Shalva Sanakoyev
D
__TITLE__
the
world
socialist
system
__TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2007-09-04T12:25:08-0700
__TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"
__SUBTITLE__
Main
Translated from the Russian by Leo Lempert
Edited by Jim Riordan
Designed by Vsevolod Trushchev
UI. n. CAHAKOEB
MHPOBAH CHCTEMA COU.HAJIH3MA Ha
__COPYRIGHT__ First printing 1972The history of the world socialist system in effect begins with the 1917 Great October Revolution which ushered in a new era, the era of socialism and communism. The victory of the revolution signified the birth of a new socioeconomic system, the defeat of the old, capitalist system and the beginning of its general crisis.
The sphere of capitalist rule contracted geographically and capitalism lost some power to shape events in its part of the world. The social processes that developed after the October Revolution, under its direct impact and as a result of building socialism in the USSR, are increasingly determining the course of world events.
For about 30 years after the October Revolution only one country constituted the socialist system, yet signs of the future emergence of socialism beyond the bounds of one country were clearly apparent. The revolutionary events in Europe resulted in workers' gains and the formation of Soviet Republics in Hungary, Bavaria and 9 Slovakia. The October Revolution was also of tremendous significance for the colonies. "The disintegration of the capitalist world,'' Lenin said, "is steadily progressing, unity is steadily diminishing, while the onslaught of the forces of the oppressed colonies ... is increasing.''^^1^^
The relations between the Soviet states which arose on the territory of the former Russian empire, the experience (however brief) of fraternal relations between Soviet Russia and the revolutionary Hungarian and Bavarian republics, the co-operation between the Russian Federation (and subsequently the USSR) and Mongolia, where a popular revolution triumphed in 1921 were all of fundamental importance. The experience of the first five years after the October Revolution demonstrated that, notwithstanding the exceptionally hard conditions, the revolutionary movement which swept a number of countries had brought entirely new, fraternal relations based on principles of proletarian solidarity. The working class of Russia, under the guidance of the Bolshevik Party, undertook not only to consummate the revolution in its country, but also to render other peoples help in their liberation struggle.
Lenin readily acclaimed the young Hungarian Soviet Republic. "The Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party,'' the message he wrote declared, "sends ardent greetings to the Hungarian Soviet Republic. .. . The working class of Russia is making every effort to come to your aid.''^^2^^ "All honest members of the working class _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, pp. 436--37,
~^^2^^ Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 197,
10 all over the world are on your side,"^^1^^ Lenin wrote to the Hungarian workers. Notwithstanding all the difficulties caused by the frenzied onslaught of world imperialism, close co-operation began to take shape between the Russian Federation and the Hungarian Republic. Although Soviet Russia was unable to render direct military and economic assistance to the Hungarian Republic, it did everything to support its government. In particular, the Government of the Russian Federation appealed to Russian prisoners-of-war who were in Hungary to join the Hungarian workers and peasants who were defending their revolution.The Hungarian Soviet Republic at once proposed a military defensive alliance to Soviet Russia, seeing its natural ally in the first socialist country. This alliance was not a product of overt or covert diplomatic action; it arose as a result of international proletarian solidarity. "We are happy and proud that Hungary is the second Soviet Republic,'' Bela Kun, leader of the Hungarian Communist Party, stated on March 23, 1919, at a meeting of Communist Party members. " Believe me, the rejoicing in Moscow today is even greater than in our country.^^2^^ We express gratitude and send greetings to the Russian Soviet _-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 391.
~^^2^^ Leaders of the Hungarian Soviet Republic received Lenin's first message of greetings over the radio on March 22, 1919. It read: "Sincere greetings to the proletarian government of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, and especially to Comrade Bela Kun. I conveyed your greetings to the Congress of the Russian Communist Party ( Bolsheviks). They were received with tremendous enthusiasm" (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 226).
11 Republic which has invariably rendered us help. . . .''^^1^^Though the Soviet Republic in Hungary lasted only 133 days, its experience and the arduous struggle of the Hungarian workers for Soviet power were of tremendous significance for the working class and revolutionary movement elsewhere in Europe, and also for Soviet Russia.
The Government of Soviet Russia helped the Soviet Republics in the Baltic area (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia), which were able to hold out briefly towards the end of 1918, and it concluded a treaty with the Finnish Socialist Republic which existed from late January to April 1918.
The relations established between states which arose on the present Soviet territory, prior to the creation of the USSR, merit special attention. The peoples of the Soviet Republics subsequently decided to unite in one state, but the earlier ties between them enriched the theory and practice of relations among states of the socialist type. The formation of Soviet Republics---the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bukhara, Khorezm and the Far Eastern Republic^^2^^---- facilitated their military, political and economic cooperation. It was then that ways and means of _-_-_
~^^1^^ B\'ela Kun, Hungarian Soviet Republic, Selected Articles and Speeches, Russ., ed. Politizdat, I960, p. 137.
~^^2^^ Soviet power was proclaimed in the Ukraine on December 25, 1917; Byelorussia on January 1, 1919; Azerbaijan on April 28, 1920; Bukhara on October 8, 1920; Armenia on November 29, 1920; Georgia on February 25, 1921. The Far-Eastern Republic was formed on April __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 13. 12 interstate relations between sovereign peoples, relations based on the principle of proletarian internationalism, began to take shape.
In studying the relations between the Soviet Republics, the specific conditions in which these Republics arose and established contact must be borne in mind, inasmuch as they all featured proletarian dictatorship in the form of Soviet power under the leadership of a single MarxistLeninist Party on the territory of the former Russian empire.
Soviet Russia rendered them direct military assistance in their struggle for national and social liberation. After the proclamation of Soviet power and the formation of sovereign Soviet national states, the Russian Federation continued to safeguard the revolutionary gains of their peoples against the many external and internal enemies.
The legal basis for relations between socialist Republics was laid by the military and economic treaties of alliance concluded by the Government of Soviet Russia with other Soviet Republics.^^1^^ Underlying these alliances were the community of interests, recognition of the independence and sovereignty of each Republic, and awareness of the need to "pool their forces both for defence _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 12. 6, 1920, and in Khorezm Soviet power was established on April 26, 1920.
~^^1^^ Such treaties were concluded by the Russian Federation with the Khorezm Republic on September 13, 1920; the Azerbaijanian Republic on September 30, 1920; the Ukrainian Republic on December 28, 1920; the Byelorussian Republic on January 16, 1921; the Bukhara Republic on March 4, 1921, and with the Georgian Republic on March 21, 1921.
13 against external enemies and for their economic development.''^^1^^ The treaties reaffirmed the right of all peoples to self-determination, renunciation of the colonial policy of former Russian governments, and complete recognition by the Russian Federation of the sovereignty and independence of other Soviet Republics. They stressed that the need for close military and economic union met the interests of the working people and that their life could be improved only by their joint struggle and by uniting their forces.These treaties are historic documents of proletarian internationalism. They, and the special agreements supplementing them, enable us to judge how great was the assistance rendered by the people of the Russian Federation to the other peoples who embarked on the socialist road. Under the treaty of alliance between the Russian Federation and the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic, the RSFSR undertook to render Khorezm (formerly Khiva) technical assistance by supplying machinery, tools, complete plant and technical personnel (Article 21); to assist in developing national culture and education (Article 18) and it gave Khorezm a subsidy of 500 million rubles.^^2^^ The other treaties and agreements contained similar provisions.
Without the military and economic assistance of the Russian Federation, popular government could not have survived in any of the other socialist Republics. ".. .We, who are faced by a _-_-_
~^^1^^ Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR), Vol. Ill, Gospolitizdat, 1959, p. 433; Vol. IV, I960, p. 130.
~^^2^^ Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 178.
14 huge front of imperialist powers, we, who are fighting imperialism,'' Lenin wrote in February1920, "represent an alliance that requires close military unity, and any attempt to violate this unity we regard as absolutely impermissible, as a betrayal of the struggle against international imperialism.''^^1^^
The treaties undoubtedly must be classed as international legal treaties and not as intrastate documents, since they provided for the creation of a united military organisation and military command and also of some economic agencies. In the statement concerning the Red Army, made by the Union Republics of the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Byelorussia at the 9th All-Russia Congress of Soviets on December 26,
1921, they declared: "The Union Republics cannot and will not allow their territory again to become a bridgehead for foreign imperialism. We are prepared to give full support to all the undertakings of the federal authority in defending the common frontiers, we are placing at its disposal all the necessary resources and insistently urge the workers and peasants of the entire Soviet Federation, both directly and through Soviet bodies, to exert every effort so that our united Red Army invariably measure up to its historical tasks.''^^2^^
Close contacts existed between the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs of the various Republics, joint diplomatic missions were set up abroad, while in some cases Soviet Republics empowered Russian delegations to represent their _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 325.
~^^2^^ Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, Vol. IV, p. 595.
15 interests at international conferences (for example, in February 1922, eight Soviet Republics empowered the delegation of the Russian Federation to represent them at the Genoa Conference) or combined delegations were formed (for example, the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation to the Lausanne Conference held between November 20, 1922, and July 24, 1923).It is of interest to trace the history of SovietMongolian friendship, the close military, political and economic relations between the USSR and the Soviet areas which arose in the course of the Chinese Revolution in the mid-1920s, the experience of fraternal solidarity with the Republic of Spain which changed during the war from a bourgeois-democratic republic into a people's republic.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 2. The Second World WarA special place in the history of world socialism is held by the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against nazi Germany and the period immediately following it. The war against the USSR, thoroughly prepared by hitlerite fascism, the vanguard of international imperialism, was the supreme trial for the new, socialist system; it decided the fate of this initial bulwark of socialism and progress in the world, the destinies of all mankind.
Imperialism set special tasks before its strike force, fascism, in the Second World War: to stem the march of history by armed force, to crush the Soviet Union---the bulwark of the
16 world revolutionary process---to institute the imperialist "new order" and to put an end to the social progress of mankind once and for all.In the titanic battle against the imperialistbred forces of fascist aggression victory was won by the most advanced social system, by the ideology of communism, the most progressive ideology in the world, by the policy of the Leninist Communist Party which, in a relatively brief period, had turned the Soviet Union into a mighty industrial and agricultural state, united the Soviet people, inspired them to fight and led their struggle to a victorious conclusion. The socialist economic system, the moral and political unity of Soviet society which rested on the unbreakable alliance of the working class and the peasantry, gave the Soviet people the resources and energy for routing the fascist invaders. Socialism rendered an inestimable service to mankind by saving the world from a terrible fate, by foiling the biggest attempt of reactionary forces to turn back the course of social development, by saving culture, civilisation and progress from destruction.
From the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Union drew on the international solidarity of the working people which helped to extend in Europe the liberation struggle against the common enemy and led to the rise of the anti-Hitler coalition. During the war the broad Resistance movement in nazi-occupied countries merged with the struggle for social emancipation, for the abolition of the decayed bourgeoislandowner regimes which had led the European states to national disaster. Fraternal solidarity __PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2-500 17 was also displayed by people of different nationalities participating in the Resistance movement in each country. The Soviet Union rendered it every support. Further, Soviet assistance in organising Polish, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Rumanian armed units on its territory was extremely valuable.
The liberation movement and the growth of elements of working people's class struggle within it were prepared by development before the war and the influence exerted by the great successes of socialist construction in the USSR on the world revolutionary process.
