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[3] __AUTHOR__ Georgi Plekhanov __TITLE__ Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works IN FIVE VOLUMES Volume~II __TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2006-08-23T16:02:07-0700 __TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"
PROGRESS PUBLISHERS MOSCOW
[4]Translated from the Russian by Julius Katzer Designed by V. Yeryomin
© Translation into English. Progress Publishers 1976 First printing 1976
014(01)-76
'--- 31---76
Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
[5]CONTENTS
B. A. Chagin G. V. PLEKHANOV'S DEFENCE AND SUBSTANTIATION OF DIALECTICAL AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST REVISIONISM ( Introduction).........................
7
SELECTED PHILOSOPHCAL WORKS VOLUME II
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF MATERIALISM Preface ....
31
I. HOLBACH....................
36
II. HELVETIUS ...................
76
III. MARX ......................
122
A FEW WORDS IN DEFENCE OF ECONOMIC MATERIALISM
(An Open Letter to V. A. Goltsev)...............
183
SOME REMARKS ON HISTORY (The Sociological Foundations of History by P. Lacombe. Translated from the French under the Editorship of R. I. Sementkovsky. Published by F. Pavlenkov).....
211
ON THE MATERIALIST UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY . .
222
ON THE "ECONOMIC FACTOR" (Final Version).........
251
ON THE QUESTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S ROLE IN HISTORY
283
ON THE ALLEGED CRISIS IN MARXISM ..........
316
BERNSTEIN AND MATERIALISM ..............
326
WHAT SHOULD WE THANK HIM FOR? (An Open Letter to Karl
Kautsky) .........................
340
CANT AGAINST KANT OR HERR BERNSTEIN'S WILL AND TESTAMENT (E. Bernstein, Historical Materialism. Translated by
L. Kantsel. Second edition. St. Petersburg, 1901)........
352
CONRAD SCHMIDT VERSUS KARL MARX AND FREDERICK
ENGELS .......................
379
MATERIALISM OR KANTIANISM ............. 398
MATERIALISM YET AGAIN ................ 415
REPLY TO AN INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE FROM
THE NEWSPAPER LA PETITE REPUBLIQUE SOCIALISTS.
Geneva, September 1899 .................. 421
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND SOCIAL VIEWS OF KARL MARX
(A Speech) ........................ 423
THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE THEORY OF THE CLASS
STRUGGLE (An Introduction to the Second Russian Edition of the
``Manifesto of the Communist Party'')............. 427
A CRITIQUE OF OUR CRITICS ............... 474
Part I. MR. P. STHUVE IN THE ROLE OP CRITIC OF THE MARXIST THEORY OK SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.............. 474
Article One
................... 474
Article Two ................... 513
Article Three
................. 566
[6]CONTENTS
THE MATERIALIST UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY
Lecture One (March 8, 1901)........
Lecture T w e (March l.t, 1901)......
Lecture T h e e (March 23, 1901).......
Lecture Four ..............
590 596 606 614 621 628
ON A BOOK BY MASARYK .................
THIS THUNDER IS NOT FROM A STORM CLOUD (A Letter to the Editor of ``Kvali'') ................... 640
ON CROCE'S BOOK (Benedetto Croce, "Economic Materialism and Marxist Political Economy. Critical = Essays^^1^^ Translated by P. Shutyakov. Published bi/ B. N. 7.vonanjov. St. Petersburg, 1902).................... 658
KARL MARX .......................
Notes
..........................
Name Index ........................
Subject Index
.......................
072 681 705 672
[7] __ALPHA_LVL1__ G. V. PLEKHANOV'S DEFENCEGeorgi Valentinovich Plekhanov, outstanding Marxist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was a fighter for the scientific materialist world-outlook, and against reactionary idealist philosophy and philosophical revisionism. In his defence of dialectical and historical materialism against the overt and covert enemies of Marxism, Plekhanov did much valuable work, during the first two decades of his Marxist activities (1883--1903), in analysing and developing a number of questions of Marxist philosophy.
His understanding of the theory of historical materialism was far deeper and more correct than that of the leading theorists of West-European Social-Democracy of the time. He laid stress on the inner links between the materialist explanation of history and dialectical materialism, and came out against attempts to impose on Marxism idealist views that were alien to it. "...All the aspects of Marx's world-outlook,'' Plekhanov wrote, "are intimately bound up with one another ... in consequence of which one cannot arbitrarily eliminate anyone of them and replace it with a sum of views no less arbitrarily clutched out of a quite different world-outlook."
In his defence of the philosophy of Marxism, Plekhanov paid attention, first and foremost, to the study and popularisation of such important questions of historical materialism as the relation between social being and social consciousness, the patterns of social development, the role of the masses and of the individual in history, the essence of, and interaction between, various forms of social consciousness, such as art, religion, the relative independence of the development of ideologies, and the like.
Plekhanov waged a struggle for the triumph of the scientific materialist world-outlook in the Russian and world labour movement at the turn of the century, in the conditions of an aggravated political and ideological conflict in society.
The end of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth were marked by a mounting struggle waged by the 8 __RUNNING_HEADER_LEFT__ B. CHAGIN __RUNNING_HEADER_RIGHT__ INTRODUCTION bourgeoisie and their ideologists against Marxism and its philosophy. The ideologists of the bourgeoisie and the revisionists--- its abettors in the working-class movement---launched a widescale offensive against Marxist philosophy.
``The dialectics of history,'' Lenin wrote, "were such that the theoretical victory of Marxism compelled its enemies to disguise themselves as Marxists."^^*^^ Marxism had become the vogue in bourgeois and petty-bourgeois circles. It was disputed and criticised; ``concessions'' were demanded of it; there were attempts to blend it with liberalism and with various trends in bourgeois ideology. It was against this background that such bourgeois liberals as Wolf, Brentano and Sombart acted. In their struggle against Marxism, the latter's overt and covert enemies made use of neoKantianism, and the eclectic so-called "theory of factors'', thereby trying to convert Marxism into vulgar "economic materialism'', replace it by ``Katheder-socialism'', and so on.
The attempts made by the bourgeois enemies of the Marxist theory, as well as by its false friends in the Social-Democratic camp, to turn Marxism into a dogma, to distort it were firmly countered by Engels, who stressed the need for a struggle against the smuggling of bourgeois ideology into the working-class movement. In his correspondence, he unmasked the bourgeoisie's attempts to revise Marxism, and especially the materialist understanding of history. In a letter to Paul Ernst (June 5, 1890) Engels wrote the following: "...As far as your attempt to treat the matter materialistically is concerned I must say in the first place that the materialist method turns into its opposite if it is not taken as one's guiding principle in historical investigation but as a ready-made pattern according to which one shapes the facts of history to suit oneself."^^**^^ Engels subjected to a thorough critical analysis the theoretical writings of the German SocialDemocrats of the time, including Karl Kautsky, who had already revealed deviations from revolutionary Marxism. At the same time, Engels was pleased by the appearance of such genuinely Marxist works as Franz Mehring's Legend of Lessing, and Plekhanov's The Development of the Monist View of History. In a letter to August Bebel dated March 16, 1892, he expressed high appreciation of Mehring's book, while noting its shortcomings. He also approved of Plekhanov's works, showed an interest in them, and welcomed their translations into foreign languages.
After Engels's death, such bourgeois ideologists as Barth, Lacombe, Schultze-Gavernitz, and Kareyev came out against the materialist understanding of history. The overt enemies of _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 18, p. 584.---£<2.
^^**^^ K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1975, pp. 390--91.---Ed.
9 Marxism were supported by the revisionists in the Second International, who adopted their idealist world-outlook, vulgar evolutionism, and mode of ``criticising'' historical materialism. There was hardly a single idealist doctrine the revisionists did not try to ``reconcile'' Marxism with. Bernstein called for a return to Kant; C. Schmidt demanded that Marxism be blended with neo-Kantianism; Woltmann declared that Marxism should be reconciled with Kantianism and "social Darwinism'', while Staudinger attempted to link up Marxism with neo-Kantianism and Machism. "In the sphere of philosophy'','Lenin wrote, " revisionism followed in the wake of bourgeois professorial `science'."^^*^^The revisionists tried to divorce Marx's economic theory and the theory of scientific communism from philosophical materialism, and to distort them in the spirit of vulgar materialism, " complementing" Marxism with neo-Kantianism and Machism.
Slovenly reasoned articles by eclectics and idealists were published in Neue Zeit, theoretical journal of the German SocialDemocrats, and especially in the newspaper Vorwdrts!, both of which were staunch supporters of neo-Kantianism, and were hostile to materialism.
Very often the Social-Democratic press did not find space for writings in defence of Marxist philosophy against idealist and vulgarising distortions. Thus, Vorwcirts! did not publish an article contributed by G. V. Plekhanov, under the title of "Comrade Paul Ernst and the Materialist Understanding of History'', which criticised idealist distortions of historical materialism.
In the mid-nineties, the Russian bourgeoisie also attempted to subordinate and adapt the working-class movement to the interests of bourgeois society. Such "legal Marxists" as Struve, Tugan-Baranovsky and Bulgakov attempted to revise Marxism and its philosophy. "Legal Marxism" was a variety of international revisionism.
In the field of philosophy, the "legal Marxists" came out in opposition to Marxist philosophical materialism and materialist dialectics, to which they contraposed neo-Kantian idealism and the vulgar theory of evolution. Calling the "legal Marxists'" philosophical views eclectic, Lenin considered them a direct reflection of the bourgeois philosophy of the times.
In considerable measure, Struve, Bernstein and other revisionists followed in the footsteps of such neo-Kantian philosophers as Kiel, Simmel, and Stammler, and repeated their slander of Marxism. As Naumann, a bitter enemy of Marxism, wrote in the journal Die Hilfe, "In his criticism of Marxism, Bernstein says nothing except what has often been said in national-social _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 15, p. 33.---Ed.
10 circles; he says all this very well and skilfully, but what is important, in the first place, is that it is he who says it. If we say thai, then it is an 'enemy' speaking; if he says the same thing, it comes from a 'comrade'."The revisionists' attacks against the theory of Marxism often met with no serious resistance within the Second International. Revolutionary Marxists such as Paul Lafargue, Wilhelm Liebknecht and Franz Mehring underestimated the danger from the revisionist trend, and especially Bernstein's struggle against Marxist materialism. Paul Lafargue was inclined to regard Bernstein's "``criticism'' of Marxism as a result of his "intellectual overstrain''. Wilhelm Liebknecht spoke of Bernsteiriianism as an intellectual trend, which should not be taken into account. In Franz Mehring's opinion, revisionism was not engendered by the social and historical conditions of the development of the working-class movement. "Revisionism has never been more than a mood in Germany,'' he wrote.
The official ``orthodoxy'' in German Social-Democratic Party was to end with ``dissensions'' within the Party as soon as possible. Kautsky's attack against Bernstein was not a voluntary act but a consequence of pressure from the lank-and-file SocialDemocrats. Besides, a considerable influence in this respect was exerted by Plekhanov's polemical articles in Neue Zeit, directed against C. Schmidt and Bernstein, as well as the criticism of revisionism coming from members of German Social-- Democratic Left wing.
In these conditions, Plekhanov's firm defence of the scientific foundations of the Marxist world-outlook and the dialectical method was of great significance, in principle, to the international working-class movement. His writings became well known in Western Europe and played an important part in exposing revisionism as bourgeois ideology in the ranks of the working-class movement. Plekhanov came out against these new enemies of Marxism in the working-class movement, not only in the press but also at invariably well-attended lectures in France, Switzerland, and elsewhere. His writings were intended to preclude the bourgeois worldoutlook penetrating into the working-class movement. Attaching great importance to the theoretical education of the working class and of its Social-Democratic vanguard, Plekhanov said: "... Without revolutionary theory there is no revolutionary movement in the true sense of the word."^^*^^ He realised the tremendous importance of Marxist materialism in spreading the ideas of scientific socialism in Russia and in refuting its opponents' views. As far _-_-_
^^*^^ G. V. Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works, Vol.~I, Moscow, 1974, p.~90.---Ed.
