INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
OF THE USSR
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[3]Georgi Plekhanov
Selected
Philosophical
Works
IN FIVE VOLUMES
Volume III
PROGRESS PUBLISHERS MOSCOW
[4]Translated from the Russian Designed by V. YERYOMIN
__COPYRIGHT__ © Translation into English. Progress Publishers 1976 32---76
014(01)76
Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
[5]CONTENTS
A. MASL1N, G. V. PLEKIIANOV'S CRITICISM OF IDEALISM AND DEFENCE OF MARXIST PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS IN HIS WRITINGS OF 1901--13 ..............
[Preface to the Third Edition of Engds' Socialism: Utopian and Scientific]........................
Synopsis of Lecture "Scientific Socialism and Religion"......
Translator's Preface to the Second Edition of F. Engels' Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy......
Patriotism and Socialism .................
On A. Pannckoek's Pamphlet. Anton Pannekoek, Socialism and Religion. Translated from the German by A . Ratn^r. Edited by P. Rumyantsev. Cheap Library of the Znaniye Society, No. 121. Price 5 kopeks. 1906.............................
Reply to Questionnaire from the Journal Mrrcure de France on the Future of Religion ....................
Joseph Diet/gen. Ernest Unterman, Antonio Labriola and Joseph Dietzgen, A Comparison of Historical Materialism and Monistic Materialism. Translated from the German by f. Nauntov; edited by P. Dauge. St. Petersburg, 1907, published by P. Dauge. Joseph Dietzgen, The Positive Outcome of Philosophy; Letters on Logic, Especially Democratic Proletarian Logic. Translated from the German by P. Dauge and A. Orlov, with a Preface to the Russian Edition by Eugene Dietzgen, and a Portrait of the Author. St. Petersburg, 1906 ...........................
Fundamental Problems of Marxism...............
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Death of Karl Marx.......
Materialismus Militans (Reply to Mr. Bogdanov).........
First Letter ......................
Second Letter .....................
Third Letter......................
On Fr. Liitgcnau's Book. Fr. Liitgenau. Natural and Social Religion. The Theory of Religion from the Materialist Point of View. St. Petersburg, 1908.........................
Henri Bergson. Henri Bergson. Creative Evolution. Translated from the Third French Edition by M. Bulgakov. Moscow, 1909 ...'..
On Mr. V. Shulyatikov's Book. V. Shulyatikov. Justification of Capitalism in West European Philosophy. (From Descartes to Mach). Moscow Rook Publishers. Moscow, 1908 ...........
On the So-Called Religious Seekings in Russia..........
First Article. On Religion................
Second Article. Once More on Religion..........
Third Article. The Gospel of Decadence..........
On M. Guyau's Book. M. Guyau. Unbelief of the Future. A Sociological Investigation. With a Biographical Note by A. Fouillee and a Preface by Professor D. N. Ovsyaniko-Kulikovsky. Translated from the French (llth Edition) Edited by Y. L. Saker, St. Petersburg . .
On W. Windelband's Book. Wilhelm Windelband. Philosophy in the Spiritual Life of Nineteenth-Century Germany. Authorised Translation from the German by M. M. Rubinstein. Zveno Publishers, Moscow, 1910 ......................
Cowardly Idealism. Joseph Petzoldt, The Problem of the World from the Standpoint of Positivism. Translated from the German by R. L., Edited by P. Yushkevich. Shipounik Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1909
31 5f>
64 84
93 98
100 117 184 188 188 211 247
284 294
299 306 306 342 380
O
414 419 424 6CONTENTS
On the Study of Philosophy.................. 455
Scepticism in Philosophy. Raoul Richter, Scepticism in Philosophy, Volume I. Translated from the German by V. Bazarov and B. Stolpner. Library of Contemporary Philosophy. Issue No. Five. Shipov-
nik Publishers. St. Petersburg, 1910............. 459
On Mr. H. Rickert's Book. H. Rickert. Sciences of Nature and Sciences of Culture. Translated from the Second German Edition. Edited by S. Hessen. Obrazovaniye Publishers. St. Petersburg, 1911 481 On E. Boutroux's Book. E. Boutroux. Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy. Translated by V. Bazarov with a Preface by the Translator. Library of Contemporary Philosophy. No. Three. Shi-
povnik Publishers. St. Petersburg. 1910........... 487
French Utopian Socialism of the Nineteenth Century....... 492
Utopian Socialism in the Nineteenth Century......"... 534
A. British Utopian Socialism.............. 535
B. French Utopian Socialism .............. 551
C. German Utopian Socialism.............. 566
Preface to A. Deborin's Book: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Dialectical Materialism .................. 577
From Idealism to Materialism. (Hegel and Left Hegelians.---David Friedrich Strauss.---The Brothers Bruno and Edgar Bauer.--- Feuerbach)........................... 500
Notes ........................... 545
Indices ........................... 669
[7] __ALPHA_LVL1__ G. V. PLEKHANOV'S CRITICISM OF IDEALISMVolume~III of G. V. Plekhanov's Selected Philosophical Works contains material written by him mainly between 1904 and 1913. Most of the articles published in this volume are directed against idealism and especially Machism and god-building, against what Plekhanov called "the theoretical bourgeois reaction''. Plekhanov criticises and exposes the untenability and reactionary essence of idealist theories with great polemical skill. This volume contains: Fundamental Problems of Marxism (1908), in which Plekhanov expounds the philosophical principles of Marxism---dialectical and historical materialism; Materialismus Militans (1908--10), a criticism of Machian philosophy and a defence of Marxist materialism; On the So-Called Religious Seekings in Russia (1909), directed against the religious world-outlook of god-builders and god-seekers; the articles "Cowardly Idealism'', "Henri Bergson'', "On H. Rickert's Book'', which criticise fashionable bourgeoisidealist trends in philosophy and sociology; a number of works on the history of West European philosophy, socialist teachings, the history of Marxist philosophy, and several other works.
These were published by Plekhanov during the Monshevik period of his activities, which began at the end of 1903. At the beginning of the twentieth century, when the centre of the world revolutionary movement shifted to Russia and the first revolution under the conditions of imperialism took place there in 1905, Plekhanov proved unequal to the role of ideologist of the revolution. Ho disagreed with Lenin on fundamental issues of revolutionary theory and tactics. Plekhanov consigned the Marxist idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution to oblivion; he did not understand the significance of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, incorrectly assessed the role of the Russian bourgeoisie and failed to reveal its counter-revolutionary essence; he came out against the preparation and execution of the 1905 armed uprising, and declared after the December 1905 armed uprising in Moscow that the people should not have taken to arms. True, during the years of reaction Plekhanov fought the enemies 8 __RUNNING_HEADER_LEFT__ A. MASLIN of the revolution, the liquidators of (he workers' party. It was during this period I hat Lenin and the Bolsheviks considered it possible to form and, in facl, did form, a bloc on principle with the group of "pro-Parly Mensheviks" headed by Plekhanov. However, Plekhanov changed his position and, in 1914, went over entirely to opportunism and social-chain inism, opposing the socialist revolution in Russia. Plekhanov's political dissidence and his transformation from a revolutionary and ideologist of the socialist revolution into a Menshevik and opponent of revolutionary Marxism may be explained primarily by his misunderstanding of the nature and peculiarities of the new historical epoch--- the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. In* assessing new developments in the revolutionary struggle under the conditions of imperialism when the socialist revolution was on the order of the day, Plekhanov often drew analogies with the old bourgeois revolutions. He was unable to analyse creatively theoretical and tactical questions of the proletarian revolution in keeping with the new conditions of the imperialist stage of capitalism, when the proletariat and its Party, confronted by monopoly capitalism, required new forms and methods of struggle, great revolutionary organisation and creative initiative on the part of the masses, and a strengthening of the organising and leading role of the Party.
However, while sharing many of the defects and narrow political views held by the leaders of the Second International, Plekhanov at the same time differed from them in his critical attitude to the philosophical principles of bourgeois ideology. He waged a relentless war against all kind of bourgeois-idealist trends. Following the Russian revolution of 1905, when the counter-revolution was attacking on all fronts, including ideology, Plekhanov fought resolutely against the various manifestations of bourgeois ideology in philosophy, sociology, art, literature, and in other spheres of the cultural life of society. As Lenin said, Plekhanov combined in himself radicalism in theory and opportunism in practice. As sometimes happens, a change of his political views did not bring about an immediate, automatic, fundamental change of his philosophical world-outlook. Plekhanov, in going over to opportunism in the tactical field and having become a Menshevik, renounced revolutionary theory on such issues of scientiiic socialism as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the nature of the driving forces of the socialist revolution, the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, etc. But the political opportunism of Plekhanov the Menshevik could not but have an effect on his philosophical standpoint and led him to make a number of deviations from Marxist philosophy. Even then, however, Plekhanov remained a distinguished propagandist of Marxist philosophy, a fighter for the
9 __RUNNING_HEADER_RIGHT__ INTRODUCTION materialist world-outlook, and even during this period he continued, although not always consistently, to defend the principles of Marxist philosophy and made a profound analysis of the basic issues of historical materialism.During the period 1904--13, he came out against the numerous enemies of dialectical and historical materialism, against the various trends of idealism, in order to protect the workers' SocialDemocratic movement from the reactionary influence of the Machians, the god-builders, t lie god-seekers, and other representatives of idealism.
Lenin valued Plekhanov's struggle against revisionism and bourgeois-idealist philosophy highly, and attached great importance to his philosophical works in defence of dialectical and historical materialism.
In the article "Marxism and Revisionism" (1908), Lenin wrote: "...the only Marxist in the international Social-Democratic movement to criticise the incredible platitudes of the revisionists from the standpoint of consistent dialectical materialism was PJekhanov. This must be stressed all the more emphatically since profoundly mistaken attempts are being made at the present lime to smuggle in old and reactionary philosophical rubbish disguised as a criticism of Plekhanov's tactical opportunism.''~^^*^^ It was not by chance that Lenin on a number of occasions recommended the study of Plekhanov's philosophical works.
Despite his opportunism in tactics, Plekhanov contributed much to the criticism of Machism, a variation of the idealist worldoutlook, and made particularly fierce attacks on the Russian leaders _ of Machism---Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, and others. In his'third letter to Bogdanov in Materialismus Militant,. Plekhanov wrote: "Those abroad who hold the same views as ourselves are very much mistaken in thinking, like my friend Kautsky, that there is no need to cross swords over that 'philosophy' which is disseminated in Russia by you and similar theoretical revisionists. Kautsky does not know the relationships existing in Russia. He disregards the fact that the theoretical bourgeois reaction which is now causing real havoc in the ranks of our advanced intellectuals is being accomplished in our country under the banner of philosophical idealism, and that, consequently, we are threatened with exceptional harm from such philosophical doctrines, which, while being idealist to the core, pose as the last word in natural science, a science foreign to every met aphysical premise. The struggle against such doctrines is not only not superfluous, it is obligatory, just as obligatory as it is to protest against _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 15, pp. 33--34.
10 the reactionary `revaluation of values' which the prolonged efforts of Russian advanced thought have produced."^^*^^ However, Plekhanov's fight against Machism was somewhat influenced by Menshevik factional interests. As a Menshevik, Plekhanov tried to link the Bolsheviks with Machism. Lenin was fully justified in writing: "Plekhanov in his criticism of Machism was less concerned with refuting Mach than with dealing a factional blow at Bolshevism.''~^^**^^ But it would be a mistake to think---as Lenin often repeated---that Plekhanov, while being a Menshevik, did nol wage war on Machism and god-building, in defence of Marxist philosophy.It is interesting to note that Plekhanov, in a letter to F. I. Dan, on November 26, 1908, criticising the Machism of the Mensheviks Valentinov, Yushkevich, and others, wrote: "I did not at any time presume that ... we could go arm in arm in the legal press with Valentinov, Yushkevich, and other semi-Marxist scoundrels (don't blame me for not expressing myself so sharply about them earlier---this has always been my opinion of them)---Write where you like, but make sure in advance that you give a wide berth to those who are bringing elements of heresy into Marxism. It is now time to cut adrift from the semi-Marxists Valentinov, Potresov, etc.... I do not think we should be more severe with Bogdanov than with Yushkevich on the grounds that the first is a Bolshevik and the second a Menshevik.... To me, heterodoxy from the Bolshevik camp is no whit worse than heterodoxy from the Menshevik camp.... I shun both."
