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p Investigation of any new sphere necessarily begins with a search for and elaboration of a method. It may be suggested, as a general proposition, that any new approach to scientific problems inevitably leads to new methods and ways of investigation. The object and method of investigation prove to be closely interconnected. The investigation therefore assumes an entirely different form and takes a 20 different course when it is aimed at finding a new method which is adequate to the new problem; in this case the form of the investigation radically differs from the forms in which the study merely uses in new spheres the methods already elaborated and established in science.

p All the psychological methods now used in experimental investigation are, despite their enormous diversity, built on one principle, according to one type, one scheme, namely, stimulus-response. However original and complex the type of psychological experiment, it is always easy to see that it stands on this universal foundation. Whatever the object and method of the psychologist’s experiment, it is always a question of exerting some action on the person, exposing him to particular stimuli, in some manner stimulating his behaviour or experiences, and then studying, investigating, analysing, describing and comparing the response to this action, the reaction to the given stimulus. This method of investigation undoubtedly rests on the basic proposition, the basic psychologic law, according to which mental processes are reactions to stimuli. The basic scheme of the experiment—stimulus-response—is at the same time the basic law of behaviour. All sorts of connections, depending on the constellation and change in the stimuli and reactions have been investigated in psychology, but we do not know of a single investigation with a fundamental step made beyond the basic, essentially elementary law of behaviour. All changes were wrought within the general scheme. Even the method of conditioned reflexes finds its place within the same general range. So different from other methods in all other respects, in this respect it hinges on their common pivot.

p This scheme underlies the psychological experiment however diverse the forms it assumes in investigations of various trends and whatever fields of psychology it penetrates. This scheme embraces all trends—from associationism to structural psychology, all fields of investigation— from elementary to higher processes, all branches of psychology—from general to child psychology.

p However, this proposition has its reverse side which is that with the generalisation and spread of our scheme to more extensive spheres of psychology the concrete content of this scheme has evaporated and disappeared in direct proportion to these processes. It may screen the most 21 diverse and exactly opposite approaches to the human mind and behaviour, the most diverse aims and objectives of investigation, and, lastly, the most different fields of investigation. The following question arises: under the circumstances isn’t the entire scheme an empty, meaningless form which is generally devoid of any content, and isn’t our generalisation therefore devoid of any meaning?

p The common elements that unite all types and forms of psychological experiment and that are in various measure characteristic of all of them, since they rest on the S-R principle, constitute a naturalistic approach to human psychology, which must be disclosed and overcome if we are to find an adequate method of investigating the cultural development of behaviour. In its essence this view seems to us to be related to the naturalistic conception of history, the one-sidedness of which consists, according to F. Engels, in that it holds that “nature exclusively reacts on man, and natural conditions everywhere exclusively determine his historical development”, and forgets that “man also reacts on nature, changing it and creating new conditions of existence for himself”.  [21•* 

p The naturalistic approach to behaviour as a whole, including the higher mental functions which have formed during the historical period of development of behaviour, does not take into consideration the qualitative difference between the history of man and the evolution of animals. The S-R scheme is essentially used in the same manner in investigating the behaviour of man and the behaviour of animals. This fact alone expresses the idea that all the qualitative differences in the history of man, all the “changes in human nature”, the whole new type of human adaptation—all of it has failed to affect human behaviour and to cause any fundamental changes in it. This idea actually declares that human behaviour is outside the pale of the general historical development of man.

p However ungrounded and even preposterous as this idea, when openly stated, may be, when concealed it continues to be a silent prerequisite, an unuttered principle of experimental psychology. It is unthinkable that labour, which has radically changed the character of man’s 22 adaptation to nature, is unconnected with the change in the type of man, if we assume together with Engels that “a tool implies specific human reality, the transforming reaction of man on nature, production”.  [22•*  Is it possible that in the psychology of man nothing corresponds to the difference in the relation to nature, which sets man apart from animals and which Engels implies when he says that “the animal merely uses his environment, man by his changes makes it serve his ends”, or in other words, that “all the planned action of all animals has never succeeded in impressing the stamp of their will upon the earth. That was left for man”.  [22•** 

p The S-R scheme and the naturalistic approach to human psychology it screens assume human behaviour to be essentially passive.

