium turned out in China.
Had China not rejected close cooperation with the socialist camp and the Chinese leadership not substituted all-out build-up of military potential for the creation of the material and technological base of socialism, the Chinese People's Republic would undoubtedly have scored further successes in industrialisation and the development of socialist society in general. For the USSR and other socialist countries, in step with the development of their own economies, would naturally have expanded industrialisation aid through the sixties. As a result, a solid material foundation would have been laid by now for socialist production relations in China. As it is, however, the material base remains weak, and this, especially with the policies pursued by the Chinese leaders, facilitates the deformation and emasculation of the very essence of socialist production relations. (The break with the socialist community has greatly __PRINTERS_P_323_COMMENT__ 21* 323 retarded economic development of Albania too, even though it received substantial material and financial aid from China in the sixties. Whereas the average annual industrial growth rate in Albania was 17 per cent in 1956--60, in 1961--65 it was only 6.8 per cent as against the 8.7 per cent planned.)
The anti-socialist orientation of Maoism is manifest not only in the parallelism of the policies pursued by Peking and the imperialist world, both of which are aimed against the socialist camp, but also in the basic concurrence of the stance and policy of the Peking leaders and those of the Chinese bourgeoisie, which exists to this day in the Chinese People's Republic. In 1957 the Maoists gave this bourgeoisie every opportunity publicly to propound its anti-socialist views.
When in mid-1957 a campaign was at last
launched against the offensive of the "bourgeois
Right-wing elements,'' the Chinese press carried
articles critical of their anti-Soviet sallies and
fabrications. In one of these articles the then General
Secretary of the Sino-Soviet Friendship
Association Tsien Chun-jui (in the sixties he became a
victim of the Maoist repressions), assessing the
stand of the "bourgeois Right-wing elements,''
stressed that their objective was the restoration
of capitalism. "The Right regarded struggle
against the Communist Party within the country
and against the Soviet Union on the international
arena of utmost importance for the achievement
of this objective,'' he said. "Unless the Communist
Party is overthrown and friendly relations with
the Soviet Union severed, the positions of
socialism are bound to remain strong.''~^^1^^ The article
__FIX__ f2-f7 ...
~^^1^^ Hsuehhsi, No. 16, 1957.
324 declared that the "ideology of bourgeois nationalism manifested in relation to the Soviet Union will become ultra-reactionary anti-Soviet nationalism.'' Today many of the aims the bourgeois forces in China fought for in the fifties have been realized by the present Peking leaders: the internationalist, Marxist-Leninist forces in the Communist Party of China were smashed during the "cultural revolution,'' struggle against the USSR has become Peking's No. 1 objective, and anti-Sovietism has been made official policy.The above-mentioned article also noted that the bourgeois Right was "beginning to develop a sense of superiority over other nations,'' that they had gone so far as to forget the foreign policy principles recorded in the Constitution and were out to "practise reactionary great-power chauvinism.'' "The foreign policy programme of the bourgeois Right-wing elements is pivoted on anti-socialism and pro-Americanism,'' Tsien Chun-jui said.
It is perfectly obvious that the foreign policy programme of the bourgeois Right-wing elements as set forth in 1957, its nationalistic class essence, has been fully espoused by the Maoists. It is not by chance that the most active anti-Sovieteers from the Right-wing camp were rehabilitated soon after 1957.
Peking's foreign policy line in many respects echoes the policies of Chiang Kai-shek, who represents the class interests of diehard Chinese bourgeois-landlord reaction. Although Mao Tse-tung once called Chiang a man from whom one could learn only what should not be done, in practice he is a zealous follower of his "teacher in reverse.'' If, after seizing power in China in 1927, 325 Chiang Kai-shek and his followers overtly and covertly engaged in anti-Soviet machinations on the international arena, circulating slanderous allegations concerning some mythical "Red imperialism,'' and today, entrenched in Taiwan, make no secret of their anti-Soviet credo, the Maoists have openly pivoted their foreign policy on anti-- Sovietism and are talking about Soviet "social imperialism.'' And if Chiang Kai-shek and his followers are active participants in the notorious Asian People's Anti-Communist League, the Maoists are fighting the international communist movement both in Asia and outside its bounds. It is not surprising that entry visas to China were refused the communist members of a French parliamentary delegation.
Like the Chiang Kai-shek crowd, the present Chinese leaders are not at all happy about the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic. Although Peking bosses have not ventured to publish maps showing the Mongolian People's Republic as a part of China, as has been done in Taiwan, they continue to cherish as they did decades ago hopes of annexing Mongolia to China.
As far back as 1936, during an interview gran- [ ted to the then obscure US journalist Edgar Snow, ' Mao Tse-tung categorically declared that after the victory of the revolution in China the MPR would "automatically,'' "of its own free will,'' once again become part of China. In April 1945 Chou Enlai's private secretary told some American officials that the Chinese leaders would like to "join Outer Mongolia (meaning the MPR to China).'' And in 1954 Mao with unadulterated great-power arrogance took up with the Soviet Government 326 the question of annexing Mongolia to the Chinese People's Republic, but was told that this was a question that should have been raised with the Mongolian people and government, and not with the Soviet Union.
Both Chiang Kai-shek and the present Chinese leaders present territorial claims to the USSR and other neighbouring countries. Both have taken a chauvinistic, great-power stance as regards China's role and place in the world. Even during the difficult period of the war against Japan, when China was in extreme straits, the Kuomintangcontrolled press made no secret of the hegemonic ambitions of Chiang Kai-shek and his followers. The newspaper Yihshihpao, for instance, wrote on December 16, 1943: "In the future the vast territory in East Asia from the Indian Ocean in the west to Japan in the east and from Australia in the south to Alaska in the north will wholly belong to China, and she shall have to bear the responsibility for the integrity and prosperity of all this territory.'' Mao Tse-tung repeated the same claims in June 1958: "The present Pacific Ocean is in reality not too pacific. In the future, when it comes under our control, it can become such.''
Indicative too is the identity of the Maoist and Chiang Kai-shek tactics of struggle against progressives at home and on the international arena. It will be recalled that in 1927, when the communist movement in China had gained substantial strength, Chiang Kai-shek struck hard at it, and at the same time brought relations with the USSR to the breaking point, to armed clashes on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. The strengthening of the forces of socialism registered in China by 1956--57 327 similarly prompted the Maoists to launch an offensive against them and to accompany the drive with a worsening of relations with the USSR and other socialist countries which eventually developed into open enmity towards them.
There is also another noteworthy coincidence. When Japanese imperialism presented a deadly danger to the Chinese state in the late twenties and early thirties, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers sought to ward off the threat by doing their utmost to provoke a clash between Japan and the Soviet Union by demonstrating their anti-- Sovietism and their readiness to yield to Japanese imperialism. In the past decade the Maoists have repeatedly displayed pliancy under pressure from US imperialism, confining themselves to endless "serious warnings.'' At the same time, in order to curry favour with it, they have escalated antiSovietism as no imperialist state has ventured to do. Besides, in the sixties Peking seized upon every opportunity to provoke a sharp aggravation of relations and even a clash between the US and the USSR, intending to remain in the sidelines itself.
A comparison of Peking's foreign policy with , the course steered by world anti-communism and the foreign policy programme of the Chinese bourgeois-landlord reaction shows that although there are definite and at times extremely sharp contradictions among these three political forces, their positions in relation to world socialism are very much alike.
However, as distinct from the latter two, Peking prefers to conduct its subversive work under a smokescreen fo "ultra-Left,'' "ultra-- revolutionary" slogans and professed aims. For this reason the 328 Peking leaders are anxious to have at least some of the socialist countries and communist parties, as well as organisations representing the nationalliberation movement, concede that Peking too stands on ``revolutionary'' positions if they cannot be induced to recognize it as the "only true revolutionary.'' This was one of the reasons why Peking returned in 1968 to its notorious " differentiated policy" towards the socialist countries. The underlying idea, formulated in the early sixties, is to concentrate on assailing the USSR, while taking a flexible attitude towards other socialist countries in order to induce them to be at least ``neutral'' in the fight waged by the Marxist-- Leninists against Peking's reactionary ideological and political platform and great-power hegemonism.
The Marxist-Leninists are not taken in by this tactic. "We,'' the Polish Trybuna Ludu said in an article on the fiftieth anniversary of the Communist Party of China, "seek normalisation of interstate relations with the Chinese People's Republic. But we resolutely reject every attempt to make use of our readiness to normalise relations to promote ends preventing the strengthening of the unity of the entire socialist community. Under no circumstances can an anti-Soviet policy and orientation on splitting the socialist community and the international communist movement serve as a platform for genuine normalisation.''
Our epoch is a crucial one in human history. The broadest unity of all progressive forces, and primarily of the socialist countries and the organised international working class, is of decisive importance for the success of the struggle against the threat of a devastating thermo-nuclear 329 war, for peace, democracy, socialism and communism. Hence the magnitude of the harm done to the interests of the revolutionary forces by the divisive activities of the ``Left'' and Right-wing revisionists operating in the ranks of these forces, in camouflage garb, seeking to speak and act in their name and to subordinate them to their influence. Especially pernicious and unprincipled is revisionism combined with and nurtured by nationalism. This combination, if transformed into official ideology governing the policies of one or another country that has embarked on the socialist road, presents a danger proportional to the size of the country that has fallen under nationalist sway.