Plekhanov's struggle against Machism, god-building, and other varieties of idealism was significant in the history of Marxist philosophy, and the allegation that, in combating Machism, Plekhanov simply wrote a few insignificant articles, is wrong. Plekhanov did not shun this struggle, but wrote a number of valuable works against Machian philosophy, in which he made a thorough criticism of the idealist views of the Russian Machians and their foreign mentors---Mach and Avenarius.
Subsequently, in May 1914, Lenin wrote an article entitled: "Plekhanov, Who Knows Not What He Wants'',in which he said: "Among intellectualist anti-Marxist circles, among the flotsam of bourgeois democracy---this is where poor Plekhanov has accidentally landed. This is where you will find chaos, disintegration and tiny factions, which are opposing the unity achieved in the course of two years by thousands of workers' groups of the Pravdist trend.
_-_-_^^*^^ See pp. 282--83 of this volume.
^^**^^ V. I. Lenin, "Empiric-Criticism and Historical Materialism'', Collected Works. Moscow, Vol. 14, p. 355, footnote.
11``We are sorry for Plekhanov. Considering the struggle he waged against the opportunists, Narodiiiks, Machists and liquidators, he deserves a better fate."^^*^^
Plekhanov came somewhat late to the light against Machism, bul his action was nevertheless of the greatest importance. At that time, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, Yushkevich, Bazarov, and other Russian Machians were trying to conceal the open idealism of their views with all kinds of terminological devices and ``new'' words, such as "elements of the world'', etc. At the same time, they were hypocritically declaring themselves Marxists, who were ``deepening'' and ``supplementing'' the philosophy of Marxism with new principles. Actually, Machian idealist philosophy was the direct antithesis of Marxist philosophy. Plekhanov wittily ridiculed Bogdanov and his Machian philosophy which he was presenting as Marxist philosophy. "While not a Marxist yourself,'' he wrote in his first letter to Bogdanov in Materialismus Militans, "you would like nothing better than that we Marxists should accepl you as our comrade.~ You remind me of the mother in one of Gleb Uspensky's stories. She wrote to her son, saying that since he lived a long way off and was in no hurry to see her, she would complain to the police and demand that the authorities send her son 'under escort' for her to 'embrace' him. Uspensky's philistine, to whom this maternal threat was addressed, burst into tears whenever he remembered it. We Russian Marxists will not weep for such reasons. But this will not stop us from telling you quite bluntly that we wish to take full advantage of our right to dissociate ourselves and that neither you nor any one else {no matter who it may be) will succeed in 'embracing' us 'under escort'."^^**^^ In the same letter to Bogdanov, Plekhanov wrote: "...You and / represent two directly opposed world-outlooks. And as the question for me is the defence of my outlook, you are, in relation to me, not a comrade, but the most resolute and irreconcilable opponent."^^***^^
The Russian idealists---the Machians, following in the footsteps of their mentors Mach and Avenarius, considered that material bodies do not exist in the real world, objectively, independently of human consciousness, but only in human sensations and consciousness. Bogdanov, as Plekhanov pointed out, reiterated Mach's proposition that it is not bodies that cause sensations, but complexes of sensations that form bodies. This old, hackneyed thesis had been formulated long since by Bishop Berkeley. Truly scientific, materialist philosophy, said Plekhanov, holds to other principles. "We call material objects (bodies) those objects that _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 20, p. 312.
^^**^^ See p. 194 of this volume.
^^***^^ See p. 189 of this volume.
12 exist independently of our consciousness and, acting on our senses, arouse in us certain sensations which, in turn, underlie our notions of the external world, that is, of those same material objects as well as of their relationships."^^*^^The Machian interpretation of this question, i.e., of the comprehension of material phenomena as a complex of sensations, is the idealist standpoint and contradicts the basic conclusions of natural science. Bogdanov only ``supplemented'' Mach a little, and said of objective phenomena that these exist not in the individual human consciousness, but in the collective consciousness of people, whose opinions and ideas are socially-coordinated, and this is what underlies their experience. In Bogdanov's opinion, the objectivity of the physical world is its universal significance, expressed by people's identical opinions and ideas, by coordination among people. Proceeding from this, Bogdanov saw truth as the socially-organised and socially-coordinated ideological experience of men. None of this changes the essence of Bogdanov's idealist views, because such a standpoint leaves untouched the main tenet of idealism, that material bodies and phenomena are sensations and not objective reality existing independently of the consciousness of people, of their experience. Plekhanov used the data and conclusions of natural science in subjecting this proposition of Bogdanov's to annihilating criticism. "...We are aware,'' he wrote, "that at one time there were no people on our planet. And if there were no people, neither was there their experience.~ Yet the earth was there. And this means that it (also a thing-- in-itself!) existed outside human experience.... The object does not cease to exist even when there is as yet no subject, or when its existence has already ceased. And anybody to whom the conclusions of modern natural science are not an empty phrase must necessarily agree with this."^^**^^
Plekhanov also sharply criticised the inconsistency of a number of idealists of the positivist trend, such as J. Petzoldt, who, assuming the existence of a world of things-in-themselves, independent of people, at the same time said that the world existed only for us. Nevertheless, J. Petzoldt finally came to the conclusion that the existence of an object independently of our minds is only its existence in the minds of other people. "Therefore,'' Plekhanov wrote, "Petzoldt himself must be placed among the idealists. But his idealism does not acknowledge its own existence and is afraid of its own essence. This is unconscious and cowardly idealism."^^***^^ We have many such idealists among the positivisls of today.
_-_-_^^*^^ See p. 214 of this volume.
^^**^^ See pp. 219, 220 of this volume.
^^***^^ See p. 433 of this volume.
13Plekhanov also severely castigated idealism and its variant, Machism, for its anti-scientific interpretation of space and time. "If space and time,'' he wrote, "are only forms of contemplation (Anschauung) that I myself possess, it is clear that when I did not exist these forms did not exist either, that is to say, there was no time and no space, so that, when I assert, for instance, that Pericles lived long before me, 1 am talking arrant nonsense."^^*^^ Plekhanov argues that contemporary science has nothing in common with such views.
In his struggle against Machism, Plekhanov dismissed the idealist theory of cognition advocated by Mach and his Russian disciples as untenable, and countered it with the scientific view on questions of epistemology. Moreover, Plekhanov proceeded from the materialist recognition of the objectively existing world. Man's sensations and consciousness allow him to know real phenomena and objects, as a result of which ``things-in-themselves'' become ``things-for-us''. Plekhanov wrote: "There is not and cannot be any other knowledge of the object than that obtained by means of the impressions it makes on us. Therefore, if I recognise that matter is known to us only through the sensations which it arouses in us, this in no way implies that I regard matter as something 'unknown' and unknowable. On the contrary, it means, first, that matter is knowable and, secondly, that it has become known to man in the measure that he has succeeded in getting to know its properties through impressions...."^^**^^
But on this important issue Plekhanov deviated somewhat from the Marxist theory of cognition, towards agnosticism. In the theory of cognition Plekhanov committed an error along the lines of Helmholtz's "theory of hieroglyphs'', when he maintained that impressions and sensations were conventional signs and not reflections or copies of things. This error was criticised by Lenin in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Yet, on the whole, Plekhanov held to the Marxist position on the theory of cognition, and made repeated sharp attacks on agnosticism. He later renounced the "theory of hieroglyphs''. In 1908, in M' aterialismus Militans, Plekhanov wrote: "In the new edition of my translation of Ludwig Feuerbach published abroad in 1905 and in Russia in 1906, I declared that while I continued to share Sechenov's view on this question, his terminology" (impressions---conventional signs of things---A. M.) "seemed somehow ambiguous to me.'' "In 1905, I said I was against the Sechenov terminology.'"^^***^^ Plekhanov was wrong in this reference to Sechenov, who had never been an agnostic. At the same time Plekhanov very competently exposed the _-_-_
^^*^^ See p. 464 of this volume.
^^**^^ See p. 221 of this volume.
^^***^^ See pp. 220, 227 of this volume.
14 hollowness of the Machians' agnosticism, shared by Bogdanov, who camouflaged his agnosticism with talk of experience and social coordination of men's views as the criteria for the verisimilitude of human knowledge. Socially-coordinated experience cannot be regarded as truth, since not all people's opinions and ideas which are both universally significant and identical, that is to say, socially-coordinated, are true and correct. Everybody knows, for example, that religious feelings and views are common to an enormous number of people even to the present day, but this does not make them correct and authentic. Plekhanov justifiably demonstrated that, from the point of view of the Machian Bogdanov, even hobgoblins and sprites exist and perceptions of them are authentic. "No, Mr. Bogdanov,'' he wrote, "no matter how you twist and turn you will never shake off the hobgoblins and sprites, as they say, neither by the cross nor by the pestle. Only a correct doctrine of experience can 'relieve' you of them, but your 'philosophy' is as far removed from such a doctrine as we are from the stars of heaven."^^*^^While defending and expounding the principles of the Marxist theory of cognition, Plekhanov frequently made inaccurate statements. In a number of cases, he linked up Marxist materialism with pre-Marxist materialism, not realising that the Marxist epistemology differed from that of the pre-Marxist materialists in being based on the dialectical method, which includes practice as the basis and criterion for cognition. So one cannot, for instance, agree with Plekhanov's assertion that "Marx's epistemology stems directly from that of Feuerbach, or, if you will, it is, properly speaking, the epistemology of Feuerbach, only rendered more profound by the masterly correction brought into it by Marx".^^**^^
Plekhanov was also mistaken in his contention that "Marx was wrong when he reproached Feuerbach for not comprehending 'practical-critical activity'. Feuerbach did understand it."^^***^^ Here, Plekhanov di*d not take account of the contemplative and incomplete nature of Feuerbach's materialism, for Feuerbach could not provide a materialist explanation of history and without this, there can be no really scientific understanding of the practical, material activity of people as the criterion for the authenticity of knowledge.
We should also stress that Plekhanov, while combating the idealism of Machian philosophy, was unable to expose its connection with the crisis in natural science. True, he did criticise individual naturalists for their idealism and their vain attempts to _-_-_
^^*^^ See p. 255 of this volume.
^^**^^ See p. 129 of this volume.
^^***^^ See p. 639 of this volume.
15 ``overcome'' materialism. "The German chemist Ostwald, a wellknown exponent of energetics,'' Plekhanov wrote, "has for long been applying himself to 'the overcoming of scientific materialism'.... But this is a mere misunderstanding. The good chemist Ostwald hopes to 'overcome' materialism by means of energetics only because he is too poorly versed in philosophy."^^*^^ But Plekhanov's criticism of the idealism of individual naturalists was no profound analysis of the crisis in natural science and the relation of Machism to this crisis. Lenin wrote in Materialism and EmpirioCriticism: "To analyse Machism and at the same time to ignore this connection---as Plekhanov does---is to scoff at the spirit of dialectical materialism, i.e., to sacrifice the method of Engels to the letter of Engels."^^**^^In spite of a number of shortcomings, Plekhanov's works criticising Machian philosophy occupy an important place in Marxist philosophy. They helped to combat idealism in philosophy, and armed the revolutionary movement in the struggle against bourgeois ideology and its philosophical foundations. However, Plekhanov remained at the nineteenth century level, and was incapable of creatively developing Marxist philosophy in conformity with the new historical conditions, of raising it to a new stage, of exposing the crisis in natural science and indicating how it might be solved by the study and application of dialectical materialism to analysis of problems in natural science. This task was fulfilled by Lenin in his masterly work Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, which, together with his other philosophical works, represents a new and higher stage in the development of Marxist philosophy.
