__SERIES__
current
problems
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__TITLE__
Science
and Morality
__TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2008-03-23T16:50:30-0800
__TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"
PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW
[4]Translated from the Russian~
HAXKA H HPABCTBEHHOCTb Ha
__COPYRIGHT__ First printing 197510507--797
H----------------113--75
014(01)-75
[5] CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................7-18 i..........................................................................:............................................19 A. Alexandrov. A SCIENTIFICAPPROACH TO MORALITY ..............21--49 G. Pospelov. MAN AND THE MORAL ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS............................................................50--64 II......................................................'................................................................65 V. Loginov. SCIENTIFICPOLITICS AND MORALITY........................67--87 E. Solovyov. KNOWLEDGE, FAITH AND MORALITY.......................88--129 A. Arsenyev. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND MORALITY (PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS)...............................130--187 O. Drobnitsky. SCIENTIFIC TRUTH AND MORAL GOOD.............188--218 III ..................................................................................................................219 V.Tolstykh. GALILEO VERSUS GALILEO........................................221--239 A. Gulyga. CRISIS---MORAL OR SOCIAL? .......................................240--257 E. llyenkov. HUMANISM AND SCIENCE...........................................258--277 [6] ~ [7] __ALPHA_LVL1__ INTRODUCTIONThe pertinence and vital import of the classic problem of science and morality are obvious not only to scholars but also to people whose occupations are far removed from science. Both scientists and laymen are concerned today with the interrelationship between science and morality. The situation determining the scope of interaction within the conditions set by the scientific and technological revolution is a unique and to a substantial degree ``unprecedented'' one. This provides us with the opportunity of looking at this traditional philosophical problem from a somewhat new perspective.
In our century' science has ceased to be the "private business" of the scientists. It is now entered into the ``budget'' of ``debits'' and ``credits'' of society as a whole. Science is silently and imperceptibly entering directly into production. It is modifying trie daily life and habits of human beings and winning an important position in the hierarchy of social consciousness. The further from the point of origin---- thefaster the motion. This proposition of Frederick Engels' is applicable not only to the development of production but to contemporary science as well. Much depends upon progress in science and technology: to no small extent trie progress of human civilization as a whole and the implementation of the vast plans for the communist transformation of society are predicated upon this progress.
However, other facts are just as indisputable. The growing interference of science in all spheres of human existence and, second, the scientific and technological revolution, having embraced within the last decades the basic production 8 spheres---have had the effect of making many moral problems yet more acute.
Modern science is developing under the influence of both internal and external factors and at times touching upon into the political world and the fundamental interests or millions of people. Under bourgeois society the increasingly `` technological'' profile of knowledge and the industrialization of science itself carries with it the danger of de-humanizing science; its achievements are perceived by many as bearing simultaneously both extraordinary good and evil. There is nothing surprising in the fact that more and more people are beginning to give serious thought to questions which at an earlier point in time were the privileged domain of a narrow circle of professional philosophers: what is the humanistic mission of science, what relationship does it have to the well-being and happiness of the human individual, is society capable of coping with the material and spiritual forces brougnt to the surface by science, is science ``controllable'', can we properly manage the utilization of scientific achievements?
These questions are being persistently posed, often in a dramatic form, by people of the most varied persuasions. Here for example, is now they are phrased in trie writings of an outstanding scientist, one of the leaders of the International Union for the Preservation of the Environment (L'Union Internationale pour la protection de la nature) Jean Dorst:
``We are quite justified in asking ourselves what is the value of a technological civilization. Each of us has at one time or another had the sensation that we are riding on a fast train that is out of control and from which it is impossible to disengage. We don't know where it is taking us, perhaps to a land of milk and honey, but perhaps to a dead end, to catastrophe in other words.... Man has played the role of sorcerer's apprentice and evoked life processes which he cannot control.''
Further on he writes:
``The degree of civilization is measured not only by the number of kilowatts of energy produced by energy sources. It is measured above all by a large number of criteria of a moral and spiritual nature, and by the wisdom of the individuals participating in a civilization ... in full harmony with the laws of nature from which man will never escape.''~^^1^^
Max Born, the eminent physicist, has stated the problem in a no less dramatic manner by touching directly upon the moral _-_-_
~^^1^^ Jean Dorst, Avant que nature meure, Neuchatel, 1965, pp. 11, 17, 18.
9 and ethical aspects of the problem. In his words, in our technological century science has acquired social, economic and political functions. Modern science and technology is developing at a constantly accelerating pace and has changed beyond recognition the profile of human civilization. Without denying the social, human usefulness of scientific and technological achievements, Born at the same time draws our attention to the process, accompanying the scientific and technological revolution, of the collapse of all ethical principles which had been created over the centuries and which 'had permitted man to preserve a dignified way of life even during the height of savage warfare and universal destruction. Born regards as most dangerous, threatening, and perhaps ``irrepairable'' the effects of the active intrusion of science and technology into the sphere of human life.Born and Dorst may be criticized for underestimating the social and class aspect of this problem which caused widespread concern---problem the resolution of which depends in the final result not upon science, or more precisely, not upon science alone. But the sense of unease conveyed by these scientists is indisputably widespread. The contradiction existing between a technological civilization and the spiritual culture of society, as well as between the level of ``knowledge'' and of moral ``consciousness'', is by no means a pessimist's stroke of imagination. It goes without saying that the conclusions drawn by Dorst and Born may seem insufficiently optimistic, particularly to those who see in the attainment of material wealth a panacea for social ills as a whole and an end in itself, who are inclined to turn the ``knowledge'' factor into a fetish, and who measure progress in terms of the level of comfort achieved and number of civilized ``toys'' accumulated. But if optimism is based upon the analysis of real factors, if faith in progress is to be freed from the fashionable illusion that science and technology are capable of resolving all of the fundamental contradictions of social existence, then these apprehensions must be recognized as well-founded and reasonable. Given the background of ``apocalyptic'' attitudes and views, which have been widely disseminated in the bourgeois world, the endeavour to defend the moral and spiritual criteria of progress, accumulated through the sufferings and triumphs of thousands of years of human history, takes on special value. This is true above all when the authors of the appeal to accountability before man are themselves scientists.
10Many scientists in the twentieth century, including Timiryazev, Joliot-Curie, Einstein and Wiener, insisted on the importance of providing a moral justification for further progress in science and technology. Helping lay the groundwork for modern science, they were also disturbed over the fate of human civilization. Far from considering the evolving situation in science as natural and normal, they emphasized, each in his own way, the dependence of scientific knowledge and activity upon social conditions and upon the moral state of society. With a feeling of trepidation and malaise Frederic Joliot-Curie wrote:
``Scientists are aware of the beneficial impact science has had upon society; they also know what could be achieved if only peace reigned supreme on earth. They wish that the phrase could never be pronounced that 'science is leading us to destruction by the atomic and hydrogen bombs'. Scientists know that science cannot be guilty. The finger of guilt should be pointed at those who employ the achievements of science to malicious ends.''~^^1^^
Scientific cognition---the accumulation of more and more profound knowledge---is a process carried out, as is well known, to subordinate reality to the power and interests of mankind. The authentic scientist, then, cannot avoid being disturbed by the human---and humanitarian---meaning of that which takes place behind the facade of the "drama of ideas''. The divergence between the true and the good is perceived by him as a social problem impossible to dismiss by references to ``professional'' impartiality. This was well understood by Norbert Wiener, who was disturbed by certain tendencies emerging in the evolution of cybernetics, the science he created, and by Albert Einstein, who more than once insisted upon the priority of moral criteria in the evaluation of the work and profile of the scholar.
Addressing their attention to the social-ethical side of scientific activity, outstanding scholars have in mind not only the feasibility of the inhuman application of the achievements of science and technology.
To be sure, science is a powerful weapon for the liberation of mankind, demanding from society responsible and competent application. But is it really possible to limit the humanitarian meaning of the problem to the sphere of application of scientific achievements alone, without touching upon the _-_-_
^^1^^ Cinq annees de luttes pour la paix, Paris, 1954, pp. 253--54.
11 modes of thought and methodology employed by the scientist? The striving toward a cognition of the essence of any given factor, subject, or phenomenon forces the scientist to remove himself from his individual human experience and to ``talk'' in the language of the object under examination. In other words the individual with his concrete interests and needs `` disappears'' from the field of vision of the natural scientist to be replaced by machines, algorithms, formulae, etc. When the epistemology of a given scientific approach to the world is turned into an absolute the result is an impoverishment and emasculation of the humanitarian content of the creative activity of the scientist, in turn engendering in the latter spurious conceptions concerning his social ``impartiality''.The history of science, including modern science, is rich in examples of selfless efforts made by scientists to defend the humanitarian import of their labours. Therefore we must separate ourselves from attempts to heap the blame for one or another social woe on science and scientists for it has become fashionable to represent them as the most probable cause of all conceivable human woes and misfortunes. The idea is not a new one---suffice it to recall Rousseau's reply to L'Academic de Dijon, casting blame for the decline of morals upon science and art. Much time as well as theoretical and practical experience were required before the guilt for social misfortune could be accurately located in the inhuman bourgeois system. Does it make any sense to repeat the errors of the past?
Without calling into doubt the noble intentions of Rousseau we wonder, however, whether it is necessary to argue that it is precisely the true opponents of human progress who are today above all interested in the advancements of similar exaggerated claims concerning the ``guilt'' of science.
It must be underscored that the pure subordination of morality to science (or the reverse) has little explanatory value concerning their interrelation in the contemporary world. The Marxist formulation of the question proposes the examination of this interaction as it applies to the fate of human activity as such. In this light we will clearly see the unbalanced nature of the extremely widespread train of thought, according to which scientific and technological progress exerts an influence on morality by engendering in moral consciousness and behaviour a given set of consequences, whereas morality serves merely as an object of encroachments on the part of science and technology. But isn't it possible that ethics has something 12 to say in answer, since it also makes a significant contribution to societal progress?
The myth of a scientific threat is one of the forms of a "substitution manoeuvre" which we encounter even today. In the capitalist countries the propagation of this myth, as a rule, provokes no serious objections on the part of the powers that be. The contemporary bourgeoisie eagerly supports the establishment of ``scientism'', that is to say, an abstract approach to scientific problems placed at a remove from real needs and interests of the real, concrete historical individual. It must be confessed, certain results have been achieved. The ideas stemming from ethical relativism have sunk deep roots in the consciousness of many bourgeois scholars, philosophers, and natural scientists today. Bearing an interest in the results of the scientist's labour, the contemporary bourgeoisie takes every opportunity to propagate its version of the ``immorality'' of scientific knowledge. In a time of unceasing assaults upon ``traditional'' morality which allegedly has not held up to the ordeals of our ``unstable'' "illogical century (at this point allusions are often made to Auschwitz and Hiroshima), bourgeois theoreticians by means of a not very skillful argumentation try to bring us to the conclusion that science and scientists can consider themselves free of moral concerns and obligations before society. Thus the dispute over science and morality acquires a clearly articulated ideological character.