The ``bridge-building'' policies of world imperialism and Peking's "differentiated policy" pursue at this stage one and the same goal-they both are designed to prevent the development of world socialism as a united political and economic system and thereby to undermine its might and influence on the world revolutionary process.
The socialist countries give a resolute rebuff to the divisive activities of Peking, which has opened a new front against world socialism, a front that is particularly dangerous because it runs through the socialist system itself. Hence utmost clarity is essential in assessing its place and role in the global confrontation of the forces of progress and reaction.
The future of socialism, its sound, successful development in the various countries, and the prospects of the struggle for socialism in the capitalist countries depend to a great extent, as the experience of the past two and a half decades has convincingly shown, on the unity of the 330 socialist world system as a whole, on the consistent utilisation of the countless advantages inherent in it. On this depends the success also of the worldwide anti-imperialist movement. Consequently, the socialist countries, while resolutely combating Peking's splitting activities and rejecting the ideological and political platform of the present Chinese leaders, are working untiringly to bring about a normalisation of inter-state relations with the Chinese People's Republic. This principled line was once again clearly reflected in the decisions of the recent congresses of the communist parties of Hungary, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the German Democratic Republic.
New Times, No. 33, 1971
[331] __ALPHA_LVL2__ New Strategy for the Same EndsO. Ivanov
The great-power, disruptive policy of the Peking leaders is causing serious damage to the interests of the world socialist system and the entire communist movement, impeding the anti-- imperialist struggle of the progressive forces and exercising an adverse influence on the international situation. What is happening in China is being exploited by anti-communist propaganda in order to discredit scientific socialism and Marxism-- Leninism as a whole.
The practical activity, political principles and pronouncements of the Chinese leadership in the current period have clearly shown that Mao Tsetung and his group are intent on following the basic political course endorsed by the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China. This means a rejection of the proletarian, class approach in assessing social phenomena, undermining the socialist community and the anti-- imperialist front, frenzied anti-Sovietism and the endeavour to establish world hegemony.
But instead of bringing the Maoists the desired results, the attempts at a frontal and forceful implementation of this policy have deepened China's internal crisis and its isolation on the international arena. That is why the Maoists have recently been compelled, while keeping up their 332 far-going hegemonic aims, to resort to manoeuvring. They are trying hard to make their policy look more respectable and less aggressive.
Ever since the Ninth Congress of the CPC, Mao Tse-tung and his supporters have been trying to complete the legalisation of the political upheaval brought about during the "cultural revolution,'' to bolster up their regime in China and gradually put into action their foreign policy aimed at achieving hegemonic aims.
In the sphere of the country's internal development, the chief task of the Maoists has been to overcome socio-economic instability and restore the prestige of the central government, which was shaken by the "cultural revolution.'' This has demanded that attention be confined to the problems of economic, Party and state construction. To a certain extent regulation of socio-political and economic activity is achieved by means of all-round militarisation and by maintaining a "besieged fortress" atmosphere. The personality cult of Mao Tse-tung is being further boosted and there are endless demagogic claims that the Maoist "cultural revolution" was "absolutely necessary in order to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat,'' and that it gave "a powerful impetus to the economic, political, ideological and cultural development of the country.'' The outrages committed by the hungweipings, and the vicious mockery of hundreds of thousands of Communists are said to have been caused by the "intrigues and provocations of Chairman Mao's enemies,'' meaning Liu Shao-chi and his adherents. This is all part of the Maoists' broad political manoeuvre aimed at stabilising the internal situation.
333However, the process of relative stabilisation is uneven and painful. The agitations of the " cultural revolution,'' particularly those connected with the major reshuffle in the Party and government, had not yet subsided when a new political crisis broke out in the ruling Maoist elite. More than one half of the 25 Members and Candidate Members of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (the Politbureau formed at the Ninth Congress in 1969) have disappeared from the political arena; and only two of the five Members of the Politbureau Permanent Committee (known as "the Five'') are politically active.
Quite recently, Lin Piao, CC CPC Vice-- Chairman and Member of the Politbureau Permanent Committee, was mentioned in the Party Rules as a "close associate" and the ``continuer'' of the cause of Mao Tse-tung. But the ink had hardly dried when, according to foreign agencies, Lin Piao was declared, following Liu Shao-chi, "a po- I litical swindler and a great careerist.'' The coun- ' try is still dominated by tension, which, as before, the Maoists are trying to blunt by accelerating their anti-Soviet campaign and whipping up war hysteria.~^^1^^
All this cannot be accounted for merely by the struggle for power in the Chinese leadership. Everything seems to indicate that the new crisis was _-_-_
~^^1^^ One can get an idea of the scope of China's anti-Soviet campaign if one notes, among other things, the fact that in less than 11 months in 1971, the Maoist government mouthpiece, Jenmin jihpao, carried about 400 items containing crude attacks on the Soviet Union, and 12 issues of Hungchi magazine carried similar material. China's book market is full of anti-Soviet literature; Radio Peking daily broadcasts anti-Soviet slander.
334 caused by a dispute among the Maoist rulers on questions of domestic and foreign policy.Being well aware of the dangerous consequences of the Maoist course, Marxist-Leninist parties are seriously concerned with the Chinese problem. They voiced their principled position at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in June, 1969. In this respect the Meeting marked an important stage in the efforts of Marxist-Leninists to strengthen the unity of their revolutionary ranks, to preserve the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory, and to counteract the anti-Leninist and subversive activity of the Maoists.
The 24th Congress of the CPSU, the recent congresses of other Marxist-Leninist parties, the constructive foreign policy of the USSR and the general offensive launched by the forces of socialism against imperialism and reaction-these have once again demonstrated most strikingly the subversive character of the foreign policy course followed by the Maoists, whose aim is to split the world revolutionary movement.
The Chinese splitters and their agents abroad have suffered serious set-backs, and this has compelled them to revise their strategy. Add to this the collapse of the imperialist sabotage against socialism in Czechoslovakia (the intrigues of the anti-socialist forces in that country were approved by the Maoists) and the firm rebuff given to the provocations of the Chinese authorities on the Soviet-Chinese frontier, and it will become clear what forced the Maoists to alter the strategy of conducting subversive activity in the international arena.
335The CPSU and other fraternal parties contrast Peking's disruptive policy with the efforts to cement the unity of the socialist countries, the world communist movement and the anti-- imperialist forces, and also with their policy of normalising interstate relations with the Chinese People's Republic. This policy was clearly set forth in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress delivered by Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, in the speeches of delegates, in the Congress's Resolution on the Report, and in the addresses delivered by the leaders of the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties to the Congress. The CPSU and the fraternal parties of the socialist countries are ready to promote the all-round development of interstate relations with the PRC without going against their principles and national interests. At the same time the Marxist-- Leninist parties are continuing to repel the attacks and expose the ideological platform of the Maoists, a platform which is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism.
Based on a consideration of long-term prospects, this policy of the Marxist-Leninists serves to cement the unity of the international communist movement and the entire anti-imperialist movement, and furthers the cause of socialism in China itself.
Owing to the internationalist stand of the socialist countries in regard to China, to their strong defence of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and to their firm counteraction of the efforts to subvert the socialist states, the world revolutionary movement and the anti-imperialist forces, it became possible to frustrate the plans of the Maoists to set up their own centre for countering 336 the world communist and working-class movement, and in large measure to neutralise the adverse consequences of Peking's policy~
The Maoists have met with serious internal and international obstacles to the achievement of their aims. The adventurism characteristic of Maoism has come sharply into conflict with reality, and this has created the ground for fresh political crisis in China. The policy of Mao Tsetung and his group is facing growing resistance from the working people and members of the Chinese Communist Party. No wonder Mao Tsetung declared that "it needs another three or four cultural revolutions" to get rid of opposition to the policy of the ruling elite and to strengthen the government, or rather - the military-bureaucratic dictatorship.
The Maoists have failed in their attempts to attain their chauvinistic and hegemonic aims through frontal attacks on the forces which they regard as their chief opponents. Nor did their fabrications about a Soviet military threat produce the hoped-for results.
The fact that the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries are consistently pursuing a policy of promoting genuine normalisation of relations with China causes difficulty for the Maoists and their anti-Soviet propaganda both at home and on the international scene.
What, then, ate the distinctive features of the new Maoist strategy? The most conspicuous of Peking's new strategems is the change in its foreign-policy slogans. The slogan "Revolution through war or prevention of war through revolution,'' advanced in the course of the Ninth Congress of the CPC, was replaced in the spring of __PRINTERS_P_337_COMMENT__ 22---193 337 1970 by another slogan which says, "The danger of a new world war still exists, and all nations must be prepared for it. But revolution is now the chief trend in the world.'' While retaining the slogan of a world war as the most expedient means of resolving the contradictions of today, the Maoists now more frequently speak about their readiness to build relations with all countries, including the socialist ones, on the basis of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence.'' But although Peking is less bellicose in its statements on international issues, it is keeping to its antiSoviet, anti-socialist direction in its foreign policy activity.
It is noteworthy that among the many capitalist countries that have recently recognized the PRC, those connected with the USA through various military alliances and blocs are displaying particular activeness.