During the Second World War and especially at its concluding stage, the Western imperialist powers did everything possible to prevent the European peoples from freely choosing the system they wanted, and to prevent progressive forces from utilising the emergent revolutionary situations. To this end, as Winston Churchill testifies in his memoirs, they wished that the front of the Western armies "should be as far east as possible"^^1^^ because, as Churchill "saw quite plainly'', "Communism would be the peril civilisation (i.e., capitalism---Sh. S.) would have to face after the defeat of Nazism and Fascism''.^^2^^
There is hardly any need for comment on this eloquent admission by one of the most farsighted leaders capitalism was able to produce in the period of its decline. This statement was made in May 1945 when it was clear that no force in the world could restrain social progress. _-_-_
~^^1^^ Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, London, 1954, p. 400.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 266.
18 ``Thus,'' Churchill recalled in his memoirs, "this climax of apparently measureless success was to me a most unhappy time. 1 moved amid cheering crowds, or sat at a table adorned with congratulations and blessings from every part of the Grand Alliance, with an aching heart and a mind oppressed by forebodings.''^^1^^The ruling circles of Britain and the United States tried to steer events to keep the liberation movement within the bounds of struggle against German fascism, and to prevent it from affecting the mainstays of capitalism in countries liberated from the nazi invaders. As early as 1941, Churchill, in a message to his then Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, demanded that the Foreign Office should "view with a benevolent eye natural movements among the populations of different countries towards monarchies'',^^2^^ in other words, should back the elements in the Resistance movement who could be relied upon as implicit supporters of the old order.
But the schemes of the reactionary forces came to grief, as the situation had become unfavourable to world capitalism. The fact that the Soviet Union had borne the brunt of the struggle against nazi Germany could not but affect the nature of the movement of the occupied peoples for their liberation. This facilitated not only the creation of an unprecedented coalition of states and peoples against the strike force of world imperialism, but it also gave an unusual sweep to the struggle in nazi-occupied countries for national and social emancipation.
_-_-_~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 400.
~^^2^^ Ibid., Vol. Ill, London, 1950, p. GG3
__PRINTERS_P_19_COMMENT__ 2* 19The Soviet war of liberation merged with the liberation struggle of the Poles, Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs and others in fascist-occupied countries, because, by contrast with the Western powers, the Soviet Union had set itself aims in the war which had fully coincided with the interests of the oppressed European peoples. With the direct military support of the armies of the first socialist state in the world, the European nations launched a liberation struggle against the nazi invaders and their agents. By rendering military aid to the embattled nations, the Soviet people discharged their supreme internationalist duty.
The war fought by the Soviet Union, with which the struggle of the other peoples against the common enemy merged, was of a class as well as a national liberation nature. In the course of it a revolutionary situation arose in a number of countries and the internal and external prerequisites matured for determined action by the working class against the nazi invaders and against the exploiting regimes. This explains how, during the war, victories by the Soviet Armed Forces, popular uprisings led by the working class and its vanguard, Communist and Workers' Parties, were consummated in the establishment of the people's democracy in a number of countries.
Revolutionary actions in countries overrun by the nazis were carried on in exceptionally difficult conditions. They were marked by struggle between the truly patriotic progressive forces headed by the working class, and reactionary elements which, even if they did take part sometimes in the Resistance movement, did so only to 20 achieve the objectives set by the imperialists, namely, to save the capitalist system. In a number of cases, even after the ousting of the nazis from a country (or part of its territory), counterrevolutionaries sought to use armed force against the working people who demanded consistent democratic reconstruction. This was the case, for example, in Rumania where on February 24, 1945, a demonstration of 500,000 people in Bucharest and demonstrations in many other cities were attacked by reactionaries ready to plunge the country into civil war. In Bulgaria, after her withdrawal from the Axis bloc, antinational elements launched propaganda in the army against participating in the war on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition. Early in 1945, reactionaries in Hungary tried to utilise the grave food situation for their own ends.
Both during this period and earlier, the epochal victories of the Soviet Army which inspired the peoples to fight and the help of the Soviet Union served as important factors which predetermined the ultimate victory of the progressive forces. The treaties of alliance between the USSR, and Czechoslovakia and Poland, concluded during the war, played a big part in the growth of the liberation movement.
The treaty between the USSR and Czechoslovakia was signed in Moscow on December 12, 1943. It had been preceded by other documents: the London Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement on joint action in the war against nazi Germany of July 18, 1941, under which the Soviet Government agreed to the formation of Czechoslovak military units on the territory of the USSR, and also the agreement to grant a loan to the 21 Government of the Czechoslovak Republic for the maintenance of the Czechoslovak Brigade in the USSR. These agreements and treaty were signed on behalf of Czechoslovakia by the governmentin-exile headed by J. Sramek, with Benes as President.
The conclusion of agreements and a treaty with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile emanated from the Soviet desire to render the Czechoslovak people every possible aid in the struggle against the nazi invaders and to unite all Czechoslovak forces both within the country and abroad to combat nazism.
As for the reactionary Czechoslovak bourgeoisie headed by Benes, in the prevailing conditions it could not ignore the popular wishes; the masses, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, called for stronger friendship with the Soviet Union in which they saw their sincere friend and deliverer.
The victories of the Soviet Army were largely responsible for liberating the territory of many European countries, Czechoslovakia included. The London group of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie had to take this into consideration. Benes' admission that the "road to the homeland passes through Moscow" is significant. It is for this reason that the government-in-exile was compelled to conclude a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Co-operation with the Soviet Union, striving to utilise it in the class interests of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie. It hoped that the USSR would be weakened by the war and as a result it could annul the alliance with it. This explains the attempt 22 of the \vSr\'amek government, made during the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks (related by Z. Fierlinger who was the Czechoslovak ambassador in Moscow at the time), to insert an amendment to Article 6 of the treaty to the effect that the Czechoslovak Government would submit the treaty for additional ratification to parliament at the earliest opportunity after the end of the war. This reservation was to leave Benes and his government a loophole for renouncing the treaty after the war and again linking the destiny of Czechoslovakia with the Western imperialist states. This attempt, however, failed and the Czechoslovak Government had to sign the treaty as it was.
Under the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of alliance both parties, bound by common aims and having a common state frontier, undertook to render each other military and other assistance in the war against Germany and all the states bound to her in acts of aggression in Europe.^^1^^ The treaty provided for mutual assistance in the postwar period as well. The parties undertook that "if one of them should become involved after the war in hostilities against Germany which would resume her Drang nach Osten policy or against any other state that would unite in such a war with Germany directly or in any other form, the other High Contracting Party would immediately render the Contracting Party thus involved in hostilities every military _-_-_
~^^1^^ Vneshnaya politika Sovictskogo Soyuza v period Otcchestvennoi voiny. Dokumenty i matcrialy (Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. Documents and Materials), Vol. I, Gospolitizdat, 1946, p. 430.
23 and other support and assistance within its power".^^1^^Considering the interests of their security, both parties agreed to maintain after the war close and friendly co-operation based on the principles of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, to develop economic relations on the widest possible scale, and to render each other every possible economic assistance.
The Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Co-operation between the two countries was a major landmark in the development of traditional Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship, and served as a means for uniting the allied peoples in the war against the common enemy. The treaty was of tremendous significance for advancing the liberation movement in Czechoslovakia, and for stimulating the activities of guerrilla detachments operating in the country under the leadership of the Communist Party. It infused fresh energy into all the Resistance forces of Czechoslovakia and opened up broad prospects for fruitful co-operation in the postwar period.
The Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, both prior and after signing the treaty, conducted a doubledealing policy as regards both the Soviet Union and the people of their own country. The government-in-exile and President Benes obediently followed the political line of the Western powers and hatched anti-Soviet plans. They took all measures to hamper the operations of the _-_-_
~^^1^^ Vncslmaya polilika Sovietskogo Soyuza. . ., p. 431.
24 Czechoslovak people against the German invaders. At the height of the war, Benes, addressing the Czechoslovak people from London, urged them: "Be cautious, preserve calm, do not succumb to provocations, we all are anxious to avoid unnecessary losses.''^^1^^The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was the true organiser of the struggle of the Czechs and Slovaks for national liberation. It consistently called for the utmost spread of this struggle, for close military and political co-operation with the Soviet Union; the fighting men of the First Czechoslovak Brigade developed a spirit of friendship with the Soviet people. Relying on the assistance of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party led the guerrilla struggle, set up a united national front of Czechs and Slovaks, organised uprisings and worked to bring victory nearer. This upset the plans of the reactionary bourgeoisie to restore the old regime in the country after its liberation.
The Soviet victories, the defeat of the nazi invaders and the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Armed Forces struck a devastating blow to the plans of Benes and other `` Londoners'' to come back to Czechoslovakia with the American and British forces and again turn her into a state dependent on the imperialist powers. The British journalist, Kingsley Martin, pointed out in his reminiscences that Benes "had always expected to return with the American and British armies, and could not disguise his _-_-_
~^^1^^ E. Bene\vs, Tri roky dnihe svclove valky (Three Years of the Second World War), London, 1943, p. 23.
25 disappointment that his route home lay through Moscow".^^1^^In March 1945, Benes and members of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile arrived in Moscow. There all the main political parties held negotiations on the setting-up of the first government of liberated Czechoslovakia and the government's policy. Benes and other leaders of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, fearing to lose their positions, had to consent to the establishment of a democratic government with the participation of Communists. This, however, did not mean that the bourgeoisie had shelved its plans for good.
Immediately after the war, Czechoslovak reactionary forces, with the active support of US and British imperialists, made every effort to annul the gains of the Czechoslovak people, disorganise the National Front Government, and foil the implementation of the Kosice Government Programme, adopted in April 1945 by all the political parties which entered the new, democratic government.
The Ko\vsice Programme outlined a number of important political and economic measures. The foreign-policy section of the Programme contained a statement on the organisation of the Czechoslovak Republic on the basis of close cooperation with the Soviet Union and other Slav peoples. "The Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Friendship and Postwar Cooperation'', it was stated in the Kosice Programme, "defines for all time the position of the Czechoslovak state on questions of foreign _-_-_
~^^1^^ The New Statesman and Nation, September 11, 1948, p. 208.
26 policy. The liberation of Czechoslovakia will be completed, the freedom and security of Czechoslovakia, her peaceful development and happy future will be achieved with the help of the Soviet Union.''^^1^^The Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Polish Republic, concluded on April 21, 1945, marked a radical turn in the relations between the two countries from mutual estrangement, hostility and open conflict towards alliance and friendship.
In the past Poland had been looked upon by the imperialists, particularly the German, as a corridor for campaign on Russia. After the First World War a state was set up on Polish territory, which represented a bridgehead for attack on Soviet Russia and served as a weapon of international imperialism spearheaded against the socialist country. Lenin wrote in 1920 that "the Versailles Peace has turned Poland into a buffer state which is regarded by the Entente as a weapon against the Bolsheviks".^^2^^ Even during the Second World War, when the Soviet Government rendered the Polish people every possible help, the reactionary Polish government-in-exile in London continued its hostile policy towards the USSR.
The Soviet Union signed an agreement with the Polish government-in-exile in London on July 30, 1941, restoring diplomatic relations between _-_-_
~^^1^^ Za svobodu ccskcho a slovenskeho naroda (For Freedom of the Czech and Slovak Peoples), Prague, 1956, p. 3(iS
^^2^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 304.