__*_*_*__G. V. Plekhanov, while criticising bourgeois idealist trends in philosophy, simultaneously did significant positive work in scientifically analysing many important philosophical questions. In his Fundamental Problems of Marxism, Materialismus Militans, "Translator's Preface to the Second Edition of F. Engels' Ludwig Feuerbach...''', and other works published in this volume of the present edition, Plekhanov devotes much attention to ascertaining the essence of Marxist philosophy, the dialectical method, the theory of cognition and fundamental questions of historical materialism.
The philosophy of Marxism, as Plekhanov demonstrates, is an entire world-outlook, contemporary materialism, which is, at _-_-_
^^*^^ See p. 598 of this volume.
^^**^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14. p. 32.
16 present, the highest stage of development of materialist philosophy. The philosophy of Marx and Engels rests upon the achievements of pre-Marxist thought, in particular, upon those of classical German philosophy---the dialectics of Hegel and the materialism of Feuerbach.At the same time, Plekhanov emphasised the qualitatively new nature of Marxist philosophy, calling the emergence of Marx's materialist philosophy a genuine revolution, the greatest revolution ever in the history of human thought.
While correctly remarking that Marx had critically fathomed and refashioned Feuerbach's materialism, Plekhanov made certain wrong formulations, making it appear as though Marx and Engels at one stage in their philosophical development were Feuerbachians and only later became dialectical materialists. Plekhanov's portrayal of the evolution of Marx and Engels does not correspond to reality, since Marx and Engels, while to some extent influenced by Feuerbach, did not proceed, as he did, from the principles of abstract man, but from recognition of the decisive role played in history by the masses. From the very beginning of their activities, Marx and Engels were revolutionaries and thinkers. While they were influenced by Feuerbach and shared his views on a number of important issues, they were not and did not become ``pure'' (``orthodox'') {followers of Feuerbach. Moreover: they were always dialecticians. Even in the early period of their activities Marx and Engels understood Feuerbach's philosophy as dialecticians, as revolutionary democrats who were beginning to comprehend the role played by the revolutionary activity of the masses, their role as the remakers of history, which was never a feature of Feuerbach's philosophy.
Plekhanov's elaboration of materialist dialectics, its interrelation with formal logic, is of considerable importance. He distinguishes the peculiarities of dialectical materialism from the metaphysical, and considers materialist dialectics as the teaching on the development and motion of all reality. The philosophy of Marxism is not simply materialism, but dialectical materialism. Its basic principle is that it recognises development and motion. If metaphysics, formal logic, says Plekhanov, adheres to the principle: "yea---yea and nay---nay'', then dialectics says: " yeanay and nay---yea."
``Every definite question,'' he wrote, "as to whether a particular property is part of a particular object must be answered either yea or nay. That is indisputable. But how should one reply where the object is changing, when it is already shedding the particular property or is still only acquiring if? Needless to say, a definite answer is demanded here too; but the point is that it will be definite only if it is based on the formula: "(yea---nay and 17 nay---yea."^^*^^ Thus, formal logic fixes the existence of (he object and its proper!ies abstracted from their changes, while dialectics indicates processes, the development of objects, phenomena. At the same time, it is extremely important to emphasise, as Plekhanov did, that dialectical logic is the reflection in the minds of people, in their conceptions, of the contradictions and development inherent in reality itself and in its phenomena. Plekhanov wrole: "Materialism pnls dialectics 'the right way up' and thereby removes the mystical veil in which Hegel had it wrapped. By the very fact of (his, it brings to light the revolutionary character of dialectics."^^**^^ Dialectical logic is Ihe logic of objective reality and is its reflection in human thought. "The rights of dialectical thinking." said Plekhanov, "are confirmed by the dialectical properties <>\ being" as being itself determines thinking. However, Pleklianov was inexact in the formulations on the interrelationship of dialectical and formal logic. He said that "just as rest is a particular case of motion, so thought, according to the rules of formal logic (conforming lo the 'i/asic lairs' of tkoug'.il) is a particular case oj dialectical thuug/it". This is inaccurate and incorrect, since formal logic does not and cannot enter into dialectical logic, lor dialectical logic, having as its own object motion and development, cannot embrace the laws of formal logic which do not deal with change and development but, consider objects outside of change. When dealing with dialectics, .Plekhanov emphasised its revolutionary character and, citing llerzen, referred to it as Ihe algebra of Ihe revolution, quoting Marx's famous words that dialectics regards every historically developing social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient, nature no less than its momentary existence, because it lets nothing impose on it, and it is in its essence critical and revolutionary.
Throughout his work in philosophy, Plekhanov paid constant attention to questions of historical materialism. lie showed that dialectical materialism extended to society is historical materialism, Ihe theory of the materialist, conception of the historical process. I n the works which make up the present volume, Plekhanov examines many problems of I.lie theory of historical materialism: social being and social consciousness, forms of social consciousness and their role in history, the laws of development of productive forces and relations of production, the part played by the geographical environment in the life of society, the role of the basis and superstructure in the development of society, the place of the masses and the individual in history, and _-_-_
^^*^^ See p. 76 of this volume.
^^**^^ See p. 79 of this volume.
2---01230
18 other issues. In propagating Hie fundamentals of historical materialism, Plekhanov underlined its methodological importance for the different social sciences, for the study of various aspects and areas of social life. "I am referring,'' he wrote in his Fundamental Problems of Marxism, "not to the arithmetic of social development, hut to its algebra; not to the causes of individual phenomena, but to how the discovery of those causes should be approached. And that means that the materialist explanation of history was primarily of a methodological significance."^^*^^Historical materialism establishes that the mode of production, which includes the productive forces and relations of production, is at the root of social life, of historical development. But what gives rise to and determines (he development of productive forces and relations of production? In Fundamental Problems of Marxism, Plekhanov replies to this question as follows: "The properties of the geograpllical environmenl determine the development of the productive forces, which, in its turn, determines the development of the economic relations, and therefore of all other social relations."^^**^^ This reply is not quite accurate. Here Plekhanov overestimates the role of the geographical environmenl. Plekhanov's formulation transforms the geographical environment from one of the conditions accelerating or retarding social development into a factor determining the development of the productive forces of society, the basis on which the life of society is built. In many of his other works, however, Plekhanov gave a correct reply to this question.
In examining the relationship of the economic basis to the superstruclure, Plekhanov set out a live-point formula: 1) the state of the productive forces; 2) the economic relations determined by them; 3) the socio-political structure erected on the given economic base; 4) mentality.of social man, determined partly by Hiedirect influence of the economy and partly by Hie socio-political system which has grown upon it; 5) ideology, reflecting the properties of the mentality. As a scheme, the ``five-point'' formula has serious shortcomings. Productive forces and relations of production, which are known to be two aspects of the mode oi production, are isolated from each other in this formula. The mentality of social man is made the fourth stage of Plekhauov's scheme; this, he mistakenly believes, finds reflection later (at the fifth stage) in various forms of ideology. But ideology as a system of views, conceptions, ideas of one or other class, is the reflection of social being, the expression of the interests of a particular class; _-_-_
^^*^^ See p. 137 of this volume.
^^**^^ See pp. 143--44 of this volume.
19 it is rooted in the economic relationships of people, in the struggle of classes, and not in the psyche.It would he wrong to consider, for example, (hat political ideology or belles-lettres reflect the psyche, for the simple reason that both these forms of ideology, of social consciousness, reflect social beings, the conditions of the material life of society, the class struggle, expressing (lie interests of different classes in society either in the form of ideas and conceptions or in the form of artistic images. Plekhanov was well aware of this and, in many of his writings, he adduced splendid reasons to prove the principles of the materialist conception of history in its application to the history of ideology, explaining the objective sources of social ideology.
Bui in the present instance---in his Fundamental J>rol>lems of Marxism---he is inaccurate in saying that ideology is the reflection of the mentality, as it were, the condensed mentality. It follows from this that the content of ideological forms is the mentality, but this does not correspond to the truth. Lenin pointed out, for example, that politics is the concentrated expression of economics. and not the mentality, as Plekhanov would have it.
While sometimes inaccurate or erroneous in his views, Plekhanov, on the whole---in his analysis of the basic questions of the theory of historical materialism---held a correct Marxist position. For instance, he convincingly elaborated one of (he fundamental theses of historical materialism---on the progressive development of society, on the change of socio-economic structures in the history of society, lie repeated Marx's statement thai no socio-economic structure will disappear before all the productive forces for which it has room have developed, and thai the new, advanced relations of production will never replace (he old before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the old society. This is why mankind always undertakes (hose tasks which are feasible, that is to say, those tasks which are ripe for solution, springing from the prevailing conditions of the material life of society. In this, we have one of the manifestations of the objective natural-historical character of the development of the human society. Such a conception differs intrinsically from the dogmatic view of the Second International about the level of development of the productive forces that I he socialist revolution would begin only in dial capitalist country in which the productive forces had developed most. However, while giving a correct reply to (his question from a general theoretical standpoint. Plekhanov in his analysis of the revolution in Mnssia relapsed into an opportunist position, leaning to the views of I lie Second International. For example, in his .Notes to (he ".HO (let-man edition of F''ito'ai>it'ii/(il Prolile/as < f Mar.i'isin he staled thai in the autumn of i'.)()"> " 20 certain Marxists ... considered a socialist revolution possible in Russia, since, they claimed, the country's productive i'orces were sufficiently developed for suck a revolution''. Plekhanov did not comprehend Ike now historical epoch---Hie epocli of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, its peculiarities, and so lie sometimes approacked questions of Ike theory of (lie revolution dogmatically, not realising the necessity for the bourgeois-- democratic revolution to develop into the socialist revolution.
The credit for creatively developing .Marxism in the ne\v historical epoch belongs to Lenin. He proved brilliantly that under the conditions of imperialism the proletarian revolution would first be accomplished in that country where I lie contradictious of imperialist capitalism were mos! acute. Of course, a definite level in the development of the productive forces of capitalism was essential in order to bring about the social revolution. There could be no question of a proletarian revolution without the necessary material prerequisites and conditions. But this was quite different from the contention of the leaders of the Second International, including Plekkanov, that tlie socialist revolution was possible only in tlie country with the kighest level of development of the productive forces of capitalism, and in which Ike proletariat comprised the majority of the population.
Plekhanov justifiably and profoundly criticised the conception of ``automatism'' in historical development. The ueo-Kantian Stammler, misunderstanding the Marxist proposition on causal necessity in social development, contended that if social development were accomplished exclusively by virtue of "causal necessity, it would be patently senseless to consciously try to further it--- Who would attempt to assist the necessary, i.e., inevitable, rising of the sun?" he asked.^^*^^ The revisionist Bernstein considered the historical teachings of Marx and Eugels to consist in a recognition of the automatic operation of the economic situation in history. Plekhanov exposed this wrong conception of Marxism as a fatalist doctrine, and argued that the history of people has nothing in common with Nature and its phenomena, that tke history of society has its own peculiarities and is made by man. 15ut man makes history in a definite direction, not arbitrarily. At different stages of historical development, men's actions have different tasks and aims which are determined by historical necessity and by the conditions of the given epoch. Consequently, "once this necessity is given,'' wrote Plekhanov, "then given too, as its effect, are those human aspirations which are an inevitable factor of social derelopmenl. Men's aspirations do not exclude _-_-_
^^*^^ See p.~180 of this volume.
21 necessity, but are themselres determined by it."^^*^^ Pro-Marxist materialism, while stating correctly that people are the product of circumstances and education, failed to note that circumstances are changed by people and that, the tutor himself must be taught. Hence it follows that Marxist philosophy places enormous importance on the activities of people, of the masses, in the historical development of society, and views history as the deeds and struggle of the masses. "With the thoroughness of the historical action'' Plekhanov recalls the words of Marx, "the size of the mass whose action it is trill therefore increase."^^**^^Thus, the logical course of development of society includes tke activities of the people. Tke proposition that society develops according to definite laws and by necessity in no way precludes recognition of the tremendous role played by people, tke popular masses, in history. On this basis, Plekhanov rejected the revisionist Bernstein's conception denying the activity and struggle of the masses.