The logical consequence of Peking's new strategy in the international arena is its open rapprochement with the ruling circles of the biggest imperialist states. In 1970 the capitalist market accounted for 82 per cent of the PRC's foreign trade turnover, as compared to only 32 per cent in 1958. These figures speak for themselves. They reveal the reorientation of the PRC's economic ties from the socialist to the capitalist market.
The USA is experiencing great difficulties in connection with the continuing war in Vietnam. It is intensifying its aggression against the peoples of Indochina and accelerating the implementation of its ``Vietnamisation'' policy. In doing so Washington is trying to use the "Peking card,'' and the Maoists are again helping the American imperialists to find a way out of the Indochina 338 impasse. What is more, Mao Tse-tung and his group are starting a new wave of anti-Sovietism to reassure the US rulers about Peking's loyalty.
The Soviet Union has always opposed the isolation of PRC and welcomes the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between China and other countries as well as the restoration of China's rights in the UN. It seems that this could lead to international detente and could make possible the solution of many major problems and the safeguarding of world peace.
Throughout the years the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have steadfastly defended the true interests of China as a socialist country. They have consistently exposed the imperialist policy of isolating and blockading the PRC, and have supported the legitimate demands to restore its rights in the UN by opposing the "two Chinas" policy.
Unfortunately, the very first steps of the Chinese delegation in the UN General Assembly have shown that the Chinese leadership intends to continue in the United Nations anti-Sovietism and its efforts to split the progressive forces. The two speeches made by the leader of the Chinese delegation at the General Assembly bear this out. Peking's obstructive stand on the question of calling a World Disarmament Conference and a conference of the five nuclear powers plays right into the hands of the enemies of peace, says the Bulgarian newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo. They are hoping that Peking's cheap demagogy will influence some Third World countries and that the imperialists will thus be able to wreck the Soviet initiatives aimed at establishing peace and security.
__PRINTERS_P_339_COMMENT__ 22* 339The CPSU and the Soviet Government consistently support the normalisation of relations between all countries because this promotes a general improvement of the international climate. At the same time, they have always considered that the development of bilateral relations between states must not interfere with the interests of other countries or proceed at their expense. The policy of improving the entire international situation is the pivot of the peace programme put forward by Comrade Leonid Brezhnev in the Report of the CC CPSU to the 24th Congress, and endorsed by the Congress. The policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government towards China is inseparably linked with this general programme. Their objective is to defend the basic interests of the Soviet people, the purity of Marxist-Leninist principles, and the ideals of peace, democracy and communism. The CPSU will never go against its own principles, against the state interests of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, or against the world revolutionary process and the anti-imperialist struggle.
Recently the Peking leadership has also changed its strategy in its relations with the socialist countries. On the one hand, readiness is expressed to promote interstate relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the basis of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence.'' But at the same time, a sixth principle is added, and this provides for interference into the internal affairs of the socialist countries and for "prolonged, irreconcilable, principled struggle.''
On October 7, 1969, a Chinese Government statement advanced the following formula: ''. . .Between China and the USSR there are 340 irreconcilable, fundamental differences, and a principled struggle between them will continue for a long time. But that should not prevent the maintenance of normal state relations between China and the Soviet Union on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.'' This formula was then extended to the PRC's relations with other socialist countries.
By proposing this basis for relations with the USSR and other socialist countries, the Chinese leadership is not only completely ignoring the class approach in international affairs, but also trying to create an international legal `` basis'' for considering them as non-socialist. Peking maintains that, apart from China itself, only Albania is a genuinely socialist state. And what is more, the Maoists want to exploit normalisation of state relations with the socialist countries (which have not adopted the doctrine of Maoism or approved the "cultural revolution'') in order to destroy or undermine their system. So although the Maoists pay lip-service to the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which include non-- interference in one another's affairs, in actual fact they are trying to legalise their subversive activity against the socialist countries and interference in their internal affairs under the pretext of waging a "principled struggle.''
The aims and programme of this struggle are openly expounded in the directive article, " Leninism or Social-Imperialism?" It is an attempt to give "theoretical backing" to the subversion against the USSR and other socialist countries, against the Marxist-Leninist parties and the international collective organisations of the socialist states-the Council for Mutual Economic 341 Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Similar aims were expressed by the Chinese leadership in its publications on the occasion of the events that took place in Poland in December 1970, in the article of March 18, 1971, marking the centenary of the Paris Commune, and in the article of July 1, 1971, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the CPC.
Why is Peking resorting to new stratagems'? It is aware of its inability to oppose all the socialist countries at the same time, and to wage a frontal attack against the socialist community combined with the international communist movement. So it decided to employ the strategy expounded in the articles dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the CPC and to Mao Tse-tung's speech "On Our Policy.'' The essence of such strategy is summed up in what they call "dual tactics.'' In their jargon this means "fighting spear with spear,'' " marshalling the forces of active supporters, winning over the intermediate forces and isolating the chief adversaries,'' "crushing the enemies singly,'' and "hitting on the head so that the rest crumbles down.'' In brief, as the Peking social chauvinists step up their subversive activity against the socialist countries, they are trying to take an individual approach to these countries, carefully studying the specific situation in each of them and the state of their relations with the Soviet Union. Nor is Peking niggardly with its promises of economic benefits and credits for separate socialist countries provided they are ``neutral'' in the major dispute between the international communist movement and the CPC leaders, and provided they loosen their ties with the Soviet Union. That is how the Peking leaders are trying to expand 342 the channels for their ideological penetration of the socialist countries. They aim to turn them into an instrument of its policy, and ultimately to undermine or weaken the unity and might of the socialist system and isolate the USSR as much as possible. This line is reminiscent of the "bridge building" stratagem by means of which imperialism has long been trying to weaken the unity of the socialist community and ``erode'' it from within.
Besides, there are other benefits which the Chinese leadership hopes to get by means of its new strategy. For example, it wants the normalisation of interstate relations between the PRC and the socialist countries to be presented as a victory for the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" and a justification of the course charted by the Ninth Congress of the CPC.
But something else betrays the treachery of the Maoist "dual tactics.'' This is that, despite all the efforts of the fraternal parties, the Chinese leadership (while proclaiming fictitious antiimperialist slogans) vigorously opposes unity of action in the struggle against imperialism. This, in effect, helps the imperialists in their attempts to mount a counter-offensive against the revolutionary movement in one area or another. An example of this is provided by the events in Indochina and also by the increasing efforts of the reactionary forces to undermine the progressive regimes in a number of Asian, African and Latin American countries.
Peking has not only kept its global strategy against the Soviet Union unchanged, but is constantly deepening and "theoretically 343 substantiating" it. Having rejected the Marxist assessment of the major contradictions of today, and the class conception of the balance of forces in the world, the Maoist politicians now contend that the chief contradiction is the one between the two ``superpowers'' (the USSR and the USA) on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other. The slogan of combating "the hegemony of the two superpowers" has become the banner under which the Chinese leadership is trying once again to build up a bloc consisting of the "small and medium-sized" states, irrespective of their socio-economic systems. This slogan is an extension of the Maoists' anti-Marxist schemes about the "intermediate zones" and the divisions of all states into ``rich'' and "poor,'' and is obviously devised to justify their anti-Soviet policy. Under the pretext of fighting "the two superpowers,'' the Maoists are discarding the idea of the confrontation of the two systems. Instead they equate socialism and capitalism, and in this way try to attain hegemony.
Peking's present foreign policy doctrine consists, on the one hand, in manoeuvring within the USSR-USA-Japan-China ``quadrangle''-in increasing the contradictions between the USSR, the USA and Japan for the sake of its own selfish, great-power chauvinist aims; and, on the other hand, in urging various states (including developing, capitalist and some socialist ones) to fight what it calls the "hegemony of the two superpowers,'' directing their attack mainly against the Soviet Union-the bulwark of socialism, world peace and security. Chinese representatives emphasise that this platform is the basis for a rapprochement with the PRC, that it is on 344 this basis that China is ready to improve relations with any country, regardless of its system.
The Maoist leadership is trying hard to find allies in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, counting on the nationalist sentiments and extremist groupings in some of them. It has begun to step up diplomatic and economic relations with the developing countries, using more flexible methods and avoiding blatant intervention in their internal affairs or open imposition of Maoist ideas.
A new feature of Chinese tactics designed to win the sympathy of the Third World was the revision in 1970 of the formerly hostile attitude towards the "movement of the non-aligned countries" .and the endeavour to subject their interests to China's hegemonic policy. It is these aims that prompted the Chinese leadership to capitalise on the slogan of struggle against "the two superpowers" and to attempt to separate the Third World countries from their reliable support in the anti-imperialist struggle-to separate them from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.
Hegemonic aspirations are also the factor that determines the attitude of the Peking leadership towards the problem of Indochina. Recent events are increasingly exposing its strategic goals in Indochina and its double-dealing policy. Everything seems to indicate that the Maoists are intent on strengthening their position in this region. If we were to uncover the real motive behind their monoeuvres, it would be plain that they are meant to show the US rulers that "the key to the solution of the Indochina problem lies in Peking,'' and to belittle the importance of the 345 initiatives of the Vietnamese patriots for a political settlement. This gives the US Administration the opportunity to ignore the constructive proposals put forward by the delegation of the South Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government and fully supported by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and by the progressive and peace forces of the world.
