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[introduction.]

p The world that surrounds man is the scene of a prodigious diversity of phenomena. The simplest observations show that between these phenomena there are definite and more or less stable connections. A definite permanence, a regularity, is found in the world. Day follows night, and winter is followed by spring. An oak, and not a pine or birch, grows out of an acorn. A chrysalis becomes a butterfly, and never becomes a caterpillar again.

p Even in distant antiquity people came to realise that the things and phenomena of the surrounding world were bound up with one another and that there was a natural necessary connection between them, independent of man’s consciousness and volition.

p True, the understanding of this connection was for long impeded by superstitions and religious notions, according to which natural phenomena might be produced by supernatural forces or Gods capable of violating the natural connection of things. However, science and materialist philosophy insisted that miracles and supernatural occurrences did not and could not exist, and that only the natural connection of things and phenomena existed in the world. Gradually, this truth penetrated deeply into the human mind.

In the course of the scientific and philosophical cognition of the world, many forms and manifestations of the universal connection of phenomena were discovered, and concepts (categories) arose to express these, such as causality, interaction, necessity, law, accident, essence and appearance, possibility and reality, form and content. This section of Chapter 2 deals chiefly with categories directly associated with the conception of the necessary character of universal connections and the determination of phenomena, i.e., the principle of determinism, which is the corner-stone of any genuinely scientific explanation of the world.

The Connection of Cause and Effect

p The most familiar form of connection, observed everywhere and always, is the connection of cause and effect.

p The cause of a phenomenon usually denotes that which brought about its existence. The phenomenon produced is called the effect or consequence. The wind, for example, is the cause of the movement of a sailing vessel.

p There is a definite sequence in time between cause and effect. The cause comes first, and is followed by the effect. But “subsequent” by no means necessarily means “consequent”. For example, day always follows night, and night follows day, but day is not the cause of night and night is not the cause of day. It is well known that the cause of the alternation of day and night is the rotation of the earth about its axis, resulting in the illumination first of one side and then of the other.

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p Effect is necessarily connected with cause. If a cause exists, the effect will inevitably follow, provided nothing interferes with it. If you press the trigger of a loaded rifle, a discharge is bound to occur. But we know that sometimes no discharge occurs. Does this mean that the causal connection has lost its necessary character? No, it only means that some other cause has prevented the discharge. Possibly, the spring of the trigger had weakened, or the gunpowder was moist, or the cartridge spoilt, etc. By investigating all the circumstances we can determine the cause which prevented the expected phenomenon from occurring. Thus, the break in the causal connection is here really only a seeming one.

p In order that a cause should produce an action, certain conditions are always required. The conditions are those phenomena which are necessary for the occurrence of a given event, but do not bring it about of themselves. For example, various conditions are necessary in order that an airplane may rise into the air, such as a suitable airfield, favourable weather conditions, etc. But these conditions of themselves are, of course, insufficient for the take-off, which requires the operation of the plane’s motors as an immediate cause.

p Quite often, particularly in complicated cases, cause is easily confused with the occasion. Such confusion is due to a superficial view of things and an inability to discern the true, deep-lying causes of phenomena. The occasion of itself cannot give rise to any phenomenon, but it acts as an impulse which brings the actual cause into operation. For example, the assassination in Sarajevo of the Austrian crown prince, Franz-Ferdinand, was the occasion for the First World War. Yet we know that the war was not caused by this assassination, but by the increasingly bitter rivalry of the imperialist powers.

To grasp events correctly in practical affairs, in politics, and to separate the essential from the non-essential, it is especially important to be able to distinguish actual causes from conditions and occasions.

Against the Idealist Conception of Causality

p Causal connection is universal in character and applies to all the phenomena of nature and society, whether simple or complex, whether known or unknown to science. Causeless phenomena do not and cannot exist. Every phenomenon necessarily has a cause.

p It is the cardinal purpose of science to determine causal connections. To explain a phenomenon, one must find its cause. By investigating and cognising the world, science penetrates to the roots of phenomena—from the surface of events to their immediate, direct causes, and from these to more profound, general and essential causes. Ignorance of the true cause of a phenomenon not only makes it impossible for man consciously to produce or prevent it; 64 it tends to give rise to unscientific and fantastic notions, superstitions, and mystical, religious explanations of nature.

p This is why the problem of causality has long been the subject of bitter controversy between materialism and idealism. Idealist philosophers have often either totally denied the objective nature of causal connection or sought its source not in nature, but in some spiritual principle.