Defending and explaining the Marxist view that society develops in accordance witli laws, Plekhanov waged a struggle against the Rickertian variety of neo-Kantianism which negates the objective nature of historical laws. Rickert maintained that laws were only effective in nature and its phenomena which are studied by natural science. In the history of society, all phenomena are so individual and unique that there can be no question of history conforming to laws. Rickert counterposed the ``sciences'' of culture to those of Nature. This conception met with a sharp rebuff from Plekhanov. Upholding the Marxist thesis on the laws of historical development, he wrote: "History becomes a science only in so far as it succeeds in explaining from the point of view of sociology the processes it portrays.... Rickert's attempt to oppose the sciences of culture to the sciences of nature has no serious basis."^^***^^
PJekhanov devoted considerable attention in his writings of that, time to the inverse influence of tke superstructure, social consciousness, on tke development of existence, of economics. When the superstructure lias developed on a specific economic basis to which it corresponds, the former, as Plekhanov rightly indicated, in turn exerts a powerful influence on the course of economic development. "Political relations,'' he remarked, " indubitably influence the economic movement, but it is also indisputable that before they influence that movement they arc created by it.... The Manifesto gives convincing proof that its authors were well aware of the importance of the ideological 'factor'."^^****^^
_-_-_^^*^^ See p. 180 of this volume.
^^**^^ See p. 183 of this volume.
^^***^^ See p. 486 of this volume.
^^****^^ See p. 156 of this volume.
22Plekhanov was hasiciil I y correct in his observal ions concerning (ho inverse influence of Ilie su persl rucl ure, social consciousness, on I he development of society, hut lie failed to elucidate the role of socialist consciousness in application to the labour movement. Moreover, he somewhat underestimated the role oi the Party in introducing socialist consciousness into the working-class movement and Ihe subjective factor and its place in the revolution.
Despite individual errors and serious shortcomings in Plckhanov's philosophical works, those contained in this volume reveal an enormous interest in the philosophy of Marxism and Ihe writer's efforts to preserve the Marxist philosophy in all purify and make il the properly of the working class.
Plekhaiiov wauled Marxist philosophy to be studied by advanced workers.
Once, after receiving a letter about the sludy of philosophy by workers, Plekhanov wrote a special article on the subject in Dnevnik solsial-demokrata I Diary of a Social-Democrat! (Mo. 12, June 1910). lie believed the study of philosophy essential, but maintained it was important for the studies to be well organised and, even more so, for the philosophy to be sound, that is to say, for it lo be Marxist philosophy. "We make it extremely difficult for ourselves lo acquire sound philosophical conceptions,'' he wrote. "How do our comrades study philosophy? They read, or I will say for politeness' sake, they 'study' the now fashionable philosophical writers. Hut these philosophical writers who are now in fashion are thoroughly saturated with idealism."^^*^^ Plekhanov explained that sludy of fashionable idealist trends could bring nothing but harm. Only the study of Marxist philosophy would give a correct world-outlook, but study-of the predecessors of Marxist philosophy was also essential. "XeilherMach nor Avenarius,'' he wrote, " neither \Vindelband nor Wundt, nor even Kant must lead us to the sanctuary of philosophical truth, but only Engels, Marx, Feuerbach, and Hegel. Only from these teachers can we learn what we need to know."^^**^^ However, these views did not cause IMekhanov to conclude that reading Die works of bourgeois philosophers was not worthwhile. On the contrary, he advised thai they be read, studied, and criticised from the standpoint of Marxist philosophy.
__*_*_*__The present volume contains a number of I'lekhanov's works criticising religion and Ihe religions seekings in Russia: "On the So-called Religious Seekings in Russia''; "On Houtroux's Hook''; _-_-_
^^*^^ See |i. /i.>7 of this volume.
^^**^^ See pp. 457--58 of this volume.
23 ``On Fr. Liilgenaifs Hook''; "On A. Pannekoek's Pamphlet" and ot hers. In I hose works he ex plains Hie origin and essence of religion and examines the reactionary role of the religious seekings and their links with idealist philosophy. In accordance with the principles of historical materialism, and utilising vast historical and ethnographical data, Plekhanov made a materialist analysis of Ihe problems of religion and atheism.Ploklianov considered religion to be a system of notions and sentiments fantastically distorting reality, lie was basically correct in tracing the origin of religion to the socio-economic conditions of primitive society, when the productive forces were at a very low level of development, when man's power over nature was negligible and he was helpless before natural phenomena, and did not understand them; il was precisely under these conditions thai man began lo endow phenomena wilh a personality and lo worship them. Animism was one of the first religious notions of primitive man. IMekhanov wrote: "Primitive man believes in the existence of numerous spirits, but worships only some of them. Religion arises from the combination of the animistic ideas with certain religious acts."^^*^^ Under Ihe conditions of primitive society, there also arose totomisrn, signifying belief in Ihe kinship of one or another clan of people and one or oilier animal, and subsequently the deification of animals, plants, elc. "The (ireek philosopher Xenophanes,'' JMekhanov noted wittily, "was mistaken when ho said I hat man always creates his god in his own image and likeness. No, at Ihe beginning lie creates his god in the image and likeness of an animal. Man-like gods appeared only Jaler, as a consequence of man's new successes in developing his productive forces. Rut even for a long time afterwards, deep traces of zoomorphism are preserved in man's religions ideas. It is enough to recall Ihe worship of animals in ancienl Egypt and the fact thai statues portraying Fjgyplian gods very often had the heads of beasts."^^**^^
IMekhanov used many examples lo trace back and prove convincingly thai religions ideas and conceptions depend on socioeconomic conditions, on social being. He noted I hat (he social relations on Monnl Olympus were reminiscent of the structure of Greek society during the Heroic period. In the now period, when the transition of socielv from feudalism to capitalism was being accomplished, deism became widespread. This was connected with the desire of the bourgeoisie in that period to restrict the royal power. "Alongside Ihe efforts lo limit the powers of kings,'' wrote Plekhanov, "came the trend towards 'natural religion' and to 'deism, that is, to a system of ideas wherein the power of God is _-_-_
^^*^^ See ]>. .'i]2 of his volume.
^^**^^ See p. 328 of this volume.
24 restricted on all sides by f lie lairs of Nature. Deism is celestial parliamentarism."^^*^^ Hut under all conditions, religion retains the mythological element, a fantastic conception of the world, the worship of divine power. Changes in religions ideas and the religions cult are really the adaptation of religion to new historical conditions and the needs of the exploiting classes, as their ideology, as their means of keeping the working masses in subjection.Plckhanov made a great contribution to I lie si niggle against the god-builders, against those who "seek a road to heareri'', as lie put it, "for the simple reason that they hare last their iray on earth". The "religion of socialism'', created by Lunacharsky and his associates, fully corresponded to the idealism of Machian philosophy, and the declaration of the god-builders to the effect that they were materialists was, to say the least, absurd. Plekhanov wrote: "Only as a consequence of his complete ignorance of materialism could our prophet of the 'fifth religion'" (A. Lunacharsky.---A. M.) "call himself a materialist."^^**^^
Plekhanov exposed the anti-scientific and harmful nature of the Russian Machian god-builders' attempt to create their religion without god, a religion purporting to be a "belief in socialism'', the idoiisation of the "potential of mankind''. He demonstrated that their talk of a proletarian religion had nothing in common with Marxism, with the working class and its socialist ideology.
God-building is the "padded-jacket of modern despondency'', said Plekhanov, and not an ide«logy of struggle. In combating godbuilding Plekhanov also criticised the errors made by Gorky at that time, saying that Gorky's Confession preached the new religion. But simultaneously with his criticism of Gorky's ideological mistakes, Plekhanov fought for Gorky the artist; although lie did not always correctly assess Gorky's works (Mother), he was well aware that G-orky was a great realist writer who paid only temporary homage to the propagation of the new religion.
Plekhanov's writings against the religious world-outlook retain their vital force even today. Basically they give a correct scientific idea of religion, its social essense and purpose, and help to resolve the question of the attitude of the proletariat and its Party to religion, and to wage the struggle against religious prejudices.
__*_*_*__In this volume there are a number of Plekhanov's works containing many profound statements and comments on the history of philosophy.
_-_-_^^*^^ See p. 341 of this volume.
^^**^^ See p. 358 of this volume.
25Plekhanov was one of I he fewMarxisls in the Second International to make an important contribution to Ihe Marxist history of philosophy and to create valuable works on the history of philosophical thought. He was not only an eminent propagandist of Marxist philosophy, but also a notable historian in this field. He contended both with the idealist historians of philosophy, who explained the development of philosophical thought by the development of the absolute idea, and with the vulgarisers of Marxism, such as Shulyatikov, who did not understand the relative independence of ideology, including philosophy.
In several of his works, Plekhanov gives a clear elucidation of the basic principle of historical materialism---that social existence determines social consciousness, including philosophical thought. He wrote: "Marx's materialism shows in what way the history of thinking is determined by the history of being"^^*^^ just as the content of philosophy is determined by economics. But at the same time, Plekhanov considered that one or other of these philosophical ideas and theories spring from economics, not directly, but indirectly, while being influenced by a number of other factors and phenomena. In his opinion, the content of ideological phenomena may be explained and determined by the economic development of society only in the very last analysis.
In class society, ideology, including philosophy, has a class character and reflects the interests and aspirations of one or other of the classes. Plckhanov gives some remarkable examples of materialist, analysis of different philosophical systems and ideas: of French materialism, classical German philosophy, the philosophy of Russian revolutionary thinkers, and others. He was able to do all this because, having mastered the Marxist method, the principles of historical materialism, he utilised them in his historico-philosophical studies.
Criticising the efforts of Shnlyatikov and other vulgarisers to derive the content of philosophical concepts directly from production, Plekhanov, in an article written specially against Shulyatikov, exposed the untenability and vulgar simplification of his historico-philosophical ``researches'' which appeared in his book Justification of Capitalism in West European /'hllosophi/ (from Descartes to Mach). Using Shulyatikov's examination ofjKantian philosophy as an example, Plekhanov made devastating criticism of his vulgar views on the history of philosophy. Shulyatikov claimed that the philosophical views of any bourgeois thinker represented a picture of capitalist production drawn with the aid of conventional signs. All philosophical terms and formulas, concepts, ideas, opinions, impressions, ``things-in-themselves'', " _-_-_
^^*^^ See p. 168 of this volume.
26 phenomena'', ``siihstances'', ``modi'', etc., etc., served, in Slnil yalikov's view, to designate classes and their interests.``After all,'' wrote I'lekhanov, "to assort that 'all philosophical terms without exception' = serve^^1^^ to designate social classes, groups, nuclei, and llieir relationships, is lo reduce an extremely important question to a simplicity thai can only he characterised by the epithet: 'Su/dalian'. This word denotes neither a 'social class' nor a 'group', nor a 'nucleus', but simply a vast woodenheadedness."^^*^^ That is why Sliulyalikov and his ilk, using such " methodology'', gave a distorted, crude, and vulgarly simplified analysis of philosophical theories, particularly the philosophy of Kant. I'lekhanov scoffed bitterly at Sliulyalikov: "According to him, when Kant wrote about nonmena and phenomena, he not only had in mind various social classes, but also, to use the expression of the old wife of one of Uspensky's bureaucrats, he 'aimed at the pocket' of one of these classes, namely, the bourgeoisie.''~^^**^^
These words of Plekhauov's, castigating those who vulgarly simplified philosophical history, have not lost their significance even today. Those historians of literature, art, philosophy, and other forms of ideology, who analyse hislorico-philosophical phenomena, if not completely, then approximately in the spirit of such vulgarism and ``woodenheadedness'', are not yet extinct. I'lekhanov devoted a great deal of attention to elucidating the historico-philosophical and ideological roots of contemporary trends in idealism. Thus, for instance, he illustrated how the ideological and philosophical sources of Macliism are rooted in the views of Berkeley. Whereas Berkeley pronounced matter to be a "collection of ideas'', a combination of sensations, that is to say, resolved the question, of matter in the spirit of subjective idealism, Mach and his supporters maintained that physical phenomena, material bodies, are essentially complexes of sensations. So Plekhanov was fully justified in writing: "Mach ... adheres firmly on this t/ueslion to the point of rlew of the eighteenth-century idealist Berkeley."^^***^^
In the writings contained in the present volume, Plekhanov also touches on many hislorico-philosophical and sociological questions connected with the preparation, formation, and development of Marxist philosophy and scientific socialism. I n such works as Fundamental I'rob/ems of Marxism: "From Idealism to Materialism''; "Utopian Socialism of the Nineteenth Century'', and others, he gives a detailed, though not always accurate, analysis of the philosophies of Hegel, Feuerbach, the French materialists, and Ihe views of the Western Utopian socialists.
