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SOME GENERAL ATTRIBUTES
OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROPOSED THEORY
 

p Above we tried to reveal the effects of the proposed anaxiomatization and hyperaxiomatization mechanisms in the psychological features of three creative tools: analogy, tropes, and symbols. Now we propose to consider some other, more general features of creative activity in the same . light. This analysis makes no claim to be exhaustive or systematic; we merely wish to draw in more facts which illustrate and corroborate the ideas put forward in this book.

p First of all, let us take up the psychological specifics of 154 schemata and schematic representations. Schemata are, as a rule, regarded as relatively primitive products of imagination; thus, literary critique opposes full-fledged literary characters to schemata, and the expression "schematic thinking" is a derogatory term. A schema is usually understood as a very generalized representation of objects or processes, interrelations between parts of objects and certain conditions of their functioning (for example, the scheme of a machine, technological schemes, etc.). Development of schemata obviously requires neglect of those details which are of secondary importance.

p Another widely known kind of phantasy are caricatures in the widest sense of the word. In graphical cartoons the correct proportion of parts of the human body and face is clearly devalued. Caricature images are also quite common in fiction, where the negative traits of characters are brought to the fore by discarding others; this was the case with Shylock’s greed, King Claudius’ baseness, etc.

p Consequently, both schemata and caricatures are created through anaxiomatization, which plays an important role in any creative activity, including that of realistic artists who are in no way striving to create cartoon images and even less schematic representations.

p This is what outstanding Russian authors had to say on this subject Ivan Goncharov wrote: "No writing is done completely from nature, otherwise it will come to nothing, have no effect. Like serving raw beef. In a word, one has to condition, clean, sweep, remove" (84, 103).

p Fyodor Dostoevsky repeatedly emphasized the importance of deleting whatever is unnecessary to the artistic concept. He wrote in a letter: "The highest skill of the writer is to be able to cross out. Who can and is strong enough to cross out what he has written himself will go far" (84, 165).

p The same idea was put forward by V. M. Garshin in his talk with I. Ye. Repin: "The greatest effort for me is removing what is unnecessary. I do it several times with everything I write until I do not see any overload in it which hinders the artistic impression" (52, 387).

p Lev Tolstoy repeatedly advised reducing the text. Thus he noted in a letter to P.D. Boborykin: "You ... do not jettison enough from what is written (prolixities), you do not sufficiently resort to technique which, for an epic writer, is the entire wisdom of art—you do not sufficiently sift the sand to obtain pure gold" (31, 100).

p While highly appreciating Maxim Gorky’s talent, Chekhov gave him a friendly piece of advice that he could write "in a more 155 compact and concise way" (12, 241) and eliminate extravagances (12, 248). Gorky himself, who urged the writers to show invention and phantasy, also required them to display characteristic features more vividly (18, 468). This is impossible, however, unless other details, artistically unjustified, are eliminated. As Konstantin Paustovsky recalls, Isaac Babel used to say that the clarity and vigor of the language consist not in that nothing could be added to a phrase but in that nothing could be deleted.

p Katherine Ann Porter, an American writer, understood that notes she had taken, that were supposed to be of great help, were actually a hindrance, "I must know a story ’by heart’ and I must write from memory" (quoted from 159, 207). This observation is a good expression of the hyperaxiomatization effect whereby an option, once found, acquires increased evaluation and hinders perception of finding other ways of expressing what is in one’s mind This is what probably Dostoevsky meant when he spoke of the difficulty of "crossing out what one has written”.

p The psychologists who studied the creative process in literature could not overlook the facts which spoke of the need to devalue (anaxiomatize), but, as a rule, related those facts to other theoretical concepts. Thus Spearman writes of "the simple device of exaggeration" which, in his view, explains the attributes of characters. Baseness, the chief characteristic of lago, is common in everyday life, but Shakespeare strongly exaggerated this trait in his character. In the same way Tennyson gave his Percival an undue allowance of nobility and Dickens made his Pickwick uncommonly well-disposed to the human race (252, 57).