p In the opinion of David Hume, the eighteenth-century English ’ philosopher, experience does not reveal the necessary connection of phenomena. That is why, he claimed, we can only say that one phenomenon follows another, but are not justified in saying that one phenomenon produces another.

p Immanuel Kant understood that there could be no science, unless the obligatory nature of causal connection was recognised. But, like Hume, he assumed that there was no such connection in observable phenomena. Kant sought the source of causality and necessity in the human mind, whose peculiar design allegedly imparts a causal connection to the phenomena we perceive.

p Many modern idealists aver that there is neither cause nor effect in nature and that, as L. Wittgenstein put it, "the belief in the casual nexus is superstition".”

p These idealist views are conclusively refuted by the whole history of science. The raison d’etre of natural and social sciences is concerned principally with discovering and studying the causes of phenomena. But the most convincing proof of the objective character of causal connection is provided by man’s practical productive activities. By discovering causal dependencies in nature and then making practical use of this knowledge, people produce the effects they require and arrive at desired results. "In this way, by the activity of human beings,” Engels wrote, "the idea of causality becomes established, the idea that one motion is the cause of another.”^^26^^

p Idealism and religion oppose the materialist causal theory with the doctrine of ends, or so-called teleology (derived from the Greek “te/os”—purpose). To the causal explanation which replies to the question why a natural phenomenon has occurred, teleology counterposes the conjecture for what ends it has occurred. According to the Ideological viewpoint, the existence, design and development of a thing are determined by the purpose, or "final cause”, for which it is meant. Teleology is an extremely convenient doctrine for religion and idealist philosophy, because it leads inevitably to the conclusion that a supreme reason (God) exists and achieves its ends in nature.

As proof of their views, supporters of teleology usually point to the purposive structure of organisms (e.g., the protective colouring of animals). Marxist dialectics does not deny purposiveness in the anatomical structure and activity of living organisms. But it declares that this has its basis in objective causes. The mechanism 65 by which these causes operate was revealed by Darwin’s theory. Alteration of plants and animals arises through their interaction with changed conditions of life. If these alterations prove beneficial to the organism, i. e., if they help it to adapt itself to the environment and to survive, they are preserved through natural selection, become hereditary, pass from one generation to another, producing that purposive structure of the organism, that adaptation to the environment, which so often strikes the imagination.

Interaction

p The theoretical and practical significance of the causal connection of phenomena is tremendous. But it does not exhaust the multiformity of relations in the objective world. Lenin wrote that " causality ... is but a small particle of the universal connection"^^28^^ and that the "human conception of cause and effect always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of the phenomena of nature, reflecting it only approximately, artificially isolating one or another aspect of a single world process.”^^27^^

p This .means that the interconnection of phenomena in nature and society is more extensive and complex than the connection expressed by the relation of cause to effect. In particular, cause and effect are subordinate to the broader relation of interaction.

p Nature constitutes a single whole, all parts of which are connected in one way or another. In this universal interconnection, any phenomenon, itself the effect of some cause, also acts as a cause in some other connection, giving rise to new effects. The evaporation of water in the seas and rivers owing to the action of the sun’s rays, for example, leads to the formation of clouds. These, in turn, produce rain, which moistens the soil and feeds the brooks and streams.

p Interaction is also observed in the influence exerted upon each other by cause and effect within one and the same process; in this sense, the two change places—the cause becoming the effect, and vice versa. The continuous thermonuclear reaction in the sun is an example of such interaction, for the process in which hydrogen atoms are converted into helium atoms creates a high temperature (of the order of millions of degrees) which, in turn, necessarily causes the synthesis of helium atoms from hydrogen atoms.

p We often observe interaction also when studying social affairs. For example, a greater popular demand for a commodity stimulates greater production of it. In turn, the growth of production produces increased demand. Cause and effect change places. Demand affects production, and production affects demand.

p Hence, cause and effect should not be viewed metaphysically as ossified, unconnected, absolute opposites. They should be viewed dialeclically as interconnected, interconvertible, “fluid” conceptions.

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p However, it is not enough to demonstrate the interaction of different factors or different phenomena. We still have to find out which side is the determining one in this interaction. It is only when we have discovered this that we can understand correctly the sources of the process, appraise the forces involved in it, and see the main line, the direction of development.

And to give a proper idea of the interaction between growth of demand and growth of production in the example cited above, it should be stressed that growth of production is the determining factor in this interaction.

