ASSEN KOJAROV
MONISM AND PLURALISM IN IDEOLOGY AND IN POLITICS
[1] ~ [2] __AUTHOR__ ASSEN KOJAROVmonum ACID
PIURMIfm
IDEOIOGV
POUTKf
__TITLE__ monism and pluralism in ideology and in politics __TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2007-11-23T04:32:35-0800 __TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"Sofia Press
[3] ~ __NOTE__ No year! No publication information until BACK of book! [4] CONTENTS Introduction 7 PART ONE. PLURALISM IN BOURGEOIS SOCIETY CHAPTER I. PLURALISM IN BOURGEOIS PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY 1. Intermediate Trend in Philosophy 11 2. Nature and Varieties of Philosophical Pluralism 16 3. Gnoseological and Social Roots 21 4. Major Representatives 26 5. Pluralism in Bourgeois Social Philosophy and Spciology 38 CHAPTER II. PLURALISM IN SOCIAL LIFE UNDER CAPITALISM 1. Is Ideology in Bourgeois Society Pluralistic? 52 2. Struggle between Ideologies and Discussions in Science 61 3. The Two Aspects of Socio-Political Pluralism 65 4. Social Structure of State Monopoly Capitalism 68 5. Rejection or Distortion of the Marxist Teaching on Classes 75 6 An Attempt at Overcoming the Crisis in Bourgeois Ideology84 7. Pluralism and the State 91 PART TWO. THE MONOLITHIC CHARACTER OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND OF SOCIALIST SOCIETY AND THE ANTI-SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTIONS OF THEIR PLURALIZATION 99 CHAPTER I. MARXISM, REVISIONISM AND THE BOURGEOIS PLURALISMS 1. A Revolutionary Class with a Scientific Ideology 2. Development and Diversity, but Not Pluralism 103 3. On the Causes that Give Rise to Revisionism 112 4. Is Leninism'Voluntaristic Marxism'? 119 5. Pluralized Marxism According to the Bourgeois Ideologists 124 6. Ideological Content of the `Variants' and the Practice of their Supporters 131 CHAPTER II. THE REVISIONISTS AND PLURALISM 1. Is It Necessary for Marxism to be Pluralistic? 137 [5] 2. At the Tail of the Bourgeois Theoreticians 142 3. Mao Tse-tung and the Pluralist Idea 146 4. The Main Criterion 151 5. Pluralism and Factionalism CHAPTER III. SOCIALISM AND PLURALISM 1. On the Term 'Models of Socialism' 2. Revisionist 'Models of Socialism'---A Sample of AntiMarxist Forgery 3. Is Socialist Society Monolithic or `Pluralistic'? 4. `Pluralization' or Bourgeois Restoration (In Lieu of a Conclusion) Bibliography [6] __ALPHA_LVL1__ INTRODUCTIONThe rise and success of the world socialist system and the almost complete disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism have brought about a radical change in balance between the forces of progress and the forces of reaction in the world. This new international state of affairs compels imperialism to display particularly great activity and aggressiveness in the ideological field. But here again the historical initiative belongs to the scientific and consistently progressive Marxist-Leninist ideology. Its impetuous character is the result of the development of society itself, because the future belongs to Marxism-Leninism and to communism.
The scientific and revolutionary essence of MarxismLeninism and its innovating nature are not manifested spontaneously, by themselves. Their effectiveness depends upon the successful operation of progressive subjective factors and above all of the Marxist-Leninist ideological organizations and institutions in the socialist countries, as well as of the entire communist movement, which does not underestimate the possibilities of the reactionary forces speculating on the ideological front.
In the Programme of the Bulgarian Communist Party, adopted at the Tenth Congress, we read: 'The great principle of our Party remains immutable: no underestimation or playing down of the ideological struggle, no compromises in the ideological sphere, struggle 7 against bourgeois ideology until the complete triumpli of communist ideology' - (70, c. 79--80)^^*^^.
There is a wide spectrum of theories, conceptions, ideas and approaches used by the ideologists of imperialism today in their struggle against Marxism-Leninism, against the forces of peace, democracy and socialism, and in defence of capitalism. The ideological champions of the old world are particularly insistent in disseminating a few theories which, with certain modifications, can be popularized in the three kinds of countries--- capitalist, socialist and developing.
One of these is the theory of `convergence'. According to this theory, as a result of the scientific and technological revolution in the socialist and capitalist countries, a process of evening out the differences between the two opposite social systems is said to have already been set in motion. In this way, gradually, a complete unification and merging between socialism and capitalism is expected to be arrived at.
Such is also the theory of `de-ideologization', most often connected with the concept of `scientism'. Under the false slogan that each and every ideology should be rejected and replaced by a `scientific' approach to social phenomena, its champions are in fact only fighting against Marxism-Leninism.
Tho theory of pluralism also belongs in this category. It is used, on the one hand, as an argument to justify the ideological chaos in capitalist society, to prove the `eternal' nature of capitalism and to embellish formal bourgeois democracy. On the other hand, it is an expression of the endeavour to graft pluralistic con ceptions on to Marxism-Leninism and the socialist society. The temporary enlivenment of revisionism after the Second World War, which made its appearance under the conditions of a far-flung dissemination of the ideas of scientific socialism over every continent, is _-_-_
^^*^^The first figure refers to the number of the book in the List of Bibliography in the appendix. The pages are indicated as follows: the letter `c' stands for literature printed in the Cyrillic alphabet; the letter `p' for literature in English and in French and the letter `S'---for literature in German and Serbo-Croatian in the Latin alphabet
8 also taken advantage of to step up propaganda for the idea of the `pluralization' of Marxism and of the socialist social system.In this work we shall try to reveal the anti-scientific and reactionary nature of pluralistic conceptions in all ideological fields and in political life.
Against the background of the scientific, monistic and materialistic explanation which Marxism-Leninism gives of social development as a law-governed process, and relying on what has already been accomplished in this direction by other Marxists in the USSR, Bulgaria and other countries, we propose to show the anti-- scientific, eclectic character of the pluralistic conceptions in bourgeois philosophical and sociological thought, and to prove the inconsistency of the attempts, by means of pluralistic theorizing, to justify the social conflicts and flaws of the capitalist system.
Attempts to apply pluralistic conceptions to Marxism-Leninism and socialist society are profoundly reactionary in their class and political tendencies, and are hostile to the revolutionary and progressive forces in the world. `Pluralization' of Marxism subjectivizes proletarian ideology, reducing it to various ' interpretations' of the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. ' Pluralized' Marxism ceases to be the theoretical foundation of a science-based international strategy and tactical plan of the working class in the struggle for the overthrow of capitalist domination and the construction of socialism and communism. The unity of the international workers' and communist movement is thus expected to be shattered, and the movement to be contaminated with the poison of bourgeois nationalism. With the ' pluralization' of the socialist system the aim is to bring socialist society back to a social structure in which antagonisms will exist between different social strata and in which there will be power conflicts between different political parties, i.e. to a restoration of capitalism.
Contrary to the assertions of the pluralists, Marxism-Leninism develops creatively as a unified complex scientific theory, illuminating the path of mankind and leading to the overthrow of the exploiter 9 capitalist system and the construction of communism. In spite of the counteraction of bourgeois ideologists and revisionists, and in spite of their predictions of an `erosion' and `pluralization' of socialism, the socialist society in the individual countries and the world socialist system as a whole are with increasing success overcoming the centrifugal forces which drag them back.
The social, political and ideological unity of socialist society is becoming ever more firmly consolidated, and the solidarity of the international communist movement is growing. The attraction of Marxism-Leninism and of communism will irresistibly continue to grow, because they alone offer a correct solution to the complex problems posed by the objective needs of social development in our times.
[10] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ PART ONE __ALPHA_LVL1__ PLURALISM IN BOURGEOIS SOCIETY __NUMERIC_LVL2__ Chapter I. __ALPHA_LVL2__ PLURALISM IN BOURGEOISWhen Friedrich Engels wrote that the 'great fundamental question of every philosophy, and especially of more recent philosophy, is the question of the relation of thought to being', Marxism made an epoch-making discovery in philosophy (6, c. 282). It was only on the basis of this discovery that the scientific classification of the various philosophical schools, trends and systems became possible.
Proceeding precisely from the fundamental question of philosophy---the relations of matter to consciousness ---Engels showed that materialism and idealism constitute the two main trends in philosophy (7, c. 281). The scientific, materialistic solution of this question consists, as V.I. Lenin wrote, in the recognition that 'the existence of matter does not depend upon perception. Matter is primary. Perception, thought and consciousness are higher products of matter organized in a specific way. Such are the views of materialists in general and of Marx and Engels in particular'. (13, c. 48). And since, as G.V. Plekhanov said, 'the most consistent and most profound thinkers have always tended towards monism, towards explaining phenomena with the aid of one basic principle (monos in Greek meaning one,) (67, c. 510)---and only matter 11 and spirit, consciousness and ideas can be such basic principles, the history of philosophical thought in its profound essence has been above all a history of the struggle between the two fundamental philosophical trends---materialism and idealism.
The rise of dialectical and historical materialism meant the creation of a consistent scientific philosophy. Thereby, in the main, all former schools and trends in philosophy were theoretically refuted. Only Marxist philosophy was in fact capable of any real further development.
However, the decline and decay of the already refuted bourgeois philosophy, which was playing a reactionary ideological role, does not take place quickly and automatically. Neither does it -mean that to this day there still do not exist certain relatively progressive spontaneous materialistic and spontaneous dialectical concepts, especially among philosophically thinking natural scientists in the West.
In the historical development of human knowledge, the theories, ideas and views which are overthrown in principle by science do not disappear at once, automatically. Even when there are no social or class reasons for their maintenance, the ideas, theories and views rejected by theoretical thought put up a certain resistance. This resistance is put up in point of fact by the champions of these views and theories. Force of habit or inertia is the most active factor. The process itself of realizing the erroneousness of views shared in the past and the adoption of other views, different from the former, is very complicated. The situation becomes much more complicated when it is a question of ideas and views which directly or indirectly affect the interests of broad social strata, i.e. which have a social or class character.
Dialectical materialism^^*^^ as a new philosophical teaching is an inseparable, very general world view _-_-_
^^*^^For the sake of brevity, in most cases we shall use 'dialectical materialism' instead of 'dialectical and historical materialism' in referring to Marxist philosophy.
12 and methodological part of Marxism as a complex social theory illuminating all basic spheres of social life: economics, politics, morals, science and culture. Marxism as a consistently scientific and integrated theory of the development of society is at the same time a new ideology, the theoretical champion of the interests of the class which is most ruthlessly exploited, oppressed and deprived of rights in capitalist society--- the proletariat; an ideology, which is called upon to be a theoretical weapon in the hands of this class in the struggle for the historically inevitable overthrow of capitalism and the setting up of a classless communist society. This indissoluble unity between the two sides of Marxism---it is at the same time both a science and an ideology---is scientifically explained, historically true, socially based and progressive. However, it is unacceptable to bourgeois ideologists, mainly because of their class bias.In our times there are plenty of social and class factors to nurture the non-scientific and theoretically outdated bourgeois philosophy, which is in basic outline idealistic and anti-dialectical. Interest in the preservation of the non-scientific trends in philosophy stems from the ruling classes in the capitalist countries, and above all from those in the imperialist states. Support for anti-scientific bourgeois philosophy also comes from the remnants of the exploiter classes in the socialist countries.
Proceeding from what has been said thus far, we can draw the following conclusions. Dialectical and historical materialism is a philosophy of the revolutionary proletariat and of communist society in the process of construction.^^*^^ Idealism in all its varieties is today the philosophy of the bourgeoisie and moribund capitalism.
The above law-governed social and class polarization of philosophy in modern society reflects the actual state of affairs in broadest outline only. Besides _-_-_
^^*^^We have in mind the communist socio-economic formation, the first stage of which Ls socialism.