p We have just seen that hyperboles and caricatures are based on a neglect of real relations and, consequently, the mechanism of which Spearman speaks can be regarded as a particular case of anaxiomatization.

p The proposed mechanisms of phantasy seem to account for many phenomena in the psychology of the language, arts, and sciences. It is common knowledge that people who learn a foreign language initially use their mother tongue as a “medium” in that they translate foreign words and sentences into their own language and coin sentences in the foreign language as they do in their own. Karl Marx, who knew numerous languages, described this phenomenon as follows: "a beginner who has learnt a new language always translates it back into his mother tongue, but he has assimilated the spirit of the new language and can freely express himself in it only when he finds his way in it without recalling the old and forgets his native tongue in the use of the new" (3, 104).

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p “Forgetting one’s native tongue in the use of the new" signifies devaluation of the transfer of laws and rules from one language into another. Some psychologists explain difficulties in learning a foreign language by a heightened evaluation of one’s native language. Thus Mavit asserts that "a very strong love for the native language ... makes learning living languages more difficult" (213, 40).

p Consequently, successful learning of a foreign language and correct translation involves anaxiomatization which, in this case, suppresses extension of the features of the native language to a foreign language.

p Ascertaining the contribution of anaxiomatization and hyperaxiomatization in painting, music, and scientific discoveries will not be possible unless a special, comprehensive effort is made to examine appropriate material in the light of the proposed concept of phantasy. Thus far in most papers on the history of arts and sciences the psychological aspects have been treated within the framework of traditional theories: the facts have been selected accordingly. Thus in his books on the psychology of musical creativity, M. Graf squeezes the entire body of experimental data into the framework of several, eclectically pieced together, philosophical and psychological theories. On the other hand, in researches not written to prove some fashionable psychological or philosophical concept, the authors provide interesting clues concerning the proposed mechanisms of phantasy. Such is The Story of Art by E. H. Gombrich, who attempts a comprehensive approach to different schools of painting, from its inception to the works of modern artists (164). Examination of a tremendous body of facts led him to a basic formula: "Each generation is at some point in revolt against the standards of its fathers; ...The urge to be different may not be the highest or profoundest element of the artist’s equipment, but it is rarely lacking altogether" (164, 2). This implies anaxiomatization and somewhat further into the book he hints at hyperaxiomatization: "every artist feels that he has surpassed the generation before him and that from his point of view he has made progress beyond anything that was known before" (164, 3).

p The artist’s creative accomplishments and successes, according to Gombrich, are explained by his urge and ability "to see the world afresh, and to discard all the accepted notions and prejudices about flesh being pink and apples yellow or red. It is not easy to get rid of these preconceived ideas, but the artists who succeed best in doing so often produce the most exciting works" (164, 10).

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p As for scientific discoveries, a frequently cited case of a scientific feat is Torricelli’s discovery of air pressure and the possibility of a vacuum. Explaining why it was Torricelli, not his teacher Galileo, who clarified why a pump could not take water higher than a certain level, a fact discovered in early 17th century, Donald Hebb, a US psychologist, declared: "Torricelli who did find the answer, performed an intellectual feat of the first order by abandoning (my italics.-/. R.) a principle that others were working with (’Nature abhors a vacuum’)" (180, 304), which Galileo himself shared. Hebb fails, however, to see a more profound mechanism behind this fact.

p Arnheim analyzes the psychological mechanism of a " scientific feat" with reference to Copernicus’s discovery and concludes, quite correctly, that "Copernicus ’had to free himself of the suggestions (my italics.-/. R.) imposed upon him by the directly given astronomical image". What now apparently remains to be done is identify the technique of freeing oneself from observation-imposed images, a technique whereby these images and the ensuing assumptions are devalued; but Arnheim’s analysis went on along a different line: "He (Copernicus.—/. R.) also needed a remarkable visual imagination which let him light upon the idea that a model of very different appearance coul’d be applied to the situation he saw" (111, 91-92).

