Theodor OIZERMAN
__TITLE__ PROBLEMS OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY __TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2007-11-06T17:32:22-0800 __TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW
[1]Translated from the Russian by Robert Daglish
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__COPYRIGHT__ First printing 1973This book is part of much more comprehensive study which the author hopes to complete within the next few years. Even so, though not embracing all the problems implied in the title, it does deal with the specific nature of philosophical knowledge, its substance, form and structure, from historical angle and may, therefore, be described as a historico-philosophical study.
Historico-philosophical studies come in various shapes and sizes. Some of them investigate the development of the philosophical thought of a particular people. Some examine the development of philosophy on a world-historic scale with the philosophical thought of various nations emerging as historical stages in the development of world philosophy as a whole. Some deal with the various branches of philosophy, with the history of epistemology, ontology, dialectics, natural philosophy and ethics, or with certain philosophical trends, schools, the work of individual philosophers, stages of philosophical development, and so on. Each type of inquiry has its specific 5 task, but all presuppose the solution of the theoretical problems of the history of philosophy. For instance, the problem of contradiction in the history of philosophy cannot, in my view, be satisfactorily solved without a scientific conception of the particular qualities of philosophical problems and how, in particular, philosophy solves them. Moreover, to be able to trace the development of the concept of contradiction in the history of philosophy, one must be clearly aware of the basic features of the philosophical approach to cognition of reality, the ideological function of philosophy, the epistemological and class roots of the various philosophical approaches to the solution of this problem.
The subject of historico-philosophical research is philosophy; the problems of historico-- philosophical science are philosophical problems. These propositions, it seems to me, are quite obvious but, notwithstanding Cicero's remark that proof only belittles the obvious, I believe that they still demand to be proved, theoretically grounded, and this is what a great part of this book is about.
Although no philosophical doctrine can claim to embrace all philosophical questions, there is not a single philosophical problem that does not fall within the scope of historico-philosophical science. Besides which, historico-philosophical science is concerned with problems that are not part of philosophy as such. These are the historical problems of the emergence and development of philosophy, its objective dependence on social conditions, its epistemological roots and so on. Nevertheless, historico-philosophical science is not a ``marginal'' discipline, its source lies not in the ``crossing'' of history and philosophy, of 6 two relatively independent fields of knowledge, but in the objectively conditioned historical process of the development of philosophical knowledge, its critical appreciation and, probably, its self-awareness.
The problems of the history of philosophy arise not because they are outside the competence of both philosophy and history. Like all philosophical problems, they have been generated by the historical and everyday experience of all mankind, and particularly in the process of cognition---scientific and philosophical. The historian of philosophy must certainly be a historian in the full sense of the term. But no matter how important it is for him to be scrupulously efficient in investigating the social conditions that give rise to a certain philosophical doctrine, his main task is to understand that 'doctrine, to appreciate it critically, to show its connection with other philosophical doctrines, a connection that must in some way or other be conditioned by the socio-historical process. Regarded from this standpoint, historico-philosophical science is a specific means of philosophical inquiry, it is the philosophy of philosophy or, to be more concise, metaphilosophy.
It is quite impossible to treat the history of philosophy purely ``historically'', empirically, without being guided by a broad and flexible "scale of values" derived from the very history of philosophy itself, from the history of man's historical development and his quest for knowledge. Even the application of the term `` development'' to the history of philosophy makes certain obvious philosophical assumptions, e.g. the assumption that certain irreversible processes of change and progress actually occur in philosophy.
7Any attempt to discover an absolute recording system is just as futile in the history of philosophy as in physics. It immediately gives itself away, as a claim to complete impartiality, and no real philosopher can be completely impartial, any more than he can be without his own point of view. The adepts of impartiality ignore the obvious fact that historians of philosophy place different value on one and the same doctrine, and this happens not because they have been remiss in studying their sources and facts or because they have departed from the scientific standards demanded by historiography. The crux of the matter lies much deeper.
No exposition can be a word-for-word repetition of what a particular philosopher wrote. At the very least it will be a retelling in one's own words. But what serious investigator of the historical process of the development of philosophy would confine himself to a mere retelling, which does not usually imply understanding? Understanding and interpretation are inseparable from each other and the student of the history of philosophy must strive for a scientifically objective understanding of his subject, which is quite incompatible with refusal to take up any definite theoretical and, hence, conceptual position. For this reason the demand that one should remain utterly dispassionate in writing the history of philosophy is merely an invitation to remain in disagreement with oneself, with one's theoretical conscience. Science is impossible without criteria of scientificality, but in philosophy and the history of philosophy there is no unanimity on this question. Historico-philosophical science has therefore to work out criteria for the evaluation of philosophical doctrines, proceeding from critical 8 generalisation of the historico-philosophical process that is at work throughout the world.
It stands to reason that these criteria (and the methods of inquiry they entail) may prove completely unsatisfactory if the historian of philosophy adopts a sectarian philosophical position and assumes, for example, that only Thomas Aquinas created a system of absolute philosophical truths, whereas his great forerunners (with the possible exception of Aristotle) languished in darkness and the philosophers of any later period have merely departed from the true path laid down for them by "Doctor Angelicus''.
The philosophy of Marxism, however, does provide a real theoretical basis for a scientific history of philosophy, since it scientifically summarises the whole development of philosophical thought up to the time of the emergence of Marxism and continues to do so as subsequent stages are reached. This also means that dialectical and historical materialism is not only historically but also logically based on the history of philosophy, which critically analyses the manifold conceptions of philosophy and formulates as a deduction from its whole development (and that of scientific cognition in general) the basic premises of dialectical and historical materialism. In this sense, it may be said that the scientific history of philosophy as a theoretical conception of the development of philosophical knowledge is an organic component of the philosophy of Marxism. The concept "philosophy of Marxism" is wider in scope than the concept "dialectical and historical materialism'', because it also embraces the scientific history of philosophy as well as certain other philosophical disciplines (ethics, aesthetics, etc.).
9Dialectical and historical materialism is fundamentally opposed to any group limitations or narrowness. One has only to recall how the founders of Marxism-Leninism criticised not only vulgar but also metaphysical, mechanistic materialism, and also the anthropological materialism of Feuerbach, or how highly they valued the brilliant ideas contained in the idealist teachings of Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, Rousseau and Hegel. From this we realise that Marxism is the philosophy in which objectivity and partisanship are organically united.
The philosophy of Marxism, while rejecting on principle the idea of a perfect and complete philosophical system (absolute science, as Marx called it), is constantly in motion, in development, on the road to new discoveries. It is constantly aware of and grappling with its unsolved problems and, while criticising its ideological opponents, also criticises itself, recognising that it is limited by the boundaries of knowledge achieved not only in the philosophical but also in the general scientific fields. Marxist philosophy is also the history of philosophy, and particularly the history of Marxist philosophy, of its progressive development, a history that provides the theoretical prerequisites and method for the investigation of any philosophical doctrine. Like any system of scientific knowledge, the philosophy of Marxism regards its scientific propositions only as an approximate reflection of reality, as the unity of relative and absolute truth, the latter being understood dialectically, i.e., relative within its own frame of reference. The significance of dialectical and historical materialism for the scientific history of philosophy is not to be found in any claim to offer the history of philosophy cut-- 10 and-dried solutions and formulas, but in its ability to guide inquiry into the development of philosophy along a truly scientific path.
Since it applies what Engels called the "logical method'', historico-philosophical science is itself a philosophical theory. It investigates such specific features of philosophy as the forms of cognition, its basic types, structure, problems, and development, its relation to other forms of social consciousness (particularly science, art, religion), the nature of philosophical controversy, change in the subject of philosophy and the affirmation of scientific philosophical knowledge, thus answering the question of the nature of philosophical knowledge.
If the basic question of any philosophy is ultimately the question of the relation of the spiritual to the material, is not the question "What is philosophy?" the basic question of historicophilosophical science?
The significance of this apparently elementary question becomes obvious to anyone who can perceive even in the most general form the distinction between philosophy and the specialised sciences, arid who asks himself why different philosophical systems existed and continue to exist, while there are no fundamentally different, incompatible systems of mathematics or physics.
This is, of course, not merely a matter of definition, which would be of purely formal significance, but of making a critical generalisation of the development of philosophy, which to no small degree determines its social status and scientific prestige and enables it to solve correctly problems that were posed by philosophy in the past but still confront it today. Hence we reach the 11 direct conclusion that the major problem of historico-philosophical science is the problem of philosophy. To understand this amazing phenomenon of the spiritual life of society, the history of mankind's intellectual development, to understand this specific form of knowledge and selfknowledge, its necessity, its irremovability, its not immediately obvious but ever growing significance in the intellectual development of the individual, to discover its role in the ideological struggle which today, more than ever in the past, is a struggle between world views, to disclose the potential possibilities of philosophy and how to realise them---all this is an urgent necessity not only for the historians of philosophy but also for anyone to whom the question of the meaning of his own life does not appear utterly pointless.
Philosophy has suffered a strange fate. A synonym of science in the ancient world, it now seeks to achieve recognition as a science on a level with newly emerged sciences of modern times. How has this come about? Is it because philosophy, on account of its great age, has fallen behind its younger comrades and is no longer fit to compete in the Marathon of knowledge? Or perhaps there is no riddle at all and the answer is simply that what was a science in ancient times cannot by its very nature be a science today? As Francis Bacon remarked, the ancients were but children while we are people of a new age, entering upon our maturity. But it is doubtful whether the concept of maturity can be applied unconditionally to the human race at any stage of its development. Man always has everything ahead of him, in the future. There is, admittedly, another explanation of this delicate situation, 12 tentatively proposed by Windelband. Is not philosophy, he asks, in the position of Shakespeare's King Lear, who gave away all his possessions to his daughters and was himself cast out into the street as a useless and troublesome old man?
At all events, philosophy now has to win its right of citizenship in the republic of science, although it has formally never been deprived of this right. This is an inner necessity for philosophy, a necessity that it must feel in the face of any other science, no matter how restricted its field of reference.
Philosophy's right to full citizenship is called in question first of all by everyday consciousness, secondly by certain exponents of the specialised sciences and, thirdly, by some philosophers. The everyday arguments usually boil down to the assertion that philosophy does not inspire confidence because it does not always take into account the demands of common sense. In the past many representatives of the positive sciences supported this commonplace argument, but nowadays, since the creation of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, they are more inclined to agree with Engels, who wrote: "Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research.''^^1^^
Some scientists reproach philosophy for not being able to answer the questions that are put to it or, worse still, for answering questions with questions to which the specialised sciences, thorough though they may be, are unable to find an answer. All these questions (whether they are _-_-_
^^1^^ F. Engcls, Anti-Duhring, Moscow, 1969, p. 31.
13 asked by science or philosophy), are difficult ones but it at least can be said in defence of philosophy that the people who ask the questions which it fails to answer cannot answer these questions either. On the other hand, if philosophy, instead of answering a question, asks one itself, we should consider whether the question is well formulated. If it is, philosophy has already made some contribution to the problem.Philosophy's most dangerous enemies, however, are to be found within its own ranks. The biggest hue and cry was raised by the neo-positivists, who declared all the historically evolved problems of philosophy illusory and non-existent in reality, while the historico-philosophical process was presented as a history of continuous misapprehension. In making their claim, the neo-positivists failed to notice the fact that the mistakes of the great philosophers were great mistakes, and the neo-positivist campaign against philosophy has ended in inglorious defeat. They themselves have been compelled to admit the unavoidability of ``metaphysical'' (philosophical) problems. The problems they called pseudoproblems have turned out to be real problems to which neo-positivism has found no positive approach.