27 the two countries, and both governments undertook to render each other every support in the war against nazi Germany. The Soviet Government further agreed to set up within the USSR a Polish army which operationally would be subordinated to the Supreme Command of the Soviet Armed Forces.^^1^^In December 1941, after talks in Moscow between the governments of the Soviet Union and Poland (headed by Sikorski), a Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed, in which both governments reaffirmed their readiness to continue the war until complete victory. They undertook to proffer each other full military aid during the war. Moreover, troops of the Polish Republic stationed in the Soviet Union would fight the German invaders jointly with Soviet forces.^^2^^ In peace-time, relations would be based on good-neighbourly cooperation, friendship and reciprocal honest discharge of the assumed obligations. Notwithstanding the serious difficulties the USSR experienced in 1941 and 1942, the Soviet Government gave the Government of the Polish Republic 300 million rubles for the maintenance of its army on the territory of the USSR.^^3^^
Thus, the Soviet Union did everything it could to pool the efforts of the Soviet and the Polish peoples in the joint struggle against the common enemy, to build up a Polish army which could fight, together with the Soviet Army, for the liberation of its country.
_-_-_~^^1^^ Vnesknaya politika Sovictskogo Soyuza v period Otcchcstvennoi voiny, Vol. I, p. 138.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 192.
~^^3^^ Ibid., p. 210.
28But the reactionaries who dominated the government-in-exile were less interested in organising the struggle against Germany than in intrigues, anti-Soviet slander and actions hostile to the Soviet Union, the true ally of Poland. This government was a tool in the hands of reactionary US and British circles. On the instructions of the government-in-exile, the Polish Army headed by General Anders had refused to participate in hostilities against Germany and, by August 1942, had been evacuated from the Soviet Union. The government-in-exile launched extensive anti-Soviet activities, to such an extent that in 1943 it, in compact with the German fascists, launched a slanderous campaign against the Soviet Union about the Polish officers killed in the Smolensk area by the nazis, ascribing this heinous crime to the Soviet Army.
The Soviet Government exposed the slanderous fabrications of the Polish reactionary bourgeoisie egged on by the US and British ruling circles. In its Note of April 25, 1943, the Soviet Government pointed out that the hostile campaign against the USSR had been undertaken by the Polish Government so as "to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Government by utilising the nazi forgery in order to wrest from it territorial concessions in Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Byelorussia and Soviet Lithuania".^^1^^ Consequently, the Soviet Government broke off all relations with the Polish government-in-exile, which, far from expressing the interests of the Polish people, acted contrary to them, playing into the hands of fascist Germany.
_-_-_~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 347.
29At the same time, the Soviet Government continued to render every assistance to the Polish people and their democratic forces in the struggle for liberating Polish lands and creating a strong, independent and democratic Poland. Aware that Polish-Soviet friendship was the best guarantee of rebuilding an independent and sovereign Polish state, the Polish democratic forces, headed by the Polish Workers' Party (PWP) which was organisationally formalised in January 1942, made every effort to strengthen Polish-Soviet friendship and rouse their people to fight the common enemy. In wartime the PWP became the leading and organising force of Polish patriots in the struggle against nazi Germany.
The Union of Polish Patriots set up a Polish division named after Thaddeus Kosciuszko, which subsequently became the core of the Polish Army in the USSR. Notwithstanding the obstinate resistance of the reactionary forces the national liberation movement in Poland headed by the Communists gained in size and strength. The Polish National Council, Krajowa Rada Narodowa, formed on the initiative of the Polish Workers' Party on January 1, 1944. played a big part in rallying together the democratic forces of the Polish people. It included, in addition to the PWP, the leading force of the bloc of the revived democratic parties, also the Polish Socialist Party, Stronnictwo Ludowe and Stronnictwo Demokratyczne. From the very first days of its existence Krajowa Rada Narodowa became a genuine righting force for liberation and the establishment of a democratic Poland. Under the leadership of the working class, the Polish people took into their own hands the cause of their 30 liberation, the restoration of national independence and state sovereignty.
In June-July 1944, as a result of a Soviet offensive at Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Mogilev, Soviet troops reached the Vistula and liberated a considerable part of Poland. The arrival of the Soviet Army and the Soviet-based Polish Army on Polish soil stimulated the liberation movement and the activities of guerrilla detachments operating behind the nazi lines. This further consolidated Poland's democratic forces, notwithstanding the hostile, reckless actions of the government-in-exile.
On July 21, 1944, the Krajowa Rada Narodowa, fulfilling the will of the entire Polish people, set up the Polish Committee for National Liberation which assumed the functions of a Provisional Government and proclaimed friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union the cornerstone of foreign policy. The Committee for National Liberation outlined in the governmental programme important economic and political measures designed to revive the Polish state. By decision of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa, in December 1944 the Polish Committee for National Liberation was reconstituted into the Provisional Government of Poland. It was recognised by the Soviet Union in January 1945 and diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and Poland.
The new Poland scornfully rejected the reactionary emigre clique and began to build a people's democracy. The Polish people became convinced that they could gain security and preserve the independence of their state only on the basis of friendship with the powerful Soviet Union.
31The Soviet Armed Forces, having defeated nazi Germany, liberated other peoples in Europe from fascist tyranny and made it possible for them to arrange their life as they thought fit. A highly favourable situation arose in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania and in the territory that is now the German Democratic Republic. Their peoples put an end to imperialist oppression by fascist states and ousted the decayed bourgeoislandowner regimes whose leaders had collaborated with the nazis. Having won freedom and national independence, these countries began to establish people's democracies.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 3. Postwar Peace Settlement.The decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the Second World War and the presence of a socialist country among the victors created for the liberated European peoples the requisites for a just solution of postwar problems. The Soviet Union consistently pursued a policy of peace and defence of the national interests of all the peoples, and so became a big stumbling block to the imperialist plans of the US and British ruling circles.
The United States and other Western powers, as related by John Campbell, secretary of the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, sought to wedge "a foot in the door of 32 Eastern Europe".^^1^^ They wanted to dictate to the peoples of Central and Southeast Europe their terms of a postwar peace settlement, to create a postwar system after the Versailles pattern, which would be spearheaded against the USSR and the revolutionary and democratic movement in the liberated countries.
But the situation after 1945 radically differed from the one after the imperialist First World War. Since the Soviet Union had played a decisive part in the Allied victory and emerged powerful from the war, the United States, Britain and France were unable to turn the countries of Central and Southeast Europe against the first socialist state in the world as they did in the 1920s and 1930s. The peoples of Central and Southeast Europe were now able to solve national problems which for decades and even centuries had aggravated the international and internal positions of the countries in this area.
For the first time in their history, the Polish people finally settled the question of frontiers and were able to reunite with their age-old lands in the West. In the struggle for the restoration of their rights the Polish people enjoyed the full support of the Soviet Government from the very outset. When the Krajowa Rada Narodowa, expressing the aspirations of the whole Polish people, early in 1944, proclaimed in its programme the aim of restoring a strong, independent, democratic Poland, the Soviet Government fully supported it. Thanks to the Soviet Union, Poland regained lands wrested from her by the German _-_-_
~^^1^^ John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs, 1945--1947, New York, 1947, p. 66.
__PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3---500 33 invaders and a just eastern frontier was drawn. The Soviet Government stated that only in this way could confidence and friendship be established between the Polish, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Russian peoples. The Soviet Government proposed the so-called Curzon Line, based on the ethnographic principle, as the eastern frontier of Poland.^^1^^ In the same statement the Soviet Government exposed the reactionary nature of the policy pursued by the London government-in-exile, which completely betrayed the interests of the people and by its actions in effect played into nazi hands.The question of Poland's frontiers was discussed at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference of the heads of the three great powers in February 1945. The Western representatives attempted to change the course of events in Poland and, under the guise of defending Polish interests, they tried to impose their own decision of the frontier issue and the establishment of a Polish Government chiefly from among reactionary Polish emigres in London. Churchill, for example, demanded that the conference participants should not leave "without taking practical measures on the Polish question''. What he meant was the setting up of a Polish Government right there at the conference.^^2^^ The Soviet delegation, naturally, could _-_-_
~^^1^^ The Curzon Line, proposed in 1920 by British Foreign Secretary Curzon as Poland's eastern frontier, passed approximately along the line Grodno---Jalowka---Nemirow--- Brest-Litovsk---Dorogosk---Ustillug, cast ol Grubcszaw, through Krylow, west of Rawa Russka, cast of Peremyszl and down to the Carpathians.
~^^2^^ The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, pp. 92--93.
34 not agree with these proposals which, in fact, constituted a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the Polish people. It declared that a Polish Government must not be set up without the Poles.Referring to the substance of the Polish question the head of the Soviet delegation stated that "for the Russians the question of Poland was not only one of honour but of security as well. It was a question of honour because in the past the Russians had greatly sinned against Poland. The Soviet Government was trying to atone for those sins. It was a question of security because the most important strategic problems of the Soviet state were connected with Poland. . . . Throughout history, Poland had always been a corridor for an enemy attacking Russia. . . . Why had enemies crossed Poland so easily until then? Chiefly because Poland had been weak. The Polish corridor could not be closed mechanically only by Russian forces on the outside. It could be reliably locked only from the inside, by Poland's own forces. For that Poland must be strong. That was why the Soviet Union had a stake in creating a powerful, free and independent Poland. The question of Poland was a question of life and death for the Soviet state".^^1^^
As regards the Soviet-Polish frontier the Soviet delegation declared its acceptance of the Curzon Line with deviations from it in some areas in favour of Poland. At the same time the Soviet delegation demanded the return to Poland of her age-old Western lands, proposing that the frontier be established along the Western _-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., pp. 93--94.
35 Neisse. Not venturing openly to attack this Soviet proposal, Churchill confined himself to empty statements and pretended that he had the interests of Poland at heart. He said that Poland should take only as much territory as she could administer. "It would hardly be the proper thing to have the Polish goose so stuffed with German viands that it died of indigestion,'' he rudely joked.^^1^^In reality the head of the British Government was concerned with entirely different interests. Even during the war the British and US ruling circles wanted Poland to remain a political pawn in the hands of the imperialists and a convenient bridgehead for anti-Soviet ventures. Such aspirations, which aroused the indignation of both Polish democratic opinion and the Soviet people, were worthily rebuffed by the Soviet Government. "It should be borne in mind,'' Stalin wrote to President Roosevelt on December 27, 1944, "that the Soviet Union, more than any other Power, has a stake in strengthening a pro-Ally and democratic Poland, not only because it is bearing the brunt of the struggle for Poland's liberation, but also because Poland borders on the Soviet Union and because the Polish problem is inseparable from that of the security of the Soviet Union.''^^2^^
Faced with the unyielding stand of the Soviet delegation, the representatives of the United States and Britain were compelled officially to _-_-_
~^^1^^ The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, p. 104.
^^2^^ Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941--1945, Moscow, 1957, p. 181.
36 recognise Poland's rights to the ancient Polish lands in the West and in the North. The Yalta Conference "recognised that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west.''^^1^^Subsequently, the Western frontiers of Poland were discussed at the Potsdam (Berlin) Conference (July-August 1945). The Heads of Government of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain agreed that Poland should receive the former German territories east of the line passing from the Baltic Sea somewhat westward of Swinemunde and from there along the Oder River up to the confluence with the Western Neisse and along the Western Neisse up to the Czechoslovak frontier, including the part of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the USSR, in accordance with the decision of the Potsdam Conference, and including the territory of the former free city of Danzig. In addition, the Potsdam Conference decided to move Germans from Poland to Germany, which logically followed from the decision to establish a new Polish frontier in the West.