_-_-_^^*^^ Sec p. 302 of this volume.
^^**^^ See p. !>0(> of I liis volume.
^^***^^ See p. 214 of this volume.
27His analysis shows the importance of the philosophical ideas of Hegel, l-'euerbach. and Ihe leachings of the Utopian socialists in the origination of Marxism.
I'lekhanov's merit lies particularly in Ihe fact that he became one of the first and most prominent historians of socialist ideas, who made a profound Marxist analysis of I heir role and importance in Ihe preparation of scientific socialism, fn the articles "French Utopian Socialism of the .Nineteenth Century" and "I' topian Socialism of the .Nineteenth Century'', he gives a convincing portrayal of the progressive nature of the Utopian socialists' ideas, their critique of capitalism, and simultaneously sheds light, on the inherent narrowness of their views, Iheir inability to indicate the way out of capitalist slavery, since they could not discover the laws of social development or understand the class struggle of the proletariat againsl Ihe bourgeoisie. Plekhanov was right in saying that "like Fourier, Saint-Simon was horrified at the very thought of the class struggle and sometimes liked to intimidate his readers with 'the propertyless class', the 'people'".^^*^^
Noting the negative altitude of the ulopian socialists lo the class revolutionary struggle, Plekhanov quoted the words of Cabel, which are pertinent in tin's respect: "77 / had the revolution in my A'AYK/), / would not open rny hand even if I had to die in exile for //."^^**^^
Following in the Marx's footsteps, Plekhanov indicated the connection between socialist teachings and the materialist worldoutlook. "If man,'' Plekhanov wrote, "draws all his knowledge, sensations, elc., from the world of the senses and the experience .gained from it, as was laughl by the eighteenth-century materialists, then the empirical world must be arranged so that in it man experiences and gels used to what is really human and that he becomes aware of himself as man."^^***^^
Despite the errors and deviations from Marxist philosophy, the works of (1. V. Plekhanov contained in this volume, today, too, serve the cause of defending Marxist philosophy, and the struggle againsl bourgeois ideology, idealisl philosophy, and all kind of revisionism.
A. MASLIN
_-_-_^^*^^ See ji. /j!l() of Ihis volume.
^^**^^ See pp. 302, 305 of this volume.
^^***^^ See p. 4',):; of Ihis volume.
[28] ~ [29] SELECTED
PHILOSOPHICAL
WORKS
VOLUME III
[30] ~ [31] __ALPHA_LVL1__ [PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION OF ENGELS'The Mussian translation of Kngels' brochure, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific is now appearing in its third edition. The second edition was published in 18U2. ^^1^^ At that lime, opinion that socialist theory in general could not be described as scientific did not yet find expression in international socialist literature. Today such opinions are being proclaimed very loudly and are not remaining without influence among some readers. Therefore, we consider if timely to examine the question: what is scientific socialism and in what does it differ from Utopian socialism?
But to begin with, let us listen to one of the ``critics''.
In a paper read on May 17, 1901 to the Merlin Student Union for the Study of Social Science (Sozialwissenschaftlicher Sludenlenverein /u Merlin), Mr. Mernstein posed the selfsame question, although he formulated it differently: "How is scientific socialism possible?" (Wie ist wissenschafflicher So/j'alismus moglich?). His investigations brought him to a negative reply. To use his own words, no ``ism'' am "be scientific": "'ism' designates system of outlooks, tendencies, systems of ideas or demands, but not science. The basis of every true science is experience. Science builds its edifice on accumulated knowledge. Socialism, however, is the teaching on a future social system and for that reason its most characteristic feature cannot be established scientifically."^^*^^
Is that right? We shall see.
First of all, let us discuss the relationship between ``isms'' and science.~ If Mr. Mernslein were right in saying that no ``ism'' can be a science, then it is clear, for instance, that Darwin/.s-m too is not a ``science''. Let us accept that for the moment. Mill, what is Darwin/.sy/f? If we are to go on accepting Air. Mernslein's theory as correct we must include Darwinism in the "systems of ideas". Mut cannot a system of ideas be a science, or is not a science a system of ideas? Mr. Bernstein evidently thinks not but lie is _-_-_
^^*^^ Ed. licrnsloin, IJ'iV ist trissensclHt/llirlicr Suziitlisnitts ni'i^Uch'.' Hoi
1901, P. :-,;,.
32 __RUNNING_HEADER_LEFT__ G. PLEKHANOV labouring under a misapprehension and all because there is an astonishing and dreadful contusion in his own "system of ideas''. I'jvory intelligent scboolchild now knows that science builds upon the basis of experience. But thai is not the question. The question is: irh-n <>.n/<"//7 does scienre build on the basis of experience? And there is only one answer to this question: science builds on the basis of experience-certain ^e/ieralisations ``(systems of ideas'') which, in turn, underlie certain f>rin'isii>ns of phenomena. But this refers to the future. Therefore, not every consideration regarding the future is devoid of scientific basis.(What kind of conclusion is it that says socialism is a worldoutlook and is therefore unscieiitiiic? Evidently .Mr. Bernstein seems to think this is indisputable. But before it could indeed be indisputable, if would bo necessary to prove from the beginning that no and noliodifs irnrld-ontlook can be scientific. Air. Bernstein has not done and will never do so; therefore, we take exception to him and say: parle/ pour vous, cher monsieur!
Further. A trend is not a science. Bui science can discover and daily does discover trends peculiar to phenomena under investigation. Scienlilic socialism, in particular, establishes a certain trend ((he trend to social revolution) prevailing in the present capitalist suciflij: socialism was a teaching on the future social, order even before it emerged from the utopian stage.
One would have to he a Bernstein in order to imagine that science is not, a "system of ideas''. It is a truly monstrous suggestion. Science is precisely knowledge worked up into a system. Bernstein, as usual, confuses mailers, lie heard aboul the appearance in contemporary natural science of a ''trend" to free science completely from hiipn/lu'ses, and decided thai science had nothing in common with any "systems of ideas''. In fact, this same scientHic ``trend'' which led Mr. Bernstein to his monstrous thesis, is groundless, llaeckel was quite right when, in criticising this mistaken ``trend'', he said: "ohno llypothese ist Krkenntnis nicht mb'glich" (Die Lehens/riiniler. Stuttgart, = 100^^7^^i, S. 07).)
If the proposition is true that the present is pregnant, with the t'u I nre. a scientific study of the present must give us the opporlu nily of foreseeing some phenomena---in this case, socialisation of the means of production---of the future, not on the basis of some kind of mysterious prophecies or arbitrary and abstract reasoning, but precisely on the basis of ``experience'', on the basis of knowledge accumulated by science.
If Mr. Bernstein wished seriously to ponder over the question he himself posed about the possibility of scientific socialism, he should first of all have decided whether the proposition we have indicated above was true or untrue in application to social phenomena. Even a moment's thought would have shown him that 33 __RUNNING_HEADER_RIGHT__ PREFACE TO SOCIALISM: UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC in this case it was no less true than in all others. Being then sure of this, he ought to have considered whether contemporary social science possessed such a store of information about present-day social relations as, when put to use, would enable science to foresee an impending replacement of these social relations by others--- the capitalist mode of production by the socialist. If he had observed that there was not and never could be such a store of information, the question of the possibility of scientific socialism would have solved itself negatively.~ But if he had been convinced that this information already existed, or could be accumulated with time, he would then have come inevitably to a positive decision on die question. But no matter how he resolved this question, one thing would have become perfectly clear to him, that which--- because of his erroneous method of investigation---still remains for him wrapped in the mist of an ill-balanced and ill-considered "system of ideas''. He would have seen that the impossibility of the existence of scientific socialism could be proved only if it became obvious that prevision of social phenomena was impossible, in other words, that before resolving the question of the possibility of scientific socialism it was essential to resolve the question of the possibility of any social science at all. If Mr. Bernstein had perceived all this, he might perhaps have observed also that the subject he had selected for his paper was "of enormous = dimensions'',^^2^^ and that he who has no other means of analysis than die muddleheaded contrasting of science and ``isms'', of experience and a " system of ideas" can do very little to elucidate such a subject.
Incidentally, we are being unjust to our author. The means of analysis at his disposal were not really restricted to such contrasts. Here, for instance, on pages 33--34 of his paper we also come across the idea that science has no other aim than knowledge, whereas "political and social doctrines" strive to resolve certain practical tasks. During the discussion which followed the reading of Mr. Bernstein's paper, a member of the audience pointed out to him in connection with this idea that medicine had the practical aim of healing, and yet it must be regarded as a science. But our lecturer replied to this by saying that healing was the task of medical art, which, in any case, presupposed a basic knowledge of medical science; but that medical science itself aims not at healing, but at the study of the means and conditions of healing. To this Mr. Bernstein added: "If we take this distinguishing of conceptions as a typical example (als typisches Muster), we shall have no trouble in defining, in the most complex cases, where science ends and where art or doctrine begins."^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ Ibid., p. 34. Note.
3---01230
34We take as our ``example'' the "distinguishing of conceptions'" recommended by Mr. Bernstein and argue thus: in socialism, as in medicine, we have to distinguish two sides: the science and the art.~ Socialism as a science studies the means and conditions of the socialist revolution, while socialism as a ``doctrine'', or as a political art, tries to bring about this revolution with the help of acquired knowledge. And we add that if Mr. Bernstein takes as a "typical example" the distinction we have made in accordance with his own example, he will readily understand exactly where in the socialist system science ends and doctrine or art begins.
Robert Owen, addressing the "British public" in one of his appeals serving as a preface to his book, A New View of Society, or Essays on the Principle of the Formation of the Human Character, wrote:
``Friends and Countrymen,
``I address myself to you, because your primary and most essential interests are deeply involved in the subjects treated in the following Essays.
``You will find existing evils described and remedies proposed--- Beneficial changes can only take place by well-digested and wellarranged plans....
``It is however an important step gained when the cause of evil is ascertained. The next step is to devise a remedy.... To discover that remedy, and try its efficacy in practice, have been the employments of my life; and having found a remedy which experience proves to be safe in its application, and certain in its effects, I am now anxious that you should all partake of its benefits.
``But be satisfied, fully and completely satisfied, that the principles on which the New View of Society is founded are true; that no specious error lurks within them, and that no sinister motive gives rise to their publicity."^^*^^
We are now in a position to follow this great British socialist's train of thought from the angle of Mr. Bernstein's "distinguishing of conceptions''; it is clear that Robert Owen began with a study of the prevailing evils and the revelation of their causes. This part of his work corresponds 1o what is known in medicine as aetiology.~ Then he went on to study the, means and conditions of the treatment of the social-diseases in which he was interested. Having found the remedy, which seemed to him to be quite _-_-_
^^*^^ Not having the English original at hand I quote from the German edition, translated by Professor Oswald Kollmann and published in Leipzig in 1900, entitled: Eine neuc Auflassung der Cesellschaft. Vier Aujsatze iiber die Bildung des menschlichen Charakters, als Einleitung zu der Entwicklung eines Planes, die I.age der Menschheit allmdhlich zu uerbessern. The extract cited is on page f>. [We are quoting from the original. London, 1817, pp. 11--12.]