Among scientists living and working in bourgeois society there are many who find themselves in agreement with Joliot-Curie, Einstein or Wiener in the effort to maintain rigorous humanitarian standards in scientific activity. However we must not forget that other types exist---those natural and particularly social scientists who have quite consciously and candidly placed themselves at the service of the ruling class. We refer to people like Edward Teller, the physicist, or William Vogt, the neo-Malthusian philosopher, who make no effort to conceal their reactionary and anti-humanitarian views. We refer to those whom Lenin pitilessly defined as the scholarly bailiffs of the capitalist class. For them naturally, the question of the moral responsibility of science does not even arise. Karl Marx; evaluating the principal difference between the classic writer of English political economy, David Ricardo, and the reactionary ideologue, Thomas Malthus, spoke of the "utter baseness" of the latter's thought, about the fully justified loathing felt by the English working class towards Malthus; "the people's instinct was correct here, in that they felt that he 13 was no man of science, but a bought advocate of their opponents, a shameless sycophant of the ruling classes.''^^1^^ Baseness of thought is an inevitable result of ``scientific'' activity directed against the interests of the individual and mankind as a wnole. A decisive pre-condition for the disappearance of such people from the sphere of science, wrote the founders of Marxism-Leninism, is the fundamental transformation of society on communist principles.
Underscoring the transformative force imbedded in science in contemporary society, Marxism-Leninism, nevertheless, avoids the extreme of overestimating this force. To be sure, science enjoys a certain autonomy and is free to ``dictate'' its conditions. But, incorporated in the system of concrete historical and social relations, science itself is subject to the ``dictates'' of reality. Its sphere of competence is by no means unlimited, and its own development is in obvious dependence upon the social and class structure of society and the dominant ideology. The tragic situation in which the modern scientisthumanist can---and often does---find himself is inexplicable from the point of view of the laws of the development of knowledge as such. The explanation must be class-based, and the resolution---socio-political.
With the victory of socialism the social conditions underlying the development of science are fundamentally altered. The well-being of man, the satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the working people, the expansion of the creative capabilities of the individual---these are its basic goals and social import. In this sense socialism is the turning-point in science, the beginning of the re-orientation of its social functions, from the "production of things" to the "production of the human as such''.
The Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th Congress states that "under socialism the fullest possible satisfaction of the people's material and cultural requirements is the supreme aim of social production".^^2^^ This fully pertains to science as well since it is becoming to an ever greater extent a direct productive force in society. Its place in social life and role in the resolution of the most pressing tasks in the building of communism is expressed not only in enhanced efficiency and in progress achieved in socialist production, but also in the creation of the necessary conditions for the harmonious _-_-_
~^^1^^ K. Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value, Part II, Moscow, 1971, p. 120.
~^^2^^ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, pp. 50--51.
14 development of the creative activity and capabilities of the Soviet people. Science---this was emphasized at the 24th Congress of the Party---is emerging as a powerful social and cultural force in the implementation of one of the major tasks in the building of communism, namely, the transformation of social relations, the moulding of a new man. This communist orientation given to science and determining the social and humanitarian meaning of scientific creativity under socialism, decisively alters the character of its interrelations with other forms or human activity---including, morality.Might it be argued then, as far as socialist society as a whole is concerned, that the question under discussion loses its relevance, that the proolem of the moral responsibility of scientist for the social effect of his own creative activity is in general erased from the agenda?
As matters stand the belief in the indifference of science to moral questions has its advocates among certain Soviet scientists as well. The motives of a technocratic ideology, the turning of scientific knowledge into a fetish, and the underestimation of moral factors find support among scientific and technological intelligentsia. ``Knowledge'' is sometimes identified with ``consciousness'', and'contrasted with ``faith'' and ``convictions''. Attempts are made to interpret the domain of the moral in the individual and society from the position of an abstract and one-sided rationalism. Even in those instances when the connection between science and morality is recognized, as indisputable, we may encounter many dubious and simplistic judgements which in fact require a more critical evaluation.
Thus, for example, the question of the relationship between science and morality touches upon essential aspects of the process of educating and bringing up the younger generation. Experience has demonstrated that the individual's level of education by itself does not guarantee a high level of moral consciousness, that an identification of the cognitive and the moral-educative aspects in personality formation is just as erroneous as is the juxtaposition of these two aspects. Consequently, no matter how important the notion `` knowledge'', it must not be turned into an absolute. The direction and object of this knowledge, in other words the ideological and moral orientation, are the most important considerations.
In this connection the proposition advanced by Lenin in the well-known speech "The Tasks of Youth Leagues" is extremely pertinent. In his words: "The entire purpose of training, educating and teaching the youth of today should be to imbue 15 them with communist ethics.''^^1^^ Does it follow that Lenin underestimated the significance of professional training for future specialists? It goes without saying, no. The question at hand is of another nature, the necessity of organically linking general education and instructions per se, on the one hand, and the tasks and goals of communist transformation of society on the other. This teaching and training should be free from one-sidedness and narrowness and contribute to the development of the truly creative individual clearly aware of his place and social role in society. Lenin posed the question of the moral underpinnings for education in the broadest sense: as not only the most important condition for the correct---full and harmonious---formation and development of the personality, but also as an essential condition for the implementation of the final goal---the building of communism. A developed moral culture and high ethical consciousness are not merely supplements to or embellishments on the ``basic'' profession of the individual but rather the expression of the authentic humane meaning of creative activity in a collectivist society. In reference to the system of ``instruction'' as such, Lenin proposes the organic unity of education, essential in both a professional and social sense.
Another aspect of the same question is connected with the state and character of the development'of scientific knowledge itself. Max Born refers to the serious gap in "style of thought" between representatives of the humanities and natural sciences. As a result civilized society is, in his words, fractured into two groups: the one guided by traditional humanist principles and the other by ideas derived from the natural sciences. Born is sceptical about hopes for overcoming this gap by a "rationally balanced education''. He is without a doubt correct, since the latter is not capable of altering the "style of thought" as such, a style which reflects the objective state of science in a society dominated by alienation. The outstanding physicist is very close in his thoughts to those precisely formulated by Karl Marx. Describing science in the future communist society, Marx wrote: "Natural science will in time subsume under itself the science of man, just as the science of man will subsume under itself natural science: there will be one science.''^^2^^ We observe that this implies not the mechanical joining of the natural and social sciences (``humanities''), or the absorption of _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 291.
~^^2^^ K Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Moscow, 1974, p. 98.
16 one by the other, but rather the appearance of a science of a new quality, in which an orientation towards humanist values finds clear expression in the very subject matter of scientific cognition and activity In the theme under discussion, the formative process of this ``umbrella'' science, already under way in socialist society, must be conceived as a process reflecting ongoing changes in the object-activity of the personality and as a process of intensification of the active creative attitude of the human, both to the outside world and to himself.The points we have outlined above suggest the motivations which led the authors of the present work---natural scientists, philosophers, historians---to gather together to express their views on one of the most urgent problems facing the modern world. The book gives an impression of the nature and level of discourse centred upon this problem and conducted by Soviet scholars. Further, the authors made an effort to overcome certain shortcomings and misperceptions, connected, in particular, with our understanding of the notions ``science'' and ``morality'' as such. We often include in our conception of ``science'' only the natural, so-called ``exact'' sciences, and leave out of consideration the social (``humanist'') disciplines. Such a notion of the range of science, excluding from its boundaries those disciplines which study directly man and social relations, is in no way justified. It undermines in advance the substantiation of points of view derived therein. The same may be said of the various understandings of the notions ``morality'' and ``ethics'' which have left themselves to a wide range of interpretations. The authors of the present work take into consideration the complexity and imprecision of the theme under discussion and endeavour to the extent of their abilities to make a contribution to its further clarification.
This collection of essays contains an analysis of the nodal points in the problem of science and morality. What correlation may be established between the truth and the good? What is the moral significance of science, its role in forming and perfecting social ethics? Where may we locate the moral factor in scientific knowledge and creativity and what are the boundaries describing the influence of morality upon the development of science?
How do we define the moral responsibility of the scientist for the social effects of the application of the discoveries and achievements of science? The connection between science and morality is not limited to simple coordination, it bears an internally coordinated stamp---such is the central idea of the 17 book, the unifying thread of the articles. Differences in points of view are often quite substantial and extend to the very interpretation of the complex dialectic of the relationship between the two spheres of human activity within our concern. The book is written in such a fashion that the reader may, pursuing the development of the central idea shared by all of the authors, in so doing discern differences in attitude.
This book is intended to stimulate discussion, it is polemical. The authors do not make any pretensions to possess the "ultimate truth''. On the contrary they believe that the problem in question stands in need of further discussion and theoretical elaboration. They hope that the proffered level of discussion will serve as a stimulus for further reflection and inquiry.
The choice of a polemical form of presentation was necessitated not only by the (not unimportant) circumstance that the scientific yet lively approach avoids the danger of ``academicism''. The writers were concerned not only with widening the circle of potential readers. In truth it is impossible, to paraphrase Lenin, to present a new view in other than a polemical form. This means of presentation is employed by the authors in disputing individual points and propositions of their colleagues as well.
[18] ~ [19] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ I __ALPHA_LVL1__ [Natural Scientists: mathematicians, physicists, chemists, geologists, etc.] __ALPHA_LVL2__ [introduction.]The problem of the relationship between science and morality is discussed on these pages by natural scientists: mathematicians, physicists, chemists, geologists, etc. In discussing this purely philosophical theme, the participants simultaneously avoid a narrow or ``discipline-bound'' approach to the question of the social aspects of the progress of knowledge, instead considering this theme as it pertains to the humanist significance of science. Expressing a wide spectrum of attitudes these representatives of the so-called "exact sciences" give voice to the originality of the personal experience accumulated in the practice of science.
The authors of the given section of the book are Academician A. D. Alexandrov (mathematician) and professor G. L. Pospelov, D. Sc. (Geology and Minerology).
[20] ~ [21] __ALPHA_LVL2__ A. AlexandrovIf a person has done some harm, he is likely to be asked: "How could you do such a thing?" He might justify himself: "I wanted things to turn out better.'' To this the retort is bound to follow: "It doesn't matter what you wanted---you should have thought about it!''
In this demand to "not only wish, but also think" is expressed that which we call the scientific approach to morality. It concerns morality inasmuch as our focus is upon moral evaluation (``I wanted things to turn out better'') and is called ``scientific'' because it is necessary to think not in a random fashion but so that thoughts correspond with reality and lead to effective solutions. In moral questions, that about which it is "necessary to think" concerns not only the external situation surrounding the person making the decision and acting, but also the authentic meaning underlying his intent to act so that "things turn out better''. It might seem somewhat bombastic to raise to the level of ``scientific'' the simple requirement that "one must think''. But the scientific approach is only a more developed form of such an approach to a subject which leads to understanding, guides practical activity and offers the possibility of prediction.
Given the various possible shadings one may give to the notions ``ethics'' and ``morality'', the most important meaning remains to give guidance to the behaviour of a person. Remaining in the sphere of judgements, evaluations and intentions alone and not finding embodiment in real activities, ethics in substance remains empty, unreal. One's intentions are not enough. The moral intent becomes real only when something is done for the better. But the recognition of this fact leads logically to the necessity of giving a scientific approach to morality.