The question of the Soviet-Polish frontier was finally settled by the signing of a treaty between the USSR and the Polish Republic in Moscow on August 16, 1945. In conformity with the decision of the Yalta Conference, this treaty established the frontier between the USSR and Poland along the Curzon Line, with deviations from it, in favour of Poland, of 5-8 km in some areas.
The reunification of Polish lands wrought deep _-_-_
~^^1^^ The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, p. 138.
37 changes in the ethnographical, geographical and economic pattern of Poland, extended her territory and strengthened her economy. The Polish Republic (it is the eighth in Europe in territory) became one of the economically developed European states.The position of another Slav state, Czechoslovakia, was substantially strengthened after the war. With the help of the Soviet Union the Czech and Slovak peoples removed all consequences of the disgraceful Munich pact and related acts. Czechoslovakia was re-established within the frontiers which existed on September 1. 1938, with some changes in her favour. By decision of the Potsdam Conference, the German population which had served as fertile soil for imperialist agents, was transplanted from Czechoslovakia to Germany. Altogether, more than three million Germans left Czechoslovakia.^^1^^
The question of reuniting the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine---part of the pre-Munich Czechoslovakia---with the Soviet Ukraine was justly settled, so that for the first time in their history the entire Ukrainian people were united in one state. The settlement of the question of the Soviet-- Czechoslovak frontier offered a striking example of unbreakable friendship between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic.
Postwar changes radically improved the position of Czechoslovakia in Europe; now she was to border in the north on the German Democratic Republic; in the east and south, on the Polish _-_-_
~^^1^^ Doklad Kontrolnogo Sovieta Sovletu Ministrov inostrannykh del (Report of the Control Council to the Council of Foreign Ministers), Berlin, 1947, p. 39.
38 People's Republic, the Soviet Union and the Hungarian People's Republic and, only on a relatively small section, on the Federal Republic of Germany.Thanks to the stand of the Soviet Government the issue of Transylvania was also finally settled on a just basis. In the interwar period and after the outbreak of the Second World War this issue had been used by the imperialist powers as bait for luring the ruling circles of Rumania and Hungary to their side. The Transylvanian question was regarded by external and internal reactionary forces as a convenient pretext for fanning chauvinism in both countries and advocating fascism. After the war the Second Vienna Award of August 30, 1940, was annulled.^^1^^ Under that Award Northern Transylvania (an area of 43,492 sq km with a population of 2.4 million) had been incorporated in Hungary under the pressure of nazi Germany and fascist Italy, Now the Hungarian frontiers which had existed prior to January 1, 1938, were to be restored.
Other frontier questions, too, were settled in the interests of peace and of the respective peoples. National minorities in several European People's Democracies were constitutionally guaranteed all rights on a par with the other citizens.
Frontier changes in Central and Southeast Europe helped to turn them into frontiers of friendship between socialist countries.
_-_-_~^^1^^ Under the First Vienna Award, November 2, 1939, a part of Czechoslovakia's territory with a total area of 11,927 sq km and a population of one million had been joined to Hungary. This decision was also annulled.
39The defeat of nazi Germany, in which the soviet Union played the decisive part, created an entirely new situation and new possibilities for the peoples of the defeated states. All the foreignpolicy actions undertaken by the Soviet Union or with its participation from the first days of the liberation of the European countries, including' the former allies of nazi Germany, were aimed at ultimately ridding their peoples of all traces of fascism and helping them to embark on a democratic road of development. This was evident in the signing of armistice agreements with Rumania (September 12, 1944), Bulgaria (October 28, 1944), and Hungary (January 20, 1945).
In the drawing up of these documents the Soviet Government was not guided---and because of the nature of socialism could not be guided--- by a feeling of revenge. It aimed to ensure future peace in Europe and this was inseverably linked with creating conditions for democratic development in the countries which participated in the war against the peace-loving peoples. The Soviet Union vigorously rejected attempts by the imperialist powers to intervene in the economics and politics of these countries, to violate their sovereignty and infringe upon their national dignity.
The armistice agreements reflected the interests both of the victorious states and of the peoples of the defeated countries. They provided for the disbandment of all pro-nazi political, military, para-military and similar organisations within Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and elsewhere. This provision was important in uprooting the remnants of fascism in the defeated countries and 40 in strengthening the democratic forces. In addition, the armistice agreements enabled the peoples of the former allies of nazi Germany actively to campaign during the closing stages of the war for the defeat of the fascist aggressor, for their own liberation; this was crucial in restoring their national independence and state sovereignty.
The armistice agreement with Rumania, for example, noted that Rumania, having terminated hostilities against the USSR in all war theatres on August 24, 1944, withdrew from the war against the Allies, severed relations with Germany and her satellites, rejoined the war on the side of the Allies against Germany and Hungary with the object of restoring her own independence and sovereignty, for which she would put up not less than 12 reinforced infantry divisions.
In the final stages of the war, the Bulgarian Army and Hungarian units fought against the nazis, while their governments declared war on Hitler Germany.
These circumstances greatly eased the armistice terms, specifically those related to compensation of losses inflicted on the Soviet Union and other Allies. Since Rumania and Hungary not only withdrew from the war but also declared war on Germany, the Soviet Union agreed to accept partial compensation of the losses inflicted by these countries upon it during the war. Rumania had to pay $300 million over six years in goods (oil products, grain, timber, sea-going and river vessels and diverse equipment). Hungary had to pay a similar sum over six years in goods ( industrial plant, river vessels, grain, cattle). Of this sum, the USSR was entitled to $200 million and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to $100 million. 41 These amounts represented an insignificant part of the losses inflicted on the USSR by the Rumanian and Hungarian fascists during their temporary occupation of Soviet territory.
Soon after the signing of the armistice agreements Hungary and Rumania received considerable privileges in the payment of reparations. The term of payment was extended to eight years, and in 1948 the outstanding sum of reparations was cut by half.
Reparations paid by Rumania, Hungary and other former allies of nazi Germany were nowhere near as onerous as they were after the First World War when the victors---the United States, Britain and France---utilised reparations to fetter the defeated states economically and to restore the aggressive might of German imperialism. The desire to strangle the defeated countries economically was alien to the Soviet reparations policy, which was based on realistic economic possibilities of Germany's former allies. The payment of reparations, connected with the operation of the key industries, facilitated the early restoration of a number of industrial enterprises with the direct assistance of the USSR which supplied the necessary raw and other materials.
The armistice agreements, thanks to which several of important international problems were solved, greatly helped to create the prerequisites for the victory of the democratic forces in Central and Southeast Europe.
At the wartime Yalta Conference, the Soviet Government succeeded in getting decisions adopted which corresponded to the interests of 42 the liberated European peoples, and to the establishment of a lasting peace. In the "Declaration on Liberated Europe'', approved at the Conference, the governments of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain declared their agreement to assist the peoples liberated from the domination of nazi Germany and "the peoples of the former Axis satellite States of Europe" in solving by democratic means "their pressing political and economic problems".^^1^^ The governments of the three powers proclaimed their readiness to ensure "the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations".^^2^^
Thus, at Yalta the governments of the United States and Britain had to agree to accept democratic principles of a postwar peace settlement, though this did not conform to the aims they had pursued during and after the war. This was largely attributable to the outstanding victories of the Soviet Army in the war against the fascist aggressors, the enhanced prestige of the USSR and the growth of the revolutionary and democratic movement the world over. The same circumstances basically explain the consent of the Western governments to adopt joint decisions on a number of questions at the Potsdam Conference.
That did not mean that the Western ruling circles really wanted to establish a democratic peace or to resolve questions of a postwar settlement justly. Despite their hypocritical statements about freedom and democracy and declarations _-_-_
~^^1^^ The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, p. 136.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
43 that they did not pursue any other aim except delivering the peoples from fascist tyranny, they actually tried to set up a system that would make all the European countries economically and politically dependent on them. In the United States and Britain, some statesmen had been quite explicit on this point even during the war. Expressing the viewpoint of influential circles Neil MacNeil, an American journalist, wrote outright as early as 1944 in his book An American Peace that the US Government should "effect a peace based on American principles. . . . We should insist upon an American peace. We should accept nothing less".^^1^^Even earlier, Henry Luce, well-known spokesman of American imperialism, in his book The American Century referred to the United States as "the most powerful and vital nation'', and urged Americans "to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit".^^2^^
Immediately after the war their imperialist plans logically led Britain and the USA to renounce the jointly-adopted decisions on a postwar settlement, the principles elaborated and adopted as guidelines by the Big Three at the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences. They exerted much effort to impose an imperialist peace on the peoples of the defeated countries.
A keen struggle arose over the framing and adoption of peace treaties with the former allies _-_-_
~^^1^^ N. MacNeil, An American Peace, New York, 1944 pp. 263, 264.
~^^2^^ Henry R. Luce, The American Century, New York, 1941, p. 23.
44 of nazi Germany---Italy, Finland, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria---and over the German problem; on one side stood the Western imperialist powers and, on the other, the Soviet Union supported by all peace-loving peoples and democratic world opinion.The Potsdam Conference of the Heads of Government of the Great Powers set up an ad hoc agency---the Council of Foreign Ministers--- to do preparatory work for a peaceful settlement and discussion of other major questions; it was charged with the urgent task of drawing up peace treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland and the framing of proposals for settling outstanding territorial issues which had arisen out of the war in Europe.
The first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers opened in London on September 11, 1945. It was attended by the ministers of five Great Powers---the USSR, the United States, Britain, France and China. The London session was to prepare draft peace treaties with Germany's former allies, but owing to the truculence of the Western governments who sought to impose their will on the Soviet Union, the session was unable to cope with the tasks before it. The failure of the London session was regarded by the US and British ruling circles as a victory for their diplomacy. Nevertheless, afraid of a further rise in Soviet authority among Germany's former allies and an even greater advance of the democratic movement in Europe, they had to agree to hold a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of three powers (the USSR, Britain and the United States) in Moscow to discuss questions of vital mutual importance. The Moscow meeting 45 (December 16--26, 1945) was a major step in preparing peace treaties with the former allies of nazi Germany. It elaborated the procedure for preparing the draft treaties, the composition and dates of the future peace conference.
``In the drawing up by the Council of Foreign Ministers of treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland,'' it was pointed out in the decision of the Moscow meeting, "only members of the Council who are or under the terms of the agreement establishing the Council of Foreign Ministers adopted at the Berlin conference are deemed to be signatory of the surrender terms, will participate unless and until the Council takes further action under the agreement to invite other members of the Council to participate on questions directly concerning them.''^^1^^
The Moscow meeting of the three Foreign Ministers laid down that the terms of the peace treaties for Italy would be formulated by the US, British, Soviet and French Foreign Ministers, and for Rumania and Bulgaria by the Soviet and British Foreign Ministers. It was further agreed that, after the drafts were prepared, a conference would be convened for considering the peace treaties with the above countries and that the conference would consist of the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers and all members of the United Nations which had contributed substantial military force in the war against European enemy states. Representatives of 21 states were to participate in the peace _-_-_
~^^1^^ United Nations Documents, 1941--1945, London, 1946, p. 257.
