__SERIES__
problems
E.A. TARABRIN
__TITLE__ The New Scramble for Africa __TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2007-11-26T16:09:34-0800 __TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW
[4]Translated from the Russian by Kenneth Russell
E. A. TAPADPHH
HOBAfl CXBATKA 3A A<t>PHKV Ha
__COPYRIGHT__ First printing 197411104--426 T 014(01)-74~90~74
[5] CONTENTS Page Introduction. The Contradictions of Modern Imperialism and Africa 7 Part One THE BUILD-UP OF CONTRADICTIONS AND RIVALRY Chapter I. Colonial Problems in the Relationship of the Western Allies During the Second World War.........23 Chapter II. Ideological Camouflage for Attempts to Redistribute Spheres of Colonial Rule..............34 Chapter III. The ``Vacuum'' Theory and the Practice of Expansion 48 Chapter IV. The Colonial Powers' "Second Front"......56 Part Two ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTER-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF AFRICA Chapter V. Conflict between Private Capital from Different Foreign Countries . . . . :..............77 Chapter VI. State ``Aid'' as a Weapon in the Competitive Struggle 98 Chapter VII The Trade War in Its Concealed and Overt Forms 119 Chapter VIII. Africa's Raw Material Resources and the Scientific and Technological Revolution............140 Chapter IX. The Monopolies' Struggle for the Sources of Strategic Materials...................163 Part Three SOCIO-POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE INTER-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF AFRICA Chapter X. The Struggle for Political Influence in the Countries of Free Africa..................197 Chapter XL Ideological Rivalry and the Mass Media.....229 6 CONCLUSION __NOTE__ Bizarre: "CONCLUSION" is verso running header for last page of table of contents. Chapter XII. The Training of National Personnel as a Part of the Inter-Imperialist Struggle.............243 Chapter XIII. The Attempt to Seize Control of the Trade Union Movement...................257 Chapter XIV. The Contradictions between the Imperialist Powers Over Regional Co-operation Between African Countries . . . 266 Chapter XV. African Issues in International Organisations and the Inter-Imperialist Contradictions............283 Conclusion....................298 Notes......:...............306 [7] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ INTRODUCTION __ALPHA_LVL1__ THE CONTRADICTIONSWorld imperialism is now making greater efforts than ever before to unite the ranks of the monopolist bourgeoisie. It is being prompted to take this step by the common class interests of the capitalist world. The two world systems are locked in struggle, the scientific and technological revolution is in full swing, and there is an upsurge of activity in the international workers' movement and the national liberation movement. Despite its attempts to adapt to the new conditions, capitalism is steadily losing ground in world economics and politics.
The trend towards greater centralisation in the imperialist camp does not eliminate inter-imperialist contradictions. They continue to develop. Moreover, the old antagonisms of capitalism are joined by new ones, which interlock with them, forming a single cluster of tensions.
In his Report to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, said: "The contradictions between the imperialist states have not been eliminated either by the processes of integration or the imperialists' class concern for pooling their efforts in fighting against the socialist world. By the early 1970s, the main centres of imperialist rivalry have become clearly visible: these are the USA---Western Europe (above all, the six Common Market countries)---Japan. The economic and political competitive struggle between them has been growing ever more acute,"^^1^^
[8]Thus, the inter-imperialist struggle is part of the integral system of co-operation and rivalry, unity and contradictions between the imperialist powers.
The contradictions of modern imperialism have a number of new distinctive features. In the first place, they are conditioned in their development by the main contradiction of the times. Imperialism today is one of the two opposing world systems, and it is, moreover, steadily weakening in the struggle with socialism.
In the second place, the scientific and technological revolution is exercising a tremendous influence on the processes that are taking place in the capitalist world. It is accelerating the growth of production, while at the same time widening the gaps between the levels of scientific and technological development in individual capitalist countries. The result is a more and more uneven development.
In the third place, modern capitalism is state-monopoly capitalism. It is inseparable from capitalism as such as a socio-economic formation. No matter what modifications a capitalist society undergoes at the stage of state-monopoly capitalism, its antagonisms continue to deepen. Relying on the strength and support of the state, the bourgeoisie of every imperialist power seeks to reinforce and extend its position in the competitive capitalist world market. It also tried to help the national monopolies in their competition against the monopolies of other countries.
The present stage is a particularly clear illustration of Lenin's law of the spasmodic and uneven development of capitalism. The action of this law is also inextricably bound up with the struggle between the two world systems.
Competition with the world socialist system forces capitalist ruling circles to stimulate economic growth even more vigorously. But different scientific, technological and economic potentials produce a further imbalance in the development of individual capitalist countries. This loosens the relative unity of the imperialist camp and intensifies the contradictions between its members.
A comparison of the main capitalist states' industrial potential, foreign trade and currency reserves enables one to assess the present and future state of the struggle between 9 the imperialist powers. The unevenness of their recent development is shown in "Table~1.
It can be seen from the table that in 1950 the USA and Great Britain accounted for 66.2 per cent of the production of the whole capitalist world. Ten years later this figure had fallen to 55.1 per cent, and after a further ten years---to 48.3 per cent. At the same time production in the countries defeated in the Second World War (the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Japan) rose from 10.7 per cent of the total world output in 1950 to 17.4 per cent in 1960 and 23 per cent in 1970.
The development of the export trade displays even greater unevenness. This is even more symptomatic, given that the motto of capitalist business circles is to boost exports and reduce imports. In 1950 the two main capitalist powers (the USA and Britain) accounted for about 30 per cent of the capitalist world's exports. Ten years later this index had sunk to 27 per cent, and by the end of the following decade---to 22.7 per cent. The corresponding totals for the FRG, Japan and Italy were 7.3 per cent, 17.1 per cent and 24.9 per cent.
The figures relating to the gold and currency reserves tell the same story. In 1948 the USA's reserves amounted to six times the total possessed by France, the FRG, Italy and Japan. By 1959 they were only twice as great as those of the above group of countries, and in 1969 already lagged behind them.
Finally, the table shows that between 1937 and 1959 the industrial growth rate of the USA was the capitalist world's highest; between 1960 and 1970 it was the last but one.
It can be concluded from the table that quick changes in the rates of economic growth of the main capitalist countries are inherent in the modern capitalist system. It is also clear that unevenness in development has now reached a postwar peak.
The imperialist states seek to defend their class interests jointly by organising aggressive military blocs and alliances, creating international monopolies and promoting economic integration. The latter merits special attention, since it is often claimed that the integration processes now visible in the capitalist world are §vid,ence of ``stabilisation'' and a __PARAGRAPH_PAUSE__ [10] Table 1 Basic Economic Indices For the Main Imperialist Powers Year USA Great Britain FRG France Italy Japan Proportion of the capitalist world's 1950 54.6 11.6 6.6 4.4 2.5 1.6 industrial production (%) 1960 45.8 9.3 9.6 4.7 3.4 4.4 1970 41.3 7.0 9.7 4.8 3.7 9.6 Proportion of world capitalist exports 1950 18.3 11.0 3.6 5.5 2.2 1.5 (%) 1960 18.1 8.9 10.2 6.1 3.3 3.6 1970 15.6 7.1 12.2 6.3 5.8 6.9 Gold and currency reserves (end-of-- 1948 24,399.0 2,009.0 295.0 553.0 --- ____ -year totals in millions of dollars) 1959 19,507.0 2,750.0 4,533.0 1,720.0 2,953.0 1,321.0 1969 16,964.0 2,527.0 7,129.0 3,833.0 5,005.0 3,654.0 Average annual growth rates of indus-- 1937--59 4.8 2.1 3.7* 3.3 4.0 3.8 trial production (%) 1960--70 4.5 2.9 6.1 5.6 6.8 13.9 1937--45---all Germany. Sources: UN Statistical Yearbook, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics for the relevant years and months; Ekonomicheskoye polozheniye hapilalisticheskihh i razvivayushchihhsya stran (The Economic Position of Capitalist and Developing Countries), surveys for 1967 and the beginning of 1968, for 1969 and the beginning of 1970. Supplement to the journal Mirovaya ehonomiha i mezhdunarodnye athnosheniya (World Economy and International Relations); International Financial Statistics, March 1950, 1954, 1961, June 1970. 11 __PARAGRAPH_CONT__ transition to a "non-conflict stage''. The formations reflecting integration can unquestionably be seen as the result of stronger centralising tendencies in the imperialist camp. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that capitalist integration is an imperialist means of overcoming the narrowness of national boundaries at the current stage of the development of productive forces: it is a peaceful way of re-allocating spheres of influence for the benefit of the various countries' monopolies. Consequently, capitalist integration inevitably leads not only to the worsening of traditional contradictions between the members of the different groupings, but also to "the creation of new contradictions--- between the integrated groupings and the outside world, as well as inside these groupings".^^2^^
Inter-imperialist contradictions are not substantially lessened by the recent accelerated formation of international monopolies. The process reflects the typical capitalist tendency to strengthen the interdependence of national economies and to internationalise production as much as possible. The intensification of the process whereby monopoly participants merge their capital and the interpenetration that inevitably results lead to a clash of interests between the imperialist states involved. Moreover, a serious antagonism within modern imperialism---between the interests of the state and the international corporation---is becoming more pronounced. Trade and customs boundaries are beginning to hinder the activities of these corporations, especially if their enterprises are located in several countries and linked by a system of co-ordinated deliveries. When this happens, the governments of the countries concerned are forced to ``liberalise'' trade and introduce legislation that is damaging to national interests as a whole. The ``super-monopolies'" disregard for national sovereignty is one of the major sources of inter-imperialist contradictions, and the situation is likely to deteriorate. The President of the American International Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Christopher H. Phillips, points out that conflict between states and multi-national corporations will become still more pronounced in the near future. National authorities should accommodate themselves to the supranational demands of an increasingly interdependent world.^^3^^ But 12 capitulation to expansionist international monopolies also means ultimately the economic redistribution of the world. The strong stand to benefit.
The special feature of today's imperialist contradictions is that now the forces and interests not only of states, but also of economic blocs of capitalist countries are clashing in the international arena. Competition between joint forces is added to the traditional rivalry between ``national'' imperialisms: economic groupings struggle among themselves and with individual powers, and conflicts arise within the groupings.
In the general complex of inter-imperialist contradictions the main antagonism nowadays is between the USA and the European Economic Community. The clashes here are particularly bitter. Next comes the string of contradictions between the USA and Japan. The traditional rivalry between these two powers is currently assuming new qualitative features.
But more than just economic processes are at work, and this must be recognised if a correct picture is to be drawn of the evolution of inter-imperialist contradictions and their future development. The bitterness of the clash is not necessarily in direct proportion to the powers' economic standing and potential. A good example is the clashes that have taken place in recent years between the USA and France. The economic forces that the two sides have been able to muster are far from equal. Nowadays politics is playing an increasing role in international contacts. The nature, pace, forms and special features of rivalry and competition between the imperialist states depend largely on politics, both foreign and domestic. The interdependence of foreign and domestic policies and their interaction are today becoming particularly close and complicated, with foreign policy factors sometimes exerting a decisive effect on the course of the inter-imperialist struggle. It is no accident that this struggle is spreading more and more to the sphere of foreign policy and military and political problems, as is reflected by the crisis in NATO and the other military and political blocs.
The world socialist system exerts an ever growing influence on inter-imperialist contradictions in foreign policy 13 too. The foreign policy of the socialist countries encourages disunity in the imperialist military and political alliances. What is more, political and economic relations with the socialist countries are themselves becoming objects of interimperialist rivalry. Some capitalist groups have an interest in developing these relations, as is predetermined objectively by the evolution of the international division of labour and the world market. Others are against contacts with the socialist countries, and they try to restrain their rivals' attempts in this direction. In fact, the socialist countries' foreign policy has caused the bourgeois camp to split into a pacifist section and an aggresive one, a process foreseen by Lenin.
