p M. Sladkovsky

p It is historical fact that the “border problem"—Maoist shorthand for territorial claims on neighbouring states—was not seen as an issue at all during the PRG’s first decade, although this was a period when treaties and agreements were signed between China and its neighbours in every field of inter-state relations. And the reason for this is not far to seek: at that time the Chinese leadership was motivated by a desire for good-neighbour relations and close co-operation with adjacent countries. SovietChinese relations were defined by a Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow on 14 February 1950, which ramified into agreements on transit travel, navigation along the frontier rivers, etc. No problems whatever arose when these enactments came into force.

p The Constitution of the PRC, endorsed by the National People’s Congress on 20 September 1954, that is, after the chief Soviet-Chinese agreements had been signed, declared: “China has already built an indestructible friendship with the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Democracies".  [176•1  In September 1956, the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China discussed the results of the first five-year economic development plan and China’s tasks for the future, and enjoined all Chinese Communists to “continue to consolidate and strengthen our eternal, unbreakable fraternal friendship with the great Soviet Union and the People’s Democracies".  [176•2  These declarations established the framework within which Soviet-Chinese 177 relations flourished, which fact was acclaimed by both governments.

p The turning point came when the nationalist CPC leadership jettisoned the policy of co-operation with the socialist countries.

p No diplomatic activity, no official talks heralded the transition. Well aware that the Chinese people—not to mention world opinion—would be nonplussed by such a sharp about-face, the Maoist leadership descended to provocation as a pretext for changing its stance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and other neighbouring states. The Maoists stirred up “disturbances” and “uncertainties” in the border regions before publishing their great-power claims.

p The Chinese frontier authorities, acting on express orders from Peking, staged a series of deliberate violations of the frontier with the USSR (and other countries) by forcing the local Chinese inhabitants to “spontaneously” cross the border and occupy grazing lands, etc. In 1962, the Chinese representatives at the llth session of the Mixed Soviet-Chinese Commission on Navigation along the frontier rivers of Amur, Ussuri, Argun, and Sungacha and on Lake Khanka declared that there were unsettled frontier problems, thereby in effect paralysing the commission. Meanwhile the catalogue of frontier violations grew, and isolated incidents escalated into large-scale clashes.  [177•3 

p Having laid the psychological groundwork by encouraging Great-Han chauvinism and anti-Soviet sentiments in China, Mao Zedong finally promulgated his “register” of territorial claims on the Soviet Union. In 1964 he told a delegation of Japanese Socialists that “about a century ago the lands east of Baikal became Russian territory and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other areas have been within the compass of the Soviet Union. The bill for this register has not yet been delivered."  [177•4 

p Confidentially, Mao also referred to plans to seize neighbouring lands to the south. At a CC CPC Politbureau session in August 1965 he announced that “we absolutely must get our hands on 178 Southeast Asia, including South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore. We must pursue the principles of peaceful coexistence as regards Cambodia. . . Regions such as Southeast Asia are extremely rich and possess enough natural resources to render any outlay made on seizing them well worthwhile. [ Southeast Asia] will be invaluable to the future development of Chinese industry. Thus it will be possible to recoup all expenditure in full. After we have got our hands on Southeast Asia we will be able to expand our potential in the area; then our potential will counterbalance that of the Soviet-East European bloc. The wind from the East will beat down the wind from the West".  [178•5 

p It goes without saying that Mao produced no lawful foundation for his claims—nor could he. He based them quite simply on the fact that the emperors of China had subscribed to this doctrine and impressed it on their subjects for countless ages. That, at least, was true: the imperial creed held that China was the centre of the world—zhong-guo—and that all other peoples and countries were vassals of the Middle Kingdom.

p Official documents are eloquent evidence of this attitude. In 1408, for instance, the Ming emperor known by the imperial designation Chengzu wrote to Yoshimoti, whom he addressed as King of Japan, about the Japanese pirates who were harrassing the Chinese eastern coast, and ordered him “to fulfil our injunction with veneration, without delay and with due result. This is enjoined upon you by your Emperor”.

p And, though Yoshimoti disregarded these humiliating demands, the Manchu Qing dynasty which followed the Ming adopted the same Great-Han stance towards Japan until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, which ended in defeat for China. The emperors were equally arrogant towards Europe—notably towards England, which also fell into the catalogue of Chinese “vassals”.  [178•6 

p This imperial arrogance was backed up by military campaigns against Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Burma, and Nepal, intended to bring them into vassal dependence on the Chinese 179 throne. And these past “glories” quicken expansionist appetites in Peking today and radically influence contemporary Chinese foreign policy.

p But no objective mind sets any store by the Maoist interpretation of historical fact. It is, after all, common knowledge that China had not only conquered other countries, but was also often itself conquered by others. Chinese dynasties ruled the Chinese empire for only two centuries of its last millennium: for the other 800 years it was controlled by neighbouring states. From 916 to 1254 Manchu-Tungus peoples were in control of northwestern China; from 1280 to 1367 the Mongol Yuan dynasty was sovereign over all China; and from 1644 to 1911 the Manchu Qing occupied the imperial throne.

p What prompts the Maoist leadership to “forget” all this, to develop a “historical logic" which leads to the absurd and selfdefeating conclusion that China as such does not exist? Zhou Enlai, speaking to the American journalist Edgar Snow in October 1960, produced a perfect refutation of this kind of argument: “If everyone should begin settling scores that go back to the remote historical past, there would be chaos all over the world.” In that case, he added, “the United States would again have to come under the British state, because it gained its independence less than 200 years ago”.

Moreover, Peking is now putting forward claims over lands which were never under any type of Chinese control—where Chinese subjects, passing through, as it were, happened to leave written evidence of their presence (as, for example, on the lower reaches of the Amur). Following this line to its “logical” conclusion, China could lay claim to most of the world—- wherever the twenty million-plus overseas Chinese are settled.