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p We have seen that controversy is not peculiar to philosophy. But what is it that distinguishes philosophical debate from the challenging of opinions in the specialised sciences?

p At first sight the opposition between materialism and idealism appears to be wholly determined by the diametrically opposite solutions they offer to the basic philosophical question. But if we remember that materialism and idealism are not simply two mutually exclusive points of view, but the two fundamental world views, and that the struggle between them makes up the vital content of the development of philosophy, we see that this explanation of the fundamental polarisation of philosophy is obviously inadequate.

p Historically speaking, idealism grew out of the religious view of the world, and it has maintained a direct or indirect connection with it throughout the centuries. The history of materialism, on 424 the contrary, is connected with anti-clerical, antireligious, atheist ideological movements. Would it not be more correct to assume that the opposite solutions to the basic philosophical question represent the theoretical substantiation of a philosophical position that in the final analysis is based not on theoretical assumptions alone? The bourgeoisie, when it was a revolutionary class, readily preached materialist philosophy, which it firmly repudiated when it became the ruling, conservative class. The moralistic criticism of materialism, so characteristic of established bourgeois society, the constant condemnation of materialism not only by idealist philosophers, who to a certain extent analyse its theoretical content, but also by the daily bourgeois press that is not really concerned with philosophical problems as such—all this constitutes a fact that illuminates, if not the nature of the theoretical differences between the main philosophical trends, at least the social implications of this ideological battle.

p It is far from the author’s intention to reduce the opposition between materialism and idealism to the contradictions between the exploiter and exploited classes, because for many centuries materialism and idealism existed in the framework of one ideology, that of the slave-owners or that of the bourgeoisie, for instance. But this only goes to show that they perform different social functions at different stages in the development of one and the same class, or express contradictions between the social groups that form that class. And if idealism sometimes emerges as the ideology of the progressive (and even revolutionary) classes, even this indicates the objective dependence of the historically determined forms of 425 idealism on social and economic factors, demands and interests.

p It would be equally unscientific to regard the struggle between rationalism and irrationalism as only a theoretical argument. The intimate connection between the socio-political ideas of the bourgeoisie in the 17th and 18th centuries and the rationalist faith in reason, in the possibility and necessity of remoulding social life on the principle of reason, is particularly obvious against the background of present-day irrationalist criticism of the "rationalist Utopias”, which lumps Marxism with any other theory that treats social progress as based on universal laws. Today’s irrationalist idealism cannot be understood if it is regarded simply as the antithesis of the rationalism of the 17th and 18th centuries, that is to say, outside the context of the social cataclysms of contemporary bourgeois society, whose ideologists have to renounce progressive philosophical traditions simply because they themselves are the implacable opponents of the heir to these traditions—Marxism.

p Most bourgeois philosophers and historians of philosophy in the second half of the 19th century directly or indirectly acknowledge that philosophical doctrines and controversies are intimately connected with circumstances independent of philosophy. Some of them regard these circumstances as deforming the immanent development of philosophical thought, while others, on the contrary, assume that the struggle of philosophical ideas is inspired by the social process. The social process, however, is usually only vaguely understood and its interpretation amounts to no more than acknowledging some irrational connection between philosophy and the philosopher’s "position in life”. Thus, even if it is conceded that the 426 sources of philosophical controversy are to be found not in thought but in life, life itself is interpreted only psychologically, as the sum total of emotional experiences independent of and determining the consciousness. Irrationalist mystification concerning the "position in life" and “historicity” of the philosopher turns out in practice to be irreconcilably hostile to the materialist and historical explanation of the essence and origin of philosophical dispute.

p Social psychology can undoubtedly help us to sort out philosophical arguments, but it does not take us beyond the bounds of the social consciousness, one of the forms of which is philosophy. The belief that philosophy exists not independently of other forms of consciousness but in conjunction with them is extremely relevant when it comes to tracing the various subjects of philosophical controversy, but it is obviously not sufficient to reveal its source and historically determined purpose and character. To discover this, we must turn from the examination of the social consciousness to the analysis of social being. The bourgeois philosophers, however, prefer a different path. In their efforts to discover the “mainspring” of philosophical debate they focus their attention on the philosophising individual, on his temperament, psychological make-up, and so on. The subjectivist-irrationalist explanation of the “ vitality” of the philosophical controversy is particularly characteristic of William James, for example, who maintained that philosophy is "our individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos".  [426•1  Philosophical differences of opinion are reduced to 427 differences of creative individuality, and philosophical controversy is thus stripped of its social and historical content. The great philosopher is the person whose temperament is most strikingly expressed.

p James maintained that the content of philosophical doctrines was determined by the “hard” or “soft” nature of the philosopher. Attributes of the hard human type were empiricism, materialism, pluralism, pessimism, determinism, scepticism, etc., while to the soft were attributed rationalism, idealism, indeterminism, and so on. This subjectivist classification of the contenders in philosophical debate sets philosophy in opposition to the sciences and to the practical affairs of society, since the cognitive side of philosophy and philosophical discussion is completely ignored.