46 conference. It was also laid down that the conference would adopt recommendations, not decisions, and these would have to be examined by the signatories to the armistice terms for Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland in drawing up the respective final texts of the peace treaties.As a result of persistent Soviet efforts to apply democratic principles in framing the peace treaties for the former nazi allies, draft treaties, just and democratic in the main, were submitted to the Paris Peace Conference which opened on July 29, 1946. With few exceptions on fundamental questions of their content, the Foreign Ministers of the great powers had adopted agreed decisions. This, however, did not deter the Western delegates from attempting to spurn the joint decisions and, with the support of delegates from capitalist countries dependent on them, to push through recommendations which violated the previously agreed decisions. They sought to impose on the defeated countries terms which would make them fully dependent on US and British monopoly capital. Such imperialist terms were especially pressed on Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.
Imperialist circles conducted this diplomatic offensive to carry out their plans which had been hatched vis-a-vis Eastern Europe during the war and had been foiled by the swift advance of the Soviet Armed Forces. Winston Churchill's "Balkan plan" held a prominent place among them; he wanted to invade the Balkans instead of opening a second front in Western Europe. William Neumann, an American historian, wrote subsequently that "a Balkan invasion would have 47 built a military barrier against Russian expansion and have given Britain and the United States a lever by which Eastern Europe's orientation could have been turned westward".^^1^^
Thus, at the Paris Conference the imperialist states endeavoured to trample underfoot the national independence of the liberated peoples and restore on the Western frontiers of the USSR the old, prewar order by which neighbouring countries would become adjuncts of international imperialism.
By contrast with the period after the First World War when Great Britain, France and the United States had been the main architects of the postwar system, the Soviet Union now played a paramount part in the peace settlement. It opposed the Western policy with a policy of democratic peace and equality of the nations, implacably exposing all the artifices of imperialist diplomacy and upholding to the end both its own interests and the interests of all the peoples.
Georgi Dimitrov, speaking about the fundamental difference in the two postwar situations, noted at the enlarged Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' (Communist) Party of Bulgaria in August 1946: "There is a big difference between the situation today and that after the First World War. Today the Soviet Union is powerful and invincible.. .. Today the terms of the peace treaties are discussed not in secret chancelleries and offices. Today international democracy is able to influence the _-_-_
~^^1^^ William L. Neumann, Making the Peace. 1941--1945, Washington, 1950, p. 100.
48 decisions taken with regard to the future peace. This is a fact of exceptionally great importance.''^^1^^Two opposing tendencies clashed on the question of peace treaties with former enemy states: on the one hand, the Western desire to impose imperialist terms of peace on the defeated countries; on the other, the Soviet struggle to prepare for the former enemy states democratic, just peace treaties, and to establish stable international co-operation based on recognition of the equality and legitimate interests of all countries and peoples, big and small. The proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference were marked by obstinate struggle of these two tendencies developing from the outset on a number of major territorial, economic and political issues directly linked with the draft peace treaties.^^2^^
The Soviet delegation, for example, opposed the unjustified claims on age-old Bulgarian and Albanian lands made by the Greek Government and backed by Anglo-US imperialist circles. The Greek Government laid claim to one-tenth of Bulgaria's territory and a considerable part of Albania. It demanded, supposedly for rectifying frontiers, the valley lying to the north beyond the Rhodope Mountains in the interior of Bulgaria. Satisfaction of these demands would have shifted the northeastern frontier of Greece considerably to the north and brought it nearer to Bulgaria's vital areas.
_-_-_~^^1^^ Rabotnichesko Dclo, August 17, 1946.
^^2^^ Subsequently we deal with questions affecting not all former allies of Germany, but only those which are now socialist states.
__PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4---500 49The Greek Government backed its claims on Bulgarian territories by ``strategic'' considerations, the desire to ``defend'' its frontiers from the Bulgarian side. Needless to say, Bulgaria because of her peaceable policy did not and could not threaten anyone, Greece included.
The US and British ruling circles supported the Greek demands, thereby violating the decisions agreed in the Council of Foreign Minister!; which left the Bulgarian frontiers unchanged. Thus, Warner, Britain's representative in the committee on political and territorial questions for the peace treaty with Bulgaria, peremptorily declared that the Greek claims to part of Bulgarian territory were justified and that the reasons given for them were based on ``strategic'' considerations and were weighty. The Western powers could not find another reason for the Greek claims since Bulgarians have been living since times immemorial within this territory.
In their support for the unjustified Greek demands, the US and British Governments were prompted by a desire to bring pressure to bear on the Bulgarian Government and to prevent radical economic and political changes. This is demonstrated in particular by the statement made by the US delegate on October 1, 1946, to the political committee of the conference to the effect that some delegations had several times mentioned the progress of democratic institutions of the Bulgarian Government and noted that the Bulgarian Government intended to maintain friendly relations with Greece. The US delegation had not been impressed by these arguments; 50 on the contrary, the US delegation entertained serious doubts concerning the development of democracy in Bulgaria as it understood it.^^1^^
The Soviet delegation revealed the underlying reason for the Greek claims on Bulgarian lands. In a bitter struggle in the political committee on the peace treaty with Bulgaria it succeeded in upholding the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers to preserve the former Bulgarian-Greek frontier. The overwhelming majority of the delegations, including those of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, voted in the committee for the proposal to retain the existing frontier. This notwithstanding, at the plenary session of the conference, the leader of the British delegation headed a group of delegations which abstained from voting on the question of preserving the Bulgarian-Greek frontier; as a result the conference took no decision at all. This was explained by the desire of the Western powers to deepen the dispute by supporting Greece's unjustified demands, and to turn it into an instrument of pressure on Bulgaria.
But the Soviet Union firmly upheld the interests of the Bulgarian people. The next session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York (November 4-December 13, 1946), having examined the recommendations of the Paris Conference, finally approved a decision on the strength of which it was recorded in the Treaty of Peace _-_-_
~^^1^^ Sovietskiye delegatsii na Parizhskoi konferentsii. Sbornik vystuplenii i materialov (The Soviet Delegations at the Paris Conference. Collection of Statements and Materials), Gospolitizdat, 1947, p. 301.
51 with Bulgaria that "the frontiers of Bulgaria . . . shall be those which existed on January 1, 1941".^^1^^The imperialist claims of the Greek ruling circles to part of Albanian territory were similarly turned down thanks to the principled stand of the USSR.
At the Paris Conference and then at the New York session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet Government also upheld the only democratic decisions consolidating peace in Europe on other territorial questions recorded in the armistice terms (annulment of the decisions of the Vienna Awards in 1938 and 1940, and others).
A keen struggle was fought at the Paris Conference on the economic aspects of the peace treaties with Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria. The Soviet delegation championed the decisions recorded in the armistice agreements with Rumania and Hungary, taking into consideration the privileges gained by these countries from the USSR.
The Soviet Government frustrated the attempts of US imperialism to utilise, as a means of blackmail and pressure on the Hungarian Republic, the property removed from Hungary into the American occupation zones of Germany and Austria. The United States made a settlement of the question of this property conditional on a change in the composition of the Hungarian Government and its renunciation of close economic and political co-operation with the USSR and other People's Democracies. The Soviet _-_-_
~^^1^^ Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Paris, 10th February, 1947.
52 Union succeeded in having the Paris Conference and the New York session of the Council of Foreign Ministers approve the reparations terms recorded in the armistice agreement with Hungary.The USSR also defended the Bulgarian Republic from the excessive reparation demands made by the Greek Government. First Greece demanded reparations of $985 million, a sum it subsequently reduced to $708 million, while at the Paris Conference it abandoned the astronomical figure and reduced its reparation claims still further to $125 million. Yet even this sum was greatly exaggerated. Just as in its territorial claims, the Greek Government was energetically supported by the United States, Britain and other capitalist powers which sought to exert political pressure on the Fatherland Front Government. Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union, the peace treaty with Bulgaria incorporated just decisions on reparations which did not infringe upon Bulgaria's national independence and sovereignty. The sum of reparations was fixed at $70 million to be paid over eight years. Greece was to receive $45 million and Yugoslavia $25 million.
In an effort to restore their positions in the countries of Central and Southeast Europe the Western governments employed a favourite old method---reference to the so-called equal opportunities principle. On October 10, 1946, Ernest Bevin, the head of the British delegation, introduced in the commission on economic questions for Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, the proposal that the "equal opportunities principle" be applied on the territory of former enemy 53 states for trading, industrial and enterprising activity of "all the United Nations'', that is, all states which not only actually but even formally belonged to the anti-Hitler coalition. This in effect would have meant licence for imperialist plunder in these countries and deprived them of the right to decide their own affairs. The imposition of such an approach to defeated small countries weakened by the war would actually have destroyed their economic independence and subordinated their economies to the interests of the imperialist powers.
Solution of the Danubian problem, which for a long time had been utilised by the imperialist states for fanning hostility among countries of the Danubian area and consolidating their control in it, was of great importance for the young People's Democracies.
After the war the United States, with the active support of Britain and France, took every measure to restore the old imperialist regime on the Danube, to bar the Danubian countries from settling the question of shipping on the Danube which is of vital importance for them, and to reintroduce the privileged position of the Western powers in the Danube basin. To achieve this end, the Western powers raised the question of internationalising the Danube, hoping to settle it by means of the "voting machine'', the bloc of capitalist states mainly dependent on the USA and created by it at the Paris Conference.
The Western powers wanted to impose their will not only on the defeated Danubian states--- Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria---but also on Danubian countries which belonged to the anti-- 54 Hitler coalition and were present at the Paris Peace Conference among the victorious countries (the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia). But the firm policy of the Soviet Union completely foiled the schemes to utilise the Paris Conference for imposing an imperialist navigation regime on the Danubian countries. The New York session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which examined the recommendations of the Paris Conference, accepted the Soviet proposal and recorded it in the following wording in the treaties of peace with Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania: " Navigation on the Danube shall be free and open for the nationals, vessels of commerce, and goods of all States, on a footing of equality in regard to port and navigation charges and conditions for merchant shipping. The foregoing shall not apply to traffic between ports of the same State.''^^1^^
Moreover, the Council of Foreign Ministers decided to convene a conference to frame a new convention on the navigation regime on the Danube. The conference was to be attended by representatives of the Danubian states (the USSR, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary) and also representatives of member states of the Council of Foreign Ministers---the United States, Great Britain and France. Delegates of Austria were invited to the conference with an advisory vote.
The Danubian Conference in this composition _-_-_
~^^1^^ Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Article 34, Paris, 10th February, 1947. Similar clauses are contained in the Treaties of Peace with Rumania and Hungary (Articles 31 and 38 respectively).
55 opened in Belgrade on July 30 and ended on August 18, 1948.The United States, Britain and France came to the conference with the selfsame imperialist plans. In contrast to this, the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies demanded the establishment of a navigation regime which would be based on the principle of equality of the Danubian states and prevent a revival of domination by the imperialist powers. The Soviet delegation vigorously rejected the Western efforts to impose their will on the Danubian states by threats and ultimatums.
The exertions of the Western powers which referred to their ``acquired'' rights with regard to the Danube, were unsuccessful. Having taken as a basis the Soviet draft, the delegations of the Danubian countries, after a persistent three-week struggle against the imperialist encroachments, drew up and signed a new convention on the navigation regime on the Danube which fully met the interests of all the riparian states. It was based on the principle of protecting the sovereign rights of countries in the Danube basin.