In order to win the confidence of the Arabs and to strengthen its position in the Middle East, Peking now prefers not to voice open objections against a political settlement of the crisis there. Yet it continues to give active support to the extremist elements there which oppose any political settlement.
The PRC leadership is dead against all the initiatives of the socialist states for a detente in Europe. It sharply opposed the Soviet and Polish agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany, and the West Berlin talks. Its propaganda discredits the idea of strengthening European security and does everything possible to interfere with efforts to attain this end.
By opposing the Soviet proposals to hold a conference of the five nuclear powers and a World Disarmament Conference, the Chinese Government has proved itself to be an opponent of detente.
Peking is now trying to bring its attitude to the international communist movement in line with its new foreign policy strategy. It wants to counterpose the various anti-Soviet political forces and revisionist elements of all hues, both Right and "Left,'' to the tendency towards growing unity among the communist forces. That is why the pursuance of the ideals of the working class 346 and of scientific socialism today requires firm action against all these enemies of Marxism-- Leninism.
The Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in 1969 has crippled the hegemonic plans of the CPC leaders. Having completely failed to turn the pro-Chinese groups in other countries into influential political parties or to unite them into something resembling an international trend, the Chinese leadership have made another attempt to win over individual communist parties or at least to persuade them not to make any public criticism of its ideology and policy. With this aim in view, Chinese propaganda and official CPC representatives have concentrated on slandering the CPSU's home and foreign policies and the situation in the USSR and the socialist community in front of foreign Communists. At the same time any pretext is used to kindle nationalism and anti-Sovietism among the ranks of the communist movement and the national-liberation movement.
In its efforts to subject the revolutionary movement and the national-liberation drive to its hegemonic aims. Maoism is managing to confuse some revolutionaries and trying to direct struggle, not against the real enemies, but against the Soviet Union and the communist parties which are actively defending Marxism-Leninism and the unity of all revolutionary forces.
The Maoist strategy can be summed up as follows: Wherever there is hope of influencing the leadership of communist parties, the Maoists readily abandon their own direct supporters,- in countries where they come up against strong resistance, they increase their support for the pro-- 347 Maoist, break-away groups and "parties,'' spend large sums on maintaining their network of political agents, and engage in direct political attacks on the communist parties in those countries.
As for the patently pro-Maoist parties, they have recently been considerably weakened. Having taken the political course dictated by Peking, they found themselves in a most awkward situation. For example, there were some communist parties whose leadership blindly followed Maoist dogmas. This led to the serious defeat of the revolutionary forces in the countries concerned, while the parties themselves lost contact with the masses, forfeited worker and peasant support, and degenerated into conspiratorial sects maintained by Peking.
It is characteristic that in fighting the communist parties of capitalist countries, Peking even makes use of its contacts with the ruling bourgeois parties. For example, the Chinese leaders demanded that representatives of the Japanese Communist Party should be excluded from the Parliamentary Association which is trying to establish diplomatic relations between China and Japan, and that communist parliamentarians should not be included in parliamentary delegations sent to China. That is how the Peking leadership is taking revenge on the Communist Party of Japan for its criticism of Maoist adventurism in the international arena and for its principled stand towards the notorious "cultural revolution.'' The international policy of the Chinese leadership has demonstrated that Maoism sharply conflicts with the anti-imperialist platform formulated at the International Meeting of June 1969.
Maoism is one of the most dangerous 348 adversaries of Marxism in the history of the revolutionary movement. The danger stems largely from the fact that Maoism is a political practice which exploits the aspirations of the masses for socialism and which relies for ideological support on the eclecticism of "Mao Tse-tung ideas,'' the political prestige of the Chinese revolution and the CPC, the state machinery, and the economic, military and other resources of the world's most populous country.
Maoist slogans sometimes find some response among certain quarters in the Third World and among young extremists in the capitalist countries, and are taken up and spread by opportunists. This is due largely to the fact that the public in these countries, not knowing the true nature of Maoism, mistakes the revolutionary rhetoric of Maoism for a genuine revolutionary spirit and concern for the interests of the fighting peoples. But deeper knowledge of Maoism dispels these illusions and proves it to be basically incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism, and with the interests of the struggle for national liberation.
The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in 1969 emphasised that combating the theory and practice of Maoism is one of the most important internationalist tasks of all the Marxist-Leninist parties and the world revolutionary movement.
In order to expose the anti-Marxist, anti-- Leninist nature of Maoism, it is essential to consider some of its specific features:
- Maoism disguises its real essence with Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary phraseology in order to deceive the Chinese people, who, because of 349 the existing conditions in the PRC, are unable to learn about the works and views of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and so accept Mao's ``ideas'' as the "pinnacle of Marxist thought;"
- the Maoists take a purely pragmatical approach to the question of theory, regarding it as an instrument for furthering their great-power policy. The Maoists unscrupulously change their political declarations and stratagems, according to the dictates of practical needs and the concrete situation, but always spearhead the attack against Marxism-Leninism, the communist movement and the socialist community, particularly the Soviet Union. The ideological and political platform of Maoism is designed to realise the hegemonic aspirations of the CPC's nationalistic leadership;
- Maoism's eclecticism makes it manifold. It is a hotchpotch of ``ideas'' that can be adapted to the most diverse needs. That is why "Mao Tsetung's ideas" suit the ultra-Left "revolutionaries,'' the extremists and Trotskyites, and the Right opportunists alike. Maoist ideas are utilised by outright anti-communists and anti-Sovietists such as Klaus Mehnert, Benjamin Schwartz and Edgar Snow. Maoism makes active use of the various anti-communist trends and of revisionism of all hues to attack scientific socialism.
The anti-Leninist ideological and political platform of the Maoists appeared in the late 1950's and took concrete shape after Peking's extensive political and ideological campaign against the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties.
Criticism of Maoism should take account of the great gap existing between Mao's published articles, which foster the myth that he is an " outstanding Marxist-Leninist,'' and his actual views. 350 These latter betray themselves in the actual policy and activity of the present Chinese leadership, Mao Tse-tung's articles and speeches are reportedly published after thorough revision, after "they have been flavoured with Marxism-- Leninism,'' as he himself says. The Maoists deliberately exploit for their selfish aims the authoritative ideas of scientific socialism, using them to conceal the unscientific, anti-Marxist character of the ideas of the "great helmsman.'' On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung has adopted many true postulates regarding the strategy, tactics and driving forces of the Chinese revolution, having borrowed them from the documents of the Communist International and from works by veterans of the fraternal parties (including some Chinese). It is the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties, not Mao Tse-tung, that are to be credited with the verified conclusions and appraisals concerning such basic issues as the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal nature of the Chinese revolution, the important role in it of the peasantry, the significance of the revolutionary army and armed struggle in China, and the tactics of a unified national front.
In order to keep "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" " unrivalled,'' all the works of the well-known Chinese propagandists of Marxism-Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po, Teng Chung-hsia, Wang Ming, Chang Wen-t'ien and others-have been destroyed; some of these authors are being constantly discredited, while others are intentionally buried in oblivion. This enables the Maoists to portray Mao Tse-tung as the great "theorist, strategist and tactician" of the Chinese revolution.
The Maoists are thus giving Mao Tse-tung 351 undeserved credit for elaborating the fundamental principles regarding the strategy and tactics of the Chinese revolution, completely ignoring the decisive role in it of the advice and recommendation of the Communist International and of the CPSU's experience. It is essential to distinguish the ``ideas'' which really belong to Mao Tse-tung from the correct precepts on which Maoism is merely capitalising in order to conceal its own anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist essence.
The importance of the struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism is becoming more and more obvious today because of the emergence of a kind of "unified ideological front" extending from ``Left'' and Right opportunism to diehard anti-communism. Today the most varied political forces-the imperialists, Maoists, nationalists, revisionists of all shades, and bellicose Zionists-are acting together in a single camp against Marxist-Leninist teachings, the communist movement and the socialist community. Mao Tse-tung and his group, who pose as ultra-" revolutionaries,'' are actually in alliance with Right revisionists and undisguised anti-Communists such as Herbert Marcuse, Milovan Djilas, Klaus Mehnert, Ernst Fischer and Zbigniew Brzezinsky.
We often see Western ideologists, disguised as ``defenders'' of humanism and democracy, systematically accusing the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of mythical "violations of democracy and the principles of humanism,'' whitewashing the criminal acts committed by the Maoists during the "cultural revolution.'' They depict the cultural revolution as an "outburst of indignation against bureaucracy,'' as an attempt to "renovate socialism,'' and as a "search for 352 Asian democracy.'' These ``democrats'' said nothing when Mao Tse-tung and his adherents dealt with well-known Chinese writers, actors and artists and with thousands of Communists and revolutionaries. They say nothing when the Maoists exile hundreds of thousands of people to concentration camps called "labour reformatories" and persecute intellectuals. Nor have they reacted to Mao Tse-tung's policy of genocide in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and South China.
To strengthen ties with the above-mentioned anti-Marxist "united front" and slacken the effectiveness of the principled criticism of the Maoist order by Marxist-Leninist parties, the Peking leaders are increasingly issuing invitations to Western literary men, correspondents and numerous delegations. For instance, in the autumn of 1970, the PRC was visited by Edgar Snow, the `` chronicler'' of Maoism. Peking insistently invites bourgeois journalists to China and works on them diligently so they would depict the situation in China in a way favourable to the Maoists. Chinese officials have suddenly become very talkative and great lovers of heart-to-heart discussions over a cup of tea with American, West German and Japanese bourgeois journalists, hoping to be favoured with wide publicity of their views and their numerous verbal attacks against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It is not surprising that on returning home these visitors whitewash the "cultural revolution,'' portraying it as the "purposeful struggle of the masses.''