Necessity and Law

p By recognising that all phenomena are necessarily subject to causality, we recognise the existence of necessity. The inception and development of phenomena that follow from the most essential relations lying at the root of a process are called necessary. Necessary development is the development that cannot fail to take place under the given conditions. For example, in the history of the organic world less adapted organisms are necessarily replaced by those more adapted.

p Necessity in nature and society is most completely revealed in laws. Recognising necessity in the origin and development of phenomena involves recognising that they are subject to certain regularities that exist independently of man’s will or desire.

p Each law is a manifestation of the necessity that governs phenomena. For example, a body raised above the surface of the earth will necessarily fall back to earth, provided it is not held up by some force acting in the opposite direction. This example illustrates the law of gravitation.

p What is a law? A law is a profound, essential, stable and repeated connection or dependence of phenomena or of different sides of one and the same phenomenon. The law of Archimedes, for example, establishes a stable connection between the weight of a fluid or gas displaced by a body immersed in it and the magnitude of the "upward thrust" exerted upon the body by the fluid or gas. Laws may be less general, operating in a limited field (e. g., Ohm’s law), or more general, applying to a very wide field (e. g., the law of conservation of energy). Some laws establish the precise quantitative dependence of phenomena and may be expressed mathematically (e. g., the laws of mechanics). Other laws do not lend themselves to precise mathematical formulation (e. g., the law of natural selection). But all laws express the objective, necessary connection of phenomena.

p Knowledge of the laws of objective reality makes possible a deeper understanding of the causes of events and therefore constitutes a reliable basis for man’s purposeful activities.

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p However, no law can embrace all aspects of a phenomenon. It expresses only the latter’s most essential features.

p To discover the law governing any particular set of phenomena, it is necessary to leave out of account all subsidiary circumstances and to isolate in its pure form the essential, decisive connection between the phenomena. Science does this both by specially contrived experiments and by logical isolation, or abstraction, of the essential aspects of the phenomena. The law of freely falling bodies (the law of Galileo), for example, does not take the resistance of the air into account and establishes that all bodies fall with the same acceleration. But in the earth’s atmosphere a body may fall swiftly, like a stone, or descend slowly, like a dry leaf, or may even rise for a time, like the seeds of the dandelion or other plants.

Galileo’s law holds good in all these cases. But this law alone is insufficient to explain fully the falling of a body in specific conditions. Such an explanation requires knowledge not only of the law, but of the circumstances in which it operates.

Necessity and Accident

p Among the diverse phenomena of nature and society are some that do not necessarily follow from the law-governed development of a given thing or a given series of events and which may or may not occur, may happen in one way, or in another way. These are accidental phenomena.

p If the farmer’s crop is damaged by hail, for example, this is accidental in relation to his labour and the laws governing the growth of plants.

p The problem of accident has been the subject of much dispute in science. The perfectly correct principle that causality holds good for all phenomena in nature and human society has led many scientists and philosophers to draw the incorrect conclusion that only necessity exists in the world, and that no phenomena are accidental. Accident, from their point of view, is a subjective concept which we use to .denote effects whose cause we do not know.

p This viewpoint is entirely wrong, because it makes the two different conceptions—necessity and causality—identical. It is true that there are no causeless phenomena in the world, and that accidental phenomena are causally determined. But this does not make accidental phenomena necessary. Take the following example. A train jumps the rails and is wrecked. We may find that the cause of the wreck was, for example, loosened rails which the linesman had overlooked. Yet the disaster was an accident, not a necessity. Why? Because it was brought about by a circumstance not necessarily connected with the laws of motion of railway traffic, since it is technically quite possible to provide conditions in which such disasters will not occur.

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p The denial of objective accidentally leads to conclusions that are harmful from the scientific and practical points of view.

p One who regards everything as necessary will be incapable of discriminating between the essential and the non-essential, between the necessary and the accidental. As Engels put it, necessity itself would then be reduced to the level of accident.

p A correct understanding of the concepts of necessity and accident involves seeing not only the difference between them, but also their connection. Necessity makes its way through a maze of accidents. The dialectics of necessity and accident consists in the fact that accident appears as a form in which necessity manifests itself, and is supplementary to necessity. Therefore, accident has its place also within a necessary process.

p Here is an example. In winter in northern latitudes the weather becomes cold and snow falls. That is a necessity. But on what particular day the temperature drops below zero and snow falls, how cold it is, how much snow falls, etc.—all that is accidental. Yet there is necessity in these accidents, because both cold and snow are necessary signs of winter in that region.