The Danubian Conference proclaimed that free navigation on the Danube should be effected "in conformity with the interests and sovereign rights of the Danubian countries and also for the purpose of strengthening the economic and cultural ties of the Danubian countries among themselves and with other countries. . . .''^^1^^
Article 1 of the Convention fully reproduces the respective articles of the peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary concerning _-_-_
~^^1^^ Conference Danubicnne, Belgrade, 1948. p. 373.
56 freedom of navigation on the Danube. But the Convention precludes any possibility for utilising this freedom for intervention in the domestic affairs of Danubian states. It extends the international regime only to the navigable part of the Danube (and not to the territory along the river banks)---from Ulm to the Black Sea, through the Sulin Mouth, with an outlet to the sea through the Sulin Canal (Article 2).The Convention envisaged the setting up of a Danubian Commission from representatives of the Danubian countries, one from each. The Soviet Union ceded second place in the commission in favour of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The competence of the Danubian commission includes: supervision over the implementation of the decisions of the Convention on the navigation regime on the Danube; drawing up of a general plan of main work in the interest of navigation on the basis of proposals and projects of Danubian states and also the compilation of a general estimate of the expenditure for these jobs. In special cases the Commission acts as an economic organisation which performs work on the Danube when a riparian state is unable to do it itself. The Commission offers consultations to Danubian states and authorities concerning the performance of jobs, establishes a single system of navigation management, unifies the rules of river supervision, keeps navigation statistics, issues manuals, sailing directions, navigation maps and atlases, draws up the budget and collects duties from vessels (Article 8).
The principle of observing the sovereign rights of the riparian countries thus permeates all the articles of the Convention. In contrast to the old 57 Danubian Commission, the new one does not stand above state bodies of Danubian states and is not the unlimited master in the basin of the Danube. It is an agency of the riparian states which carries out their will and is subordinate to them in all respects.
The Convention was adopted at the Belgrade Conference by representatives of all Danubian states and signed by them on August 18, 1948. The Western powers---the United States, Great Britain and France---refused to recognise the democratic navigation regime on the Danube; their representatives voted against the Convention and refused to sign it.
In May 1949, the Convention came into force. It put an end to the unjust regime on the Danube which had existed for about 100 years. For the first time a democratic status was instituted in the legal regime of a major international waterway, a status which met the sovereign rights of all the riparian states, precluded any possibility for the imperialist monopolies to penetrate the basin of the Danube, and conformed to the radical changes in this area after the Second World War.
The new regime, instituted by the Danubian Convention, is fully based on the principles of equal rights and mutual: non-interference of countries in each other's affairs. It opened up big prospects to the Danubian countries (at present Austria, too, belongs to the countries represented on the Danubian Commission) in using this waterway. The Convention on the navigation regime on the Danube promoted the strengthening and development of economic co-operation and cultural ties between the USSR and European socialist countries.
58 __NUMERIC_LVL2__ Chapter II. __ALPHA_LVL2__ FORMATION OF THE WORLDThe liberation struggle against nazi Germany which spread in wartime within countries that fell under the nazi heel was directed not only against the invaders but also against the reactionary regimes which had brought national disaster, loss of independence and immeasurable suffering and destruction.
The westward liberation campaign of the Soviet Army enabled all the democratic patriotic forces to unite in the struggle against the local and foreign exploiters, for the overthrow of the bourgeois-landowner regime and development towards People's Democracies.
The destinies of West European countries occupied by the American and British forces were shaped differently. The ruling circles of the Western powers gave every help to the local reactionary bourgeoisie in suppressing the workingclass and revolutionary movement in Western Europe and in preserving the capitalist system. Exploiting the considerable economic and political weakening of the West European countries, the 59 United States undertook to establish its diktat immediately after the war.
In Eastern Europe, too, the US and British ruling circles did everything to prevent the historically natural development of events, to block the road to popular revolutionary change. To this end all the weapons in imperialism's arsenal were utilised---from diplomatic pressure, blackmail and intimidation of the young People's Democracies, to attempts at directly interfering in their internal affairs. Even during the war the US and British ruling element began to prepare the ground for the subsequent subjugation of Central and Southeast Europe, and established contacts with emissaries of bourgeois parties in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, setting them the task of capturing power and converting their countries into an obedient tool of Western policy. US and British representatives conducted negotiations in Cairo with Barbu Stirbey, a leader of the so-called historical parties of Rumania, reached understanding in the Vatican with Hungarian ex-Premier Miklos Kallay and in Ankara with Gemeto, a reactionary Bulgarian politician.
But the imperialist forces were unable to alter the course of events in Central and Southeast Europe and to embroil the peoples in cruel civil wars primarily because these peoples were liberated by the Soviet Army. At the 5th Congress of the Bulgarian Workers' (Communist) Party in 1948, G. M. Dimitrov stressed that if the offensive of internal and international reaction in Bulgaria during the first years of popular democratic rule did not assume the form of open armed action, this was explained not only by the determined measures of the people's government, the vigilance 60 and the energy of the Bulgarian Communist Party, but in "a large degree by the presence ot units of the Soviet liberation army, whose mere presence simply fettered the reactionary forces".^^1^^
The influence of the bourgeoisie in economic and political life was still substantial during the early stage of popular democratic revolutions in Central and Southeast Europe. The bourgeoisie held strong positions in the economy and played quite a considerable part in political life. The reactionary and the democratic forces clashed bitterly on all important issues of home and foreign policy. The reactionaries exerted much effort to foil fundamental economic and political reforms and to restore the old order. Bourgeois political parties sabotaged democratic measures applied by the working class with the Communist Parties at its head, and hampered the establishment and strengthening of truly democratic state institutions.
Bourgeois political parties relied on the support of the Western powers whose representatives tried to meddle in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe and to aggravate the political situation. They repeatedly sought to utilise for their selfish ends the Allied Control Commissions. On October 1, 1946, US representative Major General V. M. Robertson, for example, demanded of Soviet Colonel General Biryuzov, Vice-Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria, "to convene a special meeting of the Commission to examine what measures it could take to ensure free _-_-_
~^^1^^ G. M. Dimitrov, Political Report at the 5th Congress of the Bulgarian Workers (Communist) Party, Sofia, 1948, p. 63 (in Russian).
61 elections to the Bulgarian Grand National Assembly on October 27'', including such questions as `` freedom'' of the press, radio and assembly for the opposition, the release of political prisoners, and so on.^^1^^ In other words the American representative wanted to use the Allied Control Commission for flagrant interference in Bulgaria's internal politics.In his letter of reply of October 4, the Soviet representative stated that "the ensuring of free elections is a prerogative of the Bulgarian Government which has done everything necessary in this respect.... Consequently a discussion of the questions you raised in the Allied Control Commission, and, the more so, the adoption of any measures by it would be a violation of these prerogatives and crass interference in Bulgaria's internal affairs. Furthermore, the Allied Control Commission cannot discuss these questions because they do not come within its competence, as determined by the armistice agreement with Bulgaria.''^^2^^
As the national and democratic revolutions developed the working class and its vanguard won new positions in the course of bitter class struggle, strengthening and developing popular rule. Though the struggle was acute in every country it did not turn into open civil war. The Soviet Union's defence of the interests of the People's Democracies scotched such attempts by the Western powers. The victory of the working class which headed all national and patriotic _-_-_
~^^1^^ Arkhiv vneshnei politiki SSSR (Archives of the Foreign Policy of the USSR), Series 074, Inventory List 35, Volume 127, File 20, p. 72. (Hereafter---AVP SSSR.)
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 73.
62 forces was in fact scored in relatively peaceful conditions.The struggle of the patriotic forces for winning and consolidating popular rule had much in common in various countries. In all People's Democracies, the working class, closely allied with the peasants, was the leading force of the revolution. This was the decisive factor which ensured complete victory over the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the same time, the revolutionary process in each country of Central and Southeast Europe had its distinctive features depending on the actual situation, the maturity of the revolutionary situation and the power of resistance offered by the bourgeoisie.
Let us take Czechoslovakia as an example. The bourgeoisie was able to retain in the first postwar years more ground in economic and political life than it did in neighbouring People's Democracies. Moreover, it had much experience and an elaborate system of combating the revolutionary working-class movement. The working class and the Communist Party thus faced a cunning and perfidious enemy---the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie with its political parties, which was highly skilled in playing at democracy and relied on the support of international imperialism, above all the US ruling circles. Imperialist reaction staked on the Czech and Slovak capitalists headed by Benes, who was then President of Czechoslovakia. Benes at one time stated that he was "afraid of two things only, a war and then Bolshevism".^^1^^ The _-_-_
~^^1^^ Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918--1945, Series D, Vol. II, p. 633.
63 United States expected to utilise Benes and others of like mind for keeping Czechoslovakia within the capitalist system and for blocking the further development of people's democratic revolutions in other countries.But the working people of Czechoslovakia led by their Communist Party scored a splendid victory over the reactionary and counter-- revolutionary forces in the decisive clash in February 1948. The popular victory resulted in the establishment of undivided proletarian dictatorship.
No less keen was the class struggle in the People's Democracies over foreign policy issues, above all the basic question of relations with the Soviet Union. Internal reactionaries and international imperialists did everything possible to isolate the young People's Democracies from the USSR, to deprive them of Soviet support and then crush the revolutionary movement. They sought in particular to control the Foreign Ministries. In Rumania up to the autumn of 1947 the Foreign Ministry was headed by Tatarescu, a bourgeois leader who said outright that though Rumania was bound to the Soviet Union geographically, long-standing traditions and sympathies bound her to the Western powers. Tatarescu converted the Foreign Ministry into a nest of the reactionary forces.
Reactionary politicians fully realised that were it not for the energetic economic and political support of the Soviet Union, the bourgeoisie would still be able to stem the incipient process of revolutionary changes and to restore the capitalist system. That is why for the People's Democracies the question of relations with the first socialist state in the world turned into a keystone 64 of their foreign policy from the very start. In this sphere, too, the people were victorious.
This is how the working class during a sharp class struggle, in close co-operation with the peasants, and under the leadership of Communist and Workers' Parties, successfully broke down the bitter resistance of the exploiting classes and their political parties. The fundamental revolutionary measures carried out by the working class strengthened popular rule and led to the establishment of firm proletarian dictatorship, the isolation and then the abolition of the exploiting classes and the ousting of their parties.
In countries of Central and Southeast Europe a dictatorship of the proletariat was established not in the form of Soviets, as in the USSR, but in the form of People's Democracy, which was a novel feature in the political organisation of society. It reflected the specific features of the development of the socialist revolution in conditions where imperialism was weakened and the balance of forces had changed in favour of socialism. It also reflected the historical and national distinctions of individual countries.
The experience of socialist revolution in the USSR and the People's Democracies corroborated Lenin's proposition that the transition to socialism in various countries is not always effected in the same way. At the same time, it demonstrated that there are basic, cardinal laws governing this transition which are common for all countries.
The victory of socialist revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries was ensured because the Communist and Workers' Parties were consistently guided by Lenin's ideas on the __PRINTERS_P_65_COMMENT__ 5-500 65 general laws and national distinctions of the transition to socialism.
The experience of victorious socialist revolutions in different countries marked by great diversity of local conditions, the experience accumulated over more than half a century, gives a more precise idea of these general laws and distinctions than was possible in the early period of the socialist system.
To begin with, practical experience has confirmed the conclusion of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that the leading role of the working class and its core, the Marxist-Leninist Party, in carrying out the proletarian revolution and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat is one of the cardinal principles of the transition to socialism, which is of general significance and is preserved in any conditions.