The neo-positivists acquired partially deserved influence with their special studies in logic, which have no direct bearing on their obviously subjectivist and agnostic philosophical teaching. The crisis of neo-positivism is largely due to an awareness of this now quite obvious fact. Neopositivism was opposed by the natural scientists, including some who for a time had been under its influence. This is a highly important fact because neo-positivism, unlike other idealist doctrines, as I. G. Petrovsky notes, "parasitises to a great extent 14 on the actual achievements of modern science".^^1^^ The statements by Albert Einstein, Max Plank, Louis de Broglie, Max Born and other outstanding men of science, criticising neo-positivist scepticism and substantiating materialist (and essentially dialectical) views, have convincingly demonstrated that philosophy is vital to theoretical natural science. The relevance of philosophical problems has thus been testified by non-- philosophers who have devoted themselves to philosophical problems and made a considerable contribution to the development of philosophical thought. This naturally opens up promising vistas before the historians of philosophy.
In the past 10--15 years Marxist-Leninist historico-philosophical science has been enriched by numerous researches. The six-volume History of Philosophy (Moscow, 1957--1965) was the first attempt to make a global study of the development of all philosophy from the time of its inception to the present day. Naturally this collective work, in which many Marxist historians of philosophy from other countries besides the Soviet Union participated, sums up a considerable number of specialised historicorphilosophical studies. The numerous works of Soviet historians of philosophy, concerning separate philosophical trends, schools and systems, undoubtedly contribute not only to historico-philosophical science but also to the development of dialectical and historical materialism. "At the present time,'' P. N. Fedoseyev writes, "the transition from a predominantly descriptive stage of historico-philosophical science to _-_-_
~^^1^^ I. G. Petrovsky, "In Lieu of Introduction" in Philosophy of Marxism and Neo-positivism, Moscow, 1963, p. 4 (in Russian).
15 analytical inquiry into the logic of the development of philosophical thought is becoming increasingly evident.''^^1^^ All this paves the way for the systematic theoretical investigation of the fundamental problems of the historico-philosophical process.Our task has been not only to solve the problems confronting us to the best of our ability but also to pose problems regardless of whether we ourselves can solve them at present. A common dogmatic distortion of the essence of philosophy is to be found in the view that the questions proposed by philosophy are far less important than the answers it supplies. On the other hand, when scientific Marxist-Leninist philosophy is under discussion, the dogmatist imagines that this philosophy has already answered all the questions ever posed in the past, and that one has only to wait for science and practice to pose new questions, which will immediately receive the right answers. In reality, however, by no means all the questions raised by philosophy's previous development can be solved at the present time. What is more, philosophy does not merely wait for questions to be fired at it from outside. Philosophy itself asks questions. It puts them not only to itself but to the sciences and to any sphere of conscious human activity. If in this book I have succeeded, even to some extent, in posing questions that for various reasons have escaped the general notice--- questions that deserve to be discussed regardless of whether we can answer them or not---my labours will not have been in vain.
_-_-_~^^1^^ P. N. Fedoseyev, "Philosophy and the Modern Epoch" in October Revolution and Scientific Progress, Moscow, 1967, Vol. II, p. 380 (in Russian).
16Dialectical and historical materialism is a developing philosophical science in which, as in any science, there are unsolved problems. They should not be left in the background. Rather, we should draw the researcher's attention to them. And the historian of philosophy, since he is a representative of dialectical and historical materialism, naturally seeks in his specialised researches not merely to illuminate philosophy's historical past but to contribute to the solution of its present-day problems or, at least, their correct and constructive positing.
I am fully prepared to admit that although I have done my best to substantiate them, some of my conclusions are controversial. But I have also assumed that some of the propositions that are so well established in textbooks on philosophy and which, presumably owing to constant repetition, have come to appear infallible, are in fact by no means infallible and also require discussion.
Any inquiry, unlike a work of popular science, is published so that it may be discussed. This is my attitude in publishing the present work, in which I feel I have considered only questions that deserve scientific discussion.
[17] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Chapter One __ALPHA_LVL1__ THE LOVE OF WISDOM.In the days when the ancient Greeks first coined the term ``philosophy'' there was presumably no disagreement as to what should be considered wisdom. Anything incomprehensible, which had not existed before (such as philosophy), fell into the category of things which, in the tradition of mythology, were regarded as perfectly obvious and beyond all argument or doubt.
Wisdom was attributed to the gods (or at least to some of them). Athene was worshipped as the goddess of wisdom. She was portrayed in sculpture with an owl perched at her feet, the owl being regarded as a sacred bird, presumably because it could see in the dark.
What men then regarded as wisdom was knowledge of things of which they were ignorant or could not understand, particularly prophecy. According to mythology, the gods endowed the oracles and other chosen individuals with wisdom. Like all outstanding human virtues, wisdom was the gift of the gods. In Book One of The Iliad Homer says of Calchas, the supreme augur:
18 ........... and next
Rose Calchas, son of Thestor, and the chief
Of augurs, one to whom were known things past
And present and to come. He through the art
Of divination, which Apollo gave,
Had guided the ships of Greece... .
The mythological view of the world, which immediately preceded the first philosophical doctrines of Ancient Greece, was the ideology of the primitive communal system. The development of mythology, its transformation into a kind of " artistic religion'', the emergence of theogonic, cosmogonic and cosmological notions, which were subsequently naturalistically interpreted by the first Greek philosophers, reflected the basic stages of development of the pre-class society. In this society the individual possessed no world view of his own. Philosophy could not yet exist because, as A. F. Losev has written, "here it was the tribe that thought, that set its goals, and there was no obligation upon the individual to think, because the tribe was the element of life and the element of life worked in the individual spontaneously, i.e., instinctively, not as consciously articulated thought".^^1^^
The emergence of ancient philosophy coincides with the period of the formation of class society, when mythology was still the dominant form of social consciousness. In fact, the first philosophers were philosophers just because they came into conflict with the traditional mythological view of the world.
While mythology still held sway over men's minds they never thought of asking themselves _-_-_
~^^1^^ A. F. Losev, History of Ancient Esthetics, Moscow, 1963, p. 107 (in Russian).
__PRINTERS_P_19_COMMENT__ 2* 19 the question, "What is wisdom?''. Mythology answered this question, and many others besides, in the most unequivocal manner. The rise of philosophy replaced myths and oracular prophecy with man's own thinking about the world and human life, independent of any extraneous authority. People appeared who could astonish others by reasoning about things that no one had ever thought about or dared to call in question before. These people were at first, no doubt, regarded as madmen. They called themselves philosophers, i.e., lovers of wisdom. First came the philosophers, then the name ``philosopher'' appeared, and after that the term ``philosophy''.Thales maintained that everything which existed had originated from water. According to Anaximenes, not only all things but even the gods themselves had come from air. The cosmos, Heraclitus taught, had given birth to both mortals and immortals. These assertions were revolutionary acts that established a critical mode of thinking independent of mythological and religious tradition.
We do not know whether the contemporaries of the early Greek philosophers actually believed that the Milky Way was the sprinkled milk of Hera. But when Democritus declared it to be no more than a conglomeration of stars, we may be sure that most people thought this was blasphemy. Anaxagoras, who claimed that the Sun was a huge mass of rock, brought persecution on his head.
The fact that the teachings of the early Greek thinkers were still not free from elements of mythology should not be allowed to overshadow their fundamental anti-mythological tendency. Myth, said Hegel, is an expression "of the 20 impotence of thought that cannot establish itself independently".^^1^^ The development of philosophy signified a progressive departure from mythology, particularly the mythological notion of the supernatural origin of wisdom. It was for this reason, as Hegel wrote, that "the place of the oracle was now taken by the self-consciousness of every thinking person".^^2^^
It is hard to say who first called himself a philosopher. Probably it was Pythagoras. According to Diogenes Laertius, Leon, tyrant of Phliontes, asked Pythagoras who he was and Pythagoras replied, "I am a philosopher''. The word being unfamiliar to his questioner, Pythagoras offered an explanation of the neologism. "He compared life to the Olympic Games,'' Diogenes Laertius writes. "There were three types among the crowd attending the Games. Some came for the contest, some to trade and some, who were wise, to satisfy themselves by observation. So it was in life. Some were born to be slaves of glory or the temptation of riches, others who were wise sought only truth.''^^3^^
This account suggests that Pythagoras interpreted wisdom as something reserved for the chosen few. According to some other sources, however, he maintained that only the gods possessed wisdom. At all events, the teaching of Pythagoras reveals only a general tendency towards secularisation of ``divine'' wisdom.
Thus, the emergence of ancient Greek philosophy simultaneously implied the growing _-_-_
~^^1^^ Hegel, Works in 14 volumes, Vol. 2, p. 139 (in Russian).
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 77.
~^^3^^ Diogen Lacrcc, Vic, doctrines cl sentences des philosophes illustres, Paris, 1965, p. 127.
21 conviction that wisdom as the supreme ideal of knowledge (and conduct), without which human life could be neither worthy nor honest and would be virtually wasted, could be achieved through one's own efforts. This meant that the source of wisdom lay not in faith but in knowledge and the quest for intellectual and moral perfection. Thus we see that a contradiction between faith and knowledge arises at the very fountainhead of philosophy.^^1^^Ancient Greek philosophy tells the story of the Seven Sages who founded the first city states. Some of them must have been legendary figures, but Solon, for example, is an actual historical figure whose reforms are associated with the rise of the State of Athens. Pythagoras, for whom the history of Greece was by no means the distant past, evidently had a more or less clear conception of the actually existing historical figures (Thales was said to be one of them) who afterwards came to be known as Sages.
_-_-_~^^1^^ In mythology the word ``wisdom'' signifies merely a certain notion that is expounded rather than discussed. In philosophy it is not merely a word but a concept, which must be understood and defined. This is the beginning of the theory of knowledge, the epistemological roots of the debate in which philosophy becomes a problem for itself. The deepest source of this argument is social progress, which counterposes knowledge and science to faith and religion. As Y. P. Frantsev writes, "the facts indicate that in human history philosophical thought emerges when certain knowledge has accumulated that comes into conflict with traditional beliefs. Religious notions are based on faith. Philosophical thought, no matter how feeble its development, is based on knowledge as opposed to blind faith. The birth of philosophical thought is the beginning of the struggle against faith.'' (Y. P. Frantsev, The Sources of Religion and Free Thinking, Moscow, 1959, p. 501, in Russian).
22The teaching of the materialists of the city of Miletus was directly continued by Heraclitus, who declared that "wisdom lies in speaking the truth, heeding the voice of Nature and acting in accordance with it".^^1^^ This was, of course, addressed not to the gods, for whom there was nothing to heed, but to man and man alone. But while acknowledging the existence of human wisdom, Heraclitus nevertheless maintained that such wisdom was nothing compared with the wisdom of the immortals, since "the wisest man compared with a god appears but an ape in wisdom, beauty and all else".^^2^^ This distinction between human and divine wisdom would seem to imply something more than the traditional conviction drawn from mythology. It is an acknowledgement (still vague and inadequately expressed, of course) of the fundamental impossibility of absolute knowledge.^^3^^
He who seeks wisdom must act in accordance with the order of things. Concretising this thought, Heraclitus maintained that one should _-_-_
~^^1^^ A. 0. Makovelsky, Pre-Socralics, Kazan, 1914, Part I, p. 161 (in Russian).
~^^2^^ Ibid.
~^^3^^ This elementary dialectical understanding of the nature of knowledge was lost in subsequent centuries by the creators of the metaphysical systems of absolute knowledge under the influence of the triumphs of mathematics and the natural science of the new age, which looked as if they were going to be able to obtain exhaustive ' knowledge of all that existed. The idea of the omnipotence of human reason belongs entirely to modern times. The ancient Greeks were far from holding any such notions. The ultimate expression of ancient Greek wisdom is Socrates' conviction "I know that I know nothing''. Viewed from this standpoint Plato, who believed his soul had spent so long in the transcendental realm of ideas that he could describe this realm, is no heir to the Socratic conception of wisdom.