p The bourgeois philosopher’s approach to the social and ideological analysis of the contradictions between philosophical doctrines amounts to a virtual denial of what he himself professes. Bourgeois philosophers frequently assert that the essence of philosophical debate is freedom of expression, freedom to make statements that are independent of politics, ideology and even science. We should, however, remember Hegel’s profound remark on this subject: "When the subject of freedom is under discussion, one should always ascertain if it is not private interest that is being discussed.”  [427•1  Bourgeois philosophy fulfils a quite definite ideological function even when it proclaims its freedom from ideology and religion. It does the same, when it “freely” accepts bourgeois ideological dogmas and religious beliefs, that is to say, presents them as theoretical conclusions from abstract philosophical propositions.

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p The domination of reactionary social forces in the conditions of developed capitalist society inevitably tends to make discussion between bourgeois philosophers unscientific and unproductive. We can understand Jean Piaget when he says that philosophical discussions are "a kind of dialogue between the deaf".  [428•1  But why should this be so? Because of the nature of philosophy? This is what the neo-positivists and the advocates of the philosophy of linguistic analysis contend. But both schools ignore the ideological atmosphere of philosophical debate in bourgeois society, and unless this is taken into consideration it is impossible to explain such things as the "Thomist Renaissance" in some of the capitalist countries, for instance. The zeal of the neo-Thomists in “ coordinating” Aristotle’s hylomorphism with the latest scientific discoveries provides cogent proof of the decisive influence of the political and religious ideology of bourgeois society on the development of philosophy and philosophical debate.

p Philosophical debate in bourgeois society is inevitably preconditioned by the existence of a great variety of philosophical trends and schools. Some bourgeois philosophers are reduced to despair by this fact, and bemoan the existing anarchy of philosophical systems. Others, on the contrary, see this pluralism of philosophical doctrines as the realisation of the principle of philosophical autonomy, the independence of philosophical thought from external, i.e., political, scientific and ideological, factors. In fact, however, this splitting up of bourgeois philosophy into various trends quite logically expresses the essence of the capitalist system, in which competing philosophical doctrines 429 influence people’s consciousness in all kinds of ways. All these competing doctrines, however, perform basically one and the same ideological function, as Lenin pointed out in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, when he stressed the predominantly idealist character of the contending philosophical doctrines and their unity in opposing materialism.

p The bourgeois philosophers of today quite often suggest that the disputing sides would stand a better chance of achieving understanding and overcoming their differences if they could agree on the meaning of certain terms and rules of discussion appropriate to their common humanist aim. This idea is, of course, Utopian in a world made up of opposing classes and social systems.

p In earlier chapters I stressed the specific complexity of philosophical problems, whose solution leaves open the possibility of their further development as new scientific data and historical experience are accumulated. But this, of course, does not explain the revival of historically obsolete views, long since disproved conceptions, etc. The clashes caused by such views and conceptions cannot be correctly understood without analysing the ideological sources of the differences in opinion inherent in a society whose antagonistic class structure makes ideological unity impossible in principle. The same ideological themes ( philosophers may not always be conscious of them, of course) are strikingly manifest in the modern controversy over alienation, in the various interpretations of the problem of man, in analysis of the man-society relationship, in interpretations of the essence of humanism, and so on.

p When examining the ideological sources of philosophical controversy we should remember, of 430 course, that ideology changes, and that its development, like the diversity of historical forms of its existence, acquires specific expression in philosophy. This is confirmed by analysis of the philosophical propositions characterising attitudes to certain obvious and unchallenged facts.

p In philosophy, to a far greater extent than in natural science, one has constantly to draw a distinction between knowledge (in the sense in which Leibnitz spoke of truths of fact) and beliefs, which, of course, may be based on knowledge (scientific beliefs), although knowledge does not fully account for them. Magellan believed in the existence of a strait connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The hypothesis was confirmed by his voyage. In theoretical natural science there are many beliefs by which scientists are guided. These beliefs are eventually confirmed or, on the contrary, disproved by scientific discoveries and experiment. In the latter case the scientist usually abandons such views. But it is a different matter in philosophy, where beliefs in general cannot be directly proved or disproved by experiment.  [430•1  What is more, philosophy, because it 431 discusses questions of human life, ethics and aesthetics, naturally cannot have recourse to scientific methods of testing its propositions and such methods could have only a very limited application.

p Inasmuch as beliefs express people’s attitudes to certain facts, their appraisal of these facts, they cannot be regarded as descriptions of facts. Such beliefs may stand diametrically opposed to each other and the contest between them will be not so much a matter of truth and error as of the appraisal of human behaviour as correct or incorrect, reasonable or unreasonable, moral or immoral. Even such an appraisal of contrasting philosophical beliefs, however, is quite often impossible, particularly if these beliefs reflect different historical situations and are, therefore, not mutually exclusive, although they cannot be brought into harmony.