22In point of fact intentions are materialized as a result of the activities completed by a given individual. The ensuing material process is dependent not only on the wishes of the individual. There are real conditions underlying such a process and the possibility of action by the individual. Further, there is the logical and necessary inter-connectedness of events, limiting the range of the possible and determining the inevitable consequences. If all of this remains unknown, there . are no guarantees that even the best of intentions can be carried through. To insure a correspondence between intent and result, knowledge and understanding are required. But in any complex situation, knowledge and understanding are not immediately accessible; they have to be sought out. The search for true knowledge is precisely the path of science. Consequently the necessary prerequisite for a true morality is a scientific approach to the problems of morality.
A scientific approach means, fundamentally, nothing more than to endeavour to investigate, learn about, comprehend and take into consideration that which makes up the reality. In the final analysis, this is simply conscientiousness. There is no gulf between the actions of a scientist and those of a conscientious layman. The only difference is that science operates with a whole arsenal of specialized methods and theoretical constructions while in everyday life people are forced to be guided by worldly observations, common sense and their past experience.
Thus a scientific approach presupposes a developed sense of moral responsibility which does not allow an individual to restrict himself to subjective opinions of "what is best''. Rather it demands that he come to terms with objectivity, with that which does not hinge upon the opinions and desires of the individual.
Of course, people are often forced to make decisions and act without being given time to reflect or investigate the circumstances. In these instances a conscientious person will at least try to understand the implications of given actions and decisions, to take mistakes into account and, if possible, to correct them. In this manner we accumulate moral experience which in the future permits us to guess the correct decision even when we lack the necessary knowledge or time to examine in full. We might call such guesswork "moral intuition''. But just as scientific intuition devoid of verification doesn't give reliable knowledge, so moral intuition requires verification and develops on the basis of comprehension of life and social experience.
23In speaking of a scientific approach to ethics we take for eranted the existence of at least some morality. In those instances where the choice of decisions is dictated by unmediated feeling or when this choice requires no more than experience, common sense, tradition, the example, or directions provided by someone else---in a word, in the most simple of situations---it is sufficient to follow elementary ethical prescriptions without any scientific approach. For the immoral individual the scientific approach is just as useless as it is for the ignorant who does not want to know and evinces no desire to make use of knowledge.
In the contemporary world a scientific approach to morality is of particular import since the individual is often confronted with complex moral questions. The requirement to "not only want but also think" becomes ever more important as the volume and depth of the problems facing the individual grow. If an individual makes a judgement without full understanding---for example, if an innocent person is convicted without the proper evidence---this judgement could be in direct contradiction to his personal moral principles. In acting without adequate knowledge, one may in all possibility not achieve the desired result and his moral intentions will remain unrealized. What is worse, he may come to regret the consequences of what he has done. People who give instructions without the necessary expertise or interfere blindly in what they don't understand, often bring about great harm despite their good intentions. Objectively speaking, they place themselves in a position of moral irresponsibility (as, for example, the manager who doesn't take the time to examine the task at hand, or the instructor who doesn't want to understand his students).
What events are taking place in the world? What is the meaning of these events? What is the meaning of our life activities? These questions are posed, in one form or another, by everyone who leaves the confines of daily routine and tries to define his own moral position. If an individual doesn't accept everything on faitn, he inevitably confronts these Questions and looks for the necessary knowledge. If the demand for information is not dictated by simple curiosity, it is always underpinned by a moral inquiry. However information in itself yields little, it must be comprehended. In turn, comprehension without serious conceptualization and thought is inconceivable. For this reason factual knowledge and scientific understanding are imperative for the truly thoughtful individual who tries to come to grips with important moral 24 problems. It would be naive to demand that science "explain everything" and provide answers for each and every problem. Nevertheless, science is capable of much and, what is more important, it is the only way to a profound understanding. Without it one is left with only subjective opinion and unfounded assumptions.
It could be objected that the question of the meaning of life does not fall within the domain of science. But if the answer is not to be sought in the "other world" it must be looked for in the world of reality. It is only through knowledge of the real content of life that a reasonable answer can be given to this question. Thus, even if science does not resolve ethical problems, it does give the individual support and guidance in his quests and his decision-making.
When we speak of science, we often have in mind mathematics, physics, chemistry and seem to forget the sciences of society and of man. But it is precisely these sciences which are of overriding importance for ethics inasmuch as they study human and social problems and unveil, in particular, the nature of morality itself. These sciences bear upon the inner world of man and, endeavouring to live up to the ancient philosophical maxim: "Know thyself'', they examine man in the unity of his internal and external, objective and subjective, individual and social being. The metaphysical juxtaposition of these aspects of being serves as a source of the gap between science and ethics (when the first is regarded to be directed at the external and the second, at the internal world of the individual). However, since man maintains conscious control over his actions, by virtue of this he becomes an object to himself, not to mention that in the eyes of another person he is something ``external'', that the subjective is founded in the objective.
Those who object against the ties between science and ethics generally point to the fact that science can engender evil and calamities. This, however, is imprecise. Science only discovers that which exists---be it good or bad---or establishes what is possible or impossible according to the laws of nature. New scientific discoveries turn out to be evil or menacing not ipso facto, but only as a consequence of their application when people either fail to foresee or comprehend the results, or consciously utilize the achievements of technology as a source of profit, repression, extortion or murder. Therefore the only possible means to combat the ``dangers'' of science are a higher :vel of knowledge and an effort, based upon this knowledge, directed against those social forces which would exploit 25 science. Moral indignation must be supported by knowledge to become effective and purposeful.
When the significance of science for morality comes under discussion, it sometimes happens that misunderstandings arise because science is often regarded as strictly a system of knowledge. Scientific knowledge emerges from the cognitive activities of people who are guided by their efforts to ascertain the" truth. These efforts are submitted to the dictates of experiment and logic and are in fact at the heart of science, without which the latter could not exist. The scientific spirit, with the demands that it entails, namely to examine the facts objectively, to hunt out and to pursue the truth, is important for morality.
Explanations of the significance of science for morality sometimes are regarded as attempts to ``reduce'' the latter to a science. But the spirit of science striving towards the truth is incapable of exhausting morality if only because the choice of decisions and actions depends not only upon knowledge and not even upon moral principles in isolation. It happens that people bring harm upon themselves; they are completely aware of this but unable to restrain themselves from such actions. Narcotics control, for example, would be impossible without an explanation of the harm wrought by drugs. To deny this by referring to the insufficiency of explanation by itself would be absurd. It would be just as absurd to deny a scientific approach to morality by declaring that this approach in itself cannot ensure a high level of morals.
Again, it would be no less absurd to accuse of trying to reduce morality to knowledge alone those who underscore the importance of science for the resolution of problems of morality. Indeed, knowledge states that which is, was and will be; correspondingly, it speaks in the indicative mood. Ethics, on the other hand, command. But from a simple statement of facts no imperatives can be logically adduced. For example, from the statement "you are sick" the imperative "cure yourself" doesn't necessarily follow. Therefore the reduction of ethics to knowledge or the deduction of ethics from the latter is quite impossible. They are organically interconnected. These interconnections, incidentally, are evident in the example of the sick man, for there is an obvious connection between science (medicine), the instruction to recover and the possibility of effecting a cure.
Ethics is also expressed in evaluations bearing the form of a statement (for example, "theft is evil''). But in this context an 26 imperative is always taken as a given (``don't steal''). Thus in the example above the reduction of morality to knowledge is logically impossible, just as it is in the case of a direct moral imperative.
Thus the actual dependence of ethics upon science is not to be located in the reduction of the former to knowledge. The "scientific approach" would not be scientific if it placed its claim over the entire realm of ethics, in a word, if it tried to reduce the latter to a science. It merely emphasizes that a striving towards the knowledge of truth is essential for morality, that without it morality runs the risk of remaining simply that which is desirable, but not real.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACHMany accept without any doubt the significance of knowledge and of a scientific approach as a precondition for the realization of moral intentions. But do knowledge and a scientific approach exert An influence on man's moral principles and goals themselves or does science merely determine the means rather than'the goals?
We will find the answers by examining the specific question---why is it that atheists do not set as their goal the salvation of the soul and eternal bliss in heaven? Because, apparently, they regard the salvation of the soul, heaven and hell as inventions; many maintain this position proceeding from scientifically-based convictions. Here the dependence of moral principles and goals upon science is obvious. Of course, the notions ``ends'' and ``means'' are relative: a given goal might be a means to a more general goal. In turn a means, considered as that which must still be implemented, is in fact a goal. However, incorporating a given goal within the framework of more general ends, and the latter within still more general ends, we might come to the conclusion that the moral goal is good "in general'', i.e., something abstract. In order to avoid this conclusion good and evil must be given definition. But as soon as we pose this question, we are forced to turn to human needs, to problems concerning the development of society, in a word, we are forced to adopt a scientific approach to examining phenomena. Thus the scientific approach turns out to be a necessary condition for the rational definition not only of the means of achieving moral goals, but 27 also of these goals themselves, of moral conceptions and principles.
Philosophers and religious thinkers have from ancient times proclaimed moral ideals and high ethical principles and have seeked moral perfection. Christianity proselytized the love of humanity; the ancient teaching of Hinduism argued that a disdain for property and a refusal to acknowledge the very notion of ``mine'' were virtues. The Jacobins preached freedom, equality and fraternity. But none of these ideals were brought into reality.
So, it is essential to choose real ideals and to find real means to implement them. The task of clarifying the reality of an ideal and of searching for real means of achieving them is a scientific one. Only proceeding from a scientific position, incorporating all of reality, is one capable of discovering the reasons underlying the moral malaise of mankind and of finding effective remedies.
Precisely such a scientific formulation for the problem of ethics was articulated by Marxism. Communism as an ethical and social ideal was in existence long before Marx and Engels. Their contribution consisted not so much in the clarification of this ideal as in pointing out the ways of achieving this ideal on the basis of scientific theory.
Lenin wrote: "Communist morality is based on the struggle for the consolidation and completion of communism.''^^1^^ The first proposition of the moral code, formulated in the Programme of the CPSU, states: "devotion to the cause of communism''. Clearly, this proposition will acquire a precise meaning only once it is understood exactly what is meant under the "cause of communism'', and how "the struggle for the consolidation and completion of communism" can and must be carried out. In this instance simple references to communist ideals will not suffice, because we are concerned not only with these ideals but with the cause of communism, i.e., with the actual ways of implementing these ideals. A serious answer to this question can be given only on the basis of scientific theory. Therefore the notion of communist morality, if isolated from science, is lacking in precise meaning and, bereft of scientific understanding, turns into a slogan which can support a wide range of content. To vote "for communism" is a question of moral choice, but this choice is seriously comprehended only when it is understood precisely what an individual is choosing _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 295.
28 when he relies upon a scientific concept of communism. It was not for nothing that Lenin called to learn communism, for without comprehensive knowledge, without a serious intellectual effort communism could turn into a "mere signboard'', and "such superficiality would be decidedly fatal.''^^1^^The question, consequently, becomes that of defining on what an individual bases his convictions. Does he find his premises in a blind faith in the dogma of any given teaching, in authority, in personal infallibility, or does he try to think through his convictions rationally to verify and strengthen them with serious knowledge? Of course, one can never be omniscient, nor can he predict the future in full. But this does not imply that one is left with faith only, as the unconditional acceptance of any given and unverifiable proposition. In contrast to faith, the scientific position accepts nothing unconditionally, without demonstration or foundation. With faith an individual rejects his own essence as a rational being: on the other hand, he affirms this essence if he endeavours critically to apprehend reality (including his self). Such a position does not deprive him of the solidity of his convictions but provides him with another, firmer basis than that given by faith, for in this case the convictions are well thought out and rest on solid ground. The objective meaning of the propagation of faith is often reduced to converting people into a ``flock'' which the shepherd can guide in any convenient direction. For this reason Lenin took an uncompromising stance towards religion and any other blind faith. He wrote: "To accept anything on trust, to preclude critical application and development, is a grievous sin....''^^2^^ When communists declared that their ethics was a class one, this was an expression not of their faith, but of the scientific understanding of the class nature of morality in a class society.