p If we take into account these purely theoretical considerations and add the actual impotence of experimental psychology in applying the S-R scheme to investigation of the higher mental functions, we will see that this scheme cannot serve as the basis for constructing an adequate method of investigating specifically human forms of behaviour. At best it will help us to discern the presence of lower, subordinate “collateral forms" which “do not exhaust the essence of the main form”. Application of this universal, all-embracing scheme to all stages of development of behaviour may but lead to establishment of a purely quantitative variety, complication and enhancement of human stimuli and reactions, compared with those of animals, but cannot grasp the new quality in human behaviour, because the development of behaviour from animals to man gave rise to a new quality, and this is our main idea. This development does not exhaust by a simple complication the relations between the stimuli and responses which are already given to us in the psychology of animals. Nor does it proceed along the path of quantitative increase and extension of these connections. It is centred upon a dialectical leap which leads to a qualitative change in the very relation between the stimulus and the response. Human behaviour—we could thus formulate our 23 main conclusion—differs from the behaviour of animals in the same qualitative manner as the entire type of adaptation and historical development of man differs from the adaptation and development of animals, because the process of man’s mental development is part of the general process of man’s historical development. We are thereby compelled to seek and find a new methodological formula for psychological experiment.

p We started our investigation with a psychological analysis of several forms of behaviour which are encountered, not often, to be sure, in day-to-day life and are therefore familiar to everybody, but are at the same time an extremely complex historical formation of the most ancient epochs in man’s psychological development.

p These negligible and at the same time deeply significant phenomena may be with good reason called rudimentary mental functions by analogy with the rudimentary organs.

p The rudimentary functions which we find in any system of behaviour and which are vestiges of similar, but more developed functions in other, older psychological systems are a living evidence of the origin of these higher systems in their historical connection with older strata in the development of behaviour. That is why their study may reveal essential data for understanding human behaviour, the data which we need to find the basic formula for the method. And that is why we decided to begin with small and negligible facts and to raise their investigation to a high theoretical level in an attempt to show how the great manifests itself in the very small.

p An analysis of these psychological forms reveals to us what were formerly the higher mental functions included with them in one system of behaviour and what was this very system in which rudimentary and active functions coexist. This analysis furnishes us with the point of departure of their genesis and at the same time the point of departure of the entire method.

p As ancient formations which arose in the very beginning of cultural development they have retained in pure form the principle of their structure and activity, the prototype of all other cultural forms of behaviour. What exists in infinitely more complex processes in concealed form is here open to view. All the connections with the system which at one time gave rise to them have died 24 away, the ground on which they arose has disappeared, the background of their activity has changed, they were severed from their system and were transported by the stream of historical development to an entirely different sphere. They are bearers of their own history. To analyse each such form, requires a small and finished separate monograph the size of a page. But, unlike the a priori constructions and artificially created examples and schemes, they are real formations, finding their direct and immediate continuation in experiment which reproduces their basic forms and, in investigation of primitive man, reveals their history.

p The first form of behaviour in which we are interested may be very easily pictured in connection with the specific situation in which it usually arises. This situation, in its extreme and simplified expression, is usually referred to as the situation of Buridan’s ass on the basis of the wellknown philosophical joke figuring in the writings of the most diverse thinkers; the joke is ascribed to Buridan in whose writings, incidentally, it does not appear at all. A hungry ass standing at an equal distance from two absolutely similar bundles of hay suspended on the right and left sides must starve to death because the motives prompting him are equally powerful and are aimed in opposite directions. This famous joke is supposed to illustrate the idea of absolute determination of behaviour, the idea that the will is not free. What would man do in a similar ideal situation?

p Some thinkers asserted that man would suffer the sad fate of the ass. Others, on the contrary, held that man would be a most shameful ass and not a thinking creature— res cogitans—if he perished under the same circumstances.

p Essentially, this is the basic problem of all of human psychology. It presents in an extremely simplified, ideal form the entire problem of our investigation, the entire stimulus-response problem. If two stimuli act with equal force in opposite directions, simultaneously evoking two incompatible reactions, complete inhibition results with mechanical necessity, behaviour is arrested and there is no way out.

p A person finding himself in the situation of Buridan’s ass resorts to the aid of auxiliary motives or stimuli artificially introduced into the situation. In place of 25 Buridan’s ass man would throw lots and thus master the situation.

p In the behaviour of people who have grown up under conditions of a backward culture casting lots plays an enormous role. According to investigators, in difficult cases many primitive tribes never take an important decision without casting lots. Bones thrown and fallen in a definite manner serve as the decisive auxiliary stimulus in the struggle of motives. Levy-Bruhl describes numerous methods by which an alternative is chosen with the aid of artificial stimuli entirely unrelated to the situation and introduced by primitive man exclusively as an aid to choosing one of two possible reactions.

p If we isolate in pure form the very principle of constructing the operation of casting lots, we shall easily see that its most important feature consists in the new and entirely unusual relation between the stimuli and responses which are impossible in the behaviour of an animal.