13 the two basic and opposing monistic trends--- materialism and idealism, there exist also intermediate, non-fundamental, less significant philosophical trends. Here we must first point out the views of philosophers trying to evade the question of the relation between matter and consciousness and most often taking up agnostic positions, i.e. who declare the nature of the world incognizable in principle. Akin to theirs in character is also the position of philosophers who consider the problem of whether the world is material or ideal in its essence as a `pseudo-problem', i.e. as a problem to which it is impossible and unnecessary to give an answer. Such in general outline is the position of positivism.There are also philosophical teachings which proclaim monism in its two forms---materialism and idealism---as false and one-sided, and maintain the view that more than one essence or substance lies at the bottom of being. These philosophical teachings are called pluralistic (from the Latin piiis, pluris, meaning more.)
In the past the most widespread form of philosophical pluralism was dualism, which proclaims matter and spirit as equally primary, mutually irreducible principles or substances. However, as Plekhanov very aptly pointed out, 'dualism has never been able to give a satisfactory answer to the inevitable question: in what way can the two separate substances which have nothing in common influence each other (67, c. 510).
The development of scientific knowledge in our times, especially of neurophysiology, psychology and psychiatry, offers ample and convincing proof of the constant interaction between physiological processes in the organism and man's spiritual life, or more precisely, of the material dependence of consciousness, as well as of the reverse effect of the psychic upon the vital functions of the organism. Under these circumstances, the positions of dualism become still more untenable. For this reason, among the philosophical 14 schools of our time, one increasingly rarely encounters supporters of dualism in.its pure form.
In the history of philosophical thought one comes across attempts at setting up pluralistic philosophical teachings in the strict sense of the word, such as put more than two essences or substances at the basis of the creation of the world.
Gradually, however, and mainly during the twentieth century, the term `pluralism' has acquired a broader meaning in bourgeois literature, as well as in the socio-political sphere in general. Writers began to use the term `pluralism' also for the presence of many theories, conceptions or ideological trends competing with one another, as well as for many classes, strata, groups and organizations with contradictory interests in bourgeois society. Thus, 'pluralism in philosophy' in this broader sense has come to mean not only the-pluralistic trend, but also the existence of a great number of philosophical trends, movements and schools---the materialistic trend, the various idealistic trends, positivism and other forms of eclecticism, including pluralistic philosophical trends in the narrow sense of the word.
It should be underlined straightway that not every diversity can be called pluralism. It is justifiable to define as pluralism in the broadest sense of the word those views of diversity in which the members or elements of a given plurality are examined as being essentially independent of each other, as being equal and not in a relation of subordination to each other, but as members' between which there is above all contradiction and competition. Marxism-Leninism, for instance, recognizes both the diversity in bourgeois society and the class struggle in its various forms, but it proves that bourgeois society is not pluralistic, because the capitalist class is predominant in it.
In many instances, however, the term `pluralism' is misused, being taken to designate variety in general. Thus, for instance V.Frank! writes that pluralism in the field of science consists in the fact that there exist many sciences, and not one single science (111, S. 374). 15 The existence of many sciences is not a pluralistic diversity, because the independence of the individual sciences is relative; among them there is a certain `hierarchy' as well as reciprocal dependence and transitions from one science into another. In this case we cannot speak either of complete independence of the individual sciences, or of a competitive struggle and confrontation between them.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 2. Nature and Varieties of Philosophical PluralismIn Marxist literature very little has been written on philosophical pluralism. Neither has any great attention been devoted in Marxist history to studies of the pluralistic trend or aspect in the works of a number of philosophers, including whole philosophical schools, such as pragmatism and personalism.
A scientific, Marxist description of philosophical pluralism was given by the Soviet philosopher I.Narskiy in a special article published in Vol. 4 of 'Filosophskaya Entsiklopedia' (Philosophical Encyclopedia): 'Pluralism is a view, according to which there are several or a multitude of substantial principles or kinds of being independent of each other. Pluralism is opposed to monism. In its nature it is an idealistic trend, which made its appearance in history as a modification of dualism, or as an attempt at an eclectic resolution of the contradictions of idealistic monism,' (60, c. 278).
The content of pluralism is revealed in a similar way also by Manfred Buhr (GDR): 'Designation of a kind of idealistic world views, which reject the unity of the world and instead of it proclaim diversity as a fundamental principle of reality. This diversity is conceived by pluralism as a multitude of independent essences or layers (components) of being, without, an inner link and not subordinated to any laws of mutual transformation' (96,8.854).
If we examine the above quotations, we might at first sight get the impression that there is some logical 16 contradiction in them. On the one hand, it is asserted that 'pluralism is counterposed to monism', i.e. to materialism and to idealism (because materialism and idealism are monistic philosophies). On the other hand, in both articles the link'between pluralism and idealism is stressed, with the respective nuances, I.Narskiy declares that in its essence pluralism is an idealistic trend. And M. Buhr simply characterizes pluralism as 'a kind of idealistic world views'.
In order to understand this apparent contradiction, one should take into consideration the following. There is no doubt that all adherents of pluralism reject monism, i.e. the view that there exists a uniform and single beginning or an original basis of the world. But subsequently there are substantial differences. Some pluralists think that their conception of a multitude of substances means a rejection at the same time of both materialism and idealism. But in the final count, they usually remain captured by idealism, or allowan eclectic combination of elements of idealism and materialism. Other adherents of pluralism think that the pluralistic: form offers them the possibility, while preserving the idealistic initial position, of overcoming certain fundamental difficulties of idealistic monism. They, therefore, openly preserve idealism, but reject its monistic form, the monistic interpretation of the diversity in the world.
From what has been said so far it can be seen that pluralism is an unfundamental, intermediate and eclectic trend in philosophy, which rejects the monistic, mainly materialistic, and in certain cases also the idealistic solution of the first, ontological aspect of the fundamental question of philosophy---the question of which is primary, matter or consciousness.
A pluralistic approach is also used by some bourgeois philosophers in the solution of the second, gnoseological side of the fundamental question of philosophy, the problem of knowledge of the world, of cognition. In this instance pluralism manifests itself mainly in the concept of the existence of 'many truths' for one and the same question.
__PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2.---0518 17An attempt at a systematic analysis of the content of the terms `monism' and pluralism^^1^^ and at classifying the kinds of pluralism has been made by Marvin Farber. He rightly indicates that there are two basic kinds of monism, materialistic and idealistic (the writer calls the latter spiritualism---Author's Note) (108, p. 149). Farber even manifests a certain inclination towards materialistic monism, admitting that 'physical reality' is the basis of objective reality. But at once he hastens to point out that 'monism in this sense should be conceived as a programme, not claimed as a finished solution'. (108, p. 156). In most cases, however, we notice in Farber an inclination towards positivism and, on this basis, towards `moderate' pluralism.
Farber does not adopt the monistic approach mainly because he cannot understand the dialectics between possibility and reality, between the formal (for instance, mathematical and logical truth) and the real. This can be seen in his statement that 'It is the idea of formal possibility that separates the formal from the real and which prevents their reduction to a common basis'. (108, p. 164).
Dialectical materialistic monism has correctly solved the problem of possibility and reality, as well as that of the formal truths of mathematics and logic and reality. The formal truths (mathematical, logical, etc.) are a manifestation of the universal. The universal (together with the particular, which is less universal) is a facet, an aspect of unique material objects, phenomena, processes. As V.I.Lenin pointed out, the common logical `figures' are a reflection, an abstraction of the most general, common relations between things. (14, c.168). There is no general (and particular) without the unique, just as there is no unique without the particular and general. That is why, contrary to Farber's assertion, 'the formal and the real' have a common basis, which is matter, or material reality.
Farber categorizes ontological (substantial) and logical (postulational) pluralism as major kinds of pluralism. Closely interwoven with them is causal pluralism.
18Ontological or substantial pluralism is that in connection with which we speak of more than one kind of substance. As an example Farber gives Descartes' view on the differentiation between matter, mind and God as different kinds of substance. Causal pluralism on the other hand recognizes the 'existence of more than one causal system, unrelated to one another causally.' (108, p. 165). If we proceed only from what has been said so far, we might think that Farber manifests no more than a certain inaccuracy in calling only substantial pluralism ontological, whereas in fact 'causal pluralism' is a further variety of ontological pluralism, while in this instance it is a question mainly of different `structures' or causal systems. The picture becomes more complex, however, when he examines the two basic kinds of pluralism: ontological and logical. He writes: 'A distinction should be drawn between ontological and logical pluralism, the latter meaning that there are distinct and irreducible systems of knowledge' (108, p. 155). But by 'distinct systems of knowledge' Farber understands the knowledge of qualitatively different fields of reality. Thus, he speaks of formal (mathematical and logical), physical, biological and social knowledge. Farber sees the difference between themin the 'diversity of types of organization', i.e. on the different basic forms of the motion of matter (108, p. 155, 156). But then, what Farber calls 'logical' pluralism affects not only the structure of knowledge but above all the structure of the cognitive, i.e. it is essentially identical with causal pluralism, which is in fact a form of ontological pluralism.
Farber goes on to speak of a relative autonomy of the four fields indicated as separate 'causal systems' which allegedly constitute the basis of ontological pluralism (108, p. 161, 162). But as a matter of fact, Farber finds it difficult to delimit the four basic causal systems as fields of reality: the formal, physical, biological and social, from their corresponding, as he says, logical systems or systems of knowledge. The confusion and difficulty in this instance are due to the fact that Farber rejects the theory of reflection. Thus for him at 19 one stage objective reality or `existence' is the correlate of our knowledge (108, p. 161) and at another stage the different fields or aspects of reality (causal systems) and their reflection in the human head (logical systems) prove to be identical.
In the field of knowledge, Farber also speaks of pluralism regarding the question of truth. 'Agnosticism, skepticism and pragmatic relativism have been pluralistic forms of denial of this view of truth' (of objective knowledge---Author's Note), Farber declares (108, p. 167). In fact it is here that he manifests pluralism with respect to the second, gnoseological side of the fundamental question of philosophy.
In analyzing certain stages in Farber's interesting, though internally contradictory attempt at systematizing the different kinds of pluralism, we have in part expounded our views on the question. There are two main kinds of pluralism: ontological and gnoseological, which are attempts at a non-monistic, i.e. pluralistic solution of the two main aspects of the fundamental question in philosophy. Ontological pluralism is an attempt at an `intermediate' or `third' solution to the question of which is primary: matter or consciousness; it is above all directed against the scientific, dialectical and materialistic solution to this question. Gnoseological pluralism, on the other hand, is one of the unscientific attempts to obtain a relativistic and subjectivistic answer to the problem of the cognizability of the world.
Within the framework of ontological pluralism, we distinguish first of all two main varieties: atomistic pluralism and structural pluralism. Under atomistic pluralism we include all philosophical teachings' which seek the 'ultimate basis' of reality in certain very simple, indivisible, etc. elements, particles and units. For some pluralists it is the endless variety of things and phenomena that constitute the 'neutral substance' and which in the process of practical and cognitive activity are differentiated as objective facts or subjective experiences (James), whereas for others they are monads (Leibniz), persons (personalism )or fact-atoms (Russell and Wittgenstein).
20Structural pluralism includes such philosophical teachings, which maintain the view that there exist several substances or independent foundations of being, which above all differ from each other in their structure. Among these are the different `strata' of 'realities (realms) of being' (N.Hartmann, G.Santayana) or separate `worlds' (K.Popper).
Within the system of gnoseological pluralism the pragmatic concept of 'many truths' is of the greatest significance. This is in fact the main methodological basis of the different forms of ideological pluralism.
The rejection of the thesis of the objectivity of truth and the maintenance of the view that on every question, depending upon the interests of individual groups and persons, there may be a great multitude of`truths', serves precisely as a theoretical and methodological basis for recognizing the right of existence of a countless number of schools, trends and `isms' in philosophy and in all other fields of ideology.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 3. Gnoseological and Social RootsIn the historical development of philosophical thought pluralism has not taken the form of a separate philosophical school. It usually represents an aspect, a facet of the work of individual philosophers and of the respective schools and trends.