p As an example of such a clash of opinion we may cite the much discussed philosophical question of man’s attitude to his own mortality. Montaigne, continuing the traditions of Greek Epicureanism and stoicism, argued that man is able to enjoy life only in so far as he constantly meditates on death and thus overcomes the fear of it.

p Montaigne agrees with Cicero’s dictum that to philosophise is to prepare oneself for death, "Let us strip it of its mystery,” says Montaigne, "let us behold it and grow accustomed to it by thinking of it more often than anything else. Let us be forever recalling it in our imagination, in all its aspects____We cannot be sure where death awaits us; so let us await it everywhere. To think on death is to think on freedom. He who has learned how to die has unlearned slavery. Readiness to 432 die liberates us from all servitude and bondage.”  [432•1 

p Clearly, these reflections of a philosopher of the sceptical school sharply diverge from medieval religious teaching with its cultivation of the fear of death and inevitable retribution in the hereafter for disobedience in the ephemeral present. Montaigne was the forerunner of the rationalist teaching that life should be lived according to reason. But the classical exponent of rationalist ethics was Spinoza who, like Montaigne, continued the traditions of Epicureanism and stoicism, but differed radically from him in his understanding of the reasonable attitude to death. "The free man,” he says, "thinks of nothing so little as of death, and his wisdom lies in thinking not of death but of life.”  [432•2 

p Comparing these contrasting beliefs, we find it difficult to say which of these thinkers is more correct. Both of them are right in a sense and, at bottom, both are expressing the progressive humanist beliefs of their time in different ways. Niels Bohr’s remark, which I cited earlier, on complex truths consisting of diametrically opposed statements, is fully applicable here. When considering a philosophical dispute one must, therefore, separate the struggle between truth and error from differences in opinion that express a circumstantially justified difference of attitude towards facts, the existence of which is not in question. Thus, diversity of beliefs within a given philosophical theme merely expresses the diversity of actually existing human attitudes towards generally acknowledged facts.

p Some bourgeois philosophers tend to identify 433 belief with religious faith and deny any essential difference between “faith” in the existence of the external, objective world and religious faith. This mixing of incompatible concepts is supported by various arguments. Some speak of all belief as irrational, while others acknowledge that beliefs arise from experience, but interpret experience subjectively, that is to say, simply as the totality of individual emotions. On this path we encounter such objectively unfounded concepts as, for example, "religious experience" and obvious fideist attempts to prove the reality of the supernatural on the basis of the individual’s "intimate experience”.

p Needless to say, the person who never asks himself philosophical questions acknowledges the existence of the external world without giving any preliminary thought to the matter. It may be said that he is convinced of its existence or even that he believes in its reality as something independent of the consciousness, but the safest way of putting it is that he trusts the evidence of his senses. The human individual exists practically in a world of things and people that is independent of his consciousness. The existence of material reality independent of consciousness is constantly affirmed by daily experience and practical activity, whether the individual realises it or not. It need not be proved that belief in the existence of objective reality differs fundamentally from belief in the supernatural, which is directly maintained by a certain kind of subjectivism that has its historical origin in the domination of man by the spontaneous forces of social development. That is how matters stand not only with religious faith but also with numerous bourgeois and pettybourgeois prejudices.

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p The most varied beliefs and faiths have existed in philosophy for thousands of years. Some of them are analogous to the beliefs held by natural scientists today, that is to say, they are based on more or less firmly established facts; others, on the contrary, are not in accord with the facts and may even directly contradict them. But even the latter type of belief reflects certain facts, certain social needs, interests, loyalty to historically obsolete social relationships, traditions, etc. Conflicting philosophical beliefs must, therefore, have deep historical and ideological roots, which are expressed in a vast variety of speculative theories, since, depending on tradition and conditions, one and the same ideological function or historical trend is formulated in different ways by the various contending philosophical doctrines. The neoThomist principle of the “harmony” of science and religion and the completely opposite principle of philosophers inspired by protestantism, who insist that science and religion are divided by a bottomless chasm, represent, as I have shown above, only various ways of achieving one and the same goal—apology for religion. But recognition of the radical opposition between science and religion may serve not only the fideist purpose of reducing to a minimum the cognitive significance of science; it may also serve the materialist atheistic repudiation of religion. This is why the ideological conflict acquires in philosophy a specific form of theoretical discussion of the question in which everyone taking part in the argument recognises the authority of logic and seeks to prove his point instead of merely declaring his beliefs. Even the exponents of alogism are compelled to reckon with this imperative since they try to prove the epistemological 435 weakness of logical thinking by means of logical argument.

Thus, philosophical debate, which is fed by the ideological struggle, at the same time expresses the relative independence of philosophy as a specific form of cognition of reality. The chain of logical inferences that finally make up a system of philosophical beliefs is largely determined by the initial logical assumptions, which cannot be regarded merely as the statement of individual facts, because the universality of philosophical propositions makes them proportionately less amenable to confirmation by individual facts.  [435•1