[introduction.]
p The fact that the Communist Parties can build their policies on a scientific basis is one of the most important sources of their strength.
p This means, primarily, that in defending the interests of the working class the Communists, armed with the teaching of MarxismLeninism, can base their actions on knowledge of the objective laws of social development and, especially, on knowledge of the laws of the class struggle; they take into consideration the alignment of the class forces in each concrete situation. Lenin wrote: "Only an objective consideration of the sum total of reciprocal relations of all the classes of a given society without exception, and, consequently, a consideration of the objective stage of development of that society and of the reciprocal relations between it and other societies^ can serve as a basis for correct tactics of the advanced class. At the same time, all classes and all countries are regarded not statically, but dynamically, i.e., not in a state of immobility, but in motion (the laws of which are determined by the economic conditions of existence of each class).” "^^193^^
345Below we shall dwell on some general questions of the policies of (he Communist Parties as a science arid art. The practical execution of these policies and their most important problems are dealt with in subsequent chapters of this book.
On Political Strategy and Tactics
p The acts comprising the activities of a Marxist-Leninist Party are not improvisations of the Party leadership. They are the concrete expression of the political line elaborated by the Party on the basis of a scientific analysis of Ihe given stage of (he struggle in the given situation. In political language, the terms tactics and strategy are also used to denote this line.
p The term tactics often implies a political line for a relatively short period of time determined by particular concrete conditions, whereas strategy refers to the line for a whole historical stage. However, this distinction was not always made. In the old working-class movement (before the October Revolution) the term Party tactics usually denoted all its policies regardless of the period of time for which they were planned.
p That is how Lenin used this term, denoting by it both the relatively rapidly changing tasks of leadership in the struggle of the working class (tactics in the narrow sense) and the tasks persisting throughout a whole historical stage. For example, in his book Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in a Democratic Revolution Lenin wrote about tactics in the sense of the general line of the Party planned for the whole period of preparing and carrying out the bourgeois– democratic revolution in Russia. "By the Party’s tactics,” wrote Lenin, "we mean the Party’s political conduct, or the character, direction and methods of its political activity.”^^193^^ Lenin rarely used the concept of strategy borrowed from the military sphere. Only during the post-October period did he also mention Party strategy in some of his works relating to the policies of the fraternal Communist Parties, without deeming it necessary, however, to differentiate this concept from that of tactics.
p Today Communists speak of strategy, or the strategic line, when it is a question of the general line of the Party directed towards accomplishing the main tasks of a given historical stage, taking the existing correlation of forces between the classes as a starting-point. Herein lies the distinction of strategy from tactics, which determines the current policy of the Party and is worked out for a shorter period on the basis of the Party’s general line (e.g., tactics in an election campaign, the altitude to the manoeuvres of Right-socialist leaders, the approach to Left socialists, etc.).
p . It is important to observe the strategic line in order, on the one hand, not to lose sight of the main task of the whole stage and, on the other hand, to prevent the Leftist tendency of "skipping stages". 346 But when speaking of the political strategy of the Party one should beware of being led astray by analogies from the field of military science, a fault from which, for example, many of Stalin’s statements on this subject suffer, for political strategy radically differs from military strategy.
p In politics one has to deal not with ready-formed armies but with social classes and forces, some of which may be organised but others not, and some of which act consciously while others act spontaneously. A military leader has all the available forces under his command. He can freely manoeuvre with them, throwing in his reserves wherever he considers necessary and taking only military expediency into account. Political leaders have no such possibilities. The classes and forces taking part in the events are neither armies nor reserves. Each of them acts not on the order of a commander, but under the influence of its own interests, and, what is more, as it understands these interests at the given moment. There are also many other factors which greatly complicate the task of political leadership compared with military leadership. All this must be borne in mind when using the concept of political strategy.
p When elaborating the strategic line of the Party under capitalist conditions it is important, in the first place, to determine correctly the main aim of the working class at the given stage and the chief class enemy against whom it is necessary to concentrate at the given stage the class hatred and the shock force of all the working people in order to overcome this enemy’s resistance.
p Secondly, it is necessary to determine correctly the attitude of the Party to the largest intermediate section of the population which, although it adopts an attitude of opposition to the chief enemy, nevertheless, owing to the duality of its class interests, shows dangerous political instability, an inclination to conciliation, and, at times, to direct compact with this enemy.