23 follow the universal. But what is the universal? It is fire, whose nature is a state of eternal flux. It is also Logos---absolute necessity, fate, which is sometimes identified with eternal fire and sometimes separated from it. The universal is infinitely varied. It pervades everything, gives birth to everything and destroys everything. Nothing can deviate from the universal. People do not understand the universal and fail to appreciate its limitless power even when they hear of it from the lips of the philosopher, because their own ignorance seems to them to be "their own comprehension''. Heraclitus remarks bitterly, "Most men have no understanding of the things they encounter, and cannot be made to understand by instruction, and yet it seems to them that they know.''^^1^^Thus we find that wisdom presupposes above all understanding of what the majority of men encounter, of what is known to them in general, i.e., what they see, hear and know but cannot comprehend. This notion of wisdom is organically connected with the age of the formation of philosophy, when there were still no special scientific disciplines, discovering through special investigation directly unobservable phenomena and the relations between them. As yet the philosopher was able to argue only about things that all could observe: the Earth, the Sun, the stars, plants, animals, day, night, cold, heat, water, air, fire, and so on. The philosopher applied his powers of reasoning to everything that occurred in human life and that was known to everyone: birth, childhood, youth, age, death, unhappiness, happiness, love, hate, _-_-_
~^^1^^ A. 0. Makovelsky, Prc-Socratics, Part I, p. 150 (in Russian).
24 etc. No wonder, then, that the first works of the ancient Greeks and also the Chinese and Indian philosophers, took as "first principles" the sensually observable things that were familiar to all, but to which a very special significance was attached. Even the basic, ``substantial'' properties of these things were also drawn from everyday experience, the properties of heat and cold, love and hate, the male and female genital principles, etc.Wisdom, or rather the quest for it, was seen by these early philosophers as the ability to reach a judgement about all manner of familiar things, proceeding from recognition of their intransient essence. Understanding of the universal reveals to the human mind that which is eternal, infinite and united in the countless numbers of transient, finite, multiform things. Thus not all knowledge ( knowledge of one thing, for example) could be considered wisdom. Even knowledge of many things, Heraclitus adds, does not augment our wisdom. The path of wisdom, which no man shall ever travel in its entirety, is understanding of that which is most powerful in the world and therefore the most important for our human life.
According to Heraclitus, the most important, the most powerful and unavoidable thing is universal change, the disappearance of all that appears, the conversion of all things into their opposites, their unity in eternal fire, from which the Earth, air, soul and everything else is derived. It is this omnipresent unity of the infinite multiformity, the coincidence of opposites, that the philosopher seeks to understand as supreme truth pointing the right path in life. This path lies in contempt for passing things, awareness of the relative nature of all blessings, all distinctions and 25 opposites, understanding of the all-embracing and the all-determining. Although love of wisdom is separated from wisdom, which in itself is unattainable, it is quite clear that this selfless love and the knowledge it imparts are interpreted as attributes of absolute wisdom and in this sense (mainly because of their incompleteness) as relative wisdom.
Heraclitus's conception of the ideal of human wisdom and conduct has an aristocratic and pessimistic bias. At the moment, however, we are not concerned with these features of the " weeping philosopher'', nor even with his dialectics, which is not a specific attribute of philosophical thought. The point is that his conception of wisdom reveals features which not only in ancient times but in subsequent epochs have been regarded as inherent only in philosophical knowledge and the philosophical attitude to the world.
Ancient Greece, where the concept of philosophy as love of wisdom (relative, human wisdom) first took shape, became the motherland of another and essentially different understanding of the meaning and purpose of philosophy, which was to exercise a substantial influence on all its subsequent development. I have in mind the Sophists. The word ``sophist'' is derived from the same root as the words ``sophia'' (wisdom) and ``sophos'' (wise man), and also means ``craftsman'' or ``artist''. The Sophists were the first in the history of philosophy to emerge as teachers of wisdom, thus rejecting the understanding of philosophy that goes back to Pythagoras. The Sophists were the first encyclopaedists of the ancient world. They studied mathematics, astronomy, physics, grammar, not so much as scholars, but rather as teachers, and paid teachers at that. They 26 became the founders of rhetoric, and they considered it to be an essential part of their instruction to teach the free citizen of the city state to reason, to argue, to refute and prove, in short, to defend his own interests by the power of words, argument and eloquence.
The Sophists identified wisdom with knowledge, with the ability to prove what one considered to be necessary, correct, virtuous, profitable and so on.^^1^^ Such knowledge and abilities were undoubtedly needed by the citizen of Athens for taking part in public meetings, court sessions, debates, affairs of trade and so on. By their activities as teachers of rhetoric, by their theories which overthrew apparently immutable truths and substantiated often quite unusual views, the Sophists furthered the development of logical thought and flexibility of concepts, which made it possible to bring together and unite things that seemed at first glance to be quite incompatible. Logical proof was regarded as the basic quality of truth. _-_-_
~^^1^^ Plato, expounding the views of Protagoras, describes in Theaetetus his understanding of wisdom as follows: "... I do not call wise men tadpoles: far from it; I call them `physicians' and `husbandmen' where the human body and plants are concerned.'' In the field of politics, according to Plato, Protagoras held that "the wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil to seem just to states; for whatever appears to each state to be just and fair, so long as it is regarded as such, is just and fair to it; and what the wise man does is to cause good to appear, and be real, for each of them instead of evil''. (7he Dialogues of Plato, Oxford, 1953, Vol. Ill, p. 265.) This understanding of wisdom as worldly knowledge comes into direct conflict with the previous conceptions of wisdom. However, the Sophists only take to its logical conclusion the anti-mythological conception of human wisdom, which arose with philosophy and was the first attempt to understand its specific content and purpose.
27 The universal flexibility of concepts which made its first appearance in the philosophy of the Sophists was markedly subjective in character. To prove meant to convince or persuade. The Sophists came to believe that it was possible to prove anything they chose to prove, and this eventually made the words ``sophist'', ``sophism'' and `` sophistry'' insulting to any man of learning.The Sophists usually stressed the subjectivity and relativity of the evidence of the senses and of any deductions made from them. They were the first to grasp the fact which seems so obvious today that arguments can be found to support anything. This truth was partly interpreted by them in a spirit of philosophical scepticism and relativism, and partly in the form of recognition of the possible truth of contradictory perceptions, notions and judgements. In short, the Sophists taught a type of thinking that refuses to commit itself to any unconditional postulates except those a man needs for the achievement of the aim he sets himself. They strove to make commonplace notions and concepts versatile and to overcome their incompatibility that had become rigidly established by everyday usage. On this path some Sophists drew the conclusion that there was only a relative contradiction between good and evil, that religious beliefs were illusory, and that it was a mistake to believe, as most people did in those days, that the opposition between slaves and free men was fixed by nature.
Some of the Sophists were the ideologists of slave-owning democracy, others were its opponents, but both understood philosophy as worldly wisdom, and knowledge, as the art of rhetoric with the help of which the educated man could always overcome the uneducated and the ignorant.
28The Sophists were the first to attempt the complete secularisation of wisdom, to make it accessible to anyone who acquired the necessary education. This democratic tendency of the Sophists, however, went hand in hand with an oversimplification of the tasks of philosophy, with disregard of philosophy's quest for understanding of the quintessential and universal in everything that exists, understanding of that which is most important in and for human life. These basic features of the Sophists' teaching were harshly criticised by Socrates and particularly Plato, who again raised philosophy to a pedestal beyond the reach of the mass of the people.^^1^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ In the dialogue ``Socrates' Apology" Plato expounds through Socrates the understanding of wisdom which was propounded by the first Greek philosophers. In seeking to acquire wisdom, Socrates relates, he first of all sought it among men of state. After talking to one of them, Socrates reached the conclusion that "... I am at least wiser than this fellow---for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know.'' Having spoken with poets, Socrates saw that "... not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them".... Finally Socrates turned to ordinary people, to the craftsmen, and realised that "they did know many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was''. But he went on "... because they were good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom".... (The Dialogues of Plato, pp. 345, 347). Thus, while not wholly rejecting the worldly wisdom upheld by the Sophists, Socrates sought merely to prove that human wisdom was incomplete, mixed with ignorance and therefore not to be compared with divine, absolute wisdom. Hence in ``Protagoras'' Socrates defines human wisdom as the transcending of one's own limitations: "The inferiority of a man to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself is wisdom.'' (The Dialogues of Plato, ``Protagoras'', p. 186.)
29Plato argued that neither true knowledge nor true virtue could be acquired extraneously, by means of education which at best would help to bring out the knowledge that was in a man's soul but of which he remained unaware, having obtained it during the soul's sojourn in another world.
Thus Plato reinstated that aristocratically intellectual understanding of philosophy as a love of wisdom for its own sake, inherent only in chosen natures, which had fully emerged in the first period of ancient Greek philosophy. According to his teaching, wisdom lies in understanding the abiding transcendental reality, the realm of ideas, and above all the absolutely just, absolutely true and absolutely beautiful, and in examining from this supersensual position all natural things and human affairs.
Inasmuch as Plato aspires to create a system of absolute knowledge (an essential difference between him and Socrates), he departs from the original conception of philosophy as love (quest) for the unattainable ideal of knowledge and life. His criticism of the Sophists' worldly wisdom turns out in the final analysis to be merely a repudiation of the earthly basis of wisdom. Like the Sophists, he seeks to be a teacher of wisdom, although he makes the reservation that wisdom cannot be taught to those whose souls have not been initiated. Plato's teaching thus emerges as a system of wisdom, not only in its theoretical but also in its practical aspects.
Plato's ideal of the state is a doctrine of the wise management of society ensuring the perfect embodiment of absolute justice, absolute truth and absolute beauty, thanks to which a social system will be established in which every man will 30 occupy the place assigned to him, whether he be craftsman or farmer, guardian or ruler-- philosopher. The theoretical substantiation of this reactionary Utopia, which reflected the crisis of the Athenian state, lies in the notion of achieved wisdom, which radically distinguishes Plato from his predecessors and from later philosophers of the ancient world.^^1^^
The point of departure of Aristotle's teaching is his criticism of Plato's doctrine of ideas and entails a revision of the Platonic conception of wisdom as knowledge of the transcendental. Aristotle rehabilitates reality as that which is received by the senses and strives to explain the qualitative variety of the material world, proceeding from the notion of the forms inherent in things, which in most cases are also perceived by the senses. Admittedly, Aristotle recognises, besides sensually perceived forms, the "form of forms" and the prime mover, since he can see no other way of explaining the world as a whole. Aristotle's idealism, however, differs essentially from that of Plato, who interprets philosophy as an ascent from this world to the next. Aristotle, on the contrary, believes it to be _-_-_
~^^1^^ It is highly characteristic that Democritus, a major proponent of ancient Greek materialism and a contemporary of Plato, sees wisdom as understanding of the internal structure, the unity of nature, of matter, and as the correct interpretation of duty in human life. According to the teaching of Democritus, "three abilities spring from wisdom, the ability to take excellent decisions, to enunciate them correctly and to do what is necessary''. Democritus' conception of wisdom is connected with his conception of the need to observe moderation: "Beautiful is due moderation in everything.'' The worldly wisdom of Democritus, whose political ideal is the slave-owning democracy, is equally alien both to the oracular philosophy of Plato and to the subjectivism of the Sophists.
31 the task of philosophy to examine the basic causes, the foundations and forms of nature. In this he sees genuine wisdom, while condemning the teaching of the Sophists as "only apparent and not real".^^1^^ Wisdom, in Aristotle's view, coincides with knowledge, though not knowledge of single things, but of the essence as such. In the field of ethics Aristotle's understanding of wisdom anticipates the philosophy of the Hellenic period: "The man of Practical Wisdom aims at avoiding Pain, not at attaining Pleasure.''^^2^^It is true that Aristotle calls the prime mover God, but this assertion recalls the deistic views of the New Age, since God is not regarded as a subject of philosophical investigation. Aristotle describes as theologians Hesiod and other poets, the forerunners of ancient Greek philosophy, who on the basis of mythology evolved theogonic or cosmogonic theories, attributing the immortality of the gods to their drinking ambrosia and nectar, for example. Such an explanation, Aristotle remarks ironically, may have satisfied the poets themselves, but it goes beyond the bounds of our understanding. Theology, as Aristotle sees it, is not a teaching about God (or the gods) but the "first philosophy'', whose subject is first causes and their foundations.