The radically new character of the correlation of forces now present in the international arena, due primarily to the economic growth and military power of the Soviet Union, has substantially altered the ways in which imperialist contradictions can be resolved. As before, imperialism "is distinguished by a minimum fondness for peace and freedom and by a maximum and universal development of militarism".^^4^^ It also retains its main political feature---".. .reaction evehywhere... .''^^5^^ Nevertheless, it is now unlikely that the main contradiction of the age will be resolved by military means, i.e., in a world war. Imperialism has to co-exist peacefully with the socialist system and confine its aggressive intrigues to outlying areas. As for inter-imperialist antagonisms, the existence of the socialist community also restricts the likelihood of military conflict between the imperialist powers.
However, imperialist forces are constantly striving to reallocate spheres of influence. The struggle takes many forms, and embraces the whole capitalist world. At the present time intense rivalry between the imperialist powers is centred on the developing countries.
The disintegration of the colonial system marked the beginning of a momentous process: the former colonial powers became less able to lord it over the countries they once ruled, and they lost the monopoly on deliveries of manufactured goods, machinery and equipment to the newly independent countries. The imperial powers also had to forfeit the monopoly on the import of the raw materials produced by the former colonies, and they were no longer the only countries able to offer them loans, credits and 14 technical know-how. This process affected imperialism as a whole, since the imperialists were no longer in a position to hamper the development of co-operation in these areas of the international division of labour between socialist and newly independent countries. The result is that, on the one hand, there is now the basis for a unified imperialist policy towards the younger states; on the other hand---and this is the main point---the imperialists have to compete ever more bitterly among themselves for the narrowing spheres of influence in the Third World, which remains one of the principal sources of profit for the capitalist states. Here too, then, relations between the imperialist forces are feeling the effects of two tendencies---towards unity and disunity, as they become entangled in clusters of contradictions.
Class solidarity urges the imperialist powers to unite in the struggle against the further growth of the national liberation movement and the strengthening of the contacts that have been made by the newly independent countries with the socialist community. They hold identical views on the strategy for pushing the Third World along the road of capitalist development. These common aims determine the essence of neo-colonialism and its methods of expansion. At the same time, since the overwhelming majority of new states have remained in the capitalist division of labour and market system and so continue to be subjected to imperialist exploitation, they are the object of fierce competition between the imperialist powers and monopoly groupings.
The inter-imperialist struggle embraces the former colonial and dependent world for the simple reason that the monopolies still run the key sectors of the developing countries' economies, and the collapse of the colonial empires has made the new states accessible to the competing imperialist forces. The traditional method of squeezing out rivals by military force is now, of course, unlikely to be used. Yet, despite changes in the methods employed to resolve interimperialist contradictions, they have lost none of their bitterness. The competing capitalist powers are still devising and putting into effect new ways of economically and politically redistributing the former colonial empires.
15The developing world covers a vast area, but the continent of Africa has become the imperialist powers' main battlefield. There are a number of good reasons for this.
Firstly, the developing world is far from being homogeneous in character. The countries thus classified, and there are more than 100 of them, are all at different levels of socio-economic and political development. Compared with Asia and Latin America, Africa is, on the whole, the most backward continent. Secondly, Africa was the most clearcut embodiment of the colonial system of imperialism: African territories formed part of six colonial empires, and rivalry between the colonialists is deeply rooted in the history of the area. Thirdly, the colonial regimes in Africa were the last to fall. Fourthly, Africa is remarkably well endowed. Its raw material, power and human resources are of considerable interest to the imperialist countries, despite the structural changes that have taken place in the material production of the capitalist world economy. All these factors prompt imperialist expansion in Africa, and, since the interests of the different powers clash, contradictions and conflict result. Since the collapse of the colonial empires the imperialist powers have in fact been trying to carry out a new economic and, to some extent, political redivision of Africa.
The inter-imperialist struggle in Africa during the postwar period has passed through several quite distinct historical stages, closely connected with the onward march of world events and the development of the national liberation movement. Imperialist rivalry was spurred on during the war years (1939--45). Despite the specific features of the war situation, colonial issues occupied a considerable place in relations between the Western allies, among which were the two main metropolises, Great Britain and France, and their principal opponent, the USA. Each of these powers planned to reshape the postwar world to suit its own monopoly capital. The growth period of the national liberation movement in Africa (1946--60) is marked, on the one hand, by the joint efforts of the imperialist powers to ward off the downfall of colonialism, and, on the other, by the active intervention of the USA and, later, the FRG, Italy and Japan 16 (which had noted the weakness of the European colonialists) in areas that were still undisputably controlled by the former colonial powers.
From the beginning of the sixties the liberated countries of Africa started to take shape socially and economically. They began to fight for their economic independence and to overcome their economic backwardness. However, they still provided the capitalist world with vital raw materials, a ready market and cheap manpower. The elimination of the political and other barriers with which the former metropolises had walled round their colonial possessions allowed their imperialist competitors a much freer access to the newly independent countries.
The inter-imperialist contradictions in Africa fall into several main groups, and can be summarised as follows:
1. There are economic contradictions between the former metropolises, i.e., Britain, France and Belgium, on the one hand, and other countries of monopoly capital (USA, FRG and Japan) on the other.
2. Contradictions exist between the USA, whose expansionist policy is directed mainly at military and political objectives, and the West European countries and Japan, whose interests are largely economic.
3. There are contradictions between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the USA, whose position in Africa is being undermined by the expansion of ``Eurafrica'' association.^^6^^ The inroads of American monopoly capital are being seriously obstructed by the association system.
4. The members of the EEC surfer from contradictions between themselves. Particularly acute are those between France, the FRG and Britain.
5. Finally, contradictions exist between Japan, which owing to the rapid growth of its economy is trying to gain a firm foothold in Africa, and the countries of Western Europe.
This categorisation is to some extent arbitrary, since all the contradictions are closely intertwined. In addition, their development frequently involves shifts among the imperialist powers from unity of action (in various combinations) against national liberation forces to bitter clashes and complete disarray.
17The imperialist powers are united in their efforts to keep the independent countries of Africa within the sphere of the capitalist mode of production. They are agreed that these countries should remain under the control of an industrially developed capitalist state. But which one? This is the question that causes the rivalry, competition and conflict. The condition laid down by American imperialism for an ``agreed'' policy vis-d-vis the social, political and economic development of the African countries is the handing over of the leading role to the USA. The minimum claim of the FRG and Japan is for complete parity. The former metropolises are simply trying to retain the right to ``regulate'' the development of the countries in which they alone held the reins of power not so long ago. In other words, the basic principles underlying the African policies of the imperialist countries are ridden with deep contradictions. The specific interests of the individual states also clash.
The policies of all the competing imperialist powers are in fact motivated by the same interests, whence the conflict.
Twenty per cent of Britain's foreign investments are made in Africa, 12 per cent of its foreign trade is with African countries and 27 per cent of the profits from its "overseas operations" come from there. Nor should it be forgotten that British imperialism's struggle to retain its position in Africa has political overtones too. Most of Britain's former African possessions have become its Commonwealth ``partners''. This development is regarded as essential to Britain's retention of its prestige as a great power.
France has an even larger stake in Africa than Britain. 32 per cent of all French private investment abroad is in the French-speaking countries of Africa. The need to protect the interests of French monopoly capital from its imperialist competitors was a not inconsiderable factor underlying France's decision to bind its liberated colonies together by a series of agreements on co-operation and to secure associate membership for them in the Common Market. Michel Debre, the former French Minister for National Defence, said on the 25 July 1970: "French-speaking Africa provides almost unlimited scope for a policy of national interests.''^^7^^
US interests in Africa are also both economic and political. African raw materials are of considerable importance to the __PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2---1031 18 American monopolies. The USA obtains from Africa almost 100 per cent of its imported diamonds, lithium materials, beryllium, columbite and cobalt; 25--50 per cent of its imported antimony, chromium, manganese and tantalum; and a considerable quantity of rubber, gold, uranium and oil. The high returns on investment in African countries also attract US private capital. By 1970 direct American capital investment in Africa amounted to almost 3,000 million dollars, but one must bear in mind that the official figures do not show indirect investment (through US participation in European companies). Some American monopolies in Africa are making a 40 per cent return on invested capital, i.e., some 1,000 million dollars annually.
By extending their political influence to the European powers' former possessions in Africa, the American ruling circles are attempting to reduce the standing of the old metropolises in the general system of international relations. This tendency follows from the USA's claim to "world leadership" and from the conviction that only American political influence can protect the young states from " communist infiltration''. There are long-standing political differences between France and the USA. Although considered the USA's major partner, Britain ceased long ago to be regarded by the USA as a very powerful ally.
At present the FRG, Japan and Italy are chiefly pursuing economic aims in Africa (though that is not to say that political problems do not come in for incidental attention). West German monopolies are trying to compensate for the lack of raw materials at home, to gain access to minerals that are in short supply and to create a steady outlet for their wares in African countries.
Over the last few years Japan has sharply increased its trade with Africa and is actively investing private capital, mainly in the continent's mining and manufacturing industries.
Italy's role in Africa is certainly not a leading one, but African countries receive 84 per cent of the total exports of Italian capital to the Third World. In North African markets Italian companies hold their own against French, West German and even US companies.
The inter-imperialist struggle rages throughout vast areas 19 of Africa. It involves practically all the newly independent African states to varying degrees, but the main centres of rivalry can be pinpointed quite easily.
Anglo-American contradictions are concentrated in the countries that once made up British Africa. Franco-American contradictions are located in the French-speaking countries. It is these territories that form the major battlefield for the contradictions between the USA and the EEC. In East Africa Britain, already under pressure from the USA, is beginning to face stiffer competition from the FRG and Japan. French, US and West German capital fights for control of North Africa. Finally, the African states which possess valuable mineral deposits are prizes sought by the largest monopoly amalgamations of all the main imperialist powers.
The relations between the imperialist states involved in Africa are particularly affected by the socialist-orientated countries. The desire to divert these countries from their chosen path of development forces the imperialist powers into some sort of unity, while doing nothing to eliminate the contradictions between them. The methods for resolving them simply vary according to the requirements of the situation. Thus, the imperialists' internecine struggle for political and ideological influence recedes into the background. But economic competition continues unabated, and the struggle goes on for raw material resources, profitable investment spheres and markets for commodities and services. There are two reasons why the inter-imperialist struggle is being conducted in the socialist-orientated countries. The first is that usually these countries are still dependent on the world capitalist market and foreign capital, with all that that entails. The second is that the capitalist monopolies' opposition to independent development mainly takes the form of attempts to penetrate the economies of the socialist-- orientated countries more thoroughly. This inevitably spurs on competition and rivalry, since the monopolies are all aiming at the same targets, e.g., Algerien oil, Guinean bauxites, etc.
The socialist system has a profound effect on the contradictions between the imperialist powers in Africa, and the crucial role is that played by the policies of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Under the influence of these 20 policies, based on international friendship and co-operation with revolutionary, liberation and anti-imperialist forces on the continent, the international relations of imperialism are undergoing considerable modifications. Gone are the times when monopoly capital expanded into the developing countries and had only its imperialist competitors to contend with: nowadays it must reckon with a world socialist system and its readiness to offer all-round support to liberated countries.