The world outlook of an individual includes not only his general view of the world but also his over-all moral position. Therefore an integral scientific world outlook necessarily links up this position with a scientific understanding of the world and apprehends it proceeding from the same general scientific approach. Rejection of this would signify if not a general denial of the scientific approach to ideological problems, then at least a dualism: science remains science, and ethics remains _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 288
^^2^^ Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 630.
29 ethics. But then ethics is inevitably transferred to the sphere of pure subjectivism or of religious faith. It is not for nothing that the standard-bearers of faith take up arms against those who defend the idea of a link between science and morality. The question is posed as follows: either an integral scientific world outlook or a hodge-podge of science, dogmatism and faith in God or in earthly ``infallible'' gods.The scientific world outlook advocates a scientific approach to all phenomena. This excludes a division into "spheres of influence" according to which external being belongs to science whereas good and ideals belong to faith. This is how the question of the influence of knowledge and a scientific approach upon morality is to be resolved.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ MORAL CONSCIOUSNESSMorality is formed of moral consciousness and moral sentiment; it would be inconceivable without governing the emotional sphere. But in order to govern his feelings, desires and interests, the individual must initially apprehend them. This is not always a simple task, especially if one moves from strictly personal to social and class interests and feelings. The class feeling must develop into the class consciousness^^1^^; its high level is assured by a certain sum of knowledge achieved by means of education.
Socialist consciousness was introduced into the workers' movement by the intelligentsia. Marxist political education revealed to the proletariat its authentic class interests and its historical role in the liberation of society as a whole from all forms of exploitation. Proletarians, in mastering the scientific conclusions concerning the development of society, recognized themselves not only as fighters for their individual interests or the interests of their collective alone, but as fighters for their class interests, for socialism and for a better future for all mankind. This consciousness morally elevated the proletariat to the level of heroic achievements. Thus scientific knowledge became a moral factor..This occurred, no doubt, not independently, but rather because knowledge merged. with moral sentiment and gave the latter form and direction.
_-_-_^^1^^ This (class, revolutionary---A. A.) instinct must be transformed into political awareness'', wrote Lenin. (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 24, p. 268.)
30The effectiveness of one's intentions depends on his character, on his moral strengths (conscience, will, etc.). If the individual is lacking in these, he, though possessed of the highest principles and the best intentions, will be incapable in difficult situations of acting in an authentically moral fashion. However moral strengths of themselves are not goaloriented---only through focusing them upon moral goals do they become precise and definite.
If an individual is wholly lacking in conscience (there exist such pathological cases) no appeals to his conscience will have effect. But since conscience in and of itself is only a moral strength or a form of moral consciousness, and since form must also have content, the determining factor is that of the content given to this form, that which the individual considers to be compatible or incompatible with his conscience. "The Republican has a different conscience than that of the Royalist, the rich---than that of the poor, the thinker---than that of he who is incapable of thought.''~^^1^^ But as soon as we turn to the content of conscience, we are forced to consider not only feelings but also reason. It would seem that the conscience of a patriot would not permit him to hope for the defeat of his homeland. But Leninists in the period of the imperialist war were ``defeatists'': their patriotism was socialistic. This was dictated not by feelings alone, but to no less a degree by a scientific understanding of the requirements of the moment: the defeat of Russia in the imperialist war would weaken the position of the autocracy and bring nearer its collapse and the victory of the working class. It follows from a scientific approach to morality that a refusal to comprehend the objective situation in and of itself must be considered unconscionable. Only a scientific approach permits the discovery of authentic truth. And where is conscience left if bereft of a persistent striving towards and uncompromizing respect for the truth?
Quite the same may be said for the other moral strengths: there can be no morality without simple compassion, honour and will. However one can feel compassion for different people, honour can be understood in many ways, the will can be employed to achieve a wide range of goals.
Then there is a degree of interaction between feelings and reason: knowledge influences the feelings and moral forces not only in that it gives rational definition to their content. The _-_-_
~^^1^^ K. Marx, F. Engels, Werke, Ed. 6, S. 130.
31 personality is moulded as a result of the assimilation of experience and consequently of knowledge. His moral strengths are being foi.nulated simultaneously. Thorough knowledge, by engendering decisiveness, consolidates the will. If an individual recognizes the baneful consequences of his action he will perhaps judge himself severely and his conscience will become more penetrating.Reliance upon the feelings in disregard of reason, the neglect of knowledge and understanding in asserting faith---these are the typical features of all forms of-- irrationalism, which reached its apogee under fascism. The fascist idea of a "superior race" shared no common ground with science. Hitler, providing the foundations for his views, referred not to science out to the "will of Providence'', to the ``creator'' and so on. The Hitlerian method consisted of the influencing feelings, hypnotizing people and suppressing their ability to take a critical stance towards reality, thus evoking in them "the general will''.
Some opponents of the connection between science and morality observe that the nazis also employed science, and even call them enlightened people. Indeed, it is difficult to accept as enlightenment the dissemination of fascist theories and the methods employed by Hitler of "evoking the general will''. This is not enlightenment, but rather the most flagrant obscurantism. The example provided by fascism in fact confirms the existing ties between science and morality. Correspondingly it confirms the connection between antiscientific sentiment, irrationalism and immorality.
Appeals to reason, understanding and science stand in opposition to all forms of irrationalism. It was precisely for this purpose that the human being was given a reason, this is what makes him specifically human, namely, that he not succumb to emotions alone, but rather act in accordance with the dictates of his heart and his reason. Science and reason must not be exploited simply as means for the achievement of goals determined independently of them. But general goals and moral principles themselves must be submitted to critical examination in the scientific spirit and must find support in a scientific understanding of social life.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ THE NOTION OF MORALITY AND THE ACTWe continue to outline our conclusions drawn from an analysis of the notion of morality itself. Making no claim to make a precise definition of morality, we will focus only upon 32 those features of the individual's morality which to us would appear to be essential.
First, morality presupposes not only the conscious act (including a judgement), but also its evaluation or at least the possibility of evaluating it, that is to say, the apprehension of a relationship between the completed or intended action and a corresponding system of values (the notions of good, necessary, norms, and goals). Otherwise, even given the consciousness of one's action, the individual does not know what he does, just as a child may not understand that he is behaving poorly. A she-animal heroically defends her offspring; heroism was also displayed by primitive savages. But a complete moral evaluation of an act requires an apprehension of the goal to which it was directed.
Second, morality presupposes a correlation of values, judgements and actions with the consciousness borne by others; it is a social phenomenon. The notion of a moral code held by an isolated individual is lacking in content.
Third, morality presupposes at least a minimal fulfilment in corresponding activities. Limited strictly to the sphere of moral consciousness, it would remain a "thing in itself'', devoid of reality. Even expressed only through speech it already acquires reality which can be assessed as either moral judgement or hypocrisy.
The fourth feature of morality consists in the possibility, of choice (If only a conceivable one). If this possibility be lacking, it is impossible to speak of morality.
Finally, a particular feature of morality resides in what we may call the axiomatic or unconditional imperative. As long as discussion is underway and arguments as well as opportunities are being weighed, moral consciousness does not emerge in a pure form. But there comes a moment of decision and action, when an individual may even act in defiance of reason, obeying moral dictates which have a more profound justification. This internal moral conviction rests upon feeling and is above all the result of having mastered the experiences proffered by one's life in society.
The ``cellule'' in which morality emerges in the unity of consciousness and action is the act---conscious and completed action or activity of the individual. The act is formed of the following: the goal or intentions; the plan of their implementation; the inducement or will which transform one's intentions into actions; the comprehension of the latter by the individual. Goal, plan and will refer to the consciousness; activity completes the transition from consciousness to results and 33 consequences, and the latter return to react upon the consciousness. We have before us, in a formal sense, the usual feedback system.
Besides the entire complex of external conditions, the subject of morality remains outside the confines of the given scheme, i.e., the individual himself performing the act (he is also a condition of his own activity), the considerations prompting him to advance the given goal, his value orientation, his subconscious strivings, his abilities, character, and sheer physical capacity. Behind all this, of course, stand the social conditions influencing the personality of the individual, but they ``act'' here through him. This is often ignored and frequently, complaining of circumstances, one overlooks the possibility that it is precisely oneself that is the ``condition'' interfering with the completion of one's good intentions; through indolence, cowardice, incompetence or, as it happens, stupidity.
In the scheme of the act which we have presented morality is directly incorporated in the goal. The plan determines that which must be done to achieve the goal. Correspondingly, action emerges as an imperative defined by the goal. The imperative posited by morality is called the duty. In the moral sense action is duty-bound. In the realm of inducement to action appear those which we call moral and volitional qualities, by which we indicate the ability to transform intent into action (or conversely, into restraint). Action includes the subjective (determining consciousness) and the objective (the external action itself), through which the subjective intention ``transforms'' into its result. Therefore the moment of transfer to action (the moment of will) occupies a special place: it resembles a switch, releasing the current of moral intentions into external matter. The results and consequences themselves in their objectivity are located beyond the confines of morality. But they return through perception: the individual sees what he has done and reacts in one way or another to the results of his act.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ GENERAL CONCLUSIONSThe scheme for the action, outlined above, may be isolated from morality: it describes any purposeful activity. The given scheme, therefore, depicts the elementary process of cognition 34 and of verification through practice, in a word, the most simple of experiments. Further, the goal of the experiment is knowledge: for this reason it is important to follow the results of the experiment and to draw from it the corresponding conclusions. In the instance of the moral act, this aspect is of a secondary nature. In any case the results and consequences are apprehended if not by he who initiated the act, at least by other people. Thus the moment of cognition is unavoidable.
The original unity of the moral and cognitive aspects of practice is reflected in words such as ``truth'' which expresses the notions of objective verity and moral rectitude. The same may be said of the meanings of the words ``law'' and ``obligation''. In this original unity we may also locate the source and foundation of the connection between science and morality, they are both the outgrowth of the development of two interrelated aspects of human practice~
The same original interconnection is located in the goal---the initial point for activity. The goal represents the unity of two aspects: the subjective and the objective. On a subjective level there is that which is desirable, that, in other words, which appears to the individual as good and that which he wishes to achieve. On the objective level there is that which is possible; that which may be implemented, or which at least appears feasible to the individual. An assessment of possibility is determined by knowledge. When an individual determines a goal for himself he regards achievement of this goal as possible. He would not set as a goal that which he firmly knew to be unattainable.
Our idea of what is good is also conditioned by knowledge. The satisfaction of hunger is undoubtedly ``good'' but it may turn out to be harmful for the hungry person if he eats too much too fast. It is important to know this. The examples could be multiplied.
