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p What is the task of philosophy? Its task, says E. Zeller, is "to investigate scientifically the ultimate basis of cognition and being, and to comprehend all existing reality in its connection with that basis."^^278^^ That is correct. However, a new question arises at once: can the "basis of cognition" be considered as something separate from the "basis of being"? That question must be answered decisively in the negative. Our ego contrasts itself to the external world (non-ego), but at the same time it feels its connection with that external world. Consequently, when man begins to philosophise, that is to say, when he conceives the desire to find a consistent world-outlook for himself, he immediately comes up against the question of what is the relation of ego to non-ego, of “cognition” to “being”, of “spirit” to “nature”. True, there was a time when philosophers did not discuss such questions. This was in the initial period of the development of ancient Greek philosophy. For instance, Thales taught that water is the primary substance from which all things come and to which all things return. But he did not ask himself: what relation has consciousness to that primary substance? Nor did Anaximenes ask himself the same question when he averred that the primary substance was not water but air. However, the time arrived when even Greek philosophers could no longer evade the question of the relationship of ego to non-ego, of consciousness to being. And then the question became the cardinal problem of philosophy. And it remains so even now.

p Various philosophical systems give various answers to it. But if we consider the replies given by these various systems we shall see that they are far from being as different as they appear at first sight. All of them can be divided into two compartments.

p The first embraces those philosophical constructions which take as their starting point the object, or being, or again, nature. Here, the thinkers have to explain how to the object is added the subject, to being—consciousness, to nature—spirit. Since they do not all explain this in the same way, the result is that, in spite of

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578 their having the same point of departure, their systems are not quite the same.

p The other compartment takes in all philosophical constructions which take as their starting point the subject, consciousness, spirit. Obviously, here the thinker has to explain how to the subject is added the object, to consciousness—being, to spirit—nature. And according to the manner inwhichlhey fulfil this task, philosophical systems that come into this compartment differ from one another.

p He who takes the object as his starting point, if only he has the ability and courage to think consistently, arrives at one of the varieties of the materialist world-outlook.

p He who takes the subject as his starting point and again if only he is prepared to think the matter out to the end, will turn out to be an idealist of one shade or another.

p And those people who are incapable of consistent thought stop half-way and are content with a mish-mash of idealism and materialism. Such inconsistent thinkers are called eclectics.

p To this it may be objected that there are also adherents of “critical” philosophy, who are equally far from materialism as from idealism and yet are free of the weaknesses commonly associated with the eclectic mode of thought. I recall such an objection being advanced against me by Professor Chelpanov. But I refer the reader to Chapter Six of Deborin’s book “(The Transcendental Method”). There he will see just how unfounded this objection is. Deborin clearly and convincingly demonstrates that the “critical” philosophy of Kant suffers from dualism. And since dualism is always eclectic, it is only by a misconception that one can cite Kant in refutation of my contention that every consistent thinker is bound to choose between idealism and materialism.

Fichte already pointed out the inconsistency of Kantianism, although it is true that he initially ascribed this to Kant’s followers rather than to Kant himself."Your Earth,"he said to them, "rests on an elephant, and the elephant, in turn, rests on the Earth. Your thing-in-itself, which is a pure thought, has to act upon the ego.” Convinced that Kant himself was free of this contradiction—indeed an unquestionable and unpardonable one— Fichte declared that the true meaningof the "Kantianism of Kant" lies in idealism (namely, in Fichte’s Theory of Knowledge). Kant disagreed with this, and protested in print against such an interpretation of his philosophy. He described Fichte’s idealist system as resembling an apparition: "When you think you have got hold of it, there is nothing there but yourself, and of this self there is nothing but a hand stretched out to catch."  [578•*  After that there was 579 nothing Fichte could do but reproach Kant himself with inconsistency, which he did, calling him "ein Dreiviertelskopf" ( literally, three-fourths of a head).