11 back as 1892 he wrote that "triumphant reaction attires itself in our country, among other things, in a philosophical raiment.... The Russian socialists will be obliged to take this philosophical reaction into account and consequently study philosophy."^^*^^Of particular importance for the struggle against philosophical reaction and philosophical revisionism were Plekhanov's writings of the second half of the nineties and the early years of the present century (up to 1903), which are included in this volume. These works contain a critique of neo-Kantian philosophy, the idealist understanding of history, the eclectic theory of factors, "economic materialism'', the vulgar evolutionism of the reactionary bourgeois philosophers and sociologists, as well as various forms of revision of dialectical and historical materialism by the "legal Marxists'', the Bernsteinians and the like. These works are a valuable contribution to the history of Marxist philosophy.
In their content, the articles included in this volume of Plekhanov's Selected Philosophical Works fall into three groups: the first contains writings revealing the inner link between presentday Marxist materialism and the preceding materialism, and providing an analysis of the ideas of the French materialists, with special emphasis on the revolution brought about by Marxism in the sphere of philosophy. The second group is made up of articles substantiating the materialist understanding of history, in a struggle against bourgeois ideologists. The third group contains articles criticising the ``critics'' of Marxism, such as Eduard Bernstein, C. Schmidt, Pyotr Struve, and other revisionists.
Plekhanov's writings against philosophical revisionism published in this volume are introduced by his outstanding work Essays on the History of Materialism, which provides an excellent historico-philosophical sketch of the development of French materialism, vividly reveals its role in the history of philosophy, and depicts the part played by Marx's materialism as the supreme achievement of materialist philosophy. Like many other works by Plekhanov, his Essays on the History of Materialism show him as a leading Marxist historian of philosophy. In his criticism of the neo-Kantian revision of Marxism, V. I. Lenin referred also to this book as a Marxist work containing a systematic and valuable exposition of dialectical materialism and showing that it was the logical and inevitable outcome of the most recent development of philosophy and other social sciences.
The appearance of Plekhanov's Essays on the History of Materialism was most timely during the struggle against philosophical _-_-_
^^*^^ G.~V. Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works, Vol.~I, Moscow, 1974 p.~427.---Ed.
12 reaction and the neo-Kantian revision of Marxism. Plekhanov emphasised that bourgeois historians of philosophy like Ueberweg, Lange and others were distorting the history of materialism, advancing false judgements of it, and attempting to gloss over Marx's dialectical materialism of their day. This state of affairs was typical of Russia, too, where, for instance, the reactionary journal Voprosy fdosofii i psikhologii (Questions of Philosophy and Psychology), which was founded in 1889, was running down philosophical materialism, including Russian nineteenth-century materialism.In criticising the bourgeois falsifiers of the history of materialism, Plekhanov's Essays set forth the fundamental principles of the French materialists' theory and gave a detailed and profound analysis of their socio-political views. He showed the progressiveness of Holbach and Helvetius's world-outlook, which was in keeping with the social conditions of the then revolutionary French bourgeoisie, and with the level of science during that period.
In his critical examination of the views of the French materialists, Plekhanov showed French materialism's historically inevitable limited outlook, its metaphysical character, and its inability correctly to explain the laws of social development. The French materialists were unable to eliminate the contradictions in their concept of history, which claimed that people's opinions were determined by the social environment, and the latter by people's opinions. They were unable to discover the laws governing human social life, fell into vague and muddleheaded reflections on the qualities of human nature as the cause of social development, and in their explanations of social phenomena, came out in support of naturalism.
Plekhanov's essay on Marx shows that the development of philosophy enriched materialism with the dialectical method, that great achievement of the Hegelian philosophy. However, Hegel's dialectical method was radically refashioned by Marx who, together with Engels, gave a profound critique of Hegelian idealism. "Lying at the foundation of our dialectics" Plekhanov later wrote, "is the materialist understanding of Nature. It is based on the latter; it would collapse were materialism fated to fall.''
Plekhanov stressed the exceptional importance of the Marxist dialectical method, whose creation was a revolution in social science. In a speech "The Philosophical and Social Views of Karl Marx'', Plekhanov was right in saying that "the appearance of Marx's materialist philosophy was a genuine revolution, the greatest in the history of human thought".^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ See p. 423 of this volume.---Ed.
13Plekhanov showed the historical continuity between Marxism, and progressive philosophy and social science of the past; he showed that Marxism is the logical outcome of centuries of the development of human thought, having eliminated the contradictions inherent in previous theoretical thought.
In his writings, Plekhanov gave a brilliant exposition of the materialist understanding of history as discovered by Marx, and came out in defence of its principles. He underlined the tremendous effectiveness of Marxist theory, a source of boundless energy to the proletariat, and the guideline in its struggle for emancipation.
Plekhanov did much to reveal the links between Marxist theory and the proletariat's practical activities. He showed the effectiveness of that theory, calling dialectical materialism a "philosophy of action".
In his defence of the Marxist theory of historical materialism, Plekhanov advanced a new set of arguments, and emphasised new aspects in that theory, which had previously been insufficiently dealt with in Marxist literature. He regarded the materialist understanding of history as a scientific method leading to the establishment of the truth in the sphere of social phenomena, but in no wise as a collection of cut-and-dried conclusions. "Anyone who wishes to show himself a worthy adherent of this method should not limit himself to the simple reiteration that it is not consciousness that determines being, but being that determines consciousness; he should, on the contrary, try to understand how the determination of consciousness by being actually takes place. For that, there is no other way than the study of the facts and the establishment of their causal links."
Plekhanov thoroughly criticised the "theory of factors'', employed by the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the materialist understanding of history. In his splendid article entitled "On the Materialist Understanding of History" (1897), describing the fundamental propositions of historical materialism, he made the following keen remark on the "theory of factors": " Historical 'factors' prove to be simple abstractions, and when their fog disperses, it becomes clear that men are creating, not several and separated histories---the history of law, of morals, of philosophy, and so on---but a single history of their own social relations, which are conditioned by the state of the productive forces in each given period. What we call ideologies is merely the multiform reflections, in men's minds, of this single and indivisible history."^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ See p. 250 of this volume.---Ed.
14In establishing the eclectic nature of the "theory of factors'', Plekhanov pointed out, with full justice, that the link between phenomena in society is more profoundly understood by dialectics, which calls for the ascertainment of the fundamentals of the historical process, and for an elevation above the viewpoint of simple interaction.
By itself, he pointed out, interaction does not explain anything, so that any reference to it is simply an evasion of any reply. What is necessary is a scientific analysis of that interaction. It was that analysis that led Marx to the establishment of an indisputable truth that is confirmed by the entire practice of life: the foundations of men's social relations are provided by the productive forces, whose development causes a revolution in the relations among producers, and thereby in the entire social structure.
In a series of articles defending historical materialism, Plekhanov gave a profound criticism of "economic materialism'', showing the latter as ultimately a variety of historical idealism.
Plekhanov subjected to well-grounded and profound criticism the standpoint of quietism inherent in "economic materialism'', a standpoint that the enemies of Marxism ascribed to historical materialism. He emphasised that the materialist understanding of history does not in any way doom its adherents to inactivity; on the contrary, it alone creates complete and scientifically grounded confidence in the need for men to engage in active work to accelerate the historical process. It is only according to dialectical materialism that "...social relations (in human society) are relations between people; no major step in mankind's historical advance can take place without the participation, not merely of people but of a vast multitude of people, i.e., the masses."^^*^^
Plekhanov's criticism of "economic materialism" led him to the conclusion that its adherents in historical science ignore the role of the masses in history and could provide no explanation of men's active role in developing the productive forces and in the changes in social relations; they fell into idealism when they tried to explain the causes of the historical process. In showing the active nature of the Marx-Engels theory, Plekhanov pointed out that "...it is in the latter's theory, and only there, i.e., only in dialectical materialism, that there is no trace of fanaticism".^^**^^
In his struggle against idealism and vulgar "economic materialism" Plekhanov ascertained, in detail and in all aspects, the relatively independent development of ideologies, the invincible force of progressive ideas in the historical advance as well as _-_-_
^^*^^ See p. 200 of this volume.---Ed.
^^**^^ See p. 218 of this volume.---Ed.
15 the reverse effect of ide ,s on society's economic basis. The idea of an advanced class, he pointed out, which is in keeping with its real economic interests, reveals a correct understanding and expression of history's actual course.In his review of a valuable Marxist book by Labriola on historical materialism, in which Plekhanov set forth the fundamental principles of the materialist understanding of history, he correctly criticised the author's individual erroneous propositions on the role of "racial features" in the historical development of ideologies. lie arrived at the conclusion that, as applied to historical peoples, "... the word race cannot and should not be used in respect of them in general. We do not know a single historical people that can be called a people of pure race; each of them is the outcome of very lengthy and intensive interbreeding and crossing of various ethnic elements.
In that case, how can one determine the influence of 'race' on the history of the ideologies of any people?"^^*^^
In articles written in the nineties and the early years of the present century, in which he criticised anti-Marxist theories, Plekhanov focussed his attention on expounding and defending Marx and Engels's materialist views on the historical process. Stressing the objective nature of the law-governed patterns of the historical process he analysed the causes of society's development. In striking terms, Plekhanov acquainted the reader with the fundamental propositions in Marx's Preface to his Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, namely, that economic relations among people are determined by the state of the productive forces, which, directly or indirectly, condition legal and political institutions and views, art, science, and so on.
Plekhanov followed Marx in characterising the political and legal superstructure and various forms of social consciousness and revealing their significance in the development of society's economic life. Mankind's historical development, he wrote, is marked by great and highly significant turns. This movement, however, "...never takes place on the plane of the economy alone. To go over from point A to point 5, from point B to point C and so on calls each time for a rise into the ``superstructure'' and for certain changes to be made there. It is only after such alterations have been made that a desired point can be reached. The road from one turning point to another always lies through the " superstructure". The economy hardly ever triumphs of itself; it can never be said of it: fara da se. No, never da se but always by means of the superstructure alone, always and only through certain political institutions....
_-_-_^^*^^ See pp. 235--36 of this volume.---Ed.
16``What do a given country's political institutions hinge on? We already know that they are an expression of economic relations. For that practical expression, however, these economically prompted political institutions must first pass through the minds of people in the shape of certain concepts.~ That is why mankind, in its economic advance, can never go over from one turning point to another without first going through an entire revolution in its concepts."^^*^^
Following in the footsteps of Marx and Engels, Plekhanov developed their views on the active role played by ideas in the life of society. He emphasised that Marxism alone, which has understood the source ideas spring from, correctly realises the vast social force of progressive ideas in changing social relations.
In his analysis of the mode of production as the basis of society and its development, Plekhanov emphasised the inner logic in the development of the productive forces, and the active role of production relations. It is the development of the mode of production that determines the possibility and the boundaries of the influence exerted by other aspects of the material conditions of social life, and, in particular, that of the geographic environment.
However, in his propaganda of the propositions of the Marxist theory of historical materialism, Plekhanov sometimes deviated from it in dealing with the causes of the productive forces' development. His writings contain some contradictory judgements on this question, a certain exaggeration of the part played by the geographical environment in the development of society: he sometimes asserted that the development of the productive forces is determined by the properties of the geographical environment.
In an article entitled "On the Materialist Understanding of History'', Plekhanov expressed an erroneous proposition regarding the origin and essence of the state. Of Labriola's statement that the state is the organised domination of one social class over another, he declared that this was not the complete truth. In Greece, Plekhanov claimed, the rise of the state should be ascribed, in considerable measure, to the need for the social division of labour. His writings provide no detailed analysis of the Marxist understanding of the state as the coercive organisation of one class's domination over another, an organisation for the suppression of the exploited classes; he merely made passing mention of this main internal function of the state in an antagonistic society.
_-_-_^^*^^ See p.~202 of this volume.---Ed.
17Of particular importance in Plekhanov's writings is his elaboration of the question of the individual's role in history. His article "On the Question of the Individual's Role in History" (1898) is one of the finest expositions of a scientific posing of this problem in nineteenth-century Marxist literature.
Plekhanov always tried to deal with this question in all its aspects, with particular emphasis on the following: 1) the individual and necessity; 2) the individual and the objective lawgoverned pattern of the historical process; 3) the individual and historical fortuity; 4) the individual and the development of productive forces and social relations; .">) the individual's active role in the development of historical events.