p The psychologist Taylor, who tried to unravel the psychological aspect of another scientific feat, Einstein’s discovery says that the genius of the founder of the theory of relativity was in hi& inability to understand what is obvious, "the rejection of one’s own and other people’s superficial explanations and the ability to know when you don’t know may be crucial to making original contributions" (258, 21). The words italicized by Taylor move his own “rejection” concept to the background where it is, presumably, to play an auxiliary or preparatory role. However, Einstein himself was more positive. He described his method of processing the welter of knowledge he had to acquire in his student years as follows: "The mass of insufficiently connected experimental data was overwhelming... In this field, however, I soon learned to scent out that which was able to lead to fundamentals and . to turn aside (my italics.-/./?.) from everything else, from the multitude of things which clutter up the mind and divert it from the essential" (147, 17).

p We also believe that Einstein had in mind another beneficial effect of anaxiomatization, namely overcoming an habitual way of thinking and deeply rooted views and convictions, when he explained why it took him seven years from inception of the 158 fundamental idea of the general theory of relativity to a final formulation: "Why were another seven years required for the construction of the general theory of relativity? The main reason lies in the fact that it is not so easy to free oneself from the idea that co-ordinates must have an immediate metrical meaning" (147, 66). Thus in order to take an important step towards the creation of a new scientific theory, he had to "free himself from earlier views and ideas, or to devalue them.

p Some scientists deliberately resort to techniques which amount to anaxiomatization in order to obtain the desired effect.

p Researchers into invention psychology, such as Boirel and Kaufmann have convincingly shown that the introduction of technological innovations often requires rejection of dominant hypotheses and theories (128, 82-84).

p A. N. Tupolev, an outstanding Soviet aircraft designer, speaking of decision-making factors in a conversation with psychologist P. M. Yakobson, said: "One has to have a new look at things, at one’s own thinking process, at technical designs, and at the methods of problem solution we traditionally use. One has to look as if through someone else’s eyes, breaking away from the usual, habitual scope" (quoted from 100, 117). These approaches obviously proceed through at least relative or temporary devaluing of “habitual” techniques and opinions. In that same conversation Academician Tupolev also gave a fairly accurate description of the hyperaxiomatization mechanism: "A decision is made with a certain assumption of its correctness, soundness, obviousness, and with confidence in it. With time, say, in a year, I shall probably reject it, it will seem incorrect to me... But when we work at it and find it, it is regarded as correct" (100, 117).

p In conclusion of this section let us take up some paradoxical facts that have been repeatedly described and even explained, and which still remain ununderstood. We have in mind the mutual enmity of scientists working in the same field, mutual “denial” of creative achievements, mutual “shunning” of creative work on the part of people who apparently express the same social and artistic trends, have similar scientific views, etc... S. O. Gruzenberg  [158•*  believes that differences of "emotional 159 and intellectual attitudes" are to blame (19, 25). But then this explanation invites a new question: what is it that causes a negative emotional attitude towards creative personalities (and to their products) on the parts of their colleagues, quite capable of a sound intellectual judgement.

p In our view, this phenomenon is caused, among other possible reasons, by the unity of the proposed mechanisms of imagination: hyperaxiomatization of one’s own creative techniques and findings may result in anaxiomatization of those of others.

p In discussing some scattered and diverse facts drawn from creative activity in literature, arts, science, and technology, we were interested in answering only one question: can the proposed inner mechanisms be detected behind these facts? In our opinion, the results justify a positive answer.

As this book cannot exhaustively analyze all the facts of scientific creativity in terms of the proposed phantasy conception, let us look more closely at just one creative tool, abstraction and concept formation.

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Notes

[158•*]   He illustrates his point with the following examples: "Newton could not grasp Huygens’s explanation of light in terms of wave-like motion of the ether; Huygens could not understand Newton’s teaching... Tolstoy did not understand Shakespeare... Schopenhauer refutes Hegel, Merimee derides Hugo, and Knut Hamsun, Walt Whitman, Nietzsche debunks Schopenhauer and Wagner" (19, 20). Other characteristic examples are the mutual dislike of the two giants of the Renaissance, Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo and of the ideologists of the French bourgeois revolution, Rousseau and Voltaire, and Einstein’s long-standing mistrust of statistical physics, etc.