The proletariat carries through socialist revolution in close alliance with the non-proletarian working masses. But the proletariat is unable to lead these masses and score victory in the revolution if it does not create its revolutionary organisation, a Marxist-Leninist Party.
The experience of the USSR and the People's Democracies further shows that the exploiting classes do not cede power without desperate resistance. They disdain no method of struggle to regain political dominance and restore the bourgeois order. Moreover, the exploiting classes rely not only on their own forces, preserved initially after the socialist revolution, but also on the help of the entire world reaction.
The working class must create a strong power, it has to establish its dictatorship in order to preserve and firmly consolidate the revolutionary 66 gains and to suppress any attempt to restore capitalism. This proposition, first theoretically deduced by the founders of scientific socialism and then confirmed by the experience of the working class of one country, namely, Russia, is now being corroborated by the experience of many socialist countries.
Another general principle of the socialist revolution, likewise now confirmed by the record of a number of socialist revolutions, is that the tasks of proletarian dictatorship are not limited to crushing the resistance of the exploiting classes within a country. It is necessary to ensure the country's independence from the encroachments of world reaction, to create favourable external conditions for the transition to socialism. After the October Revolution in Russia it was the dictatorship of the proletariat that enabled the young Soviet state to repulse the internal counterrevolution and the interventionist forces of 14 imperialist powers, to break down the economic blockade and to foil the attempts to strangle the socialist state. Following the directions of the CPSU, the Soviet people steadily applied the principles of proletarian dictatorship. This was a guarantee of foiling all the intrigues of socialism's enemies. The dictatorship of the proletariat was the chief weapon which ensured the triumph of socialism in the USSR.
The tasks of the socialist states in foreign policy which arose after the Second World War were greatly eased by the very existence of the Soviet Union. The resolute and consistent defence of the young People's Democracies by the USSR enabled them to avoid civil war and open armed intervention by world imperialism. Drawing on Soviet __PRINTERS_P_67_COMMENT__ 5* 67 assistance, the People's Democracies successfully coped with the difficulties in laying the foundations for a socialist economy.
The experience of history thus fully confirmed Lenin's idea that the transition from capitalism to communism cannot but provide a great abundance and diversity of political forms, but the essence is inevitably the same: dictatorship of the proletariat.
The dictatorship of the proletariat has assumed different forms in different countries and in different historical conditions.
The Paris Commune in 1871 was the first experiment in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin pointed out that despite all its mistakes the Commune was the superb example of the greatest proletarian movement in the 19th century. The Commune was short-lived, but it was first to demonstrate that the revolutionary working class could guide society and create its own state. The revolutionary masses of Russia established the dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of Soviets. Soviets existed for a certain time in Hungary, Slovakia and Bavaria and for a number of years in some areas of China. After the Second World War the revolutionary endeavour of the masses in a number of European and Asian countries created another form of proletarian dictatorship, People's Democracy.
The experience of a number of countries has demonstrated the universal significance of the principle of transition to socialism, namely, that the proletarian .dictatorship derives its main strength from the alliance of the working class with the main mass of all other working people.
The alliance of the working class with the 68 non-proletarian masses is the hub of revolutionary people's power. Its utmost strengthening and extension guarantees the success of socialist changes and ensures the invincibility of the system born of the proletarian revolution. The close, unbreakable, fraternal alliance of the working class with all the other sections of the working people, above all with the peasants, expresses a prime distinction of the dictatorship of the proletariat---its true democracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat represents the highest form of democracy, democracy for all the working people. Whatever the form in which the transition from capitalism to socialism is effected, that transition can come about only through revolution. However varied the forms of a new, people's state power in the period of socialist construction, their essence will be the same---dictatorship of the proletariat.
Moreover, the principal laws governing the development of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, reaffirmed by the experience of all the socialist states, include: establishment of ownership of the major means of production by the whole people; socialist transformation of agriculture; planned, proportional development of the economy; socialist revolution in ideology and culture, the development of a body of intellectuals linked with the people; abolition of national oppression and the establishment of full equality and fraternal friendship among peoples; defence of socialist gains from external and internal enemies; proletarian internationalism; and consistent struggle for lasting peace.
These laws are inextricably interconnected. To ignore, underestimate or renounce even one of 69 these general principles is to undermine the socialist system and endanger the revolutionary gains.
At the same time, it would be wrong to think that since the principal laws governing the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism are the same and since the principal tasks of socialist changes in society coincide in the main, the forms and methods of achieving this aim are the same for all countries.
In Russia, whose working people were the first in the world to blaze the trail to socialism, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie was overthrown very quickly. The central agencies of bourgeois political power were destroyed by the armed uprising of the Petrograd proletariat and the revolutionary soldiers on November 7 and 8, 1917. A few days or weeks were needed for overthrowing the local bourgeois authorities. The situation was different in most of the People's Democracies. There one of the distinctions of the socialist revolution was the gradual takeover of all power by the working people, the gradual development of the anti-fascist, antiimperialist revolution into socialist revolution. This process continued for a comparatively long time. During the first years of the existence of People's Democracy the bourgeoisie preserved important positions in the economy and in politics. Representatives of bourgeois parties were in the parliaments, governments and local administrative bodies.
By opposing progressive measures, the bourgeois parties and their representatives increasingly exposed themselves as a reactionary force. The working masses learned from their own 70 experience that the policy of these parties ran counter to their fundamental interests. This ultimately resulted in the complete political isolation of bourgeois parties, their ousting from state bodies and, subsequently, to their organisational disintegration.
The distinctions of the socialist revolution in the People's Democracies were also displayed in the setting up of mass political organisations which united all the democratic forces of a country, People's Fronts led by the Communists. Rallying together in a People's Front, the democratic forces defeated the internal reactionaries and destroyed the political positions of the exploiting classes. This created favourable conditions for the economic suppression of the exploiters, for nationalising industry and effecting socialist changes in the countryside.
The existence of several political parties of the working people is a manifestation of the specific nature of socialist construction in some People's Democracies. In addition to the United Workers' Party there are the United Peasants' and Democratic parties in Poland. The Christian Democratic Union, the National Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Peasants' Party are participating, together with the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, in the building of socialism in the German Democratic Republic. In Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party is joined by the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, Czechoslovak People's Party and the Slovak Reconstruction Party.
All these parties are actively co-operating with the Marxist-Leninist Parties; they recognise their leading role in all social and political spheres 71 but, expressing the particular interests of certain groups of the working people who are building socialism, they have their representatives in central and local government bodies. The Communist and Workers' Parties, in drawing up plans for socialist construction, consult the other parties, taking into account their opinions and wishes. Co-operation of a number of parties of the working people, spearheaded by the MarxistLeninist Party, is a form of the alliance of the working class, peasants, intellectuals and artisans.
One more distinction of People's Democracy should be mentioned. In Russia the proletariat, on winning power, had to disfranchise the bourgeoisie. In the People's Democracies the bourgeoisie was not deprived of political rights ( except war criminals, quislings and other accomplices of the fascist regime). The bourgeois political parties for some time had their own press and their representatives in state bodies. What is important, however, is that they were deprived of the privileges they enjoyed under the old regime and were removed from key political and economic positions.
There are also many original features in the methods of the socialist remaking of the economy in People's Democracies. While the Soviet Union, being encircled by capitalist states, could not count on outside economic aid the People's Democracies found themselves in a much more advantageous position. Immediately after liberation they were able to rely on the disinterested all-round support of the USSR. They could draw on the wealth of experience accumulated by the Soviet Union. They have solved, and are solving, problems of socialist construction in an 72 atmosphere of fraternal co-operation with the USSR and with each other, and in conditions when a powerful world socialist system exists.
The problem of organising agricultural cooperatives has also been solved in a specific way in the People's Democracies. In the USSR the land was nationalised, that is, taken over by the socialist state. The People's Democracies did not nationalise the land. Only the property of traitors who had collaborated with the nazis was confiscated. A considerable part of the land was turned over to peasants who had little or no land at all. This determined certain distinctions in the forms of peasant co-operatives. In the People's Democracies there are, for example, agricultural cooperatives in which the income is divided among members both according to their work and depending on the size of the plots given to the co-operative. In guiding the building of the new life, the Communist and Workers' Parties always consider the national and historical distinctions of their countries. They act on the principle that blind copying of the experience of other fraternal countries, the application of methods of socialist construction suitable for the conditions of another country but hardly efficacious in the given country, lead to serious mistakes and distortions in building socialism. At the same time, however, exaggeration of the role of national distinctions also represents a serious threat to the socialist gains.
To avoid mistakes and distortions in socialist construction Marxist-Leninist Parties creatively apply the general principles of the socialist revolution and socialist construction depending on the actual historical conditions of each country, 73 firmly adhering to the demands of MarxismLeninism about the proper combination in politics of the principles of internationalism and patriotism. Only such an approach ensures the combining of the interests of each socialist country and of the entire socialist community and strengthens its unity.
The period between 1947 and 1949 marked an important stage in the development of the Peoples Democracies and the transition of the people's democratic revolution into socialist revolution. Fundamental revolutionary changes in the economy and political life brought about the victory of socialist production relations and strengthened popular rule. This above all was the nationalisation of large-scale industry, a major revolutionary measure which struck a hammer blow at the exploiting classes. It was carried out in Bulgaria in 1947; Rumania in mid-1948; Poland at the beginning of 1946; Czechoslovakia in two stages ---in 1945 and 1948; Hungary from 1947 to 1949; the German Democratic Republic in 1949, and in Albania by the beginning of 1947.
In the political sphere, bourgeois elements and Right-wing political parties were isolated and ousted, on the one hand, and the democratic forces were consolidated and reinforced, on the other. A tremendous part in this was played by the elimination of the split in the ranks of the working class, the merger of Workers' Parties--- Communist and Social-Democratic.
The change in the political relationship of the class forces in favour of democracy is 74 demonstrated by data on the composition of governments during the first years of People's Democracy. The government formed in Bulgaria on September 10, 1944 (the day after the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship) included only three representatives of the Communist Party; the other ministerial posts were given to the Zveno Party (4), Agricultural Union (4), Social-- Democrats (2) and Radicals (1). In the cabinet formed in November 1946 the Communists received ten seats and ten seats were given to representatives of the Agricultural Union, Zveno, Social-- Democrats and Independents (the monarchy was abolished as a result of the referendum held on September 8, 1946). The Fatherland Front Government, formed in December 1947, consisted of 14 Communists, 5 representatives of the Agricultural Union, 2 representatives of Zveno and 2 Social-Democrats.
In Czechoslovakia only 4 Communists entered the coalition government set up on April 7, 1945. The other 16 members were representatives of other parties: Social-Democrats (3), National Socialists (3), Catholics (3), and non-party members (7). Edvard Benes who headed the country's reactionary forces held the post of president up to February 1948. After the victory in February 1948, the alignment of political forces radically changed. A member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia became president and the National Front Government was formed of 12 Communists, 3 Social-Democrats, 3 representatives of the Slovak Reconstruction Party and 3 of the People's Party.
In Hungary in the initial period the pettybourgeois Smallholders Party (representing 75 mainly rich peasants) held important positions in the government. In the coalition cabinet, formed by four political parties in April 1947, this party held half the seats and the Communists only four.
A keen political struggle developed in Poland after liberation. Reactionary bourgeois parties and above all the Peasant Party of Mikolajczyk, held important posts in the country's leadership up to 1947.