In this article, so profound in content and outstanding in form, Plekhanov substantiated the Marxist solution for the problem of the individual's role in history, brought forward interesting theoretical considerations and a mass of concrete facts, and, with sparkling wit, refuted the sociological views held by neoKantians such as Siimnel and Stammler. Plekhanov dealt in depth with the Marxist proposition on the relation between freedom and necessity, emphasising that the individual's free activities are a free and conscious expression of necessity. The consciousness of necessity makes the individual a tremendous social force, which is why "...the consciousness of the absolute necessity of a given phenomenon can only enhance energy in a man who is in sympathy with that phenomenon and regards himself as one of the forces which have brought it about".^^*^^
However influential an individual may be, he cannot change the general direction of historical development, but can, thanks to the special features of his mind and character, modify only individual features of events and some of their particular consequences. Plekhanov debunked the bourgeois cult of personality, pointing out, with every reason, that "...any talent that becomes a social force, is a product of social relations".^^**^^
At the same time, Plckhauov analysed the role of outstanding individuals, who are more keen-sighted than others, more strongly motivated and therefore aid in the accomplishment of the historic tasks set by the law-governed historical advance. An outstanding individual may exert a positive and accelerating influence, or a negative and retarding influence on the course of historical development.
In 1898 Plekhanov came out, with considerable success, against revisionism in the ranks of the German Social-Democrats. The significance of this action extended far beyond German Social-- _-_-_
^^*^^ See p. 20 of this volume.---Ed.
^^**^^ See p. 310 of this volume. ---Ed.
18 Democracy and was an important stage of Marxism's struggle against bourgeois philosophy and its influence on the world working-class movement.Lenin had a positive appraisal of Plekhanov's articles against Bernstein and Conrad Schmidt. In a letter to A. N. Potresov of June 27, 1899, he made the following remark: "I have read and re-read with great pleasure Beitrdge zur Geschichte des Materialismus, I have read the articles by the same author in Neue Zeit against Bernstein and Conrad Schmidt Neue Zeit, No. 5, 1898--99; the later issues I have not seen, I have read Stammler (Wirtschaft und Recht) whom our Kantians (P. Struve and Bulgakov) have so highly praised, and I definitely side with Monist".^^*^^
In an article entitled "Our Program'', which was intended for Rabochaya Gazeta (Workers' Newspaper) (1899), Lenin emphasised that Plekhanov was quite right in subjecting Bernstein to scathing criticism.
Plekhanov condemned the complacency and the indifference to materialist philosophy so widespread among leaders of the German Social-Democrats and many other parties belonging to the Second International. Writing to Axelrod on February 12, 1898, he expressed surprise at the behaviour of Kautsky, who had not only been silent but had allowed the appearance, in Neue Zeit, of anti-Marxist articles by revisionists. Emphasising that Bernstein's articles meant a complete renunciation of revolutionary tactics and communism, Plekhanov wrote: "I want to ask Kautsky what he thinks of all this.'' However, ho soon realised that Kautsky was opposed to any resolute acts and measures against Bernstein and his adherents, and often demanded that Plekhanov should tone down his statements against the revisionists. In a letter dated June 4th, 1898, Kautsky wrote the following to Plekhanov: "I only want to ask you to allow me to moderate the form of some of your personal attacks against Bernstein and C. Schmidl...."
The Plekhanov-Kautsky correspondence shows that the former wanted to induce Kautsky to come out with a firm criticism of the revisionists and their bourgeois teachers such as J. Wolf. Highly noteworthy in this respect is his letter to Kautsky dated May 20th, 1898, in which he asked the following: "Can you be in agreement with Bernstein? It would cause mo too' much pain to believe that. But if that is not the case, why don't you reply?"
_-_-_^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 34, p. 40. By ``Monist'', Lenin is referring to G. V. I'lekhanov, author of tho book The Development of the Monist View on History.---Ed.
19In fact, Kautsky held np publication of Plekhanov's articles in Neue Zeit, and subsequently even expressed regret that they had appeared in it at all.
Firmly convinced that philosophical revisionism was causing tremendoiis harm to the working-class movement, Plekhanov gave much thought to the struggle against Bernstein and his supporters. "From now on, this will be an all-out war; we must arm ourselves."
Even before his articles were published in Neue Zeit Plekhanov delivered a lecture, in Geneva, in the spring of 1898, "On the Alleged Crisis in Marxism''. In it he criticised philosophical revisionism and, at the same time, gave a political appraisal of the anti-Marxist collusion between the bourgeois liberals and revisionists. Plekhanov was quite right in emphasising that such bourgeois ideologists as Brentano, Wolf and Schultze-Gavernitz had, by their ``criticism'' of Marxism, laid the ground for tho revisionists' views, in particular, those of Bernstein.
In July 1898, Neue Zeit carried an article by Plekhanov entitled "Bernstein and Materialism'', and, in October of the same year, an article against Conrad Schmidt. These were followed by a series of other articles.
In his struggle against the philosophical revisionism of E. Bernstein, C. Schmidt, and their ilk, Plekhanov revealed the social and political significance of neo-Kantianism's attraction for bourgeois ideologists, and of their struggle against materialism. "The bourgeoisie's aversion from materialism,'' he wrote, "and its predilection for Kant's philosophy can be very well explained by the present-day slate of society. In Kant's doctrine the bourgeoisie see a powerful 'spiritual weapon' in the struggle against the ultimate aspirations of the working class."^^*^^
Plekhanov spoke of C.~Schmidt's vain attempts to discredit Marx and Engels's criticism of Kantianism. He supplemented his "logical criticism" of Kant's philosophy and its latest followers by showing that philosophy's class roots.
Criticising the philosophical views of E. Bernstein and C. Schmidt, Plekhanov showed that materialism and Kantian idealism could never bo reconciled, and popularised the propositions advanced by the founders of Marxism on the primacy of matter and the secondary nature of consciousness, the authenticity of cognition, and the role of men's practical activities in the process of cognition.
Plekhanov tried unsuccessfully to publish, in Neue Zeit, an article "Cant against Kant, or Herr Bernstein's Will and Testament'', which was a defence of materialist dialectics. In a note _-_-_
^^*^^ See p.~397 of this volume.---Ed.
__PRINTERS_P_19_COMMENT__ 2* 20 to Plekhanov's article "Materialism or Kantianism'', the Neue Zeit editors wrote the following: "We have decided to discontinue the discussion on this subject in view of the shortage of space occasioned by an abundance of material received.'' Thus, Kautsky discontinued publication of Plekhanov's articles against revisionism. His article "Cant against Kant" was published in 1901 in Zarya (The Dawn), theoretical journal of the Russian Marxists, which was edited [by Lenin.In his struggle against the revisionists, Plekhanov defended the Marxist dialectical method, unmasked the revisionists' metaphysics and sophistry, explained and gave concrete shape to the fundamental principles of materialist dialectics, and underlined its revolutionary content.
He criticised pedestrian evolutionism in its application to the historical process, and called for a dialectical approach to the study of history. He saw Marxist dialectics as the algebra of revolution and a profound substantiation of revolutionary upheavals in society. In his words, the revelation of concrete truth as the result of an all-round study of an object's actual properties is one of the distinctive features of dialectics.
Together with his defence of philosophical materialism and Marxist dialectics, Plekhanov repelled revisionist attacks against historical materialism, and showed that the materialist understanding of history is the latter's only scientific explanation.
He criticised Bernstein for his rejection of the Marxist theory of the class struggle and revolution. "If,'' he wrote, "Herr Bernstein has rejected materialism so as to avoid 'threatening' one of the 'ideological interests' of the bourgeoisie known as religion, his rejection of dialectics has resulted from his non-desire to frighten the selfsame bourgeoisie with the 'horrors of violent revolution'."^^*^^
Plekhanov's attacks against philosophical revisionism were highly important in defending Marxist philosophy and enhancing its influence on the international working-class movement.
Though Plekhanov criticised the revisionists from the standpoint of consistent dialectical materialism, there were some errors in his writings.
He made concessions to agnosticism in some questions of the theory of knowledge. Thus, in his polemic with Bernstein and Schmidt, he gave an erroneous formulation of the incognisability of the essence of matter.^^**^^ In an article entitled "Materialism Yet Again" (1899), lie again advanced certain propositions in _-_-_
^^*^^ See p. 369 of this volume.---Ed.
^^**^^ See pp. 320--21 of this volume.---Ed.
21 the spirit of the "theory of hieroglyphics'', which was a concession to agnosticism.Despite these errors and shortcomings in Plekhanov's criticism of revisionism, his attacks against the Kantian idealism of the "legal Marxists" and 1he Bernsteinians were outstanding events in the life of revolutionary Social-Democracy.
In an open letter to Kautsky, "What Should We Thank Him For?'', which was published in Sachsisrhe Arbeiierzeitung, and was a defence of Marx's scientific socialism, Plekhanov wrote that it was now a question of "...who is to bury whom, whether Bernstein will bury Social-Dem,ocracy or Social-Democracy will bury Bernstein".^^*^^ He proved that Bernstein was following in the footsteps of the bourgeois ``savants'' in their rejection of Marx's theory of scientific communism, and that the revisionist's hackneyed arguments contained nothing that had not been previously advanced by Marxism's bourgeois opponents.
The contemptible speech made by Kautsky at the Stuttgart Parteitag in defence of Bernstein evoked indignation among the revolutionary section of internal ional Social-Democracy, and approval from the opportunists.
Plekhanov exerted a notable influence on the Left-wing elements in German Social-Democracy. His articles in Neue Zeit were followed up by articles against Bernstein and other revisionists, written by Franz Mehring, who expressed solidarity with what Plekhanov had said.
Plekhanov demanded Bernstein's expulsion from the SocialDemocratic Party. In 1903, Plekhanov wrote the following in Iskra, in opposition to a conciliatory attitude towards the revisionists: "The international admirers of 'a friendly attitude in polemics' are incapable of understanding that, in essence, the 'orthodox' are in no way friends lo the revisionists, and must wage a mortal struggle against the latter, if only they do not wish to betray their own cause."
Plekhanov's criticism of the revisionists was an important factor in the revolutionary Social-Democrats' struggle against opportunism in the Second International. As Lenin wrote, "...the only Marxist in the international Social-Democratic movement to criticise the incredible platitudes of the revisionists from the standpoint of consistent dialectical materialism was Plekhanov''.^^**^^
In the early years of the century, Plekhanov took steps to have his critical articles against the revisionists published in the Russian press. This was required by the vital interests of the Russian working-class movement, inasmuch as Bernstein's revision of Marxism had met with full approval, not only from
_-_-_^^*^^ See p. 351 of this volume.---Ed.
^^**^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 15, p. 33. ---Ed.
22 the "legal Marxists'', those ideologists of the liberal bourgeoisie, but also from the opportunists in (he working-class movement--- the Economists. The Economists declared themselves adherents of Bernstein. The "legal Marxists'' had previously begun to revise revolutionary Marxism along the lines later followed by Bernstein and Conrad Schmidt. "As for your polemics with Schmidt,'' the "legal Marxist" Bulgakov wrote lo Plekhanov on November 20th, 1898, "you are aware that I hold a philosophical stand different from yours---Regarding your polemic with Bernstein in Stichsische Arbeitcrzeitung, I must tell you, in all frankness, that I am not on your side."In Russia, a united front against the revolutionary SocialDemocrats was formed, by the Economists and the "legal Marxists'', who upheld Bernsteinian platform. "The struggle against Bernsteinianism in Russia,'' Plekhanov wrote to Axelrod on April 21sl, 1899. "is the most urgent task of 1he moment__ To the influence of our Katheder-Marxists, we must contrapose our influence as revolutionary Marxists.'"