The peoples of the former colonies and the leaders of the national liberation movements are convinced that the socialist states are their true friends and allies in the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism and for social and economic progress. It would seem that in the circumstances only one outcome is possible: under pressure from socialism, the imperialists will seek to consolidate their forces; the presence of a common enemy will oblige them to set their differences aside. But the mechanism of the influence of the policies of the socialist community, and those of the Soviet Union in the first place, on inter-imperialist relations in the developing countries and also the results of this influence turn out to be more complicated and are not always adequately summed up by conventional formulas. Imperialism's loss of territorial monopoly and the narrowing of its sphere of domination give rise to new contradictions between the capitalist states. Individual interests often prevail over imperialist solidarity.
The course of events in the capitalist world in recent years has shown that the collapse of the colonial system led to the intensification of the inter-imperialist struggle to re-allocate spheres of influence. The forms of struggle also became considerably more elaborate. Rivalry between the international monopolies is made all the more bitter by imperialism's loss of key positions in world economy and politics together with the uneven development of the main imperialist powers, the deepening of the financial crisis and the acuteness of the export problem. In this situation inter-imperialist contradictions are spreading further to include the newly independent countries. The struggle rages around these countries' "reserve markets'', capital investment spheres and sources of strategic raw materials, as well as for political and ideological influence. The nature and dynamics of the development of imperialist contradictions in that part of the world which 21 recently made up the colonial empires can be clearly observed in Africa, where the interests of practically all the imperialist powers clash.
This book does not claim to deal exhaustively with a subject as complex as the evolution and probable future of the inter-imperialist contradictions in Africa. In the first place, the author has limited the object of study to the interimperialist struggle in the newly independent African countries, and does not touch on the interesting but separate topic of the relations between the imperialist powers in racist, colonial Southern Africa. In the second place, some of the processes examined have not yet fully revealed themselves, while others require far more reliable factual material than has as yet been amassed. Consequently, some points are dealt with in outline only, and the conclusions drawn must be regarded as provisional.
The author wishes to express his deep gratitude to N. N. Inozemtsev, I. P. Belyaev, M. M. Maximova, V. G. Solodovnikov, V. V. Rymalov, V. L. Tyagunenko and all the other specialists whose advice and comments proved so valuable in the writing of this book, and also to O. Y. Ashurov for his assistance in selecting statistical and factual material for Chapter VIII and in preparing that chapter.
[22] ~ [23] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ PART ONE __ALPHA_LVL1__ THE BUILD-UPThe events of today have been prepared by long and farreaching historical processes. Consequently, a description of the general evolution of inter-imperialist contradictions in Africa is a necessary preliminary to a study of certain aspects of them. The Second World War gave fresh impetus to the inter-imperialist struggle to redistribute markets and spheres of influence. Despite the war situation, colonial problems had a substantial effect on the relationship of the Western allies, giving rise to constant clashes. The basis for many of the contradictions between them and their presentday rivalry dates from precisely this period.
In September 1940 after the fall of France the fascist countries (Germany and Italy) concluded an agreement whereby the northern and eastern parts of Africa would go to Italy, and the remainder of the continent south of the Sahara to Germany. At the same time the slogan "Get England out of Africa" gained currency among the axis powers.
It was obviously a belligerent stance perfectly natural in wartime, and it only served to further irritate the European opponents of the axis powers. It also made the latter's aggressive intentions perfectly clear. However, the allies were far from united, and the colonial issue sparked off sharp disagreement and mutual distrust. Britain had no intention 24 of withdrawing from Africa: instead, she tried to enlarge her colonial possessions at the expense of the defeated French.
This objective lay behind the suggestions made by the British Government in the summer of 1940, when France's days seemed already numbered, to the effect that a single Anglo-French state should be set up. London's plans were then put into more practical effect in a unilateral action about which France had not been consulted. On the 17 June 1940 the Foreign Office instructed all British consuls in the French colonies to offer ``protection'' to the French, should France be defeated.
Naturally, the French Government categorically rejected London's ``integrationist'' ideas, and protested strongly against the Foreign Office action.^^1^^ However, British imperialism made repeated attempts throughout the war to effect the legal seizure of French colonies. This caused sharp differences between the British Government and the leadership of the "Fighting French" forces. The repercussions have not died down even to this day.
In supporting de Gaulle as leader of the "Free French" movement, the British were thinking of more than just consolidating the forces of the Western allies. A secondary aim was to use de Gaulle in order to take over the French colonies. But it had already become clear in 1942 that de Gaulle was stubbornly resisting London's plans, in spite of the military situation. The conflict took on such proportions that the British Government even began to look round for a ``substitute'' for de Gaulle, who was said by Churchill not to be making a "proper contribution" to victory over the axis powers. Only the absence of a suitable candidate foiled this attempt. Nevertheless, the British continued to do everything possible to prevent de Gaulle from establishing control over France's colonial possessions. In the spring of 1942, London and Washington turned down his suggestion that the "Free French" National Committee be recognised as the provisional government. In May 1942, without informing de Gaulle, the British landed troops on Madagascar. Worse still, from April to July 1942 the British Government did not allow de Gaulle out of London and prevented him from visiting the Lebanon and Syria, both territories mandated to France. 25 Nevertheless, the "Free French" leader managed to make his way to the Middle East, where he saw with his own eyes that British undertakings "not to pursue any political aims in the states of the Levant and not to encroach on France's position in the area" were not being honoured.
Upon de Gaulle's return to London, a complete breakdown in relations between him and Churchill was barely staved off. But since de Gaulle needed British support and he was necessary to Churchill in view of the forthcoming inevitable Anglo-American confrontation after the North Africa landings, the conflict was smoothed over. However, the most serious contradictions over the colonial issue during the war arose between the USA and Great Britain.
First of all, meeting with no resistance from its allies, who were recoiling under the blows of Hitler's war machine, the USA embarked on an intensive penetration of their overseas markets. But Washington also wished to remove the official hurdles blocking its entry to the colonial world. In the course of Churchill's first meeting with Roosevelt in August 1941 he was asked about "equal access to markets''. Roosevelt also demanded that this point be included in a declaration of war aims. What was really at stake here was the system of imperial preferences introduced in 1932. Seeing the danger, Churchill became very annoyed and replied: "Mr. President, I believe you are trying to do away with the British Empire. Every idea you entertain about the structure of the postwar world demonstrates it.''^^2^^ In the circumstances of the time, however, Churchill had to agree in principle t6 the American demand. The joint declaration incorporated the phrase "equal access to markets''.
It is perfectly natural that British colonies should have been coveted. Given the situation as it then was, Washington simply wrote off the other European colonial powers, which had been defeated in war: France, Belgium and Holland. Only Great Britain stood in its way, and the American bourgeoisie had longed for the opportunity to get their hands on the British Empire. It should be remembered that in 1942, at the instigation of the US Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, the State Department drew up a plan for handing all colonies over to an international trusteeship body, which the USA intended to dominate. Needless to say, 26 Britain categorically opposed the plan. Anthony Eden conveyed British views direct to Roosevelt during his visit to Washington in March 1943.^^3^^
From the very outset of the war the view began to form in Washington that, even if the war were won, the British would be too exhausted to hold on to the whole of the Empire, and their natural ``successors'' were the Americans. This view continued to spread. In 1944 the influential American journal Fortune wrote that the collapse of colonial empires demonstrated their inability to exist independently. The governments of the metropolises should invite the USA to help them devise a new colonial policy, and it was of primary importance that London should consult Washington on the question of Africa.
The problem of the colonial possessions, and particularly Britain's African colonies, proved to be a stumbling-block in Anglo-American relations throughout the war years. It was the cause of frequent disagreement at meetings between Roosevelt and Churchill.
The conflict began before the USA entered the war at the consultations held between the two leaders in August 1941 in Argentia Bay, near the Newfoundland coast. This was the meeting that resulted in the declaration of war aims known as the Atlantic Charter. The eight points of the Charter proclaimed the main objective of the war to be the destruction of nazi tyranny, and mentioned a few general democratic principles. In particular, it was stated that the USA and Britain respected the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government, and also that both powers sought the restoration of the sovereign rights and independence of those peoples which had been deprived of them by force.
In both Africa and Asia most of the politically conscious opinion believed not without reason that these Charter provisions applied to the colonies as well. American propaganda supported this view. However, immediately he returned to England, Churchill gave his version of what the Charter meant. In his report to Parliament on the 9 September 1941 he declared: "At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the states and nations of Europe now 27 under the Nazi yoke, and the territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown.''^^4^^ In other words, Churchill unequivocally excluded from the jurisdiction of the Atlantic Charter Britain's colonial empire. Shortly after, Roosevelt rejected Churchill's interpretation, stating on the 22 February 1942 that the Charter applied to the whole world and so to the British Empire as well. A similar assertion was made in May 1942 by the US Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles: "The principles of the Atlantic Charter must be guaranteed to the world as a whole---in all oceans and in all continents".^^5^^
These "variant readings" of the Atlantic Charter should not be regarded as a chance occurrence or misunderstanding. American diplomacy had set itself the task of taking advantage of a good opportunity to put pressure on Britain and provide American monopolies with access to British colonies. Elliott Roosevelt, the President's son, recalls some of the views his father expressed to him while awaiting Churchill's arrival for the Argentia meeting. Talking about the aims of the war, the President said that the USA had no intention of just being a kind uncle whom the British Empire could make use of in order to extract itself from a difficult position and then forget about. Roosevelt then produced a finesounding phrase to explain his position: as President of the USA, he was obliged to make clear to the British. . . that "America won't help England in this war simply so that she will be able to continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples''. In the subsequent discussion with Churchill the position sounded a little different. It was a question of removing `` barriers'', the economic agreements that gave some states advantages over others. Roosevelt was not insisting that Britain stop "suppressing colonial peoples''; he was simply out to abolish the Empire trade agreements that had been obstructing the US monopolies.^^6^^
To some extent, this marked a return to the Open Door Policy announced by the USA way back in 1899. The policy was supposed to ease the "peaceful economic" penetration of American capital into underdeveloped countries, so that vast 28 profits could be made out of the backward peoples without incurring the stigma of colonialism. "America ... is robbing all and sundry and doing so in a unique fashion. She has no colonies"^^7^^---this was Lenin's view of the tactics of American imperialism.
Some American historians describe Roosevelt as "a most complicated human being---a man of a bewildering variety of moods and motives'', and claim that this fact, in conjunction with his reticence and reserve and the absence of notes and diaries makes it impossible to obtain "reliable and detailed information on the motivation of his foreign policy".^^8^^ In fact, however, Roosevelt the man may have displayed a variety of moods and motives, but not Roosevelt the politician. The facts show that in clearing the path for the United States into the colonial empires of the European metropolises he was quite consistent and single-minded. His ideas on colonial policy come very close to what was later called neo-colonialism. He told Churchill, for example, that 20 thcentury colonial methods "involve bringing industry to these colonies" and "increasing the wealth of a people by increasing their standard of living, by educating them, by bringing them sanitation---by making sure that they get a return for the raw wealth of their community".^^9^^ In other words, "you need to develop before you can exploit"---with the help of the United States, of course.
An example of such tactics is provided by Roosevelt's position on the question of France's African colonies. This gave rise to sharp differences between the British, the French and the Americans at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, after the landing of Anglo-American troops in North Africa. By that time it is quite certain that Roosevelt regarded Britain and France not only as allies, but also as rivals. He said at the time that "the English mean to maintain their hold on their colonies. They mean to help the French maintain their hold on their colonies".^^10^^
Consequently, while preparations for the landing operation were being made, the Americans attempted to relegate the British to second place, suggesting that during the initial stage their role should be limited to transporting troops and supplying sea and air cover. However, London was perfectly aware that if the first landing party consisted entirely of 29 American units, the USA would be in a very strong position to assert its authority over the occupied territories. Churchill objected, and the provision of British vessels for troop transportation was halted. As a result, the operation began six weeks behind schedule.
