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6. Opponents of Philosophical Materialism
 

[introduction.]

p By recognising the material unity of the world, Marxist philosophical materialism adopts the standpoint of philosophical monism (from the Greek monos, meaning one). Marxist philosophical materialism is a consistent and harmonious doctrine because its explanation of all phenomena proceeds from a single material basis.

But there are other philosophical doctrines that are not ready to admit either the primacy of matter or the primacy of spirit. Their underlying philosophical principle is dualism (from the Latin duo, meaning two), and they seek to prove that the world has two primary bases, independent of each other and absolutely different in nature—matter and spirit, body and consciousness, nature and idea. Such was the view of Descartes.

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p But dualism is incapable of explaining the well-known fact that influences affecting the human body cause changes in consciousness, and, conversely, that thought can result in bodily motion. The standpoint of philosophical dualism is inconsistent and half- hearted, and, as a rule, leads to idealism.

The idealist philosophers who seek to explain the world from a single but idealist basis are monists too. Their monism, however, rests on an erroneous, anti-scientific foundation, since it takes as its starting-point that idea, thought, consciousness are primary, and nature, physical things, the human body are secondary and derived from the spiritual basis. In their opinion, everything is consciousness or the product of consciousness.

Objective Idealism

p The idealist view of the world in its most primitive, but still most widespread, form, finds expression in the religious doctrine of a non-material spirit, or deity, which is supposed to have existed before the physical universe and to have created it. The whole history of science refutes such views. For science has proved beyond doubt that mental phenomena and processes arise at a very high stage in the development of matter and are necessarily associated with definite material processes in the cerebral cortex and nervous system. There can be no mental phenomena without these material, physiological processes. Hence, the religious doctrine of mind existing prior to matter and nature is false and completely at variance with reality.

p A more subtle and abstract form of these views is to be found in the idealist philosophical systems. The creators of these systems asserted that the basis of all things must be sought in spiritual or nonmaterial causes, elements or essences that existed before the appearance of material things. Such views were propounded by the great idealist philosophers, Plato, Leibniz and Hegel, who made a considerable contribution to the development of philosophical thought. Plato called these non-material causes “forms” or “ideas”. Leibniz considered that the ultimate basis of all things lay in a peculiar kind of spiritual “atoms” of being—spiritually active “units” (monads). Hegel saw the ultimate basis of all things in the “idea” as an objectively existing and self-developing concept. "The idea,” he wrote, "is the true primacy and things are what they are because of the activity of the concepts intrinsic to them and disclosed in them."^^8^^ According to Hegel, nature as a whole is also the product of the concept, the idea—not an ordinary human idea, but one that exists independent of man, the Absolute Idea, which is equivalent to God.

p The philosophy of Plato, Leibniz and Hegel is termed objective idealism because it recognises the existence of some “objective” spiritual basis, distinct from human consciousness and independent of it.

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The views of the objective idealists will not stand criticism. Ideas, concepts exist only in human thought, they reflect the general features and properties of reality itself, they reflect generalised characteristics of the material world. Such, for instance, are the concepts man, society, socialism, nation, etc. Concepts, ideas that are supposed to have existed prior to nature and to have produced nature are simply a fantasy of the idealists. Lenin wrote: "... Everybody knows what a human idea is; but an idea independent of man and prior to man, an idea in the abstract, an Absolute Idea, is a theological invention of the idealist Hegel.” ’

Subjective Idealism

p Besides objective idealism, which derives nature from some divine idea, there is also subjective idealism, which asserts that material things are only the sum total of our sensations, thoughts. This philosophy makes the world part of the consciousness of the subject, i.e., of the cognising human being.

p The subjective idealist asks: What do I know of the things around me? And his answer is: Only the sensations of colour, taste, odour, density, form, etc. I do not and cannot perceive in things anything more than the sum of these sensations; is it not, then, reasonable to suppose that things are only the sum total of my sensations, and that no things exist outside or independent of sensations?

p From this reasoning of the subjective idealists, it follows that man is surrounded not by things, but by complexes of his own sensations, that the whole of nature is merely the sum total of sensations.

p That view was expounded early in the eighteenth century by the English bishop Berkeley. He frankly stated that the sole object of his idealist philosophy was to refute materialism and atheism and substantiate the existence of God.

p Subjective idealism is a crude distortion of the actual relation between our perceptions and things. It identifies human perception with the things perceived.

p The logical conclusion to be drawn from the basic tenet of subjective idealism is this: things and the perception of them are one and the same. But in that case we must conclude that the whole world is created by myself, by my consciousness, and that all other individuals, including my parents, are only perceptions of my mind and do not exist objectively. Hence, subjective idealism inevitably leads to solipsism (from the Latin words solus meaning alone and ipse meaning self), an absurd philosophy which asserts that only I myself exist, and that the whole world, including all other people, are merely figments of my imagination.