p In the earlier example of the derailed train the disaster was an accident. But if the railway is badly organised, if discipline is poor, and the personnel inefficient, then disasters will become a necessary result of the unsatisfactory working of the railway, instead of a rare accident. Of course, in that case too, the specific circumstances of a disaster, and its time and place, will still be more or less accidental.

p Further, accidents may influence the development of a necessary process, accelerating or retarding it. Frequently, accidents enter so considerably into the development of a necessary process that they become necessity. Thus, according to Darwin’s theory, minute accidental changes in an organism which are beneficial to it become established through heredity and strengthened in the process of evolution, resulting in a change in the species. Accidental differences thus become necessary characteristics of a new species.

p The above is evidence that necessity and accident are not absolutely separate from each other. They interact and pass into one another in the process of development.

p It follows from this connection of accident and necessity that accidental phenomena are also governed by certain laws, which may be studied and become known.

p For example, it has been statistically established that in the United States the average expectation of life is higher among Whites than among Negroes. This regularity docs not mean, however, that every white man lives longer than every Negro. Some Whites die young, while some Negroes live to a ripe old age. But the above regularity holds good on the average, as a whole, and reflects the 69 adverse situation of the Negroes in the U.S.A., racial discrimination, inferior living conditions, lower wages, etc.

The regularities governing accidental phenomena have been generalised in a number of scientific theories, and particularly in the mathematical theory of probability.

Determinism and Modern Science

p The principle of determinism, always upheld by the materialists, consists in the recognition of the objective character of universal connection, the causative determination of phenomena, the rule of necessity and regularity in nature and society.

p Determinism is the basic principle of all genuinely scientific thinking, since it is only by knowing the causes of phenomena that their origin can be scientifically explained, and only by knowing the law governing phenomena that their further development can be predicted. However, the conception of determinism underwent a change in the course of the development of science. Natural science in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which confined itself to studying the “macrocosm”, i. e., the world of relatively large bodies and their parts, and based itself chiefly on Newton’s mechanics, was dominated by mechanical determinism. Its distinguishing feature, which was also its defect, was that it made every cause a mechanical one.

p This viewpoint was justified and confirmed by practice in the study of the motion and mechanical interaction of celestial bodies and also of macroscopic terrestrial bodies and parts of bodies. It was by the method of mechanical determinism that scientists could predict the visible positions of the sun and planets and could calculate how to construct machines and engineering works.

p However, all attempts to apply the principle of mechanical determinism in studying more complex phenomena proved a failure. Biological phenomena, physiological and mental processes, and the social activities of people, could not be explained merely by mechanical determinism.

p The second extremely important defect of mechanical determinism was that it did not recognise the objectivity of accidental phenomena. Its adherents rejected accident as being identical with causelcssness.

p The inadequacy of mechanical determinism became particularly evident when the progress of science and technology led to cognition of the microcosm and the properties of the so-called elementary particles, i.e., the minutest and simplest particles known to modern science (electrons, positrons, mesons, etc.).

p Accident plays an extremely important part in the microcosm, and for processes occurring in it quantum mechanics takes into account both necessity and accident.

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p Discoveries in regard to the microcosm and the development of quantum mechanics were in themselves a formidable achievement of science and involved a dialectical conception of the world. It was shown that the properties and relations of material bodies, tind of their particles, were not as homogeneous and uniform as the old physics had assumed, and that matter was inexhaustible in its diversity.

p However, physical discoveries also served for drawing idealistic conclusions, which have been upheld not only by idealist philosophers, but also by some prominent scientists in the capitalist countries who have been influenced by religion and idealism.

p The school of “indeterminism” made its appearance in modern physics and the philosophy of natural science. Its representatives reject the very principle of objectively necessary connection. They proceed from the erroneous assumption that determinism is only possible in its old mechanical form, which disregards accident, and on the basis of the scientifically proved inadequacy of this mechanical determinism they conclude that any form of determinism is untenable. Thus, voluntarily or involuntarily, they allow superstition and belief in miracles to have a place in science. Some of them go so far as to attribute "free will" to the electron. From their point of view, the progress of science itself has made it possible to reconcile and combine science with idealism and religion.

In reality, however, modern physics has not refuted determinism, but has revealed that in the microcosm it operates in a special way. Study of the laws governing the phenomena of the microcosm is the main subject of quantum mechanics, which is being successfully applied in the calculations of scientists and engineers. And this is testimony that in this field, too, we are dealing with the objectively necessary connection and determination inherent in all the phenomena of reality.