But even after agreement had been reached and the landings had been successful, the USA took steps to deprive Britain of an equal share in administering the occupied areas. Cordell Hull dispatched special instructions to American representatives in North Africa, stating that the USA "bore the main responsibility" for managing North Africa's economic resources, strategic raw materials, finance, transport, industry, food supplies and even public health. Even American sources note that these and similar measures were motivated by the aim of "acquiring colonies in North Africa" or at least bases.^^11^^
Churchill's message saying that de Gaulle refused to leave London for Casablanca, since "he's furious over the methods used to get control in Morocco and Algeria and French West Africa'',^^12^^ was regarded by Roosevelt as an attempt to blackmail the Americans to drop their support for Giraud. True American businessman that he was, Roosevelt was shocked not by European colonial rule in Africa as such, but by its inefficiency. "Wealth!" he said to his sons in Casablanca. "They (i.e., the European metropolises---author) have robbed this continent of billions, and all because they were too short-sighted to understand that their billions were pennies, compared to the possibilities!. . ,"^^13^^
At a meeting between himself, Churchill and the Sultan of Morocco on the 22 January 1943 Roosevelt discarded theoretical discussion in favour of practical measures. He stated at the outset that the postwar position of colonies would be very different from their prewar status. Then he recalled the ties between French and British financiers, who had formed joint syndicates to exploit the colonies. Finally, he pointed out that, in order to tap Morocco's natural resources, (1) the United States could arrange to train Moroccan specialists in the best American universities, and (2) the Sultan would have no difficulty in negotiating contracts with American firms, which would both work the country's natural resources and provide revenue. The Sultan was delighted, and the 30 British Prime Minister, biting his cigar in fury (as eye-- witnesses recall), left the room.
The episode is revealing in more ways than one. It shows the origins of the USA's postwar expansion into Africa, lays bare the inter-imperialist contradictions over the colonial question and illustrates the methods of American neo-- colonialism, which have been further developed since that time.
Roosevelt was in no doubt as to the future status of the French colonial possessions. He not only supposed that after the liberation of France the United States (with some assistance from the British) would be able to retain its military control for many years over the French colonies in North Africa; but he was not at all sure whether it would be right to return the colonies to France "at any time''.
The USA maintained this position for many years, and it coloured Franco-American relations. In his memoirs General de Gaulle recalls how even during the war the United States had made attempts to take over North Africa and prevent France from reasserting herself as a sovereign state.^^14^^
According to the American historian William Langer, the issue of the French colonies in North Africa even influenced the US Government's decision to preserve diplomatic relations with the Vichy regime, despite its obviously pro-fascist bias. The American ruling circles hoped in this way to facilitate their penetration of North Africa, an area that was "of crucial importance" to the USA.^^15^^
US aspirations to the French colonial succession boded ill for Britain. In the first place, London had already concluded in 1943 that Britain would be unable to grab the French possessions, and, in the second place, feared that the question of partitioning the British colonies might arise. In the circumstances, the British Government preferred to oppose "the dissolution of empires" on principle. In response to Roosevelt's idea that Dakar and Bizerta should be handed over to the USA and Britain for use as bases, Eden declared in his memorandum of the 13 July 1943 that the suggestion ran counter to British interests. Britain had no need of any French territory, and disapproved on principle of any policy that might lead to the downfall of the colonial empires. Eden noted in passing that the USA had no wish to see a 31 strong French government in office, nor did it wish the French colonial empire to remain intact.
With the evident approval of the US Government, American monopolies made great strides in Africa during the war. A special trade mission, which included some prominent businessmen, visited British, French and Belgian colonies in Africa in 1942. Shortly afterwards, in October 1942, the magazine Life condemned British colonial policy and advised Britain to give up the Empire. But the British gave as good as they got. The April 1943 issue of the National Review contained a sharply worded account of the plight of the American Negroes, who were said to be worse off than colonial slaves, and on the 16 September 1944 The Economist called on the government to tell the Americans frankly and clearly that neither Britain nor the other European colonial powers had the slightest intention of giving up their colonies.
Statesmen too, especially those of the USA and Britain, did some straight talking over the colonial issue. During the war the leader of the American Republican Party, Wendell Willkie, made repeated demands for the abolition of the colonial system, promising the peoples of Asia and Africa ``guarantees'' of their independence.^^16^^ The British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, responded by saying that he was more interested in what Britons thought of the British Empire than in American views.^^17^^
But the most persistent opposition to American pretensions came from the Prime Minister himself, Winston Churchill.
His position was most pointedly summed up in his famous speech made at the Lord Mayor's luncheon on the 10 November 1942, when he declared: "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire".^^18^^
Even at the Yalta Conference in 1945, when the US State Secretary, Edward Stettinius, raised the question of the future role of the United Nations vis-d-vis the dependent territories, Churchill flared up immediately and said that in no circumstances would he consent to anyone's "thrusting interfering fingers into the very life of the British Empire''.
32Despite the military situation and Britain's increasing financial dependence on the USA, the Churchill Government used more than just words to resist American aspirations. A good example is the two countries' relations with regard to the Lend-Lease arrangement.
During negotiations over the quantity of Lend-Lease supplies and the procedure for their delivery and payment the US Government insisted that in exchange for American aid Britain should open the markets of the British Empire to American goods and abolish preferential customs tariffs. The discussion begun in Argentia Bay continued. The USA was not satisfied with the compromise article included in the Atlantic Charter. Despite Churchill's fierce resistance, the hopelessness of the situation forced the British to back down. Article 7 of the Anglo-American Lend-Lease agreement signed on the 23 February 1942 stipulated that after the war Great Britain would remove all impediments to international trade and reduce tariffs. However, Churchill's compliance with the American demand was only a trick. Cordell Hull recalls in his memoirs: "Thereafter, however, it frequently became apparent to me that Prime Minister Churchill, despite this pledge, was determined to hold on to imperial preference''.^^19^^
Grave concern was aroused in London by the fact that the USA had taken the initiative in devising a preliminary plan for a general international trusteeship system. To this end a special committee, headed by Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, was set up in the State Department in the second half of 1942. Accordingly, in February 1943 Whitehall suggested to the White House that a joint declaration on colonial policy should be published. The British draft of the document stated that responsibility for governing colonies and seeing to their defence needs should remain with the appropriate colonial powers. Bearing in mind the differences in the stage of development attained by the various colonies, these powers would gradually lead them to selfgovernment. No specific timetable was laid down. The sole concession made by Britain lay in the proposal to establish regional commissions to promote international cooperation over the improvement of living standards in the colonies.^^20^^
33It goes without saying that a document of this kind was unacceptable to a United States government that was trying to unlock the gates of the British colonial empire. The British Cabinet, in turn, rejected a draft prepared by the State Department, since the term ``independence'' occurred in a description of the future status of the colonial peoples. Although the document was referring not to the granting of independence but simply to the establishment of a timetable for granting it, Washington was informed that "the memorandum and draft resolution would not be acceptable to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in their present form".^^21^^
In the meantime the USA's interest in the colonies of the European metropolises, especially the African ones, continued to grow. The well-known American specialist in African affairs, Rupert Emerson, comments: "It was only as World War II developed that the United States came into direct and extensive contact with Africa.''^^22^^ What was meant by ``contact'' was clarified in the summer of 1943 in a public statement made by Henry Villard, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the US State Department: "Never before has the word `Africa' meant so much to the people of the United States ... the war has turned a powerful searchlight on Africa, focusing attention on its strategic position.''^^23^^
This is accurate. Strategic factors, as well as economic and political considerations, prompted US interest in Africa.
The following figures convey a clear picture of the practical results of the strengthening of the USA's grip on Africa during the war years. Before the war American monopolies controlled 43 per cent of all African mining operations for manganese ore; by 1946 the proportion had risen to 76.8 per cent. Their control over copper mining rose from 7.1 per cent to 29.2 per cent, and over vanadium extraction from 35.9 per cent to 43.1 per cent. A similar situation developed in relation to chromium, cobalt, rubber, columbite and other valuable minerals. During the period 1941--45 there was a fourfold increase in US trade with Africa: from 250 to 1,058 million dollars' worth. Private capital investment by the monopolies grew by 50 per cent over these years.
__PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3---1031 34The enterprise of the monopolies was backed up by official action. A special delegation led by Robert Murphy of the State Department and William Donovan, one of the leaders of US intelligence, was sent to North Africa in December 1940. On the 26 February 1941 Murphy signed an agreement on US economic aid to North Africa with General Weygand, head of the Vichy administration in North Africa. General Catroux, a supporter of de Gaulle, described these political manoeuvres and the subsequent US decision to land troops in North Africa as an attempt to take over the French colonies there.^^24^^ De Gaulle himself was in no two minds as to the real plans of the USA and Britain. He called the "political conduct" of his allies "blatant selfishness" and was "less inclined than ever to place any trust in the ideological formulas that they employed to conceal it''.^^25^^
The contradictions between Britain, the USA and France over colonial issues grew stronger during the early postwar period preceding the liberation of the enslaved countries from colonial rule.
__NUMERIC_LVL2__ CHAPTER II __ALPHA_LVL2__ IDEOLOGICAL CAMOUFLAGE FOR ATTEMPTSOf the well-tried "ideological formulas" (to use de Gaulle's phrase) with which the USA concealed its expansionist drive into Africa the most important must surely be `` anticolonialism''. American propaganda and numerous official statements aimed at the countries of Africa constantly recall the "traditional anti-colonialism" of the USA. This claim is used not only as a means of misleading the African peoples, but also as a weapon against imperialist competitors, especially the former metropolises.
During the Second World War it was quite common in US political and scientific circles to hear views which could have been considered to be anti-colonialist in spirit. But such sentiments were only anti-colonialist in appearance. They were not inspired by any conviction in the right of the colonial peoples to self-determination. Two factors 35 contributed towards the anti-colonial tenor of some of the statements made at the time: amazement in Washington at the ease with which Japan had swept away the colonial regimes of South-East Asia, and the conviction, especially on the part of Roosevelt and Hull, that the European colonial powers were not just incapable of running their colonies efficiently: they were also unable to defend them. The person mainly responsible for creating the myth of the USA's ``anti-colonialism'' was the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. He suggested several times that the European metropolises should fix dates upon which the colonial peoples would be accorded full independence.^^1^^
These and many other, similar facts might, of course, mislead the inexperienced. But these statements were only made for use in the inter-imperialist struggle, and had no connection whatsoever with anti-colonialism as such. The USA's "traditional anti-colonialism" was no more than a fiction. In his book The Myth of the State^^2^^ the philosopher Ernst Cassirer concluded that in the 20th century, with its unprecedented breakthroughs in science and technology, man learnt to create myths that were just as sophisticated and efficient as the tanks and planes that were built for the same purpose. Skilful myth-makers have appeared, producing a highly dangerous commodity, since it is aimed at the most sensitive of all targets---the human mind. This conclusion is amply illustrated by the ``anti-colonial'' myth concocted by prominent members of the state apparatus of the USA.
The American ``anti-colonialism'' myth stems largely from speculation over America's history and from attempts to attribute to modern US imperialism some of the progressive traits of American democracy in the 18th century. These tendencies can be found not only in propaganda publications, but also in the works of certain academics. Professor Walt Rostow, for example, who held responsible posts in the White House for a number of years, wrote: "Despite all the Communist talk of American imperialism, we are committed, by the nature of our system, to support the cause of national independence.''^^3^^ Yet a brief dip into history reveals a completely different picture, as the facts relating to Africa show clearly.