p Thus during the first stage of the Russian Revolution, Lenin defined the main aim of the movement as the overthrow of autocracy and set two tasks before the proletariat—"to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy" (the chief enemy) and "to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie".^^194^^ The Bolsheviks recognised both these tasks, whereas the Mensheviks, who did not recognise the second task, slipped into the morass of Right-wing opportunism.
p During the second stage of the Russian Revolution, Lenin defined the main aim as the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and set two tasks before the proletariat—"to crushby force the resistance of the bourgeoisie" (the chief enemy) and "to paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie".^^195^^ The Bolsheviks set out to accomplish both these tasks. Had they confined themselves to only one of them or had they considered the second task the more important of the two,-the revolution would have been seriously endangered.
p Thus, in defining the relation to the intermediate strata and forces, 347 Lenin set as the task to "paralyse the instability" of these, i.e., to ensure that at least they did not help the enemy. Stalin developed a different conception.^^198^^ According to him, it was just the intermediate strata and forces, in particular the petty-bourgeois parties (the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries) that had to be the object of the "main blow”. Such action, however, would mean not only definitely driving the wavering elements away from the revolution, but voluntarily throwing them into the arms of the enemy.
p In 1928 Stalin went so far as to declare the Left Social-Democrats "the most dangerous carriers of bourgeois policy in the working class" and he introduced additions in this sense into the theses of the Sixth Congress and Tenth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, thereby forcing the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries on to a path of sterile sectarianism.
Thirdly, when elaborating the strategic line, it is important to determine correctly the allies of the working class at the given stage of the movement. At the same time it would be wrong to regard the allies of the working class as the “reserves” of the Party which it can “utilise” at its discretion, “manoeuvring” them as freely as a general does the reserves on the battlefield. To reduce the strategic leadership in politics to the question of utilising reserves, as was done in the above-mentioned works of Stalin, is to divert the attention from the task which, in the capitalist countries, is the most essential in preparing for decisive class battles, viz., the task of continuously strengthening the ties of the Communist Party with the masses of workers and the broadest sections of the working people, the task of establishing unity of action with the Socialist Parties, trade unions and other mass organisations. Each Communist Party also proceeds from the recognition of the independent role of the working-class movement of the neighbouring countries and the revolutionary movements of the colonies, and does not regard them as mere “reserves” of the revolution in its own or any other country. Any other attitude to the individual detachments of the anti-imperialist liberation movement would not only be at variance with the principles of Communists and their political morality but would also create the danger of losing these allies.
The Art of Political Leadership
p Lenin said that politics were not only a science but an art. This means that political leadership requires not oney a correct, scientifically trustworthy analysis of the situation, and the drawing up on this basis of a correct line, but also great ability, skill and real artistry in putting this line into effect. Without such skill even the best political line will be of no avail. A correct decision as to the main aim and the chief enemy at a given stage will be useless if the Party is unable to organise the struggle for this aim and against this enemy. It is possible correctly to determine the allies of the working class 348 but will it be ot any use if the Party is unable to win them over to its side, and to organise and lead their struggle?
p Thus for political leadership it is important not only to know but also to be able to pat this knowledge into practice. How then can the Party acquire such ability, such skill?
p Theoretical studies alone are, of course, not enough. Each Party can master the art of political leadership only from its own extensive experience. For a revolutionary party, there is no school that can replace the school of practical struggle with all its trials and tribulations, victories and defeats, successes and failures.
p Of course, all this does not mean that each party must itself necessarily experience absolutely everything and can learn only through its setbacks. The process of learning the art of politics can be considerably accelerated and the number of defeats, mistakes and failures greatly reduced if the experience of the other parlies, the experience of the international revolutionary movement is carefully and skilfully studied and utilised. The works in which this experience has been generalised are an invaluable aid for those who would learn the art of political leadership. Especially important in this respect is Lenin’s outstanding book Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, which has always been of enormous importance for the international communist movement.
p What basic spheres of activity does the art of political leadership include?
p It includes, above all, the ability to work among the masses. Only the parties and leaders whose lives are bound up with the interests of the working people, who share in their aspirations and are self!essly devoted to them, can successfully cope with this task.
p One of the Leninist principles of the art of political leadership is that propaganda and agitation alone are not enough to draw the masses into an active struggle. For this, their own political experience is essential. V. I. Lenin said that "the millions of people will never heed the advice of parties if this advice does not coincide with what the experience of their own lives teaches them".^^1^^" Hence the art of political leadership consists in using means and methods which, by being derived from the experience of the masses and the level of their classconsciousness, can advance the masses in the struggle for the final aims. The Party cannot wait passively until reality itself will have taught the masses. It must be able to help them to arrive at the proper conclusions. Lenin referred to this as the ability to bring the masses to the positions of a decisive struggle on the basis of their own experience.