With this purpose in view, Plekhanov came out, in the early years of the century, with a series of articles against the "legal Marxists" and the Economists, and in defence of Marxist theory. In the Preface to the second Russian edition of the Manifesto of the Communist Parly (1900), and in his articles against Struve, Plekhanov examined the most fundamental problems of the Marxist theory, in particular, its theory of the class struggle. At the same time, he went into the content of the views held by the predecessors of Marxism, giving an appraisal of the views held by the Utopian socialist Saint-Simon and the post-Restoration historians A. Thierry, Mignet and Guizot. However, in characterising the views of the precursors of Marx and Engels, Plekhanov at times excessively approximated their views with the Marxist theory of the class struggle, without due emphasis of the qualitative distinction. Thus, he wrote the following: "Marx and Engels's view on the class struggle, the significance of politics in that struggle, and the dependence of the state power on the ruling classes is identical with Ihe views of Gui/ot and his fellow-- thinkers harboured on the matter, the only difference being that they stood for the interests of the proletariat, while the others defended the interests of the bourgeoisie."^^*^^
In his exposition of the fundamental Marxist propositions on the class struggle, Plekhanov emphasised that the class struggle is a universal consequence of the division of society into classes, and that the workers' class struggle leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, the mode of whose implementation, in Plekhanov's opinion, depended, on a number of circumstances.
_-_-_^^*^^ See p. 449 of this volume.---Ed.
23``And it is precisely because the Social-Democrats cannot foresee all (lie circumstances in which the working class will have to win its supremacy, they cannot, in principle, reject the violent mode of action.''^^*^^
Questions of the proletariat's class struggle and the social revolution came in for considerable attention in Plekhanov's articles against Struve. which were first published in Zary in 1901--02.
Plekhanov came out against Struve somewhat belatedly, lie was silent, and refrained from any polemic with Struve in the midnineti'es, when Lenin was waging an acute struggle against the "legal Marxists''. Plekhanov had not yet come out against "legal Marxism" in 1894, when Lenin gave his detailed criticism of Struve's bourgeois-liberal views. In the course of the polemic with the Narodniks, he tried to defend Struve's work Critical Notes on the Question of Russia's Economic Development, revealing an inability to understand the bourgeois meaning of Struve's slogan- "Let us learn from capitalism.'' An analysis of the correspondence between the "legal Marxists" and Plekhanov shows that, in the nineties, he did not see them as enemies to Marxism, and counted on working together with them. At the time, he considered the "legal Marxists" firm allies of the revolutionary Marxists, while Lenin allowed the possibility only of temporary agreements with them.
.
When he was exiled to a distant part of Siberia, Lenm expressed the wish that the revolutionary Social-Democratic forces should begin a struggle against neo-Kantianism, which was being used by the enemies of Marxism as a philosophical foundation for the struggle against the latter. In this connection he wrote, in September 1898: "...I am extremely surprised that the author of Beitrlige zur Geschichte des Material!sinus has not expressed his opinion in the Russian literature and does not vigorously oppose neo-Kanlianisrn, letting Struve and Bulgakov polemicise on specific questions of this philosophy, as if it had already become part of the views of Russian disciples."^^**^^
Subsequently, in his articles against Struve, Plekhanov had to acknowledge his error, slating that he had unjustifiably held that "bourgeois theory in his" (Struve's---B.C.) "views would be gradually overcome by the element of Marxism present in them."^^***^^
Under Lenin's influence, Plekhanov published a number of articles against Struve, in the early years of the century.
Of great significance to the Marxist party in Russia and to the working-class movement abroad was Plekhanov's defence, in _-_-_
^^*^^ See p. 468 of this volume.---Ed.
^^**^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 34, p. 26.---Ed.
^^***^^ See p. 487--88 of this volume.---Ed.
24 these articles, of the materialist, understanding of history, and the application of materialist, dialectics to an analysis of social relations in the second half of the nineteenth century.As Lenin pointed out as far back as 1894. "legal Marxism" was a direct reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature. With Ihe help of Bernsteinianism, it developed into a typical bourgeoisliberal trend. Bernstein's attack against Marxism was a source of great encouragement to the "legal Marxists" who, in their turn, raised a hullabaloo in (he pi-ess on the question of Bernsteinianism, in whose emergence they saw proof thai their revisionist views were correct.
Struve summed up his revision of the Marxist doctrine in his article "Marx's Theory of Social Development'', which was published in 1899 in the German bourgeois journal Archiv jilr sozlale Gesetzgebung und Statistik. In it he frankly stated that his article had been written under the direct impression of Bernstein's booklet.
Plekbanov's three articles against Struve traced the evolution of the latter's anti-Marxist views, and subjected them to a thorough criticism, revealing the theoretical foundations of Struve's revision of Marx's theory of revolution, and arriving at the conclusion that the viewpoint of the Brentano bourgeois school was predominant in his views. Slruve's metaphysical posing of the contradictions between law and the economy was utterly confusing and obscured the problem of the contradiction between society's productive forces and its economic structure.
Criticising Struve's anti-Marxist views on the blunting of contradictions in present-day society, Plekhanov contraposed to his assertions historical facts that showed that social development is effected through an exacerbation of contradictions. On the basis of convincing examples, he showed that a further aggravation oJ the contradictions between the productive forces and the production relations was taking place in capitalist society, whence he concluded that contemporary history too was developing according to the law of the aggravation of contradictions, not of their blunting.
Plekhanov was right when he pointed out that, Struve was neither the first nor the last to uphold the theory that the coiitradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie were " blunting'', a concept which had become widespread among bourgeois ideologists under the label of ``critical'' socialism. "The `blunting' of the contradiction between the capitalists and the workers is now a theme very much in vogue in bourgeois economic literature."^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ See p.~519 of this volume.---Ed.
25In rejecting the views of the bourgeois economists Goscben, Schult/e-Giivernil / and Melgaulle, those adherents of the Bastiat school, Plekhanov drew the conclusion, on the basis of facts and figures, that, considered from their economic aspect, social contradictions were growing more and more and the inequality in the distribution of the national income was mounting, as was the degree of the exploitation of the workers by the capitalists. "...The working class.'' he wrote, "has become relatively poorer because its share of the national product lias decreased relatively."^^*^^ The worsening conditions of the workers. Plekhanov said, has acquired an absolute character in certain times and places. The contemporary scene was bearing out the universal Jaw Marx had discovered of capitalist accumulation and the aggravation of class contradict ions.
At the same time. Plekhanov skilfully unmasked the philosophical ``grounds'' for Slruve's revision of the Marxist theory of revolution. With the aid of the Kantian principle of the gradual ness of change. Struve attempted to prove the impossibility of the social involution; he rejected (he dialectical theory of leaps, which he proposed replacing with the metaphysical principle of gradnalness.
In contrast with Struve and the other "legal Marxists'', Plekhanov defended and substantiated the viewpoint of Marxist dialectics on Ihe queslion of leaps, showing that the latter are inherent in reality itself and that leaps are essential even in the process of social reforms; the dialectical law of the transition of quantitative changes into fundamental and qualitative changes by means of a leap is a universal one. Plekhanov revealed the social and political meaning of the campaign waged against dialectics by Struve, Berdayev, and other opponents of Marxism. Like the Bernsteinians. the "legal Marxists" adopted, in their ``denials'' of the Marxist theory of revolution, the vulgar evolutionary principle of the "universally lawful form" of any change in pheiiomena; it was their aim to proclaim social reform the only possible road of development, thus rejecting the social revolution.
In refuting Slruve's arguments, Plekhanov wrote the following ironical words: "...yet Mr. P. Strnve has undertaken to prove to us that Nature makes no leaps and that the intellect does not tolerate them. How can that be? Or perhaps he has in view only his own intellect, which indeed doeR not tolerate leaps for the simple reason that he, as they say, `cannot tolerate' the dictatorship of the proletariat."^^**^^
_-_-_^^*^^ See p.~548 of this volume.---Ed.
^^**^^ See p.~569 of this volume.---Ed.
26Plekhanov's criticism of neo-Kantian ethical socialism is among Plekhanov's liuesl writings against the enemies of Marxism. To divorce socialism from science, convert it into an "ethical ideal" Ihat stood aside from real life, from the proletariat's struggle for revolution and the conquest of political power---such was the task pursued by the bourgeois ``criticism'' of Marxism. An " ethicisiug of socialism" meant, first and foremost, a struggle against the Marxist theory of revolution and proletarian dictatorship. The revisionists wore out to substitute, for Marx's scientific socialism, the saccharine preaching of a peaceful aspiration towards the socialist ideal.
``To us, a patently unachievable ideaf is not an ideal,'' wrote Plckhanov, "but simply an immoral trifle.~ It is the reality of the future that is our ideal, that of revolutionary Social-- Democracy."^^*^^
Plckhanov showed that the ideals of Marxism are grounded in science, the adherents of Marxism regarding the achievement of their ideal as a matter of historical necessity. "Defending the future of the movement,'' he pointed out, "means fighting for its 'ultimate aims', righting now---today, tomorrow, and on the next day, and at any minute."^^**^^
Plekhanov exposed the sophistic methods used by the opponents of Marxism, and their striving to contrast to the real and revolutionary Marx another Marx whom they had invented--- "Marx the reformer''. The revisionists ejected from Marxism, one after another, all its major propositions, which are the spiritual weapon of the proletariat in its revolutionary struggle against capitalism. Among such propositions, Plekhanov pointed out, are: dialectics; materialism; the theory of social contradictions as an incentive to social development; the theory of value; the theory of surplus-value; the social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. This emasculation of the theory of Marxism is a bourgeois parody of Marxism.
Plekhanov's articles against Struve and other bourgeois " critics" were not free of shortcomings, in particular, of certain elements of the abstract, and the academic. In his criticism of Struve. he did not deal with the concrete historical conditions of social development, or with the struggle against opportunism in Russia; neither did he analyse the class roots of "legal Marxism''. In profundity and effectiveness, Plekhanov's statements against "legal Marxism" fell short of the decisive criticism to which Lenin subjected the "legal Marxists" as early as 1894--95.
On the whole, however, Plekhanov's articles against Struve _-_-_
^^*^^ See p.~583 of this volume.---Ed.
^^**^^ See p.~588 of this volume.---Ed.
27 are an important, theoretical document produced by revolutionary Marxism.It is noteworthy that, while they were members of Iskra's editorial hoard. Plekhanov and Lenin conducted a lively correspondence, in which Lenin made a number of remarks concerning Plekhanov's articles against Bernstein and Struve. "Thank you so much,'' Plekhanov wrote to Lenin, "for your remark about my article againsl Bernstein."
Despite their errors and certain departures from Marxism, Plekbanov's philosophical writings between the mid-nineties and 1903, i.e., during the preparations to set up a Marxist working-class party in Russia, devoted to the defence, substantiation and development of the ideas of dialectical and historical materialism, and the struggle against the bourgeois liberals and revisionists, were, in their entirety, a firm achievement of Marxist theory.
However, already on the eve of the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (1903), Plekhanov showed certain departures from revolutionary Marxism in political questions. He overestimated the liberal bourgeoisie's role and failed to understand the proletariat's guiding role in the bourgeois-democratic and the socialist revolutions and the significance of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry.
These errors led Plekhanov to political and tactical opportunism, to his assuming the position of Menshevism---that opportunist trend in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.
Plekhanov, who was one of the political loaders and theorists of the Second International, failed to understand the essence of the new historical epoch that began at the turn of the century; he was unable to creatively apply Marxism to the conditions of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. The erroneous political views held by the leaders and theorists of the Second International, and their tolerance of opportunism were inherent in Plekhanov, in one degree or another. Plekhanov's wrong solution for the major political and theoretical problems of the Russian and the world revolution were also linked with his isolation from the practice of the working-class movement in Russia. lie did not discern the radical changes that the new historical period had brought into the Russian working-class movement, and failed to understand that the centre of the revolutionary movement had shifted from West to East---to Russia.
While ruthlessly criticising Plekhanov's political opportunism, Lenin never lost sight, of his services to Marxist theory. Lenin saw in Plekhanov a militant defender of Marxist philosophy and its outstanding theorist. "The services he rendered in the past," 28 Lenin wrote of Plekhanov, "were immense. During Ihe twenty years between 1883 and l',)03 he wrote a large number of splendid essays, especially those against the opportunists, Macliisls ami Narodniks."^^*^^
Lenin saw in Plekhanov's writings the finest exposition of Marxist philosophy, especially of historical materialism hitherto written; he pointed out that an entire generation of Russian Marxists had learnt from Plekhanov's works. In an appraisal of Plekhanov's philosophical heritage, Lenin wrote in 1921: "...Let me add in parenthesis for the benefit of young Party members that you cannot hope to become a real, inlelligent communist williout making a study---and I mean study---of all of Plekhanov's philosophical writings, because nothing better has been written on Marxism anywhere in the world."^^**^^
B. Chagin
_-_-_^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 20, p. 358.