Motivated by time-serving considerations and a desire to enter into contact with Peking, even some progressive papers have recently carried publications playing down the disastrous effect __PRINTERS_P_353_COMMENT__ 23--193 353 of the "cultural revolution,'' and describing the present situation in China as a socialist " countrywide experiment.'' The authors of these publications want to create the impression that Chinese society is undergoing "all-round development" and that the standard of living of the Chinese peasant and worker is rising; they compare the "people's communes" to the agricultural co-- operatives existing in the socialist countries and so on. But what they call "objective information" is often just mere repetition of official Maoist propaganda meant to mislead readers.
Right opportunists are also trying to form an alliance with the Maoists in the onslaught against Marxism-Leninism by making up to Peking and embellishing its policy and the "cultural revolution.'' One of the originators of this trend is Roger Garaudy, expelled from the French Communist Party for his anti-party activities. In his writings he presents the theory and practice of Maoism as a "model of backward socialism" which he says is the logical product of the development of Chinese society.
The ideological battle being waged by the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties forces the Maoists to assume a defensive position, change their tactics, and adapt themselves to the new situation. This principled struggle offers effective moral and political support to the genuine Communists of China and to those Chinese people, who are striving to redirect their country along the socialist path.
While consistently combating the chauvinist course of the Maoists, the CPSU is constantly educating the Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and patriotism. Soviet 354 people have the greatest respect for the Chinese people and their culture. Despite the anti-Soviet hysteria in China, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society in the USSR is still functioning actively. It is in the USSR, and not in China, that the classics of Chinese literature are being studied and the works of Lu Hsin, Lao She, Mao Tun, T'an Han and many other leading Chinese novelists, playwrights and poets are being widely published. It was not present-day China, but Moscow, that celebrated the anniversary of Sun Yat-sen and held exhibitions of paintings by Hsu Pei-hung, Chi Pai-shin and other Chinese artists. These facts serve to expose the Maoist claims that the Soviet Union conducts "anti-Chinese propaganda.''
In his address to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in 1969, CC CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev said: "We do not identify the declarations and actions of the present Chinese leadership with the aspirations, wishes and true interests of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people. We are deeply convinced that China's genuine national renaissance, and its socialist development, will be best served not by struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, against the whole communist movement, but by alliance and fraternal cooperation with them.''
The Soviet stand towards the Chinese People's Republic was reaffirmed at the 24th Congress of the CPSU. While consistently following the course mapped out by the Congress, the Party continues to be steadfast in exposing the anti-Soviet policy of the Maoists and their anti-Leninist, nationalist ideology, and to stave off Peking's encroachments upon the national interests of the __PRINTERS_P_355_COMMENT__ 23* 355 Soviet Union, and upon the unity and cohesion of the socialist community and the world revolutionary movement. The CPSU is pursuing a stable policy of normalising interstate relations between the USSR and the PRC.
In its resolution "On the International Activity of the CC CPSU After the 24th Congress of the CPSU,'' the November (1971) Plenum of the CC CPSU affirmed that the "Politbureau is consistently pursuing the policy of the 24th Congress in relations with the Chinese People's Republic.'' The Plenum expressed "complete agreement with the Politbureau's position in resolving the relevant practical questions,'' and noted with satisfaction that "the foreign policy course of the CC CPSU enjoys the full understanding and unanimous support of all Communists and the entire Soviet people. Therein lies the main strength of the CPSU's international policy.''
The situation today and the present onslaught of the Chinese leadership against Marxism-- Leninism, and against the unity of the Marxist-- Leninist parties and of the socialist countries, urgently demand still greater efforts in all areas of the ideological struggle against Maoism, so that peace, democracy and socialism may triumph.
Kommnnist, No. 7, 1971
[356] __ALPHA_LVL2__ The Foreign PolicyD. Vostokov
Since the 9th CPC Congress (April 1969) the PRC's foreign policy has not only retained its nationalistic character, but its great-power, chauvinistic essence and its break with the principles of socialist internationalism are making themselves more deeply and clearly felt.
This has been shown in the decisions of the September 1970 2nd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC as well as in the PRC's 1970--71 foreign policy activity. The 2nd Plenary Meeting called on the Party and the army resolutely to implement Mao Tse-tung's line and directives and to accomplish the tasks set by the 9th Congress. Thus, anti-Sovietism and subversive actions within the socialist community and the international communist movement as well as the striving for a rapprochement with imperialist states were confirmed as the PRC's long-term official foreign policy. By pursuing an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist policy Peking wants to compensate the Western states for their aid in the development of China's economy, as well as for helping it to carry out its great-power designs of turning China into a 357 state capable of realising its territorial claims on the Soviet Union, and of bringing under its influence the neighbouring states in East and SouthEast Asia.
The striving to reach an agreement with imperialism on an anti-Soviet basis and to exti'icate China from the international isolation in which the country found itself in the course of the " cultural revolution,'' has forced Peking to make certain changes in its foreign policy tactics, and to exercise some flexibility in attaining its greatpower aspirations. The Chinese leaders have now dampened down the propaganda of ultra-``Leftist'' slogans of a "people's war" and the utmost aggravation of international tension which they had earlier passed for effective means of stimulating the revolutionary situation in the world. Now they pose as proponents of a detente and peaceful coexistence. At the same time, they are hastily establishing diplomatic relations with other countries.
The changes in Peking's tactics are due to a number of setbacks in its foreign and home policy. These include:
-- the futile attempts to split the socialist community and international communist movement. The Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties (1969) showed that the communist parties condemned the "special course" and splitting tactics of the Peking leaders;
-- the abortive plans to use the liberation movement of the developing countries and the progressive democratic movement in the capitalist countries for its own great-power, chauvinistic purposes by means of pseudo-revolutionary demagogy;
358-- Peking's international isolation resulting from its subversive activity and interference in other countries' affairs as well as its attempts to provoke armed clashes and local wars, with China herself taking no part in them. This isolation has become especially pronounced during the "cultural revolution" since the Chinese leaders introduced methods of hungweipings' violence and armed pressures into diplomatic practice and international relations ;
-- the poor state of Chinese economy and low rates of its development caused by the recent events of the "cultural revolution" and militarisation, unavailing attempts to rely on small industries and primitive means of production, and the politically motivated curtailment of economic relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries.
At the same time, despite the defeat of the opposition and establishment of a military-- bureaucratic dictatorship, the political situation in China is characterised by political instability which forces the Peking leaders to stabilise the regime at any cost, in order to consolidate it and implement their strategic great-power, chauvinistic schemes.
The concentration of power in the hands of a small group of leaders, the reliance on special army units, the suppression of the opposition, and the liquidation of the democratic institutions in the state and the Party offer favourable conditions for arbitrariness in foreign policy, for a collusion with imperialism on the basis of deepening and strengthening the anti-Soviet line and the tactical renunciation of the ultra-``Leftist'' slogans, as well as curtailing or, at least, 359 camouflaging their ties with the ``Left'' extremist pettybourgeois elements in capitalist countries.
Peking's new tactics show that it has become the Trojan horse of imperialism in the international revolutionary movement, this forming the essence of the intensified diplomatic flirting now taking place between China and the imperialist countries headed by the USA.
In the new situation, the diplomacy of the People's Republic of China seeks to ensure a favourable attitude to the Peking regime on the part of a maximum number of states, the capitalist states, in the first place, without affecting the Maoist great-power, chauvinistic course.
The following are some of the concrete features which characterise the new stage in Peking's policy:
-- an active struggle for wide international recognition;
-- restoration of the PRC's rights in the United Nations including its permanent membership in the Security Council;
-- ensuring aid from imperialist states aimed at an accelerated economic, scientific, technological and military development of China.
These trends of the PRC's foreign policy have manifested themselves in numerous acts by the Chinese Government in the international arena. Peking is increasingly seeking to conceal its participation in the activity of the pro-Maoist groups in the revolutionary and liberation movement. In the "Third World" Peking has begun to establish contacts with pro-Western regimes.
The resumption of contacts with the United States in the beginning of 1971 and the attempts to enter into relations with it on the basis of 360 renouncing the struggle against imperialism are directly linked with what has now become an important component part of Peking's foreign policy and a new stage in the PRC's foreign policy. The Maoists have been playing on the contradictions between the two world systems in order to gain time, accumulate strength and prepare the internal and external conditions for establishing the People's Republic of China as the "third global" power. To accomplish this task the Chinese leaders have elaborated and used the "two superpowers" concept which they have made the core of their foreign policy since the 9th CPC Congress. Today the Peking regime is striving to win world-wide support for its hegemonistic aims by resorting to the slogan of uniting the "medium and small" countries and by manipulating with anti-Soviet and anti-American catchwords.
At the same time, the Peking regime is continuing to build up its nuclear-missile potential, although this task is far from being completed. However, the very possibility of such a development is already of some political significance since it enables the Chinese leaders to pursue a geopolitical course in international relations.
