p Let the gentle reader not think that we are out to trip the critic over some chance slips. Not at all! The monstrous blunder we have noted is repeated on almost every page of the “essay” and forms the logical hub about which almost all the content “revolves” in the “criticism” of revolutionary Marxism  [485•*  that Mr. P. Struve has clutched out of thin air. Thus, several pages after the commentary we have quoted from, Mr. P. Struve categorically states the following: "A revolution that removes contradiction is in any case logically necessary for the Marxist theory of the constantly mounting contradiction between the economy and law."  [485•**  These words show that Mr. P. Struve is not only " stubborn" in his incomprehensible error, but besides makes it underlie all his “criticism”: he is out to question the necessity of revolution as removing the contradiction, by pointing out that there can be no essential contradiction between law and the 486 economy (i.e., property relations, the economic structure). No less “stubbornness” in error is revealed in the following argument which our “critic” considers irresistible and triumphant:

p “What, after Marx, is called relations of production is logically and historically already included in the legal regulation of property relations. For that reason alone, it is logically impossible, while remaining on the Marxist standpoint, to speak of the contradictory development of production relations and the legal system" (but who speaks of that except you, 0 severe critic! Marx is referring to the contradiction between the productive forces and property relations. You yourself “noted” this really noteworthy “circumstance”, in the beginning of your comment— true, without "special force". How could you have so suddenly forgotten it when you came to stand in need of “criticising” Marx’s theory?—G.P.). "But what is far more important is that recognition of such development actually and absolutely precludes any realistically understood impact of economic phenomena on the legal system" (whence have you taken economic phenomena, Mr. P. Struve? You are dealing with production relations, or, in other words, with the economy, and you very correctly say that the concept of the economy is not at all fully denned by what we call the economic element in social phenomena—G.P.). "Just think: production relations" (the “critic” again, sans crier gare, returns to production relations, the idea of which, as he himself has remarked, is not at all denned by the concept of economic phenomena.—G.P.), "which are becoming more and more socialist, engender the class struggle; the class struggle gives rise to social reforms, which, it is alleged, enhance the capitalist nature of society. Thus, production relations, which are becoming more and more socialist, engender a legal system which is becoming more and more capitalist. Far from engendering any mutual adaptation between them, the economy’s impact on law ever more increases the contradiction existing between them."  [486•* 

p The part of this tirade that follows the words: "Just think" seems to have been written for the purpose of "noting with special force" the illogicality of Marx’s “orthodox” followers, who recognise the dialectical law of development. But here again, our critic imposes an "absolutely fabulous dogma" on the “orthodox” Marxists, and again his exposition converts into "barley intermixed with noxious weeds" the highly valuable grain of Marx’s theory of social development. "Just thinkl" When Marx and his “orthodox” followers speak of the constantly growing contradiction between the productive forces in capitalist society and its production relations, they understand by the latter bourgeois property rela- 487 tions, as is most clearly shown by the excerpts given above from the Manifesto of the Communist Party and as Mr. P. Struve himself admits. That is why it could never have occurred either to Marx or to his “orthodox” followers to arrive at the idea—as Mr. P. Struve imputes to them—that bourgeois society’s production relations are becoming ever more socialist. Anyone who said that would thereby be expressing the thought—worthy of some newest Bastiat alone—-that the property relations inherent in capitalist society and so ardently defended by the bourgeoisie are approaching ever closer to the socialist ideal.  [487•* 

p Mr. P. Struve has called the book The Development of the Monist View of History the finest exposition of the historico-philosophical foundations of orthodox Marxism. He considers our Beitrage zur Geschichte des Materialismus fully in the spirit of that book. I would ask the reader to go to the trouble of going through these two books and deciding for himself whether they contain anything resembling what our strange “critic” has ascribed to Marx’s “orthodox” followers!

p From all this follows the inevitable conclusion that a colossal and truly unbelievable failure to understand Marx has served Mr. P. Struve as a base of operations in his “critical” campaign. How glorious a campaign! What profound “criticism”! How interesting a “critic”!

p Mr. P. Struve’s literary career began in the autumn of 1894 with the appearance of his book Critical Remarks on the Question of Russia’s Economic Development, which produced quite a commotion. In this book, ponderously written and naive in parts but yet useful on the whole, there simultaneously appeared,

p Embracing like two sisters,^^254^^

and curiously intertwined, two theories: in the first place, the theory of Marx and the “orthodox” Marxists, and, in the second place, the theory of Brentano and his school. The eclectic mishmash in the book’s contents justified to a considerable extent both the reproaches that descended on the author from certain “orthodox” Marxists, and the hopes placed on it by other no less “orthodox” followers of Marx: the reproachers were irritated by the Brentanoism, while those who placed hopes on Mr. P. Struve expected that this bourgeois theory in his views would be 488 gradually overcome by the element of Marxism present in them. The author of these lines belonged to the number of the hopeful. True, his expectations were not very great: he never considered Mr. P. Struve a man capable of enriching Marx’s theory with any substantial theoretical contribution, but he hoped that, in the first place, Mr. P. Struve’s Brentanoism would soon be overcome by his Marxism, and, secondly, that the author of Critical Remarks was capable of a correct understanding of the author of Capital.  It now appears that we were mistaken on both scores: Marxism has already yielded place, in Mr. P. Struve’s views, to its old neighbour—Brentanoism; besides, our “critic” has revealed a total lack of understanding of the most fundamental and the most important propositions of historical materialism. In this latter respect he has gone very far back indeed, which, of course, is to be accounted for by the influence of that self-same Brentanoism. In view of all this, it remains for us only to openly confess to our error and to say in justification what Euripides used to say: "The Gods do much contrary to expectation; they do not do what we have expected, but, on the other hand, they find ways of doing the unexpected."