Every form of subjective idealism is bound to lead to solipsistic conclusions, and this is convincing proof of ils falseness.

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The Attempt to Lay Down a “Third” Line in Philosophy

p Besides idealist doctrines that frankly make consciousness the basis of the world, there are doctrines that seek to conceal their idealism and create the impression that they stand above both materialism and idealism and represent a “third” line in philosophy. One such trend is positivism.

p Positivism arose in the first half of the last century. It has now become one of the most influential philosophical trends in the bourgeois world and has gained currency among natural scientists.

p The positivists denounce all preceding philosophy as metaphysics, understanding the term to mean futile, scholastic discussion of problems that are beyond the scope of experience and incapable of scientific solution. This, they say, applies above all to the fundamental question of philosophy: which is primary, nature or consciousness? Science, the positivists tell us, must confine itself to such facts as lend themselves to observation and not seek for an underlying basis of them, whether material or spiritual. Any philosophy that seeks for such a basis is useless. Science can get along very well without philosophy; science is its own philosophy.

p The positivists claim they are neither materialists nor idealists, but investigators of empirical facts, men of science. Behind that facade, however, there lurks in fact the philosophy of idealism. For by refusing to answer the fundamental question of philosophy and affirming that it cannot be answered by science, the positivists seal themselves off from the material world, isolate themselves within the framework of their own consciousness and thus slide into the position of subjective idealism.

p That is apparent also because by “facts”—a word much bandied about by them—they understand our perceptions. The positivists maintain that only our sensations and perceptions are immediately given to us, and we should limit ourselves to the study of them.

p The bourgeois positivist philosophers insist that they stand “above” materialism and idealism. Actually, they combat materialism together with the idealists, in whose camp they belong. They denounce materialism as metaphysics although Marxist philosophical materialism is irreconcilably opposed to all metaphysics,   [43•*  including the metaphysics that talks of non-existent “substance”. It rejects both the metaphysics of idealism with its invented “ideal” basis of the world, and the metaphysics of religion with its preaching of a divine being and immortal soul. But Marxist materialism also resolutely rejects the positivists’ attempt to describe as metaphysics 44 the doctrine of a material world existing outside our mind. Positivism ascribes its own sins to others. Under cover of its verbal attacks against an imaginary "materialist metaphysics" it, in effect, propagates the metaphysics of subjective idealism.

p The whole history of philosophy demonstrates that there is not and cannot be any “third” line in philosophy besides materialism and idealism. The sooner that is realised by the adherents of positivism among Western scientists and technologists, the sooner will they be free from positivist confusion and base themselves on the firm, scientific ground of materialist philosophy.

p At the turn of the century, positivism manifested itself as Mackism after Ernst Mach, the Austrian physicist and philosopher, also known as empirio-criticism (the criticism of experience).

p Mach and his followers, notably his Russian disciple A. JBogdanov, claimed to have overcome the “one-sidedness” of materialism and idealism. But in actual fact Mach’s philosophy was basically a variety of subjective idealism.

p Mach affirmed that the primary “elements” of the universe were sense impressions. Every thing is a "complex of elements" (or sense impressions) and the whole of nature, the sum total of "sequences of elements" which are “arranged” by man in thinking about the world. Everything that surrounds us can be reduced to our sense impressions—such is the essence of the Machian understanding of the world. However, the Machians were careful to conceal the subjectiveidealist essence of their views by claiming that these elements (sense impressions) were “neutral”, neither materialist nor idealist, and were neither of a physical nor of a mental character.

p The same purpose of masking idealism was served by the claim that their philosophy was based entirely on “experience”, and that experience was the source of all knowledge.