36Leaving aside the shameful role of American slave-- traders in Africa (they led the field up to 1865), one can find examples of direct US aggression against North African countries shortly after the declaration of independence. The American war with Tripolitania lasted from 1801 to 1805. The ruler of Tunisia was induced to capitulate in 1805 when threatened by the guns of American warships. In 1815 a seaborne expedition was sent to Algeria. From 1849 to 1852 the shores of Africa were patrolled by a squadron of American warships under the command of Commodore Perry. Landing parties went ashore systematically, plundering and massacring Africans. In 1858 under the pretext of " protecting American citizens'', US naval forces were directed to Egypt. More such incidents could be listed.
Not very convincing either is the contention that the United States never acted as a colonial power in relation to Africa. It is true that the USA did not participate directly in the imperialist division of the continent of Africa, but the reason is not to be found in any ``anti-colonialist'' attitude. At that time American capitalism was not in a position to compete with West European capitalism. In any case, there was sufficient scope for US expansion elsewhere. It was at this time that the Philippines were seized, the Hawaiian Islands annexed and a protectorate established over Cuba.
One other historical fact is beyond dispute. Throughout the period preceding the Second World War not once did the USA ever demonstrate its ``anti-colonialism'' in relation to Africa. The conferences on the Moroccan question held in Madrid in 1880 and in Algiers in 1906 and the Berlin Conference of 1884--85 which enabled Belgium to take possession of the Congo are instances of this. President Cleveland even declined to submit the Final Act of the Berlin Conference to the Senate, since the document failed to take sufficient account of America's commercial interests.^^4^^
During the Anglo-Boer War of 1899--1902 the USA formally adopted a policy of non-interference, but John Hay, the Secretary of State, repeatedly made clear his attachment to Great Britain and his assumption that Britain could count on "American friendship in the war".^^5^^
37Nor did the USA find it possible to manifest its `` anticolonialism'' at the Versailles Peace Conference, where the fate of Germany's African colonies was being decided. One of the main architects of the Versailles Treaty, US President Woodrow Wilson, supported the idea of sharing out Germany's colonial legacy between Britain, France, Belgium and the Union of South Africa. This was to be done by the notorious mandate system---a camouflaged form of colonialism.
In relation to Italian aggression against Ethiopia in 1935 Washington all but openly encouraged the aggressor. Despite the obviously colonial nature of the Italian claims to this sovereign African state, the US Congress adopted a neutrality motion in August 1935 and placed an embargo on the supply of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment to Ethiopia. Italian troops invaded the country in September 1935. Moreover, like other imperialist powers, the USA sabotaged the imposition of sanctions against the aggressor, and American exports to Italy rose considerably during the war months. Rupert Emerson writes: ".. .the Fascist overrunning of Ethiopia . . . had a poignant meaning for many Negro Americans which their white fellow citizens were unlikely to share.''^^6^^
Some American historians try to maintain that during the Second World War the USA followed a consistently anti-colonialist line and that the American view on the colonial question was "that no people, therefore, should be denied the right to independence".^^7^^ The examples usually cited to support this assertion consist, of extracts from a foreign policy statement made in 1942 by Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State. "Secretary Hull . . . declared that it would always be the American purpose 'to use the full measure of our influence to support the attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it'.''^^8^^
However, this statement diverges clearly from the view (quoted above) expressed by the Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, about the unconditional application of the Atlantic Charter principles to the world as a whole. It is hardly surprising that Hull called Welles's statement `` premature'' and later compelled him to resign. Expounding the government's official position, the Secretary of State said 38 that colonial peoples had to "show themselves worthy" of freedom and "ready for it"! So, in Hull's opinion, not all the enslaved peoples had an automatic right to freedom. The question arises as to who is to judge whether a people has "shown itself worthy of freedom" and is "ready for it''. There is only one possible answer---the colonial powers. Even Hull's claim that the USA intended to use its `` influence'' is hardly sufficient indication that his position was anti-colonialist.
The main point, curiously overlooked by American historians, is that the USA's position on the granting of independence to colonial peoples, albeit hedged round with numerous conditions, had by the end of the war undergone substantial changes. Thus, at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain ( October-November 1943) the American delegation submitted a draft United Nations declaration on national independence. In fact, the document provided for the redistribution of the colonies and aimed to remove all obstacles to the penetration of the European colonial dependencies by American monopolies. In the guise of a suitable international body, the United States would also have been able to govern colonies. However, the true designs of American imperialism were cunningly concealed in democratic-sounding phrases. In particular, the draft contained the stipulation "to fix, at the earliest practicable moments, dates upon which the colonial peoples shall be accorded the status of full independence".^^9^^ This was pure demagogy, since the US State Department was already aware that the British would not support that clause. Eden reminded Hull that he had already informed the US Ambassador in London, John Winant, that the British Government did not accept the views incorporated in the American draft, and refused to discuss the matter at the Conference.
Later on the Americans themselves discarded all mention of the granting of independence to colonial peoples, even in a limited interpretation. All the later numerous documents and statements from Washington dealing with the aims of an international trusteeship system omitted both the article about granting the colonial peoples independence and the point about preparing them for self-government.
39The reason for the transformation does not, of course, lie in any US ``retreat'' under British ``pressure'', as some American investigators maintain. Several factors led to the withdrawal of the term ``independence''. Firstly, the war years saw the growing influence on US foreign policy of military circles which regarded the colonial possessions of their European allies as good sites for bases, without sparing a thought for the liberation of the colonial peoples. Secondly, influential groups which were fundamentally opposed to any international trusteeship system became active in the USA. Thirdly, and this is the main point, Britain and the USA, struggling as they were for the leading role in the postwar world, noticed that the military successes of the Soviet Union and its decisive contribution to the defeat of Hitler's Germany were causing world opinion to listen more readily to the voice of Moscow. In the circumstances Roosevelt and his aides thought it advisable to exercise restraint in their approach to the future of the colonial peoples.
Despite the greatly increased interest that the USA had taken in Africa during the war years, the device of America's ``anti-colonialism'' was only very rarely employed in the first postwar decade, even as just a political gambit. Washington's African policy then was to compete with the European colonial powers and gradually oust them from their traditional spheres of influence; but not to undermine their colonial rule in Africa.
From the political, economic and strategic viewpoints, ``co-existence'' in Africa with the established colonialists was considered in the United States to be the most convenient way of penetrating that continent. It is not difficult to find reasons for this view. In the first place, under the impact of national liberation uprisings in Asia, US ruling circles concluded that the African colonial rule of their European NATO allies would be less of a hindrance to the expansion of the American monopolies than the possible rise to power of progressive forces. Secondly, any demand to decolonise Africa, even if it were just for propaganda purposes, would create an open breach between the United States and Britain, France and Belgium; American ruling circles wished to avoid this at all costs. Thirdly, since the USA had never really adopted an anti-colonial posture, it 40 did not occur to anyone in official quarters to state, especially in public, that Africa should be freed. Finally, as Professor Emerson points out, "even the assumption of a standard American hostility to colonialism was not taken to have any present applicability to Africa south of the Sahara, which was no doubt seen as a dark continent of primitive peoples for whom colonial tutelage was in order".^^10^^
Also contrary to historical fact is the story put out by American sources that by the fifties the European colonial powers came under US ``pressure'' to grant their African colonies independence at the earliest possible moment. In fact, Washington simply looked on while Britain. France and Belgium were prompted by other factors to undertake colonial reform. Rupert Emerson observes: "The British creation of an African unofficial majority in the Gold Coast Legislative Council in 1946, for example, went at least as far as the United States was likely to suggest.''^^11^^ Other examples are not difficult to find. Henry Byroade, the US Assistant Secretary of State, stated bluntly in 1953 that "premature independence (i.e., for African colonies---author) can be dangerous, retrogressive and destructive''. Unstinting in his praise of the actions of the colonial powers in Africa, including Portugal, Byroade "called for the frank recognition that American security was linked to the strength and stability of these powers and their legitimate interest in their dependencies".^^12^^ This view differs somewhat from the spasmodic warnings delivered to the colonial powers by American spokesmen during the war to the effect that the USA was not fighting to preserve their empires!
One other interesting detail is on record. American members of a UN mission which visited Tanganyika in 1955 insisted on a 25-year period of ``preparation'' for independence. Tanganyika became an independent state just six years later, in 1961.
It is perfectly obvious from many American sources that for a certain period after the war the USA considered that it had nothing to gain from the granting of independence to the peoples of Africa. How did the US foreign policymakers of the time come to this conclusion? Ignoring the continent's growing struggle for national liberation and 41 turning a blind eye to the European powers' cruel suppression of any resistance, Washington considered that "nothing was happening" in Africa. George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, stated publicly, for example, that Africa was one place "where---in the broadest sense---no crisis exists''. It was "a region of 10 million square miles in which no significant inroads have been made by Communism''. The area was thus "relatively stable and secure".^^13^^ So the conclusion was in no doubt: since Africa's "stability and security" were a direct result of colonial rule, there was no point in the USA's trying to upset the balance. European colonialism was regarded as a "barrier to Communism" and so should not be weakened.
Official circles in the USA maintained this position until it became clear that the growth of the national liberation movement was an irreversible process that would inevitably bring about the freedom of the African colonies. As early as 1956 the prominent American diplomat Chester Bowles wrote that "the most powerful country in the world . . . cannot declare itself to be a non-participant in the affairs of a continent boiling with change. . ,".^^14^^
But even at the end of the fifties, when the liberation of Africa had already begun, the official US position was far from being ``anti-colonialist''. Joseph Satterthwaite, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, put it this way: "We support African political aspirations where they are moderate, non-violent and constructive and take into account their obligations to and interdependence with the world community. We also support the principle of continued African ties with Western Europe. We see no reason why there should be a conflict between these two concepts."^^15^^ In other words, the USA was not exactly against political freedom for Africa, so long as Africa remained within the West's sphere of influence.
With the colonial system in a state of collapse, Walt Rostow was one of the first to clarify the new US role. He called the national liberation movement and the forced retreat of the colonialists a "revolution of modernisation'', and did not object to his European competitors' loss of direct rule in the former colonies. What he did insist on was the 42 need for the United States to ``protect'' the processes taking place in the liberated countries and to show them a sample of what the "new partnership" might mean. This thinly veiled claim to the colonial succession reflected the new "vacuum theory'', which had recently taken shape. According to this theory, European rule in Africa should be replaced by an "active presence'', i.e., rule in all but name by the USA. The emergence of the theory also indicated that Washington's African policy had come in for a certain amount of revision. Professor Vernon McKay, the wellknown expert on the African policy of the USA, refers to this in his memorable sentence: "By the time Britain took the crucial, precedent-setting step of giving independence to Ghana on March 6, 1957, it was obvious to even the most conservative officials that the United States could not be more royalist than the Queen.''^^16^^
There is another important aspect to the apperance of something akin to a political doctrine governing the US attitude to Africa. Washington was in the grip of anxiety over the growing influence of socialist ideas in Africa and the initiation of co-operation between the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community and African countries.
Bourgeois historians and Western periodicals regularly hark back to the assertion that after a gap of about ten years since the end of the war the USA "fully adopted" an ``anti-colonialist'' outlook. True, there is some controversy over identifying the ``turning-point'' in Washington's African policy. Some writers say it occurred in 1956, while others say 1957--58 or 1961, i.e., the year when the Kennedy Administration took over, and so on. Each view has facts to support it. In 1956 the Office of African Affairs was founded at the State Department. In 1958 Congress converted this section into a special Bureau of African Affairs and created a new post, that of Secretary of State for African Affairs for the man who presided over it. At the time of Dean Rusk's promotion to the position of Secretary of State President Kennedy commented that Rusk's assistant on African policies was to be the former Governor of the State of Michigan, G. Mennen Williams, who was noted for his ``liberal'' views. They also recall that as early as 1957 in one of his speeches John Kennedy voiced an opinion that 43 was not very consistent with the US role as an ally of France when he advocated independence for Algeria.^^17^^
All these facts and many others certainly testify to the United States' growing interest in Africa. But, as frequently happens in bourgeois accounts, the main topic has been allowed to slip out of focus. Neither reorganisation inside the State Department nor the remarks made by American politicians had any connection with anti-colonialism as such. The supposed swing towards ``anti-colonialism'' in US African policies, discernible from the middle of the fifties, must be viewed in the light of three factors: the vigorous upsurge of the national liberation struggle in Africa, the growing influence of the socialist system on the course of world events and the intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry in Africa.