^^**^^ ibid., Vol. 32, p. 94.
[29] SELECTED
PHILOSOPHICAL
WORKS
VOLUME II
[30] ~ [31] __ALPHA_LVL1__ ESSAYS ON THE HISTORYIn the three essays I am submitting for appraisal by the German reader, I have attempted to interpret and expound Karl Marx's materialist understanding of history, which is one of the greatest achievements of nineteenth-century theoretical thought.
I am well aware that this is a very modest contribution: to provide convincing proof of all the value and all the significance of that understanding of history a full history of materialism would have to be written. Since I am not in a position to write that work, I have had to limit myself to a comparison, in several monographs, of eighteenth-century French materialism with today's.
Of all the representatives of French materialism, I have chosen Holbach and Hclvctius, who, in my opinion, are in many respects outstanding thinkers who have not been duly appreciated to this day.
Helvetius has been impugned many a time; he has often been slandered, but few have gone to the trouble of trying to understand him. When I set about describing his writings and giving a critique of them, 1 had to turn virgin soil, if I may be permitted to use the expression. The only guidelines 1 could use were several cursory remarks 1 had come upon in the works of Hegel and Marx. It is not for rne to judge in what measure I have made proper use of what I have borrowed from these great teachers in the realm of philosophy.
Even in his lifetime, Holbach, who was less bold as a logician and less of a revolutionary thinker than Helvelius, shocked others far less than the author of De l'Esprit ever did. He was not feared as much as the latter was; he was held in less disfavour, and got more fair play. Yet he, too, was only half-understood.
Like any other modern philosophical system, materialist philosophy has had to provide an explanation of two kinds of phenomena: on the one hand, Nature's; on the other, those of mankind's historical development. The materialist philosophers of the eighteenth century---at least, those who stood close to Locke--- 32 __RUNNING_HEADER_LEFT__ G. PLEKHANOV had their own philosophy of history, in the same measure as they had a philosophy of Nature. To see that, one has only to read their writings with a modicum of attention. Therefore, the historians of philosophy should certainly set forth the French materialists' ideas on history, and subject them to criticism just as they have done with their understanding of Nature. That task has not been accomplished however. Thus, for instance, when the historians of philosophy speak of IloJbacli, they usually give consideration only to his Systeme de la Nature, in which work they investigate only whatever has a hearing on the philosophy of Nature, and morals.~ They ignore Holbach's historical views, which are scattered so plentifully throughout Systeme de la, Nature and his other works. There is nothing surprising, therefore, in the public at large having not the least idea of those views, and having an entirely incomplete and false impression of Hoibach. If one also takes into account thai the French materialists' ethics has almost invariably been misinterpreted, it has to be acknowledged that very much in the history of eighteenth-century French materialism stands in need of amendment.
It should also he remembered that the approach we have mentioned is to be met, not only in general courses in Ihe history of philosophy hut also in specialist writings on the history of materialism (which, incidentally, are still few in number), examples being the classical work of Friedrich Albert Lange, in German, and a book by the Frenchman Jules-Auguste = Soury.^^1^^
As for Marx, it will suffice to say that neither the historians of philosophy in general nor the historians of materialism in particular have gone to the trouble or even making mention of his materialist understanding of history.
If a board is warped, the distortion can be rectified by bending it in the opposite direction. That is how I have been constrained to act in these Essays: I have had, first and foremost, to describe the historical views of the thinkers I am dealing with.
From the viewpoint of the school of thought I have the honour of belonging to, "the ideal in nothing else than the material world, reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought" ? Whoever wishes to regard the history of ideas from this point of view should try to explain how and in what manner the ideas of any period have been engendered by its social conditions, that is to say. ultimately by its economic relations. To provide such an explanation is a vast and noble task, whose accomplishment will utterly transform the history of ideologies.~ In these Essays, I have attempted an approach towards the accomplishment of that taslc. However. I have not been able to devote sufficient attention to it, and that, for a very simple reason: before answering the question why the development of ideas has proceeded [33]
Beitr\"age
«rr
Von
Georg Plechanow
LHoUMdL 11 Mvetfos. III. Marx.
Stuttgart Verlag von 3. H. W. Dietz
1896
Title page of the first edition of Essays on the Histnry of Materialism
[34] ~ 35 __RUNNING_HEADER_RIGHT__ ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF MATERIALISM in a definite way, one must first learn how that development has taken place. In respect of the subject of these Essays, that means that an explanation of why materialist philosophy developed in the way it did with Hoi bach and Helvetius in the eighteenth century, and with Marx in the nineteenth, is possible only after it is clearly shown what that philosophy was in reality which has been so often misunderstood and even quite distorted. The ground must be cleared before building can begin.Another few words. The reader may find that I have dealt at insufficient length with these thinkers' theory of cognition. To that I can object that I have done all I can to set forth their views in this respect with accuracy. However, since I do not number myself among the adherents of the theoretico-cognitive scholasticism that is in such vogue today, I have had no intention of dwelling on this absolutely secondary question.
Geneva, New Year's Day, 1896
G. Plekhanov
__PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__ 3* [36] __NUMERIC_LVL2__ I __ALPHA_LVL2__ HOLBACHWe are going to speak of a certain materialist.
But first: what is meant by materialism?
Let us address ourselves to the greatest of modern materialists.
``The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being,'' says Frederick Engels in his excellent book Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, (Stuttgart, 1888). "But this question could for the first time be put forward in its whole acuteness, could achieve its full significance, only after humanity in Europe had awakened from the long hibernation of the Christian Middle Ages. The question of the position of thinking in relation to being, a question which, by the way, had played a great part also in the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, the question: which is primary, spirit or nature---that question, in relation to the church, was sharpened into this: Did God create the world or has the world been in existence eternally?
``The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other... comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to various schools of = materialism."^^3^^
Holbach would have accepted this definition of materialism with the utmost readiness. He himself said nothing else. To him, what we call the mental life of animals was nothing more than a natural phenomenon, and, in his opinion, there was no need to emerge from within the borders of Nature in search of a solution to the problems she has confronted us with.^^*^^ This is very simple, and a far cry from the dogmatic assertions so often and so groundlessly ascribed to the materialists. True, Holbach saw in Nature _-_-_
^^*^^ Cf. Le ban sens puise dans la nature, suivi du testament du euro Meslier, a Paris, 1'an Ier de la Republique, I, p. 175.
[37]
Page from the Preface to the Essays... for the planned Russian edition
[38] ~ 39 nothing but matter or kinds of matter, and motion or motions.^^*^^ And it is on this thai the critics, Ph. Damiron for example, are out to entrap our materialist. They foist upon him their concept of matter arid, proceeding from that concept, attempt triumphantly to prove that matter, alone, is insufficient for an explanation of all natural phenomena.^^**^^This is a facile but threadbare device. Critics of this calibre do not understand, or pretend not to understand, that one may have a concept of matter different from theirs. "If, by Nature,'' Hoibach says, "we shall mean an accumulation of dead substances, without any properties and purely passive, then, of course, we shall be obliged to seek outside of that Nature the principle of her motions; but if, by Nature, we mean what she actually is--- a whole, in which the various parts have various properties, act according to those various properties, are constantly acting and reacting upon one another, possess weight, gravitate towards a common centre, while others depart towards the circumference; attract and repel one another, unite and separate, and, in constant collisions and comings together, produce and decompose all the bodies we see---then nothing can make us appeal to supernatural forces for an explanation of how the things and phenomena that we see are formed.^^***^^
Locke already thought it possible that matter could possess the faculty of thinking. To Ilolbach, this was a most probable assumption "even in the hypothesis of theology, that is to say, in supposing that there exists an omnipotent mover of matter".^^****^^ The conclusion drawn by Ifolbach is very simple and really very convincing: "Since Man, who is matter and has ideas only about matter, possesses the faculty of thinking, matter can think, or is capable of that specific modification which we call thought."^^*****^^
_-_-_^^*^^ "Nature, understood in the broadest sense of the word, is a vast whole resultant from a compound of different substances, their different combinations and different motions, as observed by us in the Universe.'' (Systi'ine de la Nature ou, des Lolx du Monde Physique et du Monde Moral, Londres, 1781, I, p. 3). Holbach also recognised four elements, which the ancient philosophy recognised before him: air, fire, earth and water.
^^**^^ Thus, according to Damiron, matter cannot possess the faculty of thinking. Why? Because "matter does not think, does not cognise, does not act" (Memoires pour servir a Vhistoire de la philosophie au XVIIIe siecle, Paris, 1858, p. 409).
What, amazing logic! Incidentally, in their struggle against the materialists, Voltaire and Rousseau were also in error in this question. Thus, for instance, Voltaire assured the reader that "any active matter reveals its non-material essence, which acts upon it''. To Rousseau matter was ``dead''; lie could never "imagine a live molecule".
^^***^^ Systems de la Nature, I, p. 21. The quotation is from the 1781 edition.
^^****^^ Le bon sens, I, p. 170.
^^*****^^ Systeme de la Nature, I, p. 81. Note 26.
40What does that modification depend on? Here Ilolbach advances two hypotheses, which he finds equally probable. It may be presumed that the sensitivity of matter is "the result of an organisation, a link inherent in an animal, so that dead and inert matter ceases to be dead and becomes capable of sensation when it is 'animalised', i.e. when it unites and is identified witli an animal''. Do we not see every day that milk, bread and wine turn into the substance of man, who is a creature endowed with sensitivity? These dead substances consequently become endowed with sensitivity when they combine with a creature that is endowed with sensitivity. The other hypothesis is that dealt with by Diderot in his excellent Conversation with D'Alembert. "Some philosophers think that sensitivity is a universal quality of matter. In this case, it would be useless to seek whence that quality comes to it, which we know by its effects. If one admits that hypothesis, then it will be in the same way as one distinguishes two kinds of motion in Nature---one that is known under the name of living force and another under the name of dead force---then one will distinguish two kinds of sensitivity: one that is active or living, and another that is inert or dead, and then animalising a substance will mean nothing but destroying the obstacles that prevent it from being active and sensitive.'' However that may be, and whichever of these hypotheses of sensitivity we accept, "the nonextensive being the human soul is supposed to be cannot be a subject".^^*^^
The reader will perhaps claim that neither hypothesis is marked by sufficient, clarity. We are well aware of that, and Holbach realised it no less than we do. That property of matter which we call sensitivity is an enigma that is very difficult of solution. But, says Holbach, "the simplest movements of our bodies are, to any man who gives thought to them, enigmas just as difficult to solve as thought is."^^**^^
During a conversation with Lessing, Jacobi once said, "Spinoza is good enough in my opinion, yet his name is a poor kind of salvation for us!" To which Lessing replied, "Yes! If you wish it so!... Yet ... do you know of anything better?"^^***^^
To all reproaches from their opponents, the materialists can reply in just the same way: "Do you know of anything better?" _-_-_
^^*^^ Systeme de la Nature, I, pp. 90--91. La Mcttrie also considers the two hypotheses almost equally probable. Lange has been totally wrong in ascribing a different opinion to him. This will be seen from a perusal of Chapter VI of Traite de fame. La Mettrie even supposes that "the philosophers of all ages" (with the exception of the Cartesians, of course) "recognised that matter had the faculty of sensation" (Cf.CEuvres, Amsterdam, 1764 1, pp. 97--100).
^^**^^ Le bon sens, I, p. 177.
^^***^^ Jacobi's Werke, IV, S. 54.