The problem of wisdom again comes to the fore and indeed forms the basic subject of philosophical meditation in the teachings of the age of decline of ancient society---in stoicism, scepticism, and Epicureanism. For the followers of these schools wisdom is not so much an ideal of _-_-_
~^^1^^ The Metaphysics of Aristotle, London, 1857, Book III, Ch. II, p. 84.
~^^2^^ The Nicomachcnn Ethics of Aristotle, New York, 1920, p. 175.
32 knowledge as a correct way of life which relieves the individual of avoidable sufferings, and of excesses that lead to suffering. One can trace the beginnings of these views in the first Greek philosophers, but their main conviction was that knowledge is an aim in itself. Only Hellenic philosophy proclaims the principle that knowledge in itself is of no value and is needed only because it teaches us the correct path in life.^^1^^ Happiness, which, according to Epicurus, constitutes the goal of human life, may be obtained by limiting one's needs and renouncing pleasures that have deplorable consequences. The essence of happiness is perfect equanimity, ataraxia, renunciation of the world. "According to Epicurus,'' Marx notes in his Doctoral thesis, "no good for man lies outside himself; the only good which he has in relation to the world is the negative notion to be free of it".^^2^^ But to become free of the world one must overcome one's fear of the gods and also fear of death. Hence the purpose of natural philosophy, particularly if it can prove that there is no force in the world capable of destroying the contented self-assurance _-_-_~^^1^^ According to S. Chatterjce and D. Datta, this understanding of the aim of knowledge, philosophy and wisdom is particularly characteristic of all systems of ancient Indian philosophy. ''. .. All the systems regard philosophy as a practical necessity and cultivate it in order to understand how life can be best led. The aim of philosophical wisdom is not merely the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity, but mainly an enlightened life led with farsight, foresight and insight.'' (An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Calcutta, 1950, p. 12.) One of the differences between Indian and European philosophy is that in Indian philosophy this understanding of wisdom constantly predominates.
~^^2^^ K. Marx and F. Engcls, From Early Works, Moscow, 1956, p. 143 (in Russian).
__PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3-22 33 of the sage. In this context natural philosophy plays the auxiliary role of introducing and substantiating a "philosophy of life'', which ultimately boils down to ethics. Thus wisdom comes to serve an ``applied'' aim; philosophy as a doctrine of the wise conduct of one's personal life is interpreted as intellectual therapy. Epicurus says: "Hollow are the words of the philosopher that do not serve to heal any human suffering. Just as there is no use in medicine if it does not rid the body of disease, so is philosophy of no use if it cannot banish the sickness of the soul".^^1^^Ancient Greek stoicism, which regards philosophy as "exercise in wisdom'', also stressed, like Epicureanism, the practical (in the highest sense) significance of philosophy, since its aim is to teach man "to live in accord with nature''. Stoicism proceeds from a fatalistic conception of the predetermination of all that exists. Hence the demand to live in accord with nature presumes, on the one hand, a knowledge of nature and, on the other, unconditional submission to natural necessity. Man can change nothing in the predetermined order of things. He is a philosopher or sage who, having realised the inevitable, submits to it and renounces sensual pleasures in order to rejoice in virtue, which is to be acquired through recognition of the essence of things and through the triumph of reason over appetite.
Though differing in many ways from Epicureanism and stoicism, ancient Greek scepticism also reduces wisdom to the acquisition of _-_-_
~^^1^^ Lucretius, DC Rerum Natura, Moscow, 1947, Vol. II, p. 641 (in Russian).
34 intellectual composure, aloof from human cares and worries. Diogenes Laertius, referring to Posidonius, relates that one day Pyrrho "was at sea in a ship; his companions were terrified by the storm; only he, who had remained perfectly calm and composed in spirit, pointed to a pig that was munching something and said that the wise man should preserve equal indifference.''^^1^^It would seem that this evolution in the understanding of wisdom (and by the same token, philosophy) reflects the decay of the ancient city state and a social system that permitted the free citizen to take an active part in the life of the state. Now he feels that the ground is sliding from under him. Hence for him wisdom lies in the illusory assurance that one can live in society and be free of it at the same time.
Ancient Greek philosophy came into being as a powerful intellectual movement towards knowledge in its all-embracing theoretical form. It ends as a quest for repose in a society torn by antagonistic contradictions. This crisis does not, however, mean that there were no rational ideas in the doctrines of the Hellenistic age. These doctrines pose the question of the primacy of practical reason over the theoretical and for the first time systematically criticise the naively rationalistic notion of knowledge for its own sake, whose unexpected and tragic consequences- are only too obvious in the age of capitalism and particularly imperialism, when science becomes not only a productive but also a destructive force. "Greek philosophy,'' says Marx, "begins with seven wise men, among whom is the Ionian _-_-_
~^^1^^ D. La\"erce, Vic, doctrines ct sentences des philosophcs ilhtstrcs, p. 193.
35 philosopher of nature Thales, and it ends with the attempt to portray the wise man conceptually".^^1^^ The subsequent history of Greek and GrecoRoman philosophy---the history of its transformation into the religious and mystical teachings of neo-Pythagoreanism, neo-Platonism, the later stoicism, etc.,---is in fact the prehistory of Christianity, which brought to an end the worldly wisdom of the ancient philosophers. __ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. DEIFICATIONChristianity, which became the dominant and virtually the sole ideology of the European Middle Ages, absorbed the philosophical mysticism and irrationalism of the age of the final decay of the ancient world. "Christianity,'' Engels points out, "was not imported from without, from Judea, and imposed upon the Greco-Roman world.... It is---at least in the form in which it has become a world religion---the most characteristic product of this world.''^^2^^ The apologists of Christianity called the new religion that ousted Greco-Roman polytheism philosophy. Their basic argument was that the fundamental problems of Christian doctrine (God, the creation of the world) had already been posed by Greek philosophy, but only Christianity could supply the true answers. Augustine, Tertullian and other "fathers of the Church" gave a theological interpretation and elaboration of the philosophical mysticism and irrationalism of neo-Platonism _-_-_
~^^1^^ K. Marx and F. Engels, From Early Works, p. 131 (in Russian).
^^2^^ Marx/Engcls, Wcrkc, Bd. 22, S. 456.
36 and the other idealist doctrines related to it. Vulgarised neo-Platonism, eclectically combined with Epicureanism, scepticism and particularly stoicism, was the "theoretical source" of the Christian religion.^^1^^Thus the New Testament or "divine revelation'', recounted by the apostles of Jesus Christ, turns out to be, as its historico-philosophical analysis shows, a theological revision of the philosophical theories of later antiquity, with the addition of numerous borrowings from other `` heathen'' teachings. Nevertheless, to the medieval theologians and philosophers the Scriptures appeared to be radically different from the human wisdom of the ancients. This was the divine revelation, the indisputable source for all theorising about the divine and the things of this world. This meant that for the medieval thinker divine wisdom existed in a form accessible to man, i.e., expounded in the sacred books. The only problem was to be able to understand it, to interpret it correctly.
_-_-_~^^1^^ "Stoicism in its vulgarised form,'' we read in Volume One, p. 383, of the History of Philosophy (Ed. G. F. Aleksandrov, B. E. Bykhovsky, M. B. Mitin and P. F. Yudin), "exercised a powerful influence on the moral views of the organisers of the early Christian churches; it has been established, for example, that the influence of Seneca is much in evidence in the epistles attributed by the Church to the Apostle Paul, and later, in Tertullian. Christianity is even more closely linked with neo-Platonism. Christian dogma has many important features in common with neoPlatonism. The divine trinity of Christianity corresponds to Plotinus' trinity---the One, Nous, Soul. Christianity made wide use of the neo-Platonist `emanation' and spiritualism, its teaching on ecstasy and `exaltation' as a state in which the soul comes nearer to the Deity and temporarily merges with it in the bliss of its direct contemplation, etc.''
37Theology is the metaphilosophy of the European Middle Ages. Theology, according to Thomas Aquinas, descends from the divine to the terrestrial, while philosophy seeks to ascend from the terrestrial and temporal to the divine and absolute. Philosophy commands only the truths of reason, whereas theology expounds superrational although not irrational truths, whose source is Divine Reason. Philosophy inevitably becomes the handmaid of theology. Love of wisdom is transformed into an intellectualised religious feeling. Metaphysical wisdom can be only the interpretation of theological wisdom, authentically expounded in the Bible. The philosopher cannot therefore arrive at any new or unexpected conclusions; the conclusions are given in advance and all that has to be done is to lay a logical path towards them, i.e., to justify Christian dogma in the face of everyday common sense, which is afraid not to believe in miracles and the supernatural in general, and yet cannot conceive how all this is possible.^^1^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ It is worth noting, however, that some outstanding medieval thinkers, who were alien to Christianity, interpreted philosophical wisdom far more freely and independently, in this respect approaching Aristotle, whose followers they were. Thus Ibn Sina (Avicenna) declared: "Wisdom, in our view, may be of two kinds. First, it is perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge with regard to a concept is such that it knows a thing through its essence and definition, and with regard to a judgement it is such that it is a reliable judgement on all the causes of those things that have causes. Second, it is perfection of action. This perfection lies in the fact that all that is necessary for its existence, and all that is necessary for its preser"vation, exists, and exists to the extent that it is worthy of its essence, including also all that serves for beautification and use, and is not merely a matter of necessity.'' We see here that human wisdom is assessed as the __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 39. 38
The wisdom of the ancient Greeks, says Jacques Maritain, is restricted to the human scale. "It is, in fact, a philosophical wisdom that claims not to save us through unity with the Deity, but only to guide us along the path of rational cognition of the universe.''^^1^^ Religion, as we have seen, did not inspire ancient philosophy, and reflection on the Deity held little place in it even in those cases when it asserted that divine wisdom was infinitely superior to that of humanity.
Jacques Maritain, of course, is not satisfied by the ``worldly'' wisdom to which the finest of the classical Greek philosophers, aspired. Such an interpretation of wisdom, he observes, tends towards a scientific understanding of reality, whereas the true wisdom is the wisdom of salvation, the wisdom of the saints. Maritain believes that the philosophers of the ancient East came near to this kind of wisdom in that they understood wisdom as the ascent of man from the terrestrial to the divine. Genuine wisdom, however, according to Maritain, is to be found only in Christianity and the forms of orthodox medieval theological and philosophical thought to which it gave birth. "The wisdom of the Old Testament,'' he declares, "tells us that, at bottom, our personality exists only in humility and may be saved only thanks to the divine personality. . .. This supernatural wisdom is a wisdom that gives itself, that descends. . . .''^^2^^
_-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 38. possible perfect knowledge. Only lower down the page does Ibn Sina, in the spirit of medieval tradition, citing the Koran, speak of divine wisdom which knows all things out of itself since it has created thc-in.~^^1^^ J. Maritain, Science ct Sagcsse, Paris, 1935, pp. 30-- 31.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 38.
39In returning to the medieval mode of thought (we have in mind, of course, the dominant ideology of the Christian Middle Ages) Maritain sees a way of escape for capitalist society from the contradictions by which it is being torn apart.^^1^^ Maritain has high praise for the proposition of Thomas Aquinas on the three kinds of wisdom: divine (revelation), theological, and metaphysical; the last, of course, occupies the lowest place in the hierarchy. No wonder, then, that Maritain condemns Averroism, which he defines as "an attempt to separate philosophical wisdom from theological wisdom".^^2^^ Thus contemporary neo-Thomism leads us directly into the domain of the philosophical and theological notions that dominated the feudal society of Western Europe.