35 effective, he proceeded to put it to a practical test. We might call this his therapeutics.~ Only after his experiments had given entirely satisfactory results did he decide to offer his treatment to the "British public'', in other words to begin medical practice. Previously he had been engaged in medical science, now he had to begin practising medical art.~ Here is a complete parallel: once Mr. Bernstein admits that it is possible to have a science of medicine, it is obvious he must admit that it is possible to have a science of socialism, if he wishes to be true to his own " distinguishing of conceptions''. Those same lines of investigation which we discerned in Robert Owen according to his own words may be just as easily noted among the French socialists, his contemporaries. As an example, we shall take Fourier. Ho said that he had brought to the people the ar/of being rich and happy. This part of his teaching corresponds to medical art. On what did he base this practical part of his teaching? On the laws of moral attraction, which he said had remained unknown until he finally discovered them after long and intensive research. Here we are no longer dealing with art, but with theory, with "knowledge worked up into a system'', that is to say, with science.~ And Fourier insistently repeated that his art was based on his scientific discoveries.^^*^^ It goes without saying that Mr. Bernstein is in no way bound to attach to these discoveries the same great significance that Fourier and his school did. This, however, does not affect the point at issue. Of course, Mr. Bernstein did not consider himself obliged to believe in the infallibility of all Lhe medical theories of our time. But that did not prevent him from coming to the conviction that medical art is one thing and medical science is another, and that the existence of medical art, far from precluding the existence of medical science, presumes it as a necessary condition of its own existence. Why, then, is such a correlation between art and science not possible also in socialism? Why should the existence of socialism as a socio-political ``doctrine'' preclude the existence of socialism as a science?Mr. Bernstein does not reply to these questions. Until he does his proposed "distinguishing of conceptions" will not corroborate but refute his contention that scientific socialism is impossible. And he cannot reply to these questions for the very simple reason that he has nothing to answer. Of course, there can and must be doubts about the theoretical justification of comparing medical art to socialism. But precisely on this matter our author had no _-_-_
^^*^^ See, 1'or example, ManuscriU de Fourier, Paris, 1851. p. 4, where he compares himself with Kepler and Newton. Gf. also any of the expositions of his leaching made by his followers. In each of (hem, the practical plans of social reconstruction are founded on Fourier's theoretical discoveries.
__PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__ 3* 36 doubts, and could not have had any, since his point of view on social life in no way precludes such comparisons.Thus, Mr. Bernstein's "distinguishing of conceptions" not only leaves us unconvinced about the impossibility of scientific socialism, but, on the contrary, encourages us to believe that even the socialism of Robert Owen, Fourier and other utopians was, at least partly, scientific socialism. As a consequence of this, we have begun to see less clearly that "distinguishing of conceptions'', in virtue of which, until now, we had considered that the socialist theory of Marx and Engels had marked an epoch in the history of socialism. Indeed, this ``distinguishing'' is unclear not to us alone. With Mr. Bernstein it also turns out that, although the teaching of Marx and Engels has a great deal more of the scientific element than the teachings of Fourier, Owen and Saint-Simon, yet, like these, though to a lesser degree, it contains elements of utopianism alongside elements of science and therefore the difference between them has more of a quantitative than a qualitative character.^^*^^
This opinion-fitted naturally in the context of Mr. Bernstein's paper: if scientific socialism generally is impossible, Marxism is obviously one of the unscientific ``isms'' that contain some admixture of utopianism. Mr. Bernstein's belief in the impossibility of scientific socialism is based on premises which, when correctly interpreted, lead to diametrically opposite conclusions, that is to say, oblige us to acknowledge that scientific socialism, like scientific medicine, is fully possible. Since this is the case and as we have no desire to entangle ourselves forever in Mr. "Critic's" logical contradictions, we shall break the thread of this argument and instead ask ourselves the question: how, ultimately, is scientific socialism distinguished from utopian socialism?
In order to answer this question, we shall have to define the distinguishing features of both types of socialism.
On page 14 of the pamphlet in question, Engels says: "The Utopians' mode of thought has for a long time governed the socialist ideas of the nineteenth century, and still governs some of them. Until very recently all French and English socialists did homage to it. The earlier German communism, including that of Weitling, was of the same school. To all these socialism is the expression of absolute truth, reason and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its own power. And as absolute truth is independent of time, space, and of the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is = discovered."^^3^^
Mr. Bernstein reproaches Engels with having exaggerated in this passage. He says: "I cannot agree with him when he says that they _-_-_
^^*^^ On this point read especially pages 21, 22, 28, 29 and 30.
37 __NOTE__ Missing "(" the Utopian socialists) regarded as a matter of chance, independent of historical development, in terms of place and time, the truths revealed by them to the world. This generalisation misrepresents their views on history."^^*^^If Mr. Bernstein had only taken the trouble to get better acquainted with the literature of Utopian socialism and to ponder more deeply over the fundamental historical views of the Utopian socialists, he would have seen that there is not the least shade of exaggeration in Engels' statement.
Fourier was firmly convinced that he had succeeded in discovering the laws of moral attraction, but he was never able at any time to see his theory as the fruit of France's social development. He had often wondered why hundreds, even thousands of years ago people had not made the discoveries which he had finally made. And he could answer this only by referring to man's lack of vision as well as the force of chance. He even wrote a very characteristic dissertation on the "tyranny of chance'', in which he argued "that this colossal and despicable force presides almost alone all discoveries".^^**^^ He said that he paid it tribute in his "discovery of the calculus of attraction" (dans la decouverte du calcul do 1'attraction). As with Newton, the idea was suggested to him by an apple. "A fellow traveller who dined with me in Fevrier's restaurant in Paris paid 14 sous for this famous apple. I had just come in from a part of the country where apples equal or even superior in quality were selling at half a liard each, or less than 14 sous per hundred. I was so struck by the difference in the price of apples in two places with the same climate that I began to suspect a basic defect in the industrial mechanism; out of this came those investigations which after four years led me to discover the theory of series of industrial groups and then the laws of general movement which Newton had missed... Since then I found that one could count four famous apples, two of them noted for the trouble they caused (Adam's apple and the apple of Paris) and two for the services they rendered to science. Do not these four apples deserve a special page in history?"^^***^^
This would seem to be sufficiently expressive; but it is not yet all. In Fourier's theory, chance plays a much greater role than might appear from his ingenuous reflections on the four apples. In this theory, the whole historical development of man's views, the whole destiny of human prejudice are determined by chance. "If people have persisted so long in their admiration for civilisation,'' said Fourier, "this was because none of them took Bacon's _-_-_
^^*^^ Ibid., p. 30, Note.
^^**^^ Les manuscrits de Fourier, p. 14. Cf. also CEuvres completes, t. 4, Paris, 1841, pp. 3, 4, 5.
^^***^^ Ibid., p. 17.
38 advice and made a critical analysis of the flaws and shortcomings of each profession."^^*^^ Why did no one take Bacon's advice? Very simply, because the chance that might have inspired them to follow his advice did not occur. The present order of things, which itself is only an exception to the general rule, only a digression from the trne destiny of mankind, proved to be more prolonged than it need have been, thanks to "the thoughtlessness of the sophists, who forgot that they ought to enquire into the universal aims of Providence (oublierent de speculer sur 1'universalite do la Providence) and discover that code of laws which it had to compile for human relations".^^**^^Now the reader may judge for himself whether there is even the slightest exaggeration in Engels' statement which we quoted above.
Faith in the historical omnipotence of chance was not so clearly expressed and was perhaps not so great among other eminent Utopians as it was with Fourier. But to what extent it affected even the most sober of them, Robert Owen, may be seen from the simple fact that he addressed his socialist appeals to the potentates of the earth, to those who had a substantial interest in maintaining the exploitation of man by man. Such appeals were sadly out of tune with all Robert Owen's teaching on the formation of the human character. In the literal and clear meaning of this teaching, the potentates of the earth were wholly incapable of initiating the elimination of that same social order which influenced the formation of their own views and the existence of which was so closely connected with their own vital interests. Nevertheless, Robert Owen,^^***^^ tirelessly and solicitously, with the help of detailed calculations, exact plans, and excellent drawings, explained to the monarchs of Europe what constituted a " rational" social system. In this respect Owen, like all the other Utopian socialists, was closely akin to the great French Knlightoners from whom (mainly Helvetius) he borrowed almost all of his teaching on the formation of the human character, and who, like him, and with a persistence fully deserving a better fate, explained to the crowned ``legislators'' how and in what manner human happiness could be assured. They fulminated eloquently against the ``despots'' and just as tenaciously placed their hopes in enlightened despotism. This was an obvious contradiction and, of course, it could not escape their own notice. They all realised it, some more clearly than others, but all of them consoled themselves precisely with _-_-_
^^*^^ CEuvres completes, t. 4, p. 121.
^^**^^ Manuscrits de Fourier, p. 78.
^^***^^ See, for example, his work, A Development of the Principles and Plans on which to Establish Self-Supporting Home-Colonies, etc., London, 1841, and especially the introduction to his autobiography, The Life of Robert Owen Written by Himself, Vol. I, London, 1857.
39 a trust in chance. Suppose yon have a large urn in which there are very many black balls and two or throe white ones and that you take one ball after the other. It need hardly be said that in each separate instance you have less chance of removing a white ball than a black one. But if you continue taking out the balls you will inevitably pull out a white one at last. The same applies to crowned ``legislators''. In each separate instance there is a much greater chance of finding a bad = "legislator^^1^^" on the throne than a good one. But a good one will eventually appear. He will do everything prescribed by ``philosophy'' arid then reason will triumph.This was how the French Enlightcners saw matters and this essentially deeply pessimistic view, tantamount to the admission of the utter helplessness of their ``philosophy'', had a close causal connection with their general historical outlook. It is known that even those of the eighteenth-century French Enlightener.s who were convinced materialists held idealist views on history. They believed that the development of knowledge, and man's mental development generally, was the basic cause of historical progress. In this regard, the Utopian socialists were completely at one with them. Thus, for example, Robert Owen said that "these false notions have ever produced evil and misery in the world, and that they still disseminate them in every direction. That the soled cause of their existence hitherto has been man's ignorance of human nature" .^^*^^ In accordance with this, the elimination of social evil, too, was to be expected solely from the dissemination among the people of a correct understanding of their own nature. Robert Owen was firmly convinced that such understanding would spread inevitably among the people. Only a few months before his death he wrote that man was "created to acquire knowledge by experience, and happiness by obeying the laws of his nature".^^**^^ ~ But experience is knowledge. What determines its more or less rapid accumulation? Why is it that in the course of one historical epoch mankind acquires an enormous treasure-house of knowledge, and during another, often incomparably longer period, adds only completely insignificant crumbs of knowledge lo its previous stores and sometimes loses even the stores themselves? Owen did not and could not answer this question, an extremely important one _-_-_
^^*^^ See Neue Auffassung, etc. S. 65--00. Incidentally, this thought is repeated in all his works. [Wo are quoting from Robert Owen, op. cit., pp. 114--15.J
^^**^^ __NOTE__ Just one asteriks. See his extremely interesting article, headed: "On the absolute necessity, in the nature of things, for the attainment of Happiness, that the system of Falsehood and Evil should precede the system of Truth and Good'', in the appendix to the first volume of his autobiography, issued as a separate book; PP. XXX-XXXIII.