Therefore, links are contained in the striving for good on the one hand, and knowledge on the other; contained in the very purposeful nature of practical activity and in its role for cognition. Activity is directed towards the good, but the very notion of good or evil, the assessment of the feasibility of a goal and of harmfulness or usefulness depend upon the knowledge which one has acquired. Cognition, that is science, is prompted by the same striving for the good which stimulates morality; both are directed to identical notions of social usefulness. Thus the intrinsic connection between science and morality lies at their very roots. The core of this connection resides in the 35 unity of subjective-objective and desired-possible which is inherent in the notion of a goal.
Morality presupposes consciousness. It evolves as people become aware or the effects of their actions and develop sanctions against that which brings about harm as well as work out measures to encourage that which is useful. The origin of ethics lies, therefore, in the perception of consequence---in the last link in our scheme of the action, the link including cognition (it goes without saying, cognition not only by the individual performing the act, but also by other people). The first link in the scheme---the goal ana the phenomenon of goaldetermination in itself---developed from instinctive and reflex strivings, from guiding elements which focus the activity on the achievement of an external object. The awareness of these strivings also provides the most elementary conscious goal. .
But indeed ``awareness'' is simply the transition from perception or emotional experience to knowledge. "The way in which consciousness is, and in which something is for it, is knowing.''^^1^^ Therefore in a trivial fashion moral consciousness begins with knowledge. Morality is developed in accordance with the degree of the individual's consciousness of activities and the ensuing results, in accordance with human mutual interrelations and individual needs. Morality reflects their being. That which distinguishes morality from science therefore does not consist in the assertion that science reflects reality whereas morality does not.
The difference resides in the nature of this reflection. Knowledge---the statement of objective being---is the product of science. In turn, morality, through knowledge, develops imperatives. For science, being is presented only in the form of an object. Morality, on the other hand, gives expression to the subject itself; it reflects his drives, interests, etc. Consequently it addresses its imperatives to the subject, to his consciousness, through which it guides his behaviour.
The reflection of reality in ethics is often distorted by false and fantastic notions. In the same vein knowledge is distorted and continues to be distorted by spurious theories and opinions. The movement of cognition from mythological explanations of events to quasi-scientific and later, to fully scientific explanations is continuous; the principles of science are in a state of development. The same process marks the _-_-_
^^1^^ K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 159.
36 liberation of morality from religioi s and mythological thought patterns.However the scientific self-knowledge gained by man trails behind his knowledge of the world about. When the laws of mechanics were discovered no science of man and society in the true sense of the word existed. But in the last hundred years man's self-knowledge has been firmly grounded in the soil of science. Consequently, morality is to an ever greater degree derived from this scientific self-knowledge (of both the individual and society). This connection is not a simple one; the process referred to does not proceed smoothly. But this does not serve as a basis for a denial of the fact that the progress of science and the related development of a scientific view of the world inevitably engenders a scientific approach to the problems of morality, the more so when science exerts an ever more active influence upon public life.
We must further take into account that one of the conditions giving definition to the notion of morality is the opportunity for choice (both the awareness of the opportunity for choice and the actual opportunity). To bring about this choice a correlation between consciousness and real possibilities is essential. Otherwise the choice may be aborted or may lead to undesired effects. To put it in other words, actual freedom of choice is ensured by knowledge. The role of knowledge as the condition for real freedom has been long known: freedom is indeed the capacity and opportunity to act intelligently. Extensive knowledge is afforded by science---the knowledge of conformities and regularities. Therefore an advanced morality providing a pre-established approach to activity in any given complex situation would be inconceivable without science.
Knowledge, by establishing the possible and the impossible, thereby defines when a conceivable good is realistic or unrealistic. Thus although knowledge does not define good and evil as such and does not strictly determine the choice made by the individual, it nevertheless does define the boundaries of the possible within which choice is confined. The expansion of knowledge widens the frontiers describing that to which an individual may approach consciously and, consequently, the range of conscious choice. In other words, knowledge expands the perimeter of morality. At the same time that cognition expands the real opportunities it dismisses imaginary possibilities. This in turn exerts its influence on the realm and the content of morality. Thus religious and Utopian 37 aspirations give way to more realistic and science-based perspectives. The direct influence of knowledge on the moral sphere is supplemented by that exerted through the embodiment of scientific results in practice, by alterations in human life with the consequent reflection of these changes in new moral problems ana notions.
In real life the individual often takes into account only superficial opportunities, thereby risking overlooking real possibilities. Avoidance of these extremes is possible only given the guidance of that which directs the scholar; namely the bringing to bear of existing knowledge, the attempt to expand this knowledge and to avoid the creation of absolutes.
Science, by uncovering the laws of reality thereby describes that which is in principle possible as that which is in agreement with these laws. Conversely, it describes that which is in principle impossible as that which stands in contradiction to these laws. To hope to achieve any given result in defiance of the laws of nature and of social development is in effect to hope for a miracle. To advance goals of this type, when the corresponding laws are already known, is absurd, and from our point of view, immoral.
Before a science of society had been developed, the laws of human relations and behaviour were expressed in moral precepts such as "sow the wind and reap the whirlwind''. The science of man and of society provides---and in the future will provide---more precise and profound imperatives, but the substance of the ties between knowledge and ethics remains the same as that expressed in the folk wisdom of old.
To conclude, knowledge exerts a very considerable influence on the sphere of morality for it widens the boundaries of that to which an individual may consciously address himself, it gives focus- to real, and dismisses imaginary possibilities, demonstrates possible consequences and provides new means for the achievement of goals; unreal goals are dismissed but new goals appear and are shown to be realistic. As an offshot the depth and content underlying the notion of good is changed as is the system of values pertaining to the definition of morality. It is sufficient to juxtapose the value systems of the Christian believer anci the Marxist to understand the scale of the changes introduced in this sphere by scientific knowledge.
38 __ALPHA_LVL3__ THE CONNECTION IN PRAXISWe have thus come to the conclusion that choice and the implementation of ends are primarily dependent upon knowledge in that it renders possible the distinction between real and unreal ends. In addition knowledge permits consideration of the conditions within which an action is to be carried out. The direct transition to activity depends upon will, which may be amplified by the pertinent knowledge or, on the other hand, attenuated by'lack of certainty brougnt on by insufficient or unreliable information. Next comes the ability to act: here the role of knowledge is obvious. Finally, the result is the apprehension of the outcome and consequences of the deed. The final moment must not be isolated from morality. The deed completed by the individual represents not only that which he wanted or did not want to do, but also that which in actuality took place and which thereby has its own properties and consequences quite independent of the individual's intentions. It is precisely in this, its objective state that the deed is presented to other individuals. The act of cognition, finalizing action, is essential for morality. Its importance is underscored by that significance given to conscience as the ability of the individual to evaluate the results of his own actions.
As matters stand, although individual intentions are directed at the achievement of results (otherwise they would be devoid of sense), between intentions and results there may often exist less than full correspondence. This real contradiction is resolved when one, having ascertained the lack of correspondence between intentions and ends, endeavours to explore the conditions and methods which could ensure the necessary correspondence, or to alter the ends themselves once convinced that the original ends have proven unattainable. The sequence of activity outlined above is not always feasible for the individual in question, but it may be for others who may rely on the experience of their predecessors.
The process of cognition is carried out in precisely this manner, the individual becomes aware of the result of his action and the latter is assimilated; if the necessity arises further research is conducted, the results of which are also assimilated and, together with the preceding experience, are taken into consideration in praxis. Cognition, uncovering possibilities unknown at an earlier date, engenders new ends, desires and intentions, and provides incentive for further 39 activity. The latter brings to the fore new tasks, and the process continues. The contradiction between goals and results does not disappear, but is renewed in each instance at a higher stage. This contradiction is in fact the driving force impelling cognition. Indeed would there exist a necessity for cognition if all human desires were satisfied, all intentions met and ends attained?
The same applies in the case of morality; given a lack of correlation between results and intentions the individual endeavours to correct the situation, draws out'lessons for the future or even alters his goals and principles if he perceives them to be unreal or leading to undesirable consequences. In a word, the individual comes to know the world and draws in the process the corresponding moral lessons.
Thus, the contradiction between the evaluation of a deed differentially in terms of intent and consequence is resolved by the development of morality proper. But such a resolution entails the renewal of the very same contradiction at a higher stage. New moral intentions, just as earlier ones, are not realized in toto, goals are not achieved in one fell swoop, and the search for better paths continues. Stagnant, immobile and dogmatized morality no longer takes the consequences of its application into its purview, no longer takes life into account and thus ceases to be a real morality. Rather it remains a relic of the phenomenon of cognition.
Returning to the question of the moral evaluation of the deed, we may conclude that it is necessary to make an evaluation of intent, but with the necessary stipulation that one takes into account to what extent the individual came to grips with objective reality in his intentions and in the actual implementation of the latter. To what extent did he assess the reality of his goals and plans? To what extent the results and effects? Repentance in trie event of deplorable results must be accompanied by the gleaning of lessons from this experience and by the search for better solutions. This is the requirement of the reasonable conscience, which needs not only agony but also perfection. This is the negation of moral complacency and the affirmation of an unceasing search for the better. Authentic morality exists only in a state of development. The latter is stimulated, on the one hand, by a relentlessly changing objective reality and on the other hand, by a persistent lack of fit between results and goals, overcome through the process of cognition. Morality, initiated by knowledge and growing in pace with the latter, is in a state of constant transition from the delineation of knowledge to moral imperatives, from these 40 imperatives to action, and from action once again to knowledge....
Contributing with knowledge both to external circumstances and to his own life, man determines the moral path.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRITKnowledge and the conceptions based upon it we may call the matter, the content of science; the form given to the movement of science is its method---that totality of approaches, criteria, and techniques which direct the search and determine the verification of the truth. The latter may be described as the scientific mode which in turn may be concisely stated as that approach to a subject matter which provides specific knowledge of it. It is common knowledge that without the corresponding methods and criteria it is impossible to evaluate the reliability of observations, the correctness of conclusions, or arrive at a thorough knowledge of the subject matter. Without these criteria it is further impossible to distinguish science from information collected at random or from pseudo-sciences such as alchemy. The criteria and methods pertaining to the phrase "scientific mode" are intrinsic to science itself. For example, mathematics encompasses methods for achieving results---the methods of mathematical proof and conclusions.
Scientific criteria and methods exist, of course, only to the extent that people accept these criteria and rely upon the corresponding methods. At the core of science lies the striving to know the truth and to understand the activities of man. Therefore the word combination ``pseudo-science'' is as absurd as is "black whiteness''. The scientific spirit epitomizes the quest for the truth; it is the scientific approach with its criteria and methods, converted into a search, a discovery and an affirmation of the truth by the striving towards knowledge, a striving directed in principle at the entire world (both nature and the internal world of the individual).
Unfortunately, there are those who write of science and, in particular, as it pertains to morality, who overlook precisely the essence of science, expressed in the search for the truth. In these instances science is considered in its external aspects; in terms of its applications, quantitative growth, etc. Science in their hands is turned into a force to all appearances external to humankind. It appears in this light to those who do not understand the substance of science, but see only its technical 41 applications. The particular role played by science in the contemporary world has also resulted in the frequent attracting to its ranks of those who are more interested in a career than in truth. But to make judgements concerning the whole of science on the basis of these facts would be the equivalent of confusing prostitution for love.