The neo-Thomist Johannes Hirschberger presents the Middle Ages as existing in a state of infinite divine wisdom which manifests itself in everything, in the order of nature, society and so on. "As never before in any period of the spiritual history of the West, the whole world here lives in assurance concerning the existence of God, His wisdom, power and goodness, concerning the origin of the world, the reasonableness of its order and government, the nature of _-_-_
~^^1^^ "History,'' Maritain says, "is an unimaginable drama between individuals and abused freedoms, between the eternal divine personality and our own personalities that are created. ... If we wish to survive the nightmare of a banal existence of the indefinite pronoun One, in which the conditions of the modern world suppress the imagination of every one of us, if we wish to awaken ourselves and our existcntiality, it is permissible for us to read M. Heidegger, but we shall certainly be better off in all cases reading the Bible.'' (Ibid., pp. 37--38.)
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 56.
40 man and his position in the Cosmos, the meaning of his life, the capacity of his spirit to know the world and to arrange his own life, concerning his dignity, freedom and immortality, the foundations of the law, the system of state power and the meaning of history. Unity and order are the hallmark of the time.''^^1^^Needless to say, the idyllic existence described by this contemporary Catholic historian never actually existed. The Middle Ages knew the peasant wars, the wars between suzerains, between suzerains and vassals, between monarchs and the Pope of Rome. They knew also religious heresies, ``worldly'' free-thinking, and the Inquisition. But Hirschberger's assertions, like the beliefs of Jacques Maritain, fairly accurately reproduce the predominant scholastic purview of the Middle Ages, the essence of which is well expressed in the Gospel dictum "Blessed are the poor in spirit''.
Dogmatic faith was indeed a synonym for all the wisdom accessible to man. Although Christian teaching maintained that man was created in the image of God, its true inspiration lay in the anti-humanist belief in the vanity of this world, i.e., of actual human life. Divine wisdom allegedly derived from infinite being and as opposed to the finite, transient life of man, which had to bear the additional burden of original sin, was a radical denial of ``self-willed'' human wisdom. Only the rise of the capitalist mode of production and the development of the natural sciences and mathematics were able to show philosophy a way of escape from the labyrinth of theology.
_-_-_~^^1^^ J. Hirschberger, Gcschichlc dcr Philosophic, Freiburg, 1954, Bd. I, S. 280.
41 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. A NEW AGE AND A NEW IDEALMontaigne, the outstanding forerunner of the French Enlightenment, revived the ancient secularised interpretation of wisdom from the standpoint of a philosophical scepticism that placed havoc with theology and scholastics. Quite in the spirit of Epicurus, Montaigne declares that "all the wisdom and all the discourse in the world serves in the long run only to teach us not to fear death".^^1^^ In his Essays Montaigne frequently refers to the sayings of the Bible, but only in order to extract from them the human wisdom they inherited from the human wisdom of the ancients, their moral maxims regarding the rational ordering of human life.
Pierre Bayle, another splendid exponent of bourgeois free thinking, interprets wisdom as a courageous desire to go through to the end in seeking truth, a fearless urge to cast aside misconceptions and prejudice, an unshakeable awareness of the fact that nothing is forbidden to reason. "Reason,'' he says in his Historical and Critical Dictionary, "has every right to hunt anything it wishes. But reason itself must not be defective. One should agree only with good and noble ideas and act only in accordance with them, no matter what those around us may say. In both respects the wise man shows equal courage.''^^2^^
The founders of bourgeois philosophy, Francis Bacon and Descartes, go even further, since they not only repudiate medieval ideology but also _-_-_
~^^1^^ Montaigne, Las Essnis, Paris, 1902, Vol. I, p. 8.
~^^2^^ P. Bayle, Dictionnaire liistoriquc ct critique, Amsterdam, 1740, Tome second, p. 146.
42 substantiate the new ideal of knowledge---- scientificality. Science is understood as authentic and systematic knowledge, drawn from a natural and not ``supernatural'' source, i.e., through perusal of the "Great Book of Nature'', which lies open for all men to study and meditate upon. The New Age, as Maritain puts it, is characterised by a "conflict between wisdom and the sciences and the victory of science over wisdom".^^1^^In one of his essays Bacon ridicules the " wisdom for a man's self" of the schoolmen, which, as he says, is by no means harmless but, on the contrary, is manifestly pernicious for society. "Wisdom for a man's self is, in many branches thereof, a depraved thing. It is the wisdom of rats, that will be sure to leave a house somewhat before it falls. It is the wisdom of the fox, that thrusts out the badger, who .digged and made room for him. It is the wisdom of crocodiles that shed tears when they would devour.''^^2^^ But surely there is other wisdom besides this? Bacon does not deny it. Nor does he deny divine wisdom, but the whole significance of "natural philosophy" lies, so he believes, in methodical, rationally organised inquiry into the laws of nature, in order to multiply human inventions, which are far more capable of conducing to the benefit of mankind than all the pearls of wisdom of Ancient Greece. "Now the wisdom of the Greeks was professorial and much given to disputations; a kind of wisdom most adverse to the inquisition of truth.''^^3^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ J. Marikiin, Science el Sagcsse, p. 56.
~^^2^^ F. Bacon, "The Essaycs or Counsels Civil and Moral, London, 1916, p. 73.
~^^3^^ F. Bacon, Novum Organum, New York, p. 94.
43Descartes' position was that wisdom is not a particular kind of knowledge, distinct from all others and accessible only to a few: "The whole sum of knowledge and science is but human wisdom, which remains always one and the same, no matter how various the subjects to which it is applied. . . .''^^1^^
This new understanding of wisdom fully accords with the spirit of the New Age, which substitutes for the contemplation of commonplace, constantly observed reality the active drives of exploration and discovery, experiment, strict proof and testing of the results obtained,
Descartes helped to found not only the philosophy but also the mathematics and natural science of modern times. Wisdom, according to his teaching, is characterised not only by "good sense in affairs" but also by "perfect knowledge of all that it is given to man to know".^^2^^ Perfect knowledge is reliable knowledge; his assumptions, firmly established, self-evident truths, are so clear and sharp that there can be no doubt as to the truth of them. Defining philosophy as the love of wisdom, and wisdom as knowledge "of the truths concerning the most important things'',^^3^^ Descartes, as a true spokesman of the young, progressive bourgeoisie, observes that "people who engage professionally in philosophy are often less wise and less rational than others who have never applied themselves to this study''. ...^^4^^ None of his reservations to the effect that only God is wholly wise because only He _-_-_
~^^1^^ OEuvres dc Descartes, Tome X, Paris, 1908, p. 350.
^^2^^ Les pages immortelles de Descartes, Paris, 1901, pp. 141--142.
~^^3^^ Ibid., p. 142.
~^^4^^ Ibid., p. 144.
44 has complete knowledge of everything, can weaken the revolutionary impact of the basic philosophical demand put forward by Descartes, the demand for scientific proof, which, as he constantly emphasised, can only be effected through independent, critical research, based on experiment and the "natural light" (lumen naturale) of human reason. There are four means of attaining wisdom or scientific, true knowledge, says Descartes. These are: cognition of selfevident truths; the experience of the senses; knowledge acquired through conversation with others; and the reading of good books. As for divine revelation, Descartes says that "it does not raise us gradually but all at once to infallible faith".^^1^^ This statement sounds an ironic rather than devout note, particularly if one remembers that, according to Descartes, wisdom is not faith but knowledge, which cannot be acquired at one sitting.Spinoza revives the Epicurean conception of wisdom, but on a new, rational basis that presupposes scientific, proven investigation of external nature and human essence. Epicurus assumed that the philosophical explanation of the phenomena of nature should be in accord with our sense perceptions, which he regarded as completely reliable. Spinoza, who followed Galileo and Descartes in fully appreciating the philosophical significance of Copernicus' discovery of the contradiction between sensual appearance and the essence of phenomena, argued the need for strict logical (geometrical) proof of philosophical propositions. From the standpoint of Epicurus, celestial phenomena as distinct from _-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid.
45 the terrestrial had permitted of the most varied explanations compatible with the evidence of the senses. And all these explanations were reasonable as long as they did not contradict the senses and were also conducive to peace of mind. In contrast to Epicurus, Spinoza argues that both the terrestrial and the celestial must be explained on similar lines, since necessity is everywhere the same and is expressed by the necessity of logic and mathematics.Wisdom, according to Spinoza, is cognition of universal necessity and action in accordance with it. Therefore wisdom is not only knowledge but also freedom, which lies in mastery of oneself. Spinoza declares: "The wise man's business is to make use of things and to take as much pleasure in them as possible (but not to the point of surfeit, for this is no longer pleasure). The wise man should, I say, support and restore himself with moderate food and drink, and also with the scents and beauty of green plants, beautiful clothes, music, games and exercises, the theatre and suchlike, which anyone can partake in without harm to others.''^^1^^ How far this is from the medieval ideal of wisdom!
Spinoza's conception of the philosopher-sage is usually interpreted as if Spinoza believed the wise man should be a hermit, absorbed only in meditation and remote from all human joys. There is a modicum of truth in this, but it should not be exaggerated, particularly if we consider that in the 17th century scientists were few in number and had only just begun to form a separate profession. Wisdom for Spinoza was _-_-_
~^^1^^ &Oe;uvres de Spinoza. Traduites par Emilc Saissct, Paris, 1961, tome III, pp. 224--225.
46 primarily the cultivation of the intellect combined with the quest for theoretical knowledge.In the idealist doctrine of Leibnitz wisdom is interpreted as "perfect science''. Admittedly, Leibnitz regards metaphysics and the speculative system of the "truths of reason" as such a science, which he contrasts with empirical scientific knowledge, with the "truths of fact''. The idealist interpretation of the principle of scientificality, the rationalist ``substantiation'' of theological notions, the juxtaposition of metaphysics to physics---all this was, of course, a concession to the feudal ideology reigning in Germany. All the same, it is science that he regards as the adequate expression of wisdom, and Leibnitz could appreciate science not only as a philosopher but as a brilliant mathematician and experimental scientist. Science is irrefutable. This belief is shared not only by materialists but also by the progressive spokesmen of idealist philosophy, and it is from this standpoint that they pose the traditional philosophical question of the nature of wisdom.
Of course, the concept of science existed even in medieval scholastics. Even the mystics did not always reject it. The science .of .the New Age, however---true science---introduces a fundamentally new concept of scientificality. This concept has to be accepted, although certainly not without reservations, even by the idealist philosophers, at any rate those who can be regarded as progressive thinkers. As for the materialists, they are enthusiastic advocates of scientific inquiry into nature.
Holbach's System of Nature is an encyclopaedia of the philosophical wisdom of French 18th century materialism. His stated aim is to 47 liberate man from the chains of ignorance, gullibility, deception and self-deception, to restore him to nature from which he has been decoyed by religion, by concocted systems and the shameful worship of error; to show him the true path to happiness. Man needs truth more than he needs his daily bread, because truth is knowledge of the actual relations between people and things. People are deceived only when they turn away from nature and refuse to consider its laws and ignore experience---the only source of knowledge. "When people refuse to be guided by experience and disown reason, the figments of their imagination grow huger with every passing day; they plunge joyfully into the depths of error; they congratulate themselves on their imagined discoveries and achievements, while in reality their thoughts are ever more closely confined in darkness.''^^1^^ Back to nature! This means casting aside the existence of the supernatural, putting down all the chimeras of religion. Nothing exists except nature. Nature is no abstract being but an infinite whole, an infinite variety of phenomenal Man is the highest creation of nature, and only by acting in accordance with its laws can he attain his ends. Virtue, reason, truth are not spiritualist essences, they are born of nature and only they deserve to be worshipped. Holbach makes a vigorous appeal to them: "Inspire man with courage, give him energy; allow him at last to love and respect himself; let him realise his own dignity; let him dare to liberate himself; let him be happy and free; let him be the slave only of your laws; let him improve his lot; let _-_-_
^^1^^ P. Holbach, Selected Works in two volumes. Moscow, 1963, Vol. I, p. 137 (in Russian).