The possibility of using pluralism as an ideological weapon against Marxism-Leninism and communism explains the great attention devoted to the pluralistic trend in the history of philosophy in modern bourgeois literature. In many cases this trend is exaggerated because of the wish of the representatives of bourgeois philosophy under the present conditions to make more active use of pluralism against dialectical materialism.
The increased influence and significance of pluralism in the development of philosophical thought was already pointed out more than half a century ago by Julius Goldstein, who in an introductory article to the German edition of William James' work A Pluralistic Universe wrote: 'Pluralism is the concluding stage 21 of the development which began in the 16th century with a tendency of philosophical thought towards experimentation' (118, S. XVI). This evaluation of the development of philosophical thought in the last few centuries is exaggerated. The main result of the direction of philosophy in the last few centuries towards ' experimentation' is the appearance of dialectical and historical materialism, and not of pluralism.
The significance of pluralism in bourgeois philosophy in the first half of our century is pointed out by the well-known champion of capitalism and opponent of Marxism, Josef M.Bochenski. He writes: 'Contemporary philosophers are usually pluralists in revolt against the idealistic or materialistic monism of the 19th century.Thereare some even here, both Alexander among the metaphysicians and Croce among the idealists being monists. But they are a minority whose influence is obviously diminishing'. (92, p.37). Bochenski has in this connection intentionally `omitted' the most important and widespread kind of monistic philosophy---dialectical materialism. Later, there are some ten pages in which he recognizes and stresses the monism and determinism in Marxist philosophy, but presents them in a simplistic and caricaturistic manner, as he does dialectical materialism in general. But even if we take into consideration only bourgeois European philosophy, we find that Bochenski exaggerates the pluralistic influence in it.
The increased impact of philosophical pluralism on contemporary bourgeois philosophy was also noted in an exaggerated manner in the Philosophical Dictionary of the West-German Kroner Publishing House, in 1965. 'Contemporary (bourgeois, added by the author, A.K.) philosophy, in rejecting monism, is pluralistic in its basic features. It recognizes a plurality of independent, often personified essences'. (150, S. 468).
It is not true that in contemporary, or even only in bourgeois philosophy, all `monism' is rejected. It is true, however, that pluralistic tendencies in open of disguised form can be found in the works of many representatives of almost all main trends of contemporary 22 bourgeois philosophical thought: pragmatism, phenomenology, neo-Thomism, personalism, existentialism, neo-realism, neo-positivism.
Pluralism, being one of the non-fundamental trends in philosophy has not only social, but also gnoseological roots. As a starting point in proceeding to reveal them, we shall use Lenin's profound analysis of the gnoseological roots of idealism. In Lenin's 'Philosophical Copybooks' we read: 'Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a curved line, very similar to a number of circles, to a spiral. Every segment, part, or section of this curve can be transformed (unilaterally transformed) into an independent, whole, straight line, which (if the forest cannot be seen for the trees) leads to the swamp, the priesthood (where the class interests of the ruling classes fasten it). Straightforwardness and one-sidedness, stagnancy and ossification, subjectivism and subjective blindness ---voila (there you have) the gnoseological roots of idealism'. (14, c. 361). One-sidedness, ossification and subjectivism in the cognitive process lie at the basis not only of idealism, but also of all false and anti-scientific attempts to find a`third'eclectic or agnostic answer to the fundamental question of philosophy, as well as to pluralism. For us in this instance the most important thing is to indicate which moment, which part of the complex curve, representing knowledge, is turned into a straight line by pluralism.
The main fact, the one-sided and exaggerated reflection on the cognitive process of which lies at the basis of idealism, is the relative independence and active role of man's consciousness, its capacity to exert (as a property of the human brain) a reverse impact on material existence. If we approach the question in the same way, wecome'tothe conclusion that at the basis of the pluralistic conception of the world lies the genuine diversity in reality---the presence of qualitatively different fields or spheres of objective reality, in which specific laws are in action that cannot be reduced to one another, as well as the existence of an endless diversity of objects, processes and phenomena, with 23 their specific distinguishing features. Exaggeration, swelling, treating diversity and the qualitative differences in objective reality as absolute, denying, or at least failing properly to evaluate the law-governed relation and the transitions between qualitatively different and relatively autonomous fields of reality---herein, above all, lies the gnoseological basis of philosophical pluralism. A metaphysical disruption between absolute and relative truth, etc. also takes place in this case.
As to the social roots of pluralism, the main question is that of the social interests which can be satisfied by the pluralistic philosophical teachings in a class society.
We have already pointed out that in the present-day setup, the struggle between dialectical materialism and idealism in all its varieties is in the final count a philosophical manifestation of the ideological struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between socialism and capitalism. As G.A.Kursanov justly points out, 'modern bourgeois philosophy and the modern bourgeois worldview are characterized by idealism and metaphysics with a negative attitude towards the cognition of objective truth.' (46, c.138). This is true, but it is not the whole truth. That is why Kursanov rightly points out that in a setup where the traditional bourgeois philosophical schools and systems are going through a crisis, there arises a tendency to look for 'third ways', i.e. of `convergence', of an eclectic mixing up of different and even contradictory ideas and conceptions (46, c. 139). He enumerates positivism, personalism, existentialism, and the 'humanized Marxism' of E.Fischer,R.Garaudy and A.Lefevre as different forms of manifestation of 'philosophical convergence'. In his work, however, G.Kursanov fails to underline that, under the conditions prevailing now, pluralism has also become one of the characteristic forms of looking for a third way in bourgeois ideology and in philosophy in particular.
We can in general say that the non-fundamental trends in philosophy roughly express the interests and moods of the non-fundamental classes and strata of 24 society. Under capitalism these strata* are the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the other middle urban strata, among whom.the intelligentsia plays an ever more important role. Insofar as the non-fundamental philosophical trends try to `conciliate' or to overcome the contradictions between the two main parties in the modern philosophicalstruggle---dialectical materialism and idealism, they can reflect tendencies of individual conciliatory, reformist sectors in the main classes in capitalist society---the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Under the present conditions, dialectical materialism is becoming an ever more dangerous opponent to all bourgeois ideology and to its idealistic philosophical basis, and its impact is growing irrepressibly. In this situation every non-Marxist trend in philosophy can be and is used in the struggle against Marxism-Leninism.
Pluralism, which recognizes the presence of a smaller or larger number of independent (while competing in the social sphere!) substances, truths, social strata, etc. under the present conditions assumes tremendous importance for the bourgeoisie. Precisely because the materialistic-monistic view of the world and social life in particular is a basic, theoretical and methodological principle in Marxism, pluralism as a 'middle path' in philosophy proves a very convenient form for combating dialectical and historical materialism. In the socio-political sphere of Marxist-Leninist theory concerning classes and the class struggle, the bourgeois ideologists today come forward with their own concep-. tion of the 'disappearance of the classes', an 'incomes revolution', and the like. In a similar manner in the field of philosophy, side by side with the defence of idealism and the outspoken rejection of dialectical and historical materialism, 'increasing significance is attached to various philosophical hybrids, in which pluralism, in a visible or invisible form assumes an ever greater place.
Some of the representatives of the reactionary forces are most inclined to turn to the 'middle path', or 'third way' in philosophy and in ideology in general, to preserve the supremacy of the dying class, when the 25 reactionary system is going through a profound crisis and the forces which are the bearers of progress and of the new social system, are exerting ever greater pressure. Such is precisely the case with the utilization of pluralism and a number of other conformist or convergent theories by the ideologists of imperialism today.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 4. Major RepresentativesLet us briefly mention a few of the major representatives of pluralism'in bourgeois philosophy in the imperialist phase of the development of capitalism.
Philosophical pluralism in its two basic aspects--- ontological and gnoseological---sprang up at the end of the last and the beginning of the present century in the form of American pragmatic philosophy. In its essence pragmatism is a subjective idealistic philosophical trend. William James (1842--1910), one of the founders of pragmatism, attempted, through his pluralistic conceptions, as far as possible to round off the rough edges of subjective idealism, and formally to rise `above' materialism and idealism.
The pluralistic conceptions of James are most thoroughly developed in his book A Pluralistic Universe. Although James claims to be an adherent of empiricism, which he counterposes to 'speculative metaphysics' his method of investigation is mechanistic and metaphysical. It is this limited method that faces James with the dilemma: he must choose between the general, totality, 'the absolute', the integrated, i.e. monism, and the single, the diverse, the individual, i.e. `pluralism'. James is unable to understand the dialectical link between the general and the individual, between unity and diversity, etc. That is why tie finds himself compelled to reject the totality, i.e. monism in the world, in order to accept and uphold the unitary and individual things and processes, i.e. `pluralism'.
The style and terminology of James are not very familiar to the contemporary reader, but nevertheless, let us take a quotation: 'While the philosophy of the 26 absolute agrees that substance attains its complete divinity only in the form of totality, . . . the pluralistic view, to which I give precedence, is inclined to accept. . . that the substance of reality can never be perceived as a complete unity. . . and that a distributive form of reality---the unitary form, is also logically admissible and empirically acceptable'. (126, S. 17--18).
If we set aside the question of divinity, which James recognizes, the author here seems to be warring only against the extreme philosophy of the absolute, against the concept of the substance of reality as 'complete, absolute unity'. And the pluralistic view is represented only as a view for which James displays an ' inclination'. This, however, only seems to be so.
A strict logical analysis of the views of James leads to the following conclusions. Firstly, that the monistic view of the world is presented and stigmatized as a 'philosophy of the absolute'. Materialistic monism is placed here in the same boat as absolute idealism. Secondly, the objective existence of real things and processes is denied and is reduced to the level of the 'logically permissible' and the 'empirically admissible', i.e. it is questioned.
On this basis James carries on his further pluralistic operations in the following way: Everything which is polarized in the process of cognition and in the practical activity as object and subject is proclaimed by James to be a 'neutral substance', which is neither material nor ideal. This 'neutral substance', the object of experience and practice, which is in fact the sum total of things, phenomena and processes in the entire objective reality and the subjective experiences of every man, constitutes for James `plurality' and diversity. By their `neutrality', according to the author, both idealism and materialism are rejected. It is on this anti-scientific, subjective basis that James proposes a purely practical deal: in view of the advantages offered, we should look for reality where it promises most favourable results: among the individual things of what is directly given to us. (126, S. 82). Thus, James in a peculiar way gives support to subjectivist arbitrariness.
27Dialectical materialism, being completely opposed to pluralism, is a monistic philosophical teaching which maintains that the unity of the world consists' in its material character (F. Engels). But at the same time dialectical materialism recognizes the tremendous variety of things and phenomena in objective reality, as well as in subjective, spiritual human experiences. Dialectical materialism moreover shows that a lawgoverned reciprocal link exists between qualitatively differing things, that all of them are different structural forms of the single moving matter, that qualitative transitions take place between them and that mental phenomena are secondary to material phenomena. In James' pluralistic structure things and phenomena, including all material and mental processes, are arranged side by side, and are not related in a reciprocally dependent whole.
In pragmatism (mainly in James) ontological pluralism develops, though in a not very clearly expressed, `atomistic' form. `Atoms' are `neutral', i.e. they' are neither material nor ideal individual things and phenomena.
Methodologically, the most important and most thoroughly elaborated aspect of pluralism among pragmatists is its gnoseological aspect---the conception of the `plurality' of truths, on the basis of reducing truth to utility. We shall return to this a little later.
The atomistic form of pluralism is also a feature of the theories of the champions of personalism. Contrary to Hegel's idealistic monism, according to which the essence of the world is the 'absolute idea'.thepersonalists consider the person---the active, will-powered person ---as the basic manifestation of existence and the main ontological category. The person and his experience is the only reality, according to personalism. Subjective idealism is avoided by proclaiming the world and all persons as a manifestation of the creative activity of God. I. Balakina and K. Dolgov rightly point out the influence of Leibniz's philosophy on the pluralism of the personalists. The person as a basic ontological category 28 in the latter in many respects recalls Leibniz's monads. (17, c. 243).