p Let us take a situation in which man is acted upon by two equally powerful and opposite stimuli A and B. If the joint action of the two stimuli leads to a mechanical addition of these actions, i.e., to a complete absence of any reactions, we have what should have happened, according to the joke, to Buridan’s ass. This is the highest and purest expression of the stimulus-response principle in behaviour. Complete determinability of behaviour by stimulation and complete possibility of studying the whole of the behaviour by the S-R scheme are shown here in the most simplified ideal form.

p In the same situation man throws lots. He introduces artificially into the situation, without changing it, without in any way connecting with it, auxiliary stimuli a-A and b-B. If stimulus a drops out, he will follow stimulus A, if stimulus b falls out, he will follow stimulus B. He creates his own artificial situation by introducing a couple of auxiliary stimuli. He determines his behaviour beforehand, making his choice with the aid of a stimulus introduced by himself. Let us assume that in casting lots stimulus a drops out. Stimulus A thereby wins. This stimulus A evokes the corresponding reaction X. Stimulus B evokes no reaction. Its corresponding reaction F could not be produced.

p Let us analyse what has taken place. Reaction X was, of course, evoked by stimulus A. Without this stimulus the 26 reaction could not have occurred. But X was evoked not only by A. A itself was neutralised by the action of B. Reaction X was evoked also by stimulus a which has nothing to do with it and was introduced into the situation artificially. Thus the stimulus created by man himself determined his reaction. We may, consequently, say that man determined his own reaction with the aid of an artificial stimulus.

p Like the casting of lots, tying a knot to remember something belongs to psychology of everyday life. Man wants to remember something; for example, he must execute some commission, do something, take something, etc. Not trusting his memory and not relying on it he usually ties a knot on his handkerchief or in an analogous manner places a piece of paper under the lid of his pocket watch, etc. The knot must remind him later of what he has to do. And, as everybody knows, in some cases it may serve as a reliable aid to memory.

p Here is another operation which is unthinkable and impossible in an animal. We are again ready to see a new, specifically human behaviour characteristic in the introduction of an artificial auxiliary memory aid, in the active creation and use of a stimulus as a memory aid.

p But the essence of the form of behaviour in which we are interested remains the same in all cases. This essence is in the transition from the direct perception of quantity and immediate reaction to a quantitative stimulus to the creation of auxiliary stimuli and active determination of one’s own behaviour with their aid. Artificial stimuli created by man, in no way connected with the situation on hand and placed in the service of active adaptation, again appear as a distinguishing feature of higher forms of behaviour.

p With this we may finish analysing concrete examples. Further consideration would inevitably make us repeat in new forms and manifestations the main feature, which we have singled out. We are interested in that extremely peculiar world of higher or cultured forms of behaviour which opens up beyond them and which investigation of inactive functions helps us to penetrate. We are searching for the key to higher behaviour.

p It occurs to us that we have found it in the principle of constructing the psychological forms which we have analysed. It is in this that the heuristic significance of 27 investigating rudimentary functions consists. As we have already mentioned, these psychological fossils, these living vestiges of ancient epochs clearly show the structure of the higher form. These rudimentary functions reveal to us what all higher mental processes were like before and to what type of organisation they at one time belonged.

p In all the cases we have examined, man’s behaviour was determined not by the stimuli on hand, but by a new or invariably man-made psychological situation. Creation and use of artificial stimuli as aids to mastery of one’s own reactions are the basis of the determinability of behaviour which distinguishes higher behaviour from elementary. The presence of created stimuli in addition to given stimuli is in our opinion a distinguishing feature of human psychology.

p These artificial stimuli—means introduced by man into a psychological situation and performing the function of autostimulation—we call signs, attaching to this term a broader and at the same time more exact meaning than the usual meaning. According to our definition, any conditioned stimulus artificially created by man and serving as a means of mastering behaviour—one’s own or someone else’s—is a sign. Two factors are thus essential for the concept of sign: its origin and function.

p The behaviour of man is distinguished by the fact that he creates artificial signalling stimuli, primarily a grand signal system of speech, and thereby masters the signalling activity of the cerebral hemispheres. Whereas the basic and most common activity of the cerebral hemispheres of animals and man is signalling, the basic and most common activity of man, which primarily distinguishes man from animals psychologically, is signification, i.e., creation and use of signs. We are taking this word in its literal and precise sense. Signification is creation and use of signs, i.e., artificial signals.