p The masses perceive surrounding reality through the facts which they encounter every day and which directly affect them. Hence the parties can bring the working people into the struggle against capitalism Only by leading the struggle for the immediate economic needs and political interests of the masses, by putting forward demands 349 in line with the urgent requirements of the different sections o-f tho working people, and by fighting for the satisfaction of these demands.
p An important part of the art of political leadership is, furthermore, the ability of the Party to unite its efforts with the efforts of all those with whom it is possible to achieve unity of action, including those with whom there are differences on fundamental questions. This is an important, although difficult, matter as will be shown in greater detail in the next chapter.
p The art of political leadership also includes the ability correctly to choose suitable forms of si niggle for a given situation, and the ability to be ready to change these forms most swiftly arid unexpectedly.
p If a Parly knows how to choose the forms of struggle correctly, and if it elaborates a political line in accord with the existing conditions, it can acl. vigorously and achieve definite results under the most complicated and difficult conditions.
A Parly of (he Leninist lype will never si and by idly, holding aloof and waiting for the "great hour”, the situation which will itself evoke the revolutionary enthusiasm of the working people and weaken the resistance of their enemies. It seeks and finds possibilities for active work among the masses, for an active political struggle, even under the most unfavourable conditions. The Party thus strengthens its positions and, what is even more important, brings very much closer the hour of the decisive battle, and prepares for this hour not only itself, but also the broadest possible sections of the working people. The supreme art of political leadership consists precisely in the ability to find, even during the periods when the revolution abates, directions and forms of struggle that will provide the basis for future victories and will bring these victories closer. A brilliant example of such art is the Leninist policy of the Russian Communists during the years of reaction which followed the defeat of the 1905–07 Revolution. During those years the Party showed how to act if a revolution, has failed. At that time Lenin wrote: "The revolutionary partiesrnust complete their education. They have learned to attack. Now it is time to realise that this knowledge must be supplemented with the knowledge of how to retreat properly; to realise—and the revolutionary class is taught to realise it by its own bitter experience—that victory is impossible unless they have learned both the right way to attack and the right way to retreat.”^^198^^
The Ability to Find the Main Link
p The science and art of political leadership are seen also in the ability to single out the main issues on the solution of which special efforts should be concentrated.
p Political events are interconnected, but they are always very tangled. Lenin said they could be compared to a chain, with the difference that the sequence of the links, their shapes and 350 couplings are not so simple as in a chain forged by a blacksmith. Besides, in an ordinary chain all links are alike, whereas in political life there are fundamental questions and subordinate, secondary questions. "One must be able at each particular moment to find the particular link in the chain which one must grasp with all one’s might in order to hold the whole chain and to prepare firmly for the transition to the next link.”^^199^^
p After the overthrow of tsarism the decisive link in Russia was the revolutionary withdrawal from the war. Immediately after the February Revolution the broad masses of the people were bent on a defensive war. They believed that the nature of the war had changed and that it had ceased to be imperialist. But Lenin showed the groundlessness of such illusions. As long as the bourgeoisie was in power the war continued to be an imperialist one. There was then no other way to achieve peace than by a socialist revolution. And though the masses did not understand it at first, the Party was confident that the logic of events would lead them to the conclusion that a revolution was the only salvation. And the Party concentrated its efforts on helping the masses to arrive at this conclusion.
p It required but six months for the bourgeoisie completely to unmask itself as a class that was interested in continuing the war. Then came the turning-point in the consciousness of the masses who became convinced that the war could be brought to an end only by an armed overthrow of the bourgeoisie. "Revolutionary Russia succeeded in withdrawing from the war,” said Lenin. "It took great effort, but the main need of the people was taken into account and this gave us victory.”^^200^^
p At the present time, when the danger of an annihilating nuclear war threatens the world and when international reaction is growing active again in its attempts to impose a fascist order on the nations, the struggle for peace and democracy has become the main link in the policies of the Communist Parties in capitalist countries.
The Marxist-Leninist analysis of reality and the close ties with the masses enable each Party, proceeding from the particular situation in the country, to single out the main problem whose solution brings closer the achievement of the final aim of the working class.
Notes