Washington saw that the African colonies would inevitably attain their freedom and so made a virtue of political necessity. There was no alternative to a show of "anti-- colonialism''. Open support of the colonialists was ruled out by that time, and a ``neutral'' position might prove damaging to later policies. As Emerson puts it, "the intensification of African nationalism (i.e., the national liberation struggle--- author) and the growing readiness of Britain, France and Belgium to yield to it forced the United States to run to catch up with a procession which it would have liked to believe it was leading".^^18^^
The redivision of colonial Africa became a non-starter. The liberation struggle of the African peoples demolished the plans of the imperialists. A new question emerged into the limelight: how could the USA obtain advantages over the departing colonialists in the independent countries? How could US prestige be raised in the eyes of African peoples?
Washington's new move did not pass unnoticed in the European metropolises. The British were the first to respond. Britain's representative to the UN Trusteeship Council, Alan Burns, published a book in 1957 called In Defence of Colonies. He pours scorn on the "traditional anti-colonialism" proclaimed by so much US propaganda and the verbiage from statesmen and politicians. Citing numerous examples of American colonial conquests, Burns showed that US colonial policy did not differ from that of the European powers; 44 the only differentiating factor was geography. For good measure Burns adds: "Fewer of the aboriginal inhabitants were killed in the present British colonies than perished in the American wars against the Indians.''^^19^^
The collapse of European colonial rule in Africa was, on the whole, welcomed by ruling circles in Washington. William Attwood, the former US Ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, pointed out, for example, that, with the British withdrawal, the USA was at long last presented with the opportunity for "intrusion into their East African preserve".^^20^^ These words apply equally well to other parts of the continent. The USA was more concerned with another aspect of the question: what course of development would the liberated countries follow, and might there not be an increase in the influence of progressive forces and the socialist states? The USA wished to see that African development was not hostile to the American system, that influences opposed to the American way of life were kept at bay, that access was maintained to the continent's raw materials and that US strategic needs were catered for. All this was stated in the report made by Senator Francis Bolton's special study mission to Africa. In other words, ideological control of Africa would have to be exercised by the United States.^^21^^ Similar views are encountered in a number of other official US Government documents. For example, the report of a task force assigned by Kennedy in December 1960 to study African policy rejected the idea that "Africa was still a semidependency of Europe and that America should not intrude... But it stressed that US `intrusion' should be low-key, practical. . ,".^^22^^ The ``anti-colonialism'' line was supposed to provide the ideological fuel for the "new course''. The USA's main purpose was to take control of the national liberation movement in Africa and to "turn the tide"^^23^^ of events, directing them into a channel that would suit the American monopolies.
It was not, of course, difficult at first for the United States to pose as an ``anti-colonialist'', since the general course of events in Africa did not oblige the Americans to give any practical demonstration of their feelings. The fact that they were officially regarded as allies of the colonial powers was no obstacle either. The colonialists were themselves 45 compelled to make concessions to the national liberation forces and to ``grant'' their colonies independence.
The net result, as even American researchers note, was that "the United States may have received more credit than it deserved" in Africa.^^2^^'^^1^^ But the idyll was comparatively short-lived. In the first place, the contradictions between the former European metropolises and American imperialism, their would-be successor, went from bad to worse. In his press conference of the 23 July 1964 de Gaulle declared: "The colonial powers which have accomplished, in more or less difficult circumstances, the transfer of their sovereignty to local regimes felt that everywhere, directly or indirectly, they were under pressure from Washington.'' In the second place, the true value of American statements began to dawn on the African countries themselves. The myth of US `` anticolonialism'' received a severe setback on the 24 November 1964, when mercenary troops parachuted into Stanleyville from American planes. The sight of the USA making common cause with the Belgian colonialists was a clear indication to Africans of the reality behind Washington's African policies and intentions.
It was with a certain malicious glee that the West German periodical Aussenpolitik commented that as a result of this action and a number of others "the political capital accumulated by the USA over the last few years as a counterweight to the colonial powers . . . has melted away. The African countries have realised that the main aim of US policy is to hinder communist infiltration. Against a background of growing national awareness among the peoples of Africa, this position can only look like paternalism. Owing to this and also through its leading role in NATO, of which Portugal, the most hated colonial power in Africa, is also a member, the USA has gained the stigma of neocolonialism.''^^25^^
However, American ruling circles saw no cause for embarrassment. Moreover, the appearance of anti-American feeling in most African countries not only failed to impede US expansion in the continent, but rather had the opposite effect: it gave added impetus to American activity and persistence. This, in turn, intensified the inter-imperialist struggle for influence. The African scholar Professor Ali Mazrui 46 writes: "Then gradually American aid, American personnel and American cultural and diplomatic influence began to touch the course of events in many of the new countries. And the crystallization of African attitudes towards the United States became a point of departure from a total African obsession with the former colonial powers.''^^26^^
Even today the USA has not abandoned its "anti-- colonialist" image. Instead, a few modifications have been made and additional arguments supplied. For example, every effort is made to stress the ``anti-colonial'' nature of the "Peace Corps''. Its former director, J. Hood Vaughn, declared before Congress in July 1968 that the "Peace Corps" was not an agency for promoting US foreign policy.
Declarations of this type are supposed to back up the USA's ``anti-colonial'' stance. This has become a particularly necessary step in a situation where Africa has, by and large, achieved political independence, but the economic position of the former metropolises in the young states has generally remained quite firm. This state of affairs presented a considerable obstacle to US plans for expansion. It was essential to find the key that would "unlock the door" into Africa. The ``anti-colonialist'' propaganda was just such a key. Its aim was to convince the African countries of the USA's friendship and good intentions. They were to believe that colonial designs were completely alien to an America that had experienced the yoke of British colonialism. It must be said that the spreading of the myth brought great practical benefits to the USA, and many representatives of the developing world fell under its spell to some extent.
Today the ``anti-colonialist'' line is intended not only to emphasise the ``difference'' between the USA and the former metropolises, but also to create the illusion that the USA is not an imperialist state at all; from this it would follow that US relationships with developing countries are fundamentally different from those maintained by such traditional colonial powers as Britain and France.
Seeing ``anti-colonialism'' as an important device for boosting American influence in Africa, the US propaganda machine spares no effort in publicising it. Use is even made of the fact that in recent years the government has steadily whittled down the ``aid'' money available to African 47 countries. The reasoning paraded by American spokesmen could sound convincing to the uninitiated: the USA is not a colonial power and so bears no responsibility for the aftermath of a colonial regime; only America's ``anti-colonialist'' tradition prompts it to ``participate'' in the destinies of the liberated peoples and "make sacrifices'', since the aid furnished to African countries brings in no profit and is simply "a burden on the American economy".^^27^^ At the same time the activities of the American monopolies are depicted as no more than "normal business''. Moreover, the point is rammed home that the monopolies are not interested in the political orientation of the African country into which they are sinking their capital. Philip Quigg, the editor of the journal Foreign Affairs, comments as follows: "The average American businessman with interests or markets in Africa . .. professes to be apolitical, is chary of giving his opinions and favours whatever status quo prevails, whether it be of the left or right. Because he is likely to have worldwide involvements, he may have no particular interest in Africa beyond the preservation of a climate in which he can achieve an adequate return on his investment. He is a conservative force, but not a reactionary one.''^^28^^
Not only is the USA's ``anti-colonialism'' substantiated in this way, but an attempt is also being made to refute any notion that penetration by the American monopolies may pose a threat to the independence of a young state. The Africans are told that American investments do not mean any increase in US influence.
The political headquarters and ideological services of the former metropolises do not just remain idle spectators as the USA endeavours to persuade the liberated peoples of its ``anti-colonialism''. One of the counter-measures taken in Britain and France was the wholesale rewriting of the history of colonialism. It was depicted as "the motive force of progress''. Colonialism was not, of course, swept away by the national liberation movement, but was shown to have abolished itself, having completed its "historic mission''. In British publications one even comes across claims that Britain, unlike the USA, has "rendered a great service" to the peoples of Africa by "helping them towards civilisation''; the USA "declined to take on" this "historic mission''.
48 __NUMERIC_LVL2__ CHAPTER III __ALPHA_LVL2__ THE ``VACUUM'' THEORY AND THE PRACTICEThe ``anti-colonialism'' myth set the USA apart from the European metropolises on the moral and ethical level. Another ideological formula, the so-called ``vacuum'' theory, was employed by US imperialism in its attempts to find a political and legal basis for its claim to be the trustee of the liberated countries.
The colonial powers reckoned that they would be able to keep Africa free of revolutionary change, but they were disappointed. The independence of Libya was proclaimed in December 1951. In July 1952 a revolution took place in Egypt. The Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia put an end to colonial oppression in January and March 1956. The national liberation movement gathered momentum in regions south of the Sahara as well. This was the moment at which the notorious ``vacuum'' theory emerged on to the scene. Its potential usefulness was grasped immediately by the ruling circles of America and West Germany. The theory stated in effect that the place of the retiring colonial powers had to be filled by other powers which were capable of ``protecting'' the young states from ``chaos'' and ``turmoil''.
The theory was first put forward in a collective work published by the American Council on Foreign Relations. This Council was managed by prominent members of US foreign policy departments, one of whom was Allen Dulles, the familiar figure of the CIA. It was further developed at the Conference on Contemporary Africa which the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies sponsored in Washington in August 1954. It was declared at the Conference that "the European countries are increasingly less able to carry the responsibility they have assumed in this area".^^1^^
The proponents of the ``vacuum'' theory tried to give it some respectability in imperialist circles by basing their arguments on the need to oppose the ``communist'' threat to the liberated countries. This was a perfectly natural gambit, since the stepping up of the American and West 49 German penetration of Africa in the mid-fifties coincided with the decision taken by ruling circles in the West to escalate the "cold war" and adopt a series of measures against the Soviet Union, other countries of the socialist community and the national liberation movement. By giving an anti-communist finish to their plans for securing the colonial succession, the USA and the FRG thought that, even if they were unable to throw the European metropolises off guard completely, they could at least contain their opposition to the new policy. The West German co-authors of the ``vacuum'' theory were particularly zealous in this respect. This is hardly surprising, given the correlation of forces at the time and the need for the FRG, if not for the USA, to disguise its intentions more thoroughly. Thus, having announced that the main aim of the FRG's policies in Africa was to resist "the spread of communism'', Bonn's ideologists constantly linked this proposition with the ``vacuum'' theory. In an article entitled "Black Africa---the Power-less Continent" the influential West German journal Aussenpolitik wrote: "In the eyes of the interested non-African states, the decolonisation process has created a power vacuum in Africa that has to be filled before the enemy steps in.. . Western countries are prepared to take over the zones of influence more or less voluntarily evacuated by the colonial powers in order to further the main aim---to ensure an anti-communist orientation there.''^^2^^
In the United States the problem of the "African Succession" was described in much franker terms. The aims pursued were also spelled out more honestly. In his book The New Africa the correspondent of the Washington Evening Star, Smith Hempstone, wrote that Britain and France were leaving Africa with their reputations there well and truly sullied. The vacancy should be filled by a smiling and personable America, so that the profits would start rolling in.^^3^^
The European colonial powers did not in tne least share the view that any sort of ``vacuum'' could form in Africa, nor were they packing their bags. However, the metropolises had to contend with a growing national liberation movement as well as the aspirations of their competitor-allies. The deepening of inter-imperialist contradictions forced __PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4---1031 50 them to take counter-measures and keep changing their ground in order to neutralise the expansion into Africa of the USA, the FRG and, later, Japan. In an effort to enlist the support of other states for the fight against the liberation movement and the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Africa, the colonial powers were obliged to bargain with their NATO colleagues, while at the same time striving to preserve and strengthen their own positions in the continent.