The distortions mentioned above block our view of the authentic spirit of science, characterized by a passionate, uncompromising and tightly controlled search for truth. The essential connection between science and morality also disappears from the field of vision. Given these distortions we also overlook the fact that science includes human self-awareness. The fact that self-awareness---both of the individual and of society---is a condition determining the development of morality has been understood since ancient times.
Many feel that the feature distinguishing the moral from the scientific consciousness may be located in the axiomatic imperatives yielded by the former. This is however incorrect, since we may find axiomatic imperatives at the heart of scientific consciousness as well: the striving for and respect of the truth, the adoption of scientific norms, the unconditional acceptance of that which is demonstrated by facts and logic. The individual well grounded in science, accepts its arguments and conclusions, but others may ignore these arguments and conclusions and in fact show little interest in clarifications of the truth. They may for example turn to authority rather than to an examination of the facts. On a general level, outside the realm of specialized scientific problems, the question may be posed as follows: is the striving for and respect of the truth an unconditional imperative for the individual?; do its deductions serve as an imperative for him? A positive answer indicates the scientific approach to morality. But since the achievement of objective knowledge is difficult and since, secondly, taking this objective knowledge into account is not always a pleasant task, the call for an approach in the scientific spirit often provokes protest. In this vein a moral position is advanced which excludes from the realm of morality the striving to know the truth and to come to grips with it. The fact that people will accept falsehoods only underscores the importance of a scientific approach to morality with its inherent rejection of credulity and its demand for proof.
The first and foremost demand of the scientific approach is objectivity. To examine an object, putting to the side, to the degree possible, all that is personal; to try to investigate and to understand "as it is in reality" and not as it appears at first 42 glance or as one would prefer it to be; to take account of the facts and of logic rather than of one's preconceptions or of the opinions of the authorities---this may serve as our definition of objectivity. No matter how much a physicist might wish that an experiment confirm his hypothesis he may not alter the data yielded by the experiment even by an iota. Scientific objectivity presupposes unwavering honesty, unconditional acceptance of the truth and that degree of personal modesty which would restrain one from placing his wishes and opinions above the arguments presented by the facts and by logic and from subordinating these arguments to the opinions of the authorities. Therefore the scientific spirit excludes from its domain all forms of accommodation.
Scientific activity presupposes receptivity to criticism and self-criticism. The scientist is always prepared to accept well-founded objections and recognize demonstrated error, no matter how unpleasant the fact of recognition. He verifies his own work by attempting to incorporate possible objections. Scientific creativity always combines hunches, hypotheses and fantasies with the strictest critical edge. Science conducts a search for conformities and for the essential; it never rests content with the surficial. Therefore the scientific spirit excludes superficiality and demands the most penetrating examination of the object in question. It demands persistence and thoughtfulness in the quest.
It may be observed that all of the features enumerated above have been borrowed from the domain of morality, and do not belong to science proper. Such a remark is spurious. The scientific approach does not argue that to garble or to juggle with the facts is bad, it states merely that such activity precludes the possibility of establishing the truth. In certain instances concealment of the truth may be regarded as a moral act (for example concealing from a sick person the terminal nature of his disease) but by such a choice the action forfeits its claim to being scientific. It follows that the demands for truthfulness, self-criticism, etc. are integral to science---they are internal conditions necessary for its development.
A scientist engaged in the search for truth finds himself in the position of waiting for results and decisions which are made quite independently of his will. The position of the applied scientist is somewhat different: by manipulating nature he strives to achieve the desired result. The confusion of the practical, engineering and technical position with science may be listed as yet another reason for the loss of the moral element in the scientific spirit.
43Scientific truth expresses that which exists (independently of our will); it does not depend upon moral choice; to deny the truth would be absurd, although one may in fact try to conceal it. For this reason it holds precedence over morality and must be the concluding factor to be taken into account by the latter. But the activities of the individual depend upon his choice, for this reason morality of necessity precedes the engineering position. The differences between these two positions are brought into sharp focus when we move to the analysis of social phenomena. Science endeavours to apprehend the objective tendencies and possibilities for social development. The "social engineer" sets to work to transform society. The activity of the latter may be effective and moral only given reliance upon science; it is immoral if the engineer aspires to change life, relying,only upon his preconceived opinions and neglecting objective tendencies and opportunities (the latter is typical of the politics of voluntarism, for all ``left'' deviations, for putschism, etc.).
Reliable and established knowledge serves as the firmest foundation for one's convictions. The physicist, for example, does not doubt the existence of molecular structure. But the scientist's respect for the truth must not be transformed into idolatry. It must be combined with a readiness to reconsider one's conceptions on the accuracy of any given scientific proposition, to render more accurate and develop this proposition if so demanded by the facts and by the laws of logic. Thus the tenacity of a scientific conviction is nevertheless incompatible with dogmatism and fanaticism. Similarly, the critical attitude of science, always prepared to subject to doubt any given proposition, has nothing in common with scepticism, because the former leads to more sophisticated and more precise knowledge. A readiness to reconsider existing propositions and theories and a receptivity to the most unexpected things that one may stumble upon in nature make the authentic scientific approach revolutionary. But even given a large quotient of boldness, such a revolutionary approach inexorably submits to the criteria of science.
In sum, the scientific spirit brings together perseverance in the search with the modesty of the searcher. It unites the wish to attain the truth with the strictest control, certainty with a critical stance, conviction---with doubt, unconditional respect for existing knowledge---with a readiness to reconsider and review and constantly to press forward in an indefatigable and unremitting search for tne truth.
44 __ALPHA_LVL3__ THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO MORALITYThe scientific approach may be defined as a system of norms of "scientific behaviour'', that is to say, of sensory and mental activity leading to a cognition of the truth. Morality is in fact a system of norms guiding the behaviour of the individual towards moral action and the achievement of the good. To the extent that the establishment and shaping up of morality entails a cognition of the truth, the scientific approach must be followed by ethics. Further the scientific principles are always present in morality although it may be distorted and suppressed by dogmatic, religious or subjectivist views.
This conclusion is supported by the analysis of yet one more determined feature of morality, namely, with human interrelationships. Morals begin with an act; the human steps out of the bounds of individualism and turns to other individuals, relating to them as subjects and not purely objects. The simple expression of this relationship may be found in the question; what do people need?. In a developed form it is expressed as follows: what is necessary not only for isolated close friends but also for distant acquaintances? What is necessary for society as a whole, not only today but for the future as well? It may be inferred from the above, first, that morality calls for an attempt to look at people from the objective positions offered by the norms of science (that is to say, that one endeavours not to see that which "one would like" or "seems to be plausible" but rather to understand "what is the true state of affairs''); and second, that any serious answer to questions concerning human needs requires a specific of research.
If an individual does not try to comprehend human needs his pretensions to morality are in fact vapid. At the same time to try to come to a serious understanding of anything without following the scientific spirit is quite impossible. Conviction, faith and intuition devoid of substantiation by science are in reality simply various manifestations of subjectivism, dressed up in the garb of a ``teaching''.
Once we ask "what do people need?" the question arises: what is it possible to do? Determining what is in actuality possible also calls for a scientific approach. Without such an approach all good intentions are sooner or later revealed to be devoid of content or even hypocritical. The choice is between morality incorporating the scientific approach to human problems and immorality, taking no account of humans---a third alternative, given the contemporary state of the science of man and society, is implausible.
45The elementary demand posed by the scientific approach with which we began our discourse, consists in the striving to examine the circumstances, to take the given conditions into account, to judge and to act with knowledge and understanding, calculating one's actions and the possible consequences therein. The opinion has received circulation, however, that such a requirement is not sufficiently elevated. This opinion posits the existence of the following dilemma: either nobility of character without calculation, or calculation without nobility of character. The real problem, however, lies not in the abstract juxtaposition of nobility and calculation in general, but rather in their interconnection in any given concrete situation. To leave out or to overlook pertinent facts when even the slightest opportunity is provided to include them is, speaking plainly, sheer stupidity. To ignore that which affects other people is irresponsible and even immoral. Everything depends on the goal, the circumstances, and the orientation. An individual, responsible for the welfare of others in a given situation (be it a flignt in space, mountain climbing, a battle or an uprising) and not planning for contingencies or in general not taking into account circumstances---is a criminal.
The moral approach to serious matters is initiated when the demand for calculation and situational analysis with the objectivity of the scientific spirit is first advanced, when the persistent search is conducted for optimal paths to the achievement of moral ends. How many sacrifices have occurred because people didn't bother to consider this demand! Estimation in the scientific spirit, the demand for a comprehensive stock-taking of the conditions and opportunities pertaining to the implementation of the change under consideration, and likewise of the consequences of such a change---such an approach is connected with the awareness of personal moral responsibility. Such a calculation stands, in direct opposition to the calculation of the schemer or time-server. The morality founded upon such calculation was given clear expression in Lenin's activities, whose work was characterized by an uninterrupted unity between the striving for scientifically grounded goals serving the good of humanity and, on the other hand, the strictest scientific calculation of how to move towards these goals.
The scientific orientation requires not only the scientific determination of ways and means towards the attainment of moral ends but also an agreement between these ends and moral principles, on the one hand, and objective laws on the other. Rejecting reliance upon sheer will, faith or fanaticism, 46 the scientific approach encourages an individual position to moral convictions identical to the relationship between the scientist and scientific convictions. In contrast to all forms of hypocrisy the scientific approach to morality requires objectivity from the individual in nis awareness of self, and honesty in regard to his principles and goals; it demands that one face the facts squarely and a strict examination of one's principles, convictions and goals. Just as the mathematician gives precise formulation to his axioms and draws strict inferences from them, so any conscientious individual will try to clarify his own principles and to draw the corresponding conclusions from them, avoiding the conversion of moral axioms into smokescreens for his conclusions and activities which in fact have nothing in common with these axioms.
Science does not accept anything on faith, rather it demands arguments and rejects unsubstantiated assertions. Calculations based on assertions of faith lacking in proof, these are violations not only of the scientific spirit, but also of the individual and his inalienable right to make conscious judgements.
The alternatives are sometimes posed; either nobility or calculations, either the absence of any connection between science and ethics---or the reduction of ethics to science. These alternatives stem from a lack of understanding of the dialectic. But it is precisely this dialectical approach which is important for morality. Its first feature---objectivity---is also the first demand posed by the scientific approach, with which, as we have demonstrated, authentic morality also begins. Further, the dialectic presupposes the examination of the object in all of its ties and mediations, in a state of development. The moral significance of these demands is enormous. One-sidedness is a constant source of moral error, just as is the disregard of development and, consequently, of the question of effect. Comprehensiveness implies as a given the estimation of the material and the spiritual, both external and internal, and of those subjective moments and factors inherent in human nature as such. A thorough understanding of the notion of use implies not only materiafbut also moral benefit as well as the moral effect of the deed.
Let us take another element of the dialectic, namely that of "concrete truth''. It should be obvious that it is of the utmost importance to avoid judgement and decision "on the whole" concerning moral questions and to examine the concrete aspects of the given situation.