48 him love his neighbours; let him know delight and allow others to delight as well.''^^1^^Philosophical wisdom, according to the teaching of the French materialists, should not be a dispassionate contemplation and justification of what is. Its calling is to be militant, to expose slavish genuflection to the past, to tyranny, ignorance and indolence, to spread truth, humanity and happiness, to promote the reasonable reordering of human life. Its passionate protest against feudal oppression endows French materialism with a new aspect that qualitatively distinguishes it from all previous philosophies. This is expressed in the very definition of philosophy as love of wisdom. Helvetius says: "Philosophy, as the very etymology of the word proves, consists in love of wisdom and the search for truth. But all love is passion.''^^2^^
German classical idealism, despite its constant polemic with French materialism, is at bottom inspired by the same bourgeois-humanist ideals that Holbach, Helvetius and their associates seek to substantiate. On closer inspection Kant's categorical imperative turns out to be an idealist, a priori interpretation of the ethics of enlightened self-interest. Despite the juxtaposition of practical reason to theoretical reason with the corresponding postulation of the need for a ``practical'' outlet beyond the bounds of experience and for acceptance of Christian dogma, Kant is unshakeably convinced that only science constitutes the real foundation of wisdom. It is in his Critique of Practical Reason that he _-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 684.
~^^2^^ Helvetius, Man, His Mental Abilities and Education, Moscow, 193S, p. 141 (in Russian).
__PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4-22 49 formulates the conclusion: "Science (critically inves- . tigated and methodically organised) is the strait gate that leads to the teaching of wisdom, if by this we understand not only what man does as what should serve as a guiding star for teachers, so that they can well and clearly point out the way to wisdom. . . .''^^1^^Kant's immediate successor, Fichte, goes even further in this direction. For him philosophy is a scientific doctrine. Admittedly, at the same time it is a subjective-idealist, voluntarist ontology, but this contradiction, which is inseparable from the idealist interpretation of scientific knowledge, does not detract from the historical significance of Fichte's broad philosophical posing of the problem of scientific philosophy. In Fichte's philosophy science is the highest form of knowledge, and philosophy can retain its leading place in man's intellectual life only to the extent that its understanding of the world becomes scientific and bears out the principles of all scientific knowledge in general. From this standpoint the traditional interpretation of philosophy as love of wisdom falls to the ground because philosophy, like any other scientific discipline, must now be systematic. Scientific doctrine, says Fichte, calmly allows any other philosophy to be what it chooses: passion for wisdom, just wisdom, world wisdom, wisdom of life and all the other wisdoms. This is not a denial of wisdom but a denial of its superscientificality, a denial that nevertheless conflicts with Fichte's own idealistically constructed system of perfect, absolute scientifico-philosophical knowledge.
_-_-_~^^1^^ Immamtcl Rants Werke, Berlin, 1914, Fiinfter Band, S. 176.
50Hegel's philosophy is a new stride forward on the path from prc-scientific philosophical wisdom to scientific philosophical knowledge, which is to be understood as the dialectical treatment of this wisdom---its negation and preservation. Hegel holds that the task of learning in his time is to raise philosophy to the rank of science. In his Phenomenology of Mind he pours sarcastic ridicule on romantic philosophising whose exponents regard themselves as prophets inspired from above. Their occupation is not research but holding forth. They "imagine that by veiling self-awareness in fog and repudiating reason they become the initialed ones whom God endows with wisdom while they sleep; what they actually receive and invent in their sleep is thus also dreams".^^1^^ Hegel had in mind Schelling, Jacobi and other philosophers with leanings towards irrationalism. In contrast to them he argues that philosophical truth cannot by its very nature be immediate knowledge. It is by nature mediate. It develops, enriches itself, discovers its own contradictions. The task of the philosopher is to penetrate into the immanent rhythm of the developing concept and move with it, avoiding any interruption of this motion "through the will and already acquired wisdom".^^2^^ Here he is speaking of the dialectical method, the dialectical motion of philosophical knowledge overcoming its traditional metaphysical limitations, dogmatism and the absolutising of results achieved.
In his introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel writes: "The true form in which _-_-_
~^^1^^ G. W. F. HcgcI, Sfimtliche Werke. Stuttgart, 1927 Bd. 2, S. 18.
~^^2^^ Ibid., S. 55.
51 truth exists can be only its scientific system. It has been my intention to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science, to a goal whose attainment would allow it to renounce its name of love of knowledge and become actual knowledge.''^^1^^ Hegel's encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences was in fact such an attempt, doomed to failure owing to the contradiction between method and system in Hegelian philosophy. This contradiction and the related absolutisation of historically limited philosophical knowledge was unavoidable without abandoning idealism. A positive solution to the problem of creating a scientific philosophy became possible only thanks to the materialist and dialectical philosophy of Marxism, a philosophy that by its categorical repudiation of dogmatic system-building, by the creative development of its own propositions, the critical assimilation of the achievements of science and practice, poses in quite a new light the question of the nature of philosophical knowledge and all that through the ages has been called wisdom. __ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. PROBLEM OF WISDOMOur brief excursion into the history of the problem of wisdom suggests the conclusion that in the course of history the significance of this problem has changed. It can also be said that the problem has never been discussed by the positive sciences. Perhaps wisdom has a bearing only on philosophy, and even then only to the extent that it is contrasted with the specialised sciences? Is _-_-_
~^^1^^ G. W. F. Hegel, SiimUichc Wcrkc, Bd. 2, S. 14.
52 not the word ``wisdom'' too vague a designation for philosophical knowledge? Since it is not to be found in the vocabulary of the positive sciences, perhaps we should abandon the word ``wisdom'' altogether? Bertrand Russell once asked: "Is there such a thing as wisdom, or is what seems such merely the ultimate refinement of folly?''^^1^^The word ``wisdom'' like many other words, has too many meanings. Wisdom has often been understood as the ability to draw a clear distinction between good and evil, as the ability to combine knowledge and conduct on the basis of a correct assessment of the main facts or typical situations. These definitions are correct in the sense that wisdom cannot be only knowledge, and that action not based on knowledge cannot be wise. But here we are faced with the question of the character of knowledge, the extent to which it implies understanding, and not just any understanding but understanding of something that matters in human life. It is obvious that knowledge which is merely a statement of facts, even if the gathering of these facts has entailed considerable research, is still far from wisdom, which manifests itself rather as a conclusion or generalisation. But even generalisation implies wisdom only when it contains an evaluation that can guide the solution of complex questions of theory and practical life.
Understanding, the practice .of moderation in one's conduct and affairs, because all extremes are bad, have often been called wisdom. This is also true, of course, if the sense of moderation does not become mere half-heartedness and fear of _-_-_
~^^1^^ B. Russell. History of Western Philosophy, London, 194G, p. 11.
53 making radical decisions when they are needed This was what Marx meant when he said that moderation is a category of mediocrity.^^1^^ Needless to say, the latter has nothing whatever to do with wisdom.Wisdom is often regarded as awareness of one's own errors. There can be no objection to this, of course, because only the person who does nothing never makes mistakes, if doing nothing is not to be considered a mistake in itself. But the wise man differs from the man without wisdom in that he does not make so many mistakes or, at least, manages to avoid making any great and irreparable ones. Perhaps for this reason many have seen wisdom in caution, circumspection, the avoidance of haste. These qualities, though positive in themselves, however, can easily be transformed into the defects of vacillation, procrastination and inertia.
Folk wisdom often makes fun of the would-be wise, of those who think up all kinds of newfangled ways of doing something while a perfectly simple and reasonable solution to the problem is available.
When we speak of man as a rational being we are presumably trying to define his species. When we call a man intelligent or gifted we attribute to him qualities that not everyone possesses. Wisdom is not inherent in everyone, and yet at the same time it is closely related to universal human knowledge, which is potentially available to all men. Wisdom is to be found in folk sayings and proverbs, although false wisdom and servile attitudes are also to be found there. _-_-_
~^^1^^ K. Marx and F. Engels, From Early Works, p. 196 (in Russian).
54 And yet it is a fact that man alone out of all the creatures in the universe, just because he is a rational being, may also be irrational. Does not this indicate some contradiction in wisdom that sometimes puts the whole concept in doubt?``Man,'' Eric Weil justly observes, "is a rational animal, but this is not the kind of judgement enunciated by science; it is a project for transforming the world and negating error; it is the expression of man's highest and most human aspiration.'' Straightaway, however, quite in the spirit of stoicism and the obvious contradiction to what he has just said, Weil adds that man, when he declares himself rational, "is not speaking of a fact and not even claiming to speak of a fact, but expressing his ultimate desire, the desire to be free, though not of need (that he will never be, and it will not worry him any more than need worries an animal), but of desire".^^1^^
I regard wisdom not as an empty word, not as a name for a phenomenon that does not exist. In my view wisdom exists not only in philosophy; the belief that mere philosophising leads to wisdom is one of the chief illusions of preMarxist philosophy. Wisdom is to be acquired in many and various ways and manifests itself in various fields of knowledge and activity.
When Niels Bohr said that a new fundamental theoretical synthesis in modern physics demanded completely new, ``mad'' ideas, i.e., ideas that seemed incompatible with the established truths of science, this was an extremely rational or, to use another word, wise approach to a _-_-_
~^^1^^ E. Weil, Logique de la philosophic, Paris, 1950, p. 11.
55 question that was of vital importance to the further development of natural science.The Utopian socialists regarded capitalism as a moral evil and distortion of human nature, and condemned the exploitation of man by man as incompatible with humanity and justice. Marx and Engels, who exposed the capitalist system even more vehemently, held that it was completely untenable to deduce the need for the socialist transformation of society from a moral evaluation of capitalism. This world, notwithstanding Leibnitz's illusion, is not the best of all possible worlds, and a social system does not collapse merely because of its moral shortcomings. Marx and Engels proved the necessity for transition from capitalism to socialism by scientific analysis of the objective economic laws of the development of capitalism which were creating the material prerequisites for the socialist system.
In contrast to the Utopians, who believed that socialism was bound to be achieved as soon as socialist ideas became sufficiently widespread, the founders of Marxism argued that the socialist transformation of social relations would become a necessity only under certain historical conditions. This is not only a scientific, historically grounded positing of a question that is of tremendous import for mankind; it is also a wise one.
Lenin scathingly criticised the trite wisdom of the liberals and opportunists, who justified their fear of revolution with ponderous sentiments to the effect that one must learn from life, not be in too much of a hurry, too impatient and so on. Pointing out that Marx and Engels had been wrong in their estimation of the nearness of the socialist revolution, Lenin stressed that "such 56 errors---the errors of the giants of revolutionary thought, who sought to raise, and did raise, the proletariat of the whole world above the level of petty, commonplace and trivial tasks---are a thousand times more noble and magnificent and historically more valuable and true than the trite wisdom of official liberalism, which lauds, shouts, appeals and holds forth about the vanity of revolutionary vanities, the futility of the revolutionary struggle and the charms of counterrevolutionary `constitutional' fantasies. . . ."^^1^^ There is wisdom and there is also the ``wisdom'' that is fostered by fear and impotence; the latter is the consolation of the slave who seeks to reconcile himself to his present state in life.
Soon after the victory of the Great October Revolution Lenin spoke against the Menshevik Sukhanov, who was trying to prove that the socialist revolution in Russia had no historical justification since the material conditions for the transition to socialism did not obtain in Russia. "If a definite level of culture,'' Lenin wrote, "is required for the building of socialism (although nobody can say just what that definite 'level of culture' is, for it differs in every West-European country), why cannot we begin by first achieving the prerequisites for that definite level of culture in a revolutionary way, and then, with the aid of the workers' and peasants' government and the Soviet system, proceed to overtake the other nations?''^^2^^ This posing of the question of the historical prospects of the Land of Soviets, equally free of fatalism on the one hand, and of subjective bias on the other, is indeed worthy to be called wise.
_-_-_~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 12, p. 378.
~^^2^^ Ibid., Vol. 33, pp. 47X-79.