Although Peking has formally retained the two main interconnected components-anti-Sovietism, as the major course of the foreign policy, and anti-Americanism-in its ideological, political and propaganda arsenal the latter component has finally degenerated into nationalistic doctrine which, owing to the objective historical conditions, sometimes coincides with the struggle waged by progressive forces against imperialism. Anti-- Americanism has been assigned the role of bringing pressure to bear in the bargaining which Mao 361 Tse-tung and his followers are carrying on with US imperialism for a recognition of their chauvinistic global claims, especially in East and SouthEast Asia.
The flirtation with imperialism and simultaneous pursuit of an anti-Soviet policy compel the Chinese leaders to cooperate with imperialist governments in some world affairs, as a result of which the PRC may be drawn into the orbit of imperialism's international relations and therefore China is in danger of becoming politically and economically dependent upon the developed capitalist countries.
At the same time, the foreign policy of the Peking regime, particularly in the "Third World" countries, continues to retain its petty-bourgeois radical component. In their struggle for hegemony in the world revolutionary and liberation movement the Chinese leaders, orienting themselves on the nationalistic elements prevailing in some sections of the anti-imperialist front, are seeking, by means of the "two superpowers" concept, to place nationalism at the service of their anti-Soviet policies.
In the beginning of 1971, the Chinese leadership for the first time responded positively to the initiative of the US Government which since 1963 had repeatedly proposed to normalise US-Chinese relations. Although the Chinese leadership retained and even developed some forms of relations with the United States on various levels and, according to some sources, was even willing in 1964 to receive President Johnson in the People's Republic of China despite its anti-American propaganda, all the proposals made by the USA on extending contacts and establishing them 362 officially were ostentatiously and categorically rejected.
This attitude of the PRC Government towards the US proposals was determined by a number of factors, primarily the absence of internal political conditions in China for a serious modification of its foreign policy. Of some significance also was the inconsistency of the Johnson Administration which, while improving its relations with the Mao regime and trying to apply the ``bridge-building'' concept to the PRC, heeded the ultra-Right opposition and adhered to its military and political commitments to the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The subsequent events showed that the US-Chinese rapprochement was hindered by the fact that the new Administration which followed that of President Johnson continued the escalation of war in Indochina and committed aggressive acts against the DRV and Laos in the immediate proximity to the Chinese borders.
Taking into account the fresh elements in international affairs-armed provocations by the Peking regime on the Soviet-Chinese borders, the shift of the PRC Government to a new diplomacy after the "cultural revolution,'' the futility of the US Government's attempts to prevent the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China by the US allies in NATO-and the change in the mood of the American voters with respect to the war in Vietnam, the US Republican Administration, nevertheless, went much further in its relations with the PRC than its predecessors.
The new Administration took some unilateral measures aimed at normalising the US-Chinese relations. To begin with, it relaxed the embargo on trade with the PRC. This resulted in the restoration of the US-Chinese trade relations (in 363 1970---3.5 million dollars' worth), the US Government granting licences to overseas branches of US companies to sell to the PRC such commodities as the General Motors Corporation lorry engines, excavating machines, pharmaceutical goods, rubber, etc. Subsequently, in striving to stimulate the restoration of relations, the US Government lifted all restrictions on exports of non-strategic goods to the PRC, while retaining the embargo on the trade with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, and Cuba.
Moreover, the US 7th Fleet ceased patrolling the Taiwan Strait and the US reconnaissance planes discontinued their flights over the PRC territory. The USA changed its position regarding China's entry to the UN.
On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung and his followers, who since 1964--65 have tried covertly to improve the Chinese-American relations, could overtly meet the US ``bridge-building'' policy halfway only under certain conditions, i.e., when the establishment of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship as a result of the "cultural revolution" dispelled their apprehensions that the anti-- popular policy of rapprochement with the US imperialism would consolidate the anti-Maoist opposition and undermine the already unstable status of the Mao Tse-tung group inside China.
Under these conditions, the unilateral measures taken by the US Government served their purpose. They made it possible to conduct secret negotiations with representatives of the Peking regime with the result that the State Department abrogated the need for special entry permits for US citizens wishing to visit the People's Republic 364 of China, these permits formerly being regarded by the Chinese Government as discriminatory. An agreement was also reached to invite on this basis US public and press representatives as the first step in developing bilateral contacts. Soon after this restriction had been annulled, the US pingpong team which had participated in the world championship games in Japan was invited to China and the first US newsmen were granted permission to enter the country. In April 1971, the American athletes and journalists arrived in China thus inaugurating a new stage in the USChinese relations.
In addition to public contacts, secret negotiations were held on a governmental level. H. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, during his official visit to Pakistan, secretly flew to Peking where he stayed from July 9 to 11, 1971, and had talks with Premier of the State Council of the PRC Chou En-lai. On July 16, it was declared in Washington and Peking that US President R. Nixon had been invited to visit the People's Republic of China at his convenience before May 1972; the invitation was accepted. In his TV address Nixon, explaining the reasons for his future visit, stated that the new relations which the US Administration was establishing with the PRC were not directed against any other country.
World progressive opinion, however, expressed doubt as to the selfless character of the normalisation that had begun in the relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. These relations can become an important factor of peace only if they reflect positive changes in the policy pursued by the two powers, such 365 as taking realistic positions on peaceful coexistence with other countries, and their renunciation of political manoeuvring directed against other states. There are quite a few facts, however, which warrant no such conclusion.
US imperialism has not as yet ceased its aggressive war in Indochina. The US Government has given no answer to the peaceful initiative of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam-the seven-point proposal. As for the PRC's stand on the Vietnam issue, Chou En-lai who, in his lenghty interview with James Reston, The New York Times observer, made public the principles of the PRC's foreign policy, did not support the demand of the DRV Government to fix the date of the US troops withdrawal from Vietnam and did not even mention the date the PRC wishes the US troops to be withdrawn from Taiwan.
The PRC's policy on other international issues coincides with the aggressive course of US imperialism. The Peking regime sought to utilise the Middle East situation resulting from the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries to discredit Soviet foreign policy, and tried to intensify the Soviet-American contradictions in that area. At the same time the Chinese leaders and US imperialism came out in support of the counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and attempted to profit from the difficulties which arose in the Polish People's Republic in 1970. The Chinese leaders played into the hands of NATO's global strategists by creating a hotbed of tension on the Chinese-Soviet borders.
Far from being peaceful are also the policy of building up the nuclear-missile potential, the 366 constant opposition to a detente, and the negative attitude towards collective security measures, while the urge to replace a genuine detente by foreign policy stratagems makes the policy pursued by Peking leaders similar to that of US imperialism.
These facts have led progressive people throughout the world to the conclusion that the true reasons for the rapprochement between the Chinese leadership and US imperialism are to be found in the homogeneity of their present foreign policy interests. On the one hand, US imperialism is clearly striving to weaken the influence of socialism and to gain control over the vast zone of the "Third World" in the face of the growing tendency towards complete national and social emancipation; on the other hand, the Peking regime is making no less overt the attempt to secure the position of the "world's third superpower" and to use it for the purpose of attaining its territorial claims and hegemonistic designs.
The policy of the US-Chinese rapprochement recently manifested itself in new facts. At the end of October H. Kissinger made his second voyage to Peking and had lengthy talks with Chou Enlai. The foreign press reported that these talks covered not only the protocol and the programme of the US President's forthcoming visit, but also some specific problems that are to be discussed during the negotiations.
It was no accident that Kissinger made his visit to Peking at the time when the General Assembly of the United Nations was considering the question of restoring the PRC's rights in this international organisation. The resolution to admit the 367 PRC to the UN and to expel the Chiang Kai-shek representatives was passed by a majority vote.
The progressive forces all over the world are hoping that the normalisation of relations between the PRC and the USA will not result in increased tension and deterioration in international affairs. As A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, said to the newsmen in Canada in an interview on October 20, 1971, concerning the Chinese-American negotiations, it is important that they should lead to a peaceful settlement of issues, to a relaxation of world tension. This undoubtedly also pertains to all spheres of the PRC's activity in the international arena in connection with the possibilities of its extension after the admittance of the PRC to the UN.
Without modifying their major strategic aims, the Chinese leaders in 1970--71 were vigorously changing their tactics with regard to the national liberation movement as well as the interstate relations with the developing Asian, African and Latin American countries. Their entire international activity at that period was aimed at restoring and increasing the Third World countries' confidence in China as a force independent of the "two superpowers.''
In their foreign policy activity in the Third World countries, the Chinese leaders have again resorted to the principles and formulas of the Bandung Conference and the methods of the " popular diplomacy" for the extension of all-round contacts with many countries regardless of their political orientation. China has been restoring her membership in international bodies and becoming more active in local branches of various societies. The PRC has not only returned its ambassadors 368 to a number of Afro-Asian countries but has also considerably moderated its own terms for establishing diplomatic relations in the last two years, so that today it suffices for a developing country to recognise the PRC Government as "the only legitimate government of China,'' without completely disrupting relations with Taiwan. The PRC has recently established official diplomatic relations with a number of countries, including Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Cameroons, Sierra Leone, Kuwait, Iran, Chile, Peru, the Lebanon and Rwanda.