T. A. Sakharova and I.I. Kravchenko single out Edgar Brightman and Ralph Flewelling (1871--1960) as representatives of `pluralistic' personalism. Physical reality, according to Flewelling, is something derivative from the person, and 'the atom, insofar as we may know it, is a construction of the mind'. (73, c. 77). The pluralistic trend in an atomistic form is also manifested in existentialism, and most clearly in the conception of the person as an ontological reality. Society and subsequently all objective reality are examined only as conditions for the realization of the person.
The structural form of ontological pluralism also has its representatives among the bourgeois philosophers of the 20th century.
The structural approach in the pluralistic conception of the German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882-- 1950) is particularly pronounced. Hartmann stands up against the strong influence of subjectivism and irrationalism in modern bourgeois philosophy, a fact, which in itself is a positive phenomenon. However, his struggle is not effective, because it is waged from unscientific and ultimately idealistic standpoints---from standpoints at first akin to neo-Kantian rationalism, and later to critical realism.
Proceeding from such a basis, Hartmann wrongly thinks that not only idealism, but also materialism, is one-sided. As A. Myslivchenko points out, according to Hartmann, philosophical monism leads to an oversimplified picture of the world (58, c. 326).
The main features in N. Hartmann's ontological teaching, which characterize his pluralism, are the conceptions concerning the basic spheres of existence and the schistous structure of actual reality. According to Hartmann, being includes in the first place two primary `spheres' or fields, independent of man's consciousness---the spheres of ideal being and of real being or actual reality (27, c. 35). Although Hartmann changed his views on ideal being---considering it at 29 first as having 'equal independence' with actual reality, then maintaining towards the end of his life that ideal being was 'incomplete, and its independence very limited', this dualism weighs heavily upon all his philosophy (27. c. 53).
The explanation given by Hartmann of the relation between ideal and real being, reveals the objective and idealistic,! Platonistic and Hegelian tendency of his dualism. Ideal being functions, according to Hartmann, as a kind of basic structure in actual reality: those are the most general laws and forms of objective reality and of society, hypostatized as ideal essences existing outside them.
The dualism between ideal and real being is supplemented with a more developed pluralism in the teaching about the schistous structure of actual reality. Under the influence of the achievements of the natural sciences and dialectical materialism, Hartmann considers inorganic nature, living matter, the psyche (in animals and man) and man's consciousness as four main `layers' or `strata' of actual reality. He justly points out that there exists on the one hand a dependence of the higher stratum upon the lower and, on the other hand, irreducibility of the higher stratum to the lower (for example, irreducibility of life to physicochemical processes, etc.). However, Hartmann proclaims the transitions between layers or strata to be 'incognizable, irrational'. Moreover, in pointing out that the higher stratum cannot be reduced to the lower, he does not show that the higher stratum arises from the lower in the process of its development (27, c. 49).
The organic world, however, arises and develops from the inorganic world. The psyche, i.e. the soul, also comes into being as a specific property of a certain part of living matter---the nervous system, and at a certain stage in the development of living organisms. Man's consciousness also comes into being in the process of the gradual evolution of one species in the animal kingdom, the anthropoid ape, into a social being, into man. Yet Hartmann, as we have pointed out, says nothing on the question of the emergence of 30 the higher from the lower, and considers the transitions between them as incognizable and irrational.
The transitions from one kind of structure to a different, higher kind of structure of matter, from one form of motion to a different, higher form of motion of matter, are very complicated. These transitions are accompanied by the coming into being of entirely new properties of matter: life, psyche, consciousness. All details, all `secrets' of these profound qualitative leaps in nature have not yet been discovered by science. But that such qualitative transitions do take place, that in this case it is a question of the emergence of new properties of matter which is organized in a new way, and that there is nothing irrational and incognizable in these transitions, has long ago been established by science. For its proper philosophical interpretation, however, dialectical-materialistic thinking is necessary, and this is seen to be lacking in Hartmann.
The conception of being of George Santayana (1863-- 1952) must also be categorized as structural pluralism.
A Spaniard by birth, Santayana spent the first half of his creative life in the USA, as a result of which he is considered one of the classical figures in modern American philosophy. Santayana elaborated his pluralistic ontological conception during the second half of his creative life, after he left the USA. In a four-volume work entitledRealms of Being, published between 1927 and 1940 he developed the thought that existence contained four fields, which he calls `realms': the realms of essence, matter, truth and the mind. It is these four `fields' or `realms' of being that Santayana proclaimed as primary, ontological realities (21, c. 115, 116). Two of the basic realms of being in Santayana's philosophy---essence and truth---are logical abstractions. In their definition as individual realities the influence of Platonism and Hegelianism makes itself felt.
According to Santayana, matter alone is substance and gives rise to the whole diversity of the outer world. As a consequence of this formulation, Santayana is considered a materialist. But the fundamental, highest 31 reality, in his opinion is the 'realm of essence' which realm is ideal and immaterial. That is why, although Santayana calls one of the 'realms of being' matter, substance, in the structure of his ontological system it is only one of the four foundations of being or `realities'. Moreover, matter is such a `reality' whose qualitative features are in the final count determined by the remaining three, the `non-substantial' realities.
Among the representatives of structural pluralism we must also include the modern English philosopher Karl Raymond Popper (born 1902), one of the most prominent champions of logical positivism.
In his paper 'On the Theory of the Objective Mind', read at the 14th International Congress of Philosophy in Vienna in 1968, Popper switched from subjective idealism towards objective idealism of a Platonic type. From these new, objective-idealistic positions Popper stood up against the different 'variations on the theme of body-mind dualism' in Western philosophy and against the 'main deviations' from this dualism, which were expressed in efforts to have it replaced by 'some kind of monism' (151, p. 25) and passed on to pluralist positions.
Popper in this instance turns the actual relations between the various trends in philosophy upside down. He presents dualism as the basic content of Western philosophy, and monism, i.e. materialism and idealism, is considered by him as `deviations' from dualism. One essential fact makes itself felt in these reasonings of Popper---the former neo-positivist has arrived at the conclusion that the fundamental question which philosophy has to decide is the question of `substance', of the relation between 'body and mind', i.e. between matter and consciousness. Thereby he in fact gives up the general positiyist thesis that the fundamental question of philosophy, the question of the reciprocal relation between matter and consciousness is a ' pseudoproblem' .
Indeed, how is Popper's switch towards pluralism expressed?
32Popper proceeds from a peculiar pluralistic interpretation of Platonic objective idealism. He majces a preliminary reservation that for him there is no difference whether Plato is correctly interpreted in this case---he takes the idea itself as a starting point for his conception. According to this interpretation, three ontological principles are recognized as existing independently, which Popper also calls 'three worlds': the physical world or the world of physical things; the mental world, i.e. the world of people's personal mental experiences; and the world of ideas, considered as, 'the objective content of thinking'; i.e. the mathematical and scientific theories, the logical content of assertions, of language. (151, p. 25--27).
Popper proclaims the 'third world' which according to Plato and others is supernatural and divine, to be a 'human affair', i.e. the result of thought. But this world of ideas according to Popper is also objectively real and autonomous. The peculiar character of the relation between the 'three worlds' is expressed in the fact that the first (the physical world) and the third (the world of ideas) interact with each other only through the second world---through subjective human experience, through what occurs in man's consciousness.
If we compare the 'three worlds' of Popper with the four `strata' of Hartmann and the four `realms' of Santayana, we shall see that in fact Popper's construction is a combination of the two. Like Santayana, Popper hypostatizes the general in objective reality as a separate ideal world. On the other hand, like Hartmann, he separates nature (living and non-living) and subjective human experiences into different `worlds'.
In Popper again, pluralism proves to be an attempt at overcoming the impasse of subjective idealism. But the single correct solution to this impasse has already been found . It is dialectical materialism. Popper, however, is far removed from both materialism and dialectics. His attempt to combine objective idealism with a recognition of the reality of the material world _and man's psyche in the form of pluralism collapses. __PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3.---0518 33 His efforts to resurrect in a peculiar way the Platonic and scholastic conceptions of an independent real existence of the general in things and phenomena, apart from them, outside of them and parallel with them, are futile and reactionary, because they repeat old deceptions, which have long since been refuted by scientific philosophical thought.
Theneo-Thomistic teaching of a plurality of substances is also akin to structural pluralism. For the neoThomists the conception of a multitude of substances is directed both against the monism of materialism and against pantheism (the latter recognizes a single, essentially spiritual substance), and against dualism. In fact, the neo-Thomists accept the existence of a single absolute substance, which is God. However, according to them, there also exist other substances, created by God, which only God can destroy. On this basis the neoThomist natural philosophy examines nature as a hierarchy of many existences, which have their substance: water, bread, man, etc. Relations between kinds are, therefore, raised to the position of substantiality (61, c. 50--51).
Our brief analysis of the two basic forms---atomistic and structural---in which ontological pluralism manifests itself, has shown its main weaknesses as an attempt to create such a picture of the world as would avoid the monistic and above all the materialistic solution of the question concerning the primary relation of priority between matter and consciousness. To a greater or lesser extent all ontological pluralistic conceptions prove to be artificial constructions, revealing a non-scientific, eclectic and subjectivistic character. They are all in outright contradiction with reality. Indeed, the basic position of pluralism, postulating many essences, substances or `structures', independent of one another and not found in hierarchical subordination is untenable.
The relative independence of the second, gnoseological aspect, of the fundamental question in philosophy, that of the cognizability of the world and the essence of knowledge, is also manifested in 34 pluralism. Let us stress, moreover, that ontological pluralism is not always combined with gnoseological pluralism, and vice versa.
A starting point in pragmatism for formulating a pluralistic conception with respect to knowledge is the mixing up and in essence the identification of truth with usefulness, which was maintained already by its founder, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839--1914). The same thesis is also defended by John Dewey (1859--1952) one of the most prominent representatives of pragmatic philosophy, who also gave it a new name---that of instrumentalism, mainly through his subjectivistic interpretation of knowledge. In a most pronounced form, however, gnoseological pluralism manifests itself in James and Schiller, and that is why we shall restrict ourselves to examining them.
Proceeding from the identification of truth with usefulness, which is characteristic of pragmatism, and failing to understand the dialectical relation between absolute and relative truth, as well as between truth and deception, James draws a crude subjective conclusion on the existence of many truths for one and the same question, depending upon the viewpoint, and more precisely upon usefulness and advantage.
This is how Thomas Hill summarizes, with quotations from James, his subjectivistic and on this basis `pluralistic' view of identifying truth with usefulness: 'The pragmatist recognizes thaF"our duty to look for the truth is part of our general duty to do what is advantageous'', that "the aspiration for truth does not impose any other obligations except those imposed by the aspiration for good health and prosperity" and that this duty is fulfilled in 'concrete advantages obtained by us'. (81, c. 294).
James explains this above-mentioned anti-scientific view of truth in the following statement pn theology: 'If theological ideas prove to be of value for real life, for pragmatism they are truths' (82, c. 47). Of course, theological ideas are of value, and of great value, for the domination and `business' of the exploiter classes 35 in all class societies. But the fact that they are useful for a given class does not turn these ideas into truths.
James realized to a great extent the untenability of his position, and that is why in his lectures he declared: 'I realize how strange some of you may find it when I say that an idea is ``true''insofar as it is believed to'be useful for our life. Is this not an abuse of the word `truth'? (82, c. 49). The whole development of science, together with the social practice of mankind reaffirms the fact that when truth is identified with usefulness and advantage, there is an abuse of the concept of ``truth''.