41 Where is that something better to be sought? In Berkeley's subjective idealism? In Hegel's absolute idealism? In the agnosticism or the neo-Kantianism of our times?``Materialism,'' Lange assures us, "stubbornly takes the world of sensory appearance for the world of real things."^^*^^
He wrote this remark apropos of Holbach's argument against Berkeley. It creates the impression that Holbach was ignorant of many very simple things. Our philosopher could have replied for himself, "We do not know the essence of any being, if by the word 'essence' one understands that which constitutes the nature that is peculiar to it; we know matter only through the perceptions, the sensations, and the ideas it gives us; it is only later that we judge whether it is good or bad, in accordance with the structure of our organs."^^**^^
``We know neither the essence nor the true nature of matter, although we are able to define some of its properties and qualities according to how it affects us."^^***^^
``We do not know the elements of the body, but we do know some of their properties or qualities and we distinguish between their different substances according to the effects or changes they produce on our senses, that is to say, by the various changes that their presence brings forth in us."^^****^^
Strange, is it not? Here we see our kindly old Holbach as an epistemologist of today. How was it thai Lange failed to recognise in him a comrade-in-philosophy?
Lange saw all philosophical systems in Kant, in just the same way as Malebranche saw all things in God. lie found it unimaginable that, even before the publication of Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, there could have been people, and even among the materialists, who had a knowledge of certain truths, which were, properly speaking, meagre and barren, but, seemed to him the greatest discoveries in contemporary philosophy. He had read Holbach with a prejudiced eye.
But that is not all. There is a vast difference between Holbach and Lange. To Lange, as to any Kantian, a ``thing-in-itself'' was absolutely incognisable. To Holbach, as to any materialist, our reason, i.e., science, was fully capable of discovering at least certain properties of a ``thing-in-itself''. On this point, too, the author of Systeme de la Nature was not mistaken.
Let us apply the following line of reasoning. We are building a railway. Expressed in Kantian terms, that means we are engendering certain phenomena.~ But what is a phenomenon? It is the _-_-_
^^*^^ Geschichte des Materialismus, 2. Aufl., Iserlohn, 1873, I, S. 378.
^^**^^ Systems de la Nature, II, pp. 91--92.
^^***^^ ibid., p. llti.
^^****^^ ibid., I, p. 28.
i
42 result of a ``thing-in-ilself'' acting upon us. So when we are build ing our railway, we are making a ``thing-in-itself'' act on us in a certain way that is desirable to us. But what is it that gives us the means of acting upon a ``thing-in-itself'' in such a manner? It is a knowledge of its properties, and nothing but that knowledge.Our being able to get a sufficiently close knowledge of a " thingin-itself" happens to be very useful to us. Otherwise, we could not exist here on Earth, and would most probably have been denied the pleasure of indulging in metaphysics.
The Kantians aver that a ``thing-in-itself'' is incognisable. That incognisability, in their opinion, gives Lampe, and all the worthies of philistinism, the inalienable right to their own more or less ``poetical'' or ``ideal'' = God.^^5^^ Holbach reasoned differently.
``It is being incessantly repeated to us,'' he says, "that our senses show us only the outside of things, and that our limited minds cannot conceive a God. Let us admit that is so; but those senses do not show us even the outside of the Divinity__ As we are constituted, that means that we have no ideas about what does not exist for us."^^*^^
The almost complete absence of any kind of idea of evolution was undoubtedly a weak point in eighteenth-century French materialism, as it was, in general, in any kind of materialism prior to Marx. True, such people as Diderot sometimes arrived at masterly conjectures which would have done credit to the most outstanding of our present-day evolutionists; such instances of insight, however, were not connected with the essence of their doctrine, but were merely exceptions, which, as such, merely confirmed the rule. Whether they were dealing with Nature, morals or history, the ``philosophers'' tackled the problem with the same absence of the dialectical method, and from the same metaphysical viewpoint. It is of interest to see how indefatigably Holbach tried to find some probable hypothesis of the origin of our planet and the human race. Problems now conclusively resolved by evolutionary _-_-_
^^*^^ Syst\`eme de la Nature, II, pp. 109--13. Feuerbach said the same thing. In general, his critique of religion contains much that resembles Holbach's. As i'or the conversion of a "thing-in-itsoll'" into God, it is noteworthy that the Fathers of the Church denned their God in exactly the same way as the Kantians define their ``thing-in-itself''. Thus, according to St. Augustine, God does not fit into any category: "ut sic intelligamus Deum, si possurnus, quantum possurnus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesidentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine ternpore sempiternum''. "So this may be our notion of God, if and so far as it be within our powers, a creator wanting in nothing, good without quality, great without quantity, present without abode, whole everywhere without location, everlasting without time.'' (Cf. Ueberweg's Grundriss der Geschichte dcr Philosophie, Berlin, 1881, II.) We shall refer to Hegel those readers who would like to get an idea of all the contradictions of a = ``thing-in-itself''.^^6^^
43 natural science were seen as impossible of solution by the eighteenth-century philosophers.^^*^^The Earth was not always the same as it now is. Does that mean that it was formed gradually, during a lengthy process of evolution? No. It might have been as follows: "Perhaps this Earth is a mass detached at a certain moment from some other celestial body; perhaps it is the result" (!) "of the spots or crusts that astronomers observe on the Sun's disc, whence they could spread in our planetary system; perhaps this globe is an extinct and displaced comet which once occupied a different place in the regions of space."^^**^^
Primitive man perhaps differed from his counterpart of today more than a quadruped does from an insect. Like everything else that exists on our globe and on all other heavenly bodies, Man can be imagined as being in a process of constant change. "Thus there is no contradiction in thinking that the species vary incessantly."^^***^^ This sounds perfectly in the spirit of evolutionism. It should not be forgotten, however, that Holbach saw this hypothesis as probable given "changes in the position of our globe". Whoever does not accept this condition can consider Man "a sudden result of Nature." Holbach does not adhere quite firmly to the hypothesis of the evolution of the species. "If one should reject the preceding conjectures, and if one affirms that Nature acts by a certain sum of immutable and general laws; if one should believe that Man, the quadruped, the fish, the insect, the plant, etc., are of all eternity and will forever remain what they are; if one should grant that the stars have shone in the firmament since all eternity" (thus, "a certain sum of immutable and general laws" would consequently preclude any development!---G.P.); "if one should say that it should not be asked why Man is what he is, any more than why Nature is as we see it, or why the world exists---we would not object to all that. Whatever system one adopts, it will, perhaps, reply equally well to the difficulties that embarrass one--- It is not given to Man to know everything; it is not given to him lo know his origin; it is not given to him to penetrate into the essence of things or to reach the prime principles."^^****^^
All this seems almost unbelievable to us today, but one should not forget the history of natural science. It should be recalled that, _-_-_
^^*^^ It is really surprising that Diderot admires the moral doctrine of Heraclitus, hut says nothing of his dialectics, or, if you wish, merely a few insiguiiicant words, in considering his physics. (Euvres de Diderot, Paris, 1818, II, pp. 625--26 (Encyclopedie).
^^**^^ Syst\`eme de la Nature, I, p. 70.
^^***^^ ibid., p. 73.
^^****^^ Syst\`eme de la Nature, I, p. 75. Among the problems whose solution is not given to Man, Holbach also includes the question, "What came first: the animal before the egg, or the egg before the animal?" This is a caution to scholars who like to expatiate on the uncrossablc borderlines of science!
44 long after the publication of Syst\`eme de la Nature, the great scientist Cuvier was up in arms against any idea of evolution in the natural sciences.Let us now consider Holbach's moral philosophy.
In one of his comedies, Charles Palissot, an author who lias been completely forgotten, but attracted considerable attention in the last century, has one of his characters (Valere) say the following:
Du globe ou nous vivons despote universel, II n'est quun seul ressort, Vintent personnel^^*^^ To which another character (Carondas) replies: J'avals quelque regret a tromper Cydalise Mais je vois clairement que la chose est permise.^^**^^
Thus Palissot tried to hold up the philosophers' ideas to scorn. "It is a question of achieving happiness, no matter how"---this aphorism of Valere expresses Palissot's view of the "philosophers'" ethics. Palissot was merely a "miserable ink-slinger'', yet were there many writers on the history of philosophy who advanced any other judgement on the materialist ethics of the eighteenth century? Throughout the present century, this ethics has almost universally been considered something scandalous, a doctrine unbefitting a worthy scholar or self-respecting philosopher; people such as La Mettrie, Holbach and Helvetius were considered dangerous sophists who preached nothing but sensual enjoyment and selfishness.^^***^^ Yet none of these writers ever preached anything of the kind. Any reading of their books with a modicum of attention will bear this out. "To do good, promote the happiness of others, and to come to their aid---that is virtuous. Only that can be virtuous which is conducive to the weal, happiness and security of society."
``Humaneness is the prime social virtue. It epitomises all the other virtues. Taken in its broadest aspect, it is the sense that gives all beings of our species the rights to our heart. Grounded in a cultivated sensibility, it enables us to do all the good on" faculties render us capable of. It results in love, beneficence, generosity, forbearance and compassion to our fellow-creatures."^^****^^
_-_-_^^*^^ [Universal despot of the world we live in and sole motive of everything---personal Interest.]
^^**^^ [I have some regret at deceiving Cydalise, But I see clearly that the thing is permitted.]
^^***^^ "De La Mettrie and Helvetius are sophists of materialistic ethics" (Heltner,^Literaturgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts, Braunschweig, 1881, II, S. 388). "What is fatal to materialism is that it indulges, nourishes and encourages man's lowest instincts, the baseness out of which he was created" (Fritz Schultze, Die Grundgedanken des Materialismus und die Kritil; derselben, Leipzig, 1887, S. .50).
^^****^^ La politique naturelle ou discours sur les vrais principes du guuuernement, par un ancient magistra (Holbachl, 1773, pp. 45--46.
45Where does this so groundless accusation spring from? How could it have been believed almost universally?
In the first place, ignorance is to blame. The French materialists are much spoken of, but not read. It is therefore hardly surprising that, having struck deep root, the prejudice lives on.
The prejudice itself has two sources, both equally abundant.
Eighteenth-century materialist philosophy was a revolutionary philosophy. It was merely the ideological expression of the revolutionary bourgeoisie's struggle against the clergy, the nobility, and the absolute monarchy. It goes without saying that, in its struggle against an obsolete system, the bourgeoisie could have no respect for a world-outlook that was inherited from the past and hallowed that despised system. "Different times, different circumstances, a different philosophy,'' as Diderot so excellently put it in his article on Hobbes in the Encyclop\'edie.~ The philosophers of the good old days, who tried to live in peace with the Church, had no objections to a morality which claimed revealed religion as its source. The philosophers of the new times wanted morals to be free of any alliance with ``superstition''.~ "Nothing can be more disadvantageous to human morals than having them blended with divine morals. In linking sensible morals, based on experience and reason, with a mystical religion that is opposed to reason and based on imagination and authority, one could only muddle, weaken and even destroy the former."^^*^^
This divorcement of morals from religion could not have been to everybody's liking, and it already provided grounds to revile the materialists' ethics. But that was not all. "Religious morals" preached humility, mortification of the flesh, and quelling of the passions. To those who suffer here on Earth they promised recompense in the world to come. The new morality reinstated the flesh, reinstated the rights of the passions,^^**^^ and made society responsible for the misfortunes of its members.^^***^^ Like Heine, it wanted _-_-_
^^*^^ Systeme social ou Principes naturels de la morale et de la politique. Avec un examen de Vinfluence du gouvernement sur les mceurs. Par l'auteur du Systeme de la Nature, Londres, 1773, I, p. 36. Cf. with the Preface to Morale universelle by the same author: "We shall not deal here with religious morals, which do not recognise the rights of reason, since they pursue the aim of leading people along supernatural roads."
^^**^^ "Passions are true counterweights to passions; let us not seek to destroy them but try to give them direction; let us balance those that are detrimental with those that are useful to society. Reason, the fruit of experience, is merely the art of choosing, for our own happiness, the passions we should listen to" (Systeme de la Nature, I, p. 304).
^^***^^ "Let them not tell us that no government can make all its subjects happy; no doubt, it cannot please the whims of a few idle citizens who do not know what to think up to dispel their ennui; it can and must, however, engage in satisfying the real needs of the multitude. A society enjoys all the happiness it is capable of when the greatest number of its members are fed, __NOTE__ Footnote continued on page 46. 46 ``to set up the Kingdom of Heaven here on = Earth''.^^7^^ Therein lay its revolutionary side, but therein, too, was its wrongness in the eyes of those who stood for the then existent social structure.