Immediately after the war the contradictions between Britain and America were the most blatant. Britain emerged from the war economically weakened yet hanging on to her vast colonial empire. It included a considerable part of Tropical Africa and the Middle East, the whole of the Indian sub-continent, Malaya and other parts of South-East Asia, as well as a number of territories in Oceania and the Western Hemisphere. The USA, victorious and resplendent in its economic, political and military might, naturally gazed longingly at the domains of its weaker European allies, which no longer possessed the economic, political or military capacity to keep their overseas dependencies safe from their imperialist rival.
During the first postwar years Washington's "anti-- colonialists" fixed their sights firmly on the British colonies. Even in wartime the colonial issue had proved a stumbling-block in the Anglo-American alliance. Numerous British documents and materials, as well as the statements of British leaders show that at least up to 1946 London was not considering the possibility of losing its colonial empire; on the contrary, it was assumed that the colonies could be preserved under undivided British rule, irrespective of Washington.
However, when the growth of the national liberation movement in the colonies began to take on menacing proportions, British ruling circles realised that they could not hold firm in isolation. British diplomacy then had to face up to the problem, which persisted up to the beginning of the sixties, of how to bring about joint British-US action against the liberation forces and yet retain Britain's overwhelming influence in the colonial world. The problem remained unsolved. Despite the persistent efforts of both the British Conservative and Labour Governments to form a single Anglo-American colonial front, commanded by the British 51 of course, the USA of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and, especially, Kennedy displayed a firm resolve not to "drag Britain's chestnuts out of the fire''.
During the disintegration of the colonial system the US position was aptly summed up by Under-Secretary of State Eugene Rostow in his article "Europe and the USA---- Partners out of Necessity": "The European states emerged from the war seriously weakened and, since they possessed overseas empires, were faced by the bitter prospect of a more or less rapid withdrawal from them. Despite the financial relief that such a course entailed, it was a nerve-shattering and often traumatic experience. We are now feeling the weight of the burden that history has thrust upon us. We have taken upon ourselves responsibility for the new world in Asia, Africa and the Middle East where, abandoned by Western Europe, a considerable number of weak, vulnerable young nations have evolved. The British and French will have to accept the loss of their world empires and become reconciled to their new dimension in world politics.'"^^1^^
However, Washington's attempts to carry out a "changing of the guard" unilaterally in the liberated countries were not to the liking of London and Paris. The British Government tried assiduously to bring the USA into line with their colonial policy or, failing that, to at least ensure US neutrality.
Before his retirement Winston Churchill was very active in this field, especially over the knotty problem of Egypt. For instance, addressing a meeting of the US Congress on the 17 January 1952, Churchill endeavoured to limit Washington's opposition to British policy in Egypt. He declared that the British troops stationed there were acting "as servants and guardians of the commerce of the world'', and called upon the United States to station troops in the Suez Canal zone "as a symbol of the unity of purpose which inspires us".^^5^^
The British Government took other steps to secure US support. On the 27 July 1956, the day after Egypt's decision to nationalise the Suez Canal Company, Eden stated that British troops based in Cyprus would again, if necessary, occupy the Canal Zone. Eden appealed to the USA to join Britain, recalling that in 1950 Britain had unhesitatingly supported America in the Korean War.^^0^^ But the principle 52 of "one good turn deserves another" proved weaker in the event than the inter-imperialist contradictions. The efforts of Labour leaders to bring pressure to bear on the USA were equally fruitless. The speech delivered by Herbert Morrison in the British House of Commons in which he expressed the Labour Opposition's disenchantment with the ``unsatisfactory'' conduct of "our American friends" who "do rather try our patience"^^7^^ made no impression on the USA. There was no response to Morrison's appeal to the American Government to demonstrate "to the whole world" that Britain, the USA and France were ``united''.
The depth of Anglo-American contradictions in Africa in the fifties was most clearly revealed by the situation that resulted from the three-pronged attack on Egypt in 1956.
It can be stated without exaggeration that London gravely underestimated Washington's determination to pursue an independent policy towards North-East Africa and not to be guided by the interests of its British ally. When planning the joint attack on Egypt with France and Israel, the British Government was clearly mistaken in its assumption that the USA would, at the worst, adopt a policy of non-interference. In fact, the opposite happened.
The intensity of Anglo-American contradictions during that period can be gauged from the exchange of telegrams between Eden and Eisenhower. In reply to Eisenhower's personal telegram of the 30 October 1956 suggesting immediate and frank Anglo-American consultation^^8^^ Eden said nothing positive, stating simply that "when the dust settles there may well be a chance for our doing a really constructive piece of work together''. Even when a few hours later on the same day Eisenhower protested at the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt, Eden could still, as he put it, see "no reason at this moment to suppose that the United States would oppose us at the United Nations upon almost every point".^^9^^
As is generally known, the decisive role in halting the attack on Egypt by Britain, France and Israel was played by the firm position of the Soviet Union. In special messages sent on the 5 November 1956 to the governments of Britain, France and Israel the Soviet Government demanded an immediate end to the aggression, delivering a stern 53 warning,^^10^^ which, as is recognised by the English historian F. S. Northedge, dealt the final blow to the British policy in Egypt.
However, the brunt of British criticism was borne by the USA, whose reluctance to protect the interests of Britain to the detriment of its own caused unprecedented annoyance in official quarters in London and provoked an outburst of anti-American feeling even among Conservatives. In November 1956 110 Conservative Members of Parliament tabled a motion in the House of Commons sharply condemning US policy during the events in Egypt. As they saw it, the American attitude was "gravely endangering the Atlantic alliance".^^11^^
Another noteworthy example of Anglo-American contradictions exacerbated by the practical application of the ``vacuum'' theory is the split between the two powers over the Baghdad Pact.
The creation of the British-instigated Baghdad Pact ( subsequently renamed CENTO) in 1955 had a direct bearing on the problem of defending British possessions in the Middle East and Africa. The US Government supported the idea of the Pact in principle, but later, when the organisation actually emerged, not only refused to accede to it, but also, in Eden's words, "tried to take credit for this attitude in capitals like Cairo, which were hostile to the pact".^^12^^
The point was that despite the officially declared aim of CENTO---defence against the "communist threat"---British diplomacy had other ends in sight. With the help of the Pact, London hoped in the first place to be able to look after British interests in the Middle East and North Africa, which were threatened not by communism (and certainly not by Arab communism), but by the national liberation movement. A no less important problem seemed to the British Government to be the growth of US influence in the area. By creating a multilateral bloc, London supposed that the USA could be involved in a military and political alliance headed by Britain. This would have the effect of not only placing the might of America at the service of British interests, but also limiting the contradictions and disagreements in the policies of both powers towards that part of the world. The plan did not quite work out. Up to the end of 1958 the USA 54 flatly refused to accede to the new pact, since such a step would have implied support for British aspirations in the Arab East and North Africa and hence a renunciation of its own policy. In later years the United States became a member of the pact's main committees, concluded bilateral military agreements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, completely ousted Britain from the leading role in CENTO and proceeded to make systematic use of the bloc for its own ends.
US moves connected with the setting up x)f CENTO and the openly negative attitude of the Americans towards the British-led aggression in Egypt marked the beginning of Anglo-American rivalry in an Africa that was being cleared of the rule of the European metropolises. The position adopted by the USA at that time was accurately expressed by John Foster Dulles. He declared that, although Great Britain and the USA were allies in NATO, on other matters "the United States would not identify itself fully with colonial powers".^^13^^
The British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, subsequently gave the British view of the USA's "independent role" in a confidential message to Commonwealth representatives. Listing the ``mistakes'' made by Britain in the Middle East and North Africa, among which he included the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone, Lloyd commented bitterly that these ``mistakes'' were the result of "strong American pressure''. He concluded: "We have striven hard to arrive at a common Anglo-American policy without success. We have to look after ourselves now.''^^14^^
The main disagreements between the USA and the European metropolises were not over the question of what part a decolonised Africa would play in the capitalist world. There was no particular difference of opinion here. The question that really troubled relations between the imperialist powers and which still remains to be solved was--- who should exercise ``control'' over the newly independent countries?
In the late fifties and early sixties Britain, Belgium and, to some extent, France held the view that collaboration with the USA in the Third World was desirable. Washington's position, however, was the exact opposite. "Joint 55 efforts" with any colonial power were generally thought to be a hindrance to US interests. This position was embodied in the ``vacuum'' theory, which was a real windfall for American imperialism. The FRG, Japan and some other countries caught on quickly. After all, it was no longer a question of cutting one's rivals, but simply of filling a `` vacuum''. It was much more convenient to follow such a course than to openly abide by Emerson's recommendations, for example. He advised the USA to be completely independent in its relations with African countries and in its handling of African problems. US policy should in no circumstances be influenced by America's European allies.^^1^^'
Despite its anti-communist trimmings, the ``vacuum'' theory was directed primarily against the USA's European allies, the colonial powers. Its designers proceeded from the view that there was no point in fighting a losing battle to preserve the colonial regimes. Naturally, the Americans had no intention of accelerating the liberation of the colonies: on the contrary, they strove to retard the process; but it was clear to them that it would inevitably win in the end. As G. Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, declared, the United States supported the "continuing tide of self-determination" so long as it took the form of a "deliberate, expeditious preparation for selfgovernment"^^16^^---after consultation with the USA, of course. It was obviously intended to ``consult'' not the outgoing metropolises but the forces which came to power in the new states that would emerge from the former colonies. Thus "filling the vacuum" meant simply that the USA would step in as ``spiritual'' leader of a liberated country and would ensure that the metropolis aspiring to that role was disqualified.
The other noteworthy feature of the ``vacuum'' theory was that it reflected not only the scepticism prevalent in US ruling circles over their European allies but also the American conviction that the peoples of Africa were incapable of shaping their own destinies and building a new life by themselves. Even today this assumption underlies much of Washington's African policy.
56 __NUMERIC_LVL2__ CHAPTER IV __ALPHA_LVL2__ THE COLONIAL POWERS' ``SECOND FRONT''The intrusion of the USA into what were once the African ``preserves'' of the European metropolises began during the war and proceeded at an ever increasing rate afterwards. The expansion of West German imperialism into Africa was renewed during the fifties. Japan followed suit later on. The attempts to redivide the African colonies became one of the important factors in the imperialist struggle in the "black continent''.
In order to justify its claims to Africa in the eyes of its allies, the United States adduced a variety of arguments, not the least prominent of which were those concerned with military and strategic considerations. An example is contained in the secret report drafted by US Admiral Fechteler and published in the French paper Le Monde.^^1^^ The Americans naturally challenged the authenticity of the document, claiming that it was just an article that had been previously published in the Proceedings of the American Naval Institute. Denials of this sort only had the effect of corroborating the existence and the alleged contents of the report. Having assessed the situation in Western Europe, Admiral Fechteler proposed, in effect, to replace European colonial rule in the whole of North and North-East Africa by American ``patronage''. He also stressed that "Arab nationalism ... could be heard and understood by the American leaders".^^2^^ But the United States launched its main attack on colonial Africa in the economic field.