47The basic feature of the dialectic, its essence, lies in the objective flexibility of concepts, reaching for the unity of opposites. Not the subjective flexibility of the sophist, but the flexibility reflecting the comprehensiveness and internal complexity of the object as such. The complexity and contradictory nature of life renders this feature of the dialectic an essential condition determining the morality of a decision already made. The metaphysical approach to moral problems inexorably leads to moral miscalculations and anti-humane decisions.
The dialectic considers everything in a state of development and refrains from absolutes. Even the absolute imperativeness of morality is only a moment in its development: moral imperatives are also subject to constant review and extension, just as the axioms of mathematics, for example, are reviewed and extended. Life is a process, a process created by humans. Therefore the good can oe apprehended only in the process of establishing it, in the process of ascent to a good of broader scope---in the same manner that questions of truth are resolved in the unfolding of knowledge. Consciousness lacking in intrepidness loses its bearings once it catches a glimpse of the perpetuity of motion. It would prefer, that here and now something could be given a fixed definition and presented in the form of a ready-made answer; what is true and untrue, the proper and the improper. There are however no final and conclusive answers, they are given formulation in the process of human activity as such, in the apprehension and creation of life, in the unending ascent to higher forms of morality.
Metaphysics merely juxtaposes the truth and the good, science and morality. In fact what is important is their interrelationships, the unity of cognition and praxis, the constant transition of the idea of truth to that of good, of theory into practice and back to theory again, as Lenin pointed out in his Philosophical Notebooks. In these writings we find the relevant extracts from Hegel as well, in particular, that "the Idea of the Good can find its complement only in the Idea of the True".^^1^^ We note that practice is directed to the attainment of the good and is thus connected with the "Idea of the Good'', and that theory, cognition, and science are linked with the "Idea of the True''. It is instructive to compare Lenin's statements concerning the necessity of unifying these elements with Kant's juxtaposition of ``pure'' and ``practical'' reason.
_-_-_~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 216.
48The good is primary for the individual. Truth is necessary to him not in and of itself, but as a means of achieving a higher good. But since truth in its objectivity does not depend upon the will of the individual, it is in this sense primary in relation to morality and must be taken as its condition, as an inalienable element of the determining not only methods but also moral ends in themselves. Without truth morality is devoid of foundation.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSIONIn a complete state, moral consciousness, as we know it, is built on three pillars: humanism, responsibility and the scientific approach. Responsibility requires a scientific position but in turn only the latter permits the precision necessary for an understanding of humanism and the responsibilities vested on the human being. Humanism signifies humaneness, a respect for the human personality, the recognition of the principal equality of all humans as self-aware beings with a capacity for creation and self-development and, correspondingly, with a pursuit of freedom. This above all presupposes the recognition of the material needs of the individual; otherwise selfdevelopment and freedom remain empty phrases. From such a general perspective humanism remains an ``abstract'' entity. But it is an essential precondition for a moral attitude towards other humans. However the scientific approach does not allow one to rest content with this point of view alone, but requires further progress in pace with the understanding of the social nature of man and in accord with historical conditions and social contradictions. Thus we arrive at the concrete historical understanding of humanism and of human responsibility. The latter is rooted in the fact that each individual is in one way or another a co-participant in all that which takes place in society, that he is not only a product of circumstances but also an active participant in the creation of these circumstances. Because of his creative abilities the individual is also capable of altering these circumstances.
The humanistic ideal of society is that association, in the words of Marx, in which the free development of each is the precondition of the free development of all. Responsibility summons one to work for such an ideal; the scientific attitude determines the path to travel to reach this ideal and serves as a guide in this journey and struggle.
In the contemporary world this signifies above all the struggle for man, the struggle against a social order in which 49 one's life is fully in the power of others. Vitally important for the success of this struggle are a profound understanding of human needs, of objective processes and the conditions governing further development, and an ability to search out optimal solutions and the ability to predict---in a word, an authentic scientific stance.
A relentless drive to acquire knowledge of the truth concerning society and the self is important for every thinking individual. To be human, and not simply the plaything of circumstances and external power; the subject and not merely the object of life; to be morally responsible rather than a philistine; to make a conscious contribution to the contemporary struggle---creativity, understanding and knowledge are as necessary as the air we breath. Morality requires knowledge of the meaning of human life and activities which runs deeper than that directly provided by the stream of the quotidian. This is only possible nowever with a scientific understanding of social development and of the place of the individual in this process. Only in unification with science and by incorporating the spirit of searching for the truth can morality carry through its mission as the conscious regulator of human activity. Therefore the isolation of morality from science, whatever the terms and regardless of intentions, is in reality the negation of authentic morality.
[50] __ALPHA_LVL2__ G. PospelovContemporary science is becoming an organic part of the life of mankind. By accelerating all societal processes it is forcing people to give more thought to the question of their future in terms of the relationship between the personal and the social.
I find it impossible to refrain from relating a conversation concerning people and science which I became engaged in with a casual acquaintance made during a trip---an ordinary working fellow. Among other things ne said:
``You can't escape from science today any more than you can from fate. It's gotten involved with everything. If you ask me, an ordinary fellow off the street, what I think of science I've got a three word answer: respect, hope, fear. You understand... I'm afraid because I want to keep on living and I feel sorry for people. Now it can be done so scientifically ... one big blast and curtains. To make it worse, you get the feeling that science could make people redundant; it seems to me that we won't have to worry so much about where we're all going to live so much as what we'll have to do with our time. People won't feel they're needed for anything. And then you also tnink, would it really be rosy to live in a scientifically-run society ... that is, it everything were scientific. Do you think people would feel respect when they looked each other in the eye.... I'd feel sort of naked, I tell you''.
It occurred to me then: the time has surely come to an end when one could take up science and pay no attention to the question of the social effects following upon scientific research. I have in mind not only those consequences wrought by 51 technology, biology, medicine and other natural science disciplines, but also those connected with the evolution of human psychology and with the general moral aspects of society.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ MORALITY AS THE SPIRITUALThe formation of the individual as a personality was initiated with the emergence of collectives of thinking beings mutually connected through social labour and through common spiritual interests. This was one of the conditions ensuring the relative stability of the human collectives as distinct from the herd, and further providing for the emergence of a specifically human feature, the need for affirmation as a personality.
The spiritual commonality of humans is a social necessity. Material and social causes are of overriding importance in establishing this necessity. However this unity emerges as a result also of the human striving for cognition of the surrounding world and for confirmation of the supremacy of the human over nature. Thus it may be said that broad and universal human demands contribute to the emergence of spiritual unity. In substance the demonstration of the human propensity for collectivism also lies at the basis of morality.
Concrete forms of morality are determined by the forms of human association and by the level of the social consciousness of the members of a given grouping. Since one and the same person simultaneously belongs to several interlocking yet highly divergent (in terms of the nature of the ties) social groups, each individual is the bearer of an entire complex of moral principles: class, national, religious, to name a few. These principles are sometimes in harmony and sometimes in conflict depending on the circumstances for they are influenced by the vagaries and peripetia of his social existence. Nevertheless, seen as a whole these principles form not a conglomerate, but rather a complex system of interacting moral principles, among which in class society the dominant role is performed by those which are determined by the class status of their bearer. Marxist-Leninist science of society has demonstrated that the moral principles of the ruling class of contemporary society---the working class, offer the most coherent solutions to universal human problems, that communist ethics and morality embody those principles imperative for the harmonious 52 spiritual unity in the future of all individuals on the basis of voluntary service to society, posited as the highest spiritual need of its members.
The universal elements of morality emerged during the early stages of social development---when people became cognizant of the fact that there is a human race and that, independent of the vagaries of individual life, each person remains a member of the human race and is therefore called upon to bear spiritual responsibility for its continued existence. This responsibility before society came to be expressed in terms of individual moral responsibility, for example in the form of responsibility before God---quite fully reflecting, however, earthly relations and human experience.
Science brought the question of the spiritual responsibility of man before the human-species down from heaven to earth. Confirming the objectivity of truth, the equality of all before the truth, and the appeal of scientific truths to all thinking people, science and conviction based upon knowledge became one of the pillars supporting human spiritual unity. Science proclaimed specific moral principles having an all-pervasive nature and universal significance.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MORALITYFrom ancient times the answer to the question "what is truth?" has been sought with the same vital significance given to the quest for the "philosopher's stone" in the realm of alchemy. In the eyes of many this answer was to demonstrate the meaning of human life and point the way to the highest forms of morality.
The very same question "what is truth?" is posed by science, only with a different format, for truth is indeed the primary goal and fundamental result of scientific research and discovery.
An idea, once adopted as a given truth by a collective, thereby becomes an element unifying this group, since through its affirmation individual inclination is given expression as collective opinion. This also occurs when misconceptions receive wide circulation and masquerade as the truth, to be exposed only over the course of time. Thus truth contains, in potentiality, elements of moral principle. In substance this pertains to all truths, including those which determine the 53 actions and judgements made through ideological channels and those whicn are remote from ideological problems. Therefore the struggle for the victory of each given idea advanced as the truth and capable of becoming collective opinion has a definite moral impact. The nature of the latter is conditioned by the type of truth to be affirmed and defended and by the role exerted therein by both faith and doubt.
For science the apprehension of a truth "on faith" does not suffice. Verification and confirmation both in practice and through intersecting theoretical constructions are a sine qua non. Religion does not leave room for doubts to be cast on the truth of its dogma. Science, on the other hand, forces all truths to pass through the prism of doubt. Through doubt it finds reinforcement and locates more correct solutions. This represents the impressive moral fiber of science. It is this strength which appears to be capable of liberating humankind from the fetters of ignorance and of inspiring man to struggle against the gods and the elements, of reinforcing the sense of individual strength in man's consciousness, and of turning his efforts to the service of people.
The uncompromising nature of science distinguishes it from all other spheres of human activity and endows it, in the eyes of many, with a unique capacity for generating authentic truths and force mercilessly exposing falsehoods. By itself this is capable of facilitating the unification of humans around the ideals of science. The collective recognition of the reality of scientific truth is imbued with the collective expectation of the realization of these truths and engenders the conviction that if something is carried out in a scientific manner this indicates that it is being performed correctly.
Not all types of scientific truths are directly correlative with morality. If the moral implications of truths derived from the social sciences are self-evident, the same may not be said of the truths offered by the natural sciences. To cite one instance, what impact in the area of moral relations can be deduced from the assertion that two times two equals four rather than three? However in actual life a knowledge of the multiplication tables does expedite the conclusion of proper decisions and encourage honesty in determination of behaviour.
It is possible to set aside morality in the process of discovering social and natural laws. But to apply these laws and to side-step collisions with moral questions is impossible, for these questions pervade all life situations. Therefore the intrusion of science in whatever form into life has definite moral effects (which will be more direct if the given intrusion is 54 connected with the realization of ideas from the social sciences, and indirect when connected with the realization of those from the natural sciences).
__ALPHA_LVL3__ THE MORAL ASPECTS OF KNOWLEDGEMorality is a social phenonemon. Therefore the moral profile of an individual is determined by a wide spectrum of influences exerted on his spiritual world by various aspects of his activity. In this context an important role is playea by the interrelation of faith and knowledge.
faith is a powerful moral factor capable of engendering in the individual both moral uplift and fanatic barbarity, the two being capable of co-existing in one and the same person without arousing in him a sense of internal contradiction. History is rich with supporting evidence. This may be explained by a variety of reasons, among them by the form of conviction engendered by faith and characterized by the close dependency of judgement upon the internal thought system. The latter may be disjunctive with reality and may contain logical contradiction and absurdities, but since it corresponds to the idea of faith, even a falsehood may be accepted by a believer as the truth.