The progressive forces in society, and especially the working class are interested in a thorough discovery of the laws of all natural and social phenomena and processes. That is why it can be said that truth---in the sense of correct knowledge---is always useful to them, without treating the two concepts as identical. However this is not so in the case of the reactionary forces. For them in many instances, especially in social life, flagrant untruths are advantageous, and that is why they stubbornly support them. It is this aspect of the question that James and pragmatists in general fail to take into consideration when they identify truth with usefulness.
As we have already mentioned, the pluralistic view of truth is also championed by another prominent representative of pragmatism, F.C.S. Schiller (1864--1937). U. Melville has made a very brief and exact analysis of the views of Schiller on this question and that is why we permit ourselves to reproduce it almost word for word. According to Schiller, as Melville explains it, truth is an answer to a question concerning a concrete, cognizing man and, namely, 'the best answer for the time being'. That is why, according to F.C.S. Schiller, truth cannot be one. It must be referred to one or another time and place, to people and their intentions (158, p. 51, 52). Every man, according to Schiller, has a truth of his own, which is such as long as it satisfies him (49, c. 353-- 354).
36As can be seen, Schiller has failed to understand the concreteness of truth, as a reflection of the correctness of the same objectively real things and processes which are reflected in knowledge. But as soon as these things and processes change (depending upon a change in the conditions determining them), our knowledge ( = the truth) about them must also of necessity change. But the truth about a concrete thing under certain conditions is and can be only one. It can be attained in a more profound or else in a one-sided, partial way. This is a different question. Our knowledge of one and the same thing deepens incessantly, but it does not follow from this that as a result 'many truths' are obtained. Truth, being the true knowledge of a given thing, is one, although it may be incessantly developing, expanding, becoming richer and more exact.
The study of the forms and manifestations of pluralism in the gnoseological teachings of the different trends in modern bourgeois philosophy is an important task, deserving of special attention. Every philosophical trend which denies objective truth, i.e. the cognizability of the world in principle, unless it stands on the positions of complete agnosticism, stands to a greater or lesser extent close to the pluralistic interpretation of truth.
As the Soviet philosopher M.B. Mitin points out, the teaching of the conventional or conditional character of the prerequisites (postulates, axioms, etc.) of the different scientific theories, which is upheld by most of the trends in modern neo-positivism, is a starting point for a pluralistic interpretation of knowledge, in the spirit of the well-known conclusion of James: 'As many as are the starting points, so many are also the truths'. (52, c. 337). Conventionalism, for instance, leads to pluralistic conclusions in the philosophy of its founder Henri Poincare (1860--1934) and to linguistic conventionalism in that of Rudolf Carnap (1891--1971), the last outstanding representative of neo-positivism from the Vienna circle.
Both the pragmatic identification of truth with usefulness and positivistic conventionalism---and in 37 general all forms of gnoseological pluralism---are above all directed against the theory of reflection, which lies at the basis of the dialectical and materialistic teaching of the cognizability of the world and objective truth.
The pluralistic conception of truth among the pragmatists, based on identifying truth with usefulness, and advantage, can be called gnoseological utilitarianism. Proceeding from this term and from our analysis of gnoseological pluralism among the pragmatists and certain neopositivists, -we may conclude that gnoseological utilitarianism (James) and gnoseological conventionalism (Carnap) represent two varieties or forms of gnoseological pluralism.
It can be seen from the above that philosophical pluralism in its two main varieties---ontological and gnoseological---is in the final count above all directed against materialism. In all pluralistic conceptions examined by us we have found that their stand against monism does not in fact mean a rejection of idealism and is usually connected with open or disguised support for it.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 5. Pluralism in Bourgeois Social Philosophy andIf materialism in the field of general philosophical theory is as old as philosophy itself, this is not so in the field of social phenomena. It is a well-known fact that even the most outstanding materialist philosophers up to Marx, including Ludwig Feuerbach, continued in the main to uphold idealistic positions in the field of social phenomena. 'No one contests the great importance of the means of labour. . . but the means of labour are invented and used by man. . . The efforts of the mind are the cause, the development of the productive forces ---the effect. Hence, mind is the prime mover of historical progress, and those are therefore right who assert that opinions rule the world, i.e. that the world is ruled by man's reason'. This was how G.V. Plekhanov 38 formulated the salient feature of the idealistic conceptions of the development of society, which predominated throughout philosophical and socio-political literature up to the appearance of Marxism (67, c. 611).
It is not our task here to examine the way in which those prerequisites were formed, which enabled Marx and Engels to bring to a conclusion the revolutionary change in philosophy by creating dialectical materialism and giving a dialectical materialistic explanation of society and of social life. In this connection it is important to underline that the appearance of historical materialism as part of scientific philosophy meant at the same time the creation of a radical turning point in the development of all social sciences, especially of sociology, political economy and history.
The disciplines of history and political economy had been given their form, though on inconsistent scientific foundations, far before the appearance of Marxism. Dialectical and historical materialism created the solid basis for their definite transformation into consistent sciences which reveal the structure, mechanisms and laws of phenomena in the respective fields of social life. However, this was not the case with sociology.
The most general theoretical problems of social life and society in the past were dealt with first of all by philosophy, and more particularly by a part of philosophy called philosophy of history. In second place these problems were studied by historical science. General theoretical problems of society had also been treated to a certain extent in works devoted to the political and state structure of society. The French philosopher Auguste Comte (1793--1857), one of the founders of the positivist trend in philosophy, was the first to use the term sociology, and is considered as one of the founders of bourgeois sociology. Credit is due to Comte for having upheld the idea that a separate theoretical science of society was necessary. However, his positivistic philosophical starting point did not allow him to get a firm foothold on solid methodological ground in formulating the new discipline.
39Comte came forward with a theoretical conception according to which human society in its development had passed through three stages: the theological stage, which was characterized by the fact that people explained all phenomena by the action of supernatural, divine causes; the metaphysical stage, during which people explained processes and phenomena by the action of different `essences' and `causes' and a positive stage, when under the influence of the developing sciences people began to explain social phenomena scientifically. The idea of the three stages of social development was not originally Comte's, but was borrowed from his teacher, Saint Simon. Essentially, this conception is idealistic. The new stages in the development of society, according to this conception, were brought about by idealistic causes---by changes in the method of thinking and of explaining the various phenomena.
Even during Comte's lifetime, the dialectical materialistic and monistic theory of the character of human society, its motive forces and the laws of its development was created by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. As V.I. Lenin points out, Karl Marx 'was the first to place sociology on scientific foundations, by establishing the concept of a socio-economic formation ---as a sum total of given production relations, and establishing that the development of such formations is a natural and historical process' (10, c. 124--125). However, Comte's sociological theory remained to the end idealistic and metaphysical, and was not in the least influenced by the revolution effected by Marxism in social science.
Scientific Marxist sociological theory developed for nearly a whole century mainly within the framework of dialectical and historical materialism, and partly within the third component part of Marxism---- scientific communism. The problem of the development of Marxist sociology as a separate theoretical science dealing with the general laws of the functioning and development of human society is closely linked with the question of the place of ethics and aesthetics in the 40 integrated system of Marxism-Leninism. Among Marxist philosophers and sociologists, in Bulgaria in particular, over the last two decades the view has gained ground that sociology can with good reason be separated from dialectical and historical materialism and assume the form of a separate theoretical science dealing with the structure and the most general laws of human society. A pioneer of this view is Todor Pavlov, who, proceeding from general Marxist-Leninist principles in establishing the objects and purposes of the various sciences, defended the view as early as the thirties in the first edition of his major work The Theory of Reflection (65, c. 394--395). Pavlov also defended and developed this view in his later worke. The same view is maintained and supported in the works of Zh. Oshavkov, N. Iribadjakov, V. Dobriyanov and other Bulgarian writers. This is also the view of the author, and we shall be guided by it in our further discussions.
Irrespective of whether they accept the view of delimiting sociology as a very general separate science concerned with society, distinct from historical materialism, or whether they consider historical materialism and sociology as identical, all MarxistLeninists are unanimous on the point that Marxist philosophical and sociological theory is the only scientific: theory dealing with human society and the laws of its development which has a consistent monistic character. From among the most important features or elements which characterize Marxist-Leninist monistic philosophical and sociological theory, let us point out the following: social consciousness is the result of social life, i.e. the material life of society, whose most salient feature is the mode of production; parallel with the development of society, the reverse impact of social consciousness on social life increases; the role of the implements of labour is decisive in changing socioeconomic formations; another decisive factor is the role of the economic basis with respect to the political, ideological and cultural superstructure, and the growing reverse impact of the superstructure on the economic basis; the various organized subjective 41 factors of social development in class societies, and above all the state and the political parties, are dependent upon the socio-economic system; the fact that the active role of the progressive subjective factors in the development of society is constantly increasing.
The basic principle of historical materialism, that social life gives rise to social consciousness, is a logical inference from the dialectical-materialistic solution of the fundamental question in philosophy. In the same way, the main thesis of idealism in the social sphere--- that ideas are the main motive force in social life, is a logical inference from the idealistic solution to the fundamental question in philosophy, which, moreover, is a inference equally acceptable to both objective and subjective idealists. What is more, the thesis of the determining role of ideas in social life is also fully acceptable to philosophical dualism, in which matter is usually the passive principle and mind the active principle.
We have seen, however, that idealism as a philosophical weapon of the bourgeoisie is losing its attraction at present, both under the influence of the successes achieved by the world socialist system, and because of the positive impact of certain law-governed processes in capitalist society itself, connected with the development of the scientific and technical revolution. A number of major changes which have set in and are gaining ground first in practice and then also in social theory in the countries of state monopoly capitalism, increasingly undermine any open-hearted defence of the thesis that 'ideas rule the world'. In particular, there is the ever more intensive forecasting, programming and planning in economics and other new fields, and the powerful impact of electronic and cybernetic technology on social life.
In the states of the imperialist camp, the predominant ideology continues to be idealism in its different variants. Not one of the bourgeois idealistic social theories, however, is in a position to give a reasonable and convincing explanation of the central fact in our epoch: the rapid upswing of communism 42 and the steady decline of capitalism. The practical activity of the leading bodies of the imperialist states, however, is hardly based on idealistic social theories, which have mainly a propaganda value. On the contrary, this activity itself could rather serve to refute the idealistic maxim that 'ideas rule the world', and it indirectly also proves the Tightness of MarxismLeninism.
These circumstances lead us to ask ourselves the question: In what way are the pluralistic philosophical teachings which we examined in the preceding paragraph refracted in the field of social philosophy? Or, more precisely, what pluralistic theories of society are put forward by the contemporary bourgeois philosophers and sociologists, which in most cases only formally, in words, oppose the idealistic line in bourgeois philosophical and social thought that is losing influence, and are in effect directed mainly against Marxi sm-Leninism.?
Idealistic inferences can also be drawn from pluralistic ontological conceptions in the field of social philosophy. This explains why quite a few bourgeois philosophers, who under the pressure of developing natural-scientific thought are pluralists when examining the question of the reciprocal relation between matter and consciousness, very often take up openly idealistic positions as soon as they pass on to social phenomena. This takes place under the impact of the reactionary bourgeois political ideology which is permeated with anti-communism.
The ideologists of the more liberal and democratic part of the capitalist class in the imperialist countries, towards whom some of the most far-sighted strategists of big state-monopoly capitalism direct themselves, find methodological support in ontological pluralistic philosophical conceptions for the elaboration of pluralistic socio-philosophical theories for counterposing them as an alternative to MarxismLeninism. A further concrete manifestation of these theories is the pluralistic interpretation of modern bourgeois democracy, in an attempt to present it in a new, 43 more humanistic form and as the only possible social structure of society.
In this connection let us also point out the following. Usually one and the same author does not elaborate the three levels of pluralism: the general philosophical (and above all ontological), the socio-philosophical or sociological and the political, although there is an inner logical link between these levels. However this is mainly an eloquent proof of the fact that bourgeois philosophers, sociologists and political scientists are very seldom consistent in their theoretical conceptions, from the most general philosophical problems to the political structure of society.