On the 20 January 1949 in his inaugural address President Truman announced a broad campaign for redistributing the colonial world and spheres of influence. "Point Four" of this programme, which dealt with the increased export of American private capital under the guise of "aid to backward areas'', was of direct relevance to Africa. The US Chamber of Commerce hastened to declare the African continent a highly favourable area for "American capital investment'', while business circles indicated that 6,000 million dollars would be invested in Africa over the coming 10--15 years. This did not in fact happen, of course. Direct American 57 capital investment in Africa over the period 1950--61 grew from 300 million to only 1,000 million dollars. Nevertheless, US plans for financial and economic expansion into Africa caused grave anxiety during these years in the capitals of the colonial powers.
The USA launched its onslaught on British colonial Africa from three bases: from the Republic of South Africa, where branches of the largest American monopolies had established themselves with comparative ease; from London, since the American monopolies were widely represented in the City; and from the USA directly. Typical examples of US penetration are not hard to find. In Ghana (then the Gold Coast), despite the resistance of British firms, US companies began exploiting bauxite and manganese ore deposits. In Nigeria the American Smelting and Refining Corporation organised in the spring of 1952 a mixed syndicate for mining zinc, lead and silver ores. In Tanganyika in 1952 American capital was used to help expand the lead- and copper-- mining industries. The United States also started to penetrate Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia. In August 1950 a government mission from Southern Rhodesia visited the USA at the invitation of the Americans. It was agreed that American capital would henceforth be granted the same privileges as British investment. Soon the American Metal Company had taken over the two largest copper-- mining concerns, Roan Antelope and Mufulira Mines, and in 1959 the Americans secured the transfer of the Board of the Rhodesian Selection Trust, which managed these and a number of other companies, from London to Northern Rhodesia.
In 1955 the Rhodesian branch of the Vanadium Corporation of America, called the Rhodesian Vanadium Corporation, which mined for chromites in Southern Rhodesia, bought up the shares of the Wihdons Mineral Company, which extracted manganese ore in Northern Rhodesia.
In 1957 the American Newmont Mining Company set up in Tanganyika the company Western Rift Exploration in order to prospect for radioactive elements and rare and nonferrous metals and extract them.
US oil monopolies also made their debut in Africa. The Socony Mobil concern began drilling for oil in Nigeria and 58 then tried to obtain as a concession an oil-rich area of 4,000 square miles. Standard Oil (New Jersey) made a similar move. Between 1956 and 1957 the Gulf Oil Corporation intensified its search for oil in Ghana. It is significant that the total capital investment by the American oil monopolies in British East and British West Africa amounted by 1956 to about half of all private direct US investment in this group of British colonies.
American capital had already acquired a strong position in the Belgian Congo during the war years as a result of mining uranium ore there for the manufacture of atomic bombs. The next step, in the spring of 1950, was the purchase by a group of American monopolies of a large packet of shares in the British Tanganyika Concessions. This move made the British ruling circles very unhappy. In November 1950 Tanganyika Concessions bowed to British Government pressure and gave an undertaking not to sell to anyone for at least ten years its holdings of the share capital of other companies without first obtaining Treasury consent. In the meantime, though, American monopolies had secured direct access to the Belgian Congo's uranium and copper mines, as well as its railways.
In 1954 Belgians were completely ousted from control of the uranium mines by the Americans. There was sharp reaction in Brussels. Belgium's Foreign Minister sent a special message to the President of the USA pointing out that the Americans had broken a standing agreement and demanding recognition of Belgium's right to joint management of the uranium workings. Many deputies in the Belgian Parliament also protested against the US action. Nevertheless, Washington remained deaf to these and subsequent protests.
In 1949, at the suggestion of the USA, a Franco-American corporation for stimulating joint investment in the French colonies was formed, as well as the North American Oil Society, in which Standard Oil (New Jersey) came to have the major stake. At the same time, making use of France's weakened position, the American monopolies gained concessions in Senegal, the Cameroons, French Guinea, Dahomey, Morocco and Algeria. The last two countries provided a base for representatives of the US non-ferrous metal and 59 mining industry: the Newmont Mining Company, Mines Incorporated and Joseph Lade moved in. They were interested in mining lead ore and other minerals. These firms managed to take over a non-ferrous metal plant in Zellija (Morocco). In Gabon the United States Steel Corporation swallowed up 50 per cent of the shares in the SOMIFER company, which mined for iron ore, and 65 per cent of the shares in the Compagnie Miniere de 1'Ogooue S. A., which extracted manganese. It was only after sharp protests in France that the American holding in the Compagnie Miniere was reduced to 49 per cent. In Togo and Senegal American groups gained respectively 31 per cent and 12 per cent of the share capital of the companies that were mining for phosphates in Benin and Tigba. This list of examples is by no means exhaustive.
Although the scale of the operation differed from place to place, American capital made an all-out effort to open the door into every African country. The USA wishes to maintain is right to equal economic opportunities in African territories ---that is how the USA's African policy was summed up by George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and African Affairs, speaking in May 1950 in Oklahoma City. These words expressed not so much the US claim to "equal opportunities" in Africa as the desire to occupy a monopoly position. Naturally, this course was not acceptable to the European colonial powers, and their resistance to American expansion into Africa mounted. Both in the US Congress and the American press repeated attacks were made (for good reason) on London in particular. In theory London agreed to the influx of American capital into its colonies, but in practice raised one obstacle after another. In November 1951 the National Foreign Trade Council, a very influential body in US business circles, even adopted a special resolution demanding that the governments of the European colonial powers create normal conditions for American capital investment.
However, despite the military and political alliance with the USA, Britain was not prepared to surrender colonial advantage without a fight. This is shown in the speech Churchill made before the US Congress on 17 January 1952. In it he warned the USA and other pretenders to the British 60 legacy: "Let no man underrate the abiding power of the British Commonwealth and Empire ... the British Commonwealth of Nations, spread all over the world, is not prepared to become a state or group of states in any continental federal system on either side of the Atlantic.''^^3^^ This rebuff was backed up with practical measures. Between 1950 and 1955 the British Government extended the system of empire preference.
West Germany's penetration of Africa during the period preceding the liberation of the continent was accomplished mainly through trade. In 1951 the FRG's exports to Africa far exceeded the prewar level and over the following five years increased 2.3 times. Over the same period West German imports rose 1.7 times.
The fastest growth occurred in the export to West Germany of the African countries' raw materials and foodstuffs. Imports of Nigerian rubber increased from 20 tons in 1949 to 5,200 tons in 1956. During the same period imports of timber went up from 127,000 to 3.4 million cubic feet; cocoa beans from 400 to 8,200 tons; iron ore from Sierra Leone from 200 tons (1950) to 464,000 tons; coffee from Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika from 21,000 to 280,000 tons; and cotton from Tanganyika from 700 tons (1953) to 5,900 tons. Trade was particularly intensive between the FRG and the countries of British East Africa. Although lagging far behind Britain, the USA and Japan in terms of the volume of its exports to these countries in 1950--57, the FRG's export growth rate was higher. During the last 2-3 years of the period Britain had good reason to contemplate the West German penetration with alarm and even with jealousy, as The Times pointed out.
Meanwhile Bonn was making far-reaching plans. The familiar figure of Hjalmar Schacht was talking of " restoring the German colonial empire in a new form".^^4^^ The West German monopolies---Krupp, Heinkel, Haenschel, Volkswagenwerke and Siemens---followed in the footsteps of the trading firms. West German capital began to be invested in a number of African countries. During the colonial period, however, the sum invested was small: in 1958 it amounted to only 108 million marks, spread throughout Africa. Britain and France placed rigid limitations on their 61 traditional enemy's investment in their colonies. Nevertheless, the annual increment in West German capital investment in Africa (averaging 55.6 per cent) was higher than in Europe (38 per cent) or Asia (25 per cent).
In view of its position in the first half of 1950, the FRG was, of course, still "gathering strength" and simply followed in the wake of the USA, France and Britain. West German diplomacy and the monopolies were obliged to be cautious and conceal their true objectives. Gerhard Schroder, the Foreign Minister in the Adenauer Government, even went so far as to state: "We have no African policy.''^^5^^ In fact, there was an African policy, and it was conducted in terms that were far from welcome to the other imperialist powers. Thus, West German spokesmen stressed that, since the Germans had lost their colonies as early as in the First World War, they were free of the "psychological burden" that weighed upon the European colonial powers. From the FRG, defeated in war, could come no "imperialist threat as, for example, from the USA''. The fate of West Germany, it was said, was very similar to that of the African countries: both were underprivileged and were "extras on the stage of world politics''. And so on. Bonn clearly wished Africa to regard the FRG as a ``dependent'' country "on the end of a leash" held by the Western allies.
Japanese trade expansion began in British East Africa, where the cheap products of Japanese light industry, especially textiles, started to compete successfully with British goods. Next, Japanese businessmen appeared in West African countries, where, according to the Kyodo Tsushin Agency, trade was of ``enormous'' benefit to Japan. By 1960 Japan's exports to Nigeria were 7 times greater than her imports, and in the case of trade with Sierra Leone exports exceeded imports 80 times. A number of West African countries were obliged to introduce import quotas on Japanese goods. The unique feature in the Japanese penetration of Africa was that it took place under direct US patronage ---the American monopolies then viewed Japanese capital as an ally.
Since the imperialist rivals of the European metropolises concealed their drive for expansion by championing `` anticolonialism'', the "liberalisation of trade'', "joint aid for 62 the colonies' development'', etc., which, naturally, went down very well in Africa at the time, the old colonial powers had to resort to various defensive tactics. In fact they had to wage a war on two fronts: against the growing national liberation movement and against the pressure of their imperialist competitors. Hence the duality of many of the measures taken.
Britain, France and Belgium formulated their own " colonial development plans" in opposition to the American programmes for "aid to backward areas''. This too produced clashes between the colonialists and the ``pretenders''.
Speaking in the House of Commons on the 22 January 1948, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, made it perfectly clear that the measures taken by the government were intended primarily to serve the interests of the European colonial powers. He said: "In the first place, we turn our eyes to Africa, where great responsibilities are shared by us with South Africa, France, Belgium and Portugal. ... The organisation of Western Europe must be economically supported. That involves the closest possible collaboration with the Commonwealth and with overseas territories, not only British but French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese."^^6^^ And not a word about the overseas ally whose capital was stubbornly carving out for itself an equal share in the British programmes for exploiting the colonies! Congressional reaction in the USA was violent. Britain came in for a barrage of criticism: here was a country which was in receipt of considerable sums of money from the USA, was investing them in the colonies and raking in the profits, and yet was placing obstacles in the way of an American colonial expansion! In 1950 under pressure from Washington, London acquiesced to the holding of negotiations between the Colonial Development Corporation and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). However, the negotiations foundered, and it was only in February 1953 that the Bank managed to sign an agreement with Britain about a loan of £60 million to finance colonial development.
It is understandable that Britain's policy towards her African possessions in the postwar years was preoccupied by the fight against the national liberation movement. This 63 applied to both the Labour Government of 1945--51 and to the Conservative Government which succeeded it. However, the policy did not lose sight of the need to defend the colonial empire against inroads made by imperialist competitors.
Once dependent on Washington, London was in no position to decline discussion of colonial matters. The question of the access of American capital to Empire markets was a topic that cropped up on any occasion, even though the actual aim of a meeting might be to examine the Marshall Plan, the Mutual Security Programme, Britain's eligibility for fresh loans or the possibility of setting up joint military bases. Great Britain would invariably agree---admittedly, with reservations---to an influx of American capital and would promise to see that it financed her "colonial programmes''. In practice, though, Britain did everything to impede this process. As The Economist put it, "... a Commonwealth whose development was financed predominantly from America would not long remain a British Commonwealth".^^7^^
Somewh