p It is quite clear that such signalling which is a reflection of the natural connections of phenomena and is entirely a creation of natural conditions cannot form an adequate basis for human behaviour. Active reshaping of nature by man is essential to human adaptation. This reshaping of nature by man underlies all of human history. It necessarily presupposes an active change in human behaviour. “By thus acting on the external world and changing it, 28 he at the same time changes his own nature,” says K. Marx. “He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway.”  [28•* 

p Every definite stage in mastering the forces of nature necessarily corresponds to a definite stage in the mastery of behaviour, in subordinating the psychological processes to the power of man. Active adaptation of man to the environment and the change in man’s nature cannot be based on signalling which passively reflects the natural connections of various agents. They require an active coupling of such connections which are impossible in a purely natural type of behaviour, i.e., based on a natural combination of the agents. Man introduces artificial stimuli, signifies behaviour and by means of signs creates from without new connections in the brain. Together with the assumption of this we tentatively introduce a new regulatory principle of behaviour into our investigation, a new conception of determinability of man’s reactions. It is the principle of signification which means that man creates from without connections in his brain, controls his brain and through it his own body.

p A question naturally arises: how is it generally possible to create connections from without and regulate the behaviour of the type under discussion? This possibility is offered in the coincidence of two factors. In point of fact, the possibility of such regulatory principle lies as an inference in the prerequisite, in the structure of the conditioned reflex.

p The theory of conditioned reflexes is based on the idea that the main difference between a conditioned and an unconditioned reflex is not their mechanism, but the formation of the reflex mechanism. “The only difference is,” says I. P. Pavlov, “that in one case there is a ready-made conduction path, whereas the other case requires preliminary coupling; in one case the mechanism of communication is quite ready, in the other case the mechanism is somewhat supplemented each time until it is completely ready.”  [28•**  Consequently, the conditioned reflex is a mechanism newly 29 created by a coincidence of two stimuli, i.e., created from without.

p The second factor, whose presence explains the possibility for the appearance of a new regulatory principle of behaviour, is the social life and interaction of people. In the process of social life man has created and developed most complex systems of psychological connections without which neither work nor all of the social life would be possible. These means of psychological connections are in their very nature and function signs, i.e., artificially created stimuli whose purpose is to stimulate behaviour, to form new reflex connections in the human brain.

p The two factors taken together enable us to understand the possibility of formation of the new regulatory principle. Social life makes it necessary to subordinate the behaviour of the individual to social requirements and at the same time creates complex signal systems—means of communication which direct and regulate the formation of conditioned connections in the brain of man. The organisation of higher nervous activity creates the necessary prerequisite for it, creates the possibility of regulating behaviour from without.

p In explaining man’s behaviour from the psychological aspect the inadequacy of the regulatory principle consisting in construction of the conditioned reflex is, as was already mentioned, that by means of this mechanism we can only understand how the natural inborn connections regulate the formation of connections in the brain and human behaviour, i.e., understand behaviour on a purely naturalistic, but not historical plane. This regulatory principle quite corresponds to the passive type of animal adaptation.

p But no natural connections make it possible to understand the active adaptation to nature, the change of nature by man. This can be understood only from man’s social nature. Otherwise we return to the naturalist assertion that only nature acts on man. “Natural science, like philosophy,” says Engels, “has hitherto entirely neglected the influence of men’s activity on their thought; both know only nature on the one hand and thought on the other. But it is precisely the alteration of nature by men, not solely nature as such, which is the most essential and immediate basis of human thought, and it is in the measure 30 that man has learned to change nature that his intelligence has increased.”  [30•* 

p This new type of behaviour must necessarily correspond to a new regulatory principle of behaviour. We find it in the social determination of behaviour realised by means of signs. The leading role in all social connections is played by speech. I. P. Pavlov says that “owing to all of an adult’s preceding life the word is connected with all the external and internal stimuli reaching the cerebral hemispheres, it signals them all, replaces all of them and may therefore evoke all the actions and reactions of the organism conditioned by these stimuli”,  [30•** 

p Man’s psychological development took place in the phylogenesis and is taking place in the ontogenesis not only along the line of improving and complicating the grandest signal panel, i.e., the structure and function of the neural apparatus, but also along the line of elaborating and acquiring a correspondingly grand system of speech signals which are the key to this panel.

p So far our discourse appears perfectly clear. There is an apparatus meant for the coupling of temporary connections and there is a key to this apparatus, which makes il possible, in addition to the connections forming by themselves under the influence of natural agents, to produce new, artificial couplings subject to man’s will and choice. The apparatus and key to it are in different hands. One man influences another through speech. But the complexity of the problem becomes obvious as soon as we connect the apparatus and the key in one person, as soon as we begin to deal with the concept of autostimulation and selfmastery. Here psychological connections of a new type arise within the selfsame system of behaviour.

p We shall place this transition from the social influence outside the personality to the social influence within the personality in the centre of our investigation and shall attempt to elucidate the most important factors from which the process of such transition forms.

The use of auxiliary means, the transition to mediating activity radically reorganises the entire mental operation, 31 as the use of a tool modifies the natural activity of organs and endlessly extends the system of activity of the mental functions. The former and the latter together we designate by the term of higher mental function or higher behaviour.