p The reactionary philosophy of Machism was criticised by Lenin in his book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Lenin pointed out that the Machians’ reference lo “experience” does not make their philosophy a scientific one. For “experience” can be interpreted in a materialist and an idealist way. The materialist recognises that all our knowledge derives from experience, but, at the same time, ho emphasises that this experience deals with the external objective world, in other words, our experience has an objective content. The Machian, while agreeing that our knowledge derives from experience, denies the existence of objective reality, given in experience.Instead., he maintains that experience is concerned not with the objective world, but merely with our sensations, perceptions and conceptions and our investigation must be confined to these. In short,the Machian in reality adopts the standpoint of subjective idealism.

p Lenin also denounced as philosophical trickery the Machian attempt to rise above materialism and idealism by means of such a term as "neutral element”, lie wrote:

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p “Everybody knows what human sensation is; but sensation independent of man, sensation prior to man, is nonsense, a lifeless abstraction, an idealist artifice.”^^10^^ Lenin showed that these "neutral elements" were in reality sensations, and that a doctrine which sought to make them the basis of the world was subjective idealism.

p Did nature exist prior to man, Lenin asked the Machians. If nature is the creation of the human mind, if it can be reduced to sensation, then, consequently, man made nature, and not the other way round. Yet we know from the natural sciences that nature existed long before man.

p Does man think with the aid of the brain, Lenin asked the Machians. From their doctrine it follows that the human brain is itself a "complex of elements”, of sensations, that is, a product of man’s mental activity. But in that case we must infer that man thinks without the help of the brain, that the brain is only a “construction” of thought invented in order to provide a better explanation of mental activity.

p Do other people exist besides myself, Lenin asked the Machians. The inescapable inference of Machian philosophy is that all other people are merely complexes of sensations, that is, the product of my brain.

The Machian philosophy led to solipsism, and this was conclusive proof of its untenability. It enjoyed wide influence at the beginning of the century. In the twenties it gave way to new forms of positivism.

Roots of Idealism

p Idealist philosophy gives us an incorrect, distorted view of the world. It misrepresents the real relation between thought and its material basis. In some cases it is a result of a deliberate desire to distort or conceal the truth. That is frequently the object in our time, when bourgeois philosophers are eager to curry favour with the ruling class by preaching idealism. But the history of philosophy knows many instances of idealist doctrines resulting from the "honest error" of philosophers who were sincerely seeking the truth.

p The process of cognition (as the reader will learn from Chapter 3) is very complex and has many aspects. Hence, there is always the possibility of a one-sided approach to it, the tendency to exaggerate and absolutise the significance of one or another of its aspects, making it independent of everything else. That is the procedure of the idealist philosophers. The Machians and other subjective idealists, for instance, absolutise the fact that all our knowledge of the surrounding world is derived from sensations, which they divorce from the material things that give rise to the sensations and then draw the idealist conclusion that the world consists of nothing but sensations.

p Lenin pointed out that cognition always contains the possibility of deviation from reality into fantasy, of the substitution of 46 imaginary interconnections for real ones. Narrowness and onesidedness, subjectivism and subjective blindness—such are the epistemological roots of idealism, that is, its roots in the very process of cognition.

p But for these roots to produce a “plant”, for the errors of cognition to be embodied in an idealist philosophical system opposed to materialism and materialist natural science, requires definite social conditions and, moreover, that these erroneous views should be to the advantage of definite social forces and enjoy their support. A onesided and subjectivist approach to cognition of the world leads to the swamp of idealism where, Lenin wrote, it is "consolida te d by the class interests of the ruling classes"—slave-owners, feudais or bourgeoisie. In this lie the class roots of idealism.

The reactionary nature of philosophical idealism is clearly apparent from its ties with theology, religion. Lenin pointed out that every variety of philosophical idealism is, in the final analysis, subtle defence of theology, of clericalism. Even when it does not openly announce its leaning towards religion, philosophical idealism, in actual fact, has the same basis as religion. That is why the Church has always zealously supported it and has been hostile to philosophical materialism, persecuting its exponents whenever possible.

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Notes

[43•*]   In philosophy, the term “metaphysics” is used to denote two things: firstly, an anti-dialectical view of the world, and, secondly, speculative antiscientific and scholastic inventions of the “true”, supersensible essence of being. A more detailed account of metaphysics will be found in Chapter 2.