As to pluralism in gnoseology and especially as to its main form, the theory of the plurality of truths and of the replacement of truth by success and usefulness, the latter theory has the widest application in the social field as an argument used to justify the ideological chaos in present-day bourgeois society.
The main form of pluralism, which is defended by the bourgeois philosophers in connection with social development is the eclectic ' multi-f actor theory'. At its core is the view that the development of society is the result of many factors, which are independent of one another, not subordinated in any way to one another, and are equal: geographical environment, biological laws, technology, economics, politics, culture, ideology, etc.
Let us at once point out that in rejecting the pluralistic `multi-factor' theory, Marxist monism can in no case be reduced to a `single-factor' theory. `Single-factor' theories are only the various caricatures of Marxism, such as 'economic materialism' against which F. Engels fought in his notable work 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy,' or its Russian variant of the single-factor theory--- `economism' against which Lenin had to wage a long struggle.
In this connection we must stress that in the 'many factors' theory there is a grain of truth. Each one of the factors enumerated above does in fact exercise a certain influence upon social development. Historical 44 materialism and Marxist sociology, however, reveal and explain scientifically that the mode of production is the factor which plays the determining role in the development of society. The influence of all other factors over and above all else, depends upon the mode of production. It is only on this scientific basis that we can understand why, for instance, one and the same geographical environment (climate, natural resources, water resources, etc.) has not played the same role in the development of society in the various historical periods.
Marxist sociology, taking into account the influence of all the different factors on the life of society, establishes the important law that in the course of the upward development of human society, the role of people's conscious and purposeful activity and above all the role of the progressive subjective factor, and hence of science, scientific ideas and consciousness, is growing stronger all. the time. Nevertheless, Marxist sociology retains its standpoint of dialecticalmaterialistic monism, because it realizes that the very appearance and development of ideas, before they can exercise a reverse impact on material production and other spheres of life, depends in the final count upon the requirements of the economic basis of society.
Production relations, for their part, depend upon the degree of development of the productive forces and, above all, upon their most mobile and most revolutionary part---the implements of labour, instruments and machinery. When in a given social system the character of the implements of labour gradually changes, there arises the need to replace the already outdated production relations with new production relations, which correspond to the changed productive forces. The progressive strata of society gradually become aware of this necessity in one ideological form or another, and begin to fight for the respective change. In this way social existence determines social consciousness, and the latter---through the operation of the respective subjective factors---exercises a reverse influence on social existence (4, c. 6,7).
45The pluralistic theory of the 'many factors' is to a greater or lesser extent and in one form or another shared by two prominent contemporary representatives of bourgeois philosophical and sociological thought: the British philosopher Karl Popper and the French sociologist Raymond Aron (born in 1905).
The ontological philosophical pluralism of Popper, which we examined in the preceding paragraph, is an entirely new phenomenon in his philosophical development. Here we find ourselves faced with a fundamental feature of the sociological views of Popper, developed as early as the nineteen fifties and expounded in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies (152).
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In this book Popper calls his view that social laws, i.e. the laws of social life, differ radically from the natural laws 'critical dualism'. Popper counterposes this view to the view that there is no difference between the natural laws and the laws of society, which view he refers to as 'naive monism'.
Marxists also maintain that there is a certain qualitative difference between natural laws and social laws. This is expressed mainly in the fact that social laws are laws of social life, in which people take part as conscious beings guided by certain definite goals. However, in their basic character social laws are equal to natural laws, insofar as both the ones and the others are objectively real, manifest themselves regardless of whether people know them or not, and hence exist independent of man's will.
Popper, however, denies the existence of objective laws in social life. As social laws, he proclaims the norms of conduct formulated as juridical laws, moral rules, customs, etc. These social laws, according to him, are not objective, because people create them at their own discretion. As distinct from the natural laws, he calls them normative laws.
The existence of social norms by no means refutes the existence of objective social laws. On the contrary, social norms can be understood only on the basis of a knowledge of social laws. Social norms are a subjective 46 reflection of the requirements of the objective social laws upon the consciousness of society. And since in a class society the economic and social situation of the different classes differs sharply, this finds its expression in the formation among them of different social norms or in a different attitude towards the social norms of the dominating class transformed into juridical laws.
Proceeding from his anti-scientific, subjectivistic assimilation of social laws with normative laws, Popper also develops a second aspect of his 'critical dualism' which deals with the nature of social processes. 'Critical dualism', according to Popper, also manifests itself in the fact that social life is a unity of `facts' and `decisions'. `Facts' are, above all, the manifestations of the 'economic factor' in social life. `Decisions' are manifestations of another factor---the people's 'free choice'. Decisions, for their part, depend upon the normative laws, which we have mentioned above.
In his book 'The Poverty of Antihistoricism', while analyzing the second aspect of Popper's 'critical dualism', the Bulgarian author V. Dobriyanov points out this thought of Popper: 'The economic factor has to be taken into consideration as one of the factors of social life, but it must in no case be overestimated. Marx'shistorical materialism must be respected, but need not be taken too seriously, because in such a case it would lead us to a denial or underestimation of our decisions, regarding the role which man plays in the historical process'. (31, c. 70).
Thus Popper reduces the basic factors in social life to two: `facts', from among which he points out above all the 'economic factor', and `decisions' which, as we have seen, are determined by and depend upon the normative social laws. And, as Popper specifies, 'norms are human creations in the sense that we can blame no one but ourselves for them, neither nature, nor god. It is our duty to perfect them, as much as we can, if we find that they are inacceptable.' (The Open Society and its Enemies', Vol. 1, p. 59; 31, c. 44). According to Popper, therefore, it is not the objective social laws but 'social norms' that lie at the basis of 47 social life. And the social norms themselves, according to him, are not the objective result of the social situation of the classes. They are simply a conscious creation of the people. It turns out that Popper's critical dualism is in fact nothing more than a fig leaf, covering the nakedness of the very old monistic thesis of idealism that ideas rule the world!
Raymond Aron develops his pluralistic views on the factors which bring about the development of society in a direct polemic with the monism of the MarxistLeninist theory of society. He writes: 'The societies referred to as capitalist do not obey either a determinism or a dialectics, in which the contradictions of the economic system are a sufficient cause. A society and an epoch are not a unity which is determined as a whole by one cause or one value. Sociological and historical pluralism is not the acknowledgement of a lack of knowledge, but is an acknowledgement of the structure of the socio-historical world' (88, p. 54, 55). We shall not dwell here on the unfounded and anti-scientific rejection by Aron of determinism and dialectics in the development of capitalist society, because this is not our task. As to sociological pluralism, about which it is the question, Aron tries to define it by opposing it to the view that every social system, i.e. every society, is called forth by one cause, by one factor. Aron speaks here about the system being called forth by only one factor and thus distorts Marxism. As we have seen, Marxism also recognizes the action of many factors, but.graduates them and examines them in a unified system. We repeat, Marxist monism consists not in a rejection of the presence of many factors which influences social development, but in establishing the determinative role of the mode of production, and more particularly of the economic basis---production relations.
Methodologically akin to the theory of the 'many factors' are other pluralistic conceptions in bourgeois ideology---that of social stratification and that of the group structure of society. These are particularly widespread among bourgeois political scientists. Since the 48 pluralistic theories of bourgeois political scientists are entirely based on the conceptions of social stratification and of groups, we shall examine these conceptions in the following chapter.
The multi-factor theory of the structure and development of society in its different variants from a methodological viewpoint recalls that diversity of ontological pluralism which we have named 'structural pluralism'. We can also discover a similar methodological link between the atomistic diversity of general philosophical pluralism and certain pluralistic conceptions in modern bourgeois sociology.
The atomistic pluralistic approach to the problems of sociology is manifested in the works of the French positivist sociologist from the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, Emil Durkheim (1858-- 1917). He thinks that sociology has to investigate 'social facts' to begin with. 'Social facts', according to him, are the social collectives and institutions, and what he has in mind in this connection are their actions, laws, moral norms, collective ideals, etc. Durkheim considers 'social facts' as objectively existing outside the individuals who take part in them or share them.
Durkheim does not reduce a 'social fact' to the individual person, because 'the group feels, thinks and acts differently from what its members would to if they were separated from it' (78, c. 99). On this basis he thinks that collective ideas and other manifestations of consciousness as a social product have a definite coercive force with respect to the individual.
What is valuable in Durkhein is his understanding that social consciousness is not equal to the simple sum total of the consciousnesses of the individual persons, and that the activity of the social group is not equal to the simple sum total of the activities of its members, taken in isolation from the group. However, in detaching the conscious activity of the collectives ('social facts') from the material life of these collectives, Durkheim falls into objective idealism and abstract schematism---he fails to see that the basic and determinative feature of 'social facts' is the sphere __PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4.---0518 49 of material production, and that in this sphere the fundamental feature is production relations. That is why his theory of social facts is unable to explain the change in the social behaviour of individuals and collectives, or, alongside this, to explain social development in general.
The founder of sociometry Jacob Moreno (born 1892) in his sociological theory puts forward a conception akin to atomistic pluralism.
Moreno examines the separate man, the individual, as a 'social atom', considered not in isolation from the social community, but in conjunction with the complex network of psychological ties of an emotional character which connect him with other men in communities represented in the main by small social groups. In the spirit of Bergson's 'elan vital', Moreno considers that `spontaneity', based mainly on an emotional charge, is the main social quality of people, and that the relations which unite people into groups are essentially psychological. It is here that the non-scientific, idealistic and metaphysical nature of Moreno's whole sociological structure manifests itself. His `microsociology' does not help to explain the social structure and the laws of social development.
A number of representatives of personalism and behaviourism also have an `atomistic' approach to social life. As T. Sakharova and I. Kravchenko point out, the personalists deny the class structure of society and consider it as an `aggregate', similar to a physical conglomerate, whose basic cell is the person (73, c. 77). The representatives of 'pluralistic behaviourism' (P. Lazarsfeld, M. Rosenberg, T. Adorno and others) consider the social behaviour of people as a simple sum total of the behaviour of the individual persons (62, c. 153).
In this brief analysis of philosophical and sociological pluralism and its major varieties and forms, we have proceeded from the viewpoint that the setting up of sociology as a separate theoretical science of society is correct. Sociology, in our opinion, differs from historical materialism above all in its object. Historical 50 materialism has as its object the study of society as a sphere of interaction between material and spiritual components; in other words, the question of the mutual relation between social consciousness and social being holds a central place in it. Marxist sociology, on the other hand, in studying society and its unity from both its aspects, material and spiritual, examines mainly its social structure and its corresponding laws of development. In this connection, a fundamental question in sociology concerns the reciprocal relations between basis and superstructure, in each of which there enter both material and spiritual (ideal) components.
If we apply the same methodological approach of delimiting philosophy from sociology to the bourgeois pluralistic conceptions of society, we come to the following conclusion. The multi-factor social theory, in which the material and ideal factors of social development are examined as independent from each other and as equal in one or another degree, is a philosophical pluralistic theory, because it solves the question of the reciprocal relations between social being and social consciousness in a pluralistic spirit. Unlike this, the theory of social stratification and the personalistic theory of society as a 'conglomerate of persons' are pluralistic theories of a sociological character, or on a sociological level.
The heightened pluralistic trends in bourgeois philosophical and sociological thought under statemonopoly capitalism is one of the major manifestations of the deepening crisis in bourgeois ideology. The increased significance of philosophical and sociological pluralism in modern bourgeois social science is a symptom of the weakness of open idealism and to a greater or lesser degree means, although formally and in words, a reatreat from idealism to the standpoint of a `third' line, an intermediate line in philosophy and sociology. At the same time, however, the growth of the pluralistic trend in bourgeois philosophy and sociology is also a manifestation of aggressiveness by contemporary bourgeois ideology, an attempt to defend 51 capitalism with new, more flexible methods under the present-day balance of forces which is unfavourable for imperialism.