Knowledge gives birth to a completely different form of conviction. As distinct from faith, knowledge is not internally confined. It may be verified at any given point. A lack of correlation between knowledge and reality leads to the replacement of conviction by doubt. Conviction founded on blind faith sooner or later collapses together with the ethical system based upon it as it collides with reality or with scientific logic. Conviction founded upon true scientific knowledge is reinforced as it encounters reality and is submitted to logical control as knowledge itself expands. This form of conviction contributes to the creation of a sense of harmonious balance between thought and reality. The latter is the basis of an elevated moral spirit and forms a fertile soil for moral perfection as a whole. Does it follow that knowledge is destined to oust faith (in the broader meaning of the word) in the future and that the morality of the future society will be founded solely upon knowledge having no need of faith as such?
First of all we must observe that there are elements of faith in evolving knowledge, for it is impossible (and quite unnecessary) to deduce knowledge from its initial propositions in each case. Without faith in the truth of initial scientific propositions, 55 without a modicum of trust, it would be impossible to make headway. But at the same time, every scientific inquiry contains in one form or another an element of scepticism concerning previously accumulated knowledge. It is through doubt that the scientist moves to new discoveries. In this sense ``heretics'' often form the cutting edge of science. Such is one of the feature contradictions impelling science forward. But it does not exclude faith in the truth of scientific knowledge and in the omnipotence of science, a faith which is one of the motive forces stimulating scientific progress. Such faith is founded upon the fact that the conclusions of science are constantly being tested and confirmed in practice.
The relationship between faitn and knowledge may seem to be a simple one if we analyze the essence of the former without delving into those aspects touching upon its human origins and significance. If we take into account its real human ties, however, this mutual relationship acquires a very complex character. It is sufficient to note that the entirety of the experience gained from the socialist revolution and the building of socialist society have demonstrated that a powerful motive force for man may be found not only in a concrete knowledge of the laws of social development but also in a faith in the verity of the laws discovered by Marxism-Leninism. Such a faith is inseparable from the recognition of the greatness of man and mankind as a whole and an acceptance of the role and possibilities offered by science. It is inseparable from an internal striving for personal verification of these possibilities through participation in the life of society. Just as knowledge, it is the bulwark maintaining an uncompromising high moral standard on the part of man.
However, since acquired knowledge separates the individual from the crowd, it contains the seeds of other possibilities, namely that of the moral impoverishment of the arrogant specialist. The feeling of superiority over one's compatriots sometimes leads to the separation out of the scientific elite into an isolated caste. On the other hand the untrained anarchic mind is capable of employing knowledge to justify a cynical stance towards the world. Like the crazed anatomist who sees in his lover above all an anatomical object, so the cynic begins to see the world in gray, manifesting thereby his limited purview and the poverty of his perception of reality. The number of cynics who, from "scientific position" ridicule everything and everybody is fairly sizeable, especially among those who have acquired specialized analytical tools before assimilating the wisdom gained from life itself.
56The scientific approach to the analysis of any given phenomenon is inevitably a rationalist approach. But rational thought, without which the notion of a specialist is inconceivable, may in psychological terms turn into the baneful habit of adopting a rationalist position to every aspect of life. Such a person oegins to demonstrate a cynical attitude towards nature, towards generally recognized human and cultural values if their application does not coincide with his conceptions concerning rationalism.
Having rapidly multiplied the channels for disseminating information science has today strewn an avalanche of information upon the population. This is a positive good---but only within definite limits. Forcing the brain and nervous system of the individual to work beyond their normal limits, the sea of information becomes a narcotic with detrimental effects upon the psyche and nerves of the individual. Many people today eagerly try to accumulate every conceivable titbit of information, not so much because they are collecting data on a given question but rather because this information has become like alcohol or cigarettes, and acts either as a stimulant or depressant. Having developed the habit of absorbing an enormous volume of printed, audio and visual information, we have begun to carry this habit beyond the limits necessary for education, in a number of cases facilitating the emergence of vicious mores, a certain information mania. In the future, or so some assert, it will be possible to establish direct link-ups to the brain of the human so that educational and other forms of information will be directly ``fed'' to the brain cells, by-passing the organs of sight and hearing. It is not difficult to imagine that these new methods, if employed unwisely, could in fact ``help'' society "blow itself up" through mass schizophrenia.
The most important safeguard against the negative effects wrought by science on the formation of society's moral principles is the maintenance of a high level of culture. It can even be said that to a certain degree science is connected to morality through culture and that high moral standards are achieved through a high cultural level.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ MORALITY AND A CULTURE OF ROBOTSIf we evaluate science independently of the process of verification and of the dissemination of scientific truths among scholars we may catch a glimpse of science in isolation from 57 moral categories proper. This will offer a perspective on science as such, in its `pure'' form and in abstraction from its human origins.
Given such an approach science and morality represent only potentials for activity and in this sense possess a measure of mutual independence. Such mutual independence may be preserved even given activity, but only that which remains within the confines of mental activity. Both scientific analysis and moral evaluation of one's own or of others' activities may be carried on independently of each other, offering the scientist the opportunity of finding gratification or torment in the search for truth, and the moralist the same possibility in his reflections of morals. But even at this point we may observe the outlines of the field upon which science and morality may meet. Testimony in support of this is offered by the life of the scientist, tor whom scientific truth serves as the source of moral tribulations stemming from confrontations with the dogma of faith which arise as he becomes aware of the truth. Another example---the activities of ideologues and of those who apply ``scientific'' barbarism, occupied with the development of scientific methods for mass extermination. Examples of the opposite type may also be cited, when the search for truth exerts an ennobling influence upon the scientist by evoking in him a sense of revulsion towards evil and tyranny in any form.
Emerging from the "intellectual incubator" to the sphere of practical activity science and morality acquire a particular position. Activity turns science into a productive force and the moral elements of consciousness into moral codes. These codes are powerful factors in the spiritual unification of a society.
At the core of the activity which actualizes morality lies human interrelations. Moral factors are demonstrated only through people and have vital import only in terms of human interactions.
At the core of the activity which carries scientific truth into life we may also locate direct human interrelations. This latter, however, is not an indispensable condition. Truth, codified in the corresponding fashion, is also realized in activity without the participation of the living brain. Truth (in the form of information) may be deposited in machines which in a number of instances have successfully replaced thought processes and duplicated the specialized labour of the individual. Scientific truth as such is not necessarily the product of the human mind; it may be the product of the thinking machine" which imitates the subconscious and intuitive mechanisms underlying human 58 thought processes. These inanimate store-houses of knowledge are capable of drawing upon their own ``knowledge'', accumulated in memory banks, in the search for "scientific truths'', and capable as well of borrowing from each other, from accumulated ``knowledge'' and from the solutions founded upon this knowledge. A system of cybernetic computers has already been operationalized in which the units are mutually complementary and provide each other with information and mathematical solutions. Further, robots, proceeding from the ``knowledge'' deposited in them, are capable of producing things, that is to say, of being an active transforming force. Their possibilities in this sphere are quite substantial, and robots will probably be employed by mankind on a wide scale in the future, in particular in research far under the crust of the earth or in the ``colonization'' of planets presenting formidable barriers to human habitation. For this purpose we will create entire complexes of self-programming and selfregulating robots capable of simulating researchers and "workers and of reproducing themselves and the necessary ancillary installations.
Such an instance would seem to bear witness to the fact that science is in principle capable of "tearing away" not only from humans but also from human society and might thus be examined in isolation from these ties. Indeed, let us propose the following chain of events: humans with the aid of science and social labour create robots and then complexes of robots. These complexes with the aid of the information deposited in them and of "social labour" develop new scientific truths and create new productive forces as well as ... organic matter capable of evolution and the transformation over time into thinking beings, discovering scientific truths and producing ... robots.
In this entire chain of suppositions, elaborated not only by science-fiction writers but by scientists as well, there is one detail which bears directly upon the problem of science and morality.
No matter how unlimited the possibilities suggested by robots, they are in fact artificially organized matter which can originally emerge only as a result of the efforts of the living mind and in response to us needs. As far as the living mind is concerned, it emerges spontaneously from either ``inanimate'' or animate---but in no case thinking---matter. This mind is a specific feature of life, its highest manifestation.
Thus truth is manifested in activity in both an unmediated fashion---through human interrelations, and indirectly, 59 through certain devices implementing the connection: man---machine---man. In distinction from the living mind the electronic brain, in carrying out a normal function, may remain free of conflict with living intelligence. On the other hand it may, as a result of the capacities for free activity embedded in its mechanisms, provide recommendations which would have the effect of disunifying, oppressing or intellectually impoverishing human beings---in sum, objectively antihumanistic projects. However, this arbitrary behaviour on the part of a machine would not bear an immoral character, for morality defines only conscious relations between human beings. It is another matter if the "immoral actions" of the machine are pre-programmed by a human individual, that is to say are consciously directed by him. The fact that the executor of these activities is a machine does not divest the individual of moral responsibility for the consequences. Thus emerges the problem of moral responsibility for activities implemented by the tools of technology but governed by human beings.
At first glance the thought is a trivial one. When an automobile under the control of a reckless driver runs over a pedestrian, it is the driver rather than the car's engine who is judged by the laws of the courts and of morality. In a more complex situation, however, when a cybernetic machine exerts pressure on the psyche of the human individual, the question loses its triviality. It turns into the massive and complex problem of the moral principles underlying the progress of civilization.
The reproduction in practice by the machine of certain features of the human being as a unique biological entity has permitted science to open the door to the world of human ``doubles'', capable of immeasurably enriching human life. Drawn into the spinning gyre of new problems by rapid scientific and technological progress, man is no longer in a position to get by without these ``doubles'' not because of laziness but simply because his own biological capacities are limited. Although the ``double'' is but an assistant in complex tasks, an ``appliance'' added to the human intellect, it is capable" of competing in a number of spheres of human activity which are accessible, customary and dear to humans as ``human'' activities.
Having opened the door to human ``doubles'', science has also closed some doors giving access to certain types of production and professions, labelling them objectively unnecessary. These occupations only recently seemed to be 60 permanent features of the landscape and provided work tor many people.
At first glance this would seem to constitute no particular danger since new professions and new opportunities for the application of one's energies are emerging. However, the current developments in science and technology are demonstrating that professional ``obsolescence'' is in fact gaining speed. In turn the prognosis for the augmentation of professions by means of increasingly narrow specialization does not present an optimistic picture. The narrower the specialization the more rapidly obsolescence sets in. Also directly connected with the narrowness of specialization are the possibilities, of substituting a machine for the given specialist and the dwindling distance separating the life span of a given profession and the period of training required to learn it. We observe the beginnings of what may be called the pursuit of disappearing professions. The employee is beginning to experience a feeling of being "perpetually late" for the tram of time. In an antagonistic society we even note the emerging problem of the "superfluous man''. Such a perspective is not merely the play of science-fiction writers