57Wisdom exists because there are great questions to be answered that are of vital importance to the human race (and the individual); these questions take shape in men's minds and they cannot be left unanswered. Even if the answers do not provide a ready and complete solution, they always (if they are wise answers) conduce to the correct posing of further questions, and thus the solution that is bound to come sooner or later.
The philosophers were mistaken when they counterposed wisdom to science. This mistake is being repeated today by many contemporary idealist philosophers of the irrational school. One cannot agree with Walter Ehrlich, for example, who maintains that philosophy "should in fact, signify wisdom and hence a special kind of knowledge, that does not at all coincide with scientific knowledge, which is available to everyone (if one has the necessary time and education)".^^1^^ No knowledge should be counterposed to science. There is no such thing as knowledge that is above science. What does exist is prescientific and unscientific knowledge, and this is what wisdom becomes if it is juxtaposed to science. Does this mean that wisdom should become a science or is becoming one? By no means! Science is a system of concepts, whose meaning is organically linked with the subject of the given science. Wisdom is not a system of concepts; the specific nature of wisdom cannot be defined by pointing to the subject of inquiry. Wisdom has no such subject merely because it is not an inquiry, although it is, of course, understanding. _-_-_
~^^1^^ W. Ehrlich, Philosophic dcr Geschichtc dcr Philosophie, Tubingen, 1965, S. 17.
58 This understanding is based on the data of science, but not only on them. Of no less importance to wisdom are everyday and historical experience.Wisdom is not an ideal of knowledge, since not all knowledge, ideally conceived, becomes wisdom. The ideally exact and complete cognition of any physical structure has nothing to do with wisdom, which does not, of course, belittle the value of such knowledge. But wisdom is not an unattainable ideal. The rationalism of the New Age, which attempted to create a "perfect science" of wisdom, was obviously unaware that any absolute ideal is a meaningless concept. Ideals are historical; they are generated by social development, which subsequently transcends them in its movement forward. The ideal of knowledge, the ideal of social management as historically concrete ideals are entirely realisable, and for this reason the concept of absolute perfection cannot be applied to them. But does such a concept exist? Not, I believe, as a scientific concept.
Jacques Maritain is, perhaps, more consistent than Leibnitz when he maintains that perfect science is impossible and perfect wisdom exists only in the Scriptures. But this view makes sense only to the religious, and then only to those of them who regard the Bible as "divine revelation" and not a historical document. Philosophy, since it thinks in concepts, cannot stand on faith.
Philosophy begins with reflections on the nature of wisdom. Today the problem of wisdom retains its significance as a philosophical problem. But it would obviously be incorrect to assume that philosophy boils down to the study or attainment of wisdom, as Jean Piaget, for 59 instance, maintains: "The reasoned synthesis of beliefs, no matter what they may be, and of the conditions of knowledge, is what we have called wisdom, and this is what seems to us to be the subject of philosophy.''^^1^^
We cannot agree with these definitions of wisdom and the subject of philosophy. Wisdom may be regarded as a specific form of knowledge, but the "reasoned synthesis of beliefs" may surely be called wisdom only with reference to the distant past, before the dawn of science.
One of the specific features of philosophy is that the universal and necessary significance of its propositions is constantly in the process of becoming and development. Is this characteristic of wisdom? Apparently not. Nevertheless the original meaning of the word ``philosophy'' retains its significance even today. It speaks of the possibility of human wisdom, but also of the fact that we shall never be replete with it.
Some contemporary philosophers with religious leanings hold that wisdom has declined into science and that art has been replaced by technology. It is my belief that these philosophers have a distorted view of both science and technology. Wisdom, of course, does not lie in the discovery of the structure of DNA, and art is not the mass production of motor-cars. But a new basis for both wisdom and art is emerging more and more in the latest discoveries of science and the achievements of technology.
Wisdom will not become a science, just as science will not become wisdom. Philosophy, no matter how high a value it places on wisdom, _-_-_
~^^1^^ J. Piagct, Sfie.csxf cl illusions rlc la />/iilosof>//ir, Paris, .1968, p. 281.
60 should not identify itself with it. Philosophy can and should be a system of scientifically grounded knowledge. This conclusion has nothing in common, however, with the positivist ridicule of the quest for wisdom as a metaphysical pretension.We know that neo-positivism's struggle against ``metaphysics'' quite unexpectedly brought the neo-positivists to the realisation that the problems of philosophy were unavoidable. This notable fact should be regarded as evidence that the problem of wisdom retains its significance in philosophy, just as the question of the rational ordering of human life is still being discussed in society. One can agree with Bertrand Russell, who for all his hesitations in assessing the significance of the content and meaning of philosophy, finally declares that there are certain general questions that cannot be answered in the laboratory, from which it does not necessarily follow that they should be presented to the theologists for the taking. It is for philosophy to deal with these questions.
``Is the world divided into mind and matter, and, if so, what is mind and what is matter? Is mind subject to matter, or is it possessed of independent powers? Has the universe any unity or purpose? Is it evolving towards some goal? Are there really laws of nature, or do we believe in them only because of our innate love of order? Is man what he seems to the astronomer, a tiny lump of impure carbon and water impotently crawling on a small and unimportant planet? Or is he what he appears to Hamlet? Is he perhaps both at once? Is there a way of living that is noble and another that is base, or are all ways of living merely futile? If there is a way of living that is noble, in what does it consist, and 61 how shall we achieve it? Must the good be eternal in order to deserve to be valued, or is it worth seeking even if the universe is inexorably moving towards death? ...
``The studying of these questions, if not the answering of them, is the business of philosophy.''^^1^^
It is not our purpose here to discuss how Bertrand Russell formulates the basic questions of philosophy and which of these questions he leaves out of his list. It would seem that these questions are mostly formulated in such a way that any correct answer to them is inconceivable. The philosophy of Marxism formulates these questions differently and does not, of course, confine itself to recognising their unavoidability. Dialectical and historical materialism solves these and other philosophical problems in alliance with natural science and the humanities.
Russell and the philosophers who have transferred their allegiance from positivist nihilism to a recognition of the inevitability of ``metaphysics'' adopt a different stand. In his efforts to avoid the dogmatism of the theologists, and dogmatism in general, Russell arrives at scepticism and moderate pessimism, which he sees as the only general position worthy of the philosopher (and the scientist in general). The theoretical formulation of this position is as follows. "Uncertainty, in the presence of vivid hopes and fears, is painful, but must be endured if we wish to live without the support of comforting fairy tales. It is not good either to forget the questions that philosophy asks, or to persuade ourselves that we have _-_-_
~^^1^^ B. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, pp. 10--11.
62 found indubitable answers to them. To teach how to live without certainty and yet without being paralysed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do for those who study it.''^^1^^ A good many people would be prepared to take these words as the ultimate in wisdom, although it seems that in the state of uncertainty in which we are supposed to live, between the comforting fairy tale and the paralysis of hesitation which this British philosopher so rightly deplores, there is no room left for taking any important decisions at all.We have examined various interpretations of the word ``wisdom'' in its relation to the origin and development of philosophy. In view of the multiplicity of meanings the word may suggest, it is probably better not to attempt any set definition. The innumerable meanings which it has acquired in the course of history and retains to this day, and which cannot therefore be discounted, would make any such definition purely arbitrary from the standpoint of the history of philosophy, whose function is to sum up the historical development of the philosophical conceptions of wisdom. However the mere enumeration of the semantic meanings of this word and recognition of the fact that these meanings bear some relation to one another are bound in one way or another to lead to a concept. Without claiming to give a definition, I would advocate regarding wisdom as a fact and not a figment, as a fact that can be understood and theoretically defined in conceptual form. In this case wisdom may be understood as the generalisation of the multifarious knowledge and experience of the _-_-_
^^1^^ Ibid., p. 11.
63 human race, a generalisation formulated as the principles of cognition, evaluation, behaviour and action. This is, of course, a too general definition, but it does help to move on from the original meaning of the word ``philosophy'' to an examination of the specific nature of philosophical knowledge. [64] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Chapter Two __ALPHA_LVL1__ MEANING OF THE QUESTIONThere are some questions that cannot be answered by the people who ask them but can be answered by others. There are some questions that have many answers. If one of these answers is correct, the solution to the problem is to choose the correct answer. This choice cannot be made blindfold. How then is one to know whether one has chosen correctly?
In philosophy there are hosts of different answers to the question "What is philosophy?''. These answers cannot be described either as correct or as incorrect. The point is that every answer to a given question is above all an answer to another, more particular question. Thus, Aristotle's definition of philosophy is essentially a definition of Aristotle's own philosophy. But to what extent does Aristotle's philosophy, or that of any other philosopher, represent an authentic expression of the essence of philosophy which, as we know, is subject to historical change? A rose is a plant, but not all plants are roses. As the history of philosophy shows, nearly all __PRINTERS_P_65_COMMENT__ 5-22 65 philosophers have been convinced that their teaching is a genuine expression of the unchanging essence of philosophy.
So, if there are many answers to the question "What is philosophy?'', its solution cannot be reduced to choosing the most correct of the available answers. What we must do is investigate this great variety of answers and, in so doing, we shall probably find that both the questions and its numerous answers compel us to take a look at the multiform reality which philosophy seeks to understand. Then, in order to find the answer to a question which overfrequent repetition has made distasteful to philosophers it will be necessary not so much to compare the available answers as to investigate the relation of philosophical awareness to man's everyday and historical experience, to the so-called specialised sciences, to social needs and interests, because only the investigation of this historically changing relationship can explain both the fundamental nature of the question itself and the incompatibility of the various answers to it.
When the question "What is consistency?" is asked, we are obviously concerned with the meaning of a term. When people ask "What is it?'', they usually point to the object that evoked the question, in which case we have no difficulty in answering if, of course, we happen to know what the object in question is.
Needless to say, the question "What is it?" may be purely rhetorical, but then it expresses rather the emotional state of the questioner and probably requires no answer at all. In some cases the question "What is it?" refers to a phenomenon that has been discovered but not yet studied. A description may then provide the answer to 66 the extent that the phenomenon is observable. If the phenomenon cannot be described or a description is of little use, the question remains open because we simply do not have the necessary empirical data for a satisfactory answer.
Things are quite different in philosophy. The meaning of the question "What is philosophy?" is bound up with the meaning of all philosophical questions in general and with the position philosophy has held throughout the millennia, and with the situation it is in today.
Of course, the question "What is philosophy?" may be an expression of the kind of casual interest that will always be satisfied by any definite answer. For instance, a tourist may ask about a building that happens to catch his eye. He receives an answer, makes a note of the name of the building and goes on to the next name. This is the kind of casual interest evinced by the educated person who asks about philosophy merely because it is something that is being talked about at the moment. Some educated people like to have concise answers to all questions that are likely to be raised in current conversation; they simply don't want to find themselves at a loss. But when it is the philosophers who ask themselves the question "What is philosophy?'', we can have no doubt that they are asking about the meaning of their own intellectual life, and even whether it has any meaning at all. To a great extent the fact that philosophers are asking themselves this question means that they are aware of the need to justify the existence of philosophy, to prove its actual raison d'etre. This means that doubt is being cast on the validity, if not of philosophy in general, at least on most of its past or still existing species. Evidently, 67 then we must study the origin of the specific differences between philosophies. Their historical origin is proved by facts. But are not these differences immutable? Until we have succeeded in proving the opposite, the question "What is philosophy?" will continue to sound like Pontius Pilate's famous question "What is truth?''.
We experience no particular difficulty in answering such questions as "What is Schilling's philosophy?'', "What is Nietzsche's philosophy?" or "What is the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre?" Not because these are simple questions but because their content may be strictly defined. But to answer the question "What is philosophy?" we must break away from that which distinguishes Schelling, Nietzsche and Sartre and many other philosophers from one another. But what is left after such an abstraction which rules out the distinctions between one philosophy and another? Abstract identity? But this is only an instance of concrete identity, whose significance is directly related to the significance of the distinction it implies.