40 for a scientific explanation of historical phenomena. In general people who hold idealist views on history do not and cannot answer this question. And that is understandable. To be able to answer it, they would have to explain what it is that determines man's mental development, that is to say, they would have to perceive this development not as the basic cause of the historical process, but as the outcome of another, more deep-seated cause. And this would be tantamount to acknowledging the bankruptcy of the idealist conception of history. He who does not yet acknowledge this, must inevitably give chance a very large place in his interpretation of historical events and in his consideration of Ihe future. Chance furnishes him with an explanation of all that he cannot explain by the conscious activity of historical persons. Reference to chance is the first unconscious and, involuntary step towards recognising that the development of mans consciousness is conditioned by causes that are independent of him. That is why the Enlighteners of the eighteenth century and the Utopian socialists alluded so often to the element of chance. Fourier's "four apples" are as absurd now as the French Enlighteners' ``urn'' full of balls. But both the ``urn'' and the ``apples'' had their adequate basis in the deep-seated qualities of the idealist conception of history; and the political and social reformers and revolutionaries who held such views had to appeal, more often than other philistines, to the ``urn'', the ``apples'' and much more of the unexpected. Indeed, if the historical process of accumulation of knowledge is determined in the last analysis by a series of chance phenomena which have no necessary connection with the course of social life and the development of social relations, then each individual contribution to the general treasure-house of knowledge, every discovery made by this or that thinker, including the author of this or that plan of social reconstruction, must inevitably be a gift of chance. And if the discovery of truth is dependent upon chance, then the dissemination of this truth and its embodiment, more or less rapidly, in social life, must also be subordinated to that same "colossal and despicable force''. Hence that coquetting of the French Enlighteners and the Utopian socialists with the potentates of the earth which excites so much wonder today. With them, practice corresponded to theory, ``art'' to ``science''.True, at times there was a marked dissatisfaction among the Utopian socialists with the theory they had, inherited from the Enlighteners, an endeavour to escape from the narrow circle of idealism and stand on more real ground. They were striving to create a social science. Hence all their "discoveries".~ Some of these were remarkable, in the full sense of the word. They threw a vivid light on many paramount aspects of the historical process, for instance, the role of the class struggle in the modern history of West European 41 societies,^^*^^ and thus prepared the way for the scientific explanation of social phenomena. But they only prepared the way for it. Historical idealism, which was the standpoint of all socialists in the first half of the nineteenth century, made much more difficult the final elaboration of a scientific view of social life. Only phenomena which conform to objective laws can be subjected to scientific explanation. This conformity to laws presupposes the subordination of phenomena to the law of necessity, whereas historical idealism considers historical progress almost exclusively as Ihe product of the conscious and consequently the free activity of men. So long as this contradiction existed, a scientific explanation of social life was impossible. Not only were the socialists of that time unable to resolve this contradiction; they could not even formulate it with the necessary precision, although it had already been clearly grasped and precisely formulated by German philosophy in the person of Schelling.
Schelling demonstrated that the freedom of human activity not only did not preclude necessity, but, on the contrary, presupposed necessity as its own condition.^^**^^ Schilling's profound thought was developed fundamentally and in detail by Hegel. To put it into everyday language, it means that man's activity may be considered from two sides. First, man appears before us as the cause of some or other social phenomena. In so far as man realises that he himself is such a cause, he believes that the question of whether these social phenomena should or should not be produced depends on him. And to that extent he believes that his activity is conscious and free. Bui the man who acts as the cause of a given social phenomenon can and must also be seen as the effect of those social phenomena which fashioned his personality and the trend of his volition. When considered as an effect, social man cannot be regarded as a free agent, since the circumstances that determine the trend of his volition are independent of him. Thus, his activity appears to us as subject to the law of necessity, that is to say, as activity conforming to law. We may conclude from this that freedom does not in any way preclude necessity.~ It is very important to know this truth because it---and it alone---opens the way to a scientific explanation of social life. We already know that only those phenomena which are subject to the law of necessity are open to scientific explanation. If we knew social man only as the cause of social phenomena, we would understand his activity only from the point of view of freedom, and therefore it would always be inaccessible to scientific explanation. The Enlighteners of the _-_-_
^^*^^ See my Prei'ace to [the Russian edition of j the Manifests of the C ommunist Party*
^^**^^ System^ des Transcendentalen Idealisnus, Tubingen, 1800, S. = 422.^^6^^ Cf. N. Boltov's The Development of the Monist View of History, pp. 105 et seq.
42 eighteenth century, and the Utopian socialists of the nineteenth century, in their judgements on history, saw social man only as the cause of social phenomena. This was because of their idealist view of history: whoever considers mental development to be the most basic cause of historical progress will take account only of the conscious activity of men, and conscious activity is precisely that activity which we call free.^^*^^Necessity does not preclude freedom. Moreover, the conscious and, in this sense, the free activity of men is possible only because their actions are necessary. This may seem paradoxical, but it is an irrefutable truth. If men's actions were not necessary, it would be impossible to foresee them, and where that is impossible, there is no place for free activity in the sense of conscious influence on surrounding life.^^**^^ Thus, necessity proves to be the guarantee of freedom.
This was all very well elucidated already by the German idealists, and in so far as they held to this standpoint in Iheir opinions of social life, they were on the firm ground of science.~ But just because they were idealists, they could not put their own brilliant ideas to proper use. True, their philosophical idealism was not necessarily connected with the idealist view of history. Hegel remarks in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History thai although, of course, reason governs the world, it does so in the same sense as it governs the motion of the celestial bodies, i.e., in the sense of conformity to law. The motion of the celestial bodies conforms to definite laws, but their motion is unconscious motion. According to Hegel, the historical progress of mankind is accomplished in the same way; human progress is subject to certain laws, but men are not conscious of these laws and one may say, therefore, that historical progress is unconscious.~ Men err when they think that their ideas are the principal factors in historical progress. The ideas of any given epoch are themselves determined by the character of that epoch. Moreover, the owl of Minerva flies out only at night. _-_-_
^^*^^ "Necessity in opposition to freedom, is nothing else than the unconscious,'' Schelling rightly observes (op. cit., p. 424).
^^**^^ "I might hope to foresee them (the acts of my fellow-citizens) only on the condition that I could examine them as I examine all oilier phenomena of the world surrounding me, i.e., as the necessary consequences of definite causes which are already known, or may become known, to me. In other words, my freedom would not be an empty phrase only if consciousness of it could be accompanied by understanding the reasons which give rise to the free acts of my neighbours, i.e., if I could examine them from the aspect of their necessity.~ Exactly the same can my neighbours say about my own acts. But what (Iocs this mean? This means that the possibility oj the free (conscious) historical activity of any particular person is reduced to zero, if at the very foundation of free human actions there does not lie necessity which is accessible to the understanding oj the doer" (N. Beltov, The Development of tlie Monist View of Histon/, p. = 106).^^6^^
43When men begin to study their own social relations, it may be said with certainty that these relations have outlived Iheir day and are preparing to yield place to a new social order, the true character of which will again become clear to mankind only when its turn, too, has come to leave the historical scene.^^*^^
These arguments of Hegel's are very far removed from the naive notion, representing the essence of the idealist explanation of history, that historical progress is determined, in the final analysis, by the development of ideas, or, as the French Enlighteners sometimes expressed it, that ``opinion'' governs the world. Hegel did, at least, point out correctly how historical progress cannot be explained. But his arguments likewise contain nothing to indicate the true cause. And it could not be otherwise. Tf Hegel was far from the naive historical idealism of the French Enlighteners and the Utopian socialists, this did not in the least disturb the idealist foundation of his own system, but this foundation could riot but hinder the elaboration of an entirely scientific explanation of the social and historical process. According to Hegel, the basis of all world development is the development of the Absolute Idea. With him it is the development of this idea which, in the final analysis, explains all human history. But what is this Absolute Idea? It is---as Feuerbach^^**^^ explained very well---only the personification oj the process of thinking. Thus, world development generally and historical development in particular are to be explained by the laws of human thought, or, in other words, history is explained by logic.~ Just how unsatisfactory this explanation is may be seen from many of Hegel's own works. With him historical progress is comprehensible only when it is interpreted not by logic but by the development of social---and predominantly economic---relations. When he says, for instance, that Lacedaemon fell mainly as a consequence of economic inequality, this is quite understandable in itself and is fully in accord with the conclusions of modern historical science. But the Absolute Idea has definitely nothing to do with this, and when Hegel turns to it for a final elucidation of the fate of Greece and Lacedaemon, he has literally nothing to add to what he has already explained by referring to economics.^^***^^
__NOTE__ Just above, one asteriks instead of three.Hegel was fond of repeating that idealism reveals itself as the truth of materialism. But his Philosophy of History proves the exact opposite. It makes clear that in application to history materialism must be acknowledged as the truth of idealism. In order _-_-_
^^*^^ See N. Beltov, op. cit., p. = 101.^^7^^
^^**^^ See his Crundsdtze der Phil.osoph.ie der Zukunft, $ 23.
^^***^^ For more detail see my article "Zu Hegel's seehzigstem Todestag" in Neue Zeit, November = 1891.^^8^^
44 finally to find the straight and true road to a scientific explanation of the social-historical process, investigators had to lay aside all varieties of idealism and adopt the materialist standpoint. This was done by Marx and Engels. Their materialist conception of history is characterised as follows in the present pamphlet:``The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to svipport human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in men's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch. The growing perception that existing social institutions are unreasonable and unjust, that reason has become unreason and right wrong (Vernunft Unsinn, Wohlthat Plage geworden), is only proof that in the modes of production and exchange changes have silently taken place with which the social order, adapted to earlier economic conditions, is no longer in keeping. From this it also follows that the means of getting rid of the incongruities that have been brought to light must also be present, in a more or less developed condition, within the changed modes of production themselves. These means are not to be invented by deduction from fundamental principle, but are to be discovered in the stubborn facts of the existing system of = production."^^9^^
If the growing perception that existing social institutions are unreasonable and unjust is itself a consequence of socio-economic development it is clear that a certain conformity to law may alsobe found in the conscious activity of men, which is conditioned by their conceptions of reason and justice. Since this activity is determined, in the last analysis, by the development of economic relations, now, having ascertained the trend of the economic development of society, we thereby acquire the possibility to foresee in which direction the conscious activity of its members must proceed. Thus, here as with Schelling, freedom flows from necessity and necessity is transformed into freedom. But whereas Schelling, because of the idealist nature of his philosophy, could not get beyond general---though extremely profound--- considerations in this respect, the materialist conception of history allows us to use these general considerations for the investigation of ``living'' life, for the scientific explanation of all the activity of social man.
45In providing the possibility to observe the conscious activity of social man from the point of view of its necessity, the materialist conception of history thus paves the way for socialism on a scientific basis. In the passage we quoted from Engels, he says that the means of getting rid of the social incongruities cannot be invented, that is to say, devised by some brilliant thinker, but must be discovered in the changed economic relations of the particular epoch. And to the extent that such discoveries are possible, so also is scientific socialism possible. We now have, therefore, a very definite answer to the question raised by Mr. Bernstein regarding the possibility of scientific socialism. True, it looks as though Mr. Bernstein himself does not suspect that such an answer exists. But that only goes to show that he has understood nothing at all of the basic teaching of the people he has professed to follow for the last twenty years.
One may devise something that is completely non-existent; a discovery applies only to that which already exists in reality. What is, therefore, to discover in economic reality the means of getting rid of social incongruities? It is to demonstrate that the very development of this reality has already created and continues to create the economic basis of the future social order.
Utopian socialism proceeded from abstract principles; scientific socialism lakes as its starting point the objective course of economic development of bourgeois society.
(Utopian socialism readily worked out plans for the future social structure. Scientific socialism, notwithstanding Mr. Bernstein's assertion quoted earlier, occupies itself not with the future society, but with defining that tendency which is peculiar to the present social order. It does not paint the future in glowing colours: it studies the present.~ A vivid example: on the one side, Fourier's image of the future life of mankind in the Phalansteries; on the other side, Marx's analysis of the present capitalist mode of production.)
If the means of gelling rid of the present social incongruities cannot bo devised on the basis of general considerations about human nature, but must be discovered in the economic conditions of our time, it is patent that their discovery likewise cannot bo a matter ofchance, independent of these conditions. No, the discovery itself is a process conforming to law and accessible to scientific study.