__NUMERIC_LVL2__ Chapter II. __ALPHA_LVL2__ PLURALISM IN SOCIAL LIFEIdeology reflects the conditions of the material life of the different classes and strata in society. In the final count, it rests on an economic basis. However, ideology has a relative independence of its own. That is why it has its own inner laws, on the basis of which each new ideological trend can and must be elucidated as a new stage or new step in the development, or as an antithesis of one or another, or of several ideological trends of the preceding periods. The determination of the different ideological trends by the material conditions of life is usually indirect, manifold, broken up by the impact of many factors from the sphere of the superstructure and from inside ideology itself. Any attempt to explain the content of every ideological trend directly and immediately by economic reasons is a vulgarization of the scientific Marxist-Leninist approach.
The new balance between the forces of socialism and the forces of capitalism on a world scale has placed its visible seal on bourgeois ideology. The various bourgeois schools and trends today are openly or covertly, and to an ever greater extent covertly, levelled against Marxism-Leninism and the socialist system. And, secondly, instead of justifying and supporting the `justice' and `eternity' of capitalism, they prefer to present it as having a changed or changing social character, and are even ready to deny the concept of `capitalism'.
Against this general background we can understand why ideological life in modern capitalist society envelops itself in the veil of such diversity, or, following 52 the expression of the majority of bourgeois authors, why there is such a `wealth' of bourgeois ideological trends.
Irrespective of the great diversity in the names of the bourgeois schools, in our times there are two ideologies warring against each other on a world scale. The one is Marxism-Leninism, which is an integrated, unified, and at the same time consistently monistic ideology, in the precise sense of the concep* of `monism'. Its philosophical basis is dialectical materialism. This ideology in capitalist society expresses the interests of the proletariat above all but at the same time the lasting, radical interests of all other working people, too. Under socialism MarxismLeninism expresses the interests of all classes and strata in the new society: workers, cooperative farmers and the intelligentsia, because there are no antagonistic contradictions between them and they are united on the platform of socialism.
Opposed to Marxism there is bourgeois ideology, which, although it represents a variegated picture of heterogenious ideological trends vying with each other, as a whole expresses and defends the interests of the capitalist class. The various bourgeois ideological trends either reflect the interests and aspirations of various strata of the bourgeoisie, or are unsuccessful attempts at solving the question of the basic world view and social problems which are insoluble from bourgeois class positions. Most often they are combinations between the one and the other.
The general picture of ideological life in contemporary capitalist society (on a world scale) cannot be characterised as 'ideological pluralism' for the following main reasons.
Firstly, as regards their content and from the viewpoint of their historical perspectives, the two ideologies are not and cannot be of equal status and value. Marxism-Leninism is a scientific ideology, which illuminates the laws of the development of mankind and serves as a revolutionary methodology for overthrowing capitalism and setting up communism. Bourgeois ideology, which played a progressive role in the 53 struggle against feudalism, on the whole possesses a reactionary character under the present conditions. The individual rational elements in it are subordinated to the anti-scientific goals which the imperialist bourgeoisie sets itself. That is why, from a cognitive, gnoseological viewpoint, the struggle between the two ideologies is not and cannot be `pluralistic', i.e. a struggle with fair competition and compromise. It is a struggle, the objective content and goal of which can only be the complete victory of Marxism-Leninism and the disappearance, the dying out of bourgeois ideology.
Secondly, the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and bourgeois ideology is not `pluralistic' as regards equality of conditions and rights between the competing `partners', as required by the pluralistic conception. There is no such equality either in bourgeois society or under socialism. Bourgeois democracy claims to be bringing about 'equal conditions' for competition between different ideological and political trends. This is in fact the meaning of the 'sacred and inviolable' principles of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association and organization! As we all know, in capitalist society the working class and the other working people enjoy these democratic rights and freedoms only insofar as they have managed to win them in a hard struggle. Nevertheless, however broad the bourgeois democracy thus won may be, it always remains essentially formal and very limited for the working people. However, the pluralistic label tries to disguise this reality and create the illusion that unequal conditions either do not exist, or that, insofar as this inequality is acknowledged, it can be overcome without changing the system.
In socialist society the conditions for the dissemination of the two ideologies are also unequal. However, unlike capitalism, Marxism-Leninism here holds a predominant position. In the socialist society Marxist ideology receives open social and state support, and the restrictions set on the specific arrangements for disseminating the historically doomed bourgeois ideology are also applied openly.
54This is why Marxists reject as scientifically inconsistent and as an ideological and political mystification the name of 'ideological pluralism', given to the struggle which is being waged today between the two ideologies, both under capitalism and on a world scale.
Bourgeois ideology itself, taken as a relatively isolated independent whole, may with a certain justification be called `pluralistic', insofar as it represents a collection of trends claiming to be more or less independent, and which are in a position of reciprocal confrontation with one another in spite of their close kinship---their common social and class basis and unity in the struggle against Marxism-Leninism. In this connection, we should dwell on the causes and character of the ideological diversity reigning in the bourgeois camp.
The main reason for the existence of many schools and trends in bourgeois ideology is the contradictory character of the capitalist system and of the bourgeoisie itself as a ruling class. The profound contradiction between the interests of the handful of exploiters, on the one hand, and the working people headed by the working class on the other, cannot but give rise to f different opinions among the bourgeois ideologists, to different evaluations and to a search for ways and means of achieving a partial removal or at least a screening of this contradiction.
Private ownership over the means of production, profit as the main stimulus for economic activity, and competition, in their turn give rise to contradictions between the interests of the different bourgeois strata' and even between the individual capitalist groups. The cult of private ownership and profit, and the transformation of each profession into `business' introduces elements of competition and strengthens the manifestations of subjectivism and voluntarism in the actions of ideological workers and in their theoretical systems. All this cannot help but influence the appearance of many ideological trends and schools.
An important cause for the increase in the number of competing ideological trends is the fact that neither the bourgeoisie as a whole, nor any stratum of the 55 capitalist class is interested in revealing the actual laws of social development. Thus the class interests of the bourgeoisie hinder its theoreticians from supporting a struggle for objective truth in their social investigations. The class limitations of the bourgeoisie, its interest in the preservation of capitalism and hence in hiding the truth about social life is the insurmountable obstacle which prevents bourgeois ideology from finding a consistent scientific approach to social phenomena. And the failure of each successive ideological trend gives rise to the need to come forward with others which are equally far from the objective truth or from understanding the laws of society.
The socially-based plurality of trends partially warring against one another in bourgeois ideology takes place within the limits of the capacity of theoretical thought to err, to draw wrong inferences and generalizations. Here we come to the gnoseological roots of pluralism in bourgeois ideology.
The gnoseological roots of idealism, about which we have already spoken, are in their nature gnoseological grounds for every flight of man's thought away from reality, i.e. for every theoretical deception. On this basis, we have already indicated those elements which are the gnoseological roots of philosophical pluralism. In this connection let us point out that a possible source of misjudgements is also opened up by the most active and most creative feature of human thought---its capacity to manifest inventiveness, to combine properties and elements of objective reality in the human head. This takes place in a manner which is not a simple repetition of what has been found as objectively existing, but represents a logical inference concerning reality, a necessary or possible combination. On this general foundation, creative thinking can present as something real, necessary or at least possible even such a `relation'between objective things and properties as is neither existent, nor objectively feasible, i.e. which is untrue and impossible (83, c. 135--151).
The above-indicated peculiarity of theoretical thinking renders possible and indeed more or less 56 inevitable the making of mistakes in the course of any investigative activity, including the creation of some hypothetical, abstractly `possible' conceptions to explain a given phenomenon, which are basically false. These false conceptions, which contain a `possible' explanation of events, can exist on an equal footing with those which more or less correctly reflect the studied object, until a complete scientific theory is set up for the given phenomenon.
How do matters stand after a scientific theory has been put forward in a given field, the validity of which has been proved by long, comprehensive practice? Can attempts, already rejected and refuted by science, at the solution of a given problem continue to be supported, and more and more new `variants' for the same purpose be created and counterposed to the scientific solution of the problem? This is not only possible, but is even usual, when the scientific solution to the problem runs counter to the interests of wide social strata, and especially those of the ruling class in a given society.
In order to underline the class attitude towards truth, V.I.Lenin points out that 'if the geometrical axioms affected the interests of people, they would be disputed' (12, c. 17). The attitude of the great majority of bourgeois teachings in our times towards Marxism is reminiscent of Lenin's above statement.
The bourgeois ideologists themselves usually present the existing `pluralistic' chaos in their camp as something positive and desirable, as a manifestation of a creative spirit and blossoming of bourgeois culture. A.Reck, for instance, in the epilogue to a study in which he examines the work of 12 American bourgeois philosophers who made their appearance after the Second World War, writes: 'The views of the new American philosophers are as diverse as the forces and factors in American culture. The pluralism of American philosophy is a most valuable asset, not only because it affords the American thinker the freedom to develop and express his ideas, but also because it endows him with an intellectual flexibility:. . . (153, p. 348). Karl Bosl, who in fact has a critical attitude towards 57 contemporary political pluralism, writes that 'pluralism in world-views and religious convictions, pluralism in economy, politics, science, art, culture. . . is a natural form of manifestation of human existence and activity'. (93, S. 131).
In a number of writings by bourgeois ideologists we also find pessimistic tones in connection with the same phenomenon. Thus, for instance, elsewhere Bosl declares that he does not know whether dynamism and pluralism in our times are the symptoms of crisis and decay, or the initial stage of a new culture and a new social system. (93, S. 65). In fact, both the one and the other are true. The capitalist system today is in a state of crisis and decay, as a result of which bourgeois ideology is also going through a profound crisis. The socialist system and Marxist-Leninist ideology and culture, however, are on the upsurge, despite the difficulties of growing.
However, regardless of whether or not they extol ideological pluralism, bourgeois theoreticians are basically unanimous in their negative attitude towards Marxis m-Lenini sm.
In our time the number of bourgeois ideologists who have set out openly to refute, or else to `correct', `rectify' and `supplement' Marxism is growing constantly. Among those who have particularly specialized in this field are Josef Bochenski, Gustav Wetter, John Plamenats, Sydney Hook, Raymond Aron, Karl Popper, Daniel Bell.ZbignevBrzezinski and many others. In fact, though, their criticism of MarxismLeninism in the best of cases affects isolated, fragmentary situations, whereby they present the criticised theory as a whole in a distorted, untrue form. On the other hand, that little of value which contemporary bourgeois ideologists do try to counterpose to Marxism-Leninism is in fact not only not a contradiction, but on the contrary, it only reaffirms the truth of Marxism-Leninism. Such are the attempts at speculating with some success in astronomy (the theory of the 'expanding universe'), physics (the principles of 58 complementarity and uncertainty), molecular biology, cybernetics, the active role of consciousness, ideas in social development, etc.
Contemporary bourgeois ideology cannot set up against Marxism an integrated, internally incontroversial theory of its own, which gives a scientific explanation of the profound social processes taking place in our time: the scientific and technological revolution and its social consequences, the struggle between the two world social systems, the real trends of development in the three types of countries---socialist, capitalist and newly-liberated, the powerful world movement for peace, democracy and progress. Of course, there have been certain attempts in this direction: W. Rostow's theory of the 'stages of economic growth'; the theory of the 'industrial society' and more particularly its newest variants, including the G.Galbraith's 'industrial state', the futurological conceptions of the 'postindustrial society' of Daniel Bell, Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener; Zbignev Brzezinski's 'technotronic era', or, for instance, Julian Huxely's 'evolutionary humanism'.
So far we have been speaking only about the two main classes in capitalist society and about their ideologies.
In the non-socialist countries there are still other classes and strata, which do not belong either to the capitalist class or to the proletariat. Setting aside the exploiter class of feudal landowners, which still exists and represents a considerable force mainly in the. developing countries, it is a matter here mainly of the working peasantry and the various strata of urban petty and middle bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia.