In Rumania where the monarchy existed up to the end of 1947, bourgeois parties had lost their positions in the government in the main by the beginning of 1948. The government formed in April 1948 consisted of 11 representatives of the Workers' Party, four of the Agricultural Union, one of the National People's Party and two non-party members.
The economic, cultural and political rapprochement of the People's Democracies and the Soviet Union was deepened and new, socialist international relations emerged and developed as these states progressed and, by carrying out fundamental revolutionary changes, strengthened the economic and political positions of socialism. A socialist community began to take shape in the course of struggle against internal and international reactionary forces.
The People's Democracies inherited a grave legacy. In the past most of them were economically backward agricultural appendages of big capitalist states and had no heavy industry. Prolonged domination of the foreign monopolies, fascist occupation and hostilities---all this resulted in their emerging from the war with a wrecked economy. Some of them had been brought to the 76 brink of economic catastrophe by fascism and their own bourgeoisie and landowners. In Rumania, for example, industrial output at the beginning of 1947 barely reached 48 per cent of the 1938 level. Industrial production in Bulgaria after the war amounted to 64 per cent of the prewar level, and agricultural production, about 70 per cent. The German invaders inflicted tremendous damage on the economy of Poland. War destruction and looting by the nazis reduced the country's national wealth by 38 per cent, greatly undermined the productive forces and substantially depressed the living standard of the people even as compared with the low prewar level. The capacity of Hungary's industry in 1945 was only 60 per cent of 1938, while industrial output amounted only to one-third of the 1938 level.
This situation demanded of the Communist and Workers' Parties in the People's Democracies the greatest exertion of effort for restoring their economies.
From the start the Peole's Democracies relied on the all-round support and assistance of the Soviet Union in restoring and advancing their economies. Though the USSR itself faced tremendous difficulties after the war, it immediately after the liberation of the countries of Central and Southeast Europe began to render them extensive material aid in restoring their economies and readjusting to normal life.
In the first years after liberation Soviet assistance played a major part in coping with postwar difficulties and in defending their economic, and, 77 consequently, also national independence from the encroachments of the imperialist powers.
Thus, on February 20, 1945, the Soviet Government extended to Hungary, not yet fully liberated, credits to the sum of ten million pengos at the request of her Provisional Government; additional credits of 250 million pengos were given on March 7 and 500 million pengos on May 10, 1945. The USSR helped Hungary to carry out spring sowing and saved the people from starvation. In March, May and June 1945, the Soviet Government allotted from the stocks of the Soviet Army 33,000 tons of grain, 4,431 tons of meat, 3,333 tons of sugar and other foodstuffs for the population of large Hungarian cities.
The first trade agreements and the consequent Soviet deliveries of raw materials, equipment and foodstuffs strikingly attest to the fraternal assistance of the USSR to the People's Democracies in the initial period of their existence.
The first trade agreement between the USSR and Bulgaria was signed as early as March 14, 1945. It recorded that both parties considered it the first stage in developing economic relations between their countries in the new conditions and that they would elaborate a programme of measures to promote fuller economic co-operation. On December 15 of the same year an agreement was signed on the delivery of 30,000 tons of maize and 20,000 tons of wheat to Bulgaria by the Soviet Government.
The worsened food situation compelled the Bulgarian Government to ask the Soviet Union for additional grain deliveries. In reply to the request an additional 40,000 tons of maize and wheat were delivered within 4 months.
78Under the first agreements Bulgaria received from the Soviet Union considerable quantities of oil, metal, chemicals, rubber and grain. What is particularly important is that she received raw materials, about 10,000 tons of cotton and 2,000 tons of wool, for the textile industry, the leading sector at the time. This enabled the spinning mills to work at full capacity in two and three shifts and avoid unemployment.
Another Bulgarian-Soviet trade agreement was signed in Moscow on April 27, 1946. It called for imports of Soviet goods 2.5 times greater than under the 1945 agreement. Between 1945 and 1947 Bulgaria received from the Soviet Union on the strength of these agreements 229,000 tons of oil products and lubricants, 217,000 tons of metals and metalwares, 33,000 tons of cotton, 72,000 sets of automobile tyres, 2,020 lorries and tractors, large quantities of self-propelled combines, agricultural machinery, rail waggons and spare parts.
V. Kolarov, prominent leader of the Bulgarian working-class movement, stated: "Immediately after the armistice (October 1944), the Soviet Government displayed magnanimity towards the Bulgarian people. We were regarded . . . not as a defeated country, but as a friendly country. From 1946 to 1949 the Soviet Government supplied 345,000 tons of grain to save the population in drought-stricken areas of our country.''^^1^^
The two-year agreement, signed between the USSR and Bulgaria on July 5, 1947, provided _-_-_
~^^1^^ D. Blagoycv, G. Dimitrov, V. Kolarov and others, For Unbreakable Soviet-Bulgarian Friendship, Sofia, 1951, pp. 241--42 (in Bulgarian).
79 for still greater extension of trade. Imports of Soviet oil products, ferrous and non-ferrous metals and metalwares were envisaged in quantities fully satisfying Bulgaria's needs. In addition, she received the necessary quantities of paper and cellulose, substantial quantities of natural and synthetic rubber and rubber goods, thousands of goods waggons and passenger coaches, trolleybuses, lorries and motorcars, metal-cutting machine tools, electric power stations and radio stations. In exchange Bulgaria sent to the Soviet Union tobacco, metal ores and concentrates, tinned fruit and vegetables. The agreement was concluded at a time when Bulgaria launched her two-year economic restoration and development plan (1947--1948).This was followed by the signing on August 28, 1947, of an agreement on Soviet deliveries of industrial plant on credit and the rendering of technical assistance in building new industrial enterprises. It was dovetailed with the republic's two-year plan in whose successful implementation Soviet assistance played a considerable part.
As a result of the fulfilment of the two-year plan Bulgaria's industrial output exceeded the prewar level by 71.5 per cent, with the growth rates of heavy industry being considerably higher than in light industry. Notwithstanding three poor years, the grain harvest approached the 1939 level. Agricultural labour co-operatives became firmly established as the new form of organisation in agriculture. At the end of 1948, more than 1,000 of these co-operatives united 74,000 peasants and they owned about 3,000,000 decares of land (a decare equals about one-tenth of a hectare).
The Rumanian People's Republic has 80 repeatedly voiced its great appreciation of Soviet assistance rendered above all in foodstuffs. In 1945, the Soviet Union gave Rumania, by way of a loan, 300,000 tons of grain which helped her to cope with the serious food difficulties resulting from crop failure. In 1946, in view of the repeated poor crop, the USSR again came to her aid.
The import of Soviet grain to Rumania was also of great political significance. Speaking on June 27, 1947, at the graduation of political workers of the Rumanian Army, Premier Petru Groza said: "The years of drought placed us in a difficult position. We were compelled to pay gold for maize from the West. The terms imposed on us were onerous, and this notwithstanding, we received very little maize. We again had to knock at the doors of our friends in the East. We know that they too suffered from drought and, nevertheless, last year they loaned us 30,000 carloads of grain delivered to our country, without demanding any guarantees, without demanding gold, and we were unable to repay this loan. Yet, when we again turned to our friends they understood us and are helping us again.''^^1^^
Serious food supply difficulties also arose in the Czechoslovak Republic. Here, too, Soviet assistance was of political as well as economic significance.
In 1945 and 1946 the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia made reciprocal deliveries of goods which subsequently were included in the nomenclature of mutual deliveries provided for by the agreement of April 12, 1946. On the same _-_-_
^^1^^ AVP SSSR, Series 0125, Inventory List 38, Volume 180, File 41, p. 18.
__PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__ 6---500 81 day, a protocol on grain assistance to Czechoslovakia was also signed.In mid-July 1947, it was decided at the SovietCzechoslovak talks in Moscow that the two countries would conclude a five-year agreement. Specifically, it was decided that the Soviet Union would supply Czechoslovakia in 1948 with 400,000 tons of grain, including 200,000 tons of wheat. But on November 25, 1947, the Czechoslovak Government asked the Soviet Union to increase grain deliveries. By November 29 the Soviet Government had already informed Czechoslovakia that the request would be satisfied.
The Soviet Union rendered considerable financial assistance to the People's Democracies during those years. Under the agreement of December 14, 1948, Czechoslovakia received from the USSR a loan in gold totalling 132.5 million rubles at an annual interest of 2.5 per cent.
The European People's Democracies completed economic restoration in the main in 1948 and 1949, when two- or three-year restoration and development plans were carried out. As a result, industrial output in all these countries regained the prewar level and in some even topped it. Czechoslovakia, for example, reached the prewar level in 1948; moreover, it surpassed it by more than 30 per cent in the output of means of production. Poland's industry was restored and substantially reconstructed as a result of her fulfilling the three-year plan (1947--1949). Bulgaria's industrial output reached 170 per cent of the prewar level at the end of 1948.
The People's Democracies swiftly organised their economic life and began to advance rapidly. While the index of industrial output (1937 = 100) 82 of six European capitalist countries (Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Luxemburg and France) amounted to 102 in 1948, 111 in 1949 and 116 in 1950, in the six European People's Democracies (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania) which suffered from the war much more than the capitalist states, this index was 122 in 1948, 151 in 1949 and 185 in 1950. In other words, in the People's Democracies industrial production at the end of 1950 was almost twice as high as before the war, while in the European capitalist countries it rose only by 16 per cent.
The fulfilment of plans for restoring the war-ravaged economy and the revolutionary economic and politlcal changes led to the introduction of socialist production relations. All this enabled the European People's Democracies to begin long-term economic planning. The first five-year plans adopted by Bulgaria (1949--1953), Czechoslovakia (1949-- 1953), Hungary (1950--1954'), Rumania (1951-- 1955), Albania (1951--1955) and the German Democratic Republic (1951--1955) provided for the development of heavy industry and the laying of the economic foundations of socialism.
The transition to long-term planning, in turn, created a solid basis for long-term economic agreements, for deepening and extending co-operation, and for the emergence arid development of new forms of economic ties between socialist states. The treaties of commerce and navigation and other long-term agreements played a big part 83 in the economic relations between the USSR and the People's Democracies. The Soviet Union and Rumania concluded a treaty of commerce and navigation in Moscow on February 20, 1947. The parties agreed to accord each other unconditional and unlimited most-favoured-nation treatment with regard to all questions of trade and navigation and also of industry and other kinds of economic activity on their territories. The Soviet Union concluded similar agreements with other socialist countries: Hungary (July 15, 1947), Czechoslovakia (December 11, 1947), and Bulgaria (April 1, 1948). Article 1 of the SovietBulgarian Treaty stipulated that the governments of both countries would from time to time conclude agreements determining the volume and composition of reciprocal deliveries of goods, both for annual and longer periods and also other terms ensuring the uninterrupted and increasing trade between both countries in conformity with the economic needs of each. An agreement on reciprocal deliveries of goods in the period 1948-- 1952 was signed between the USSR and the Polish Republic on January 26, 1948. It fixed the main contingents of mutual deliveries of goods, totalling more than $1,000 million. In addition, an agreement was signed on deliveries of industrial plant on credit to Poland (1948--1956).
The trade and economic agreements between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies concluded between 1947 and 1950 reflected the new economic relations which were arising between socialist states. Their substance consisted in the striving of the socialist countries to help each other and to work jointly for general advance. The rise of such forms of co-operation 84 as co-ordination of national eco