The basic principle of the materialist explanation of history is that men's thinking is conditioned by their being, or that in the historical process, the course of the development of ideas is determined, in the final analysis, by the course of development of economic relations. If this is the case, it is plain that the formation of new economic relations must necessarily bring with it the 46 appearance of new ideas corresponding to the changed conditions of life. And should a new socio-political idea enler the head of some brilliant man and should he realise, for example, that the old social order cannot last, but must be replaced by a new one, I hen this happens not "by chance'', as the Utopian socialists believed, but by the force of quite comprehensible historical necessity. Similarly, Ihe dissemination of this new socio-political idea, its assimilation by the brilliant man's supporters, cannot be attributed to chance; it gains ground precisely because it corresponds lo the new economic conditions, and pervades precisely thai class or strata of the population which more than any other feels the disadvantages of the obsolete social system. The process of the dissemination of the new idea also turns out to be in conformity to law. And since the dissemination of the idea corresponding 1o the new economic relations must sooner or later be followed by its realisation, that is to say, the elimination of the old and the triumph of the new social order, it follows that the whole course of social development, all social evolution---with its various aspects and the revolutionary features peculiar lo it---is now perceived from the point of view of necessity. Here, then, we have in full view the main feature which distinguishes scientific socialism from utopian.~ The scientific socialist envisages the realisation of his ideal as a matter of historical necessity, whereas the Utopian socialist pins his hopes on chance.~ This brings a corresponding change in methods of propaganda for socialism. The Utopians worked at random, today addressing themselves to enlightened monarchs, tomorrow to enterprising and profit-hungry capitalists and on the following day to disinterested friends of humanity and so on.^^*^^ The scientific socialists, on the other hand, have a well-balanced and consistent programme based on the materialist understanding of history. They do not expect all classes of society to sympathise with socialism, being aware that, the ability of a given class to be amenable to a given revolutionary idea is determined by the economic position of that class, and _-_-_
^^*^^ Le seul haume a notre servitude, c'ost, de temps en temps, un prince vertueux et eclaire; alors les malheureux oublient pour un moment leurs calamites. [The sole consolation in our servitude is the appearance from time to time of a virtuous and enlightened sovereign; then the unfortunate forget their misfortunes for a moment.] So said the well-known Grimm in the eighteenth century (quoted from L. Ducros, Les Encijcluiiedixfux, Paris, 1900, p. 160). It is plain to anyone that the hopes of Grimm and his followers were really adjusted to chance. We know by now that the Utopian socialists differed very little in this respect from the Enlighteuers of the eighteenth century. True, the Enlighteners put their trust only in monarchs, while the utopian socialists also expected miracles from the goodwill of simple mortals among the propertied classes. This difference is to be explained by changed social relations, but it does not erase the fundamental resemblance resulting from identical views on history.
47 that of all classes in contemporary society only the proletariat finds itself in an economic position inevitably pushing it into revolutionary struggle against the prevailing social order. Here, too, as everywhere, the scientific socialists are not content to view the activity of social man as the cause of social phenomena; they look more deeply and perceive this cause itself as the consequence of economic development. Here as everywhere they examine the conscious activity of men from the point of view of its necessity."If for the impending overthrow of the present mode of distribution of the products of labour, with its crying contrasts of want and luxury, starvation and surfeit, we had no better guarantee than the consciousness that this mode of distribution is unjust, and that justice must eventually triumph, we should be in a pretty bad way, and we might have a long time to wait. The mystics of the Middle Ages who dreamed of the coming millennium were already conscious of the injustice of class antagonisms. On the threshold of modern history, three hundred and fifty years ago, Thomas Munzer proclaimed it to the world. In the English and French bourgeois revolutions the same call resounded---and died away. And if today the same call for the abolition of class antagonisms and class distinctions, which up to 1830 had left the working and suffering classes cold, if today this call is reechoed a miUionfold, if it takes hold of one country after another in the same order and in the same degree of intensity that modern industry develops in each country, if in one generation it has gained a strength that enables it to defy all the forces combined against it and to be confident of victory in the near future---what is the reason for this? The reason is that modern large-scale industry has called into being on the one hand a proletariat, a class which for the first time in history can demand the abolition, not of this or that particular class organisation, or of this or that particular class privilege, but of classes themselves, and which is in such a position that it must carry through this demand on pain of sinking to the level of the Chinese coolie. On the other hand this same large-scale industry has brought into being, in the bourgeoisie, a class which has the monopoly of all the instruments of production and means of subsistence, but which in each speculative boom period and in each crash that follows it proves that it has become incapable of any longer controlling the productive forces, which have grown beyond its power; a class under whose leadership society is racing to ruin like a locomotive whose jammed safety-valve the driver is too weak to open. In other words, the reason is that both the productive forces created by the modern capitalist mode of production and the system of distribution of goods established by it have come into crying contradiction with that mode of production itself, and in fact to such a degree that, 48 if the whole of modern society is not to perish, a revolution in the mode of production and distribution must take place, a revolution which will put an end to all class distinctions. On this tangible, material fact, which is impressing itself in a more or less clear form, but with insuperable necessity, on the minds of the exploited proletarians---on this fact, and not on the conceptions of justice and injustice held by any armchair philosopher, is modern socialism's confidence in victory = founded."^^*^^\thinspace^^10^^
That is what Engels said in his dispute with Diihring, and his words portray in full clarity the distinguishing features of scientific socialism with which we are now familiar: the view that the emancipation movement of the proletariat is a law-regulated social process; the conviction that only necessity can ensure the triumph of freedom.^^**^^
Taine says somewhere that perfect science reproduces with great accuracy in ideas the nature and consistency of phenomena. Such a science can make accurate forecasts about each separate phenomenon. And there is nothing easier than to show that social science does not and cannot have such accuracy. But neither has scientific socialism ever claimed such accuracy. When its opponents object that sociological prediction is impossible, they confuse two quite distinct concepts; the concept of the direction and general outcome of a particular social process, and the concept of separate phenomena (events) out of which the process is composed. Sociological prediction is distinguished, and always will be distinguished, by its having very little accuracy in everything that concerns the forecast of separate events, whereas it possesses quite considerable accuracy where it has to define the general character and trend of social processes. Let us take an example. Statistics prove that the mortality rate fluctuates according to the lime of the year. Knowing how it fluctuates in a particular country or locality, it is easy to forecast to what extent the number of deaths will go up or down from one period of the year to another. Mere we are speaking about the general character and trend of a particular social process, so it is possible to make a very exact _-_-_
^^*^^ Herrn Eugen Dilhrings Umwalzung der Wlxsenschaft, dritto Auflage, S. 161--62.
^^**^^ When our Belinsky---on his being first attracted to Hegel---resolutely abandoned for a time his aspirations to freedom, he gave a striking and incontestable proof of the depth of his theoretical understanding. His renunciation of freedom-loving aspirations was inspired precisely by the consciousness that the triumph of freedom could be assured only by objective necessity. But since he saw nothing in Russian reality to indicate the objective necessity of such a triumph he gave up all hope of it as being theoretically unsound. Later he said of himself that he had been unable to "develop the Idea of negation". This concept, in its application to bourgeois society, was developed by the founders of scientific socialism.
49 forecast. But if we should wish lo know lite particular phenomena in which will be expressed, say, I ho increase in mortality with the coming of autumn, or if we should wish (o ask ourselves which particular persons will not survive the autumn and what will be the concrete circumstances which will bring about their demise, we should not expect an answer from social science; and if we si ill hoped to get one we should have to resort to t he services of a magician or a fortune-teller. Another example. Suppose that in the parliament of a given country there are representatives of the big landowners whose income is being seriously reduced by coinpetit ion from neighbouring countries; of the industrial employers who market their products in the same neighbouring countries; and lastly of the proletarians who exist solely by selling their labour power. A Bill !o impose a high tariff on grain imports has been brought before this parliament. What do you think? Will the sociologist be able to foretell how the parliamentary representatives of the various social classes will react to this Bill? We think that in this case the sociologist (and not. only the sociologist, the man of science, but any one who lias any political experience and common sense) has every possibility lo make an accurate forecast. "The representatives of I lie landowners,'' he will say, "will support the proposal with all their energy; the representatives of the proletariat will just as energetically -eject it, and in this respect the employers' representatives will not lag behind them in opposition, unless the landowners' representatives have bought their agreement not lo oppose the Bill by making some kind of really important economic concession lo them in some other field.'' This forecast will be made on the basis of analysing the economic interests of the different social classes and it will have the definiteness and accuracy of a mathematical deduction, at least as far asdic landowners and the proletariat are concerned. Further, knowing the voting strength ot the representatives of each of ! lie^e classes in parliament, our sociologist will be able easily and accurately to forecast the fate of the Bill. Here again his forecast can have a very large measure of accuracy and reliability. But since you may not be satisfied with having a general forecast of the nature and trend of this particular social process---the process of struggle over 1 he Bill---and wish to know in advance who exactly will speak on the Bill, and exactly what kind of scenes their speeches will give rise to in the parliament, the sociologist will reply to such questions, not by scientific prediction, but with more or less witty conjectures; and if you are still dissatisfied, your only remaining hope is again the fortune-teller. A third example: if you take the works of the great French Enlighteners of the eighteenth century---say, for instance, Holbach---you will find in them the whole social programme of the Great French Revolution. But __PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4---01230 50 __NOTE__ rescan darker what yon will nol I'md in Ilicm is one single for or;) si about Ihe historical events which later constituted the process by which the demands advanced by the French Knlighleiiers on behalf of the en I ire t hircl esl ale were put i n I o effect. Whence this difference? It is cleai' where il conies from. The nature and trend of a given social process is one tiling; the separate events which go lo make up live whole process are qnilo another matter, ff 1 understand tbe nature and trend of the process. [ can foretell its outcome.~ Bui no mailer how profound my comprehension of this process may he, it will not enable me to foretell separate events and their particular features. When people say thai sociological prediction is impossible, or, at least, extremely difficult, lliey alinosl always have in mind Ihe impossibility of foretelling parlienlar events, completely forgetting thai I his is not Ihe business of sociology. Sociological prediction has as its ohjecl, nol isolated events, but the general results of that social process irhicli---as, for example, the process of development of bourgeois society---is already being accomplished a I the gii-en lime. Thai Ihese general results can bo determined beforehand is well illustrated by Ihe above-mentioned example of I lie French .Revolution, the entire social programme of which was formulated, as we have said, by Ihe advanced literary representatives of the bourgeoisie.^^*^^Scientific socialism says, first of all, that the victory of socialist ideals presupposes as UK essential condition, a cerlaiji course of economic development of bourgeois society, taking place independently of Ihe will of Ihe socialists; secondly, thai Ibis essential condition is already at hand, determined by the nature and development of Ihe relations of producl ion peculiar to that society; thirdly, thai I lie very dissemination of socialisl ideals among Ihe working class of Ihe contemporary capitalisl countries is caused by the economic structure and development of Ihese counlries. Such is Ihe general idea of scicnli " socialism. And this general idea is nol invalidated in any way by Ihe completely correct proposition that sociology will never be a perfect science in Ihe sense meant by Taine.~ Well, and what of it? Although sociology is nol a perfect science, the general conception of scientific socialism is nonetheless indisputable, rendering all doubts of the possibility of such socialism groundless.
_-_-_^^*^^ In his recently published book, Les classes sociales, analyse de la vie sociale, the Paris Professor Bauer expresses a similar view regarding sociological prediction. His book is interesting in many respects. It is a pity that the learned Professor is very badly informed on the history of the views he is developing. Evidently it does not enter his head that among his " predecessors" lie should have included the philosophers Schelling and Ih'gel, and the socialists Marx and Engels.
51The bourgeois theoreticians and the ''critics" of Marx often advance also Ihe following argument in discussions on the possibility of scientific socialism: ''If scientific socialism is possible,'' they say, "then bourgeois social science is also possible, which is self-con!radiclory nonsense, since science can be neither socialist nor bourgeois. Science is integral. Bourgeois political economy is as unthinkable as socialisl mathematics."
This argument, too. is based on a confusion of ideas. Mathematics can be neither socialisl nor bourgeois---that is true. Hut what is true in application lo malhenial ics is unlrue when applied to social science.
What is the sum of the squares of Ihe shorter sides of a rightangled triangle equal lo? To Ihe square of the hypotenuse. Is thai right? Il is. Is il always right? Always. The relation of the square of Ihe hypotenuse lo the sum of Ihe squares of the olher two sides cannot vary, since the properties of mathematical figures are invariable. And whal do we find in sociology? Does the subject of its investigation remain invariable? Il does nol. The subject of sociological investigation is society and society develops and, consequently, changes.~ It is just this change, this development