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p Herr Bernstein asserts that Marx exaggerated tlie rapidity of the historical advance. This is true in respect of Marx’s view regarding the development of capitalist society. But why was Marx disposed towards that exaggeration? Here too, J Lerr Bernstein puts the blame on dialectics.  Again, this aspect of the influence exerted by dialectics is seen by him as most harmful and dangerous, and it is this aspect that makes him steer clear of the "pearls of dialectics”. Unfortunately, however, that aspect, too exists only in his imagination.

p According to Hegel, the logical process of negation takes place outside of time. However, the actual processes of the negation of one natural phenomenon by another, or of one social system by another are determined, in the rapidity of their course, by their own nature, and by the concrete conditions in which they take place. In bis polemic with Diihring and in his book Ludwig Feuerbach, Engels refers to the development of the Universe as a dialectical process. Did he exaggerate the rapidity of this process, which, in his own words, called for extremely lengthy periods of time? We do not think so. Even were he to have fallen into that error, if would have been the fault, not of dialectics but of some other circumstances: an insufficient knowledge of natural history, a lack of attention to the subject, or something like that. The influence of dialectics on his judgement of the speed of such processes would, in that case, have been just as negligible as that of the complexion of the Empress of China.

p Let us take another example, this time from the sphere of history.  Contraposing his dialectical method to Proudhon’s abstract thinking, Marx wrote in his Misere de la Philosophic: "It took the whole three centuries in Germany to establish the first big division of labour, the separation of the towns from the country."^^17^^’* Was the speed of historical development, exaggerated here? There does not seem to be any exaggeration here either, but even if there is. dialectics has nothing at all to do with it.

p Here is a third example, which hears upon contemporary social life. As is common knowledge, Lassalle was a firm adherent of the dialectical method, hut this firm adherent of the dialectical method thought it would take from a hundred to two hundred years for the gradual elimination of "landed and capitalist property" (des (mind- und Kapitaleigenthums). To judge by Herr Bernstein’s frame of mind today, he may be expected to find even such a period too brief. lie probably thinks, like Rodhertus, that the elimination just mentioned will take at least live hundred years. That, is his own affair, but Marx would have probably said that Lassalle wanted more time than was necessary for the radical 361 reconstruction of society. Hence if follows that the Hegelians, who were all agreed in recognising the, importance of the dialectical method, could appraise in highly different ways the pace of contemporary social development. Consequently if any particular adherent of dialectics really exaggerates that speed, that should be ascribed to something else but in no way to dialectics.

p “We know,” says Uerr Bernstein, "that we think and know sufficiently well in what way we think. But we shall never learn how that takes place; in what manner consciousness arises from external impressions, the excitation of the nerves, or from a change in the position and the interaction of the atoms of the brain."

p It is true that we shall never learn how consciousness arises in us, but that is not the point; the question is whether our ignorance can serve as an objection to materialism.  “Critical” thinkers such as F. A. Lange, and even physiologists such as Du Bois-Reymond thought that it could; the present author is of the opinion that it cannot.  We have proved that by excerpts from the works of La Mettrie, cited in an article directed against Herr Bernstein.^^175^^ He has taken offence at us for the article but, as the reader will now see, he has understood absolutely none of our objections. "Attempts have been made,” Herr Bernstein continues, "to account for this by ascribing to the atom a certain degree of capacity for consciousness, a degree of animateness in the sense of the monad doctrine."

p Indeed, attempts have been m,ade. Among the authors of such attempts was, as pointed out in our article, the materialist La Mettrie, though a comparison of his doctrine with Leibnitz’s doctrine of monads is somewhat far-fetched, llerr Bernstein says nothing of La Mel trie himself, though he thinks, in general, that "this’ (the reference is to the above-mentioned attempt) "is an image in the mind, an assumption forced on us by our mode of thinking and our need of an integral world-outlook."

p If the reader has understood this we can only congratulate him most sincerely because he has been more fortunate than the author of these lines, or Herr Bernstein himself, who does not seem to understand what he says. This is nothing more than a surmise! Of course, it is not! It is something that llerr Bernstein got to understand only when he decided to deny materialism, while nobody with any understanding of the matter has passed that “this” off for something else.

p But what follows from that “this” being a simple surmise? Is it that materialism is a hollow doctrine? That is the question, to which (here is no “atom” of reply either in llerr Bernstein’s former “critical” exercises or in the book under review.

p Further: "An article in which I indicated this circumstance and remarked that pure materialism is ultimately idealism has 362 provided Mr. Plekhanov with the desired pretext to attack me in Neue Zeit (Issue 44, 16th year, II^^170^^), accusing me of ignorance in general, and, in particular, of a complete absence of any understanding of Engels’s philosophical views. I say nothing of Mr. Plekhanov’s having arbitrarily made my words refer to things I did not touch upon; I state only that his article ends with a statement to the effect that Engels, in replying to a question from Mr. Plekhanov: ’So do you think old Spinoza was right when he said that thought and extent are nothing but two attributes of one and the same substance?’ said, ’Of course, old Spinoza was quite right.’"