The existence of a host of incompatible philosophies makes the solution of the problem "What is philosophy?" extremely difficult. But this very circumstance testifies to the fact that the difficulty of answering increases in proportion to the availability of the factual data for its solution. Unlike the non-specialists in philosophy, the philosophers have these data at their disposal. So to them the question "What is philosophy?" appears particularly difficult. Thus the question has a different ring for the student who is just embarking on a course of philosophy and for the philosophers themselves, who are not outside philosophy, who put the question to themselves, 68 and who realise that the answer cannot simply be referred to in a textbook.
Some educated people who regard philosophy as an occupation too serious or too exhausting to devote their leisure to it, and yet not serious enough to claim any of their working hours, are badly upset upon discovering that many notions, beliefs, concepts and truths that never gave them any cause for doubt turn out to be unclear, uncertain, and unsound as soon as they come up for discussion by qualified philosophers. They feel they have been cheated, when they find themselves deprived of the carefree certainty of what they imagined to be self-evident. And yet throughout the history of philosophy, an edifice in which every outstanding thinker instead of building the next storey begins once again to lay a new foundation, there are in fact no notions, concepts or truths that are not open to question. Questions that have been declared solved (and often actually have been solved) constantly revert to the status of problems. Is this not the reason why the question "What is philosophy?" has been discussed in philosophy from the time of its beginning to the present day?
All outstanding philosophical doctrines negate one another. This is the empirical fact from which historico-philosophical science proceeds. This negation may be abstract, metaphysical or it may be concrete and dialectical, but it is negation that characterises every philosophical system and, hence, the specific nature of philosophy, despite the fact that its immediate implication is merely that some philosophical systems differ from others. These at first glance ``antagonistic'' relations between philosophical doctrines have always placed in doubt the unity of philosophical 69 knowledge. But if there are only philosophies and no philosophy, does not the question "What is philosophy?" lose all meaning? Is philosophy possible as a science? The significance of these questions has grown historically as the gap between various philosophical systems has widened. And the fact that the philosophical systems of the distant past are constantly re-emerging and developing in new ways gives even greater urgency to these questions, since it is not only the philosophical systems of a given historical period that oppose one another but all the philosophies that have ever existed.
In philosophy there is no such thing as a single definition of concepts, not even of the concept of philosophy itself. We know that Ludwig Feuerbach often used to declare: My philosophy is not a philosophy at all. But no one would ever think of asserting that Feuerbach was not a philosopher. The rise of Marxism as a philosophy denoted the negation of philosophy in the old sense of the term, the abolition of philosophising, as opposed to the positive sciences and practice. Nevertheless this old philosophy has continued to exist and to evolve new systems. This does not mean that the old philosophy has not been abolished, for this old philosophy is already a system of obsolete views.
In the positive sciences truth usually overcomes error in the course of a period of history that can be surveyed with relative ease, that is to say, it takes only so long as is needed to assimilate, check and look for fresh confirmation, and so on. The historico-philosophical process does not fall into this pattern. It is impossible to say how long will be needed for philosophical truth to triumph over philosophical error; some 70 philosophical truths established centuries ago still have not broken through the crust of prejudice. The reason for this lies not so much in philosophy as in the historically determined socio-economic conditions, which are not immune to change either in theory or practice. But whatever the reason, the fact still remains, and this forms, if not the philosophical, at least an extremely important source of the question "What is philosophy?''.
It may appear that the incompatibility of most of the great philosophical doctrines, the incompatibility of the various interpretations of the very concept of philosophy makes it extremely difficult to distinguish philosophical questions from the non-philosophical. And yet philosophers of radically different schools usually agree with one another as to which questions may or may not be considered philosophical. No one would think of treating Lamarck as a philosopher because he wrote The Philosophy of Zoology, although certain philosophical questions are considered in this work. This applies not only to philosophers but to readers with a sound knowledge of philosophy, who are also quite capable of distinguishing the philosophical from the nonphilosophical. What is more, when reading a nonphilosophical work, such as a poem or a novel, they have little difficulty in picking out the philosophical ideas it contains and, when studying certain ostensibly philosophical works, are able to state with assurance that they lack philosophical ideas.
So it is probably easier to distinguish the philosophical from the non-philosophical than, say, the chemical from the physical. The distinguishing features of philosophical judgement are nearly 71 always self-evident, since a negative definition of philosophy (i.e., a definition of what does not constitute philosophy) is not usually hard to make. But the specific nature of philosophy still remains a problem. So the question "What is philosophy?" may be classed as one of the basic philosophical questions and as such, to be discussed not by those who know nothing about philosophy but by those who have dedicated themselves to its study. Thus it becomes a question not so much for others as for oneself. The posing of this question testifies to the development of philosophy's self-awareness, manifestation of its selfcriticism.
Thus, philosophy differs essentially from other systems of knowledge in that it is constantly questioning itself as to its own nature, goal and terms of reference. This specific feature of philosophy was quite evident even in the days of Ancient Greece, when Socrates proclaimed as a philosophical credo the dictum of the Delphic oracle, "Know thyself''. As is shown by the dialogues of Plato, this task always leads to discussion of the actual meaning of philosophy.
Hegel pointed out that the schools which followed Socrates' dictum "Know thyself" are investigating the "relation of thinking to being'', trying to reveal the subjective side of human knowledge, in consequence of which "the subject of philosophy becomes philosophy itself as a science of cognition".^^1^^ The development of philosophy in modern times has demonstrated even more impressively that philosophy's self-- knowledge, the conversion of philosophy into a subject _-_-_
~^^1^^ Hegel, Works in 14 volumes, Vol. 2, p. 91 (in Russian).
72 of special philosophical inquiry is the sine qua non of its fruitful development.^^1^^It should not be assumed, however, that whenever a philosopher asks the question "What is philosophy?'', the question always has one and the same implication, and it is only a matter of his being dissatisfied with the answers. In fact, what he is looking for is not a perfect definition but a new range of philosophical problems, which is counterposed to the old and is declared to be of great importance and actually defining the concept of philosophy.^^2^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ Friedrich Schelling was right when he asserted that "the very idea of philosophy itself is the result of philosophy which as an infinite science is also the science of itself''. (Schellings Werke, Erster Hauptband. Jugendschriften 1793--1798. Miinchen, 1927, S. 661.) Of course philosophy turns out to be a "science of itself" not because it is an "infinite science'', which embraces everything. The essence of the question, however, which Schelling did express correctly, is that the idea of philosophy is the result of its historical development, and the contradictory content of this idea is the reflection of the actual contradictions of the development of philosophy and of all that determines both the form and the content of its development.
~^^2^^ When Fichte flatly declares that there are probably not more than half a dozen people in the world who know what philosophy actually is he is, of course, referring to the philosophical questions raised by his own philosophy which, so he believes, turn philosophy into a genuine science capable of helping to bring about a reasonable reformation of human life. Fichte declares that the primary task of philosophy is to answer the question "What is man's destiny, his purpose, in the Universe?''. The final, culminating goal of "any philosophical investigation" is to answer the question "What is the purpose of the scientist or---which is the same thing, as we shall see later--- the purpose of the highest and truest of men....'' (J. Fichte, The Vocation of the Scholar.) This understanding of philosophy as the science of man, and this understanding of man as the being who most adequately realises his __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 74. 73
Thus, discussion of the question "What is philosophy?" constantly discloses the enrichment of philosophy, the renewal of its range of problems by the history of mankind. This is why the question has retained its meaning throughout the centuries. In our day it becomes particularly relevant because man has acquired power over the mighty forces of nature and this, owing to the antagonistic nature of social relationships, is not only a blessing but also presents an unprecedented threat to the very existence of the human race.
The contemporary ideological struggle, which to some extent determines the course of historical events, again and again raises the old but eternally new questions of the meaning of human life and the "meaning of history'', of the nature of man and his relations to the environment, to external nature and to himself, of freedom of will, responsibility and external determination, of progress, and so on. Those who maintain that philosophy is a historically outmoded means of comprehending empirical reality naturally declare these and other problems to be pseudoproblems. This attitude in contemporary bourgeois philosophy often turns out to be an indirect apology for ``traditional'', i.e., capitalist, relations. As for the thinkers who seek a positive solution to these philosophical questions, they ultimately realise the need for a radical solution of social problems. For them the question "What is philosophy?" coincides in some measure with the _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 73. rational social essence in science, signifies, in Fichte's view, that philosophy is a scientific teaching, i.e., the solution of the questions posed by Kant. Obviously this new understanding of the meaning and purpose of philosophy is at the same time a new positing of the question "What is philosophy?''.
74 problem of the rational refashioning of the life of society.The scientific and technological revolution, its astonishing achievements, contradictions, prospects and social consequences give rise to what are in effect philosophical problems. Present-day philosophical irrationalism takes a pessimistic view of the ``monstrous'' scientific and technical advances of the present age. Such philosophical laments over the "breakdown of technological civilisation'', the "end of progress" and the inevitability of global disaster are closely connected with the question "What is philosophy?" because it implies an evaluation of human reason, of science. Thus this question, which in its original form arises from the empirical observation of a vast number of incompatible philosophical systems (in this form it is mainly of interest to philosophers), is today growing into a question of the historical destiny of mankind and thus becomes a social problem that concerns every thinking person. Now it is a matter of how far mankind is capable of understanding itself, of controlling its own development, of becoming the master of its fate, of coping with the objective consequences of its cognitive and creative activity.^^1^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ The social significance of the question "What is
philosophy?" receives special treatment in the work of
Martin Heidegger. His line of reasoning runs approximately as
follows: nuclear age, nuclear energy---inner essence of
matter having some incomprehensible relation to all
existence---determines our future. But the primary source of
science is philosophy. Philosophy as the awareness of the
unknowability of existence, this is the watchword that
"seems to be written on the gates of our own history and,
we would make so bold as to say, on the gates of the
contemporary world-historic epoch, known as the nuclear age.''
(M. Heidegger, Was ist das---die Philosophief, Tubingen,
1956, S. 15.) Heidegger, as often happens, allows himself to
__NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 76.
75
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2. HOW PHILOSOPHY DELIMITS,
COGNISES AND DETERMINES ITSELF
The question "What is philosophy?" also asks what are the subject-matter, significance and limits of philosophical knowledge. No research, no science is possible without the ability to determine its own frame of reference. The clearer the subject, its problems and aims, and even its capabilities, the stricter the process of definition becomes.
For most of the specialised scientific disciplines, particularly the applied ones, the problem of selfdelimitation solves itself empirically. Things become much more complicated with the socalled fundamental science,^^1^^ where the subject _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 75. be diverted from the actual historical process, i.e., the antagonistic social relations in consequence of which the discovery of nuclear energy achieved practical realisation in the atomic bomb. The danger that the bomb presents for mankind stems, according to Heidegger, from the development of philosophy, from the desire to know the essence of existence. From this standpoint, which implies an obscurantist interpretation of scientific and technological progress and cognition in general, Heidegger examines the question "What is philosophy?" as an intimation of mankind's tragic fate. This "is not a historical question, which sets out to reveal how what is called `philosophy' emerged and developed. This is a historical question in the sense that it is a fateful (geschickliche) question" (Ibid., S. 18).
~^^1^^ As E. K. Fyodorov proposes, one should include in the classification of sciences worked out by Engels "only the fundamental sciences, precisely because they investigate the basic (and varied) forms of the motion of matter''. Philosophy, it would seem, could be included among the fundamental sciences but it does not investigate any specific form of the motion of matter. Nor can it be classed with the other, ``non-fundamental'' sciences which, as Fyodorov points out, "applied the results of the fundamental sciences to the study of specific natural objects''. This fact alone makes philosophy a problem for itself.
76 of inquiry (and the frame of reference) cannot be strictly delimited. If, for example, mathematical, physical and chemical methods of research are being more and more widely applied outside the actual framework of mathematics, physics and chemistry, this not only indicates the significance of these methods for other sciences but also, to a certain, though inadequate extent, characterises the subject of mathematics, physics, etc. The questions "What is mathematics?'', "What is physics?" st