In his Correspondance = litt\'eraire,^^8^^ Grimm wrote that, following the publication of Helvetius's De VEsprit, a certain comic verse circulated throughout Paris, expressing the apprehension of " respectable folk":
``Admirez tous cet auteur-la
Qui de TEsprit' intitula
Un Hire qui nest que mattered^^*^^
Indeed, all materialist morals were merely ``matter'' to those who did riot understand them, and also to those who, though understanding them excellently, preferred "tippling wine in secret, while preaching water-drinking in = public".^^9^^
This will be sufficient to explain how and why materialist morals, to this day, make the hair of all philistines of all ``civilised'' nations stand on end.
Yet there were, among the opponents of materialist morals, such men as Voltaire and Rousseau. Were they philistines too?
As for Rousseau, he was no philistine in this instance, but it must be admitted that the Patriarch of = Ferney^^10^^ brought a substantial portion of philistinism into the discussion.
When a man comes into the world, he brings with him only the faculty of sensation, what is known as the intellectual faculties all develop from this faculty. Some of the impressions or sensations a man gets from the objects he meets please him, while others cause him suffering. He approves of some of them, which he wants to last or become renewed in him; he regards others with disapproval, and avoids them as much as he can. In other words, a man likes some sensations and the objects that produce them, and dislikes other impressions and that which evokes them. Since man lives in society, he is surrounded by creatures like himself, who feel exactly what he does. All these creatures seek enjoyment, and fear suffering. They call good whatever gives them enjoyment, and evil whatever causes them suffering. Whatever is of constant use to them they call virtue, while whatever is injurious _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote continued from page 45. clothed and housed---in a word, can, without excessive labour, satisfy the needs that Nature has made necessary to them.... As a consequence of human follies, entire nations are obliged to toil, sweat, and water the soil with their tears so as to provide for the luxury, whims and corruption of a small number of madmen, a handful of useless people, for whom happiness has become impossible because their unbridled imagination knows no bounds" (ibid., p. 298).
^^*^^ [Admire this author, all of you, who has entitled his book On the Spirit, though it contains nothing but matter.]
47 to them in the make-up of those that surround them is called vice.~ One who does good to his fellow-men is good; he who causes them harm is evil.~ Hence it follows, in the first place, that man does not stand in need of divine aid to distinguish virtue from vice; in the second place, for men to be virtuous, the performance of virtue should give them pleasure, be pleasing to them. Man should love vice if it makes him happy. A man is evil only because it is to his advantage to be so. Evil and wicked men are so often to be met in this world of ours only because no government exists that could enable them to find advantage in justice, honesty and charity; conversely, the vested interests everywhere drive them to injustice, evil and crime. "Thus, it is not Nature that creates evil people, but our institutions that make them such."^^*^^Such is the formal aspect of materialist morals, which we have conveyed almost in Holbach's own words. His thoughts often lack clarity. Thus, it is tautological to say that if vice makes man happy, he should love vice; if vice does indeed make man happy, then he already loves vice. This absence of precision in Holbach often leads to unfortunate consequences. Thus, in one place he says that "interest is the only motivation of human acts". Elsewhere he gives the following definition: "We call interest that object with which any man, in conformity with the temperament and ideas peculiar to him, links his well-being; in other words, interest is simply what each of us regards as necessary to his happiness".^^**^^ This is so broad a definition that one can no longer tell the difference between materialist and religious morals^^***^^; any adherent of the latter could say that his opponents had merely invented a new terminology, and preferred to call self-interested such actions that had previously been called disinterested.~ However that may be, one can readily understand what Holbach meant by saying that if vice makes man happy he should love vice. He makes society responsible for the vices of its members.^^****^^
Voltaire fulminates against Holbach for the latter's alleged advice to people to take to vice if that proves to their advantage. This reminds one of 1'abbe de VLignac, who made a convert to the new morality reply to the question of whether he should love the interests of his nation, as follows: in the measure in which it is to my advantage. Yet Voltaire knew more of the matter than de Lignac ever did: he knew his Locke very well, and must have _-_-_
^^*^^ Systerne de la Nature I p. 306.
^^**^^ ibid., p. 268.
^^***^^ It is not only too broad but also tautological since it says nothing except that man wants only what he wants. This was noted by Turgot in ins analysis of Helvetius's theory of morality.
^^****^^ "In depraved societies one should oneself be depraved to be happy" (Systems de la Nature, II, p. 237).
48 seen that materialist morals were merely continuing the English philosopher's cause. In his Trait\'e de metaphysique, Voltaire himself said far bolder things about morals than Holbach ever did. However, the patriarch felt afraid: he was apprehensive lest the people, after turning into atheists and utilitarian moralists, should become too audacious. "All things considered,'' he wrote to Madame Necker (September 20, 1770), "the age of Phaedra and le Misanthrope was a better = one."^^11^^ Of course it was! The people were held in curb far better then!What is most comical is that Voltaire contraposes the following argument to Holbach's morals: "Our society cannot exist without the ideas of the justice and injustice, he (God) has shown us the road to reach them---Thus, for all people, from Peking to Ireland, the weal of society is firmly established as an immutable rule of virtue." What a discovery for an atheist philosopher to make!
Rousseau's conclusions were different: he thought that utilitarian morals could not explain the most virtuous of human actions. "What is meant by offering up one's life in one's own interests?" he asked, adding that he found repellent that philosophy which was a source of embarrassment to virtuous actions, escaped from any difficulty only by ascribing base intentions and evil motives to virtuous actions, and "is obliged to humiliate Socrates and slander = Regulus".^^12^^ For an appreciation of what this reproach signifies, we have to advance the following considerations.
In their struggle against "religious morality'', the materialists were out, first and foremost, to prove that people were capable of knowing what ``virtue'' is, without any aid from Heaven. "Did men need supernatural revelation,'' Holbach exclaimed, "to learn that justice is necessary for the preservation of society, or that injustice merely brings together enemies prepared to do injury to one another? Was it necessary that God should speak for them to realise that creatures who have gathered together need to love each other and render each other aid? Was aid necessary for them to discover from on high that vengeance is an evil, an outrage against one's country's laws, which, if they are just, see to it that citizens are avenged? ... Is not anyone who values his life aware that vice, intemperance and sensual pleasure shorten his days? Finally, has not experience proved to any thinking being that crime is an object of hatred to his" (i.e., the criminal's.---G.P.) "fellow men; that vice is injurious to those who aru infected with it; that virtue wins respect and love for those who cultivate it? If men reflect but a little on what they do, on their true interests, and on the purpose of society, they will realise their duty to one another.... The voice of Reason is sufficient 49 for us to learn what our duty is towards our fellow creatures."^^*^^
Since Reason is sufficient to leach us our duties, I lie medial ion of Philosophy is indicated to show us I hat virtue lies in our own arift correctly understood interest.. It must, also show us that the most illustrious heroes of mankind would not have actetl otherwise if they had had only their own happiness in mind. Thus psychological analysis arises, which does, indeed, often and obviously humiliate Socrates and slander Regulus. Consequently, Rousseau's reproach was not made without certain grounds; only the "citizen of Geneva" forgot thai the "slandered Socrates" often fell into the same error that the materialists are reproached = with.^^**^^
Whether in Greece or in France, in Germany or in Russia (Chernyshcvsky and his followers)---the Enlighteners everywhere made one and the same mistake. They were out to prove what cannot be proved but must be taught by the life of society = itself.^^***^^ ~ Mankind's moral development follows closely in the footsteps of economic necessity, precisely adapting itself to society's actual needs. In this sense, it can and should he said thai interest is the foundation of morality. However, the historical process of that adaptation takes place behind people's backs, irrespective of the will and intellect of individuals. A line of behaviour that is dictated by interest seems lo be an injunction of the ``gods'', "inborn conscience'', ``Reason'', or ``Nature''. But what kind of interest is it that dictates one line of behaviour or another to individuals? Is it self-interest? In innumerable cases, it is. __NOTE_PAGE_49__ Second "**" in original, in body, should probably be "***". _-_-_
^^*^^ Le Christianisme devoile on exainen das principes et des effets de la religion chrclienne, a Londres, 1757, pp. 120--28. This book was called "the most horrible that could have appeared on Earth''. It was actually brought out in Nancy, not in London.
^^**^^ "And yet,---what Possession (sic!) shall; be placed in Competition with a Friend? What Slave so affectionate to our Persons, or studious of our Interest? What Horse able to render us such Service? From whence, or from whom, can we at all Times and on every Occasion receive so many and such essential Benefits?" (Xenophon's Memoirs oj Socrates, II, Ch. IV). Nothing more ``cynical'' was ever said by the French materialists. Does that mean that Socrates ``slandered'' himself?
^^***^^ Incidentally, in the eighteenth century this was fully in keeping with the spirit of the times, and the adherents of "religious morality" in no way lagged behind the materialists in this respect, sometimes producing quite amusing ``proofs''. Hero is a splendid example. According to Helvetius, the Jesuits initialed the performance of a ballet in Rouen, in the year 1750, "the object of which was to show that '[Measure prepares the youth for the true virtues, that is to say, the first act is on the civic virtues, the second---on the military virtues, while the third is on the virtues proper to religion'. In the ballet they tried to prove that truth through the dances. Personified Religion performed a pas de de.nx with Pleasure and, to give the latter more piquancy, as the = Jansenists^^13^^ said at the time, the Jesuits clad him in trousers. But if, in their opinion, pleasure can do anything with man, what is it that interest cannot do with him? Is not all interest reduced in us to a search after pleasure?" (De l'Homme, I, section~II, chap.~16.)
__PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4---01047 50 However, inasmuch as individuals listen to their voice of their personal interests, it is no longer a question of ``virtuous'' actions that we are called upon to explain. Such actions reflect the interest of the entity, social interest, and it is the latter that prescribe them. The dialectic of historical development leads, not only to "sense becoming nonsense, and beneficence turning into evil"^ but also to the selfish interests of society or a class often turning, in the hearts of individuals, into impulses full of unselfishness and heroism. The secret of that conversion lies in the influence of the social environment. The French materialists were good at appraising that influence; they kept on reiterating that upbringing determines everything, that people become what they are, and are not born that way. Nevertheless, they regarded and depicted this process of moral moulding as a series of reflexions that are repeated at every instant in every individual's mind and are directly modified according to the circumstances affecting the private interest of anybody who is motivated to action. From this viewpoint, as we have seen, the moralist's task takes shape of itself. The thinking of individuals should be protected against errors, and the moral ``truth'' be pointed out to them. In that case, then, what is meant by pointing out the moral truth? It means pointing out where personal interest, as best understood, lies; it means lauding that particular disposition of heart which leads up to some praiseworthy action. It was thus that the psychological analysis which Rousseau rose up against came into being; it was thus that there appeared the interminable hymns of praise in honour of virtue that Grimm called = capucinades^^15^^. The latter were highly characteristic of some of the eighteenth-century French materialists, while a false analysis of behaviour motivations was a feature of the others. However, the absence of the dialectical method is conspicuous in everything they all wrote, and wreaks vengeance on all of them in equal degree.In his polemic against materialist morals, Rousseau often appealed to the conscience, that "divine instinct'', "innate feeling'', and the like. It would have been easy for the materialists to explain that feeling as being the fruit of upbringing and habit. For their part, however, they preferred to present it as a series of reflections grounded in a thorough awareness of personal interest. According to Holbach, conscience can be defined as "knowledge of the effects that one's actions produce on others, and, conversely, on ourselves''. "A guilty conscience is the certitude or the fear of having merited their hatred or their contempt by our conduct towards them."^^*^^ It is clear that Rousseau could not have been satisfied with such a ``definition''; it is just as clear _-_-_
^^*^^ Systems social, I, p. 56; cf. also La Morale unlverselle, I, pp. 4-5.
51 that the materialists could not tolerate his point of view. The least admission of "innate feeling" would have defeated all their philosophy. Today dialectical materialism can easily single out that part of the truth which is contained both in Rousseau's statements and in those of the French materialists.And so all moral laws originate from ``Reason''. Rut what is Reason guided by in its search after these laws? By Nature, Holbach replies without the least hesitation. "Man is a feeling, intelligent and rational being.'' Reason does not have to know anything more than that to endow us with "universal morality".