China's diplomatic penetration into Latin America also betrays the PRC's new tactics. Peking is continuing to intensify its efforts to extend its official relations with countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Of late, Chinese propaganda has been changing its accents in the "Third World.'' There now appear fresh catchwords and concepts designed to camouflage the opportunism of the Peking leaders and their departure from the anti-- imperialist struggle as well as, consequently, to retain the possibility of struggling for the hegemony of the PRC as the sole uniting and guiding force in the Third World. As a matter of fact, Chinese `` antiimperialism'' has become idle talk which, as was recently emphasised by the Arab press, serves only as a "serious warning" to Washington. AlAhbar wrote: "The revolutionary phrase-- mongering cannot conceal the bargaining of the Peking leaders with US imperialism.''
In keeping with this position, the Maoists' tactics in the national-liberation movement of the three continents substantially changed in 1970-- 71. While actually continuing to sabotage the __PRINTERS_P_369_COMMENT__ 24--193 369 cause of the peoples' anti-imperialist struggle, Peking has endeavoured to normalise its relations with pro-imperialist forces. True, in 1971 the Chinese press continued to extol the `` successes'' of the small and uncoordinated Peking-- directed groups which exert no influence on the course of the real anti-imperialist struggle waged by the peoples of that region. But that was only lip-service to Peking's ostentatious "anti-- imperialism.''
Moreover, in order to attain its nationalistic aspirations and, for this purpose, to dispel the mistrust with which the governments of a number of Third World countries regarded Peking in 1966--68, the Chinese leaders, under the guise of so-called double revolutionary tactics, simply betray the forces which they supported before. For instance, in 1971, China abandoned the Ceylon ``Left'' putchist forces which she herself had inspired. The Maoists also acted improperly in relation to East Pakistan.
Seeking to use Pakistan as its major "strong point" in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area, and playing on the contradictions between Pakistan and India, Peking also made some peaceable gestures to India in 1971, although its true aims are in no way concerned with the interests of the two countries.
Peking uses a similar tactic in the Middle East. According to Arab public opinion, the Chinese leaders instigated the September 1970 events in Jordan which led to the defeat of the Palestine organisations. In 1971 the Peking leaders were still interested in keeping this conflict unsettled, although they no longer talked about it openly. The Maoists continued to propagate their bellicose 370 principles and to declare their support for the liberation struggle of the people of Palestine, but, at the same time, ceased their sharp attacks against the peaceful settlement plan, thus playing a double game with the Palestine resistance movement and the fighting Arab countries. The Chinese leaders unhesitatingly declared that they "had lost their confidence in the Palestine guerrillas and do not intend to support them in the future.'' All this hardly agrees with the statement made by Chou En-lai in September 1971, to the effect that "China does not sell her principles and does not betray her comrades-in-arms.''~^^1^^
Peking's course aimed at consolidating China's positions to the full in countries of socialist orientation (Burma, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea, the Congo-Brazzaville) is a new feature of her foreign policy tactics in the Third World. While widely spreading in these countries their version about the two "superpowers,'' the Maoists hope to undermine these progressive nations' confidence in the USSR, to discredit the Soviet Union's foreign policy and even its efficient economic assistance. Thus, the Chinese leaders mean not only to weaken the ties between the Third World and the socialist countries but also to completely disunite them and become a leading force there.
To attain this goal, Peking has changed its formerly negative attitude to the idea of nonalignment. Today the Chinese leaders seek to turn it against the USSR as one of the "superpowers" _-_-_
~^^1^^ Chou En-lai's interview to the Director of the Mexican Excelsior newspaper, September 5, 1971.
__PRINTERS_P_371_COMMENT__ 24* 371 and hope to utilise the non-aligned countries in their great-power designs.The PRC's economic policy in the Third World has also suffered some changes. There is a clear tendency to increase the number of states receiving Chinese aid, as well as the amount of this aid. The countries of socialist orientation have always been China's chief contractors in the development of her economic cooperation with the Third World countries (Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea, the Congo-Brazzaville, and Mali were receiving Chinese aid even during the "cultural revolution''). In 1970--71, the People's Republic of China concluded a number of new agreements on economic and technical cooperation with the Arab Republic of Egypt, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Sudan, Mali, Somalia, Ceylon, and Mauritania. By the beginning of 1971, the countries of socialist orientation accounted for about 60 per cent of the total Chinese aid to the Third World and for most of the enterprises actually built.
The changes in Peking's tactics in Africa since the 9th CPC Congress have been directly connected with the fact that the genuine nationalliberation movements had rejected China's claims to the leadership of the revolutionary forces and had consolidated their ties with the socialist countries, the Soviet Union in particular. At the same time, the pro-Maoist groups and organisations have discredited themselves, lost their links with the people, and have become overt enemies of the African revolutionary-democratic forces.
In an attempt to restore their positions in the African national-liberation movement, the Chinese leaders have of late attached special importance 372 to the struggle of the peoples of Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies, and ceased the gross imposition of their views and concepts on the revolutionary forces.
Striving to restore the contacts with the revolutionary-democratic organisations in the South of Africa, the Chinese leaders are very reluctant to curtail their relations with the Pan-African Congress, the South-West Africa National Union and other pro-Maoist groups on the dependent territories, obviously hoping to retain and continue to use them in their hegemonistic policy. Peking maintains particularly close ties with the National Union for the Complete Independence of Angola the leadership of which at its 2nd Congress (1970) openly supported China on all issues.
In the national-liberation movement of Africa, as also in other areas, Peking has been employing the "double revolutionary tactics.'' This also applies to the pro-Maoist organisations and groups which have become an obstacle to the Peking broad diplomatic offensive in Africa. Thus, the Chinese leaders ceased supporting the pro-Maoist groups in the Cameroons and the Zaire Republic. Since the end of 1969, the CPC's leadership has discontinued its support of the opposition organisations in Botswana (the Botswana People's Party), Swaziland (the Swaziland Progressive Party), and Lesotho (the Lesotho Congress Party).
The unscrupulous but more flexible policy of the Chinese leaders is directed towards the same old goal, i.e., achieving hegemony in the national liberation movement, and weakening its union with the socialist countries, and the international communist and working-class movement.
The major task of the Chinese leadership in 373 Latin America today is the development of interstate relations. Peking has vigorously striven for recognition by Latin American governments. Here the Chinese leaders stand on overtly anti-Soviet positions and endeavour to activate the Maoist groups. At the same time, they are trying to undermine the revolutionary movement from within and to impose upon it their ideological and organisational leadership. Thus, Peking is striving to neutralise the crisis consequences and the discontent in Latin American pro-Chinese groups that resulted from the changes in the foreign policy tactics of the Chinese leadership, in particular its flirting with US imperialism.
The CPC's leadership attaches special importance to the development of economic and trade relations with Latin American countries. In AprilMay 1971, the PRC government trade delegation visited Chile and Peru and, for the first time in the history of Chinese-Latin American relations (except Cuba), signed trade agreements and a protocol. In mid-June 1971, a Peruvian trade delegation, as well as Gavier Tantalean Vanini, Peru Minister of Fishing, visited Peking. A trade protocol was signed, the People's Republic of China committing itself to purchase 150,000--200,000 tons of fish flour, 20,000 tons of fish oil, 35,000-- 40,000 tons of copper, 10,000 tons of lead and 10,000 tons of zinc before the end of 1972. The two countries decided to exchange trade representations.
Trade relations are also developing between the PRC and Ecuador. The press reported talks on China's purchases of bauxites and aluminium in Guyana. Eliseo Berruato, Mexican DeputySecretary for Industry and Commerce, expressed 374 himself in favour of extending trade ties with the PRC.
The change in the attitude of a number of proAmerican governments in Latin America towards China is also closely connected with the increased US-Chinese contacts in 1971. The representatives of these Latin American countries' big capital will obviously attempt to make large profits in the Chinese market.
Since the "cultural revolution" the PRC's diplomatic activity has extended, first and foremost, to the Western capitalist countries which Peking regards as a global force that has common political interests with China. The Chinese leadership attaches great importance to establishing ties with European capitalist countries on the basis of "consolidating all forces against the hegemony of the two ``superpowers'' and thus seeks partly to solve the PRC's political and economic problems through cooperation with the West; it also wants to use Europe as a means of pressure on the USA and the USSR.
Having advanced the theory of "small and medium" countries, the Peking leaders regard Great Britain, France, the FRG and other Western countries as victims of the pressure exerted by the ``superpowers'' and, ignoring the class essence of capitalism, they are actually willing to regard them as not belonging to the imperialist system.
By advocating the slogan of a Europe competing with the ``superpowers'' the Chinese leaders share the common ``ideological'' principles of bourgeois nationalism and endeavour to use them for a rapprochement with the capitalist countries. On the basis of this, the PRC won its recognition by some European states and established 375 diplomatic relations with Italy, San Marino, Austria, Turkey and Belgium in 1970--71. It is characteristic that the NATO leaders do not object to recognition of the PRC. Nearly half the members of this aggressive organisation have established diplomatic relations with the PRC and are developing economic contacts. The Chinese press, in its turn, has practically ceased criticising the NATO aggressive bloc.
In extending their relations with developed capitalist states, the PRC's leaders seek to utilise the Western economic, scientific and technical potential for the purpose of obtaining strategic goods and technical assistance in building military objects.