Various ideological trends have formed through the ages and are now in existence, which strive to be direct champions of the interests and moods of various intermediary strata in society. This can be seen most clearly in the field of political ideologies and movements. The ideological content of similar theoretical conceptions and political movements is either in a 59 reformist spirit---in the direction of a gradual `removal' of the flaws of capitalism, or is of an extremist, radical character, containing a non-- scientific, rebellious refutation of capitalism combined with Utopian ideas for the rapid construction of a new, just social system.
Consistent Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements, irrespective ot the fact that they criticise the non-scientific, reformist or Utopian leftist features m the ideologies of these movements, persistently seek political cooperation with the organizations of the nonproletarian strata of the working people in town and country, in the name of certain closer or more distant positive goals. Marxists enlist the progressive representations of the middle layers as their allies in the joint struggle against the anti-human ideology of imperialism and reaction, without, however, making any compromise over theory. Marxism-Leninism is a science, a scientific ideology. It can develop and grow richer on the basis of new data from science and social practice, but it cannot be `combined' with other ideologies, for instance, for considerations that it would win over to its side the adherents of these ideologies.
Certain authors, however, who consider themselves as Marxists, succumb to bourgeois pressure to transfer the principle of peaceful coexistence even to the ideological field and are inclined on this basis to adopt the bourgeois thesis of ideological or worldview `pluralism'. These include L. Lombardo-Radice. He invites us directly 'to recognize that more worldviews can generalize and express the "objective "aspirations of human society for progress'. He points out Christianity, pacifism, Gandhiism, etc. as such world views (142, S. 258).
Our whole analysis reveals the unscientific character of such a proposition. It is true that in past epochs the progressive aspirations of certain social strata and of whole nations were expressed through unscientific ideologies, very often in a religious form. It is true that even today in certain countries there are progressive social movements of the working people, which are also 60 guided by non-scientific and above all religious ideologies (Christianity, Mohammedanism, etc.). However, Marxists set up their cooperation with these social movements with a view to concrete, truly progressive economic, social, political and cultural tasks, without making any compromise with their nonscientific ideologies.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 2. Struggle between Ideologies and Discussions inThe irreconcilable contradiction of class interests, which gives rise to antagonistic ideologies in capitalist society, excludes the possibility of peaceful coexistence between these ideologies. Thus there are no grounds for the assertions of bourgeois theoreticians that the capitalist system secures conditions for 'ideological pluralism', i.e. for a manifestation on an equal footing and in competition of contradictory ideologies. The well-known neo-Thomist Gustav Wetter, who has specialized in combating Marxism-Leninism, bases his speculations precisely upon these assertions.
The hierarchy of the Catholic Church, including the Jesuit Order to which G. Wetter belongs, was in the past the most forceful opponent of all spiritual freedom and an enemy to any struggle of views in ideology. However, neither the anathemas against those thinking differently nor the physical persecutions and the burnings at the stake of `heretics' like Giordano Bruno has helped the Catholic Church to preserve its monopoly ideological influence on the hearts and minds of the people in the Western European countries.
In the present setup, the working people who are catholic in the West welcome with ever greater understanding and sympathy the peaceful and constructive policy of the USSR and the other socialist states, as well as the efforts of the communist parties to rally together all working people and all democratic, antimonopolist, anti-imperialist and peaceful forces in the name of the defence of peace and democracy, and in 61 favour of social progress. Some leading figures in the Catholic Church and the Christian democratic political parties in the Western European countries become mouthpieces for these feelings among the Catholic masses, and manifest an inclination to cooperate with communists and other democratic and progressive forces in their countries. Some of the most reactionary ideologists of Catholicism, including Gustav Wetter, when taking due account of the progressive feelings of the Catholic masses, seemingly retreat from their former standpoints and declare themselves in favour of a `dialogue' with the communists. However, it is under the banner of pluralism that they strive to turn this forced retreat into a new weapon for an attack on Marxism and communism.
Gustav Wetter at first assumes an attitude of agreement with the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. (174, S. 292). He even declares that he understands the Soviet view that in the ideological field peaceful coexistence is impossible.
With these statements he only prepares himself to attack the realistic proposal put forward by the Marxists: since the contradictions in worldviews can never be solved as long as there are classes, the main dialogue between Marxists and Catholics has to be held not on questions of world views but on the ways of uniting the efforts of the widest social strata for a joint struggle for peace, democracy and social progress. G. Wetter condemns this reasonable line, stigmatizing it as 'worthless pluralism'. (174, S. 300). Instead of this 'worthless pluralism',i.e.instead of joint activity aimed at protecting the interests of the working people, Wetter puts forward another 'dynamic pluralism'. According to him, efforts must be made 'to resolve the contradiction that worries us today, knowing full well that after overcoming it other contradictions will crop up, and also remembering very well that progressive development takes place precisely by way of the constant solution of some contradictions and the cropping up of others'. (174, S. 303).
62The quotation given above sounds almost as if it were Marxist. Marxists no doubt are in favour of looking for the most effective ways 'to resolve the contradiction worrying us today'. They also know very well that after overcoming one contradiction, new contradictions crop up, etc.
However, Marxists are armed with a scientific worldview, and that is why they have a different approach to the various contradictions, depending upon the character of the contradictions and the objective conditions. In the present epoch the solution of the contradiction between private-capitalist ownership and the social character of the productive forces has historically come to a head. It is a contradiction which has already been solved or is in the process of being solved in a considerable part of the globe. And the contradiction between the scientific Marxist worldview and the non-scientific worldviews, (including religious worldviews), is now being solved only in individual countries, where socialism has triumphed. This contradiction will be fully solved after the elimination of the capitalist system on a world scale, in the process of the construction of a communist society. In the name of the struggle for democracy and social progress, the broad people's masses can be rallied together today irrespective of their worldviews. Putting differences in world views into the foreground, as Wetter does, means recommending a policy of disuniting the people's masses and in actual fact helping reaction.
Proceeding from the inevitable existence of contradictions in any development, and from the inevitable clash of opinions as a means of reaching the truth when seeking a way to resolve contradictions, though without having any grounds for this, G. Wetter draws the wrong conclusion that eternal 'ideological pluralism' is inevitable.
Clashes of opinion in the development of sciences, including social science, have nothing in common with the view of 'ideological pluralism'. They are a method for attaining the truth, leading to the solution of the problem and putting an end to the controversy. It is 63 quite another matter that in science there always arise new problems and that clashes of views constitute a constant method of developing it. However, the occurrence of new contradictions does not usually lead to the same division into different opinions, as in the preceding instance. All those participants in the controversy who truly work for the development of science are actively interested in the correct solution of every contradiction in science. That is precisely why clashes of views in science have nothing in common with the bourgeois conception of pluralism, i.e. the achievement of temporary, partial compromises between groups with contradictory interests.
The struggle between different opinions in the course of the development of the social sciences while seeking the best possible ways to solve practical social problems will always go on. However, the ideological struggle, the struggle between proletarian and bourgeois ideology is not `pluralistic', i.e. on an equal footing as regards the conditions in which it is waged, nor will it go on forever. It will gradually die out after the disappearance of the capitalist system on a world scale.
Gustav Wetter, however, falsely and tendentiously describes the ideological struggle under capitalism as `pluralistic', and as a struggle in which the two ideologies---the bourgeois and the proletarian---are placed on an equal footing. At the same time, he puts the ideological struggle interpreted by him as `pluralistic' under the common denominator of a clash of opinions over the resolution of every contradiction. What is more, these `operations' are carried out by G. Wetter with strictly defined diversionist aims: to be able to put forward a claim for 'exactly the same pluralism', i.e. to create a possibility for the widest possible propagation of bourgeois, including religious, ideology under socialism.
Wetter stakes on the fact that bourgeois democracy is in words almost always unlimited. The bourgeoisie tries in every way to disguise the class, exploiting and limited character of its democracy. Bourgeois 64 ideologists usually do not dareto declare openly to the workers that they are deprived of one right or another, or that there are great limitations on their opportunities to take advantage of them. The bourgeoisie, however, does in fact limit them in a thousand ways. In the socialist society the class character of democracy is openly manifested---that power is in the hands of the working people, headed by the working class; that, therefore, democratic rights and freedoms may not be used to the detriment of socialism, or for an activity aimed at the restoration of capitalism.
Gustav Wetter, however, fights for precisely such `freedom' and such a `pluralism': to open the gates of the socialist society to unlimited preaching of any ideological trend. However, for the socialst society this is already a stage which has been passed. In socialist society the struggle of opinions develops mainly on another plane---in favour of the further development of science, the discovery of the most efficient way to overcome difficulties and errors, and solve the new problems that crop up every day. The working people in the socialist society do not wish to go back, they do not wish to have their heads muddled with reactionary, outdated ideas long since refuted by science and the development of society.
In the socialist society the communist party and the government manifest understanding and tolerance for the traditions and beliefs of the various strata of society, including their religious convictions. However, freedom of conscience, including that of religion, is guaranteed without making it possible to speculate for political ends with the religious beliefs of part of the population.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 3. The Two Aspects of Socio-Political PluralismThe conception of pluralism in social life has been elaborated by some of the more liberal bourgeois sociologists and political scientists. Firstly it embraces the views that the social structure of capitalist society __PRINTERS_P_65_COMMENT__ 5.---0518 65 is pluralistic. For the sake of brevity we shall designate this aspect by the term which is often applied by both Marxists and bourgeois theoreticians---'social pluralism'. The second aspect affects the political sphere directly and is a specific form for explaining bourgeois democracy. Together with some of its supporters and critics, we shall refer to this aspect of the conception of pluralism in social life as 'political pluralism'.
The political structure is an inseparable and important part of the super structure of society. That is why the social and political aspects of pluralism are indissolubly connected with and to a great extent dependent upon each other. In examining them as a unity, we shall speak about 'pluralism in social life', and about socio-political pluralism', or shall merely use the term `pluralism'. Political pluralism is also called 'pluralistic democracy', which term we also propose to use.
The American sociologists William Kornhauser and Robert Dahl are well-known contemporary theoreticians of socio-political pluralism. According to Charles Perrow, a competent bourgeois critic of pluralism, Kornhauser's work 'The Politics of Mass Society' (134) is the best statement of the sociological theory of political pluralism (148, p. 411--412). Robert Dahl's work 'Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent' (99), for its part, is a circumstantial and competent exposition mainly dealing with the problems of political pluralism, as is indicated by its title.
On the European continent, among the modern theoreticians of social and political pluralism, in addition to Raymond Aron and Karl Popper about whom we have already spoken, a prominent place is occupied by the Austrian sociologist Norbert Leser. As W. Truger points out (167, S. 2), he strives to present pluralism as an alternative to Marxism. One of the most typical representatives of militant anticommunism in the early seventies, Zbignev Brzezinski, also champions pluralistic conceptions, especially in his latest works (95). The pluralistic treatment of modern 66 capitalist society is strongly defended in Peter Drucker's book 'The Age of Discontinuity' (105).
A considerable number of the more voluminous works published in the West in the last decade, which are especially devoted to pluralism, are written mainly in a critical spirit. This is especially so as regards the criticism of pluralism from non-Marxist standpoints even by defenders of state-monopoly capitalism. We have in mind particularly the following books: 'Pluralismus und pluralistische Gesellschaft. Bauprinzip, Zerfallerscheinung, Mode,' by Karl Bosl, published in the Federal German Republic and in Austria in 1967 (93); 'The Decline of American Pluralism,' by Henry S. Kariel, published in the USA in 1961, republished in 1967 (129); the collection ' Laissezfaire Pluralismus', edited by Goets Briefs, the author of the main work in the collection---'Staat and Wirtschaft im Zeitalter der Interessenverbande,' published in West Berlin in 1966 (94).
Charles Perrow's paper 'The Sociological Perspective and Political Pluralism,' read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in 1964 (148) is also written in a similar critical mood,