p The author of these lines was indeed greatly surprised when he saw how poorly Engels’s philosophy (and consequently Marx’s as well), has been understood by Herr Bernstein, who spent several years in close contact with Engels. In reply to Herr Bernstein’s call: "Back to Kant”, we invited him to return to a study of philosophy (zuriick ins Studierzimmer). We did not seek any pretext for an attack on Herr Bernstein. If our surprise found expression in a certain sharpness, that acerbity can be explained by our former relations with Herr Bernstein. Though to us he always seemed to be narrow-minded (this can be borne out by many of our closest comrades), we yet considered him a member of Marx’s school, and were amazed by the truly puerile trifles he had written about materialism. At the time, our sharply-worded opinion of him might have been found somewhat unjust by some readers, but today scarcely anyone with some claim to knowledge will be found who will make so bold as to reproach us of exaggeration. Herr Bernstein’s philosophical ignorance has now revealed itself in all its lustre, so that we shall not even invite him to return to his schoolbooks: we can see that schoolbooks have not been written for such as he is.

p Pure materialism is ultimately idealism! But in that case, is the philosophy of Fichte and Hegel “ultimately” the philosophy of La Mettrie or Holbach?! This can be asserted only by one who has no understanding of materialism, idealism, Holbach, La Mettrie, Hegel or Fichte. Idealism undoubtedly has a common feature with materialism: a striving towards a monist explanation of phenomena. However, the mode in which this striving is given effect to in materialism is the diametrical opposite of the mode in which it is effected to in idealism, which is why materialism “ultimately” diverges radically from idealism.

p In his call "back to Kant”, Herr Bernstein ought to have shown that the road being followed by materialism is wrong in one respect or another. Instead of that, he has limited himself to a “reduction” (and what clumsy and naive reduction!) of materialism to idealism. What amazing force and profundity of criticism!

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p And now about Spinoza. Mme. Kantsel has made a poor translation of the relevant passage in Herr Bernstein’s book. Herr Bernstein says that our article, written on his "return to Kant" (whom he has never known, as is acknowledged even by his fellow-thinker Mr. Struve), is reducible to my conversation with Engels, which he has quoted. That is not true.

p A German comrade, who is far more competent in matters of philosophy than Herr Bernstein is, has expressed, in Neue Zeit, the thought that materialism as grounded in natural science does not stand up to criticism, and should not be linked with the theory of Marx and Engels, which can be very easily linked with the far more valid philosophical system of Spinoza.  Since Herr Bernstein has incidentally referred to the article by this comrade, we have found it necessary to reply to it as well. We have shown that Marx and Engels never adhered to the materialism which the Spinozist comrade has called that of natural science, i.e., the materialism of Vogt and Moleschott. Further, on the basis of the works of La Mettrie and Diderot, we have shown that French eighteenthcentury materialism was in essence nothing more than a modification of Spinozism. We have shown the same in respect of Feuerbach as well. It was only after that, when we went over to Marx and Engels, the founders of scientific socialism, that we, in noting the close affinity between their philosophical views and those of Feuerbach, voiced our conviction that their materialism was also a variety of Spinozism. Finally, as one of the grounds for that conviction, wo referred to one of our conversations with Engels. With Herr Bernstein, it appears that our article, in its entirety, can be reduced to that conversation. What should these words be ascribed to: a lack of truthfulness or of understanding?

p “With Spinoza,” Herr Bernstein continues, "God is the substance he ascribes these two attributes to. At all events, Spinoza identifies God with Nature, which is why Spinoza has long been denounced as a denier of God, while his philosophy has been rejected as atheistic whereas, formally speaking, it is a kind of pantheism__ Spinoza arrived at the notion of ’God’as infinite substance with attributes already mentioned, as well as others, this in a purely speculative way; for him, law-governed thinking and being were identical. In this respect, he resembled certain materialists but it would be an arbitrary understanding of the word to call him a representative of philosophical materialism.... If by the word ’materialism’ one is in general to understand something definite, then it can be only the doctrine of matter as the ultimate and sole foundation of things. But Spinoza expressly characterised his substance ’God’ as non-corporeal.... Anyone is, of course, free to be a Spinozist; only, in that case, he will no longer be a materialist."

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p This is all that llcrr Bernstein has been able to say in reply toon r historical note. It is not much. However, to this little one can apply, in a certain sense, the Latin expression non multa. set! rmillum.

p Spino/a resembles some materialists in his seeing law-governed thinking and being as identical. Very good. Consequently there exist materialists who acknowledge the identity of being and thinking. It appears that they do. But that is balderdash, and if Herr Bernstein understood the actual meaning of the words: the identity of being and thinking, he would of course never have discovered that identity in any single materialist. He would have seen that recognition of the identity of being and thinking is possible only in idealism. And then—a new and also very considerable advantage of an understanding of the subject—he would not have said that pure materialism is ultimately idealism. However, he does not understand what he is speaking of and is therefore as clumsy and helpless in his use of philosophical terminology, as the “magician” (in Gleb Uspensky’s story Songs of Need) was clumsy and helpless in his use of the literary language, when he promised to display to the ladies and gentlemen in the audience "the decapitation of the head, nose and other parts of the body".

p If Spinoza had recognised the identity of being and thinking, he would have been a “pure” idealist, i.e., something he never was. His single substance is simultaneously both material and spiritual.  [364•*  In Bernstein’s words, however, Spinoza ”expressly characterised" it as non-corporeal. How well he has understood Spinoxa! Almost as well as he has understood Hegel!

All these blunders of Herr Bernstein’s are most obvious and most unpardonable; they testify to such total and absolute incompetence in the field of philosophy that the reader may well ask whether it is worthwhile dwelling on them? However, anyone who would be prone even for a minute to give a negative reply to that question would be making a big mistake.