Thus, in the PRC's foreign contacts imperialist powers have actually replaced the socialist countries with whom the Chinese leaders have curtailed their economic relations. The capitalist world has become China's major supplier of plant equipment (including military equipment). In the last seven years, British, West German, French, Italian and other companies have signed contracts with the PRC's foreign trade bodies for the delivery of 300 million dollars' worth of equipment for 43 industrial enterprises, including 18 chemical, four oil-refining, ten engineering and five steel manufacturing plants.
The trip of the PRC's economic delegation headed by the Foreign Trade Minister, Bai Sianko, to the West European countries in SeptemberNovember 1971 attests the PRC's intentions to strengthen its ties with the capitalist world.
Considering the interest displayed by the Peking regime in establishing all-round contacts with the West, the governments and the 376 reactionary circles in some NATO countries hope to use China as an anti-Soviet force. Great Britain and the FRG's reactionary elements in particular being obviously eager to create a military complex in China directed against the USSR.
Their common stand also makes itself felt in the questions pertaining to the relaxation of tension and the creation of a collective security system in Europe. The struggle waged by the USSR and other socialist countries for a detente, establishment of a European security system based on recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe, and for convocation of an all-European conference meets with stubborn resistance of the Chinese leadership and the reactionary forces in the NATO countries, primarily the revanchists in the FRG. Striving to provoke conflict situations between the USSR and the USA, the Chinese leadership attempts to hinder a detente in Europe and to retain possibilities for bringing pressure to bear on the USSR from the West. The Chinese leaders regard a detente in Europe as dangerous to their strategic plans.
The Peking regime sharply condemned the Soviet-West German treaty of August 12, 1970. Peking alleged that the treaty was a "betrayal of the interests of the German people, the Soviet people and the peoples of the whole of Europe" and declared that the Soviet Union had given to West Germany "tacit consent to annex the GDR.'' Thus, the Chinese leaders' stand with respect to the Soviet-West German treaty objectively merged with that of the most reactionary forces of West German imperialism who, in their turn, described the treaty as a "provocation against China.''
377The rather frank statement of Huang Chen, the Chinese Ambassador to Paris, is typical of the Chinese leaders' attitude to the problems of European security. On November 5, 1970, speaking in Paris on the occasion of the Italy-PRC mutual diplomatic recognition, he said: "We Chinese are against the Soviet proposal to convene an allEuropean security conference. By this, the Soviet Union wants to oust the Americans from Europe so that it may bring greater pressure to bear on China and to fetter its satellites more than ever before. The agreement between Bonn and Moscow helps the USSR to implement its plans.''
The present-day foreign policy of the Chinese leadership is characterised by a "flexible line" aimed at a rapprochement not only with the USA but also with Japan, the sharp criticism of the Sato Government by the Peking leaders notwithstanding. After the November 1969 Japanese-US talks which had demonstrated a consolidation of their imperialist efforts in Asia, as well as their anti-Chinese stance, Chinese propaganda brought to the forefront the theme of struggle against Japanese militarism.
In the propaganda speeches of Chinese leaders, Japanese militarism is increasingly mentioned as the chief enemy of the people alongside the two "superpowers.'' However, the Chinese leaders are developing contacts with Japan in practically all spheres, and their relations with the Japanese ruling Liberal-Democratic Party have become very active. Despite the fact that the Sato Government has not responded to Peking's far-reaching proposals made in the 1960s, the Chinese leaders have not abandoned their hopes and efforts of striking a bargain with the Japanese ruling 378 quartcrs on the nationalistic, anti-Soviet basis which they had proclaimed earlier.
It is but natural that in their relations with the Mao Tse-tung group, Japanese imperialists take into account its anti-Sovietism and subversive activities against the democratic forces of Japan, as well as the opportunity to utilise JapaneseChinese contacts to bring pressure to bear on the USA. At the same time, the Japanese Government continues to consolidate its imperialist efforts in Asia and to extend its economic and political penetration into Taiwan. Under the conditions of the escalation of the US aggression in Vietnam, the Japanese Government stopped using the funds of the Export-Import Bank of Japan for financing deliveries of complete sets of equipment to China. It also exercises stricter control over the exports and even the exposition in the PRC (at the Japanese industrial fairs) of non-- commercial samples of goods regarded as strategic.
While further consolidating and extending its military-political alliance with the USA, the Japanese Government has agreed overtly to include Taiwan, Vietnam, and South Korea in the sphere of the "security treaty.'' Moreover, it has demonstrated its readiness to see to it that the status quo in the Taiwan problem be preserved. Thus, Japan is increasingly more frankly claiming leadership in Asia in union with and aided by the United States.
Having failed, by means of nationalistic and anti-Soviet flirting with Japan's ruling quarters, to mitigate the anti-Chinese stance of her militarypolitical alliance with the USA and to gain access to Japanese investments and technology, the Chinese leadership increased its pressure on Japan 379 and started severely criticising the Sato Government, at the same time activating its relations with the opposition, the so-called pro-Chinese elements of the Liberal-Democratic Party. The Chinese leaders are blackmailing Japan's ruling circles with the possibly anti-Japanese trend of the newly-emerging Chinese-US rapprochement. They demonstrate to the Japanese ruling circles their blatant anti-Sovietism and solidarity on the "Northern territories" issue, the solidarity on which Japan may allegedly rely in bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union.
At the same time, a very specific feature may be traced in Peking's growing criticism of the Japanese reactionaries and militarists. This criticism increasingly' boils down to attacks against the activity of the present government making it possible to use it as a kind of a smoke-screen for the purpose of hiding the actually growing political ties with the Japanese ruling quarters as a whole. The so-called pro-Chinese opposition within the Liberal-Democratic Party, the opposition whose mood, alongside the racial-nationalistic "flexibility,'' is characterised by overt anti-- Sovietism and revanchism, speaks on behalf of these quarters. The Chinese leaders persistently seek to present it as a progressive, anti-imperialist force with which a mutual understanding would be tantamount to a unification of the Asian peoples' efforts in their struggle against the US-Japanese reactionaries.
In the joint communiques with the above-- mentioned LDP representatives (at the annual negotiations in Peking on the trade with the big Japanese capitalists), the Chinese leadership shows its full accord with them on a number of key 380 international issues which do not only relate to the Chinese-Japanese relations. Although the Japanese side represents the upper stratum of the Japanese monopoly bourgeoisie's ruling party, at the trade talks it makes vigorous attempts to dissociate itself from the Sato Government foreign policy. It expresses an ``understanding'' of China's stand on a number of world issues, for instance, that the new interpretation of the Japanese-- American "security treaty" has turned it into a more harmful military alliance directed against the Chinese and other Asian peoples; that the Japanese reactionaries have become a major supporter of US imperialism and the vanguard in the struggle against the peoples of Asia; that the USJapanese reactionaries seek to perpetuate the occupation of Taiwan and South Korea and the split of Vietnam; and that in Japan, the revival of militarism has become a reality.
Moreover, the placemen of the Japanese monopoly circles, who reflect the interests of the monopoly section which, pursuing its own imperialist aims with respect to Asia, including China, are inclined to be less dependent on the USA, even declare their resolve to oppose the revival of Japanese militarism.
The Chinese leaders also seek to build their relations with the democratic forces of Japan on an anti-Soviet basis. It is well-known that the ``revolutionary'' activity of the Peking leaders in Japan during the "cultural revolution" resulted in increased dissociation of the country's democratic forces and weakening of some of its contingents. This service rendered to the Japanese ruling quarters can hardly be overestimated. The Japanese-American "security treaty" was to 381 expire in June 1970, and a fierce struggle was waged between the US-Japanese reactionaries, on the one hand, and the progressive forces, on the other, to determine the country's further course. The cherished hope of the US and Japanese imperialist circles was to weaken the stand of the progressive forces and their pressure, and to attain this aim these imperialists had exerted a great deal of effort.
Objectively, Peking was acting in the same vein. The obviousness of this fact forced the Peking leaders somewhat to modify the wording of the thesis of struggle against the "four enemies" which they had been imposing on the Japanese democratic forces, although the essence of this thesis remained unaffected. Anti-Sovietism and subversive actions against the Communist Party of Japan remain the core of the Chinese leaders' activity in the democratic movement of Japan.
All this goes to show that, despite the changes in their tactical principles, and peaceable verbiage, the foreign policy of the Maoists has not altered its essence and remains nationalistic and adventurist. The Chinese leaders continue acting on the strength of their anti-socialist propositions aimed at winning a leading status in the world by pursuing an anti-Soviet policy, carrying on subversive activity in the socialist community and the world communist and democratic movement; they are increasingly developing contacts with imperialist states, particularly with the USA, and are endeavouring to use the Third World countries as an instrument of achieving their great-power chauvinistic aims.
Meanwhile the restoration of the PRC's rights in the United Nations that was advocated by the 382 USSR, which has always defended, as a matter of principle, the interests of the Chinese people and China as a great power, offers the PRC fresh opportunities in international relations. Today it is becoming increasingly evident that only a policy based on socialist principles can really protect China's national interests and give the Chinese people a chance to concentrate their efforts on socialist construction as well as to restore the genuine prestige of the PRC in the international arena.
Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 12, 1971
[383] __ALPHA_LVL0__ The End. [END] onAciibin no amAU&cKO Ueiia 47 Kon [384]