The psychology of this appeal to ``Nature'' can easily be spelt out. Incidentally, it is explained by Holbach himself: "To impose duties on us, and to prescribe to us laws that obligate us, an authority is doubtlessly needed that has the right to command us.'' But the materialists were at war with all the traditional authorities, so they appealed to Nature to find a way out of the difficulty. "Can anyone deny this right to necessity? Can one question the claims of that Nature which exercises sovereign rights over all that exists?" All this was very ``natural'' at the time, but it must be emphasised that, like most of his contemporaries, Holbach was referring only to the nature of ``Man'', which is something quite different from the Nature we have to struggle against for our existence.
Montesquieu was convinced that differences in climate produced "variety in laws''. He adduced most inconclusive proof to bear out this relationship, while the materialist philosophers demonstrated it with no great difficulty. "Will one say,'' Holbach asked, "that the Sun which shone down on the Greeks and the Romans, who were so jealous of their liberties, does not send the same rays upon their effete descendants?"^^*^^ Basically speaking, however, Montesquieu's line of thought was not quite erroneous. Today we know the significance the geographical environment has had for the history of mankind, and if Montesquieu was mistaken, that does not at all mean that those who attacked him on this score had a better understanding of what Hegel was later to call the "geographical foundation of world history''. They had not the least knowledge of the matter, neither right nor wrong knowledge. Human nature was the key they expected to use to open _-_-_
^^*^^ Politique naturelle, II, p. 10; Sy^leme social, III, pp. 0-8. For his part, Voltaire never tired of warring against this opinion of Montesquieu, who, incidentally, had said nothing new on this question, but had merely repealed the views of certain Greek and Roman writers. To be fair, we shall add that Holbach often spoke of the influence of climate far more superficially than Montesquieu did. "In its essence, a definite climate organises and modifies people in such a way that they become either very useful or harmful to their race" (!), says Ilolhach in Systeme de la Nature.
__PRINTERS_P_51_COMMENT__ 4* 52 all doors in the edifice of morals, politics and history. It is often difficult for us today to have a clear realisation of a point of view so commonly held by eighteenth-century writers.``The development of the arts,'' it was said by Suard, for example, "is subject to the same gradations that one observes in the development of mankind.'' Wo seize eagerly upon this idea, thinking that the author is about to reveal the hidden causes of human development, which, while independent of the human will, give direction to their spirit and enlightenment (``lumieres'' ). There are some who think that, thanks to Suard, they are escaping from the circulus vitiosus the philosophy oE history was revolving in so hopelessly in the eighteenth century. They are, however, too precipitant, and deeply mistaken. The causes that the development of the ``arts'' is subordinate to are dependent only on the nature of---``man''.... "In childhood man has nothing but his senses, his imagination and his memory; he needs nothing but songs and tales. Then follows the age of passions, and the soul wants to be stirred and agitated; next the mind expands and reason becomes fortified; these two faculties, in their turn, have to be exercised, their activities extending to everything affecting man's curiosity, tastes, feelings and needs."^^*^^
It is now recognised by all natural scientists that the sequence of forms the individual organism passes through, from the embryo to its full development is a repetition of !ho form-changes gone through by the ancestors of the genus the organism belongs to. Embryogenetic development epitomises the genealogical.~ In the same way, one can regard the sequence of forms that each man's mind goes through from infancy to full development as a kind of synopsis of the lengthy and slow changes each man's ancestors underwent in the course of history. Highly interesting research can, in our opinion, be carried out in this field.^^**^^ But what would be said of the natural scientist who would see, in the embryogenetic history of an individual organism, sufficient grounds for changes in a genus? But that is exactly the mode of thinking of Suard and, together with him, of all eighteenthcentury ``philosophers'', who had a vague idea of the pattern of mankind's development.
In this, Grimm is in full accord with Suard. "What people has not started by being a poet, and ended by being a philosopher?" he asks.^^***^^ Helvetius alone understood that this fact could _-_-_
^^*^^ Du progr\`es des lettres et de la philosophic dans le dix-huiti\`eme siecle. In M\'elang de litterature, Paris, l'an XII, t.~III, p.~383.
^^**^^ It goes without saying that the closest attention should be paid to the tremendous influence that adaptation to the social environment exerts on the individual's spiritual and moral development.
^^***^^ Correspondance litt\'eraire, ao\^ut 1774.
53 spring from other and deeper causes than Suard thought. But we have not yet come to Helvetius.Man is a sentient, thinking and rational creature. He is created thus, has always been and will always remain that way, despite all his errors. In this sense, man's nature is immutable. What, then, is there surprising in the moral and political laws dictated by that nature being, in their turn, of universal significance, unchanging, and constant? These laws have not yet been proclaimed, and it must be admitted that "'nothing is more common than to see civil laws in contradiction with those of Nature''. These corrupt civil laws are due to the "perversity of morals, the errors of societies, or tyranny which forces nature to bow to its authority".^^*^^ Let Nature have its say, you will learn the truth once and for all. Errors arc without number, but there is only one truth. "Morals do not exist for the monster or the madman; universal morals can be established only for rational and normally organised creatures; in them Nature does not change; observation alone is needed to infer the immutable rules that they must follow."^^**^^
But how is one to explain that the same Holbach could have written the following lines: "Like all natural bodies, societies undergo transformations, changes, and revolutions; they are formed, grow and disintegrate just like all beings. One and the same laws cannot suit them in different circumstances of development: useful in one period, they become useless and harmful in another."
It is all very simple. Holbach draws a single conclusion from the above argumentation, namely that obsolete and outmoded laws (the reference is to the laws of France at the time) should be abolished. The entrenchedness of a law speaks rather against it than for it. The example of our forebears is no evidence in its favour. Holbach could have proved this in theory, but only by appealing to ``reason'', but, in view of his readers' prejudices, he pretended to adhere to the historical point of view. The same is true of the history of religions. The ``philosophers'' have devoted a great deal of attention to this subject, their purpose being to prove that the Christian religion, which claims to be based _-_-_
^^*^^ Politique naturelle, I, p.~52.
^^**^^ Condorcet, who rebelled against Voltaire's views on this particular matter, which were diametrically opposite to his own, asserted (Le ftiilosophe ignorant™; the Patriarch often changed his views) that the ideas 01 justice and right developed "without fail in one and the same way with all beings endowed with the ability to feel" and acquire ideas. Therefore they will 'be. the fame" Of course, it is true that people "often change them . but any creature that reasons correctly will arrive at the same ideas in morals as in geometry. Such ideas are the necessary conclusion from the indisputaDle truth that "people are feeling and thinking creatures''. (In a Note to 1 hilosoptie ignorant of the Kehl edition of Voltaire's works.)
54 on revelation, fully resembles all profane religions. This was a blow aimed against the odious Christian faith; when it had been dealt, none of the ``philosophers'' felt concerned with a study of the comparative history of religions. The times were revolutionary, and all ``truths'' proclaimed by the philosophers (which very often contradicted one other) had immediately practical aims in view.We shall remark at this point that "human nature" often led the materialist philosophers much farther than they had expected. "The distinction that was often drawn between physical and moral man was excessively abused.'' Man is a purely physical being. Moral man is the selfsame physical creature, only considered from a definite angle, i.e., in respect of some of his faculties as conditioned by his organisation. Hence, "All of men's errors are physical errors'".^^*^^ Thus, what devolves on medicine, or rather on physiology, is the task of providing us with a key to the human heart. The same science should also explain to us the historical changes that have taken place in mankind. "In Nature, in which everything is interlinked, everything acts and interacts, everything moves and changes, composes and decomposes, forms and is destroyed, there is not a single atom that does not play an important and necessary role; there is not a single imperceptible molecule which, if placed in suitable circumstances, does not lead to tremendous effects__ An excess of acridity in a fanatic's bile, excessively inflamed blood in a conqueror's heart, troublesome digestion in a monarch's stomach, a whim that passes through some woman's mind" (also a molecule?---G.P.) "are sufficient causes to start wars, send millions of men into the slaughter, destroy fortresses, reduce cities to rubble... and spread desolation and calamity for a long succession of centuries...."^^**^^
There is a well-known aphorism about the speck of sand that found its way into Cromwell's bladder, thus leading to the entire picture of the world being reshaped. There is neither more nor less content in this aphorism than in Holbach's ideas about ``atoms'' and ``molecules'' as the causes of historical events, the only difference being that we owe the aphorism to a pious man. In the latter's opinion, it was God who introduced the fatal speck of sand into the Protector's body. Holbach already would have nothing of God, but in everything else he could produce no objection to this aphorism.
Aphorisms of this kind contain a ``grain'' of the truth, but that truth also relates to the entire truth in just the same way as a ``grain'' or a molecule does towards all matter in the Universe. _-_-_
^^*^^ Syst\`eme de la Nature, I, p.~5.
^^**^^ ibid., I, p. 214.
55 Since it is infinitesimal, that truth does not take us a single step forward in our study of social phenomena. And if we did nothing else in historical science but await the advent of the genius that Laplace dreamt of---a genius who, with the aid of molecular mechanics, will reveal to us all the secrets of mankind's past, present and future---we could indulge in long and calm slumber, for that marvellous genius's coming will not take place so soon.``If, aided by experience, we knew the elements underlying the temperament of a man or of most of the individuals a people is made up of, we would know what is to their liking, what laws they need, and what institutions are useful to them."^^*^^ In that case, however, what would become of "universal morals" and " policies that are in accord with Nature"? Holbach has nothing to say on that score but comments with ever greater zeal on all the moral, political and social laws which, of necessity, derive from man's nature as considered in the capacity of a sentient, etc., creature.
It was highly "natural'' that, in Holbach's times, Mother Nature was politically and morally on the side of the very laws that the French bourgeoisie needed at the moment when it was prepared to become = ``everything''.^^17^^
A tacit agreement, a social pact, exists between society and its members. That contract is renewed at every moment, and is designed to ensure the mutual guarantees of citizens' rights, of which liberty, property and security are the most sacred. Moreover: "Liberty, property and security are Ihe only bonds that attach people to the land they live in. No homeland exists if these advantages have disappeared."^^**^^ Property is the sonl of this holy trinity. Security and liberty are necessary in society. "But it is impossible for man to keep or make his existence happy if he cannot enjoy the advantages his exertions and his personality (!) have provided him with. Therefore the laws of Nature have granted every man a right which is called property".~ Society cannot deprive a man of his property "because it is created to _-_-_
^^*^^ Syst\`eme de la Nature, I, p. 106.
M. Jules Soury naively remarks about those words: "This idea of Baron d'Holbacb's lias in part become a fact.'' (!) "Nevertheless, it is moral statistics rather than physiology ttiat seems bound to render the greatest services to the physics o[ morals" (lireuiaire de i'hisloire dii materialising, Paris, 1881, p. 053).
^^**^^ Politique naturelle, I, pp. 1.V14, 38, 125.
``The great and chiel end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property, to which in tbe stale of Nature there are many things wanting...'' (John Locke, Tiro Treatises on Civil Government, [London, 1884, liook II], Ch. IX, "Of the Ends of Political Society and Government'', p. 256).
56 assure that property''. Thus, pnipiTly is llio aim, and liberty and security are the means. Lei us examine this sacred right in this light and in greater detail.Where does it spring from? It is based on the necessary relation that arises between man and the product of his labour. Thus, a field becomes, in a certain way, a part of him who cultivates it, because it is his will, his arms, his strength, his industry, in a word, "his inherent individual qualities, those belonging to his person'', that have made that field what it is. "That field, irrigated with his sweat, becomes, so to speak, identified with him; its yield belongs to him in just the same way as his limbs and his faculties do, for, without his labour, that produce would never have existed or, at least, would not have existed in the way it does."^^*^^
Thus Holbach saw bourgeois property in the form of the product of the proprietor's own labour. This, however, did not preclude his high regard for merchants and manufacturers, those " benefactors, who, in enriching themselves, give occupations and life to all society".^^**^^ He seems to have had a correct, though not quite c